Virtual power plant income distribution method with flexible resources considering external contribution

Abstract

The invention provides a virtual power plant income distribution method considering external contribution by flexible resources, which comprises the following steps of: dividing members into flexible resources and non-flexible resources on a framework by considering contribution mechanism difference of the members participating in operation cooperation of a virtual power plant, constructing a virtual power plant double-layer operation optimization model convenient for calculation and compensation of flexible resource external contribution; adopting an alternating direction multiplier method to realize distributed implementation of a profit distribution process, and representing a coexistence state of multiple benefit subjects in the virtual power plant; a VCG mechanism is introduced to define the external contribution of the flexible resources in an operation optimization result, the actual contribution of the members is defined, and a profit compensation method of the non-flexible resource members to the flexible resource alliance is constructed; an asymmetric Nash bargaining game is introduced, and flexible resource alliance income is allocated to each flexible resource member.

Description

Technical Field

[0001] The present invention relates to the field of multi-agent cooperative profit distribution, and in particular to a virtual power plant profit distribution method and system that takes externality contributions of flexible resources into consideration. Background Art

[0002] In the context of the construction of a new power system with new energy as the main body, the distribution network side is faced with the access of massive distributed resources (distributed resources), including renewable energy, energy storage and controllable loads. Virtual power plants (Virtual Power Plants, virtual power plants) can bring together distributed resources with different characteristics and participate in power grid operations and market transactions, which can effectively overcome the problems of small capacity and strong random volatility of single distributed resources. In the context of cooperative participation in the power market, each distributed resource comes from different stakeholders, and all have the need to protect policy privacy and maximize their own interests. Therefore, how to achieve fair and reasonable distribution of benefits is the core problem that needs to be solved for virtual power plants to aggregate various members to cooperate and coordinate with each other.

[0003] However, unlike non-flexible resources such as wind power and photovoltaic power, flexibility contribution has positive externalities. A considerable part of its contribution in operation optimization cannot be obtained because the subject of its role is not easy to clearly define. Pure virtual power plant operation optimization cannot effectively represent this externality, resulting in low benefits for flexible resources participating in virtual power plant operation.

[0004] At present, most of the research on the internal revenue balance and distribution mechanism of virtual power plants proposed to solve this problem is based on cooperative game methods, including bargaining game method, Shapley value method, nucleolus method, etc. It has the limitation of "one size fits all" in describing the individual characteristics of participants: in the process of revenue distribution, all members have the same distribution weight, and the distribution result depends only on the total revenue generated by the cooperation and the marginal contribution of each member to the cooperation, without considering any other characteristics of the members. In addition, the same set of measurement standards are adopted for all members within the virtual power plant, ignoring that the utility function and physical constraints of flexible resources are different from those of non-flexible resources [Energy storage participation in the power market mechanism: current situation and prospects]. In general, flexible resources have the ability to achieve energy spatiotemporal decoupling that non-flexible resources do not have, and contribute by shifting energy in time. The contribution mechanism is fundamentally different from that of non-flexible resources, and it is this difference that leads to the external contribution of flexible resources. The revenue distribution method based on cooperative games cannot describe the difference in contribution mechanism, so it may even blur the actual contribution of non-flexible resources and flexible resources. Therefore, how to reasonably define the externality contribution of flexibility resources in the overall benefits of virtual power plants and how to reasonably distribute the benefits is still a topic that needs further exploration and development.

[0005] By searching the prior art, the construction method of the income distribution model and the income distribution method of the virtual power plant (CN117764464A) correct the deviation income according to the conditional risk value theory, and construct the income distribution model according to the predetermined income and the corrected deviation income function. However, this invention does not take the externality contribution of flexible resources into consideration in the income distribution, and does not consider the reasonable distribution of income between two types of non-homogeneous entities, flexible resources and non-flexible resources. Therefore, the performance of the method proposed in this invention needs to be further improved. Summary of the invention

[0006] In order to overcome the shortcomings of the prior art, the present invention proposes a profit distribution method through two-layer operation optimization-external contribution definition and profit compensation-cooperative game.

[0007] The present invention is achieved by at least one of the following technical solutions.

[0008] A virtual power plant revenue allocation method considering externality contribution of flexibility resources includes the following steps:

[0009] (1) Two-layer operation optimization: Distributed resource members use a two-layer optimization approach to achieve local decision management and collaborative optimization under the optimization rules.

[0010] (2) Definition of externality contribution and compensation of benefits: After the optimization phase, the optimization results will give the initial benefits of each non-flexible resource member and the flexible resource alliance. At this time, the externality contribution of the flexible resource is defined, and corresponding fees are charged to the non-flexible resource members to obtain the final benefits of the non-flexible resource members, thus ending the benefit distribution process of the non-flexible resource members.

[0011] (3) Cooperative game: After the profit compensation is completed, the negotiation ability of the members in the profit distribution is measured according to the indicators of each flexibility resource member's overall contribution to the flexibility resource alliance and the virtual power plant, and the asymmetric Nash bargaining game is used to distribute the flexibility resource alliance's profits to each flexibility resource member to complete the entire profit distribution process.

[0012] Furthermore, step (1) adopts a two-layer operation optimization model to achieve two-layer operation optimization, which specifically includes:

[0013] The upper-level optimization aims to maximize the total revenue of each non-flexible resource member within the virtual power plant, and optimizes the strategies of each non-flexible resource and flexible resource member; the lower-level optimization aims to minimize the total operating cost of the flexible resource alliance, and allocates the operating tasks of each flexible resource based on the overall flexible resource strategy obtained from the upper-level optimization as a constraint condition;

[0014] The goal of the upper-level problem of virtual power plant operation optimization is to maximize the total benefits of each non-flexible resource within the virtual power plant. nf , is the inflexible resource output vector, whose components is the time-phased output of non-flexible resource member i; is the flexibility resource output vector, whose components is the output of flexible resource member j in different time periods; the income of the i-th non-flexible resource member in time period t is express, yes The function is expressed as:

[0015]

[0016] Where T is the optimization period, N is the set of non-flexible resource members in the virtual power plant, and M is the set of flexible resource members in the virtual power plant. In the upper-level optimization, flexible resources are only optimized with non-flexible resource members, and their benefits are not included. is the expected external characteristic of the virtual power plant, which is given by the upper power grid; Formula (2) ensures that the overall behavior of the virtual power plant complies with the dispatching instructions of the upper power grid;

[0017] The goal of the lower-level optimization of the virtual power plant is to make the total operating cost of each flexible resource under the total output limit of the flexible resources given by the upper-level optimization The lowest cost is the operating cost of the jth flexible resource member in period t. express, Flexible resource output decision The function is expressed as:

[0018]

[0019] in The total output constraint of the flexibility resources given for upper-level optimization is:

[0020]

[0021] Furthermore, the distributed solution method of the two-layer operation optimization model specifically includes:

[0022] Based on the alternating direction multiplier method, the centralized two-level optimization is decomposed into distributed optimization problems:

[0023] First, we construct the augmented Lagrangian function L1 of the upper optimization problem (1) to (2):

[0024]

[0025] Where λ is a parameter, μ is the iteration step, λ(t) is the Lagrangian operator vector, μ(t) is the iteration step vector, is a zero function; through the construction of augmented Lagrangian function, the upper optimization is decomposed into the following optimization sub-problems:

[0026] Inflexible resource sub-problem:

[0027]

[0028] Where L nf,i (P nf,i ) is the optimization sub-problem of the demand solution of inflexible resource members;

[0029] Flexibility resource sub-problem in upper-level optimization:

[0030]

[0031] Where L u fr,j (P fr,j ) is the optimization sub-problem of the flexible resource member demand solution in the upper-level optimization;

[0032] Construct the augmented Lagrangian function L2 of the lower optimization problem (3)~(4):

[0033]

[0034] This leads to the flexibility resource sub-problem in the lower-level optimization:

[0035]

[0036] Where L d fr,j (P fr,j ) is the optimization sub-problem of the flexible resource member demand solution in the lower-level optimization.

[0037] Furthermore, the solution of the distributed optimization problem includes the following steps:

[0038] ① Initialization: set the number of iterations r = 0, the Lagrangian operator vector λ(t) = λ0(t), select the iteration step vector μ(t), and set the output of all members to 0, λ0(t) is the initial Lagrangian operator vector;

[0039] ② Determine local constraints: Each member sets the constraints of its local optimization sub-problem according to its output forecast data and load information, including the upper and lower output constraints determined by the status of each member itself, the capacity constraints of flexible resource members, etc.;

[0040] ③Set convergence conditions:

[0041]

[0042] in is the output result of non-flexible resources after the rth iteration, is the output result of the flexible resources after the rth iteration, σ1 and σ2 are both set parameters;

[0043] The conditions mentioned in formula (11) are the convergence conditions of power shortage and decision variable change rate. When both satisfy the set parameters σ1 and σ2, the iteration is considered to converge;

[0044] ④ All members communicate with other members in the system, receive the output strategies of other members, and update their own strategies according to the local optimization sub-problem, that is:

[0045]

[0046] ⑤ After all members are updated, check the change rate of the decision variables and the power shortage of each member. If there is a situation where the set convergence conditions are not met, go to step ④ and update the Lagrangian operator according to the following rules:

[0047]

[0048] Where λ(t)r is the Lagrangian operator adopted in the rth iteration.

[0049] Otherwise, stop updating the strategy and output the final strategy of each member;

[0050] After the upper-level optimization is completed, all non-flexible resource members output their optimization results as the final results, and all flexible resource members enter the lower-level optimization;

[0051] The iterative solution process of the lower-level optimization is similar to that of the upper-level optimization. Each flexible resource member updates its output strategy alternately, which will not be repeated here.

[0052] Furthermore, the externality contribution positioning method specifically includes:

[0053] After the operation optimization phase, the overall benefits of the virtual power plant will be expressed by equations (14) to (16):

[0054]

[0055] F fr =F fr,tr -C fr (15)

[0056]

[0057] Where N is the set of non-flexible resource members in the virtual power plant, F VPP is the total revenue of the virtual power plant, is the electricity price traded between the virtual power plant members and the grid. is the p2p transaction electricity price between members; F fr is the initial benefit of the flexible resource, and the net benefit of the flexible resource electricity interaction F fr,tr Minus the cost of running flexible resources C fr Get, F fr,tr It is calculated by the profit of flexible resources trading with the power grid and the cost of P2P transactions with non-flexible resources. That is, the overall profit of the virtual power plant is the initial profit of the non-flexible resources. F fr,tr with -C fr The sum of three non-repeating parts; F nf,i is the initial benefit of non-flexible resource member i when all members participate in the operation optimization; T is the optimization period, N is the set of non-flexible resource members in the virtual power plant;

[0058] The marginal benefit brought to non-flexible resource member i by the flexible resource alliance participating in the virtual power plant aggregation is defined as M i , which is equal to the change in the initial income of non-flexible resource member i before and after the flexible resource alliance participates in the virtual power plant optimization:

[0059]

[0060] In the formula, F nf,i is the initial benefit of non-flexible resource member i when all members participate in the optimization operation, is the initial benefit of non-flexible resource member i when only flexible resources are removed from the virtual power plant aggregation.

[0061] Furthermore, the definition of externality contribution and compensation of benefits include:

[0062] 2) Definition of externality contribution:

[0063] Through the Vickrey-Clark-Groves (VCG) mechanism, the Flexibility Resource Alliance i The contribution of the flexible resource alliance will be defined as: the total change in marginal benefits brought by the flexible resource alliance to all other non-flexible resource members before and after the non-flexible resource member i participates in the use of the flexible resource alliance, and the fee paid by each non-flexible resource member Should be:

[0064]

[0065] Where M k That is, the marginal benefit brought to the non-flexible resource member k by the flexible resource alliance participating in the virtual power plant aggregation, represents the marginal benefit that non-flexible resource member k obtains from the flexible resource participation in the virtual power plant aggregation when non-flexible resource member i does not use the flexible resource alliance; N is the set of non-flexible resource members in the virtual power plant;

[0066] The definition of non-flexible resource member i not using the flexible resource alliance is: only fix the strategy of i to the strategy when the flexible resource alliance does not participate in the aggregation. At this time, it is considered that the decision of non-flexible resource i has no impact on the decision of flexible resource.

[0067]

[0068] in is the initial benefit of inflexible resource member k when inflexible resource i does not use flexible resources, is the initial benefit of non-flexible resource member k when only flexible resources are removed from the virtual power plant aggregation.

[0069] Furthermore, the compensation method for the external contribution specifically includes:

[0070] After the non-flexible resources compensate the flexibility resource externality contribution defined in claim 6 to the flexibility resource alliance, the non-flexible resource members’ income is the final income W of their participation in the virtual power plant aggregation. nf,i :

[0071]

[0072] The total payment F received by all flexibility resource members VCG for:

[0073]

[0074] Furthermore, the calculation method of the flexibility resource alliance benefits specifically includes:

[0075] The compensation income obtained by the flexible resource alliance is F VCG The net benefit of flexible resource electricity interaction in operation optimization fr,tr The sum is defined as the flexibility resource alliance to be distributed F fr,al :

[0076]

[0077] W fr =F fr,d -C fr (twenty three)

[0078] That is, the overall benefit of the virtual power plant is also the final benefit of the non-flexible resources. The ultimate benefit of the alliance with flexible resources is W fr The sum of fr is the initial benefit of the flexible resource, and the net benefit of the flexible resource electricity interaction F fr,tr Minus the cost of running flexible resources C fr Get; F VPP is the total revenue of the virtual power plant;

[0079] It has been determined by the optimization results and the income compensation, so that each flexible resource member bears its own operating costs, and only F remains in the overall income of the virtual power plant. fr,al It needs to be distributed, and after allocating it to each flexibility resource member using the symmetric Nash bargaining game method, the profit distribution process is completed.

[0080] Furthermore, the negotiation power index includes: negotiation weight, which measures the negotiation power of each subject by taking the marginal contribution of each member to the virtual power plant revenue and the marginal contribution to the flexibility resource alliance revenue as negotiation power index, where:

[0081] (1) Contribution of the flexibility resource alliance to total revenue

[0082] The marginal contribution to the total revenue of the alliance can directly reflect the contribution of each member of the alliance. The definition formula is as follows:

[0083]

[0084] in F is the alliance benefit contribution of flexible resource member j; fr,al The income to be distributed by the Flexibility Resource Alliance; is the benefit of the alliance when flexibility resource member j does not participate in virtual power plant aggregation;

[0085] (2) Virtual power plant revenue contribution

[0086] When distributing revenue, it is necessary to take into account both the marginal contribution to the total revenue of the flexibility resource alliance and the contribution to the overall revenue of the virtual power plant, which is defined as follows:

[0087]

[0088] in is the virtual power plant revenue contribution of flexibility resource member j; is the overall benefit of the virtual power plant when flexibility resource member j does not participate in the virtual power plant aggregation;

[0089] The bargaining power of each member α j Score by their negotiation ability I j Decision, I j It is the weighted sum of its flexibility resource alliance total revenue contribution and virtual power plant revenue contribution. The weight values ​​of various negotiation power indicators need to be negotiated and determined before all flexibility resource members participate in the virtual power plant aggregation, and their values ​​can be readjusted as the composition of flexibility resource members changes.

[0090]

[0091] Among them, γ1 and γ2 are the weight values ​​of the corresponding negotiation power indicators, which need to be determined through negotiation or other methods before the formation of the flexibility resource alliance, and M is the set of flexibility resource members in the virtual power plant.

[0092] Furthermore, the income distribution is completed according to the Nash bargaining game:

[0093] The negotiation breakdown point is defined as the operating cost of each entity in the flexibility resource alliance:

[0094] d es =C es (28)

[0095] d cl =C cl (29)

[0096] where d es Negotiating breaking point for energy storage members, d cl Negotiate break points for controllable load members; C es is the energy storage operation cost, C cl The operating cost of the controllable load; if the negotiation income cannot cover the operating cost, the member will not choose to participate in the aggregation;

[0097] After the bargaining power of each member is determined, the benefits that each member should receive in the distribution are determined by the following rules:

[0098]

[0099]

[0100] Where W fr,j is the game benefit of flexibility resource member j, d j is the negotiation breakdown point, M is the set of flexible resource members in the virtual power plant, α j For each member’s bargaining power, F fr,al It is the income to be distributed by the Flexibility Resource Alliance.

[0101] Compared with the prior art, the present invention has the following beneficial effects:

[0102] (1) A two-layer operation optimization model is proposed to decouple the objective function of flexible resources from the output decision of non-flexible resources from the optimization method. Compared with the commonly used single-layer optimization, the two-layer optimization has less impact on the overall revenue of the virtual power plant, and the flow of member contributions is clearer, making it easier to define the externality contribution of flexible resources.

[0103] (2) Compared with traditional centralized optimization, the distributed solution method of the operation optimization model can ensure the distributed completion of operation optimization and benefit distribution, which corresponds to the composition structure of multiple stakeholders of the virtual power plant.

[0104] (3) The proposed two-layer optimization model-income compensation method can reflect the difference in contribution mechanism between inflexible resource members and flexible resource members in the compensation process and the flow of benefits, and can reflect the time dimension contribution of flexible resource members, and ensure that the marginal benefits brought by the participation of flexible resources in aggregation into inflexible resources are distributed between flexible resources and inflexible resources in a Pareto optimal manner.

[0105] (4) The asymmetric Nash bargaining game method can give a more reasonable distribution result for the problem of allocating benefits among members of the flexibility resource, thus making the entire distribution process fair and reasonable. BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS

[0106] In order to more clearly illustrate the technical solutions in the embodiments of the present invention, the drawings required for describing the embodiments are briefly introduced below. Obviously, the drawings described below are only some embodiments of the present invention. For ordinary persons in the art, other drawings can be obtained based on these drawings without creative work, among which:

[0107] Figure 1 A diagram of the architecture of a virtual power plant revenue allocation method considering the externality contribution of flexibility resources provided in an embodiment of the present invention;

[0108] Figure 2 An information-physical architecture diagram of a virtual power plant system provided by an embodiment of the present invention;

[0109] Figure 3 A flowchart for distributed solution of virtual power plant operation optimization problem provided by an embodiment of the present invention. DETAILED DESCRIPTION

[0110] The present invention proposes a virtual power plant revenue distribution method taking into account the externality contribution of flexibility resources, which is used to solve the problem of fair and reasonable distribution of revenues among various market players within the virtual power plant in the context of cooperative participation in the electricity market.

[0111] In order to enable those skilled in the art to better understand the scheme of the present invention, the present invention will be further described in detail below in conjunction with the accompanying drawings and specific implementation methods. Obviously, the described embodiments are only part of the embodiments of the present invention, rather than all of the embodiments. Based on the embodiments of the present invention, all other embodiments obtained by ordinary technicians in this field without making creative work are within the scope of protection of the present invention.

[0112] The present invention proposes a revenue distribution method through two-layer operation optimization-external contribution definition and revenue compensation-cooperative game, and combines the revenue distribution mechanism to propose a new two-layer operation optimization model of virtual power plant. From the perspective of virtual power plant operation optimization, the present invention divides members into flexible resources and non-flexible resources in terms of architecture according to the difference in contribution mechanism of members in participating in the virtual power plant operation cooperation. The alternating direction cross multiplier method is used to complete the model solution, and the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) mechanism is used to define the external contribution of flexible resources in the operation optimization results. The contribution definition process fully reflects the difference in contribution mechanism between flexible resources and non-flexible resources, and clarifies the actual contribution of members. Based on this, a revenue compensation method for non-flexible resource members to the flexibility resource alliance is designed to realize the internalization of the external contribution of flexibility resources while improving the overall revenue status of flexibility resources. Asymmetric Nash bargaining game is introduced, and the bargaining power of each member is determined based on the total revenue contribution of the flexibility resource alliance and the revenue contribution of the virtual power plant, and the revenue of the flexibility resource alliance is distributed to each member. The above three are based on double-layer operation optimization, and the optimization results provide a basis for revenue distribution; the flexibility resource alliance revenue compensation is the core, which realizes the definition of the externality contribution of flexibility resources and the reasonable distribution of revenue between flexibility resources and non-flexibility resources; the flexibility resource revenue distribution based on asymmetric Nash bargaining game is used as a supplement to complete the complete revenue distribution process. The three complement each other and constitute the virtual power plant revenue distribution method of the present invention.

[0113] Embodiment 1

[0114] like Figure 1 , Figure 2 , Figure 3 As shown, the purpose of this embodiment is to provide a flow of the revenue compensation process in the virtual power plant revenue distribution method considering the external contribution of flexibility resources, which specifically includes:

[0115] Step 1: Two-layer operation optimization: Distributed resource members use two-layer optimization to achieve local decision management and collaborative optimization under the optimization rules.

[0116] The two-layer optimization method includes:

[0117] The upper-level optimization aims to maximize the total revenue of each non-flexible resource member within the virtual power plant, and optimizes the strategies of each non-flexible resource and flexible resource member; the lower-level optimization aims to minimize the total operating cost of the flexible resource alliance, and allocates the operating tasks of each flexible resource based on the overall flexible resource strategy obtained from the upper-level optimization as a constraint condition;

[0118] The goal of the upper-level problem of virtual power plant operation optimization is to maximize the total benefits of each non-flexible resource within the virtual power plant. nf, is the inflexible resource output vector, whose components is the time-phased output of non-flexible resource member i; is the flexibility resource output vector, whose components is the output of flexible resource member j in different time periods. The income of the i-th non-flexible resource member in time period t is expressed as express, yes The function is expressed as:

[0119]

[0120] Where T is the optimization period, N is the set of non-flexible resource members in the virtual power plant, and M is the set of flexible resource members in the virtual power plant. In the upper-level optimization, flexible resources are only optimized with non-flexible resource members, and their benefits are not included. is the expected external characteristic of the virtual power plant, which is given by the upper power grid; Formula (2) ensures that the overall behavior of the virtual power plant complies with the dispatching instructions of the upper power grid;

[0121] The goal of the lower-level optimization of the virtual power plant is to make the total operating cost of each flexible resource under the total output limit of the flexible resources given by the upper-level optimization The lowest cost is the operating cost of the jth flexible resource member in period t. express, Flexible resource output decision The function is expressed as:

[0122]

[0123]

[0124] in The total output constraint of the flexibility resources given for upper-level optimization is:

[0125]

[0126] The distributed solution method of the two-layer operation optimization model specifically includes:

[0127] Based on the alternating direction multiplier method, the centralized two-level optimization is decomposed into distributed optimization problems:

[0128] First, we construct the augmented Lagrangian function L1 of the upper optimization problem (1) to (2):

[0129]

[0130] Where λ is a parameter, μ is the iteration step, λ(t) is the Lagrangian operator vector, and μ(t) is the iteration step vector. is a zero function. Through the construction of augmented Lagrangian function, the upper level optimization is decomposed into the following optimization sub-problems:

[0131] Inflexible resource sub-problem:

[0132]

[0133] Where L nf,i (P nf,i ) is the optimization sub-problem of the demand solution for inflexible resource members.

[0134] Flexibility resource sub-problem in upper-level optimization:

[0135]

[0136] Where L u fr,j (P fr,j ) is the optimization sub-problem of the flexible resource member demand solution in the upper-level optimization

[0137] Then, the augmented Lagrangian function L2 of the lower optimization problem (3) to (4) is constructed:

[0138]

[0139] This leads to the flexibility resource sub-problem in the lower-level optimization:

[0140]

[0141] Where L d fr,j (P fr,j ) is the optimization sub-problem of the flexible resource member demand solution in the lower-level optimization

[0142] Step 2, externality contribution definition and income compensation: After the optimization phase, the optimization results will give the initial income of each non-flexible resource member and the flexible resource alliance. At this time, the externality contribution of the flexible resource is defined according to the income compensation method, and the corresponding fees are charged to the non-flexible resource members to obtain the final income of the non-flexible resource members, thus ending the income distribution process for the non-flexible resource members. In the income compensation process, the flexible resources are regarded as an alliance and receive income compensation as a whole. The initial income and compensation income of the flexible resource alliance together form the income of the flexible resource alliance.

[0143] The revenue compensation method is to fix the operation strategy of each non-flexible resource member to the strategy when the flexible resource does not participate in the aggregation, and optimize it again with the optimization rule of Step 1;

[0144] Step 3: Define the externality contribution of flexibility resources according to the income compensation method:

[0145] According to the definition of M, the marginal benefit brought by the flexible resource alliance to the non-flexible resource i after participating in the virtual power plant aggregation i , which is equal to the change in the initial income of non-flexible resource i before and after the flexible resource alliance participates in the virtual power plant optimization:

[0146]

[0147] In the formula, F nf,i is the initial benefit of non-flexible resource member i when all members participate in the optimization operation. is the initial benefit of non-flexible resource i when other conditions remain unchanged and only the flexible resources are removed from the virtual power plant aggregation.

[0148] Flexibility Resource Alliance i The contribution of will be defined as: the total change in marginal benefits brought by the flexible resource alliance to all other non-flexible resource members before and after the non-flexible resource member i participates in the use of the flexible resource alliance. According to the above definition, the fee paid by each non-flexible resource member Should be:

[0149]

[0150] In the formula, It represents the marginal benefit that non-flexible resource member k obtains from the flexible resource participation in the virtual power plant aggregation when non-flexible resource member i does not use the flexible resource alliance.

[0151] The definition of non-flexible resource i not using the flexible resource alliance is: other conditions remain unchanged, only the strategy of i is fixed to the strategy when the flexible resource alliance does not participate in the aggregation. At this time, it can be regarded that the decision of non-flexible resource i has no impact on the decision of flexible resource. The calculation method is as follows:

[0152]

[0153] in is the initial revenue of non-flexible resource k when non-flexible resource i does not use flexible resources. The present invention assumes that the virtual power plant brings together a large number of non-flexible resource members, so when any non-flexible resource member does not use the flexible resource alliance, the operation optimization problem still has a feasible solution.

[0154] In contrast, non-flexible resource members have i The contribution is:

[0155]

[0156] Step 4: Charge corresponding fees to non-flexible resource members, obtain the final income of non-flexible resource members and the income of flexible resource alliance, and end the income distribution process of non-flexible resource members and the income compensation process of flexible resources:

[0157] The income of non-flexible resource members after compensation is the final income W of participating in the virtual power plant aggregation. nf,i :

[0158]

[0159] The total payment received by the Flexibility Resources Alliance under this compensation method is:

[0160]

[0161] Embodiment 2

[0162] The purpose of this embodiment is to provide a distributed solution process for a virtual power plant revenue allocation method that considers the externality contribution of flexible resources. Taking the upper layer optimization as an example, it includes the following steps:

[0163] ① Initialization: set the number of iterations r = 0, the Lagrangian operator vector λ(t) = λ0(t), select the iteration step vector μ(t), and set the output of all members to 0;

[0164] ② Determine local constraints: Each member sets the constraints of its local optimization sub-problem according to its output forecast data and load information, including the upper and lower output constraints determined by the status of each member itself, the capacity constraints of flexible resource members, etc.;

[0165] ③Set convergence conditions:

[0166]

[0167] in is the output result of non-flexible resources after the rth iteration, It is the output result of flexible resources after the rth iteration.

[0168] The conditions mentioned in formula (11) are the convergence conditions of power shortage and decision variable change rate. When both satisfy the set parameters σ1 and σ2, the iteration is considered to converge;

[0169] ④ All members communicate with other members in the system, receive the output strategies of other members, and update their own strategies according to the local optimization sub-problem, that is:

[0170]

[0171] ⑤ After all members are updated, check the change rate of the decision variables and the power shortage of each member. If there is a situation where the set convergence conditions are not met, go to step ④ and update the Lagrangian operator according to the following rules:

[0172]

[0173] Where λ(t) r is the Lagrangian operator adopted in the rth iteration.

[0174] Otherwise, stop updating the strategy and output the final strategy of each member;

[0175] After the upper-level optimization is completed, all non-flexible resource members output their optimization results as the final results, and all flexible resource members enter the lower-level optimization;

[0176] The iterative solution process of the lower-level optimization is similar to that of the upper-level optimization. Each flexible resource member updates its output strategy alternately, which will not be repeated here.

[0177] Embodiment 3

[0178] The purpose of this embodiment is to provide a method for allocating revenue within a flexibility resource alliance in a virtual power plant revenue allocation method that takes into account the externality contribution of flexibility resources:

[0179] The definition of externality contribution and the method of benefit compensation include:

[0180] 1) Positioning of externality contribution:

[0181] After the operation optimization phase, the overall benefits of the virtual power plant will be expressed by equations (14) to (16):

[0182]

[0183] F fr =F fr,tr -C fr (15)

[0184]

[0185] Where N is the set of non-flexible resource members in the virtual power plant, F VPP is the total revenue of the virtual power plant, is the electricity price traded between the virtual power plant members and the grid. is the p2p transaction electricity price between members; F fr is the initial benefit of the flexible resource, and the net benefit of the flexible resource electricity interaction F fr,tr Minus the cost of running flexible resources C fr Get, F fr,trIt is calculated by the profit of flexible resources trading with the power grid and the cost of P2P transactions with non-flexible resources. That is, the overall profit of the virtual power plant is the initial profit of the non-flexible resources. F fr,tr with -C fr The sum of three non-repeating parts; F nf,i is the initial benefit of non-flexible resource member i when all members participate in the optimization operation.

[0186] The marginal benefit brought to non-flexible resource member i by the flexible resource alliance participating in the virtual power plant aggregation is defined as M i , which is equal to the change in the initial income of non-flexible resource member i before and after the flexible resource alliance participates in the virtual power plant optimization:

[0187]

[0188] In the formula, F nf,i is the initial benefit of non-flexible resource member i when all members participate in the optimization operation, is the initial benefit of non-flexible resource member i when only the flexible resources are removed from the virtual power plant aggregation;

[0189] M i Yes F nf,i This special part of the benefits can only be generated when the flexibility resource alliance participates in the aggregation. From the previous analysis, we can see that due to the existence of external contributions, M i There is a part that belongs to the flexibility resource alliance contribution, and the externality contribution is all in M i middle.

[0190] 2) Definition of externality contribution:

[0191] Through the Vickrey-Clark-Groves (VCG) mechanism, the Flexibility Resource Alliance i The contribution of the flexible resource alliance will be defined as: the total change in marginal benefits brought by the flexible resource alliance to all other non-flexible resource members before and after the non-flexible resource member i participates in the use of the flexible resource alliance, and the fee paid by each non-flexible resource member Should be:

[0192]

[0193] Where M k That is, the marginal benefit brought to the non-flexible resource member k by the flexible resource alliance participating in the virtual power plant aggregation, represents the marginal benefit that non-flexible resource member k obtains from the flexible resource participation in virtual power plant aggregation when non-flexible resource member i does not use the flexible resource alliance;

[0194] The definition of non-flexible resource member i not using the flexible resource alliance is: only fix the strategy of i to the strategy when the flexible resource alliance does not participate in the aggregation. At this time, it is considered that the decision of non-flexible resource i has no impact on the decision of flexible resource.

[0195]

[0196] in is the initial benefit of inflexible resource member k when inflexible resource i does not use flexible resources, is the initial benefit of non-flexible resource member k when only flexible resources are removed from the virtual power plant aggregation.

[0197] 3) Compensation for externality contributions:

[0198] After the non-flexible resources compensate the flexibility resource externality contribution defined in 2) to the flexibility resource alliance, the non-flexible resource members’ income is the final income W of participating in the virtual power plant aggregation. nf,i :

[0199]

[0200] The total payment F received by all flexibility resource members under this compensation method VCG for:

[0201]

[0202] The flexibility resource allocation method specifically includes:

[0203] a. Calculation of the benefits of the flexible resource alliance:

[0204] Overall benefits of virtual power plants:

[0205]

[0206] F fr =F fr,tr -C fr (twenty three)

[0207]

[0208] where F fr is the initial benefit of the flexible resource, and the net benefit of the flexible resource electricity interaction F fr,tr Minus the cost of running flexible resources C fr Get, F fr,trIt is calculated by the profit of flexible resources trading with the power grid and the cost of P2P transactions with non-flexible resources. That is, the overall profit of the virtual power plant is the initial profit of the non-flexible resources. F fr,tr with -C fr The sum of three non-overlapping parts.

[0209] The compensation income obtained by the flexible resource alliance is F VCG The net benefit of flexible resource electricity interaction in operation optimization fr,tr The sum is defined as the flexibility resource alliance to be distributed F fr,al .

[0210]

[0211] W fr =F fr,d -C fr (twenty three) That is, the overall benefit of the virtual power plant is also the final benefit of the non-flexible resources. The ultimate benefit of the alliance with flexible resources is W fr sum.

[0212] It has been determined by the optimization results and the income compensation, so that each flexible resource member bears its own operating costs, and only F remains in the overall income of the virtual power plant. fr,a l needs to be distributed. After allocating it to each flexibility resource member using the symmetric Nash bargaining game method, the income distribution process is completed.

[0213] b. Distribution of the benefits of the flexibility resource alliance:

[0214] The negotiation weight measures the negotiation power of each subject by taking the marginal contribution of each member to the revenue of the virtual power plant and the marginal contribution to the revenue of the flexible resource alliance as negotiation power indicators.

[0215] The negotiation breakdown point is defined as the operating cost of each entity in the flexibility resource alliance:

[0216] d es =C es (45)

[0217] d cl =C cl (46)

[0218] where d es Negotiating breaking point for energy storage members, d cl Negotiate break points for controllable load members; C es is the energy storage operation cost, C clThe operating cost of the controllable load. If the negotiation income cannot cover the operating cost, the member will not choose to participate in the aggregation;

[0219] Due to the differences in the nature of each flexibility resource member, different flexibility resource members make different contributions to the system. This difference is described by bargaining power, and the marginal contribution of each member to the virtual power plant revenue and the marginal contribution to the flexibility resource alliance revenue are used as bargaining power indicators to measure the bargaining power of each subject.

[0220] (1) Contribution of the flexibility resource alliance to total revenue

[0221] The profit distribution is carried out according to the principle of "whoever contributes, whoever benefits". The marginal contribution to the total profit of the alliance can directly reflect the contribution of each member of the alliance. Its definition formula is as follows:

[0222]

[0223] in is the alliance benefit contribution of flexibility resource member j; is the revenue of the alliance when flexibility resource member j does not participate in virtual power plant aggregation.

[0224] (2) Virtual power plant revenue contribution

[0225] When distributing revenue, it is necessary to take into account both the marginal contribution to the total revenue of the flexibility resource alliance and the overall revenue contribution of the virtual power plant. The definition is as follows:

[0226]

[0227] in is the virtual power plant revenue contribution of flexibility resource member j; is the overall benefit of the virtual power plant when flexibility resource member j does not participate in the virtual power plant aggregation.

[0228] The bargaining power of each member α j Score by their negotiation ability I j Decision, I j It is the weighted sum of its flexibility resource alliance total revenue contribution and virtual power plant revenue contribution. The weight values ​​of various negotiation power indicators need to be negotiated and determined before all flexibility resource members participate in the virtual power plant aggregation, and their values ​​can be readjusted as the composition of flexibility resource members changes.

[0229]

[0230] Among them, γ1 and γ2 are the weight values ​​of the corresponding negotiation power indicators, which need to be determined through negotiation or other methods before the formation of the flexibility resource alliance, and M is the set of flexibility resource members in the virtual power plant.

[0231] After the bargaining power of each member is determined, the benefits that each member should receive in the distribution are determined by the following rules:

[0232]

[0233] Where W fr,j is the game benefit of flexibility resource member j, d j The breaking point of the negotiations.

[0234] Those skilled in the art should understand that the modules or steps of the present disclosure can be implemented by a general computer device, or alternatively, they can be implemented by a program code executable by a computing device, so that they can be stored in a storage device and executed by the computing device, or they can be made into individual integrated circuit modules, or multiple modules or steps therein can be made into a single integrated circuit module for implementation. The present disclosure is not limited to any specific combination of hardware and software.

[0235] The above embodiments are implementation modes of the present invention, but the implementation modes of the present invention are not limited to the above embodiments. Any other modifications, modifications, substitutions, combinations, and simplifications that do not deviate from the spirit and principles of the present invention should be equivalent replacement methods and should be included in the protection scope of the present invention.

Claims

1. A virtual power plant revenue allocation method considering externality contribution of flexibility resources, characterized in that: The following steps are involved: (1) Two-layer operation optimization: Distributed resource members use a two-layer optimization approach to achieve local decision management and collaborative optimization under the optimization rules. (2) Definition of externality contribution and compensation of benefits: After the optimization phase, the optimization results will give the initial benefits of each non-flexible resource member and the flexible resource alliance. At this time, the externality contribution of the flexible resource is defined, and corresponding fees are charged to the non-flexible resource members to obtain the final benefits of the non-flexible resource members, thus ending the benefit distribution process of the non-flexible resource members. (3) Cooperative game: After the profit compensation is completed, the negotiation ability of the members in the profit distribution is measured according to the indicators of each flexibility resource member's overall contribution to the flexibility resource alliance and the virtual power plant, and the asymmetric Nash bargaining game is used to distribute the flexibility resource alliance's profits to each flexibility resource member to complete the entire profit distribution process.

2. According to claim 1, a virtual power plant revenue allocation method considering externality contribution of flexibility resources is characterized by: Step (1) adopts a two-layer operation optimization model to achieve two-layer operation optimization, which specifically includes: The upper-level optimization aims to maximize the total revenue of each non-flexible resource member within the virtual power plant, and optimizes the strategies of each non-flexible resource and flexible resource member; the lower-level optimization aims to minimize the total operating cost of the flexible resource alliance, and allocates the operating tasks of each flexible resource based on the overall flexible resource strategy obtained from the upper-level optimization as a constraint condition; The goal of the upper-level problem of virtual power plant operation optimization is to maximize the total benefits of each non-flexible resource within the virtual power plant. nf , is the inflexible resource output vector, whose components is the time-phased output of non-flexible resource member i; is the flexibility resource output vector, whose components is the output of flexible resource member j in different time periods; the income of the i-th non-flexible resource member in time period t is express, yes The function is expressed as: Where T is the optimization period, N is the set of non-flexible resource members in the virtual power plant, and M is the set of flexible resource members in the virtual power plant. In the upper-level optimization, flexible resources are only optimized with non-flexible resource members, and their benefits are not included. is the expected external characteristic of the virtual power plant, which is given by the upper power grid; Formula (2) ensures that the overall behavior of the virtual power plant complies with the dispatching instructions of the upper power grid; The goal of the lower-level optimization of the virtual power plant is to make the total operating cost of each flexible resource under the total output limit of the flexible resources given by the upper-level optimization The lowest cost is the operating cost of the jth flexible resource member in period t. express, Flexible resource output decision The function is expressed as: in The total output constraint of the flexibility resources given for upper-level optimization is:

3. A virtual power plant revenue allocation method considering externality contribution of flexibility resources according to claim 2, characterized in that: The distributed solution method of the two-layer operation optimization model specifically includes: Based on the alternating direction multiplier method, the centralized two-level optimization is decomposed into distributed optimization problems: First, we construct the augmented Lagrangian function L1 of the upper optimization problem (1) to (2): Where λ is a parameter, μ is the iteration step, λ(t) is the Lagrangian operator vector, μ(t) is the iteration step vector, is a zero function; through the construction of augmented Lagrangian function, the upper optimization is decomposed into the following optimization sub-problems: Inflexible resource sub-problem: Where L nf,i (P nf,i ) is the optimization sub-problem of the demand solution of inflexible resource members; Flexibility resource sub-problem in upper-level optimization: Where L u fr,j (P fr,j ) is the optimization sub-problem of the flexible resource member demand solution in the upper-level optimization; Construct the augmented Lagrangian function L2 of the lower optimization problem (3)~(4): This leads to the flexibility resource sub-problem in the lower-level optimization: Where L d fr,j (P fr,j ) is the optimization sub-problem of the flexible resource member demand solution in the lower-level optimization.

4. A virtual power plant revenue allocation method considering externality contribution of flexibility resources according to claim 3, characterized in that: The solution of the distributed optimization problem comprises the following steps: ① Initialization: set the number of iterations r = 0, the Lagrangian operator vector λ(t) = λ0(t), select the iteration step vector μ(t), and set the output of all members to 0, λ0(t) is the initial Lagrangian operator vector; ② Determine local constraints: Each member sets the constraints of its local optimization sub-problem according to its output forecast data and load information, including the upper and lower output constraints determined by the status of each member itself, the capacity constraints of flexible resource members, etc.; ③Set convergence conditions: in is the output result of non-flexible resources after the rth iteration, is the output result of the flexible resources after the rth iteration, σ1 and σ2 are both set parameters; The conditions mentioned in formula (11) are the convergence conditions of power shortage and decision variable change rate. When both satisfy the set parameters σ1 and σ2, the iteration is considered to converge; ④ All members communicate with other members in the system, receive the output strategies of other members, and update their own strategies according to the local optimization sub-problem, that is: ⑤ After all members are updated, check the change rate of the decision variables and the power shortage of each member. If there is a situation where the set convergence conditions are not met, go to step ④ and update the Lagrangian operator according to the following rules: Where λ(t) r is the Lagrangian operator adopted in the rth iteration; Otherwise, stop updating the strategy and output the final strategy of each member; After the upper-level optimization is completed, all non-flexible resource members output their optimization results as the final results, and all flexible resource members enter the lower-level optimization; The iterative solution process of the lower-level optimization is similar to that of the upper-level optimization. Each flexible resource member updates its output strategy alternately, which will not be repeated here.

5. According to claim 1, a virtual power plant revenue allocation method considering externality contribution of flexibility resources is characterized by: The externality contribution positioning method specifically includes: After the operation optimization phase, the overall benefits of the virtual power plant will be expressed by equations (14) to (16): F fr =F fr,tr -C fr (15) Where N is the set of non-flexible resource members in the virtual power plant, F VPP is the total revenue of the virtual power plant, is the electricity price traded between the virtual power plant members and the grid. is the p2p transaction electricity price between members; F fr is the initial benefit of the flexible resource, and the net benefit of the flexible resource electricity interaction F fr,tr Minus the cost of running flexible resources C fr Get, F fr,tr It is calculated by the profit of flexible resources trading with the power grid and the cost of P2P transactions with non-flexible resources. That is, the overall profit of the virtual power plant is the initial profit of the non-flexible resources. F fr,tr with -C fr The sum of three non-repeating parts; F nf,i is the initial benefit of non-flexible resource member i when all members participate in the operation optimization; T is the optimization period, N is the set of non-flexible resource members in the virtual power plant; The marginal benefit brought to non-flexible resource member i by the flexible resource alliance participating in the virtual power plant aggregation is defined as M i , which is equal to the change in the initial income of non-flexible resource member i before and after the flexible resource alliance participates in the virtual power plant optimization: In the formula, F nf,i is the initial benefit of non-flexible resource member i when all members participate in the optimization operation, is the initial benefit of non-flexible resource member i when only flexible resources are removed from the virtual power plant aggregation.

6. A virtual power plant revenue allocation method considering externality contribution of flexibility resources according to claim 5, characterized in that: Definition of externality contribution and compensation of benefits, including: 2) Definition of externality contribution: Through the Vickrey-Clark-Groves (VCG) mechanism, the Flexibility Resource Alliance i The contribution of the flexible resource alliance will be defined as: the total change in marginal benefits brought by the flexible resource alliance to all other non-flexible resource members before and after the non-flexible resource member i participates in the use of the flexible resource alliance, and the fee paid by each non-flexible resource member Should be: Where M k That is, the marginal benefit brought to the non-flexible resource member k by the flexible resource alliance participating in the virtual power plant aggregation, represents the marginal benefit that non-flexible resource member k obtains from the flexible resource participation in the virtual power plant aggregation when non-flexible resource member i does not use the flexible resource alliance; N is the set of non-flexible resource members in the virtual power plant; The definition of non-flexible resource member i not using the flexible resource alliance is: only fix the strategy of i to the strategy when the flexible resource alliance does not participate in the aggregation. At this time, it is considered that the decision of non-flexible resource i has no impact on the decision of flexible resource. in is the initial benefit of inflexible resource member k when inflexible resource i does not use flexible resources, is the initial benefit of non-flexible resource member k when only flexible resources are removed from the virtual power plant aggregation.

7. A virtual power plant revenue allocation method considering externality contribution of flexibility resources according to claim 1, characterized in that: The compensation methods for externality contributions specifically include: After the non-flexible resources compensate the flexibility resource externality contribution defined in claim 6 to the flexibility resource alliance, the non-flexible resource members’ income is the final income W of their participation in the virtual power plant aggregation. nf,i : The total payment F received by all flexibility resource members VCG for:

8. The virtual power plant revenue allocation method considering externality contribution of flexibility resources according to claim 1 is characterized in that: The calculation method of the flexibility resource alliance benefits includes: The compensation income obtained by the flexible resource alliance is F VCG The net benefit of flexible resource electricity interaction in operation optimization fr,tr The sum is defined as the flexibility resource alliance to be distributed F fr,al : That is, the overall benefit of the virtual power plant is also the final benefit of the non-flexible resources. The ultimate benefit of the alliance with flexible resources is W fr The sum of fr is the initial benefit of the flexible resource, and the net benefit of the flexible resource electricity interaction F fr,tr Minus the cost of running flexible resources C fr Get; F VPP is the total revenue of the virtual power plant; It has been determined by the optimization results and the income compensation, so that each flexible resource member bears its own operating costs, and only F remains in the overall income of the virtual power plant. fr,a l needs to be distributed. After allocating it to each flexibility resource member using the symmetric Nash bargaining game method, the income distribution process is completed.

9. A virtual power plant revenue allocation method considering externality contribution of flexibility resources according to claim 6, characterized in that: Negotiation power indicators include: Negotiation weight uses the marginal contribution of each member to the virtual power plant revenue and the marginal contribution to the flexibility resource alliance revenue as negotiation power indicators to measure the negotiation power of each subject, among which: (1) Contribution of the flexibility resource alliance to total revenue The marginal contribution to the total revenue of the alliance can directly reflect the contribution of each member of the alliance. The definition formula is as follows: in F is the alliance benefit contribution of flexible resource member j; fr,al The income to be distributed by the Flexibility Resource Alliance; is the benefit of the alliance when flexibility resource member j does not participate in virtual power plant aggregation; (2) Virtual power plant revenue contribution When distributing revenue, it is necessary to take into account both the marginal contribution to the total revenue of the flexibility resource alliance and the contribution to the overall revenue of the virtual power plant, which is defined as follows: in is the virtual power plant revenue contribution of flexibility resource member j; is the overall benefit of the virtual power plant when flexibility resource member j does not participate in the virtual power plant aggregation; The bargaining power of each member α j Score by their negotiation ability I j Decision, I j It is the weighted sum of its flexibility resource alliance total revenue contribution and virtual power plant revenue contribution. The weight values ​​of various negotiation power indicators need to be negotiated and determined before all flexibility resource members participate in the virtual power plant aggregation. Its value can be readjusted as the composition of flexibility resource members changes: Among them, γ1 and γ2 are the weight values ​​of the corresponding negotiation power indicators, which need to be determined through negotiation or other methods before the formation of the flexibility resource alliance, and M is the set of flexibility resource members in the virtual power plant.

10. A virtual power plant revenue distribution method considering externality contribution of flexibility resources according to any one of claims 1 to 9, characterized in that: The income distribution is completed according to the Nash bargaining game: The negotiation breakdown point is defined as the operating cost of each entity in the flexibility resource alliance: d es =C es (28)d cl =C cl (29) where d es Negotiating breaking point for energy storage members, d cl Negotiate break points for controllable load members; C es is the energy storage operation cost, C cl is the operating cost of the controllable load; if the negotiation income cannot cover the operating cost, the member will not choose to participate in the aggregation: After the bargaining power of each member is determined, the benefits that each member should receive in the distribution are determined by the following rules: Where W fr,j is the game benefit of flexibility resource member j, d j is the negotiation breakdown point, M is the set of flexible resource members in the virtual power plant, α j For each member’s bargaining power, F fr,al It is the income to be distributed by the Flexibility Resource Alliance.

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