A distributed control method for DC microgrids to resist unbounded FDIA

Abstract

The present invention provides a DC microgrid distributed control method for resisting unbounded FDIA. When the secondary control output of the DC microgrid encounters FDIA and causes the system to deviate from the rated operating state, the method of the present invention can adaptively compensate for the attack amount according to the global error signal through the designed distributed compensator, so that the system gradually recovers the rated operating state when it suffers from FDIA. The present invention does not require additional communication network layout, nor does it require a large amount of data for neural network training. It has low implementation cost and no requirements for local control. It has a wide range of applications and can effectively improve the elasticity of the DC microgrid.

Description

Technical Field

[0001] The present invention belongs to the field of control, and in particular relates to a DC microgrid distributed control method for resisting unbounded FDIA. Background Art

[0002] DC microgrids, with their advantages of high efficiency, reliability, and easy integration of distributed energy and energy storage systems, have shown great potential in promoting energy structure transformation and improving energy utilization efficiency. In the operation and management of DC microgrids, voltage regulation and power distribution are the key control objectives to achieve stable system operation and efficient energy utilization. To achieve the above control objectives, droop control, as a decentralized control strategy, is favored because of its simple structure, easy implementation, and no need for a central controller. Droop control simulates the droop characteristics in traditional power systems, so that each distributed power source (DG) automatically adjusts its output voltage or current according to a preset droop curve, thereby achieving preliminary power distribution and preliminary voltage regulation. However, in practical applications, due to the inevitability of line impedance in DC microgrids, traditional droop control methods often fail to achieve ideal control effects, and there are problems of voltage deviation and power distribution errors. This error not only affects the stable operation of the system, but may also reduce the overall performance and efficiency of the system. In order to overcome this limitation of droop control, secondary control strategies have emerged. Secondary control aims to compensate and correct the errors caused by droop control by introducing additional control links to achieve more accurate voltage regulation and power distribution. Among the many secondary control schemes, distributed control has become one of the current research hotspots due to its good scalability, robustness and reduced dependence on communication. Distributed control strategies allow each node or controller in the system to collaboratively achieve the global control goal based on local information exchange, effectively improving the flexibility and reliability of the system. However, the introduction of communication networks also brings new security challenges to the secondary control of DC microgrids, such as false data injection attacks (FDIA) and actuator failures (secondary control output failures, which are essentially equivalent to outputs being affected by FDIA). These problems may seriously affect the normal operation and control effect of the system. Therefore, a large number of distributed secondary control studies targeting FDIA have emerged in recent years, but there are still some shortcomings.

[0003] Existing distributed secondary control research for FDIA can be divided into two categories: data-driven and model-driven. Data-driven refers to identifying FDIA by detecting the digital features of communication signals, such as distributed control methods based on data credibility, using weighted mean subsequence reduction (WMSR) to identify and isolate attacked lines, and artificial intelligence methods such as long short-term memory networks and gated recurrent units. Data-driven methods can often only be applied to large-scale DC microgrids. For example, after identifying and isolating the lines, it is necessary to maintain the connectivity of the communication network, and large-scale data is required to train neural networks. It is difficult to apply in small DC microgrids. Model-driven methods mainly include designing various observers, such as distributed extended state observers, adaptive compensators, and distributed sliding mode observers, as well as designing hidden communication networks to ensure data accessibility. However, observer-based methods often assume the boundedness of attack signals or actuator faults, or the boundedness of derivatives, and hidden communication networks obviously greatly increase the design cost. Summary of the invention

[0004] In view of the defects in the prior art, one of the purposes of the present invention is to provide a DC microgrid distributed secondary control with strong mobility to resist unknown unbounded FDIA, without requiring data as a training set. Another purpose of the present invention is to provide a flexible control scheme, so that when the system suffers from FDIA, the controller can generate a compensation signal for compensation and maintain the control target.

[0005] The technical solution adopted by the present invention is specifically as follows:

[0006] A DC microgrid distributed control method for resisting unbounded FDIA, comprising:

[0007] Obtain the DC side output current, DC voltage and DC voltage reference value of each distributed power source of the DC microgrid at the current moment and share them through the communication network;

[0008] Each distributed power source uses a distributed compensator to perform distributed estimation of the attack amount based on the acquired DC side output current, DC voltage and the DC voltage reference value at the previous moment;

[0009] Each distributed power source compensates the result obtained by the distributed compensator to the distributed power source secondary control output, and each distributed power source of the DC microgrid is controlled based on the corresponding compensated secondary control output, thereby achieving the control goal of resisting false data injection attacks;

[0010] The distributed compensator is constructed based on a first-order system that transforms the distributed secondary control problem of a DC microgrid that resists unknown unbounded attacks into a consistency control problem of each distributed power source when facing unknown unbounded attacks.

[0011] Furthermore, the DC microgrid includes a plurality of distributed power sources, which are connected to a DC bus of the DC microgrid through a converter, wherein the converter is Boost, Buck, DAB or bidirectional Buck.

[0012] Furthermore, the distributed secondary control problem of the DC microgrid for resisting unknown unbounded attacks is converted into a first-order system for the consistency control problem of each distributed power source when facing unknown unbounded attacks, which is constructed in the following way:

[0013] Derivation of the quadratic control output expression containing unknown unbounded attacks;

[0014] Let the intermediate parameters Substitute the derived quadratic control output expression containing unknown unbounded attack into the formula The derivative of , we get the quadratic control output expression containing unknown unbounded attack after the second derivative; They respectively represent the DC voltage reference value and DC voltage of the i-th distributed power source after secondary control; The derivative of is substituted by the inverse expression of the estimated value of the average voltage of the DC bus corresponding to the i-th distributed generation;

[0015] Then, the quadratic control output expression without unknown unbounded attack is substituted into the quadratic control output expression with unknown unbounded attack after the second derivation to obtain the quadratic control output expression with unknown unbounded attack after the third derivation, that is, the first-order system is obtained.

[0016] Furthermore, the secondary control output expression containing unknown unbounded attack after the third derivation is as follows:

[0017] ;

[0018] In the formula, the subscript i is the index of the distributed generation, and the superscript represents the derivative of the corresponding parameter, is the estimated value of the average voltage of the DC bus by the i-th distributed generation, is the DC side output current of the i-th distributed power source, is the droop coefficient of the shunt transformer corresponding to the i-th distributed generation, is the rated DC voltage, is a variable describing network connectivity. If the i-th distributed generation and the j-th distributed generation are connected, ,otherwise ; is the set of all distributed power sources that communicate with the i-th distributed power source; and is the coefficient, Indicates unknown unbounded attack; x iis the intermediate parameter.

[0019] Furthermore, the distributed compensator is obtained based on the first-order system observation estimation that converts the distributed secondary control problem of the DC microgrid to resist unknown unbounded attacks into the consistency control problem of each distributed power source when facing unknown unbounded attacks, as follows:

[0020] ;

[0021] In the formula, , , Respectively An estimated value of To compensate The secondary control output after is the parameter; is the global error. In steady state, Under the effect of Estimates Will approach ,and is obtained by adaptive estimation of the global error; if ,but cannot approach 0, so according to Make adjustments until Tends to 0.

[0022] Furthermore, by adopting express The derivative of , and then realize adaptive estimation to get ; express The derivative of satisfies the following conditions: hour, ,when hour, .

[0023] Further, ;

[0024] or ,in is a constant, function The definition is as follows:

[0025] ;

[0026] as a parameter.

[0027] An electronic device comprises a memory, a processor and a computer program stored in the memory and executable on the processor. When the processor executes the computer program, a DC microgrid distributed control method for resisting unbounded FDIA is implemented.

[0028] A storage medium containing computer executable instructions, which, when executed by a computer processor, implement a DC microgrid distributed control method for resisting unbounded FDIA.

[0029] A computer program product includes a computer program / instruction, which, when executed by a processor, implements the steps of a DC microgrid distributed control method for resisting unbounded FDIA.

[0030] The beneficial effects of the present invention are:

[0031] When the secondary control output of the DC microgrid encounters FDIA and the system deviates from the rated operating state, the method of the present invention can adaptively compensate for the attack amount according to the global error signal through the designed distributed compensator, so that the system gradually recovers the rated operating state when it suffers FDIA. The present invention does not require additional communication network layout, nor does it require a large amount of data for neural network training. It has low implementation cost and no requirements for local control. It has a wide range of applications and can effectively improve the elasticity of the DC microgrid.

[0032] The method of the present invention can maintain the normal operation of the power supply system in extreme environments or complex working conditions. For example, it can maintain the control objectives of voltage tracking and power distribution under conditions such as external electromagnetic interference, actuator aging, and communication line noise. Improve smart grid emergency response measures. The method described in the present invention can enhance the system's resilience to actuator failures, provide emergency response time for smart grids, and thus improve the reliability of the system. Scenarios such as data centers, smart buildings, and electric vehicle power supply networks have high requirements for power supply reliability, and are easily subject to man-made malicious network attacks or actuator failures. The control strategy proposed in the present invention can provide high-reliability power supply for these systems. Optimize the power system monitoring and protection system. The control strategy provided by the present invention can resist external malicious attacks or actuator failures, so it can simplify traditional remote monitoring and protection systems and reduce system operating costs. BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS

[0033] Figure 1 This is an exemplary flow chart of a DC microgrid distributed control method for resisting unbounded FDIA according to the present invention;

[0034] Figure 2 It is an exemplary DC microgrid and local layer control block diagram of the present invention;

[0035] Figure 3is an exemplary secondary control block diagram of the present invention;

[0036] Figure 4 This is a waveform result diagram of a DC microgrid under FDIA when the distributed compensator of the present invention is not started in an embodiment of the present invention;

[0037] Figure 5 It is a waveform result diagram of the DC microgrid under FDIA when the distributed compensator described in the embodiment of the present invention is started in the embodiment of the present invention. DETAILED DESCRIPTION

[0038] Exemplary embodiments will be described in detail herein, examples of which are shown in the accompanying drawings. When the following description refers to the drawings, the same numbers in different drawings represent the same or similar elements unless otherwise indicated. The implementations described in the following exemplary embodiments do not represent all implementations consistent with the present application. Instead, they are merely examples of devices and methods consistent with some aspects of the present application as detailed in the appended claims.

[0039] The terminology used in the present application is for the purpose of describing particular embodiments only and is not intended to be limiting of the present application.

[0040] As used in this application and the appended claims, the singular forms "a", "an", "said", and "the" are intended to include the plural forms as well, unless the context clearly indicates otherwise. It should also be understood that the term "and / or" as used herein refers to and encompasses any and all possible combinations of one or more of the associated listed items.

[0041] It should be understood that although the terms first, second, third, etc. may be used in the present application to describe various information, these information should not be limited to these terms. These terms are only used to distinguish the same type of information from each other. For example, without departing from the scope of the present application, the first information may also be referred to as the second information, and similarly, the second information may also be referred to as the first information. Depending on the context, the word "if" as used herein may be interpreted as "at the time of" or "when" or "in response to determining".

[0042] The present invention provides a DC microgrid distributed control method for resisting unbounded FDIA, such as Figure 1 As shown, the control process includes the following steps:

[0043] Obtain the DC side output current, DC voltage and the DC voltage reference value of each distributed power source of the DC microgrid at the current moment and share them through the communication network; at the same time, perform conventional secondary control;

[0044] Each distributed power source uses a distributed compensator to perform distributed estimation of the attack amount based on the acquired DC side output current, DC voltage and the DC voltage reference value at the previous moment;

[0045] Each distributed power source compensates the result obtained by the distributed compensator to the distributed power source secondary control output, and each distributed power source of the DC microgrid is controlled based on the corresponding compensated secondary control output, thereby achieving the control goal of resisting false data injection attacks;

[0046] The distributed compensator is constructed based on converting the distributed secondary control problem of the DC microgrid to resist unknown unbounded attacks into a first-order system for the consistency control problem of each distributed power source when facing unknown unbounded attacks. In a specific implementation scheme, the following steps are specifically included:

[0047] (1) Deriving the quadratic control output expression containing unknown unbounded attacks includes the following sub-steps:

[0048] (1.1) Establish a simplified model of conventional secondary control attacks:

[0049] Figure 2 The figure shows an exemplary DC microgrid structure, including several distributed generation (DG), each DG is connected to the DC bus through a converter, and the converter is controlled by a voltage and current double closed loop. Data is transmitted between the distributed generation through a sparse communication network. Other electrical devices in the microgrid are regarded as resistive loads. Figure 2 As shown, each converter corresponds to each DG one by one, then the converter corresponding to the ith DG, i.e., the ith converter topology consists of a DC voltage source v s,i 、Inductance L s,i , switch tube, diode, DC bus capacitor C dc , resistor R s,i Composition, i L,i is the inductor current, i dc,i is the DC side current of the converter, v dc,i is the DC side voltage of the converter, then Figure 2 As shown, the expression of conventional quadratic control is:

[0050]

[0051]

[0052] in, is the rated DC voltage, is the DC voltage reference value of the i-th DG after secondary control, is the DC side output current of the i-th DG, is the droop coefficient of the ith DG corresponding to the current transformer. is the voltage compensation obtained by secondary control, considering the secondary control output Unknown unbounded attack caused by superimposed false data injection ,Right now

[0053]

[0054]

[0055] but, is the secondary control output without unknown unbounded attacks, The expression is

[0056]

[0057] In the formula is the set of all DGs that communicate with i-DG (i-DG is used to represent the i-th DG below). is a variable describing network connectivity. If i-DG and j-DG are connected, ,otherwise . and For undetermined coefficients, the range of the coefficients can be determined by combining stability proof.

[0058] Combining formulas (1), (3) to (5) gives a simplified model of conventional secondary control under attack;

[0059] (1.2) The derivative of the simplified conventional quadratic control attack model, that is, the quadratic control output expression containing unknown unbounded attacks, is as follows:

[0060]

[0061] Superscript Denotes the derivative of the corresponding sign.

[0062] (2) Order Substitute the derived quadratic control output expression containing unknown unbounded attack into the formula The derivative of , we get the quadratic control output expression containing unknown unbounded attack after the second derivative, as follows:

[0063]

[0064] further The derivative of is calculated by the estimated value of the average voltage of the DC bus corresponding to the i-th distributed power source Substituting the reverse expression, the estimated value of the average voltage of the DC bus by the i-th distributed generation is given by the following formula:

[0065]

[0066] in Indicates estimated value The first derivative with respect to time, represents the DC voltage of the ith DG. In steady state, the DC voltage of each DG node is will tend to be consistent and equal to the actual DC voltage of each node The average value of . Auxiliary control quantity estimated by average voltage. For undetermined coefficients, the range of the coefficients can be determined by combining stability proof.

[0067] (3) Substitute the quadratic control output expression without unknown unbounded attack (Formula (5)) into the quadratic control output expression with unknown unbounded attack after the second derivation to obtain the quadratic control output expression with unknown unbounded attack after the third derivation, and obtain the first-order system, as follows:

[0068]

[0069] In the formula, is an auxiliary variable, , At this point, the distributed secondary control problem of the DC microgrid against unknown unbounded FDIA is transformed into the above-mentioned first-order system facing unknown unbounded attacks. The consistency control problem.

[0070] Furthermore, the first-order system is observed and estimated to obtain the distributed compensator as follows:

[0071]

[0072] In the formula, , Respectively for The estimated value of . To compensate The secondary control output. as a parameter. is the global error. In steady state, Under the effect of Estimates Will approach ,and The global error It is obtained by adaptive estimation; if ,but cannot approach 0, so according to Make adjustments until Tends to 0.

[0073] In a specific embodiment, ;

[0074] as a parameter.

[0075] In another specific embodiment,

[0076] in is a constant, function The definition is as follows:

[0077]

[0078] To speed up the convergence.

[0079] The present invention is further described in detail below in conjunction with the accompanying drawings and embodiments. It should be emphasized that the above drawings and the following description are only exemplary and are not intended to limit the scope of the present invention and its application.

[0080] The control block diagram of this embodiment is as follows Figure 3 As shown. Based on the conventional secondary control, the compensation control quantity is obtained by the distributed compensator. The present invention is further described in conjunction with the embodiment. Figure 2 The DC microgrid shown in the figure includes 4 DGs, a resistive load R L , 4 DGs are connected to the DC bus through Boost converters; for the convenience of analysis, all parameters (including circuit parameters and control parameters) except the droop coefficient are set to be the same in the local layer. Under normal working conditions, the ratio of the output current of each DG should be 2:2:1:1. The local layer parameters are shown in Table 1. are the proportional coefficient and integral coefficient of the current loop PI controller respectively, They are the proportional coefficient and integral coefficient of the voltage loop PI controller respectively.

[0081] Table 1 Local layer parameters of the embodiment

[0082]

[0083] in Indicates the voltage of DG corresponding to the DC voltage source, is the internal resistance of the DC voltage source, is the inductance of the Boost converter, is the DC bus capacitance, and the line impedance is the resistor and inductance express. is the resistive load on the DC bus.

[0084] The parameters of the secondary control and the compensator of the present invention are shown in Table 2. Similarly, all DG parameters are consistent, so the subscripts are omitted in the table, such as represent , the other variables are the same, where the derivative of the unknown unbounded attack estimate of the compensator is expressed using formula (11).

[0085] Table 2 Secondary control parameters of the embodiment

[0086]

[0087] The simulation conditions are as follows: 0-1s, no attack, at 1s, attack on 1-DG .

[0088] The simulation results are as follows Figure 4 and Figure 5 shown. Figure 4 The waveforms of the DC voltage and current when the compensator of the present invention is not started are shown. It can be seen that after 1 second, Under the action of , the DC bus voltage deviates from the rated value, and the power distribution of each DG is no longer inversely proportional to the droop coefficient. Figure 5 The DC voltage and current waveforms when the compensator of the present invention is started are shown. After 1 second, the DC bus voltage and the power of each DG deviate from the rated value, but gradually return to the state before the attack under the action of the compensator.

[0089] Corresponding to the above-mentioned embodiment of a DC microgrid distributed control method for resisting unbounded FDIA, the present invention further provides an electronic device, which includes one or more processors for implementing the above-mentioned embodiment of a DC microgrid distributed control method for resisting unbounded FDIA.

[0090] The electronic device of the present invention can be applied to any device with data processing capability, and the device with data processing capability can be a device or apparatus such as a computer.

[0091] The device embodiment can be implemented by software, hardware or a combination of software and hardware. Taking software implementation as an example, as a device in a logical sense, it is formed by the processor of any device with data processing capability in which it is located to read the corresponding computer program instructions in the non-volatile memory into the memory for execution. From the hardware level, the electronic device includes a processor, memory, network interface, and non-volatile memory. In addition, any device with data processing capability in which the device in the embodiment is located can also include other hardware according to the actual function of the device with data processing capability, which will not be described in detail.

[0092] The implementation process of the functions and effects of each unit in the above-mentioned device is specifically described in the implementation process of the corresponding steps in the above-mentioned method, and will not be repeated here.

[0093] For the device embodiment, since it basically corresponds to the method embodiment, the relevant parts can refer to the partial description of the method embodiment. The device embodiment described above is only schematic, wherein the units described as separate components may or may not be physically separated, and the components displayed as units may or may not be physical units, that is, they may be located in one place, or they may be distributed on multiple network units. Some or all of the modules may be selected according to actual needs to achieve the purpose of the scheme of the present invention. Ordinary technicians in this field can understand and implement it without paying creative work.

[0094] An embodiment of the present invention further provides a computer-readable storage medium having a program stored thereon. When the program is executed by a processor, a DC microgrid distributed control method for resisting unbounded FDIA in the above embodiment is implemented.

[0095] The computer-readable storage medium may be an internal storage unit of any device with data processing capability described in any of the aforementioned embodiments, such as a hard disk or a memory. The computer-readable storage medium may also be any device with data processing capability, such as a plug-in hard disk, a smart memory card (Smart Media Card, SMC), an SD card, a flash card (Flash Card), etc. equipped on the device. Furthermore, the computer-readable storage medium may also include both an internal storage unit of any device with data processing capability and an external storage device. The computer-readable storage medium is used to store the computer program and other programs and data required by any device with data processing capability, and may also be used to temporarily store data that has been output or is to be output.

[0096] Obviously, the above embodiments are merely examples for the purpose of clear explanation, and are not intended to limit the implementation methods. For those skilled in the art, other different forms of changes or modifications can be made based on the above description. It is not necessary and impossible to list all the implementation methods here. The obvious changes or modifications derived therefrom are still within the scope of protection of the present invention.

Claims

1. A DC microgrid distributed control method for resisting unbounded FDIA, characterized in that: include: Obtain the DC side output current, DC voltage and DC voltage reference value of each distributed power source of the DC microgrid at the current moment and share them through the communication network; Each distributed power source uses a distributed compensator to perform distributed estimation of the attack amount based on the acquired DC side output current, DC voltage and the DC voltage reference value at the previous moment; Each distributed power source compensates the result obtained by the distributed compensator to the distributed power source secondary control output, and each distributed power source of the DC microgrid is controlled based on the corresponding compensated secondary control output, thereby achieving the control goal of resisting false data injection attacks; The distributed compensator is constructed based on converting the distributed secondary control problem of the DC microgrid to resist unknown unbounded attacks into a first-order system for the consistency control problem of each distributed power source when facing unknown unbounded attacks. Specifically, the derivative of the secondary control output expression containing unknown unbounded attacks is as follows: The superscript · indicates the derivative of the corresponding sign; is the rated DC voltage, is the DC voltage reference value of the i-th distributed power source after secondary control, i o,i is the DC output current of the i-th distributed power source, r i is the droop coefficient of the shunt transformer corresponding to the i-th distributed generation; a atk,i is an unknown unbounded attack; where N i is the set of all distributed power sources that communicate with the i-th distributed power source; a ij is a variable describing network connectivity. If the i-th distributed generation and the j-th distributed generation are connected, then a ij =1, otherwise a ij =0; k o,i and b o,i is the coefficient to be determined; Let the intermediate parameters Substitute the derived quadratic control output expression containing unknown unbounded attack into v dc,i The derivative of , we get the quadratic control output expression containing unknown unbounded attack after the second derivative; They represent the DC voltage reference value and DC voltage of the i-th distributed power source after secondary control respectively; v dc,i The derivative of is calculated by the estimated value of the average voltage of the DC bus corresponding to the i-th distributed power source The reverse expression substitution is as follows: in Indicates estimated value The first derivative with respect to time, v dc,i Represents the DC voltage of the i-th distributed generation. In steady state, the DC voltage of each DG node will tend to be consistent and equal to the actual DC voltage v of each node dc,i The average value of i is the auxiliary control quantity of average voltage estimation; β 1,i ,β 2,i ,β 3,i is the coefficient to be determined; Then, the quadratic control output expression without unknown unbounded attack is substituted into the quadratic control output expression with unknown unbounded attack after the second derivation to obtain the quadratic control output expression with unknown unbounded attack after the third derivation, that is, the first-order system is obtained; the quadratic control output expression with unknown unbounded attack after the third derivation is specifically as follows: In the formula, the subscript i is the index of the distributed generation, and the superscript · represents the derivative of the corresponding parameter. is the auxiliary control quantity, is the estimated value of the average voltage of the DC bus by the i-th distributed generation, i o,i is the DC output current of the i-th distributed power source, r i is the droop coefficient of the ith distributed generation corresponding to the shunt transformer, is the rated DC voltage, a ij is a variable describing network connectivity. If the i-th distributed generation and the j-th distributed generation are connected, then a ij =1, otherwise a ij =0; N i is the set of all distributed power sources that communicate with the i-th distributed power source; k o,i and b o,i is the coefficient, a atk,i Indicates unknown unbounded attack; x i is an auxiliary variable; the distributed compensator is based on converting the distributed secondary control problem of the DC microgrid to resist unknown unbounded attacks into the first-order system observation estimation of the consistency control problem of each distributed power source when facing unknown unbounded attacks, as follows: In the formula, Respectively An estimated value of To compensate Secondary control output after k i ,λ i ,b i is the parameter; i is the global error. In steady state, i Under the effect of i Estimates will approach x i ,and is the global error ρ i Obtained by adaptive estimation; if a atk,i ≠0, then ρ i cannot approach 0, so According to ρ i Adjust until ρ i tends to 0; where, by adopting ρ i express The derivative of , and then realize adaptive estimation to get The i express The derivative of satisfies the following conditions: i >0, When i When ≤0, 2. The method according to claim 1, characterized in that The DC microgrid includes a plurality of distributed power sources, which are connected to a DC bus of the DC microgrid through a converter, wherein the converter is Boost, Buck, DAB or bidirectional Buck.

3. The method according to claim 1, characterized in that By adopting ρ i express The derivatives of are as follows: or Where ζ>0 is a constant, function sig ζ (ρ i ) is defined as follows: σ i as a parameter.

4. An electronic device comprising a memory, a processor, and a computer program stored in the memory and executable on the processor, characterized in that: When the processor executes the computer program, the method for distributed control of a DC microgrid against unbounded FDIA as described in any one of claims 1 to 3 is implemented.

5. A storage medium comprising computer executable instructions, wherein the computer executable instructions, when executed by a computer processor, implement a DC microgrid distributed control method for resisting unbounded FDIA as described in any one of claims 1 to 3.

6. A computer program product comprising a computer program / instructions, characterized in that When the computer program / instruction is executed by a processor, the steps of a DC microgrid distributed control method for resisting unbounded FDIA as described in any one of claims 1 to 3 are implemented.

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