Steel plant intelligent video monitoring data storage security sharing method based on block chain

Abstract

The invention discloses a blockchain-based intelligent video monitoring data storage security sharing method for an iron and steel plant. The method comprises the following steps of: generating a public key PKS and a master key TMK based on an attribute encryption algorithm; distributing shares of the shared key S by constructing a matrix and defining a function, wherein the shares are distributed in different rows of the matrix; re-encrypting the data by using a hybrid proxy re-encryption algorithm based on a ciphertext strategy; secure data storage and access control are realized based on a secure storage mode of revocable attribute-based encryption RABE and a block chain; and in combination with a block chain technology, a consensus algorithm is adopted to verify transactions, so that the security and robustness of the system are enhanced. According to the invention, the utilization rate of the data is improved, the cooperation efficiency is enhanced, the security and transparency of the video monitoring data are improved, and the cost of information transmission and storage is reduced. The distributed storage and access control of the data are realized, the confidentiality and integrity of the cloud center data are ensured, and the security and efficiency of the steel plant video monitoring system in the storage and transmission process are enhanced.

Description

Technical Field

[0001] The present invention relates to a method for storing and securely sharing intelligent video surveillance data in a steel plant, which combines a variety of advanced information security technologies such as blockchain technology, attribute-based encryption (ABE), stream encryption, and edge computing. Background Art

[0002] The intelligent video surveillance system of the steel plant has the ability to monitor the production process in real time, significantly improving production safety. However, the current monitoring system has problems such as low data security, easy tampering, lack of data integrity verification methods, and low sharing efficiency, which has become a difficult problem that needs to be solved urgently in the industry.

[0003] In order to meet these challenges, the use of blockchain technology to solve the data storage and sharing problems in intelligent video surveillance in the steel industry has important practical significance and wide application value. For example, Fan et al. proposed an improved ID-based signature authentication and secure data sharing scheme for the Internet of Things in the 10th issue of Journal of Systems Architecture in 2021, "A secure and efficient authentication and datasharing scheme for internet of things based on blockchain". The scheme provides mutual authentication between the perception layer and the transmission layer to ensure the confidentiality of data during transmission. The improved scheme not only has provable security and the ability to resist the above attacks, but also reduces resource and energy consumption through low-cost operation and communication. Wu et al. proposed a secure authentication and key agreement scheme in the 1st issue of Security and Communication Networks in 2021, "Improved authenticated key agreements scheme for fog-driven iot healthcare system", which makes up for the imperfections of the previously proposed scheme. In order to evaluate the security of the proposed authentication scheme, the informal security analysis Burrows-Abadi-Needham (BAN) logic analysis was performed. In addition, the ProVerif tool is used to formalize the security verification of the scheme. By comparing the performance with earlier schemes, the proposed scheme has been shown to have higher applicability and security. Li et al. proposed in IEEE Systems Journal, No. 1, 2020, "A secure anonymous identity-based scheme in new authentication architecture for mobile edge computing" that user anonymity is also fully protected for lightweight devices. The security of the scheme was proved under a specific security model.

[0004] Although the above schemes theoretically provide effective data storage and sharing solutions, their high computational cost limits their applicability in secure data sharing services. The implementation of attribute-based encryption (ABE) and smart contracts involves complex mathematical operations, which significantly prolongs the time for key generation and data encryption when the number of users and attributes increases. Industrial environments such as steel plants have high requirements for the real-time performance of video surveillance data, and high computational costs will delay the encryption and sharing of data, affecting the monitoring effect, and may lead to failure to timely discover and deal with potential security risks. In addition, high computational costs also mean greater resource consumption, especially for edge devices, which may lead to overload or excessive energy consumption, affecting the stability and sustainability of the system. Complex computational processes may also lead to poor user experience, and users have to wait a long time to obtain authorization or data when requesting data access, which reduces their trust and satisfaction with the system. Therefore, in order to overcome this limitation, it is necessary to explore more efficient algorithm and technology combinations that can not only ensure data security but also maintain a reasonable balance between computation and resource consumption. Summary of the invention

[0005] The purpose of the present invention is to propose a blockchain-based intelligent video surveillance data storage and security sharing method for steel plants. The method uses blockchain technology and cloud storage to store detection information and massive video data, and uses blockchain technology to ensure the security and reliability of the system. Through a distributed storage architecture, the method implements a dual storage system for detection information and video content, ensuring the security of data during transmission and storage.

[0006] Specifically, the present invention is achieved through the following technical solutions.

[0007] The invention discloses a blockchain-based steel plant intelligent video surveillance data storage and security sharing method, which comprises the following steps:

[0008] (S01): During the system initialization process of the intelligent monitoring platform, the system initializes the system parameter k by inputting security parameters, and generates the public key PKS and the master key TMK using an attribute-based encryption algorithm. These keys play a key role in encryption, decryption, and data processing of edge devices. In this scheme, the monitoring information is first pre-processed on the edge device, such as filtering and format conversion, to reduce the burden on the central server. The system receives the public key PKS, the LSSS access structure L, and the detection information F as input, and generates the encrypted detection information ciphertext C through a series of encryption operations. To ensure the security of the data, the ciphertext C is stored in the distributed storage system IPFS, thereby effectively preventing data loss or illegal access. The video data V is also pre-processed on the edge device, including steps such as downsampling or encoding compression. Next, the system uses the public key PKS, the stream encryption key SEK, and the length parameter L to encrypt the video and generate the video ciphertext CV. The encrypted video CV is stored in the cloud or in IPFS to achieve distributed and secure access. The system uses the master key TMK and the user's attribute set s to generate the user's private key SK i . The master key TMK is the key input parameter required to generate the private key SK. In an edge computing environment, part of the key generation process can be completed on the edge device, thereby reducing the computing pressure on the central server. During the decryption process, the hash address of the encrypted data is obtained from IPFS, and then the private key SK is used to decrypt the ciphertext C or the video ciphertext CV to obtain the plaintext V or monitoring information f. The decryption operation will only succeed when the attributes corresponding to the user's private key SK meet the predetermined access policy. Performing distributed decryption operations on edge nodes can effectively improve the efficiency of decryption;

[0009] (S02): Using the key generation algorithm, the shares of the shared key S are distributed in different rows of the matrix by constructing a matrix and defining a function; the matrix constructs M x×y , and set a function p(i) to map each row of the matrix to this function. Next, randomly select y1,y2,...y n ∈z p , forming a vector v = (s, y1, y2, ···y n ) T , where s is the shared key value, and s∈Z p At this point, n shares of the shared key s are formed. For any (Mv) i ∈p(i), can obtain part of the shared key. Even if some shares are leaked, it is still impossible to reconstruct the complete key, thus ensuring the security of the system;

[0010] (S03): Use a hybrid proxy re-encryption algorithm based on ciphertext strategy to re-encrypt the data and store the data through the Interstellar File System (IPFS). The file is encrypted to generate a unique hash value Hash, which is stored in the global distributed hash table as a unique file identifier. When the file is downloaded, the system quickly locates and verifies the authenticity of the file based on the hash value.

[0011] (S04): Based on the revocable attribute-based encryption RABE and the secure storage method of blockchain, secure data storage and access control are realized. A security model is constructed to evaluate its anti-attack capability. The evaluation process is as follows:

[0012] (1) Setup phase: The challenger generates a public key PKS and a master key TMK. The public key is made public and the master key is retained.

[0013] (2) Query phase: The attacker requests decryption keys related to different attribute sets, and the challenger generates keys using the master key TMK and returns them;

[0014] (3) Challenge phase: The attacker selects plaintext messages M0 and M1 of equal length and specifies an access policy. The challenger uses the public key PKS and the access policy to encrypt one of the messages to generate a ciphertext C and sends it to the attacker.

[0015] (4) Guessing stage: The attacker encrypts the message based on the guess; if the guess accuracy is significantly higher than the random level, the scheme is considered to be cracked; otherwise, the scheme is considered to be secure;

[0016] (5) Security evaluation: Under the assumption that the probability of an attacker correctly guessing coin b is only negligible compared to random guessing, the CP-ABE scheme is secure, and even if the attacker obtains multiple attribute keys, if his attribute set does not satisfy the access policy, he cannot successfully decrypt the ciphertext;

[0017] (6) Selective security model: The attacker needs to select the challenge matrix M before the setup phase. x×y , and submitted in the setup phase; the query phase requests the private key for a specific attribute set, and in the challenge phase, the plaintext M0 and M1 are selected, and the challenger generates the ciphertext and returns it; in the guessing phase, the attacker tries to determine the encrypted content;

[0018] (7) Decision q-parallel BDHE assumption: Based on the decision q-parallel BDHE assumption, if the generator g and the index s are given, it is difficult to distinguish and random values;

[0019] (8) Construction of simulation algorithm: The decision q-parallel BDHE problem is solved by the simulation algorithm. If the attacker can crack the encryption scheme with a significant advantage, the simulation algorithm can solve it with a non-negligible advantage, thereby ensuring the security of the encryption scheme under the selective security model.

[0020] (S05): A secure sharing method for intelligent video surveillance data storage in steel plants based on blockchain. Users use a verification equation to confirm whether the stored data is correctly signed. If the equation holds, the data is considered secure and reliable. The signed ciphertext is then generated and placed in the blockchain for storage. In combination with blockchain technology, a consensus algorithm is used to verify transactions, enhancing the security and robustness of the system. This method is not only applied to intelligent video surveillance systems in steel plants, but can also be extended to other application scenarios that require efficient and secure key management.

[0021] The attribute-based encryption algorithm described in step (S01) of the present invention includes the following specific contents:

[0022] (1) System settings.

[0023] Setup(1 k )→(PKS,TMK): The verification agency executes the algorithm, inputs the system security parameter k, and outputs the specific system public key PKS and master key TMK. Input: System security parameters, including but not limited to key length, encryption algorithm selection, and other security requirements. Execution: The verification agency processes the input security parameters through the key generation algorithm to generate the required key.

[0024] (2) Detection information encryption

[0025] (PKS, F, L) → (C): Use encryption technology to protect the privacy of detection information. The input public key PKS and access structure L are used as the basis for encrypting and decrypting detection information. At the same time, the detection information F is also input, which is the specific content that needs to be encrypted. After a series of encryption operations, the encrypted detection information ciphertext C is obtained. The encryption process is as follows:

[0026] 1) Initialization: Determine the input public key PKS, which is used for encryption and decryption to ensure the security of data during transmission. The access structure F defines which users or roles can access the encrypted data, usually based on the user's attributes or permissions. And the detection information L to be encrypted, including sensor data, log information or other sensitive information.

[0027] 2) Access policy evaluation: Determine the validity of user attributes based on the access structure F to ensure that only users with corresponding permissions can perform decryption operations.

[0028] 3) Encryption preparation: Use an encryption algorithm (such as symmetric encryption or asymmetric encryption) to initialize the encryption process and prepare to encrypt the detection information.

[0029] 4) Encryption operation: Encrypt the detection information L to be encrypted. It can be expressed by the following formula: C = E pks (L, F, r), where E is the encryption function and r is a randomly generated session key or random number used to enhance encryption security.

[0030] 5) Generate ciphertext: After the encryption operation, the encrypted detection information ciphertext C is obtained. This ciphertext includes: the encrypted data content, related metadata, such as access policy F and other necessary authentication information, so as to verify it during decryption.

[0031] 6) Output ciphertext: Return the generated ciphertext C to ensure the security of information during storage or transmission.

[0032] Through the above encryption process, the detection information L is effectively protected in the ciphertext C. Due to the use of public key PKS and specific access structure F, only users with corresponding permissions can access the original data. This method not only ensures the privacy of information, but also prevents unauthorized access and tampering, providing strong data security protection.

[0033] (3) Video encryption

[0034] Encrypt(PKS,SEK,L,V)→(CV): The following is a detailed description of the process of encrypting video data, especially the specific steps involving input parameters and encryption operations.

[0035] 1) Video preprocessing: The edge device preprocesses the raw video data V. The video stream collected and preprocessed by the edge device includes image frames, audio, and other related information.

[0036] 2) Initialize encryption parameters: determine and load the public key PKS (the public key used to encrypt video data to ensure the security of data during transmission and storage), the stream encryption key SEK (the symmetric key used to stream encrypt video data to prevent unauthorized access during data transmission) and the length parameter L (the length or block size of the video data, used for segmented processing of encryption operations).

[0037] 3) Stream encryption: Use the stream encryption key SEK to encrypt the video data V. Stream encryption is a symmetric encryption method suitable for processing continuous data streams such as video and audio. The encryption process can be expressed as: CV stream =StreamEncrypt(SEK,V,L) where StreamEncrypt is the stream encryption function, CVstream It is the encrypted stream data.

[0038] 4) Public key encryption: Use the public key PKS to encrypt the stream encryption key SEK and generate the encrypted key E PKS (SEK) so that the decryption key can be obtained by the authorized user when the video data needs to be decrypted. This process can be expressed as: PKS =Encrypt(PKS,SEK).

[0039] 5) Ciphertext generation: The encrypted stream data CV stream and the encrypted key E PKS (SEK) to generate a complete encrypted video ciphertext CV. The structure of the ciphertext CV may include encrypted stream data and keys, length information and other metadata.

[0040] 6) Video storage: Encrypted video CV can be stored in the cloud to ensure centralized storage and management. In addition, in order to enhance data security and availability, encrypted video CV can also be stored in IPFS, which supports distributed storage and access, and provides decentralization and fault tolerance.

[0041] Through the above encryption process, the video data V is highly secure during transmission and storage. Public key encryption ensures the security of encryption keys, and stream encryption keys and preprocessing steps ensure the efficiency of video data in practical applications. Storing encrypted videos in the cloud or IPFS further improves the reliability of the system and the accessibility of data, while also ensuring the privacy and integrity of the data.

[0042] (4) Key generation

[0043] (TMK,S)→(SK): is a process for executing a key generation algorithm. The main purpose of the system is to generate a private key SK based on the user attribute set S. Through this algorithm, the generated private key SK has a high degree of uniqueness and security. The generation of each private key depends on the user's specific attribute set and the protection of the master key. The introduction of random values ​​ensures that private keys generated under the same attributes will not be the same, thereby enhancing the security of the system. This design effectively prevents the reuse and prediction of keys and provides strong security protection. Input parameters: master key (TMK), the master key of the system, which is the basis for private key generation; user attribute set (S): the user's attribute set, used to generate the corresponding private key. Output private key (SK), a private key generated based on the user attribute set. Algorithm flow:

[0044] 1) Initialization: Set up a random number generator RNG to generate secure random values ​​and define an empty private key set SK.

[0045] 2) User attribute analysis: S = {s1, s2, ..., s n} Perform in-depth analysis to evaluate the weight and importance of each attribute and determine the relationship between attributes so that a unique private key can be generated based on these relationships. Generate random values: For each attribute s i ∈S, use the random number generator to generate a random value r i , ensuring that these random values ​​have sufficient entropy to ensure security.

[0046] 3) Calculate the private key: Use the master key TMK and the generated random value r i , combined with user attributes to calculate the private key. The private key SK can be generated using the following formula: SK = H (TMK, S, r1, r2, ..., r n ) Where H is a secure hash function or encryption function that combines the master key, the user attribute set and the random value to generate a private key. Output private key: Return the generated private key SK to the user, while retaining the mapping relationship of the user attribute set S for subsequent key use and management.

[0047] (5) Decryption

[0048] (SK, C / CV)→(V / F): Only when the attributes of SK match the access policy permissions can the corresponding ciphertext C or CV be obtained. Finally, the relevant original video V or detection information F can be obtained. The decryption steps are as follows:

[0049] 1) Attribute matching: Check whether the user's attribute set matches the access policy defined by the ciphertext C or the encrypted video CV. Only when the user's attributes meet the access policy, the user has the authority to continue the decryption operation.

[0050] 2) Decryption operation: If the attributes match, the system uses the private key SK to decrypt the ciphertext C or the encrypted video CV. The decryption process can be expressed as: V / F = Decrypt (SK, C / CV) where Decrypt is the decryption function, V represents the original video restored after decryption, and F represents the decrypted detection information.

[0051] 3) Restore the original data: The decrypted content may be video data V or detection information F, depending on the input ciphertext type. If the input is encrypted video CV, the decrypted result is the original video V. If the input is ordinary ciphertext C, the decrypted result is detection information F.

[0052] This decryption process uses a strict attribute matching mechanism to ensure that only users with the appropriate permissions can decrypt and access sensitive data, such as video or detection information. This method not only improves data security, but also ensures refined management of access control, so that only authorized users can obtain and use relevant information.

[0053] The key generation algorithm described in step (S02) of the present invention is implemented by the user and the PKS to generate the user's public key and private key, including the following steps:

[0054] (1) Secret value selection

[0055] Third-party user i chooses a secret value And calculate the secret value parameter X i =x i P (P is a public system parameter that supports the subsequent key generation process). The user sends his secret value X through the public channel. i and the ID i To PKS.

[0056] (2) Generate partial private key and partial public key

[0057] PKS randomly selects an integer And calculate w i =H0(ID i ,X i ,u i ), get the user's partial private key

[0058] D i =w i +s, (s is part of the private key, which is directly used to generate the complete private key and is sent to the user through a secure communication channel to ensure its security.) and part of the public key E i =H0(ID i ,X i ,u i )P,D i , sent to the user through a secure communication channel (D i is part of the public key, sent over a public channel for public use), E i Sent to users via public channels.

[0059] (3) Generate public key and private key algorithm

[0060] PKS receives the user's partial private key D i and partial public key E i When the user judges equation D i P=E i +sp's legitimacy, if established, the user receives part of the private key D i and partial public key E i , and calculate the complete public key PKS = E i +H1(ID i ,X i )X i And the complete private key.

[0061] (4) Decryption

[0062] SK={D=g a g aη ,L=g η ,D λ =f λ η}: In the decryption step, DU generates a private key, uses hashing to encrypt the IPFS return address and video address, and stores them on the blockchain; DU uses its own private key to decrypt the video and the detection information stored in IPFS. DU has attributes S = {att1,att2,...,attn}, for any attribute k in S.

[0063] The hybrid proxy re-encryption algorithm based on ciphertext strategy described in step (S03) of the present invention includes the following specific contents.

[0064] (1) System initialization: Set the security parameter λ. During the system initialization phase, the public parameter PK and the master key MK are generated. Assume that the bilinear pairing e:G1×G2→G T , where G1 and G T are two cyclic groups, with order p being a prime number. Select the generator g∈G1 and the master key MK=(g a ,a∈Z p ), public parameter PK=(g,g a ,e(g,g)).

[0065] (2) Key generation: The system administrator generates a private key based on the user's attribute set S. For each attribute i∈S, let H(i) be the hash function that maps the attribute to G1. For each user, select a random value r∈Z p , generate the user's private key: SK = {D i =g r ·H(i) a |i∈S}.

[0066] (3) Encryption phase: The encryptor chooses the plaintext M∈G T , and define access policy A. Next, select a random number s∈Z p , and encrypt the plaintext. Generate the symmetric key K = M·e(g,g) as , the corresponding encrypted ciphertext is: C = (C1 = g s ,{C i =H(i) s |i∈A},C2=M·e(g,g) as ), where C1 is the encrypted part of the random number, C i It is the attribute-related encryption part, and C2 is the mixed encryption part of the plaintext.

[0067] (4) Proxy re-encryption key generation: Assuming that the data owner wants to transfer the ciphertext to a new user, a proxy re-encryption key is generated. For the original access policy A and the new access policy A', a re-encryption key RK is generated. Proxy re-encryption key: RK = (g r' ,H(i') r' ,e(g r' ,g s )), where r' is a randomly chosen value for the new user and i'∈A'.

[0068] (5) Re-encryption phase: The proxy re-encrypts the ciphertext without decrypting the original plaintext. Using the proxy re-encryption key RK, the original ciphertext C is converted into a ciphertext that the new user can decrypt. The new attribute encryption part is regenerated: C' i =C i ·RK i =H(i')·H(i) r' Thus, a new re-encrypted ciphertext C' is obtained.

[0069] (6) Decryption phase: The new user receives the re-encrypted ciphertext C' and uses his own private key to decrypt the symmetric key K and restore the plaintext. The new user uses the private key to decrypt: e(D i ,C' i )=e(g r' ,H(i') s )=e(g,g) r's , recover the symmetric key through the attribute set A': M = C2 / e(g,g) as ,Finally, the new user can recover the plaintext M by decrypting the ciphertext.

[0070] This algorithm controls access rights through bilinear pairings e and attribute sets, implements proxy re-encryption, and provides flexible encryption and decryption operations in complex scenarios with multiple users and multiple attributes.

[0071] The steps of secure storage based on revocable attribute-based encryption (RABE) and blockchain described in step (S04) of the present invention are as follows:

[0072] (1) Public key generation: Let G1 and G2 be two bilinear groups, the generator is g∈G1, and the bilinear mapping is e:G1×G1→G2. Let the master key MSK = α∈Z p , the public key PK generation formula is as follows: PK = {g, g α ,e(g,g) α}, α∈Z p .

[0073] (2) Key generation: Assume that the user's attribute set is S = {A1, A2, ..., An}, the master key is MSK = (α). For each attribute A i , generate the private key SK as follows: SK = {D = g α ·g r ,{D i =g r ·H(A i )} Ai∈s}, where H(A i ) is attribute A i The hash value of r∈Z p is a random number.

[0074] (3) Encryption: Given a message M∈G2 to be encrypted, the access structure is A. Generate an encryption key for each attribute using a random number s∈Z p , the ciphertext download based on blockchain is as follows: The encryption process is as follows: CT = (C = M·e(g,g) αs ,C1=g s ,{C i =H(A i ) s} Ai∈A ).

[0075] (4) Decryption: When the user's attributes satisfy the access structure, decryption is possible. Let the user's private key be SK. The decryption steps are as follows. The user calculates the intermediate value: e(D, C1) = e(g α g r ,g s )=e(g,g) αs e(g,g) rs Combined with C, we get the message M: M = C / e(D,C1) / e(g r ,g s )=M·e(g,g) αs / e(g,g) αs =M.

[0076] (5) Revocable keys: To achieve real-time revocation of attribute keys, a revocation list RL is defined, which contains all revoked key identifiers. The revoked key checking process can be expressed as, Check if SK i ∈RL, if SK i ∈RL, the corresponding user's key is revoked and cannot decrypt the message.

[0077] (6) Security model derivation: Assume that attacker A attempts to undermine the security of the system by obtaining multiple keys for decryption attacks. We use the bilinear Diffie-Hellman exponent assumption (BDHE) to ensure system security. Specifically, assume that the probability that an attacker can decrypt is P(Success of A)≤ε in the system. By constructing a difficult mathematical problem, such as the q-parallel BDHE problem, it is proved that the probability of an attacker successfully cracking is extremely small under the existing computing power.

[0078] (7) Consensus mechanism and blockchain: In blockchain, assuming that the consensus algorithm is proof of work (PoW), the generation time of each block depends on the complexity of hash calculation. Assuming the calculation complexity is D, the probability of successfully mining a block is P (Block Mined) = 1 / D. By reducing the calculation difficulty D, the block generation rate can be dynamically adjusted.

[0079] (8) Blockchain transaction verification: Assume that each transaction T x Contains information such as sender S, receiver R, amount A, signature Sig, etc. The transaction verification process can be expressed as: Verify(T x )={Sig=Valid(S,A)}, verify the transaction through the consensus mechanism and package it into the block to complete the transaction on the chain.

[0080] Based on the above derivation, our invention provides a secure storage and access control solution that combines attribute encryption, key revocation and blockchain consensus mechanism. In this solution, it can effectively deal with malicious attackers' attempts to crack encrypted data, while ensuring the security and reliability of the system's data storage and access process.

[0081] The data storage security sharing method described in step (S05) of the present invention comprises the following steps:

[0082] (1) System settings: Select user identity R = {ID1, ID2, ..., ID n}, and use a randomly selected integer to generate a signature parameter G = bP. The calculation of G is crucial for subsequent operations.

[0083] (2) Signature process: For each user, the system calculates the encrypted value, T = H1 (ID i ,pk i ),I i =GT*SK, and w i =H3(ID i ,I i ,G). These hash functions ensure user-specific signatures and data integrity

[0084] (3) Random polynomial calculation: The system calculates a polynomial λ(x) = a0+a1x+···+a n-1 x n-1 +x n ,as well as Used to enhance security. Even if some intermediate values ​​are leaked, the introduction of polynomials ensures that the overall security will not be affected.

[0085] (4) Data encryption: During the encryption process, the value To mask the random key α and storage location pos, generate the ciphertext: These ciphertexts are used to securely store video data on the blockchain.

[0086] (5) Signature generation: signature parameter S = S t +bL(modt), where L encapsulates various cryptographic parameters. This signature ensures the authenticity and integrity of the video data.

[0087] (6) Ciphertext storage: The generated ciphertext and its signature are stored in the blockchain, ensuring that only authorized users can access and verify the stored data.

[0088] (7) Ciphertext download and decryption: Authorized third-party users retrieve the signed ciphertext And calculate the required hash function and polynomial to derive the encryption key and storage location information. The decryption process calculates: The user ensures the integrity of the data by verifying that L = L'

[0089] (8) Final verification: The user verifies whether the stored data is correctly signed using the following equation: e(SP,P) = e(h(pk A +pk B +2sp)+GL,P)e(pk A +sp,F). Is it true? If true, the data is considered safe and reliable. Generate the signed ciphertext: The whole process of the present invention ensures the safe storage, retrieval and verification of video data in the intelligent video surveillance system integrated with blockchain. The integrity and authenticity of the data stored on the blockchain are ensured by using signatures and cryptographic hash functions.

[0090] The core of the present invention lies in a model composed of seven key entities, including sensor devices, edge devices, blockchain, cloud storage, InterPlanetary File System (IPFS), intelligent supervision module and data users. The model aims to significantly improve the efficiency and security of video surveillance in steel plants. During the execution of the method, sensor devices and edge devices are responsible for real-time collection and processing of various types of data in the monitoring area, and encrypting and uploading key information to the blockchain network. Blockchain technology, with its decentralized and tamper-proof characteristics, ensures the integrity and authenticity of data, and provides a strong security guarantee for the video surveillance data of steel plants. Cloud storage and IPFS together constitute a secure storage and efficient sharing platform for data. Cloud storage has strong storage capacity and scalability, and can provide a reliable storage environment for massive video data; IPFS uses its content addressing characteristics to achieve rapid retrieval and sharing of key information. The combination of the two not only ensures the reliability of data, but also improves the access efficiency of data. As the "brain" of the system, the intelligent supervision module performs real-time analysis of data uploaded to the blockchain. Through advanced data analysis algorithms, the intelligent supervision module can detect abnormal situations in a timely manner and issue warnings to provide support for the safe production of steel plants. As the ultimate beneficiary of the system, data users can access and view the monitoring data stored in the blockchain and cloud storage at any time through authorization, realizing efficient information sharing. This not only improves the utilization rate of data, but also enhances the collaboration efficiency between departments within the steel plant. With the help of blockchain technology, this method not only improves the security and transparency of the steel plant's video surveillance data, but also reduces the cost of information transmission and storage. In addition, combined with the intelligent supervision module, the system can quickly identify potential safety hazards, thereby effectively preventing accidents and safeguarding the safe production of the steel plant. In the field of information security, protecting the steel plant's intelligent video surveillance data from illegal access and preventing data tampering or leakage has always been a key challenge. As a new type of distributed data storage technology, blockchain technology provides an effective solution to this challenge with its characteristics of decentralization, non-tamperability, traceability and verifiability. Through the implementation of the present invention, the steel plant will be able to build a safe, reliable and efficient intelligent video surveillance system, providing a strong guarantee for the sustainable development of the enterprise. BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS

[0091] Figure 1 The data sharing system of the blockchain metallurgical plant, where (a) is the data sharing model, (b) is the blockchain model, and (c) is the blockchain metallurgical plant data sharing model.

[0092] Figure 2 This is a system structure diagram of a blockchain-based steel plant intelligent video surveillance data storage and security sharing method.

[0093] Figure 3This paper presents a blockchain structure for a secure sharing method of intelligent video surveillance data storage in a steel plant based on blockchain.

[0094] Figure 4 This is the encryption and decryption flow chart.

[0095] Figure 5 For the data sharing stage: the relationship between time consumption and the number of third-party users.

[0096] Figure 6 For the ciphertext download phase: the relationship between time consumption and the number of third-party users.

[0097] Figure 7 Compute a comparison of costs for the five options.

[0098] Figure 8 The communication cost comparison of five schemes.

[0099] Fig. 9 Mix encryption and decryption times for files of different sizes. DETAILED DESCRIPTION

[0100] The present invention will be further described below in conjunction with the accompanying drawings and specific embodiments.

[0101] The present invention provides a strong guarantee for the data security of the steel plant. This technology can ensure that the video surveillance data inside the plant is efficiently and safely transmitted and managed, thereby effectively preventing potential safety hazards. Figure 1 As shown in the figure, the P2P network does not rely on a specific central node. Network resources and services are provided by peer nodes in a distributed and self-organizing manner. The joining and exit of any node does not affect the overall function of the network. In iron and steel metallurgical plants, the application of intelligent video surveillance systems has become an important line of defense for protecting data security. With the help of blockchain technology, the video surveillance data of the plant can be stored in a distributed manner to ensure that the data is not lost due to a single point of failure. At the same time, the tamper-proof characteristics of the blockchain prevent the data from being illegally tampered with during transmission, ensuring the authenticity and integrity of the data. On this basis, the intelligent video surveillance system can also analyze abnormal situations within the plant in real time, and realize fast and accurate data sharing through blockchain technology. In this way, plant managers can quickly take corresponding measures to avoid accidents. Blockchain technology can also set permission management for data access within the plant to ensure that sensitive information is only disseminated within the authorized scope. As Figure 2As shown in the figure, the present invention improves the efficiency and security of video surveillance in steel plants. Sensor devices and edge devices are used to collect and process monitoring data in real time and upload key information to the blockchain. Cloud and IPFS provide a reliable data storage and sharing platform to ensure that the data is not tampered with. The intelligent supervision module is responsible for real-time analysis of the data to detect abnormal situations in a timely manner. Data users can access and view monitoring data at any time, thereby achieving efficient information sharing. By using blockchain technology, not only the security and transparency of data are improved, but also the cost of information transmission and storage is reduced.

[0102] The combination of edge devices and blockchain provides strong technical support for the smart supervision platform. Edge devices can extract key information from video streams in real time through close cooperation with sensors, greatly improving data processing efficiency. Blockchain technology ensures the integrity and security of these sensitive data and prevents information leakage and tampering. This integration of technologies not only provides strong functional support for the smart supervision platform, but also makes the storage and processing of video data more efficient and reliable. In the composition of the block header, the parent hash value plays the role of linking blocks, so that an orderly data chain is formed between blocks. The timestamp records the generation time of the block to ensure the timeliness of the data. The current hash value is the unique identifier of the block to prevent data duplication. The identifier ID is generated according to the video time period. This design enables blocks to be classified and retrieved according to specific video content. The signature information SignInf is the last link of the block header. It is a signature generated by an encryption algorithm to verify the integrity and authenticity of the block header. In the block body, the hash value IPFS_Hash of the IPFS storage detection file and the hash value Video_Hash of the video file are key information for data storage and retrieval. IPFS_Hash is used to identify a specific file, while Video_Hash is used to identify a specific video content. These two hash values ​​can be used to quickly and accurately retrieve data. Figure 3 As shown, the blockchain structure of the present invention is clearly visible. Figure 4As shown. During the overall system initialization process of the intelligent supervision platform, the detection information and video are encrypted to generate ciphertexts respectively, and this process is called encryption. Subsequently, the user uses his private key to decrypt the ciphertext, and this process is called decryption. Specifically, the detection information encryption in the encryption process, the present invention will process the detected information through an encryption algorithm to generate ciphertext. This process ensures the security of information during transmission and storage. Video encryption, similarly, the video file will also be encrypted by an encryption algorithm to protect the video content from unauthorized access. Ciphertext generation, the encrypted detection information and video each generate a set of ciphertexts, which cannot be understood without the corresponding decryption key. User private key of the decryption process, the user has a private key, which is the private part of the corresponding public key generated during the encryption process, and only the user himself knows it. Decryption operation, the user uses his private key to decrypt the ciphertext. The decryption process reverses the encryption operation and converts the ciphertext back to the original detection information or video content.

[0103] After the simulation experiment was realized, Figure 5 Shows the time consumption of executing the data sharing phase. The simulation simulates the computational overhead required for the data sharing phase in the data sharing model for third-party users from 0 to 100. Figure 6 ,The time required for data sharing in other schemes and the ,model of the present invention gradually increases as the number of authorized ,third-party users increases.,However, the model of the present invention has higher ,computational efficiency at this stage. Figure 6 The simulation experiment shows the time consumption of executing the ciphertext download stage. The simulation simulates the computational overhead required for the ciphertext download stage in the data sharing model for third-party users from 0 to 100. The model of the present invention has higher computational efficiency at this stage. Figure 5 and Figure 6 It can be further observed that with the rapid growth in the number of third-party users, the time consumption fluctuation of the model of the present invention is relatively small and the growth rate is relatively slow. It has good robustness and is more suitable for blockchain data sharing models with frequent changes in the number of nodes, limited computing resources, and high execution efficiency of the algorithm. Figure 7 The computational overhead of various operations, including bilinear operation P, exponential operation E, hash operation H and multiplication operation M, is analyzed. The present invention is compared with the four schemes. The results show that the computational overhead of the present invention is lower than that of Fan et al, Wu et al and Li et al, but higher than that of Zhu et al. Figure 8Analysis shows that the communication overhead in the scheme of Fan et al is 4352 bits, the communication overhead in the scheme of Wu et al is 15360 bits, the communication overhead in the scheme of Li et al is 7168 bits, the communication overhead in the scheme of Zhu et al is 6656 bits, and the communication overhead in the scheme of the present invention is 5376 bits. It can be seen that the present invention has significant advantages in terms of communication overhead, especially in reducing unnecessary communications, thereby effectively reducing the overall cost. Fig. 9 The results show that the encryption and decryption time of the hybrid based on CP-ABE increases with the increase of file size, and the file size is almost linearly related to its encryption and decryption time.

[0104] The concept of system symbols occupies a pivotal position in the field of artificial intelligence. They are not only the basic building blocks of computer programs, but also the bridge for us to communicate with smart devices. With the help of system symbols, people can complete various tasks more efficiently, ranging from simple data processing to complex logical operations. With the continuous development of artificial intelligence technology, it can help computers understand human language, thereby achieving more intelligent dialogue and communication. In addition, the application of symbolic logic in fields such as autonomous driving and financial forecasting has greatly improved the accuracy and efficiency of data processing. However, the application of system symbols is not smooth sailing. In actual operation, how to choose appropriate symbols to express specific meanings has become a problem to be solved. In order to solve this problem, researchers are working hard to develop more flexible and efficient symbol systems. At the same time, with the rise of quantum computers, people have also begun to explore how to use symbolic technology in the quantum field to open up new paths for the development of artificial intelligence. In short, as an important part of the field of artificial intelligence, the development and application of system symbols will undoubtedly greatly promote the progress of science and technology. The main symbols of the present invention are shown in Table 1.

[0105] Table 1 Main symbols of the present invention

[0106]

[0107] The correctness of the proposed method depends on the following three theorems:

[0108] Theorem 1 In the key generation algorithm, it is verified that the partial private key generated by PKS is correct. Proof: By establishing equation D i P=E i +sp ensures the correctness of the user's partial private key, which can be deduced as follows:D i P=(w i +s)P=w i P+sP=E i +sp. Therefore, Theorem 1 is correct.

[0109] Theorem 2 In the proxy authorization algorithm, the verification proxy information is correct.

[0110] Proof: By establishing the equation e(VP,P)=e(hP+F,pk A +sp) ensures the correctness of proxy information, which can be deduced as follows:

[0111] e(VP,P)=e((h+f)(H1(UD A ,X A )x A +w A +s)P,P)

[0112] =e(H1(UD A ,X A )X A +E A +sp,hP+F)

[0113] =e(pk A +sp,hP+F)

[0114] Therefore, Theorem 2 is correct.

[0115] Theorem 3 In the decryption algorithm, it is correct to verify the validity of the signature by calculating the signature parameters.

[0116] Proof: By establishing the equation e(S p P,P)=e(h(pk A +pk B +2sp)+GL,P)e(pk A +sp,F) to verify the validity of the signature, which can be deduced as follows:

[0117] e(S p P,P)=e((h+f)sk A +h·sk B +gL)P,P)

[0118] =e((h□sk A +f·sk A +h·sk B +gL)P,P)

[0119] =e((h(sk A +sk B )+f·sk A +gL)P,P)

[0120] =e((h(H1UD A ,X A )x A +w A +H1(UDB ,X B )x B +w B +2·s+f(H1(UD A ,X A )x A +w A +s)+gL)P,P)

[0121] =e(h(pk A +sp)+h(pk B +sp)+f(pk A +sp)+GL,P)

[0122] =e(h(pk A +pk B +2sp)+GL,P)e(f(pk A +sp),P)

[0123] =e(h(pk A +pk B +2sp)+GL,P)e(pk A +sp),fP)

[0124] =e(h(pk A +pk B +2sp)+GL,P)e(pk A +sp,F)

[0125] Therefore, Theorem 3 is correct. When verifying whether the source of the message is reliable, the use of bilinear pairing operations has been minimized. In the proxy authorization stage, e(VP,P) is independent of the data sharing operation and can be calculated before sharing the data. The model and the existing model calculation amount will be compared. Define P to represent the bilinear mapping calculation, n to represent the number of third-party users, H to represent the hash function operation used to process short messages, and E to represent the modular exponentiation operation. The system ensures its security and reliability through the immutability and fault tolerance of the blockchain. In terms of data information collection and processing, the combination of edge computing and the network is adopted, and IPFS and the cloud are used for storage. In terms of access control, we abandon the traditional access method based on the real identity of the user and adopt an access control method based on user attributes. When a user accesses the system, the intelligent monitoring center will assign the corresponding private key according to the user's attributes. Only users who meet the access structure can successfully access the system. This design enhances the anonymity of the system.

[0126] We conducted experiments to verify the encryption algorithm of the present invention. The experimental environment includes an operating system of 64-bit Windows 10 Professional Edition and computer hardware of Core i7-7500U CPU, 12GB RAM, 512G solid state, compiler is IntelliJ IDEA, and the compiled language is Python.

[0127] The detailed process of the data sharing stage is shown in Table 2.

[0128] Table 2 Algorithm 1

[0129]

[0130] Ciphertext downloading phase: The relationship between time consumption and the number of third-party users is shown in Table 3.

[0131] Table 3 Algorithm 2

[0132]

[0133]

[0134] Table 4 shows the time taken for each function when it is run 1000 times.

[0135] Table 4 Time required for related operations

[0136]

[0137] Table 5 analyzes the computational overhead of the four operations.

[0138] Table 5 Computational overhead comparison

[0139]

[0140] Assume that G1, G2 and The bit length of both is 1024 bits, and the size of the symmetric ciphertext is C x is 128 bits. In the four schemes Fan et al, Wu et al, Li et al and Zhu et al, the communication overhead is 4352 bits, 15360 bits, 7168 bits and 6656 bits respectively. The total communication overhead of the scheme of the present invention is 5376 bits. It can be seen that the scheme of the present invention has significant advantages in terms of communication overhead, especially in reducing unnecessary communication, thereby effectively reducing the overall cost.

[0141] Table 6. Communication overhead comparison

[0142]

[0143] Compared with other solutions, the disadvantage of not being able to store the video completely is that the blockchain is added to further improve the security of the present invention. In the face of massive videos, the computing workload is allocated to edge devices, which reduces the computing pressure of the center. The access is further detailed as shown in Table 7.

[0144] Table 7 Comparison results of related schemes

[0145]

[0146] In the present invention, the number of attributes in CP-ABE remains unchanged, and the attributes are fixed to 4. The first category compares the encryption parameters of the same file, as shown in Table 8, indicating that the encryption time of hybrid encryption is shorter, but because it performs two-step decryption, it is slightly longer than the simple CP-ABE decryption; the second category compares the time of hybrid encryption and decryption of different files, indicating that the time of hybrid encryption and decryption based on CP-ABE will increase with the increase of the file, and the size of the file is approximately linearly related to its encryption and decryption time.

[0147] Table 8 Comparison of different capacity encryption algorithms

[0148]

Claims

1. A blockchain-based steel plant intelligent video surveillance data storage and security sharing method, characterized by The following steps are involved: (S01) Initializing the system parameter k by inputting the security parameter, and generating the public key PKS and the master key TMK by the attribute-based encryption algorithm; Used for pre-processing on edge devices, including filtering and format conversion; Receiving a public key, an access structure and detection information as input, generating an encrypted detection information ciphertext through an encryption operation, and storing the ciphertext in a distributed storage system; (S02) Using the key generation algorithm, by constructing a matrix and defining a function, the shares of the shared key S are distributed in different rows of the matrix; constructing a matrix M x×y , let function p(i) map each row of the matrix to p(i), randomly select y1,y2,...y n ∈z p , forming a vector v = (s, y1, y2, ···y n ) T , where s is the shared key value, and s∈Z p , thus forming n shares of the shared key s; (S03) re-encrypting the data using a hybrid proxy re-encryption algorithm based on a ciphertext strategy, including the following steps: (1) System initialization: Set the security parameter λ. During the system initialization phase, the public parameter PK and the master key MK are generated. Assume that the bilinear pairing e:G1×G2→G T , where G1 and G T are two cyclic groups, with order p as prime number; select generator g∈G1, select master key MK=(g a ,a∈Z p ), public parameter PK=(g,g a ,e(g,g)); (2) Key generation: The system administrator generates a private key based on the user's attribute set S; for each attribute i∈S, let H(i) be the hash function that maps the attribute to G1; for each user, select a random value r∈Z p , generate the user's private key: SK = {D i =g r ·H(i) a |i∈S}; (3) Encryption phase: The encryptor chooses the plaintext M∈G T , and define access strategy A; next select a random number s∈Z p , and encrypt the plaintext; generate the symmetric key K = M·e(g,g) as , the corresponding encrypted ciphertext is: C=(C1=g s ,{C i =H(i) s |i∈A},C2=M·e(g,g) as ) Among them, C1 is the encrypted part of the random number, C i It is the attribute-related encrypted part, and C2 is the mixed encrypted part of the plaintext; (4) Proxy re-encryption key generation: Assuming that the data owner wants to transfer the ciphertext to a new user, a proxy re-encryption key is generated. For the original access policy A and the new access policy A', a re-encryption key RK is generated. Proxy re-encryption key: RK=(g r ',H(i') r ',e(g r ',g s )) Where r' is a randomly selected value for a new user, i'∈A'; (5) Re-encryption phase: The proxy re-encrypts the ciphertext without decrypting the original plaintext. It uses the proxy re-encryption key RK to convert the original ciphertext C into a ciphertext that the new user can decrypt. It regenerates the new attribute encryption part: C i '=C i ·RK i =H(i')·H(i) r 'Thus obtaining a new re-encrypted ciphertext C'; (6) Decryption phase: The new user receives the re-encrypted ciphertext C' and uses his own private key to decrypt the symmetric key K and restore the plaintext; the new user uses the private key to decrypt: e(D i ,C i ')=e(g r ',H(i') s )=e(g,g) r ' s , recover the symmetric key through the attribute set A': M = C2 / e(g,g) as ,Finally, the new user can recover the plaintext M by decrypting the ciphertext; The data is stored through the Interstellar File System (IPFS). The file is encrypted and calculated to generate a unique hash value Hash, which is stored in the global distributed hash table as the unique identifier of the file. When the file is downloaded, the system quickly locates and verifies the authenticity of the file based on the hash value. (S04) Based on the revocable attribute-based encryption (RABE) and the secure storage method of blockchain, secure data storage and access control are realized; a security model is constructed to evaluate its anti-attack capability. The evaluation process is as follows: (1) Setup phase: The challenger generates a public key PKS and a master key TMK. The public key is made public and the master key is retained. (2) Query phase: The attacker requests decryption keys related to different attribute sets, and the challenger generates keys using the master key TMK and returns them; (3) Challenge phase: The attacker selects plaintext messages M0 and M1 of equal length and specifies an access policy. The challenger uses the public key PKS and the access policy to encrypt one of the messages to generate a ciphertext C and sends it to the attacker. (4) Guessing stage: The attacker encrypts the message based on the guess; if the guess accuracy is significantly higher than the random level, the scheme is considered to be cracked; otherwise, the scheme is considered to be secure; (5) Security evaluation: Under the assumption that the probability of an attacker correctly guessing coin b is only negligible compared to random guessing, the CP-ABE scheme is secure, and even if the attacker obtains multiple attribute keys, if his attribute set does not satisfy the access policy, he cannot successfully decrypt the ciphertext; (6) Selective security model: The attacker needs to select the challenge matrix M before the setup phase. x×y , and submitted in the setup phase; the query phase requests the private key for a specific attribute set, and in the challenge phase, the plaintext M0 and M1 are selected, and the challenger generates the ciphertext and returns it; in the guessing phase, the attacker tries to determine the encrypted content; (7) Decision q-parallel BDHE hypothesis: Based on the decision q-parallel BDHE hypothesis, if the generator g and the exponent s are given, it is difficult to distinguish and random values; (8) Construction of simulation algorithm: The decision q-parallel BDHE problem is solved by the simulation algorithm. If the attacker can crack the encryption scheme with a significant advantage, the simulation algorithm can solve it with a non-negligible advantage, thereby ensuring the security of the encryption scheme under the selective security model. (S05) A secure sharing method for intelligent video surveillance data storage in a steel plant based on blockchain. Users verify the equation to confirm whether the stored data is correctly signed. If the equation holds, the data is considered safe and reliable. A signed ciphertext is then generated and placed in the blockchain for storage. In combination with blockchain technology, a consensus algorithm is used to verify transactions, thereby enhancing the security and robustness of the system.

2. According to claim 1, a blockchain-based steel plant intelligent video surveillance data storage and security sharing method is characterized by: The attribute-based encryption algorithm described in step (S01) includes the following steps: (1) System settings: Setup(1 k )→(PKS,TMK): The verification agency executes the algorithm, inputs the system security parameter k, and outputs the specific system public key PKS and master key TMK; Input: system security parameters, including but not limited to key length, encryption algorithm selection, and other security requirements; Execution: The verification agency processes the input security parameters through the key generation algorithm to generate the required key; (2) Detection information encryption: (PKS, F, L) → (C): Use encryption technology to protect the privacy of detection information; input public key PKS and access structure L as the basis for encrypting and decrypting detection information; also input detection information F, which is the specific content to be encrypted; after a series of encryption operations, the encrypted detection information ciphertext C is obtained; the encryption process is as follows: 1) Initialization: Determine the input public key PKS, which is used for encryption and decryption to ensure the security of data during transmission; the access structure F, which defines which users or roles can access the encrypted data, usually based on the user's attributes or permissions; and the detection information L to be encrypted, including sensor data, log information or other sensitive information; 2) Access policy evaluation: Determine the validity of user attributes based on the access structure F to ensure that only users with corresponding permissions can perform decryption operations; 3) Encryption preparation: Initialize the encryption process using a symmetric encryption algorithm or an asymmetric encryption algorithm to prepare to encrypt the detection information; 4) Encryption operation: Encrypt the detection information L to be encrypted; use the following formula to express: C=E pks (L,F,r) Where E is an encryption function, and r is a randomly generated session key or random number used to enhance encryption security; 5) Generate ciphertext: After the encryption operation, the encrypted detection information ciphertext C is obtained; this ciphertext includes: the encrypted data content, related metadata, access policy F and other necessary authentication information, so as to be verified during decryption; 6) Output ciphertext: Return the generated ciphertext C to ensure the security of information during storage or transmission; (3) Video encryption: 1) Video preprocessing: The edge device preprocesses the raw video data V. The video stream collected and preprocessed by the edge device includes image frames, audio, and other related information; 2) Initialize encryption parameters: determine and load the public key PKS, stream encryption key SEK and length parameter L; 3) Stream encryption: Use the stream encryption key SEK to stream encrypt the video data V; the encryption process can be expressed as: CV stream =StreamEncrypt(SEK,V,L) Among them, StreamEncrypt is the stream encryption function, CV stream It is the encrypted stream data; 4) Public key encryption: Use the public key PKS to encrypt the stream encryption key SEK and generate the encrypted key E PKS (SEK) so that the decryption key can be obtained by the authorized user when the video data needs to be decrypted; this process is expressed as: E PKS =Encrypt(PKS,SEK); 5) Ciphertext generation: The encrypted stream data CV stream and the encrypted key E PKS (SEK) combination to generate a complete encrypted video ciphertext CV; the structure of the ciphertext CV includes the encrypted stream data and key, length information and other metadata; 6) Video storage: Encrypted video ciphertext CV is stored in the cloud or IPFS, supporting distributed storage and access, providing decentralization and fault tolerance; (4) Key generation: 1) Initialization: Set up a random number generator RNG to generate secure random values ​​and define an empty private key set SK; 2) User attribute analysis: S = {s1, s2, ..., s n } Perform in-depth analysis to evaluate the weight and importance of each attribute and determine the relationship between attributes so that a unique private key can be generated based on these relationships; Generate random values: For each attribute s i ∈S, use the random number generator to generate a random value r i , ensuring that these random values ​​have sufficient entropy to ensure security; 3) Calculate the private key: Use the master key TMK and the generated random value r i , calculate the private key based on the user attributes; generate the private key SK using the following formula: SK = H(TMK, S, r1, r2, ..., r n ), where H is a secure hash function or encryption function, which is used to generate a private key by combining the master key, the user attribute set and the random value; output the private key: return the generated private key SK to the user, while retaining the mapping relationship of the user attribute set S for subsequent key use and management; (5) Decryption: 1) Attribute matching: Check whether the user's attribute set matches the access policy defined by the ciphertext C or the encrypted video CV; only when the user's attributes meet the access policy, the user has the authority to continue the decryption operation; 2) Decryption operation: If the attributes match, the system uses the private key SK to decrypt the ciphertext C or the encrypted video CV; the decryption process can be expressed as: V / F = Decrypt(SK, C / CV) where Decrypt is the decryption function, V represents the original video restored after decryption, and F represents the decrypted detection information; 3) Restore the original data: The decrypted content may be video data V or detection information F, depending on the input ciphertext type; if the input is encrypted video CV, the decrypted result is the original video V; if the input is ordinary ciphertext C, the decrypted result is detection information F.

3. According to claim 1, a blockchain-based steel plant intelligent video surveillance data storage and security sharing method is characterized by: The key generation algorithm in step (S02) is implemented by the user and PKS to generate the user's public key and private key, including the following steps: (1) Secret value selection: Third-party user i chooses a secret value And calculate the secret value parameter X i =x i P, P is a public system parameter that can support the subsequent key generation process; the user sends his secret value X through the public channel i and the ID i to PKS; (2) Generate partial private key and partial public key: PKS randomly selects an integer And calculate w i =H0(ID i ,X i ,u i ), get the user's partial private key D i =w i +s, s is part of the private key, which is directly used to generate the complete private key and sent to the user through a secure communication channel to ensure its security; and part of the public key E i =H0(ID i ,X i ,u i )P,D i , sent to the user through a secure communication channel, D i It is part of the public key, sent through public channels for public use. i Sent to users via public channels; (3) Generate public key and private key algorithm: PKS receives the user's partial private key D i and partial public key E i When the user judges equation D i P=E i +sp's legitimacy, if established, the user receives part of the private key D i and partial public key E i , and calculate the complete public key PKS = E i +H1(ID i ,X i )X i And the complete private key; (4) Decryption: SK={D=g a g aη ,L=g η ,D λ =f λ η }: In the decryption step, DU generates a private key, uses hashing to encrypt the IPFS return address and video address, and stores them on the blockchain; DU uses its own private key to decrypt the video and the detection information stored in IPFS. DU has attributes S = {att1,att2,...,attn}, for any attribute k in S.

4. According to claim 1, a blockchain-based steel plant intelligent video surveillance data storage and security sharing method is characterized by: The steps of secure storage based on revocable attribute-based encryption (RABE) and blockchain described in step (S04) are as follows: (1) Public key generation: Let G1 and G2 be two bilinear groups, the generator is g∈G1, and the bilinear mapping is e:G1×G1→G2; let the master key MSK = α∈Z p , the public key PK generation formula is as follows: PK = {g, g α ,e(g,g) α }, α∈Z p ; (2) Key generation: Assume that the user's attribute set is S = {A1, A2, ..., A n }, the master key is MSK = (α); for each attribute A i , generate the private key SK as follows: SK = {D = g α ·g r ,{D i =g r ·H(A i )} Ai∈s }, where H(A i ) is attribute A i The hash value of r∈Z p is a random number; (3) Encryption: Given a message M∈G2 to be encrypted, the access structure is A; generate an encryption key for each attribute using a random number s∈Z p , the ciphertext download based on blockchain is as follows: The encryption process is as follows: CT = (C = M·e(g,g) αs ,C1=g s ,{C i =H(A i ) s } Ai∈A ); (4) Decryption: When the user's attributes satisfy the access structure, decryption can be performed. Let the user's private key be SK. The decryption steps are as follows. The user calculates the intermediate value: e(D, C1) = e(g α g r ,g s )=e(g,g) αs e(g,g) rs Combined with C, we get the message M: M = C / e(D,C1) / e(g r ,g s )=M·e(g,g) αs / e(g,g) αs =M; (5) Revocable keys: To achieve real-time revocation of attribute keys, a revocation list RL is defined, which contains all revoked key identifiers; the revoked key checking process can be expressed as, Checkif SK i ∈RL, if SK i ∈RL, the corresponding user's key is revoked and cannot decrypt the message; (6) Security model derivation: Assume that attacker A attempts to undermine the security of the system by obtaining multiple keys to perform decryption attacks. We use the bilinear Diffie-Hellman exponent hypothesis (BDHE) to ensure system security. Specifically, assume that the probability that an attacker can decrypt is P (Success of A) ≤ ε in the system. By constructing a difficult mathematical problem, such as the q-parallel BDHE problem, we prove that the probability of an attacker successfully cracking is extremely small under the existing computing power. (7) Consensus mechanism and blockchain: In blockchain, assuming that the consensus algorithm is proof of work (PoW), the generation time of each block depends on the complexity of hash calculation. If the calculation complexity is set to D, the probability of successfully mining a block is P(BlockMined) = 1 / D. By reducing the calculation difficulty D, the block generation rate can be dynamically adjusted. (8) Blockchain transaction verification: Assume that each transaction T x Contains information such as sender S, receiver R, amount A, signature Sig, etc. The transaction verification process can be expressed as: Verify(T x )={Sig=Valid(S,A)}, verify the transaction through the consensus mechanism and pack it into the block, and complete the transaction on the chain; Based on the above derivation, our invention provides a secure storage and access control solution that combines attribute encryption, key revocation and blockchain consensus mechanism; in this solution, it can effectively deal with malicious attackers' attempts to crack encrypted data, while ensuring the security and reliability of the system's data storage and access process.

5. According to claim 1, a blockchain-based steel plant intelligent video surveillance data storage and security sharing method is characterized by: The data storage security sharing method described in step (S05) comprises the following steps: (1) System settings: Select user identity R = {ID1, ID2, ..., ID n }, and use the randomly selected integer b to generate the signature parameter G = bP; the calculation of G is crucial for subsequent operations; (2) Signature process: For each user, the system calculates the encrypted value, T = H1 (ID i ,pk i ),I i =GT*SK, and w i =H3(ID i ,I i ,G); these hash functions ensure user-specific signatures and data integrity (3) Random polynomial calculation: The system calculates a polynomial λ(x) = a0+a1x+···+a n-1 x n-1 +x n ,as well as Used to enhance security; even if some intermediate values ​​are leaked, the introduction of polynomials ensures that the overall security will not be affected; (4) Data encryption: During the encryption process, the value To mask the random key α and storage location pos, generate the ciphertext: These ciphertexts are used to securely store video data on the blockchain; (5) Signature generation: signature parameter S = S t +bL(modt), where L encapsulates various cryptographic parameters; this signature ensures the authenticity and integrity of the video data; (6) Ciphertext storage: The generated ciphertext and its signature are stored in the blockchain, ensuring that only authorized users can access and verify the stored data; (7) Ciphertext download and decryption: Authorized third-party users retrieve signed ciphertext And calculate the required hash function and polynomial to derive the encryption key and storage location information; the decryption process calculates: The user ensures the integrity of the data by verifying that L = L' (8) Final verification: The user verifies whether the stored data is correctly signed using the following equation: e(SP,P) = e(h(pk A +pk B +2sp)+GL,P)e(pk A +sp,F); whether it is true; if it is true, the data is considered safe and reliable; generate the signed ciphertext: And put it in the blockchain.

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