Safety protection method, device, equipment and medium for doors connected to train platforms

Abstract

The present invention relates to a method, device, equipment, and medium for protecting doors during platform coupling. The method includes synchronizing the coupling status between the head and tail onboard controllers within a train unit, and disabling door activation by the onboard control system when the train is in the coupled state. Compared to the prior art, the present invention avoids the risk of erroneous door opening caused by inconsistent coupling status calculations by the head and tail onboard controllers, and ensures that door activation is always disabled when the train is in the coupled state.

Description

Technical Field

[0001] The present invention relates to a train operation control system, and in particular to a method, device, equipment and medium for protecting the safety of doors of a train connected to a platform. Background Art

[0002] In order to solve the problems of waste of transportation capacity and decreased passenger satisfaction caused by the uneven temporal and spatial distribution of passenger flow on urban rail transit lines (tidal, Y-shaped lines, large and small intersections, shared lines, etc.), transportation organization technology based on flexible formation has come into being. It realizes automatic coupling and uncoupling of train units at specific positions on the line (such as depot lines, storage lines, reversing tracks, platforms), thereby flexibly changing the train formation and realizing a transportation organization model with the best coordination between demand and capacity.

[0003] When coupling is being performed on a mainline platform, the coupled train stops accurately and steadily at the coupling stop point on the platform and enters the coupled state upon receiving the "coupling command" issued by the Automatic Train Monitoring System (ATS). The uncoupling train collides with the coupled train at a low speed in accordance with the uncoupling command issued by the ATS, completing the coupling. Considering the collision speed and impact force during coupling, the coupled train may experience unexpected displacement. If the coupled train is currently undergoing boarding or alighting operations due to door opening conditions, the unexpected movement of the coupled train could cause harm to passengers.

[0004] After searching, CN116279668A discloses a fully automatic coupling safety protection method with on-board autonomous confirmation. It specifically discloses that after the coupled train stops at the designated position according to the operating instructions, the coupling conditions to be checked include: when the train stops at the platform, checking whether the doors are in a closed and locked state, and the door enable has been canceled.

[0005] For an on-board control system based on a head-to-tail hot standby redundant architecture, since the controllers at both ends operate independently, the train coupling status and door enable outputs calculated by the controllers at both ends may be inconsistent, resulting in the train being unable to prohibit the door opening operation as expected. The currently disclosed technology only mentions the cancellation of the door enable when the coupled train stops at the platform, but does not consider how the coupled train based on the head-to-tail redundant architecture can ensure that the controllers at both ends cancel the door enable synchronously. Therefore, for an on-board control system that adopts a head-to-tail hot standby redundant architecture, how to always ensure that the door enable of the coupled train will not be output incorrectly has become a technical problem that needs to be solved at present. Summary of the Invention

[0006] The purpose of the present invention is to overcome the defects of the above-mentioned prior art and to provide a method, device, equipment and medium for safety protection of doors of trains connected at platforms.

[0007] The purpose of the present invention can be achieved by the following technical solutions:

[0008] According to a first aspect of the present invention, a method for protecting the doors of a train coupled at a platform is provided, the method comprising synchronizing the coupled status between the head and tail on-board controllers within a train unit, and prohibiting the doors from being enabled by the on-board control system when the train is in the coupled state.

[0009] As a preferred technical solution, the coupling and uncoupling states of the coupled train include: CS0_reload state, CS1_nooperation state and CS2_be coupled state, wherein the CS0_reload state is the state when the train is loading data, the CS1_no operation state is the state when the train is not coupling and uncoupling operation, and the CS2_be coupled state is the state when the train is in the coupled state.

[0010] As a preferred technical solution, the synchronization of the connected status between the head and tail onboard controllers in the train unit includes the following steps:

[0011] Step S1: When safety conditions are met, any onboard controller in the train unit determines that the train has entered the coupled state, that is, the coupling and uncoupling state changes from the CS1_no operation state to the CS2_be coupled state. The train unit is equipped with two onboard controllers, one at the front and one at the rear of the train unit.

[0012] Step S2: The onboard controller records the cycle number of the moment of entering the CS2_be coupled state as Be_Coupled_SN, and sends the cycle number to another onboard controller in the train unit;

[0013] Step S3: When both onboard controllers in the train unit enter the connected state, the master onboard controller requests to be connected to the regional controller. In each communication cycle, one of the two onboard controllers is determined to be the master onboard controller based on their health status, and the master onboard controller sends communication messages to the outside.

[0014] Step S4: When the communication between the two onboard controllers in the train unit is interrupted, the master onboard controller requests the regional controller to cancel the connection;

[0015] Step S5: After receiving the authorization cancellation information from the regional controller, both vehicle-mounted controllers exit the coupled state, that is, change from the CS2_be coupled state back to the CS1_no operation state.

[0016] Step S6: When the master vehicle controller requests the regional controller to cancel the connection for more than the first delay time, the master vehicle controller automatically exits the connection state;

[0017] Step S7: When one onboard controller exits the connected state, the other onboard controller in the train unit also exits synchronously.

[0018] As an optimal technical solution, the safety conditions in step S1 are that the following conditions are met at the same time: the communication between the two onboard controllers in the train unit is normal; the coupler is aligned; the train unit is positioned in a safe area where coupling is allowed; the train has stopped safely; and the doors are closed and locked.

[0019] As a preferred technical solution, the first delay time in step S6 is determined by taking into account the validity period of the connection request message sent by the connected train to the regional controller, the validity period of the movement authorization message calculated by the regional controller for the de-connecting train, and the time required for the de-connecting train to emergency brake and stop.

[0020] As a preferred technical solution, when the train is in the coupled state, the onboard control system prohibits the door from being enabled, including the following steps:

[0021] Step S8: any onboard controller in the train unit checks whether the local end is in the coupled state CS2_becoupled. If so, the door is directly disabled. Otherwise, step S9 is executed.

[0022] Step S9, the onboard controller checks whether communication with another onboard controller in the train unit is normal;

[0023] Step S10: If the communication is normal, check whether the Be_Coupled_SN signal sent by the other vehicle controller is valid. If it is valid, disable the door. Otherwise, jump to step S12.

[0024] Step S11, if the communication is interrupted, check whether the Be_Coupled_SN signal sent by the other vehicle controller before the communication is interrupted is valid. If it is valid, continue to disable the door enable within the second delay time after the communication is interrupted. Otherwise, jump to step S12;

[0025] Step S12: Outputting door enable after other door opening safety conditions are met.

[0026] As a preferred technical solution, the second delay time in step S11 is determined by taking into account the validity period of the connection request message sent by the connected train to the regional controller, the validity period of the movement authorization message calculated by the regional controller for the de-connecting train, and the time required for the de-connecting train to emergency brake and stop.

[0027] As a preferred technical solution, the coupling operation is allowed to be performed only when the communication between the two onboard controllers in the coupled train is normal.

[0028] As a preferred technical solution, during the execution of the coupling operation, when the communication between the two onboard controllers in the coupled train is interrupted, the coupled train is allowed to exit the coupled state and restore door enablement only after ensuring that the uncoupling train has stopped.

[0029] As a preferred technical solution, during the execution of the coupling operation, when the communication between the two onboard controllers in the coupled train is interrupted and then restored, if the preset conditions are met, the coupling is requested to the regional controller again without manual intervention.

[0030] According to a second aspect of the present invention, a device is provided for implementing the above-mentioned method for protecting the door safety of a train connected to a platform. The device includes a first on-board controller and a second on-board controller in a train unit, a three-layer switching communication device, and a regional controller. The on-board controller includes a first logic operation unit, a vehicle input acquisition unit, and a door enable drive unit. The regional controller includes a second logic operation unit.

[0031] As a preferred technical solution, the first logic operation unit in the on-board controller receives the door closed and locked status and the coupler centering status obtained by the vehicle input acquisition unit, and at the same time integrates the information from another on-board controller and the regional controller to calculate the coupled status of the train; the door enable is calculated using the coupled status, and is output to the vehicle through the door enable drive unit.

[0032] As a preferred technical solution, the three-layer switching communication equipment is used for network communication between the first onboard controller and the second onboard controller in the train unit, as well as for vehicle-ground wireless communication.

[0033] As a preferred technical solution, the second logic operation unit in the regional controller calculates the cancellation authorization information and cooperates with the first logic operation unit in the onboard controller to maintain the coupled status of the train.

[0034] According to a third aspect of the present invention, an electronic device is provided, comprising a memory and a processor, wherein a computer program is stored in the memory, and the processor implements the method when executing the program.

[0035] According to a fourth aspect of the present invention, a computer-readable storage medium is provided, on which a computer program is stored, and when the program is executed by a processor, the method described above is implemented.

[0036] Compared with the prior art, the present invention has the following beneficial effects:

[0037] 1. The present invention designs an exchange of coupling status information between the head and tail vehicle controllers, and confirms whether the coupling state can be exited through a request / response mechanism with the regional controller. Furthermore, a safe exit mechanism for the coupling state is designed in the event of vehicle-ground communication interruption, thus avoiding the risk of accidental door opening due to inconsistent coupling status calculations by the head and tail vehicle controllers.

[0038] 2. The present invention combines the coupled status calculated by the head and tail on-board controllers and the head and tail communication status to calculate the door enable, ensuring that the door enable is always prohibited when the train is in the coupled state. In the case of asynchronous operation between the head and tail, the door enable will not be output incorrectly, ensuring the safety of passengers when the platform performs the coupling operation.

[0039] 3. The present invention is implemented through software logic, without the need for additional hardware devices or additional communication interfaces;

[0040] 4. The present invention is completed automatically by the system without manual intervention. BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS

[0041] Figure 1 Schematic diagram of train coupling at a platform in an embodiment of the present invention;

[0042] Figure 2 Schematic diagram of coupling and uncoupling state transition of a coupled train in an embodiment of the present invention;

[0043] Figure 3 This is a flowchart of the synchronization process of the connected state between the vehicle-mounted controllers in an embodiment of the present invention;

[0044] Figure 4 This is a flowchart of the vehicle control system disabling door enabling in an embodiment of the present invention;

[0045] Figure 5 Schematic diagram of a door safety protection device connected to a train platform in an embodiment of the present invention. DETAILED DESCRIPTION

[0046] The following will clearly and completely describe the technical solutions in the embodiments of the present invention in conjunction with the accompanying drawings. Obviously, the described embodiments are part of the embodiments of the present invention, not all of them. Based on the embodiments of the present invention, all other embodiments obtained by ordinary technicians in this field without making creative efforts should fall within the scope of protection of the present invention.

[0047] Unless otherwise defined, the technical or scientific terms used in this application should have the ordinary meaning understood by a person of ordinary skill in the technical field to which this application belongs. The words "one", "a", "the" and the like used in this application do not indicate a limit on quantity and may indicate the singular or plural. The terms "include", "comprise", "have" and any variations thereof used in this application are intended to cover non-exclusive inclusions; for example, a process, method, system, product or device that includes a series of steps or modules (units) is not limited to the listed steps or units, but may also include steps or units that are not listed, or may also include other steps or units that are inherent to these processes, methods, products or devices. The words "connect", "connected", "coupled" and the like used in this application are not limited to physical or mechanical connections, but may include electrical connections, whether direct or indirect. The word "multiple" used in this application refers to two or more. "And / or" describes the association relationship of associated objects, indicating that three relationships can exist. For example, "A and / or B" can mean: A exists alone, A and B exist at the same time, and B exists alone. The character " / " generally indicates that the objects before and after are in an "or" relationship. The terms "first", "second", "third", etc. involved in this application are only used to distinguish similar objects and do not represent a specific order for the objects.

[0048] This embodiment provides a method for protecting the doors of trains coupled at a platform, the method including synchronizing the coupled status between the head and tail on-board controllers in a train unit, and prohibiting the doors from being enabled by the on-board control system when the train is in the coupled state.

[0049] Figure 1 This is a schematic diagram of train coupling at the platform in an embodiment of the present invention. The specific process is as follows:

[0050] The coupled train stops accurately and steadily at the coupled stop point on the platform, and enters the coupled state after meeting the conditions, and sends a "request to be coupled" to the zone controller (hereinafter referred to as ZC); based on the coupling request information, the ZC determines that the coupled train in front of the going train has met the coupling conditions, and calculates the movement authorization allowing coupling for the going train.

[0051] When the coupled train does not meet the coupling conditions, it sends a "request to cancel coupling" to ZC; after ZC receives the cancellation request sent by the coupled train, it first withdraws the mobile authorization terminal of the coupled train, and after confirming that the coupled train has stopped in front of the withdrawn mobile authorization terminal, it sends an "authorization to cancel coupling" message to the coupled train; after receiving the "authorization to cancel coupling" message sent by ZC, the coupled train exits the coupled state.

[0052] It can be seen from this that there is a possibility of collision between the coupled train and the uncoupled train during the entire process from entering the coupled state to exiting the coupled state. In order to avoid the risk of injury to passengers boarding and alighting due to unexpected movement of the coupled train during coupling, the doors of the coupled train should be prohibited from being enabled throughout the coupling process.

[0053] The following part of the embodiment of the present invention will describe how to always ensure that the door enable of the connected train will not be output incorrectly for an on-board control system that adopts a head-to-tail hot standby redundant architecture.

[0054] Figure 2 This figure shows the coupling and uncoupling state transitions for a coupled train in this embodiment. The coupled and uncoupling states of a coupled train include: CS0_reload, CS1_no operation, and CS2_be coupled. The CS0_reload state indicates when the train is loading data, the CS1_no operation state indicates when the train is not in coupling and uncoupling operation, and the CS2_be coupled state indicates when the train is coupled.

[0055] The coupling / uncoupling state transitions from the CS2_be coupled state to the CS0_reload state, indicating successful coupling and the start of loading new train formation data. The coupling / uncoupling state transitions from the CS1_no operation state to the CS0_reload state, indicating that the train has been uncoupled and the start of loading new train formation data. The coupling / uncoupling state transitions from the CS0_reload state to the CS1_no operation state, indicating that the train formation data has been loaded and normal operation services can begin. These state transitions do not occur during the coupling process and have no safety impact on boarding and alighting operations. Therefore, the present invention focuses on the transitions between the coupling / uncoupling states CS2_be coupled and CS1_no operation, as well as how to achieve synchronization between the two onboard controllers within the train unit.

[0056] For the onboard control system, which utilizes a head-to-tail hot standby redundant architecture, the train unit features two onboard controllers, located at the head and tail of the train unit. During each communication cycle, one of the two controllers is determined to be the primary controller based on its health status. The primary controller then sends communication messages.

[0057] like Figure 3 As shown, the synchronization of the connected status between the head and tail onboard controllers in the train unit includes the following steps:

[0058] In step S1, when the following safety conditions are met, any onboard controller in the train unit determines that the train has entered the coupled state, that is, the coupling and uncoupling state changes from the CS1_no operation state to the CS2_be coupled state:

[0059] The communication between the two onboard controllers in the train unit is normal;

[0060] The coupler is aligned;

[0061] The train unit is positioned within the safe zone where coupling is permitted;

[0062] The train has come to a safe stop;

[0063] The doors are closed and locked.

[0064] In step S2, the onboard controller records the cycle number of the moment of entering the CS2_be coupled state as Be_Coupled_SN, and sends the cycle number to another onboard controller in the train unit.

[0065] Step S3: When both onboard controllers in the train unit enter the coupled state, the master onboard controller requests the regional controller to be coupled.

[0066] Step S4: When the communication between the two onboard controllers in the train unit is interrupted, the master onboard controller requests the zone controller (ZC) to cancel the connection.

[0067] Step S5: After receiving the authorization cancellation information from the regional controller, both vehicle-mounted controllers exit the coupled state, that is, change from the CS2_be coupled state back to the CS1_no operation state.

[0068] Step S6: When the master vehicle controller requests the regional controller to cancel the connection for more than the delay time T1, the master vehicle controller automatically exits the connection state.

[0069] The delay time T1 is determined by taking into account the validity period of the connection request message sent by the connected train to the regional controller, the validity period of the movement authorization message calculated by the regional controller for the connecting train, and the time required for the connecting train to stop by emergency braking.

[0070] Step S7: When one onboard controller exits the connected state, the other onboard controller in the train unit also exits synchronously.

[0071] like Figure 4 As shown, when the train is in the coupled state, the onboard control system prohibits door enabling, including the following steps:

[0072] Step S8: any onboard controller in the train unit checks whether the local end is in the coupled state CS2_becoupled. If so, the door is directly disabled. Otherwise, step S9 is executed.

[0073] Step S9, the onboard controller checks whether communication with another onboard controller in the train unit is normal;

[0074] Step S10: If the communication is normal, check whether the Be_Coupled_SN signal sent by the other vehicle controller is valid. If it is valid, disable the door. Otherwise, jump to step S12.

[0075] Step S11, if the communication is interrupted, check whether the Be_Coupled_SN signal sent by the other vehicle controller before the communication is interrupted is valid. If valid, continuously disable the door enable within the delay time T2 after the communication is interrupted. Otherwise, jump to step S12;

[0076] Step S12: Outputting door enable after other door opening safety conditions are met.

[0077] The delay time T2 is determined by taking into account the validity period of the connection request message sent by the connected train to the regional controller, the validity period of the movement authorization message calculated by the regional controller for the connecting train, and the time required for the connecting train to stop by emergency braking.

[0078] The coupling operation is allowed only when the communication between the two onboard controllers in the coupled train is normal, to avoid the erroneous output of the door enable command to the vehicle during the coupling due to the asynchrony between the two onboard controllers (one end prohibits the door enable due to entering the coupled state, while the other end allows the door enable due to not entering the coupled state).

[0079] During the coupling operation, when the communication between the two onboard controllers in the coupled train is interrupted, the coupled train is allowed to exit the coupled state and restore door enable only after ensuring that the uncoupled train has stopped.

[0080] During the coupling operation, when the communication between the two onboard controllers in the coupled train is interrupted and then restored, if the preset conditions are met, the train will request the regional controller to be coupled again without manual intervention.

[0081] For an onboard control system that adopts a head-to-tail hot standby redundant architecture, the present invention briefly describes the safety protection of the doors of the coupled trains in the case of head-to-tail asynchronous operation as follows:

[0082] - Single-ended restart: When one onboard controller restarts, the previously calculated CS2_be coupled state is lost. However, it can communicate with the other onboard controller in the train unit to determine whether the train is currently coupled (step S2), thereby disabling the door enable according to step S10.

[0083] - Asynchronous calculations between the head and tail trains: Onboard controller 1 is in the CS2_be coupled state, and onboard controller 2 is in the CS1_nooperation state. First, according to step S3, if the coupled states calculated by the onboard controllers at both ends are inconsistent, no coupling request will be sent to the ZC, and the ZC will not authorize the uncoupling train to execute the uncoupling. If asynchronous calculations between the head and tail trains occur after the coupling request is sent to the ZC, onboard controller 2 may also disable door enabling according to steps S2 and S10.

[0084] - If the communication between the head and tail is interrupted, first, according to step S1, the on-board controller does not allow the train to enter the coupled state; secondly, if the communication is interrupted after the train enters the coupled state, according to step S4, the on-board controller 1 will request the ZC to cancel the coupling; according to steps S5 and S6, it is ensured that the on-board controller 1 has definitely exited the coupled state after the delay time T1; therefore, according to step S11, the on-board controller 2 only needs to keep the door enabled during the delay time T2 of the communication interruption.

[0085] The above is an introduction to a method embodiment. The following further illustrates the solution of the present invention through an apparatus embodiment.

[0086] This embodiment also provides a device for implementing the above-mentioned method for protecting the doors of trains connected at the platform. Figure 5 As shown, the device includes an onboard controller 1 and an onboard controller 2 in a train unit, a three-layer switching communication device, and a regional controller, wherein the onboard controller includes a first logic operation unit, a vehicle input acquisition unit, and a door enable drive unit, and the regional controller includes a second logic operation unit.

[0087] The first logic operation unit in the on-board controller receives the door closing and locking status and the coupler centering status obtained by the vehicle input acquisition unit, and at the same time calculates the coupled status of the train by integrating information from another on-board controller and the regional controller; uses the coupled status to calculate the door enable and outputs it to the vehicle through the door enable drive unit.

[0088] The three-layer switching communication equipment is used for network communication between the onboard controller 1 and the onboard controller 2 in the train unit, and can perform vehicle-to-ground wireless communication between the onboard controller and the regional controller to achieve secure interaction of network information.

[0089] The second logic operation unit in the regional controller calculates the uncoupling movement authorization for the uncoupling train based on the coupling request of the coupled train; and feeds back the coupling cancellation authorization information to the coupled train based on the coupling cancellation request of the coupled train, and cooperates with the first logic operation unit in the on-board controller to maintain the coupled status of the train.

[0090] The electronic device of the present invention includes a central processing unit (CPU), which can perform various appropriate actions and processes according to computer program instructions stored in a read-only memory (ROM) or loaded from a storage unit into a random access memory (RAM). In the RAM, various programs and data required for device operation can also be stored. The CPU, ROM, and RAM are connected to each other via a bus. An input / output (I / O) interface is also connected to the bus.

[0091] Many components in a device are connected to the I / O interface, including: input units, such as a keyboard and mouse; output units, such as various types of displays and speakers; storage units, such as magnetic disks and optical disks; and communication units, such as network cards, modems, and wireless communication transceivers. The communication unit allows the device to exchange information / data with other devices via computer networks such as the Internet and / or various telecommunication networks.

[0092] The processing unit performs the various methods and processes described above, such as methods S1 to S12. For example, in some embodiments, methods S1 to S12 may be implemented as a computer software program, which is tangibly contained in a machine-readable medium, such as a storage unit. In some embodiments, part or all of the computer program may be loaded and / or installed on the device via a ROM and / or a communication unit. When the computer program is loaded into the RAM and executed by the CPU, one or more steps of methods S1 to S12 described above may be performed. Alternatively, in other embodiments, the CPU may be configured to execute methods S1 to S12 in any other appropriate manner (e.g., by means of firmware).

[0093] The functions described above herein may be performed, at least in part, by one or more hardware logic components. For example, and without limitation, exemplary types of hardware logic components that may be used include: field programmable gate arrays (FPGAs), application specific integrated circuits (ASICs), application specific standard products (ASSPs), systems on chip (SOCs), complex programmable logic devices (CPLDs), and the like.

[0094] The program code for implementing the method of the present invention can be written in any combination of one or more programming languages. Such program code can be provided to a processor or controller of a general-purpose computer, a special-purpose computer, or other programmable data processing device so that when the program code is executed by the processor or controller, the functions / operations specified in the flow chart and / or block diagram are implemented. The program code can be executed entirely on the machine, partially on the machine, as a stand-alone software package, partially on the machine and partially on a remote machine, or entirely on a remote machine or server.

[0095] In the context of the present invention, machine-readable medium can be a tangible medium that can contain or store a program for use with an instruction execution system, device or equipment or used in combination with an instruction execution system, device or equipment. Machine-readable medium can be a machine-readable signal medium or a machine-readable storage medium. Machine-readable medium can include, but is not limited to, electronic, magnetic, optical, electromagnetic, infrared or semiconductor systems, devices or equipment, or any suitable combination of the foregoing. More specific examples of machine-readable storage media can include electrical connections based on one or more lines, portable computer disks, hard disks, random access memories (RAM), read-only memories (ROM), erasable programmable read-only memories (EPROM or flash memory), optical fibers, portable compact disk read-only memories (CD-ROM), optical storage devices, magnetic storage devices, or any suitable combination of the foregoing.

[0096] The above description is merely a specific embodiment of the present invention, but the scope of protection of the present invention is not limited thereto. Any person skilled in the art can easily conceive of various equivalent modifications or substitutions within the technical scope disclosed in the present invention, and such modifications or substitutions are intended to be within the scope of protection of the present invention. Therefore, the scope of protection of the present invention shall be subject to the scope of protection of the claims.

Claims

1. A method for protecting the doors of trains connected to platforms, characterized in that: The method includes synchronizing the coupled state between the head and tail onboard controllers in the train unit, and prohibiting the onboard control system from enabling the doors when the train is in the coupled state; The synchronization of the connected status between the head and tail onboard controllers in the train unit includes the following steps: Step S1: When safety conditions are met, any onboard controller in the train unit determines that the train has entered the coupled state, that is, the coupling and uncoupling state changes from the CS1_no operation state to the CS2_be coupled state. The train unit is equipped with two onboard controllers, one at the front and one at the rear of the train unit. Step S2: The onboard controller records the cycle number of the moment of entering the CS2_be coupled state as Be_Coupled_SN, and sends the cycle number to another onboard controller in the train unit; Step S3: When both onboard controllers in the train unit enter the connected state, the master onboard controller requests to be connected to the regional controller. In each communication cycle, one of the two onboard controllers is determined to be the master onboard controller based on their health status, and the master onboard controller sends communication messages to the outside. Step S4: When the communication between the two onboard controllers in the train unit is interrupted, the master onboard controller requests the regional controller to cancel the connection; Step S5: After receiving the authorization cancellation information from the regional controller, both vehicle-mounted controllers exit the coupled state, that is, change from the CS2_be coupled state back to the CS1_no operation state. Step S6: When the master vehicle controller requests the regional controller to cancel the connection for more than the first delay time, the master vehicle controller automatically exits the connection state; Step S7: When one onboard controller exits the connected state, the other onboard controller in the train unit also exits synchronously.

2. A method for protecting the doors of trains connected to platforms according to claim 1, characterized in that: The coupling and uncoupling states of a coupled train include: CS0_reload state, CS1_no operation state, and CS2_be coupled state. The CS0_reload state is the state when the train is loading data, the CS1_no operation state is the state when the train is not coupling and uncoupling, and the CS2_be coupled state is the state when the train is coupled.

3. The method for protecting the doors of trains connected to platforms according to claim 1, characterized in that: The safety conditions in step S1 are that the following conditions are met simultaneously: the communication between the two onboard controllers in the train unit is normal; the coupler is aligned; the train unit is positioned in a safe area where coupling is allowed; the train has stopped safely; and the doors are closed and locked.

4. The method for protecting the doors of trains connected to platforms according to claim 1, characterized in that: The first delay time in step S6 is determined by taking into account the validity period of the connection request message sent by the connected train to the regional controller, the validity period of the movement authorization message calculated by the regional controller for the disconnecting train, and the time required for the disconnecting train to stop by emergency braking.

5. The method for protecting the doors of trains connected to platforms according to claim 1, characterized in that: When the train is in the coupled state, the onboard control system prohibits door enabling, including the following steps: Step S8: Any onboard controller in the train unit checks whether the local end is in the coupled state CS2_be coupled. If so, the door is directly disabled. Otherwise, step S9 is executed. Step S9, the onboard controller checks whether communication with another onboard controller in the train unit is normal; Step S10: If the communication is normal, check whether the Be_Coupled_SN signal sent by the other vehicle controller is valid. If it is valid, disable the door. Otherwise, jump to step S12. Step S11, if the communication is interrupted, check whether the Be_Coupled_SN signal sent by the other vehicle controller before the communication is interrupted is valid. If it is valid, continue to disable the door enable within the second delay time after the communication is interrupted. Otherwise, jump to step S12; Step S12: Outputting door enable after other door opening safety conditions are met.

6. A method for protecting the doors of trains connected to platforms according to claim 5, characterized in that: The second delay time in step S11 is determined by taking into account the validity period of the connection request message sent by the connected train to the regional controller, the validity period of the movement authorization message calculated by the regional controller for the disconnecting train, and the time required for the disconnecting train to stop by emergency braking.

7. The method for protecting the doors of trains connected to platforms according to claim 1, characterized in that: The coupling operation is allowed only when the communication between the two onboard controllers in the coupled train is normal.

8. A method for protecting the doors of trains connected to platforms according to claim 7, characterized in that: During the coupling operation, when the communication between the two onboard controllers in the coupled train is interrupted, the coupled train is allowed to exit the coupled state and restore door enable only after ensuring that the uncoupled train has stopped.

9. A method for protecting the doors of trains connected to platforms according to claim 7, characterized in that: During the coupling operation, when the communication between the two onboard controllers in the coupled train is interrupted and then restored, if the preset conditions are met, the regional controller is requested to be coupled again without manual intervention.

10. A device for implementing the door safety protection method of a train connected to a platform as described in any one of claims 1 to 9, the device comprising a first onboard controller and a second onboard controller in a train unit, a three-layer switching communication device and a regional controller, the onboard controller comprising a first logic operation unit, a vehicle input acquisition unit, and a door enable drive unit, and the regional controller comprising a second logic operation unit.

11. The device according to claim 10, characterized in that The first logic operation unit in the on-board controller receives the door closed and locked status and the coupler centering status obtained by the vehicle input acquisition unit, and at the same time calculates the coupled status of the train by integrating information from another on-board controller and the regional controller; calculates the door enable using the coupled status, and outputs it to the vehicle through the door enable drive unit.

12. The device according to claim 10, characterized in that The three-layer switching communication equipment is used for network communication between the first onboard controller and the second onboard controller in the train unit, as well as for vehicle-ground wireless communication.

13. The device according to claim 10, characterized in that The second logic operation unit in the regional controller calculates the cancellation authorization information and cooperates with the first logic operation unit in the onboard controller to maintain the coupled state of the train.

14. An electronic device comprising a memory and a processor, wherein a computer program is stored in the memory, wherein: When the processor executes the program, the method according to any one of claims 1 to 9 is implemented.

15. A computer-readable storage medium having a computer program stored thereon, characterized in that: When the program is executed by a processor, the method according to any one of claims 1 to 9 is implemented.

Images