A vehicle platooning control method for defending against eavesdropping attacks

Abstract

The present invention discloses a vehicle formation driving control method for defending against eavesdropping attacks, belonging to the field of vehicle network security technology. During the wireless transmission process of the formation vehicles, a designed fuzzy vector is introduced to effectively protect the state privacy and complete the formation control task at the same time. The method comprises the following steps: determining the lead vehicle and the following vehicle, and then determining the network topology; the lead vehicle randomly generates a fuzzy vector that meets the conditions, and transmits the false state to the following vehicle according to the formation control communication protocol; the following vehicle designs a noise vector and receives the fuzzy vector transmitted by the lead vehicle, and when communicating with the front and rear adjacent vehicles, transmits its own false state according to the designed formation control communication protocol; constructs a second-order dynamic model of the lead vehicle and the following vehicle, designs the control input based on the formation control communication protocol, and completes the formation control. The present invention has the advantages of simple operation, low computational complexity, and strong real-time performance.

Description

Technical Field

[0001] The present invention belongs to the technical field of vehicle formation safety control, and in particular relates to a vehicle formation travel control method for defending against eavesdropping attacks. Background Art

[0002] With the development of communication technology, inter-vehicle communication ensures real-time sharing of status information between vehicles, enabling vehicles to adjust their status based on the motion of adjacent vehicles, thereby maintaining a stable platoon formation. This helps improve road capacity and efficiency, conserve energy, and protect the environment. However, this shared information includes sensitive information, such as the leader's trajectory. In an open communication environment, eavesdroppers can illegally obtain sensitive information by eavesdropping on communication channels, disrupting the smooth completion of the platooning mission and even threatening the safety of the driver.

[0003] In the prior art, patent application number CN201910294303.1, entitled "A Vehicle Platoon Evaluation Method Based on Privacy Protection," proposes a solution that uses bilinear mapping to ensure information authenticity, homomorphic encryption algorithms and timestamps to protect the immutability of vehicle trust values, and filterable truth values ​​to calculate vehicle trust values, thereby achieving a secure assessment of vehicle platoons. However, this method only assesses the behavior of platoon vehicles and does not protect the privacy of transmitted information. The open communication environment in which platoon vehicles transmit data makes it easy for eavesdroppers to obtain vehicle status and further disrupt the completion of the platooning mission. Furthermore, patent application number CN202410140826.1, entitled "A Vehicle Platoon Security Monitoring System Based on Remote Driving," proposes a solution that uses a monitoring center to monitor and manage the status of vehicle platoons and provide early warnings and handling of abnormal situations. This method improves the safety of platooning but does not protect data privacy.

[0004] In summary, how to design a platoon control communication protocol that has practical engineering application value, is lightweight, has low computational complexity, can effectively defend against eavesdropping attacks to infer vehicle status, and protects the privacy of vehicle owners has become a difficult problem that needs to be solved urgently. Summary of the Invention

[0005] In order to solve the threat posed by eavesdropping attacks to vehicle platooning tasks, the present invention provides a vehicle platooning driving control method for defending against eavesdropping attacks.

[0006] Technical solution: The present invention discloses a vehicle formation driving control method for defending against eavesdropping attacks, comprising the following steps:

[0007] (1) Initialize the N-vehicle platooning task. Set the front vehicle in the platoon as the leader vehicle, numbered 0, and the direction of the leader vehicle's movement is the platoon's direction of travel. Set the other vehicles in the platoon as follower vehicles, numbered {1,...,(N-1)}. The leader vehicle establishes a communication connection with each follower vehicle, and each follower vehicle also communicates with its front and rear adjacent vehicles.

[0008] (2) A weighted directed graph G(V,E,A) is established to represent the network structure of the vehicle formation and the communication relationship between vehicles, V = {v1,v2,...,v n} represents the set of nodes in the network, each node represents a vehicle in the formation, represents the edge set, A=[a ij ] n×n represents the adjacency matrix of graph G;

[0009] (3) Selecting the position and velocity of the vehicle as the system state, establishing a second-order vehicle dynamics model of the lead vehicle and the following vehicle, extracting state information from the system state, adding fuzzy vectors and random noise, and periodically exchanging the state information based on the communication relationship between the vehicles;

[0010] (4) Based on its own status and the status information received from the lead vehicle and adjacent vehicles, the following vehicle designs a platoon control communication protocol so that the following vehicle and the lead vehicle reach the same speed and the same safe distance is maintained between the vehicles in the platoon.

[0011] Furthermore, the adjacency matrix A in step (2) is [a ij ] n×n When the conditions i≠j and (i,j)∈E are met, a ij =1, otherwise a ij =0.

[0012] Furthermore, the adding of the fuzzy vector in step (3) is specifically as follows:

[0013] In the kth sampling period of the formation control process, the leading vehicle randomly generates N-1 two-dimensional vectors δ j =[δ 1,j ,δ 2,j ] T , (j∈{1,2,...,N-1}), so that for i=1,2, Established;

[0014] The leading vehicle sends a data packet to the No. 1 following vehicle in the formation. The data packet includes the false state information of the leading vehicle after being blurred by the vector δ1.

[0015] Send a data packet to the n∈{2,...,N-1} following vehicles in the formation, including the leader vehicle vector δ n The false state information after blurring, and the blur vector δ added to car (n-1) n-1 .

[0016] Furthermore, the data packet sent by the pilot car to car 1 is in represents the false position and velocity of the leading vehicle after being blurred by the vector δ1 in the kth sampling period, and transmits it to the following vehicle No. 1;

[0017] The data packet sent by the pilot car to vehicle n∈{2,...,N-1} is where [δ 1,n-1 ,δ 2,n-1 ] T represents the fuzzy vector added by the pilot car to vehicle n-1, It represents the false position and speed information transmitted by the pilot car to vehicle n. The calculation formula is:

[0018]

[0019] The (n-1)th vehicle receives the state information from the nth vehicle after adding the fuzzy vector, which is expressed as:

[0020]

[0021] Furthermore, the random noise added in step (3) is specifically:

[0022] The (n-1),n∈{2,...,N-1}th vehicle generates random noise ω n-1 (k)=[ω 1,n-1 (k),ω 2,n-1 (k)] T , add random noise ω to car n n-1 (k) and receives the false position and speed information after the vehicle is received, and receives the data packet from vehicle n, which includes the data packet n-1 The blurred status information of vehicle number n.

[0023] Furthermore, the noise signal randomly generated by the (n-1)th vehicle is expressed as:

[0024]

[0025]

[0026] Among them, the random variable v n-1 (k), Obeys a standard normal distribution with a mean of 0 and a variance of 1, and the set {v n-1 (k)} n＝2,...,N-1；k＝0,1,2，... and These variables in are jointly independent, 0<μ1<1, 0<μ2<1 for all vehicles;

[0027] The state information after random noise is added from the (n-1)th vehicle to the nth vehicle is expressed as

[0028]

[0029]

[0030] Furthermore, the second-order dynamic model of the pilot vehicle in step (3) is expressed as:

[0031]

[0032] Where x0(k) represents the position of the pilot car, v0(k) represents the speed of the pilot car, and u0(k) represents the control input;

[0033] The second-order dynamic model of the j,j∈{1,...,N-1}th following vehicle is expressed as:

[0034]

[0035] Where x j (k), v j (k),u j (k) represents the position, velocity and control input of the jth following vehicle respectively;

[0036] The goal of the vehicle platooning mission is to ensure that the following vehicle travels at the same speed as the lead vehicle, and that all vehicles in the platoon maintain the same safe distance. This can be described as follows:

[0037]

[0038] Where r represents the safe distance between two adjacent vehicles, and d represents the vehicle body length.

[0039] Furthermore, the design of the formation control communication protocol in step (4) is specifically as follows:

[0040] (4.1) Define the position error △x between vehicle n and vehicle (n-1) in the kth sampling period n (k), speed error △v n (k), expressed as:

[0041]

[0042]

[0043] (4.2) Define the position error inferred by the eavesdropper after stealing the transmitted data and speed error Expressed as:

[0044]

[0045]

[0046] (4.3) Design the formation control communication protocol as follows:

[0047]

[0048]

[0049] V(h n-1,n (k)=V1+V2 tanh(C1h n-1,n (k)-C2)

[0050]

[0051] Among them, α, β, κ, λ, p, q, η, γ, V1, V2, C1, C2 are control parameters; r n-1,n represents the desired distance between vehicles n-1 and n, with r n-1,n =-r n,n-1 ; r n represents the expected distance between the pilot vehicle and vehicle n; k n Indicates the communication link between vehicle n and the pilot vehicle. If there is a connection, the value is 1, otherwise it is 0; represents the pseudo distance between vehicles n-1 and n; Γ = (κ / α)k n , is the fuzzy vector gain; tanh(·) represents the hyperbolic tangent function; θ n represents the input of the electronic throttle of the nth vehicle, that is, the throttle opening; c and b are system parameters that represent the relationship between the electronic throttle opening and vehicle acceleration.

[0052] Furthermore, the opening of the electronic throttle and the acceleration a of the vehicle n (k) The dynamic equation of the electronic throttle opening of vehicle n changing with vehicle speed is expressed as:

[0053] a n (k)=-b(v n (k)-v0)+c(θ n (k)-θ0)+d n

[0054] Where v0 represents the steady-state speed corresponding to the throttle input θ0, d nIndicates disturbance.

[0055] Furthermore, the formation control communication protocol is designed, and k=k+1 is set, and steps (4.1) to (4.3) are repeated until the position error and the speed error approach zero.

[0056] In order to defend against eavesdropping attacks during the vehicle formation control process and ensure the security of the formation transmission information, this paper designs a formation control communication protocol that guarantees data privacy. When the leading vehicle sends its own information to the following vehicle, it adds a fuzzy vector to protect its own state from being illegally obtained by eavesdroppers; in order to ensure the completion of the formation task, the fuzzy vector δ added to the vehicle n-1 is n-1 Transmit it to the following car No. n. And in the process of following car No. n transmitting its own state to car No. n-1, add the fuzzy vector δ n-1 When car n-1 transmits its own state to car n, it adds the fuzzy vector ω n-1 It protects its own status from being stolen and effectively ensures the security of vehicle privacy information during the vehicle formation process, providing a new formation control communication protocol for the information security of vehicle formations. BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS

[0057] Figure 1 Flowchart of the method of the present invention.

[0058] Figure 2 Schematic diagram of the communication topology of the vehicle platoon in the method of the present invention.

[0059] Figure 3 Schematic diagram of the formation control communication protocol designed for the method of the present invention.

[0060] Figure 4 (a) is a vehicle position simulation diagram of the method of the present invention.

[0061] Figure 4 (b) A simulated diagram of the vehicle position inferred after the eavesdropper steals the transmission data considered by the method of the present invention.

[0062] Figure 5 (a) is a simulation diagram of the workshop position error defined by the method of the present invention.

[0063] Figure 5 (b) is a simulation diagram of the position error inferred after the eavesdropper steals the data as defined by the method of the present invention.

[0064] Figure 6 (a) is a simulation diagram of vehicle speed according to the method of the present invention.

[0065] Figure 6 (b) A simulation diagram of the vehicle speed inferred after the eavesdropper steals the transmission data considered by the method of the present invention.

[0066] Figure 7 (a) is a simulation diagram of workshop speed error defined by the method of the present invention.

[0067] Figure 7 (b) is a simulation diagram of the speed error inferred after the eavesdropper defined by the method of the present invention steals the data. DETAILED DESCRIPTION

[0068] It should be understood that the following specific embodiments are only used to illustrate the present invention and are not used to limit the scope of the present invention. After reading the present invention, various equivalent modifications of the present invention by those skilled in the art will fall within the scope defined by the claims attached to this application.

[0069] like Figure 1 FIG2 is a flow chart of a vehicle platooning control method for defending against eavesdropping attacks disclosed in the present invention. The method of the present invention will be further described below in conjunction with the steps of a specific embodiment:

[0070] (1) Initialization process, that is, N vehicles recognize and initialize each other through vehicle-to-vehicle wireless communication technology, and set the vehicle at the front of the team as the pilot vehicle, numbered 0, and the direction of the pilot vehicle is the direction of the team. The remaining vehicles are follower vehicles, numbered {1,...,(N-1)}. The pilot vehicle provides path planning, speed instructions and control instructions for the vehicle team by establishing a communication connection with the remaining vehicles. In addition to receiving information from the pilot vehicle, each follower vehicle also communicates with the adjacent vehicles in front and behind to obtain the position, speed and acceleration information of the adjacent vehicles to update its own status, such as Figure 2 shown.

[0071] (2) The network structure of the vehicle formation and the communication relationship between vehicles are represented by a weighted directed graph G(V,E,A), V = {v1,v2,...,v n} represents the set of nodes in the network, i.e., the vehicles in the formation, A = [a ij ] n×n Represents the adjacency matrix of graph G, satisfying the conditions i≠j and (i,j)∈E, a ij =1, otherwise a ij =0.

[0072] (3) The position and velocity of the vehicle are selected as the system state, and the second-order vehicle dynamics model of the pilot vehicle is constructed as follows:

[0073]

[0074] Where x0(k) represents the position of the pilot car, v0(k) represents the speed of the pilot car, and u0(k) represents the control input.

[0075] The second-order dynamic model of the j,j∈{1,...,N-1}th following vehicle is expressed as:

[0076]

[0077] Where x j (k), v j (k),u j (k) denotes the position, velocity, and control input of the jth following vehicle, respectively. Based on the communication link between vehicles, state information is exchanged at each sampling period, which is denoted as k.

[0078] Based on its own state and the information received from the lead vehicle and neighboring vehicles, the follower vehicle j designs its control input so that it reaches the same speed as the lead vehicle and maintains the same safe distance between the vehicles in the platoon. This can be expressed as:

[0079]

[0080] Where r represents the safe distance between two adjacent vehicles, and d represents the vehicle length. This means that the following vehicle travels at the same speed as the lead vehicle, and all vehicles in the platoon maintain the same safe distance.

[0081] like Figure 3 As shown, in the kth sampling period of the formation control process, the leading vehicle randomly generates N-1 two-dimensional vectors δ j =[δ 1,j ,δ 2,j ] T , (j∈{1,2,...,N-1}), so that for i=1,2, The leading vehicle sends a data packet to the No. 1 following vehicle in the formation. The information in the data packet includes the false state information of the pilot car after being blurred by the vector δ1, which can be expressed as:

[0082]

[0083] In the formula Indicates that in the kth sampling period, the leader vehicle adds the false position and velocity of the fuzzy vector δ1 and transmits it to the following vehicle No. 1, and at the same time sends a data packet to the n∈{2,...,N-1} following vehicles in the formation This includes the fuzzy vector δ added by the pilot car to car (n-1) n-1 =[δ 1,n-1 ,δ 2,n-1 ] T and the vector δn Blurred false status information The calculation formula is:

[0084]

[0085] Since fuzzy vectors are added during the transmission of status information between the pilot vehicle and the following vehicles, the illegal acquisition of the pilot vehicle status by eavesdropping attacks can be effectively prevented.

[0086] The (n-1),n∈{2,...,N-1}th vehicle generates random noise ω n-1 (k)=[ω 1,n-1 (k),ω 2,n-1 (k)] T , the calculation formula is:

[0087]

[0088]

[0089] where the random variable v n-1 (k), Obeys a standard normal distribution with a mean of 0 and a variance of 1, and the set {v n-1 (k)} n＝2,...,N-1；k＝0,1,2，... and These variables in are jointly independent. 0<μ1<1, 0<μ2<1 holds for all vehicles. (n-1) vehicles send an additive noise ω to vehicle n. n-1 The false position and velocity information after (k) can be expressed as:

[0090]

[0091] And receive the data packet from vehicle n, that is, n-1 The blurred state information of vehicle number n can be expressed as:

[0092]

[0093] During the information exchange between the two vehicles, the status values ​​transmitted are not the real status. Even if an eavesdropper obtains the relevant data, he cannot infer the real status of the vehicles in the formation.

[0094] Define the position error △x between vehicle n and vehicle (n-1) n (k) and speed error △v n (k) is:

[0095]

[0096]

[0097] The position error inferred by an eavesdropper after eavesdropping on the transmitted data and speed error Defined as:

[0098]

[0099]

[0100] (4) Based on its own status and the status information received from the lead vehicle and adjacent vehicles, the following vehicle designs a platoon control communication protocol so that the following vehicle and the lead vehicle reach the same speed and the same safe distance is maintained between the vehicles in the platoon.

[0101] Based on the results obtained in the previous steps, the communication protocol for the formation control of the lead vehicle and the following vehicle is designed, which can be expressed as:

[0102]

[0103]

[0104] V(h n-1,n (k)=V1+V2 tanh(C1h n-1,n (k)-C2)

[0105]

[0106] Among them, α, β, κ, λ, p, q, η, γ, V1, V2, C1, C2 are control parameters, c, b are positive numbers, r n-1,n represents the desired distance between vehicles n-1 and n, r n-1,n =-r n,n-1 , r n represents the expected distance between the pilot car and vehicle n, k n Indicates the communication link between vehicle n and the pilot vehicle. If there is a connection, the value is 1, otherwise it is 0.

[0107] Under the bidirectional head formation topology, k n =1 holds for all following vehicles. represents the pseudo distance between vehicles n-1 and n, Γ = (κ / α)k n , tanh(·) represents the hyperbolic tangent function. θ n The electronic throttle input of the nth vehicle, i.e. the throttle opening degree. The electronic throttle opening degree and the vehicle acceleration a n (k) is related to adjusting the throttle opening by the engine control module to further change the vehicle's acceleration. The dynamic equation for the change of the vehicle's electronic throttle opening with vehicle speed can be expressed as:

[0108] a n(k)=-b(v n (k)-v0)+c(θ n (k)-θ0)+d n

[0109] Where v0 represents the steady-state speed corresponding to the throttle input θ0, d n Denotes the disturbance. Let k = k + 1 and repeat the steps until the formation task is completed, that is, the position error and velocity error approach 0.

[0110] Thus, the above-described formation control communication protocol can be used to implement formation control tasks that defend against eavesdropping attacks and protect the privacy of vehicle transmission information. In a preferred embodiment of the present invention, a leader-follower formation model consisting of n = 4 vehicles was selected to verify the effectiveness of the present method. The system parameters set in this embodiment are shown in Table 1.

[0111] Table 1 System parameters

[0112]

[0113]

[0114] The driving positions of the lead vehicle and the following vehicle in the formation are as follows: Figure 4 As shown in (a), the position error is Figure 5 As shown in (a), the eavesdropper estimates the position of the platoon vehicles as follows: Figure 4 As shown in (b), the estimated position error is Figure 5 As shown in (b), the formation control communication protocol does not affect the execution of the formation control task and can effectively prevent attackers from eavesdropping on the vehicle's location.

[0115] Under the formation control communication protocol, the speed of the formation vehicles is as follows: Figure 6 As shown in (a), the speed error is Figure 7 (a). As can be seen from the figure, the following car follows the leading car at the expected speed. The eavesdropper's estimate of the vehicle speed and speed error is as follows Figure 6 (b) and 7(b). Figure 5 and Figure 7 The position and velocity errors in the platoon control communication protocol can be concluded to defend against eavesdropping attacks that steal data transmitted between vehicles in the platoon, as well as against illegal inference of position and velocity information, while ensuring that the platoon achieves its control objectives. The protocol is simple to operate, has low computational complexity, and offers high real-time performance, making it applicable to practical transportation systems.

Claims

1. A vehicle platoon driving control method for defending against eavesdropping attacks, characterized in that: Including steps: (1) Initialize the N-vehicle platoon driving task, set the front vehicle in the platoon as the pilot vehicle, numbered 0, and the direction of the pilot vehicle is the driving direction of the platoon; set the other vehicles in the platoon as follower vehicles, numbered The lead car establishes a communication connection with each following car, and each following car also communicates with the adjacent cars in front and behind it. (2) Establish a weighted directed graph Represents the network structure of the vehicle platoon and the communication relationship between vehicles, Represents the set of nodes in the network, each node represents a vehicle in the formation, represents the edge set, represents the adjacency matrix of graph G; (3) Selecting the position and velocity of the vehicle as the system state, establishing a second-order vehicle dynamics model of the lead vehicle and the following vehicle, extracting state information from the system state, adding fuzzy vectors and random noise, and periodically exchanging the state information based on the communication relationship between the vehicles; In the process of formation control sampling period, the pilot car is randomly generated Two-dimensional vector , , so that for Both Established; The lead vehicle sends a data packet to the No. 1 following vehicle in the formation. The data packet includes the information that the lead vehicle is vectored. False status information after blurring; Towards the formation The following vehicles send data packets, including the pilot vehicle being vectored Blurred false status information, and added to Blurred vector of car ; (4) Based on its own status and the status information received from the lead vehicle and adjacent vehicles, the following vehicle designs a platoon control communication protocol so that the following vehicle and the lead vehicle reach the same speed and the same safe distance is maintained between the vehicles in the platoon.

2. The vehicle platoon driving control method according to claim 1, characterized in that: The adjacency matrix described in step (2) In meeting the conditions and hour, ,otherwise .

3. The vehicle platoon driving control method according to claim 2, characterized in that: The data packet sent by the pilot car to car 1 is ,in , , Indicates in The pilot car is vectored The blurred false position and velocity are transmitted to the following vehicle No. 1; Pilot car direction The data packet sent by vehicle No. is ,in Indicates that the pilot car is added to The blurred vector of vehicle No. Indicates that the pilot car transmits The false position and speed information of vehicle No. is calculated as follows: No. The vehicle receives The state information of a car after adding the fuzzy vector is expressed as: 。 4. The vehicle platoon driving control method according to claim 3, characterized in that: The random noise added in step (3) is specifically: No. Cars generate random noise ,Towards Car No. sends add random noise After the false position and velocity information is received from The data packet of vehicle No. Blurred Vehicle status information.

5. The vehicle platoon driving control method according to claim 4, characterized in that: No. The noise signal randomly generated by a vehicle is expressed as: Among them, the random variable It obeys the standard normal distribution with mean 0 and variance 1, and the set and These variables in are jointly independent, This is true for all vehicles; No. The car is sent to The state information of the vehicle after adding random noise is expressed as 。 6. The vehicle platoon driving control method according to claim 5, characterized in that: The second-order dynamic model of the pilot vehicle in step (3) is expressed as: In the formula Indicates the position of the pilot vehicle. Indicates the speed of the pilot car, represents the control input; No. The second-order dynamic model of the following vehicle is expressed as: In the formula , , Respectively represent The position, velocity and control input of the following vehicle; The goal of the vehicle platooning mission is to ensure that the following vehicle travels at the same speed as the lead vehicle, and that all vehicles in the platoon maintain the same safe distance. This can be described as follows: In the formula Indicates the safe distance between two adjacent vehicles. Indicates the vehicle body length.

7. The vehicle platoon driving control method according to claim 1 or 6, characterized in that: Step (4) of designing the formation control communication protocol is as follows: (4.1) is defined in Sampling period, vehicle With vehicle Position error between , speed error , expressed as: (4.2) Define the position error inferred by the eavesdropper after stealing the transmitted data and speed error , expressed as: (4.3) Design the formation control communication protocol as follows: in is the control parameter; Indicates vehicle and The expected distance between vehicles is ; Indicates pilot car and vehicle The expected distance between Indicates vehicle The communication link with the pilot vehicle is 1 when there is a connection, otherwise it is 0; , indicating vehicle and Pseudo vehicle distance between them; , is the fuzzy vector gain; represents the hyperbolic tangent function; Indicates the The input of the vehicle's electronic throttle, that is, the throttle opening; It is a system parameter that represents the relationship between the electronic throttle opening and vehicle acceleration.

8. The vehicle platoon driving control method according to claim 7, characterized in that: The opening size of the electronic throttle and the acceleration of the vehicle About vehicles The dynamic equation of the electronic throttle opening changing with vehicle speed is expressed as: in Indicates that the throttle input is The corresponding steady-state speed is Indicates disturbance.

9. The vehicle platoon driving control method according to claim 8, characterized in that: The design of the formation control communication protocol makes , repeat steps (4.1) to (4.3) until the position error and velocity error tend to 0.

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