A robot-based substation anti-misoperation control method, backend, and system

Abstract

This invention discloses a robot-based substation anti-misoperation control method, backend, and system, belonging to the field of intelligent control technology and applicable to robot operation backends. The method comprises: obtaining the operation task instruction generated by the anti-misoperation host during the first anti-misoperation verification of the operation task; confirming the target device location according to the operation task instruction and sending a movement instruction to the robot to activate the intelligent mechanical lock; simultaneously returning an unlocking request and status information to the anti-misoperation host for a second anti-misoperation verification; and, upon successful verification, sending an unlocking key to the robot to unlock the intelligent mechanical lock; after unlocking, sending the operation task instruction to the robot to perform the corresponding instruction operation. Therefore, by implementing this invention, the problem of high cost for one-button sequential control operation retrofitting in existing technologies for aging substations can be solved.

Description

Technical Field

[0001] This invention belongs to the field of intelligent control technology, and relates to a robot-based substation anti-misoperation control method, backend, and system. Background Technology

[0002] Traditional one-click sequential control operation in substations relies on a robust communication infrastructure (such as forward and reverse isolation devices and aggregation terminals) to build a secure partitioning architecture and deploy a real-time communication link between an intelligent anti-misoperation host and the robot operation backend to achieve dual anti-misoperation verification of operation commands (initial logical verification and secondary equipment status verification) to ensure operational compliance.

[0003] Due to outdated equipment and inadequate or obsolete communication systems, aging substations cannot afford the deployment costs of complex communication equipment (such as aggregation terminals and forward / reverse isolation devices) used in traditional solutions, nor can they establish real-time interactive links for security zones. This results in the inability of the robot operation backend and the anti-misoperation host to collaboratively complete equipment status collection and secondary verification, and there is a lack of low-cost alternatives. Ultimately, this fails to meet the dual anti-misoperation safety requirements of one-click sequential control operation, hindering the automation upgrade of aging substations. Summary of the Invention

[0004] This application provides a robot-based substation anti-misoperation control method, backend, and system, which can solve the problem of high cost of one-click sequential control operation transformation in old substations in the prior art.

[0005] To achieve the above objectives, in a first aspect, the present invention provides a robot-based substation anti-misoperation control method, applicable to robot operation backends; the substation anti-misoperation control method includes:

[0006] Obtain operation task instructions; wherein, the operation task instructions are generated by the intelligent anti-misoperation host when performing the first anti-misoperation verification on the operation task created by the central control center;

[0007] According to the operation task instruction, the location of the target device is confirmed and a corresponding movement instruction is sent to the robot so that the robot moves to the location of the target device and activates the smart mechanical lock of the target device. At the same time, an unlocking request and the status information of the target device are returned.

[0008] The unlock request and status information are sent to the intelligent anti-misoperation host, so that the intelligent anti-misoperation host can perform a second anti-misoperation verification based on the status information, and return the unlock key after the second anti-misoperation verification is passed;

[0009] The unlocking key is sent to the robot so that the robot can unlock the smart mechanical lock using the unlocking key;

[0010] After the smart mechanical lock is unlocked, the operation task instruction is sent to the robot so that the robot can perform the corresponding instruction operation according to the operation task instruction.

[0011] Compared to existing technologies, the embodiments of this application have the following beneficial effects: By acquiring the operation task instructions generated by the intelligent anti-misoperation host during the initial anti-misoperation verification, the process of manually creating and reviewing operation tickets is replaced, eliminating the risk of human error and improving the standardization level of instructions; the robot's movement path is planned according to the operation task instructions and movement instructions are issued, utilizing the robot's autonomous navigation capabilities to replace traditional manual inspection and positioning, reducing reliance on fixed positioning base stations or high-precision sensors, and avoiding the transformation costs incurred by deploying new hardware in old substations. Furthermore, by activating the intelligent mechanical lock and collecting the equipment's status information after the robot moves to the target equipment location, the work of manually verifying the equipment status on-site is transformed into an automated process, avoiding the defects of lacking online monitoring interfaces for equipment status in old substations, as well as the inefficiency and security risks of manual verification; at the same time, the equipment's status information is bound to the unlocking request and sent to the intelligent anti-misoperation host, strengthening operational security through a phased verification mechanism and avoiding the vulnerabilities of single verification. In addition, by having the robot receive the unlocking key and control the intelligent mechanical lock, the deployment requirements of aggregation terminals or dedicated servers in traditional solutions are eliminated, reducing the hardware and communication link transformation costs in intermediate links. This solution, through its architecture of "automated operation + layered verification + localized execution," enables old substations to complete one-click sequential control upgrades with minimal deployment costs, without requiring significant modifications to existing equipment or communication facilities, thus directly addressing the core issue of high upgrade costs.

[0012] In some embodiments of the first aspect of this application, the step of obtaining the operation task instruction includes:

[0013] The system receives operation task instructions sent by the relay device; wherein, the intelligent anti-misoperation host is deployed in security zone one, the relay device and the robot operation backend are deployed in security zone two, and the intelligent anti-misoperation host and the robot operation backend communicate with each other through the relay device;

[0014] The relay equipment includes a communication front-end host or an edge computing device;

[0015] When the relay device is a communication front-end host, the intelligent anti-misoperation host communicates with the robot operation backend through the forward and reverse isolation device and the communication front-end host;

[0016] When the relay device is an edge computing device, the intelligent anti-misoperation host communicates with the robot operation backend through a one-way optical shutter and the edge computing device.

[0017] Compared to existing technologies, the above embodiments offer the following advantages: By introducing a relay device (communication front-end host or edge computing device) as the communication hub between Security Zone 1 (intelligent anti-misoperation host) and Security Zone 2 (robot operation backend), data isolation transmission across security zones is achieved using forward and reverse isolation devices or one-way optical gates, preventing the intelligent anti-misoperation host from being directly exposed to low-security zones and reducing the risk of external attacks. When using a communication front-end host, bidirectional communication traffic is limited by forward and reverse isolation devices to meet the compliance requirements of power grid security zoning. When using edge computing devices, one-way communication is achieved through one-way optical gates, while avoiding the high cost of deploying bidirectional isolation devices. This design flexibly adapts to the communication conditions of different older substations (such as whether they have forward and reverse isolation devices), achieving secure communication and low-cost upgrades across security zones without requiring a complete redesign of the network architecture.

[0018] In some embodiments of the first aspect of this application, sending the unlock request and status information to the intelligent anti-misoperation host includes:

[0019] When the relay device is a communication front-end host, the unlock request and status information are sent to the communication front-end host, so that the communication front-end host sends the unlock request and status information to the intelligent anti-misoperation host.

[0020] Compared with existing technologies, the above embodiments have the following advantages: by forwarding the unlocking request and device status information to the intelligent anti-misoperation host through the communication front-end host, and utilizing the unidirectional transmission characteristics of the forward and reverse isolation device (such as only allowing data from the low security zone to the high security zone), data leakage in the high security zone is prevented, and reliable communication across security zones is achieved under the existing network architecture of old substations, avoiding the high costs incurred by deploying dedicated communication gateways or upgrading network facilities.

[0021] In some embodiments of the first aspect of this application, sending the unlock key to the robot includes:

[0022] When the relay device is a communication front-end host, after the intelligent anti-misoperation host returns the unlock key, the unlock key is sent to the robot; wherein, the unlock key is generated by the intelligent anti-misoperation host after the second anti-misoperation verification is passed, and sent to the robot operation backend through the communication front-end host.

[0023] Compared with existing technologies, the above embodiments have the following advantages: after the intelligent anti-misoperation host generates the unlocking key, the key is transmitted to the robot operation backend through the communication front-end host, and then distributed to the robot, realizing the secure transfer of the key across security zones, while avoiding the modification costs incurred by deploying a dedicated key server.

[0024] In some embodiments of the first aspect of this application, after receiving the unlock request and the status information of the target device, and before sending the unlock key to the robot, the method further includes:

[0025] When the relay device is an edge computing device, the unlock request and status information are sent to the edge computing device so that the edge computing device can perform a second anti-misoperation verification based on the status information, and return the unlock key after the second anti-misoperation verification is passed.

[0026] Compared to existing technologies, the above embodiments have the following advantages: Secondary anti-misoperation verification based on device status information is directly executed by edge computing devices, replacing the remote verification process of the intelligent anti-misoperation host, reducing latency and failure risks in cross-security zone communication; simultaneously, the unidirectional data flow characteristic of the one-way optical shutter (allowing data only from the high-security zone to the low-security zone) replaces traditional bidirectional isolation devices, reducing equipment deployment costs. This architecture, through the "edge-based verification" mechanism, achieves an effective balance between security zoning compliance and upgrade costs in scenarios with weak communication infrastructure in older substations.

[0027] Secondly, the present invention also provides a robot operation backend, the robot operation backend comprising: an instruction acquisition module, a movement control module, an unlock request module, a key sending module, and an execution control module;

[0028] The instruction acquisition module is used to acquire operation task instructions; wherein the operation task instructions are generated by the intelligent anti-misoperation host when performing the first anti-misoperation verification on the operation task created by the central control center.

[0029] The mobile control module is used to confirm the location of the target device and send a corresponding mobile command to the robot according to the operation task instruction, so that the robot moves to the location of the target device, activates the smart mechanical lock of the target device, and returns an unlocking request and the status information of the target device.

[0030] The unlocking request module is used to send the unlocking request and status information to the intelligent anti-mistake host, so that the intelligent anti-mistake host can perform a second anti-mistake verification based on the status information, and return the unlocking key after the second anti-mistake verification is passed;

[0031] The key sending module is used to send the unlocking key to the robot, so that the robot can unlock the smart mechanical lock according to the unlocking key;

[0032] The execution control module is used to send the operation task instruction to the robot after the smart mechanical lock has unlocked, so that the robot can perform the corresponding instruction operation according to the operation task instruction.

[0033] Compared to existing technologies, the above embodiments offer the following advantages: The instruction acquisition module standardizes the reception of operation task instructions, eliminating errors from manual transmission; the motion control module drives the robot to autonomously navigate to the target equipment, replacing the time-consuming and safety-risk aspects of manual inspection; the collaboration between the unlocking request module and the key sending module ensures strict synchronization of secondary verification and key transmission, preventing operation interruptions; and the execution control module directly issues operation instructions after unlocking, forming a closed-loop control process. This modular design, through functional decoupling and automated execution, improves overall system efficiency while reducing reliance on outdated substation communication facilities.

[0034] Thirdly, the present invention also provides a robot-based substation anti-misoperation control system, including: a central control center, an intelligent anti-misoperation host, a robot operation backend, a robot, an intelligent mechanical lock, and various target devices;

[0035] The intelligent anti-misoperation host is connected to the central control center for communication.

[0036] The robot operation backend is connected to the intelligent anti-misoperation host for executing a robot-based substation anti-misoperation control method as described above.

[0037] The robot is wirelessly connected to the robot operation backend;

[0038] Each of the target devices is equipped with the intelligent mechanical lock;

[0039] The intelligent mechanical lock is connected to the robot via Bluetooth.

[0040] Compared to existing technologies, the embodiments of this application have the following advantages: Standardized operation tasks are generated collaboratively by the centralized control center and the intelligent anti-misoperation host, ensuring compliance of the command source; the wireless communication between the robot operation backend and the robot can easily adapt to the weak network environment of old substations; the intelligent mechanical lock is directly connected to the robot via Bluetooth, eliminating the deployment cost of the aggregation terminal. The above system architecture, through a "centralized control-layered verification-local execution" model, can achieve one-click sequential control operation with minimal modifications to existing old facilities, directly overcoming the problem of high renovation costs for old substations.

[0041] In some embodiments of the third aspect of this application, the target device is configured with sensors and a ZigBee communication module, and the robot is configured with a ZigBee terminal; wherein, the ZigBee terminal and the ZigBee communication module of the target device form a mesh network, the sensors are used to collect the target device's own status information, and the ZigBee communication module is used to send the status information to the robot through the mesh network.

[0042] Compared to existing technologies, the above embodiments have the following advantages: By configuring sensors and ZigBee communication modules on the target device, and using ZigBee terminals and device modules to form a mesh network, self-organized collection and transmission of device status information can be achieved, replacing the shortcomings of traditional solutions that rely on wired sensor networks or manual on-site recording; the sensors directly collect the target device status data and transmit it to the robot via the mesh network through multiple hops, avoiding the transformation difficulties caused by aging cables or missing communication interfaces in old substations; the self-organizing network characteristics of the mesh network support dynamic coverage and multi-path redundancy, adapting to scenarios with complex equipment distribution or severe obstruction in old substations, and improving the reliability of data collection; the robot receives device status information through the ZigBee terminal and integrates the data into a secondary error prevention verification process, avoiding the need to deploy additional data collection gateways or relay devices, further reducing transformation costs.

[0043] In some embodiments of the third aspect of this application, the robot is equipped with a camera and a visual recognition module; wherein the camera and the visual recognition module are used to collect status information of the target device.

[0044] Compared with existing technologies, the above embodiments have the following advantages: by equipping the robot with a camera and a visual recognition module, machine vision technology is used to automatically identify the number and status information of the target equipment, replacing the inefficient mode of relying on physical sensors or manual on-site verification in traditional solutions; the visual recognition module avoids the limitations of missing sensor interfaces or difficult modification in old substations by analyzing the equipment status in real time; at the same time, the coordination between visual recognition and robot mobile operation integrates inspection and operation functions into a single carrier, avoiding the need to deploy inspection robots or fixed cameras separately for status monitoring, and significantly reducing hardware deployment costs.

[0045] In some embodiments of the third aspect of this application, the robot and the robot operation backend are configured with a LoRa gateway; wherein the LoRa gateway is used to wirelessly connect the robot and the robot operation backend.

[0046] Compared to existing technologies, the above embodiments have the following advantages: By configuring a LoRa gateway for the robot and its operating backend, a wireless communication link is established using the long-distance and low-power characteristics of LoRa technology, replacing the high-cost communication upgrades that rely on fiber optic or Wi-Fi base stations in traditional solutions; the wide-area coverage capability of the LoRa gateway supports cross-regional mobile operations of the robot in the complex environment of substations, avoiding operation interruptions caused by signal blind spots; the low-bandwidth data transmission characteristics of the LoRa protocol adapt to the communication needs of robot operation commands and status feedback, reducing the load pressure on the existing network facilities of old substations; at the same time, the collaboration between LoRa and the robot's local control logic enables reliable transmission of operation commands and real-time feedback of execution status, ensuring strict synchronization between error prevention verification and operation execution, and improving the overall stability of the system. Attached Figure Description

[0047] Figure 1 This is a flowchart illustrating a robot-based substation anti-misoperation control method provided in some embodiments of the present invention.

[0048] Figure 2 This is a schematic diagram of a robot-based substation anti-misoperation control system provided in some embodiments of the present invention.

[0049] Figure 3 This is a complete architecture diagram of a one-button sequential remote control operation for a substation provided in some embodiments of the present invention.

[0050] Figure 4 : This is a simplified flowchart of a one-click sequential remote control operation method provided in some embodiments of the present invention.

[0051] Figure 5 This is a complete flowchart of a one-click sequential remote control operation method provided in some embodiments of the present invention.

[0052] Figure 6 : This is a simplified flowchart of another one-click sequential remote control operation method provided in some embodiments of the present invention.

[0053] Figure 7 : This is a complete flowchart of another one-click sequential remote control operation method provided in some embodiments of the present invention.

[0054] Figure 8 : This is a simplified flowchart of another one-click sequential remote control operation method provided in some embodiments of the present invention.

[0055] Figure 9 This is a complete flowchart of another one-click sequential remote control operation method provided in some embodiments of the present invention. Detailed Implementation

[0056] The technical solutions of the embodiments of the present invention will be clearly and completely described below with reference to the accompanying drawings. Obviously, the described embodiments are only some embodiments of the present invention, and not all embodiments. Based on the embodiments of the present invention, all other embodiments obtained by those skilled in the art without creative effort are within the scope of protection of the present invention.

[0057] In existing substations with well-developed communication infrastructure, it is possible to... Figure 3 This diagram illustrates a complete architecture for one-button sequential remote control operation in a substation, enabling interaction between the robot and the anti-misoperation host. Specifically, forward and reverse isolation is used to isolate Safety Zone I and Safety Zone IV. Safety Zone IV includes a front-end server, a robot back-end, and a convergence terminal. The convergence terminal communicates with the five-proof computer key and intelligent mechanical lock to perform unlocking and closing operations, and to issue operation tickets to the five-proof computer key. The front-end server communicates with the intelligent anti-misoperation host and sequential control host in Safety Zone I to receive trolley operation commands. The robot back-end sends operation commands to the robot.

[0058] The specific process includes: the sequential control host creates a handcart (i.e., target device) operation task and requests operation permission from the anti-misoperation host. After the anti-misoperation host verifies the handcart operation task using anti-misoperation logic, it issues the handcart operation command (i.e., operation task command) to the front-end server. The front-end server sends the handcart operation command to the robot backend. The robot backend controls the robot to move to the position of the handcart device to be operated, and then requests the anti-misoperation host to unlock the smart mechanical lock through the front-end server. After receiving the unlock request command, the anti-misoperation host verifies the unlock request command using anti-misoperation logic. After passing the verification, the front-end server issues an unlock command to the smart mechanical lock through the aggregation terminal. After unlocking, it sends unlock success information back to the robot backend. After receiving the unlock success information, the robot backend issues handcart operation commands to the robot, and the robot operates the handcart according to the handcart operation commands. Through the above equipment and process, communication and interaction between the robot and the anti-misoperation host can be realized.

[0059] However, in some older substations, the communication infrastructure is inadequate, the equipment is outdated, and the cost of upgrading is high, making it difficult to deploy the aforementioned equipment and meet the communication needs between devices. Therefore, in these substations, robots are often completely independent and cannot communicate and interact with the anti-misoperation host, making it difficult to achieve anti-misoperation and promote one-click sequential control.

[0060] Example 1:

[0061] Please refer to Figure 1To address the high cost of retrofitting existing one-button sequential control operations in aging substations, this invention provides a robot-based substation misoperation prevention control method, applicable to robot operation backends; the substation misoperation prevention control method includes steps S1 to S5:

[0062] Step S1: Obtain the operation task instruction; wherein, the operation task instruction is generated by the intelligent anti-misoperation host performing the first anti-misoperation verification on the operation task created by the central control center.

[0063] Step S2: According to the operation task instruction, confirm the location of the target device and send the corresponding movement instruction to the robot so that the robot moves to the location of the target device and activates the smart mechanical lock of the target device, while returning the unlocking request and the status information of the target device.

[0064] Step S3: Send the unlock request and status information to the intelligent anti-misoperation host, so that the intelligent anti-misoperation host can perform a second anti-misoperation verification based on the status information, and return the unlock key after the second anti-misoperation verification is passed.

[0065] Step S4: Send the unlocking key to the robot so that the robot can unlock the smart mechanical lock according to the unlocking key.

[0066] Step S5: After the smart mechanical lock is unlocked, the operation task instruction is sent to the robot so that the robot can perform the corresponding instruction operation according to the operation task instruction.

[0067] In specific implementation, such as Figure 4 The diagram shows a simplified flowchart of a one-button sequential remote control operation method and its corresponding... Figure 5 The diagram shows a complete flowchart of a one-click sequential control remote operation method. To promote one-click sequential control in older substations without online anti-misoperation systems, an intelligent anti-misoperation host, a robot, and a robot operation backend can be added to these substations. The intelligent anti-misoperation host is the device running the anti-misoperation system, which has pre-set anti-misoperation logic for the substation (such as five-prevention rules), meeting the requirements of one-click sequential control for an independent anti-misoperation host. When the anti-misoperation logic needs to be updated, it can be updated via USB flash drive or mobile terminal.

[0068] The robot operation backend serves as the robot's control platform. It can connect via wired connection to the intelligent anti-misoperation host and communicate wirelessly with the robot using the HTTP protocol. Furthermore, considering the inadequate communication infrastructure and high upgrade costs in older substations, a LoRa gateway (such as the optional SX1276 LoRa module) can be added to the robot operation backend for simpler and more convenient communication connectivity. This covers key areas of the substation, enabling wireless communication between the robot operation backend and the robot. The robot operation backend can also transmit aggregated local data (such as equipment status and operation logs) to the central control center via wired connection, addressing remote communication needs in areas without network coverage.

[0069] Furthermore, in some older substations, the equipment is outdated and lacks sensors for automatic status monitoring. Before switching operations, manual verification of the equipment's status may be required. To achieve error-proof verification in one-button sequential control operations, two methods can be used:

[0070] 1. Install external ZigBee communication modules (such as wireless transparent transmission modules based on CC2530) on these primary and secondary devices. The robot is equipped with a ZigBee terminal (such as the CC2530 chipset) that supports Mesh protocol stacks (such as Z-Stack) and acts as a ZigBee node to form a Mesh network with these devices. The ZigBee communication module connects to the primary and secondary devices or corresponding sensors through wired interfaces (such as UART, GPIO) to collect device status data and send it to the Mesh network. The robot collects this device status data and transmits it to the robot operation backend via LoRa. The robot operation backend sends this data to the intelligent anti-misoperation host to perform real-time logic verification (i.e., the second anti-misoperation verification). The anti-misoperation host sends the logic verification result back to the robot operation backend. When the logic verification passes, the robot operation backend sends instructions to the robot according to the operation ticket (i.e., operation task instructions) to perform the switching operation. If existing sensors support other protocols (such as Modbus), they can also be connected to the ZigBee network via a protocol converter or adapter. The converter encapsulates sensor data (such as RS-485 or analog signals) into ZigBee protocol packets and wirelessly transmits them to the mesh network. For example, an ESP32 + ZigBee module can perform protocol conversion through programming. In this solution, the ZigBee network can be deployed wirelessly, avoiding damage to old cables or equipment. Network coverage can be extended by robot movement, and dead zones of fixed nodes can be filled. Furthermore, the robot can activate the ZigBee module only when collecting device or sensor data, and enter a low-power mode when idle.

[0071] Second, the robot is equipped with a high-definition camera and an AI visual recognition module to automatically identify the numbers and status of primary and secondary equipment. The collected data is transmitted to the robot's operation backend via LoRa, and then real-time logic verification is performed as in Method 1. At this point, the robot functions as both an inspection robot and an operation robot. Before performing switching operations, it acts as an inspection robot, collecting the status of relevant equipment within the substation and sending it to the anti-misoperation host for verification. After the anti-misoperation verification is passed, the robot transforms into an operation robot to perform the switching operations.

[0072] Furthermore, in older substations, there is a problem where robots cannot operate the existing anti-misoperation interlocking devices. If the robot is to remotely control the switchgear, the existing anti-misoperation interlocking devices need to be removed. However, after removing the existing five-proof interlocking devices, the anti-misoperation interlocking function is lost during manual operation, resulting in non-compliance with relevant safety regulations. If the existing anti-misoperation interlocking devices are not removed, the devices can only be opened on-site by personnel carrying a specific anti-misoperation computer key, making remote control operation impossible. To address this issue, the existing switchgear anti-misoperation interlocking device can be replaced with a smart mechanical lock, which can simultaneously support one-click sequential remote control of the robot switchgear and on-site manual operation. In substations with established communication infrastructure, there is generally a convergence terminal. The smart mechanical lock communicates with the front-end server through the convergence terminal, and the front-end server issues opening and closing commands to the smart mechanical lock through the convergence terminal. However, older substations cannot meet the opening and closing server requirements of smart mechanical locks. To save on the renovation costs of older substations, in this solution, the robot can directly control the smart mechanical lock via Bluetooth connection. After receiving the information that the anti-misoperation verification by the intelligent anti-misoperation host has passed, the robot operation backend requests the unlocking key for the handcart device (i.e., the target device) to be operated from the central control center, and then sends it to the robot. Once the robot receives the key, it sends it to the intelligent mechanical lock via Bluetooth to unlock it. This eliminates the need for a central terminal, saving costs. Therefore, after the modification according to the above scheme is completed, all devices are deployed in the same secure area. Specifically, the process of the robot performing a secondary anti-misoperation verification when moving to the device to be operated is as follows: Figure 4 As shown: The robot moves in front of the device, the robot operation backend verifies the robot's position, the operation task begins, then the robot activates the smart mechanical lock and requests operation from the smart anti-misoperation host through the robot operation backend (i.e., the smart anti-misoperation host performs a secondary anti-misoperation verification before the robot operates). After the smart anti-misoperation host passes the anti-misoperation verification, it sends the operation permission and unlocking key to the robot through the robot operation backend. After receiving the key, the robot sends it to the smart mechanical lock via Bluetooth to unlock it. Then the robot operates the target device to perform various command operations such as switching. After the operation is completed, the robot locks the smart mechanical lock via Bluetooth, and then the robot operation backend reports the results to the smart anti-misoperation host or the central control center.

[0073] Compared to existing technologies, the embodiments of this application have the following beneficial effects: By acquiring the operation task instructions generated by the intelligent anti-misoperation host during the initial anti-misoperation verification, the process of manually creating and reviewing operation tickets is replaced, eliminating the risk of human error and improving the standardization of instructions; the robot's movement path is planned according to the operation task instructions and movement instructions are issued, utilizing the robot's autonomous navigation capabilities to replace traditional manual inspection and positioning, reducing reliance on fixed positioning base stations or high-precision sensors, and avoiding the transformation costs incurred by deploying new hardware in old substations. Furthermore, by activating the intelligent mechanical lock and collecting the equipment's status information after the robot moves to the target equipment location, the work of manually verifying the equipment status on-site is transformed into an automated process, avoiding the defects of lacking online monitoring interfaces for equipment status in old substations, as well as the inefficiency and security risks of manual verification; at the same time, the equipment's status information is bound to the unlocking request and sent to the intelligent anti-misoperation host, strengthening operational security through a phased verification mechanism and avoiding the vulnerabilities of single verification. In addition, by having the robot receive the unlocking key and control the intelligent mechanical lock, the deployment requirements of aggregation terminals or dedicated servers in traditional solutions are eliminated, reducing the hardware and communication link transformation costs in intermediate links. This solution, through its architecture of "automated operation + layered verification + localized execution," enables old substations to complete one-click sequential control upgrades with minimal deployment costs, without requiring significant modifications to existing equipment or communication facilities, thus directly addressing the core issue of high upgrade costs.

[0074] Furthermore, step S1 can be implemented through the following preferred embodiments, specifically:

[0075] The system receives operation task instructions sent by the relay device; wherein, the intelligent anti-misoperation host is deployed in security zone one, the relay device and the robot operation backend are deployed in security zone two, and the intelligent anti-misoperation host and the robot operation backend communicate with each other through the relay device;

[0076] The relay equipment includes a communication front-end host or an edge computing device;

[0077] When the relay device is a communication front-end host, the intelligent anti-misoperation host communicates with the robot operation backend through the forward and reverse isolation device and the communication front-end host;

[0078] When the relay device is an edge computing device, the intelligent anti-misoperation host communicates with the robot operation backend through a one-way optical shutter and the edge computing device.

[0079] In this preferred embodiment, a relay device (communication front-end host or edge computing device) is introduced as the communication hub between Security Zone 1 (intelligent anti-misoperation host) and Security Zone 2 (robot operation backend). Data isolation transmission across security zones is achieved using forward and reverse isolation devices or one-way optical gates, preventing the intelligent anti-misoperation host from being directly exposed to low-security zones and reducing the risk of external attacks. When a communication front-end host is used, forward and reverse isolation devices restrict bidirectional communication traffic to meet the compliance requirements of power grid security zoning. When an edge computing device is used, one-way communication is achieved through a one-way optical gate, avoiding the high cost of deploying bidirectional isolation devices. This design flexibly adapts to the communication conditions of different older substations (such as whether they have forward and reverse isolation devices), achieving secure communication and low-cost upgrades across security zones without requiring a complete network architecture overhaul.

[0080] Furthermore, when the relay device is a communication front-end host, step S3, which sends the unlocking request and status information to the intelligent anti-misoperation host, can be implemented through the following preferred embodiment, specifically:

[0081] The unlock request and status information are sent to the communication front-end host, so that the communication front-end host sends the unlock request and status information to the intelligent anti-misoperation host.

[0082] In this preferred embodiment, the unlocking request and device status information are forwarded to the intelligent anti-misoperation host through the communication front-end host. By utilizing the unidirectional transmission characteristics of the forward and reverse isolation device (such as only allowing data from the low security zone to the high security zone), data leakage in the high security zone is prevented. Reliable communication across security zones is achieved under the existing network architecture of old substations, avoiding the high costs incurred by deploying dedicated communication gateways or upgrading network facilities.

[0083] Furthermore, when the relay device is a communication front-end host, after the intelligent anti-misoperation host returns the unlocking key, the unlocking key is sent to the robot; wherein, the unlocking key is generated by the intelligent anti-misoperation host after the second anti-misoperation verification is passed, and sent to the robot operation backend through the communication front-end host.

[0084] In this preferred embodiment, after the intelligent anti-misoperation host generates the unlocking key, the key is transmitted to the robot operation backend through the communication front-end host, and then distributed to the robot, so as to realize the secure transfer of the key across security zones, while avoiding the modification costs caused by deploying a dedicated key server.

[0085] In practice, some older substations have built-in online anti-misoperation systems that intelligently generate operation tickets, which are stored in a five-proof computer key. These systems are divided into different security zones using forward / reverse isolation devices or firewalls. Operators, holding the five-proof computer key, perform switching operations step-by-step according to the operation ticket. However, when implementing one-click sequential control in these substations, the network architecture cannot be redesigned, and robots still cannot directly communicate and interact with the anti-misoperation host for verification, thus failing to achieve anti-misoperation operation.

[0086] In response to this situation, such as Figure 6 A simplified flowchart of another one-button sequential remote control operation method is shown, along with the corresponding... Figure 7 The diagram shows a complete flowchart of another one-click sequential remote control operation method. The central control center (or the monitoring host in the existing system) and the intelligent anti-misoperation host are deployed in Security Zone 1. In Security Zone 2, a communication front-end host, a robot operation backend, and the robot are deployed. Security Zones 1 and 2 are separated by a positive and negative isolation device. The communication front-end host and the intelligent anti-misoperation host are wired together and communicate via an encrypted protocol. The robot operation backend is also wired together and communicates via HTTP. The robot operation backend also runs a LoRa gateway. The robot communicates wirelessly with the robot operation backend via the LoRa protocol. The robot communicates with the intelligent mechanical lock via Bluetooth, using a key to unlock and lock the intelligent mechanical lock. In this case, the specific process of the robot performing a secondary anti-misoperation verification when it moves to the device to be operated is as follows: Figure 6 As shown, specifically: the robot moves in front of the device, the robot operation backend verifies the robot's position, the operation task begins, then the robot activates the smart mechanical lock, and requests operation from the smart anti-misoperation host through the robot operation backend and the communication front-end host for secondary anti-misoperation verification. After the anti-misoperation verification is passed, the robot sends operation permission and unlocking key to the robot operation backend through the communication front-end host. After the robot obtains the key, it sends it to the smart mechanical lock via Bluetooth to unlock it, and operates the device to perform various command operations such as switching. After the operation is completed, the smart mechanical lock is locked via Bluetooth.

[0087] Preferably, when the relay device is an edge computing device, after receiving the unlock request and the status information of the target device, and before sending the unlock key to the robot, a second anti-misoperation verification can be performed to obtain the unlock key through the following preferred implementation method:

[0088] The unlock request and status information are sent to the edge computing device, so that the edge computing device can perform a second anti-misoperation verification based on the status information, and return the unlock key after the second anti-misoperation verification is successful.

[0089] In practice, some older substations, due to their early construction, have outdated network equipment and simple communication systems. They lack modern forward and reverse isolation devices or firewall technology, making it impossible to effectively isolate different security zones.

[0090] In response to this situation, such as Figure 8 The diagram shows a simplified flowchart of another one-button sequential remote control operation method and its corresponding... Figure 9 The diagram shows a complete flowchart of another one-click sequential remote control operation method. It uses an edge computing device as the anti-misoperation host, isolated from the central control center and the intelligent anti-misoperation host. Essentially, the central control center and the intelligent anti-misoperation host are deployed in security zone one, while the edge computing device is deployed in security zone two. A one-way optical shutter (i.e., the one-way optical axis in the diagram) mirrors the data from the existing intelligent anti-misoperation host in zone one to the non-real-time database of the edge computing device in zone two, thus mirroring the anti-misoperation operation rules of zone one. The one-way optical shutter enables unidirectional data flow, avoiding the deployment costs of complex bidirectional isolation devices (such as forward and reverse isolation devices). This achieves a balance between safety zoning compliance, functional scalability, and renovation costs in older substations. The specific operation method in this solution is as described in the corresponding method embodiment above. Figure 8 and Figure 9 As shown, it will not be repeated here.

[0091] In this preferred embodiment, secondary anti-misoperation verification based on device status information is directly executed by edge computing devices, replacing the remote verification process of the intelligent anti-misoperation host and reducing latency and failure risks in cross-security zone communication. Simultaneously, the unidirectional data flow characteristic of the one-way shutter (allowing data only from the high-security zone to the low-security zone) replaces the traditional bidirectional isolation device, reducing equipment deployment costs. This architecture, through the "edge-based verification" mechanism, achieves an effective balance between security zoning compliance and upgrade costs in scenarios with weak communication infrastructure in older substations.

[0092] Example 2:

[0093] Please refer to Figure 2 Based on the same inventive concept, the present invention discloses a robot operation backend, which includes: an instruction acquisition module M1, a movement control module M2, an unlock request module M3, a key sending module M4, and an execution control module M5;

[0094] The instruction acquisition module M1 is used to acquire operation task instructions; wherein the operation task instructions are generated by the intelligent anti-misoperation host when performing the first anti-misoperation verification on the operation task created by the central control center.

[0095] The mobile control module M2 is used to confirm the location of the target device and send a corresponding mobile command to the robot according to the operation task instruction, so that the robot moves to the location of the target device, activates the smart mechanical lock of the target device, and returns an unlocking request and the status information of the target device.

[0096] The unlocking request module M3 is used to send the unlocking request and status information to the intelligent anti-misoperation host, so that the intelligent anti-misoperation host can perform a second anti-misoperation verification based on the status information, and return the unlocking key after the second anti-misoperation verification is passed;

[0097] The key sending module M4 is used to send the unlocking key to the robot, so that the robot can unlock the smart mechanical lock according to the unlocking key;

[0098] The execution control module M5 is used to send the operation task instruction to the robot after the smart mechanical lock has unlocked, so that the robot can perform the corresponding instruction operation according to the operation task instruction.

[0099] Furthermore, the instruction acquisition module M1 includes: a first instruction acquisition unit;

[0100] The first instruction acquisition unit is used to receive operation task instructions sent by the relay device; the intelligent anti-misoperation host is deployed in security zone one, the relay device and the robot operation backend are deployed in security zone two, and the intelligent anti-misoperation host and the robot operation backend communicate through the relay device.

[0101] The relay equipment includes a communication front-end host or an edge computing device;

[0102] When the relay device is a communication front-end host, the intelligent anti-misoperation host communicates with the robot operation backend through the forward and reverse isolation device and the communication front-end host;

[0103] When the relay device is an edge computing device, the intelligent anti-misoperation host communicates with the robot operation backend through a one-way optical shutter and the edge computing device.

[0104] In this preferred embodiment, the instruction acquisition module M1 introduces a relay device (communication front-end host or edge computing device) as a communication hub between Security Zone 1 (intelligent anti-misoperation host) and Security Zone 2 (robot operation backend). It utilizes forward and reverse isolation devices or one-way optical gates to achieve data isolation transmission across security zones, preventing the intelligent anti-misoperation host from being directly exposed to low-security zones and reducing the risk of external attacks. When using a communication front-end host, forward and reverse isolation devices limit bidirectional communication traffic to meet the compliance requirements of power grid security zoning. When using an edge computing device, one-way optical gates enable unidirectional communication, avoiding the high cost of deploying bidirectional isolation devices. This design flexibly adapts to the communication conditions of different older substations (such as whether they have forward and reverse isolation devices), achieving secure communication and low-cost upgrades across security zones without requiring a complete network architecture overhaul.

[0105] Furthermore, the unlock request module M3 includes a first unlock request unit;

[0106] The first unlocking request unit is used to send the unlocking request and status information to the communication front-end host when the relay device is a communication front-end host, so that the communication front-end host sends the unlocking request and status information to the intelligent anti-misoperation host.

[0107] In this preferred embodiment, the unlock request module M3 forwards the unlock request and device status information to the intelligent anti-misoperation host through the communication front-end host. By utilizing the unidirectional transmission characteristics of the forward and reverse isolation device (such as only allowing data from the low security zone to the high security zone), it prevents data leakage in the high security zone and realizes reliable communication across security zones under the existing network architecture of old substations, avoiding the high costs incurred by deploying dedicated communication gateways or upgrading network facilities.

[0108] Furthermore, the key sending module M4 includes: a first key sending unit;

[0109] The first key sending unit is used to send the unlocking key to the robot after the intelligent anti-misoperation host returns the unlocking key when the relay device is a communication front-end host; wherein the unlocking key is generated by the intelligent anti-misoperation host after the second anti-misoperation verification is passed, and sent to the robot operation backend through the communication front-end host.

[0110] In this preferred embodiment, after the key sending module M4 generates the unlocking key on the intelligent anti-misoperation host, it transmits the key to the robot operation backend through the communication front-end host, and then sends it to the robot, thereby realizing the secure transfer of the key across security zones and avoiding the modification costs incurred by deploying a dedicated key server.

[0111] Furthermore, the unlock request module M3 also includes a second unlock request unit;

[0112] The second unlock request unit is used to send the unlock request and status information to the edge computing device after receiving the unlock request and the status information of the target device, and before sending the unlock key to the robot, when the relay device is an edge computing device, so that the edge computing device performs a second anti-misoperation verification based on the status information, and returns the unlock key after the second anti-misoperation verification passes.

[0113] In this preferred embodiment, secondary anti-misoperation verification based on device status information is directly executed by edge computing devices, replacing the remote verification process of the intelligent anti-misoperation host and reducing latency and failure risks in cross-security zone communication. Simultaneously, the unidirectional data flow characteristic of the one-way shutter (allowing data only from the high-security zone to the low-security zone) replaces the traditional bidirectional isolation device, reducing equipment deployment costs. This architecture, through the "edge-based verification" mechanism, achieves an effective balance between security zoning compliance and upgrade costs in scenarios with weak communication infrastructure in older substations.

[0114] Specifically, for a more detailed explanation of the working principles and procedures of the robot's operating backend, please refer to the relevant description in Example 1.

[0115] In this embodiment, the instruction acquisition module standardizes the reception of operation task instructions, eliminating errors from manual transmission; the motion control module drives the robot to autonomously navigate to the target equipment, replacing the time-consuming and safety-risk aspects of manual inspection; the collaboration between the unlocking request module and the key sending module ensures strict synchronization of secondary verification and key transmission, avoiding operation interruptions; and the execution control module directly issues operation instructions after unlocking, forming a closed-loop control process. This modular design, through functional decoupling and automated execution, improves the overall system efficiency while reducing reliance on aging substation communication facilities.

[0116] Example 3:

[0117] Please refer to Figure 4 Based on the same inventive concept, the present invention discloses a robot-based substation anti-misoperation control system, comprising: a central control center, an intelligent anti-misoperation host, a robot operation backend, a robot, an intelligent mechanical lock, and various target devices;

[0118] The intelligent anti-misoperation host is connected to the central control center for communication.

[0119] The robot operation backend is connected to the intelligent anti-misoperation host for executing a robot-based substation anti-misoperation control method as described in any of the embodiments in Example 1.

[0120] The robot is wirelessly connected to the robot operation backend;

[0121] Each of the target devices (not shown in the figure) is equipped with the intelligent mechanical lock;

[0122] The intelligent mechanical lock is connected to the robot via Bluetooth.

[0123] In this embodiment, standardized operation tasks are generated collaboratively by the centralized control center and the intelligent anti-misoperation host to ensure compliance of the source of instructions; the wireless communication between the robot operation backend and the robot can easily adapt to the weak network environment of old substations; the intelligent mechanical lock is directly connected to the robot via Bluetooth, saving the deployment cost of the aggregation terminal. The above system architecture, through the "centralized control-layered verification-local execution" mode, can achieve one-click sequential control operation with only minor modifications to the existing old facilities, directly overcoming the problem of high cost of retrofitting old substations.

[0124] Furthermore, the target device is equipped with sensors and a ZigBee communication module, and the robot is equipped with a ZigBee terminal; wherein, the ZigBee terminal and the ZigBee communication module of the target device form a mesh network, the sensors are used to collect the target device's own status information, and the ZigBee communication module is used to send the status information to the robot through the mesh network.

[0125] In this preferred embodiment, by configuring sensors and ZigBee communication modules on the target device, and using ZigBee terminals and device modules to form a mesh network, self-organized collection and transmission of device status information is achieved, replacing the shortcomings of traditional solutions that rely on wired sensor networks or manual on-site recording. The sensors directly collect the target device status data and transmit it to the robot via the mesh network through multiple hops, avoiding the transformation difficulties caused by aging cables or missing communication interfaces in old substations. The self-organizing network characteristics of the mesh network support dynamic coverage and multi-path redundancy, adapting to scenarios with complex equipment distribution or severe obstruction in old substations, and improving the reliability of data collection. The robot receives the device status information through the ZigBee terminal and integrates the data into a secondary error prevention verification process, avoiding the need to deploy additional data collection gateways or relay devices, further reducing transformation costs.

[0126] Furthermore, the robot is equipped with a camera and a visual recognition module; wherein the camera and visual recognition module are used to collect status information of the target device.

[0127] In this preferred embodiment, by equipping the robot with a camera and a visual recognition module, machine vision technology is used to automatically identify the serial number and status information of the target equipment, replacing the inefficient mode of relying on physical sensors or manual on-site verification in traditional solutions. The visual recognition module avoids the limitations of missing sensor interfaces or difficult modification in old substations by analyzing the equipment status in real time. At the same time, the coordination between visual recognition and robot mobile operation integrates inspection and operation functions into a single carrier, avoiding the need to deploy inspection robots or fixed cameras separately for status monitoring, and significantly reducing hardware deployment costs.

[0128] Furthermore, the robot and the robot operation backend are configured with a LoRa gateway; wherein, the LoRa gateway is used to wirelessly connect the robot and the robot operation backend.

[0129] In this preferred embodiment, by configuring a LoRa gateway for the robot and its operating backend, a wireless communication link is established using the long-distance and low-power characteristics of LoRa technology, replacing the high-cost communication upgrades that rely on fiber optic or Wi-Fi base stations in traditional solutions. The wide-area coverage capability of the LoRa gateway supports cross-regional mobile operations of the robot in the complex environment of a substation, avoiding operation interruptions caused by signal blind spots. Through the low-bandwidth data transmission characteristics of the LoRa protocol, the communication requirements for robot operation commands and status feedback are adapted, reducing the load pressure on the existing network facilities of old substations. At the same time, the collaboration between LoRa and the robot's local control logic enables reliable transmission of operation commands and real-time feedback of execution status, ensuring strict synchronization between error prevention verification and operation execution, and improving the overall stability of the system.

[0130] The specific working processes of each module described above can be referred to the corresponding processes in the foregoing method embodiments, and will not be repeated here. The division of modules is only a logical functional division, and there may be other division methods in actual implementation. For example, multiple modules may be combined or integrated into another system.

[0131] The specific embodiments described above further illustrate the purpose, technical solution, and beneficial effects of the present invention. It should be understood that the above descriptions are merely specific embodiments of the present invention and are not intended to limit the scope of protection of the present invention. In particular, it should be noted that any modifications, equivalent substitutions, improvements, etc., made within the spirit and principles of the present invention should be included within the scope of protection of the present invention for those skilled in the art.

Claims

1. A robot-based substation anti-misoperation control method, characterized in that, Suitable for robot operation backend; The substation anti-misoperation control method includes: Obtain operation task instructions; wherein, the operation task instructions are generated by the intelligent anti-misoperation host when performing the first anti-misoperation verification on the operation task created by the central control center; According to the operation task instruction, the location of the target device is confirmed and a corresponding movement instruction is sent to the robot so that the robot moves to the location of the target device and activates the smart mechanical lock of the target device. At the same time, an unlocking request and the status information of the target device are returned. The unlock request and status information are sent to the intelligent anti-misoperation host, so that the intelligent anti-misoperation host can perform a second anti-misoperation verification based on the status information, and return the unlock key after the second anti-misoperation verification is passed; The unlocking key is sent to the robot so that the robot can unlock the smart mechanical lock using the unlocking key; After the smart mechanical lock is unlocked, the operation task instruction is sent to the robot so that the robot can perform the corresponding instruction operation according to the operation task instruction; The instruction to obtain the operation task includes: The system receives operation task instructions sent by the relay device; wherein, the intelligent anti-misoperation host is deployed in security zone one, the relay device and the robot operation backend are deployed in security zone two, and the intelligent anti-misoperation host and the robot operation backend communicate with each other through the relay device; The relay equipment includes a communication front-end host or an edge computing device; When the relay device is a communication front-end host, the intelligent anti-misoperation host communicates with the robot operation backend through the forward and reverse isolation device and the communication front-end host; When the relay device is an edge computing device, the intelligent anti-misoperation host communicates with the robot operation backend through a one-way optical shutter and the edge computing device; After receiving the unlock request and the status information of the target device, and before sending the unlock key to the robot, the process further includes: When the relay device is an edge computing device, the unlock request and status information are sent to the edge computing device so that the edge computing device can perform a second anti-misoperation verification based on the status information, and return the unlock key after the second anti-misoperation verification is passed.

2. The substation misoperation prevention control method based on a robot as described in claim 1, characterized in that, Sending the unlock request and status information to the intelligent anti-misoperation host includes: When the relay device is a communication front-end host, the unlock request and status information are sent to the communication front-end host, so that the communication front-end host sends the unlock request and status information to the intelligent anti-misoperation host.

3. The substation misoperation prevention control method based on a robot as described in claim 1, characterized in that, Sending the unlock key to the robot includes: When the relay device is a communication front-end host, after the intelligent anti-misoperation host returns the unlock key, the unlock key is sent to the robot; wherein, the unlock key is generated by the intelligent anti-misoperation host after the second anti-misoperation verification is passed, and sent to the robot operation backend through the communication front-end host.

4. A robot operation backend, characterized in that, The robot operation backend includes: an instruction acquisition module, a movement control module, an unlock request module, a key sending module, and an execution control module; The instruction acquisition module is used to acquire operation task instructions; wherein the operation task instructions are generated by the intelligent anti-misoperation host when performing the first anti-misoperation verification on the operation task created by the central control center. The mobile control module is used to confirm the location of the target device and send a corresponding mobile command to the robot according to the operation task instruction, so that the robot moves to the location of the target device, activates the smart mechanical lock of the target device, and returns an unlocking request and the status information of the target device. The unlocking request module is used to send the unlocking request and status information to the intelligent anti-mistake host, so that the intelligent anti-mistake host can perform a second anti-mistake verification based on the status information, and return the unlocking key after the second anti-mistake verification is passed; The key sending module is used to send the unlocking key to the robot, so that the robot can unlock the smart mechanical lock according to the unlocking key; The execution control module is used to send the operation task instruction to the robot after the smart mechanical lock has unlocked, so that the robot can perform the corresponding instruction operation according to the operation task instruction; The instruction acquisition module includes: a first instruction acquisition unit; The first instruction acquisition unit is used to receive operation task instructions sent by the relay device; the intelligent anti-misoperation host is deployed in security zone one, the relay device and the robot operation backend are deployed in security zone two, and the intelligent anti-misoperation host and the robot operation backend communicate through the relay device. The relay equipment includes a communication front-end host or an edge computing device; When the relay device is a communication front-end host, the intelligent anti-misoperation host communicates with the robot operation backend through the forward and reverse isolation device and the communication front-end host; When the relay device is an edge computing device, the intelligent anti-misoperation host communicates with the robot operation backend through a one-way optical shutter and the edge computing device; The unlock request module includes a second unlock request unit; The second unlock request unit is used to send the unlock request and status information to the edge computing device after receiving the unlock request and the status information of the target device, and before sending the unlock key to the robot, when the relay device is an edge computing device, so that the edge computing device performs a second anti-misoperation verification based on the status information, and returns the unlock key after the second anti-misoperation verification passes.

5. A robot-based substation anti-misoperation control system, characterized in that, include: Centralized control center, intelligent anti-misoperation host, robot operation backend, robot, intelligent mechanical lock and various target devices; The intelligent anti-misoperation host is connected to the central control center for communication. The robot operation backend is connected to the intelligent anti-misoperation host for executing a robot-based substation anti-misoperation control method as described in any one of claims 1-3; The robot is wirelessly connected to the robot operation backend; Each of the target devices is equipped with the intelligent mechanical lock; The intelligent mechanical lock is connected to the robot via Bluetooth.

6. The robot-based substation anti-misoperation control system as described in claim 5, characterized in that, The target device is equipped with sensors and a ZigBee communication module, and the robot is equipped with a ZigBee terminal; wherein, the ZigBee terminal and the ZigBee communication module of the target device form a mesh network, the sensors are used to collect the target device's own status information, and the ZigBee communication module is used to send the status information to the robot through the mesh network.

7. A robot-based substation anti-misoperation control system as described in claim 5, characterized in that, The robot is equipped with a camera and a visual recognition module; wherein, the camera and visual recognition module are used to collect status information of the target device.

8. A robot-based substation anti-misoperation control system as described in any one of claims 5-7, characterized in that, The robot and the robot operation backend are configured with a LoRa gateway; wherein, the LoRa gateway is used to wirelessly connect the robot and the robot operation backend.

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