Supply chain management method and device, electronic equipment and readable storage medium

Abstract

The invention discloses a supply chain management method and device, electronic equipment and a readable storage medium, and can be applied to the technical field of supply chain management. The method comprises the following steps: determining a plurality of supply chain objects in a supply chain; constructing a double-layer game model based on the plurality of supply chain objects; the double-layer game model is solved in an inverted order, equilibrium solutions corresponding to the multiple supply chain objects are obtained, and the equilibrium solutions are used for reflecting the effort cost and the violation probability of the multiple supply chain objects in the process of executing the supply chain compliance strategy under the two management relations; based on the equilibrium solution, target strategies under the two management relations are determined respectively, and the target strategies are one of a delegation strategy and a control strategy; and based on the target strategy, managing decisions and behaviors of the supply chain object in the process of executing the supply chain compliance strategy. Through the method and the device, the technical problem that decisions and behaviors of supply chain objects of different levels in a supply chain are difficult to manage in related technologies is solved.

Description

Technical Field

[0001] The present application relates to the technical field of supply chain management, and in particular to a supply chain management method, device, electronic device, and readable storage medium. Background Art

[0002] As supply chains become more complex and multi-tiered, managing lower-tier suppliers becomes increasingly challenging. For example, ensuring compliance with ethical sourcing, social responsibility, and environmental standards across all tiers of the supply chain is crucial for maintaining a company's reputation, ensuring compliance, and optimizing overall supply chain operations. This impacts not only a company's reputation and compliance but also the stability and efficiency of the supply chain. However, in multi-tiered supply chains, information asymmetry between supply chain entities at different tiers complicates monitoring the compliance of secondary suppliers, creating technical challenges in managing the decisions and actions of supply chain entities at different tiers.

[0003] Currently, no effective solution has been proposed to the technical problem that it is difficult to manage the decisions and behaviors of supply chain objects at different levels in the supply chain. Summary of the Invention

[0004] The main purpose of this application is to provide a supply chain management method, device, electronic device and readable storage medium to solve the technical problem of difficulty in managing the decisions and behaviors of supply chain objects at different levels in the supply chain.

[0005] In order to achieve the above objectives, according to one aspect of the present application, a supply chain management method is provided. The method includes: determining multiple supply chain objects in a supply chain, wherein the supply chain objects include at least a zero-level buyer object, a first-level supplier object, and a second-level supplier object, wherein the zero-level buyer object trades with the first-level supplier object, and the first-level supplier object trades with the second-level supplier object; constructing a two-level game model based on the multiple supply chain objects, wherein the two-level game model includes a delegation strategy and a control strategy under two management relationships, wherein the two management relationships include the first-level supplier object managing the second-level supplier object, and the second-level supplier object managing the first-level supplier object, wherein the delegation strategy is used to instruct the first-level supplier object to delegate management authority in the process of executing the supply chain compliance strategy on the second-level supplier object, and the control strategy is used to instruct the zero-level buyer object to directly manage the process of executing the supply chain compliance strategy on the second-level supplier object; solving the two-level game model in reverse order to obtain equilibrium solutions corresponding to the multiple supply chain objects, wherein the equilibrium solutions are used to reflect the effort costs and violation probabilities of the multiple supply chain objects in the process of executing the supply chain compliance strategy under the two management relationships; determining target strategies under the two management relationships based on the equilibrium solutions, wherein the target strategy is one of a delegation strategy and a control strategy; and managing the decisions and behaviors of the supply chain objects in the process of executing the supply chain compliance strategy based on the target strategies.

[0006] Optionally, a two-layer game model is constructed based on multiple supply chain objects, including: determining the cost function and benefit function of the process of multiple supply chain objects executing the supply chain compliance strategy, the cost function is used to quantify the effort cost of the corresponding supply chain object to meet the compliance requirements of the supply chain compliance strategy, and the benefit function is used to reflect the benefits of the corresponding supply chain object in the supply chain operation process; determining the information flow and information asymmetry between multiple supply chain objects, wherein the information flow is used to describe the information transmission path within the supply chain, and the information asymmetry is used to describe the differences in the information acquisition of multiple supply chain objects; based on the cost function and benefit function of multiple supply chain objects, and the information flow and information asymmetry between multiple supply chain objects, a two-layer game model is constructed.

[0007] Optionally, the two-layer game model is solved in reverse order to obtain equilibrium solutions for multiple supply chain objects, including: determining the decision-making order of multiple supply chain objects based on the management relationship; starting from the end of the decision-making order, the two-layer game model is solved in reverse order to obtain equilibrium solutions for multiple supply chain objects.

[0008] Optionally, the equilibrium solution includes at least: the violation probability of the first-level supplier object in the process of implementing the supply chain compliance strategy, the violation probability of the second-level supplier object in the process of implementing the supply chain compliance strategy, and the expected benefits of the zero-level buyer object in the process of supply chain operation.

[0009] Optionally, based on the equilibrium solution, the target strategies under the two management relationships are determined respectively, including: comparing the violation probability of the first-level supplier object under the delegation strategy with the violation probability of the first-level supplier object under the control strategy under the two management relationships respectively, to obtain a first comparison result; comparing the violation probability of the second-level supplier object under the delegation strategy with the violation probability of the second-level supplier object under the control strategy under the two management relationships respectively, to obtain a second comparison result; comparing the expected benefit of the zero-level buyer object under the delegation strategy with the expected benefit of the zero-level buyer object under the control strategy under the two management relationships respectively, to obtain a third comparison result; determining the target strategies under the two management relationships based on the first comparison result, the second comparison result and the third comparison result.

[0010] Optionally, based on the first comparison result, the second comparison result and the third comparison result, the target strategies under the two management relationships are determined, including: in response to the management relationship being that the first-level supplier object manages the second-level supplier object, and the first comparison result indicates that the violation probability of the first-level supplier object under the delegation strategy is lower than the violation probability of the first-level supplier object under the control strategy, and the second comparison result indicates that the violation probability of the second-level supplier object under the delegation strategy is lower than the violation probability of the second-level supplier object under the control strategy, and the third comparison result indicates that the expected benefit of the zero-level buyer object under the delegation strategy is higher than the expected benefit of the zero-level buyer object under the control strategy, determining the delegation strategy as the target strategy; in response to the management relationship being that the first-level supplier object manages the second-level supplier object, and the first comparison result indicates that the violation probability of the first-level supplier object under the delegation strategy is higher than the violation probability of the first-level supplier object under the control strategy, and the second comparison result indicates that the violation probability of the second-level supplier object under the delegation strategy is higher than the violation probability of the second-level supplier object under the control strategy, and the third comparison result indicates that the expected benefit of the zero-level buyer object under the delegation strategy is lower than the expected benefit of the zero-level buyer object under the control strategy. The expected benefit of the buyer object, the control strategy is determined as the target strategy; in response to the management relationship being that the second-level supplier object manages the first-level supplier object, and the first comparison result indicates that the violation probability of the first-level supplier object under the delegation strategy is lower than the violation probability of the first-level supplier object under the control strategy, and the second comparison result indicates that the violation probability of the second-level supplier object under the delegation strategy is lower than the violation probability of the second-level supplier object under the control strategy, and the third comparison result indicates that the expected benefit of the zero-level buyer object under the delegation strategy is higher than the expected benefit of the zero-level buyer object under the control strategy, the delegation strategy is determined as the target strategy; in response to the management relationship being that the second-level supplier object manages the first-level supplier object, and the first comparison result indicates that the violation probability of the first-level supplier object under the delegation strategy is higher than the violation probability of the first-level supplier object under the control strategy, and the second comparison result indicates that the violation probability of the second-level supplier object under the delegation strategy is higher than the violation probability of the second-level supplier object under the control strategy, and the third comparison result indicates that the expected benefit of the zero-level buyer object under the delegation strategy is lower than the expected benefit of the zero-level buyer object under the control strategy, the delegation strategy is determined as the target strategy.

[0011] In order to achieve the above-mentioned purpose, according to another aspect of the present application, a supply chain management device is provided. The device includes: a first determination unit, which is used to determine multiple supply chain objects in the supply chain, wherein the supply chain objects include at least zero-level buyer objects, first-level supplier objects, and second-level supplier objects, and the zero-level buyer objects trade with the first-level supplier objects, and the first-level supplier objects trade with the second-level supplier objects; and a device for constructing a two-layer game model based on multiple supply chain objects, wherein the two-layer game model includes a delegation strategy and a control strategy under two management relationships, wherein the two management relationships include the first-level supplier object managing the second-level supplier object, and the second-level supplier object managing the first-level supplier object, and the delegation strategy is used to indicate the management rights in the process of executing the supply chain compliance strategy on the second-level supplier object. Authorization is limited to first-level supplier objects, and the control strategy is used to instruct zero-level buyer objects to directly manage the process of executing supply chain compliance strategies on second-level supplier objects; the solving unit is used to solve the two-layer game model in reverse order to obtain equilibrium solutions corresponding to multiple supply chain objects, wherein the equilibrium solutions are used to reflect the effort costs and violation probabilities of multiple supply chain objects in the process of executing supply chain compliance strategies under two management relationships; the second determination unit is used to determine the target strategies under the two management relationships based on the equilibrium solutions, wherein the target strategies are one of the delegation strategies and the control strategies; the management unit is used to manage the decisions and behaviors of supply chain objects in the process of executing supply chain compliance strategies based on the target strategies.

[0012] Optionally, the construction unit is also used to: determine the cost function and benefit function of the process of multiple supply chain objects executing the supply chain compliance strategy, the cost function is used to quantify the effort cost of the corresponding supply chain object to meet the compliance requirements of the supply chain compliance strategy, and the benefit function is used to reflect the benefits of the corresponding supply chain object in the supply chain operation process; determine the information flow and information asymmetry between multiple supply chain objects, wherein the information flow is used to describe the information transmission path within the supply chain, and the information asymmetry is used to describe the differences in the information acquisition of multiple supply chain objects; based on the cost function and benefit function of multiple supply chain objects, and the information flow and information asymmetry between multiple supply chain objects, a two-layer game model is constructed.

[0013] Optionally, the solving unit is further used to: determine the decision sequence of multiple supply chain objects based on the management relationship; and solve the two-layer game model in reverse order starting from the end of the decision sequence to obtain equilibrium solutions for multiple supply chain objects.

[0014] Optionally, the second determination unit is also used to: compare the violation probability of the first-level supplier object under the delegation strategy with the violation probability of the first-level supplier object under the control strategy under the two management relationships, respectively, to obtain a first comparison result; compare the violation probability of the second-level supplier object under the delegation strategy with the violation probability of the second-level supplier object under the control strategy under the two management relationships, respectively, to obtain a second comparison result; compare the expected profit of the zero-level buyer object under the delegation strategy with the expected profit of the zero-level buyer object under the control strategy under the management relationships, respectively, to obtain a third comparison result; determine the target strategies under the two management relationships based on the first comparison result, the second comparison result and the third comparison result.

[0015] Optionally, the second determination unit is further used to: in response to the management relationship being that the first-level supplier object manages the second-level supplier object, and the first comparison result indicates that the violation probability of the first-level supplier object under the delegation policy is lower than the violation probability of the first-level supplier object under the control policy, and the second comparison result indicates that the violation probability of the second-level supplier object under the delegation policy is lower than the violation probability of the second-level supplier object under the control policy, and the third comparison result indicates that the expected benefit of the zero-level buyer object under the delegation policy is higher than the expected benefit of the zero-level buyer object under the control policy, determine the delegation policy as the target policy; in response to the management relationship being that the first-level supplier object manages the second-level supplier object, and the first comparison result indicates that the violation probability of the first-level supplier object under the delegation policy is higher than the violation probability of the first-level supplier object under the control policy, and the second comparison result indicates that the violation probability of the second-level supplier object under the delegation policy is higher than the violation probability of the second-level supplier object under the control policy, and the third comparison result indicates that the expected benefit of the zero-level buyer object under the delegation policy is lower than the expected benefit of the zero-level buyer object under the control policy, determine the control policy as the target policy. Determine as the target strategy; in response to the management relationship being that the second-level supplier object manages the first-level supplier object, and the first comparison result indicating that the violation probability of the first-level supplier object under the delegation strategy is lower than the violation probability of the first-level supplier object under the control strategy, and the second comparison result indicating that the violation probability of the second-level supplier object under the delegation strategy is lower than the violation probability of the second-level supplier object under the control strategy, and the third comparison result indicating that the expected benefit of the zero-level buyer object under the delegation strategy is higher than the expected benefit of the zero-level buyer object under the control strategy, determine the delegation strategy as the target strategy; in response to the management relationship being that the second-level supplier object manages the first-level supplier object, and the first comparison result indicating that the violation probability of the first-level supplier object under the delegation strategy is higher than the violation probability of the first-level supplier object under the control strategy, and the second comparison result indicating that the violation probability of the second-level supplier object under the delegation strategy is higher than the violation probability of the second-level supplier object under the control strategy, and the third comparison result indicating that the expected benefit of the zero-level buyer object under the delegation strategy is lower than the expected benefit of the zero-level buyer object under the control strategy, determine the delegation strategy as the target strategy.

[0016] To achieve the above object, according to another aspect of the present application, an electronic device is provided, which includes a memory and a processor, wherein the memory stores a computer program, and the processor is configured to run the computer program to perform the steps in any of the above method embodiments.

[0017] In order to achieve the above-mentioned purpose, according to another aspect of the present application, a computer-readable storage medium is provided, wherein the computer-readable storage medium stores a plurality of instructions, and the instructions are suitable for being loaded by a processor and executing the steps in any one of the above-mentioned method embodiments.

[0018] In order to achieve the above object, according to another aspect of the present application, a computer program product is provided. The computer program product includes a computer program. When the computer program is executed by a processor, the computer program implements the steps in any of the above method embodiments.

[0019] In an embodiment of the present application, a two-tiered game model is constructed based on the information asymmetry between supply chain objects at different levels in the supply chain and between supply chain objects to optimize compliance management in a multi-tiered supply chain. The two-tiered game model includes a delegation strategy and a control strategy under two management relationships. By solving the equilibrium solution of the two-tiered game model in reverse order, it is possible to determine the most appropriate management relationship and strategy between the zero-level supplier and the second-level supply chain object under information asymmetry. The determined management relationship and target strategy are then used to manage the decisions and behaviors of the supply chain objects in the process of implementing the supply chain compliance strategy. This helps ensure the compliance of the decisions and behaviors of the supply chain objects in the process of implementing the procurement strategy, reduces violations in the supply chain, and thus solves the technical problem in related technologies of difficulty in managing the decisions and behaviors of supply chain objects at different levels in the supply chain. BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS

[0020] The accompanying drawings, which constitute part of this application, are intended to provide a further understanding of this application. The exemplary embodiments and descriptions of this application are intended to explain this application and do not constitute an improper limitation on this application. In the accompanying drawings:

[0021] Figure 1 This is a hardware structure block diagram of a computer terminal for implementing a supply chain management method according to an embodiment of the present application;

[0022] Figure 2 is a flow chart of a supply chain management method according to an embodiment of the present application;

[0023] Figure 3 is a schematic diagram of a supply chain management device according to an embodiment of the present application;

[0024] Figure 4This is a structural block diagram of an electronic device according to an embodiment of the present application. DETAILED DESCRIPTION

[0025] In order to enable those skilled in the art to better understand the present invention, the following will clearly and completely describe the technical solutions in the embodiments of the present invention in conjunction with the drawings in the embodiments of the present invention. Obviously, the described embodiments are only part of the embodiments of the present invention, not all of the embodiments. Based on the embodiments in the present invention, all other embodiments obtained by ordinary technicians in this field without making creative efforts should fall within the scope of protection of this application.

[0026] It should be noted that the terms "first", "second", etc. in the specification and claims of the present application and the above-mentioned drawings are used to distinguish similar objects and are not necessarily used to describe a specific order or sequential order. It should be understood that the data used in this way can be interchangeable where appropriate, so that the embodiments of the present application described herein can be implemented in a sequence other than those illustrated or described herein. In addition, the terms "including" and "having" and any of their variations are intended to cover non-exclusive inclusions, for example, a process, method, system, product or device comprising a series of steps or units is not necessarily limited to those steps or units clearly listed, but may include other steps or units that are not clearly listed or inherent to these processes, methods, products or devices.

[0027] It should be noted that the collected information (including but not limited to user device information, user personal information, etc.) and data (including but not limited to data for display, data for analysis, etc.) involved in this application are information and data authorized by the user or fully authorized by all parties, and the collection, storage, use, processing, transmission, provision, disclosure and application of the relevant data comply with relevant laws, regulations and standards, take necessary confidentiality measures, do not violate public order and good morals, and provide corresponding operation portals for users to choose to authorize or refuse. For example, an interface is set up between this system and relevant users or institutions to provide users with corresponding operation portals for users to choose to agree or refuse the automated decision-making results; if the user chooses to refuse, the expert decision-making process will be entered.

[0028] Example 1

[0029] According to an embodiment of the present application, an embodiment of a supply chain management method is also provided. It should be noted that the steps shown in the flowchart of the accompanying drawings can be executed in a computer system such as a set of computer executable instructions, and although a logical order is shown in the flowchart, in some cases, the steps shown or described can be executed in an order different from that shown here.

[0030] The method embodiment provided in the first embodiment of the present application can be executed in a mobile terminal, a computer terminal or a similar computing device. Figure 1 This is a hardware structure diagram of a computer terminal (or mobile device) for implementing a supply chain management method according to an embodiment of the present application. Figure 1 As shown, the computer terminal 10 (or mobile device) may include one or more (illustrated as 102a, 102b, ..., 102n in the figure) processors 102 (the processor 102 may include but is not limited to a processing device such as a microprocessor (Micro controller Unit, abbreviated as MCU) or a programmable logic device (Field-Programmable Gate Array, abbreviated as FPGA)), a memory 104 for storing data, and a transmission device 106 for communication functions. In addition, it may also include: a display, an input / output interface (Input / Output, abbreviated as I / O), a universal serial bus (Universal Serial Bus, abbreviated as USB) port (which may be included as one of the ports of the BUS bus), a network interface, a power supply and / or a camera. It will be understood by those skilled in the art that Figure 1 The structure shown is only for illustration and does not limit the structure of the above electronic device. Figure 1 More or fewer components than shown, or with Figure 1 Different configurations shown.

[0031] It should be noted that the one or more processors 102 and / or other data processing circuits described above may generally be referred to herein as "data processing circuitry". The data processing circuitry may be embodied in whole or in part as software, hardware, firmware, or any other combination thereof. In addition, the data processing circuitry may be a single independent processing module, or may be incorporated in whole or in part into any of the other components of the computer terminal 10 (or mobile device). As described in the embodiments of the present application, the data processing circuitry serves as a processor control (e.g., selection of a variable resistor terminal path connected to an interface).

[0032] The memory 104 can be used to store software programs and modules of application software, such as the program instructions / data storage device corresponding to the supply chain management method in the embodiment of the present application. The processor 102 executes various functional applications and data processing by running the software programs and modules stored in the memory 104, that is, realizing the above-mentioned supply chain management method. The memory 104 may include a high-speed random access memory, and may also include a non-volatile memory, such as one or more magnetic storage devices, flash memory, or other non-volatile solid-state memory. In some instances, the memory 104 may further include a memory remotely located relative to the processor 102, and these remote memories may be connected to the computer terminal 10 via a network. Examples of the above-mentioned network include, but are not limited to, the Internet, an intranet, a local area network, a mobile communication network, and combinations thereof.

[0033] The transmission device 106 is used to receive or send data via a network. A specific example of the aforementioned network may include a wireless network provided by the communications provider of the computer terminal 10. In one embodiment, the transmission device 106 includes a network interface controller (NIC), which can be connected to other network devices via a base station to enable communication with the Internet. In another embodiment, the transmission device 106 may be a radio frequency (RF) module, which is used to communicate with the Internet wirelessly.

[0034] The display may be, for example, a touch screen liquid crystal display (LCD), which enables a user to interact with a user interface of the computer terminal 10 (or mobile device).

[0035] Under the above operating environment, this application provides Figure 2 The supply chain management method shown. Figure 2 This is a flowchart of the supply chain management method according to Example 1 of the present application.

[0036] Step S201: determine multiple supply chain objects in the supply chain.

[0037] In the technical solution provided in step S201 above, the supply chain objects include at least a zero-level buyer object, a first-level supplier object, and a second-level supplier object. The zero-level buyer object transacts with the first-level supplier object, and the first-level supplier object transacts with the second-level supplier object. Information asymmetry exists between the zero-level buyer object and the second-level supplier object.

[0038] In this embodiment, the zero-tier buyer object is at the top of the supply chain, transacting directly with the first-tier supplier object, typically the end user of a product or service, or a company directly engaged in the market. The first-tier supplier object supplies products or components to the zero-tier buyer object, while simultaneously establishing a transaction relationship with the second-tier supplier object, from which it purchases the required raw materials or services. The second-tier supplier object, located further down the supply chain, transacts directly with the first-tier supplier object, but maintains an indirect relationship with the zero-tier buyer object, providing raw materials, components, or services, indirectly influencing the final product of the supply chain.

[0039] Alternatively, in a multi-tiered supply chain, the zero-tier buyer acts as a leader, whose decisions influence the management of supply chain compliance strategies. First-tier and second-tier suppliers, based on their respective roles and cost structures, have a direct impact on the implementation and compliance of supply chain compliance strategies.

[0040] Alternatively, identifying supply chain stakeholders can help quantify the responsibilities and costs of each participant in supply chain compliance management. For example, Tier 1 buyers may need to incentivize compliance with supply chain compliance policies through financial support, while Tier 1 and Tier 2 suppliers may need to consider the costs of compliance enforcement and potential risks of non-compliance.

[0041] Step S202: construct a two-layer game model based on multiple supply chain objects.

[0042] In the technical solution provided in step S202 above, the two-tier game model includes a delegation strategy and a control strategy under two management relationships: the first-tier supplier object manages the second-tier supplier object, and the second-tier supplier object manages the first-tier supplier object. The delegation strategy is used to instruct the first-tier supplier object to delegate management authority in the process of executing the supply chain compliance strategy on the second-tier supplier object, and the control strategy is used to instruct the zero-tier buyer object to directly manage the process of executing the supply chain compliance strategy on the second-tier supplier object. The supply chain compliance strategy is used to at least indicate the compliance standards and specifications to be adhered to by supply chain objects at different levels in the supply chain.

[0043] In this example, the dynamic relationships between the zero-tier buyer, the first-tier supplier, and the second-tier supplier in a multi-tier supply chain are key to managing procurement policy compliance. The two-tier game model encompasses two types of management relationships: the management (leadership) of the first-tier supplier over the second-tier supplier, and the management (leadership) of the second-tier supplier over the first-tier supplier. Within each management relationship, the zero-tier buyer can adopt two different strategies to promote supply chain compliance: delegation and control.

[0044] Alternatively, under a delegation strategy, the zero-tier buyer authorizes the first-tier supplier to manage the supply chain compliance strategy for its second-tier suppliers. This means that the first-tier supplier assumes responsibility for monitoring and ensuring that second-tier suppliers adhere to the supply chain compliance strategy. Typically, delegation strategies are based on the direct business relationship between the first-tier and second-tier suppliers and the ease of information flow. The zero-tier buyer may provide funding, technical support, or guidance to the first-tier supplier to incentivize greater effort in implementing the supply chain compliance strategy, thereby indirectly influencing the second-tier supplier's behavior.

[0045] Alternatively, under a control strategy, the Tier 1 buyer directly manages the Tier 2 supplier's implementation of the supply chain compliance policy. This means the Tier 1 buyer will directly engage with the Tier 2 supplier, providing funding, training, audits, or other forms of support to ensure compliance. A control strategy is typically adopted when the Tier 1 buyer deems direct management more effective or when Tier 1 suppliers are unable to adequately ensure compliance.

[0046] Optionally, when constructing a two-level game model, the cost and benefit functions of each supply chain entity in implementing supply chain compliance policies can be considered. The cost function for each supply chain entity in implementing the management policy reflects the direct and indirect costs incurred by that entity in implementing the supply chain compliance policy, such as additional audit fees, training costs, and technical support costs. The benefit function considers the economic benefits of supply chain operations and the potential positive impacts of compliance management, such as enhanced reputation and reduced risk.

[0047] Optionally, when constructing a two-tier game model, one can also consider the information flow between supply chain entities and potential issues arising from information asymmetry. For example, a first-tier buyer may not be able to directly observe the specific behaviors or costs of a second-tier supplier, which can affect their decision-making. Information transparency between first-tier and second-tier suppliers can also affect the effectiveness of compliance management.

[0048] Alternatively, leadership relationships in a two-tiered game model (e.g., a first-tier supplier leading a second-tier supplier or vice versa) can have a profound impact on the decision-making and management of supply chain entities. Changes in leadership relationships can affect the order of decision-making and the availability of information, thereby affecting the costs and benefits of each member and the implementation of supply chain compliance strategies.

[0049] Alternatively, by constructing a two-level game model, we can analyze the optimal behavioral strategies of supply chain entities under different leadership relationships, including their effort level, probability of violation, and expected profit in implementing supply chain compliance strategies. This allows us to determine which supply chain compliance management strategy (delegation or control) is more effective in reducing the risk of violations while maximizing the economic benefits of supply chain entities in the presence of information asymmetry. We can also explore the impact of funding factors, including whether funding can be adjusted exogenously or endogenously, and how this adjustment affects the decision-making of supply chain entities in implementing supply chain compliance strategies. We can also assess the impact of supply chain leadership on the compliance management of supply chain compliance strategies, focusing specifically on how leadership relationships alter the information flow between supply chain entities and how this alteration affects the ultimate compliance management outcomes.

[0050] In this step, by constructing a two-level game model, we deeply analyzed the impact of different leadership relationships on the compliance of supply chain compliance strategies under a multi-level supply chain structure, as well as how to optimize the management of supply chain compliance strategies through delegation strategies and control strategies. The purpose is to provide zero-level buyers with decision-making tools to select the strategy that best balances costs, risks and benefits, thereby effectively managing the compliance issues of supply chain compliance strategies in the supply chain.

[0051] Step S203 , solving the two-layer game model in reverse order to obtain equilibrium solutions corresponding to multiple supply chain objects.

[0052] In the technical solution provided in the above step S203 of the present application, the equilibrium solution is used to reflect the effort cost and violation probability of multiple supply chain objects in the process of executing the supply chain compliance strategy under the two management relationships.

[0053] In this embodiment, the reverse order solution can be performed using backward induction. In multi-tiered supply chain management, the behavior of supply chain objects often follows an orderly decision-making process, where the decisions of supply chain objects at different levels depend on those of supply chain objects at other levels. Backward induction starts from the last step of the decision-making process and reversely derives the optimal strategy for all supply chain objects, thereby solving the equilibrium state of the entire supply chain.

[0054] Optionally, the decision-making order can be determined based on the supply chain's hierarchical structure. In a situation where a first-tier supplier leads a second-tier supplier, the first-tier supplier will make the decision first, followed by the second-tier supplier, and finally the zero-tier buyer. Conversely, in a management relationship where a second-tier supplier leads a first-tier supplier, the decision-making order is reversed.

[0055] Alternatively, a reverse order solution is performed, typically starting from the end of the decision sequence, i.e., the last decision maker in the supply chain, and reversing the optimal strategy. This typically involves solving the cost and benefit functions for each supply chain entity to determine how that entity adjusts the compliance-related effort level and funding allocation of the supply chain compliance strategy given the leadership relationship and strategy choices.

[0056] Alternatively, an equilibrium solution refers to a stable state achieved by supply chain entities at different levels, all choosing optimal strategies within a given supply chain structure and management relationship. Individual supply chain entities cannot unilaterally change their behavior. The equilibrium solution includes the compliance effort level, violation probability, and expected benefits of each supply chain entity's supply chain compliance strategy, reflecting the behavioral characteristics of supply chain entities after considering costs, benefits, and risks.

[0057] Optionally, the equilibrium solution not only reflects the supply chain entities' behavioral responses to the supply chain compliance strategy's compliance management but also provides key information: cost-benefit analysis, noncompliance risk assessment, strategy selection guidance, and the influence of leadership relationships. Regarding cost-benefit analysis, the equilibrium solution reveals the cost allocation and expected benefits of compliance management within the supply chain compliance strategy, helping supply chain leaders (zero-level buyers) understand the capital flows and profit potential under different strategies. Regarding noncompliance risk assessment, by calculating the probability of noncompliance in the equilibrium state, zero-level buyers can evaluate the effectiveness of the supply chain compliance strategy's compliance management and which strategy to adopt to minimize noncompliance risk. The equilibrium solution provides zero-level buyers with a basis for selecting a delegation strategy or a control strategy. By comparing the benefits and compliance of the two strategies, they can determine which strategy best achieves their goals under specific conditions. Regarding the influence of leadership relationships, by comparing the equilibrium solutions under different leadership relationships, we can gain insight into how leadership influences the compliance behavior of supply chain entities within the supply chain compliance strategy and the effectiveness of supply chain management strategies.

[0058] In this step, the zero-level buyer can develop a more precise compliance management plan for the supply chain compliance strategy based on the analysis results of the two-layer game model to ensure the compliance and economic benefits of the supply chain.

[0059] Step S204: Based on the equilibrium solution, target strategies under the two management relationships are determined respectively.

[0060] In the technical solution provided in step S204 of this application, a comparative analysis of the equilibrium solutions obtained from solving the two-level game model is performed, including a comparison of delegation and control strategies under two management relationships: the first-tier supplier leading the second-tier supplier and the second-tier supplier leading the first-tier supplier. The delegation strategy involves the zero-tier buyer indirectly managing the second-tier supplier's implementation of supply chain compliance policies through the first-tier supplier, while the control strategy involves the zero-tier buyer directly intervening in the management of the second-tier supplier.

[0061] Optionally, the choice of management strategy is based primarily on three criteria: the probability of violation (i.e., the likelihood of violations occurring when implementing the supply chain compliance strategy), the supplier's level of compliance (reflecting the strictness and efficiency of the implementation of the supply chain compliance strategy), and the expected benefits of the zero-level buyer (the net benefit after considering costs, compliance cost sharing, and losses caused by violations).

[0062] Alternatively, by comparing the above criteria under the two management relationships, we can determine which strategy (delegation strategy or control strategy) can better reduce the probability of violations, improve compliance, and maximize the expected benefits of the zero-level buyer. The target strategy is selected based on the optimal compliance management results of achieving the supply chain compliance strategy. That is, while ensuring that supply chain entities comply with the supply chain compliance strategy, we must also ensure the economic efficiency and stability of the supply chain.

[0063] Alternatively, when determining the target strategy, it is necessary to comprehensively consider the information flow and asymmetry within the supply chain, the cost function, the benefit function, and the financial factors involved in the supply chain compliance strategy. For example, if the first-tier supplier has a significant cost advantage in implementing the supply chain compliance strategy, and the zero-tier buyer suffers significant losses from the second-tier supplier's violations, then a delegation strategy may be more optimal. Conversely, if the zero-tier buyer suffers less losses, then a control strategy may be the target strategy to maximize profits, even if it may carry a higher probability of violation.

[0064] Optionally, in the process of determining target strategies, we may encounter the phenomena of "institutional failure" and "bottoming out." Institutional failure refers to the phenomenon that when the primary buyer perceives a low risk of losses from secondary suppliers' non-compliance, they may choose a strategy with a higher probability of non-compliance to pursue higher profits. The bottoming out effect refers to the vicious cycle that arises when institutional failure occurs, whereby the primary buyer may choose to invest in less cost-effective suppliers, resulting in a decline in the compliance and economic efficiency of the overall supply chain.

[0065] In this step, the equilibrium solution is used to determine the target strategies under the two management relationships, which can ensure that the supply chain management strategy can not only effectively implement the supply chain compliance strategy, but also balance the economic interests of the supply chain objects.

[0066] Step S205: Based on the target strategy, manage the decisions and behaviors of the supply chain objects in the process of executing the supply chain compliance strategy.

[0067] In the technical solution provided in the above step S205 of the present application, after the target strategy is determined by solving the two-layer game model in reverse order, the decisions and behaviors of the supply chain objects in the process of executing the supply chain compliance strategy can be managed according to the target strategy to ensure the compliance of the supply chain objects in the process of executing the supply chain compliance strategy, where the target strategy may refer to a delegation strategy or a control strategy.

[0068] In this embodiment, if the target strategy is a delegation strategy, it means that the zero-tier buyer will provide additional funds (or incentives) to the first-tier supplier to entrust the first-tier supplier to manage the compliance of the second-tier supplier in the process of implementing the supply chain compliance strategy.

[0069] Alternatively, if the target strategy is a control strategy, the zero-tier buyer will directly intervene in the compliance management of the second-tier supplier to implement the supply chain compliance strategy, bypassing the first-tier supplier. In this case, the zero-tier buyer directly establishes contact with the second-tier supplier.

[0070] In this step, the zero-level buyer can manage the decisions and behaviors of supply chain objects in the process of implementing the supply chain compliance strategy based on the target strategy to ensure that supply chain objects at all levels in the supply chain comply with the supply chain compliance strategy.

[0071] In steps S201 to S205, a two-tiered game model is constructed based on the information asymmetry between supply chain objects at different levels in the supply chain and between supply chain objects to optimize compliance management in a multi-tiered supply chain. This two-tiered game model includes a delegation strategy and a control strategy under two management relationships. By solving the equilibrium solution of the two-tiered game model in reverse order, it is possible to determine the most appropriate management relationship and strategy between the zero-level supplier and the second-level supply chain object under information asymmetry. The determined management relationship and target strategy are then used to manage the decisions and behaviors of supply chain objects in the process of implementing supply chain compliance strategies. This helps ensure the compliance of the decisions and behaviors of supply chain objects in the process of implementing procurement strategies, reduces violations in the supply chain, and thus solves the technical problem in related technologies of difficulty in managing the decisions and behaviors of supply chain objects at different levels in the supply chain.

[0072] The embodiment of the present invention is described in detail below in conjunction with the above steps.

[0073] As an optional implementation method, step S202 constructs a two-layer game model based on multiple supply chain objects, including: determining the cost function and benefit function of multiple supply chain objects in the process of executing the supply chain compliance strategy, the cost function is used to quantify the effort cost of the corresponding supply chain object to meet the compliance requirements of the supply chain compliance strategy, and the benefit function is used to reflect the benefit of the corresponding supply chain object in the supply chain operation process; determining the information flow and information asymmetry between multiple supply chain objects, wherein the information flow is used to describe the information transmission path within the supply chain, and the information asymmetry is used to describe the differences in the information acquisition of multiple supply chain objects; constructing a two-layer game model based on the cost function and benefit function of multiple supply chain objects, and the information flow and information asymmetry between multiple supply chain objects.

[0074] In this embodiment, the cost function describes the effort and associated economic costs expended by supply chain entities to achieve compliance with procurement policy requirements. The benefit function reflects the economic benefits accrued by supply chain entities during supply chain operations, including sales revenue, cost savings, and enhanced reputation. For tier-one buyers, benefits may come from product sales, while for tier-one and tier-two suppliers, benefits may derive from transactions with buyers and the reputation and market access gained through compliance management.

[0075] Alternatively, in a supply chain, information flow refers to how information is transferred from one entity to another, including information about costs, demand, prices, and compliance status. Information asymmetry refers to the fact that supply chain members may have different access rights to certain aspects of the supply chain. For example, a first-tier buyer may not have direct access to detailed information about a second-tier supplier, while a first-tier supplier may have more comprehensive information about the second-tier supplier. Information asymmetry can increase the complexity of supply chain management, particularly in managing procurement policy compliance.

[0076] Optionally, define cost and benefit functions for each supply chain object to ensure that each supply chain object accurately reflects the costs and benefits of implementing compliance management for supply chain compliance policies. Include a description of information flow in the two-level game model, including how information is transmitted between supply chain objects and how information asymmetry affects decision-making.

[0077] Optionally, when building a two-tier game model, you need to define delegation and control strategies for two management relationships: first-tier suppliers managing second-tier suppliers and second-tier suppliers managing first-tier suppliers. The delegation strategy delegates management authority over supply chain compliance policy enforcement to the first-tier supplier. The control strategy allows the zero-tier buyer to directly manage supply chain compliance policy enforcement on the second-tier supplier.

[0078] In this step, the constructed two-level game model will reflect the interaction of various supply chain objects in the supply chain under different strategies and leadership relationships, as well as how to make the optimal decision between costs and benefits to improve the overall compliance and economic efficiency of the supply chain.

[0079] As an optional implementation method, step S203 solves the two-layer game model in reverse order to obtain equilibrium solutions for multiple supply chain objects, including: determining the decision-making order of multiple supply chain objects based on the management relationship; starting from the end of the decision-making order, solving the two-layer game model in reverse order to obtain equilibrium solutions for multiple supply chain objects.

[0080] In this example, in a two-tiered game model, the decision-making order influences the strategic choices of each supply chain entity. Different decision-making orders are established based on two different management relationships: first-tier suppliers leading second-tier suppliers and second-tier suppliers leading first-tier suppliers. The decision-making order follows the hierarchical structure of the management relationship. Specifically, when a first-tier supplier leads a second-tier supplier, the first-tier supplier, as the leader, makes the first decision. Subsequently, the second-tier supplier reacts based on the first-tier supplier's decision. Finally, after observing the decisions of the first-tier and second-tier suppliers, the zero-tier buyer decides whether to adopt a delegation strategy or a control strategy.

[0081] Alternatively, reverse solving involves analyzing from the end of the decision sequence step by step to ultimately determine the optimal decision for each supply chain entity. This process, often called backward induction, ensures that each supply chain entity makes the optimal decision after fully understanding the possible strategies of subsequent entities.

[0082] Alternatively, we can start from the end of the decision sequence and analyze the decisions of the second-level suppliers (in the case of the first-level leader) or the decisions of the zero-level buyers (in the case of the second-level leader) first. This is because the end decision maker acts last in the game and its decision is based on the strategic choices of all other supply chain players.

[0083] Optionally, equilibrium solutions are the core results of supply chain management strategy analysis, representing the stable state under the combined optimal strategies of all supply chain entities under a given management relationship and decision sequence. These solutions include, but are not limited to, effort level, violation probability, and expected profit. Effort level represents the optimal level of effort for first- and second-tier suppliers in compliance management within the supply chain compliance strategy, which directly impacts the probability of violation. Violation probability represents the probability of violations by second-tier suppliers in the supply chain under different strategies and management relationships. Expected profit represents the expected return of the zero-tier buyer when adopting a delegation or control strategy.

[0084] In this step, by reversing the two-level game model, we can fully understand the interactions between supply chain entities and identify the decision points that achieve the lowest risk of noncompliance and the highest expected profit under different management relationships. This not only helps zero-level buyers make optimal strategic choices but also provides a theoretical basis for supply chain compliance management, guiding how to optimize resource allocation, improve compliance, and ensure economic efficiency in complex and multi-layered supply chain structures.

[0085] As an optional implementation method, the equilibrium solution includes at least: the violation probability of the first-level supplier object in the process of implementing the supply chain compliance strategy, the violation probability of the second-level supplier object in the process of implementing the supply chain compliance strategy, and the expected benefits of the zero-level buyer object in the process of supply chain operation.

[0086] In this example, in a two-tiered game model, first-tier suppliers directly transact with second-tier suppliers. The implementation and compliance of their supply chain compliance policies are directly linked to the healthy operation of the supply chain. The probability of noncompliance refers to the likelihood that a first-tier supplier will violate the provisions of the supply chain compliance policy when implementing its procurement strategy. In equilibrium, the probability of noncompliance for a first-tier supplier reflects the optimal choice for the first-tier supplier under the current incentive and cost-benefit structure. For example, if the zero-tier buyer provides sufficient financial support to reduce the cost of implementing the supply chain compliance policy, the probability of noncompliance for the first-tier supplier will be low in the equilibrium solution.

[0087] Alternatively, second-tier suppliers' adherence to supply chain compliance policies is a key component of supply chain compliance management. The probability of noncompliance here refers to the likelihood that a second-tier supplier will fail to adhere to the compliance requirements of the supply chain compliance policy when performing its duties. In a two-level game model, the second-tier supplier's probability of noncompliance is influenced by the first-tier supplier's compliance management, direct or indirect intervention by the zero-tier buyer, and the supplier's own costs and benefits. The second-tier supplier's probability of noncompliance in the equilibrium solution indicates the second-tier supplier's optimal behavior under the current supply chain structure and management policy, as well as its tendency to adhere to the supply chain compliance policy.

[0088] Alternatively, the expected return of the zero-level buyer during supply chain operations is the financial return the zero-level buyer expects to receive under the supply chain management strategy. This is the revenue from supply chain operations minus all costs, including direct costs, compliance management costs associated with supply chain compliance strategies, and potential losses from non-compliance incidents. In the equilibrium solution, the expected return reflects the bank's optimal economic benefit after considering all relevant costs and risks when choosing a specific management strategy (delegation or control).

[0089] This step identifies equilibrium solutions under different management relationships and strategies, revealing the optimal behavior of suppliers at all levels and the optimal economic outcomes for the bank (buyer) within the supply chain. These solutions provide a basis for banks to make decisions when designing procurement strategy compliance management mechanisms, helping them select the strategy that best balances costs, risks, and benefits to ensure efficient supply chain operations and compliance with supply chain compliance strategies.

[0090] As an optional implementation method, based on the equilibrium solution, the target strategies under the two management relationships are determined respectively, including: comparing the violation probability of the first-level supplier object under the delegation strategy with the violation probability of the first-level supplier object under the control strategy under the two management relationships respectively, to obtain a first comparison result; comparing the violation probability of the second-level supplier object under the delegation strategy with the violation probability of the second-level supplier object under the control strategy under the two management relationships respectively, to obtain a second comparison result; comparing the expected benefit of the zero-level buyer object under the delegation strategy with the expected benefit of the zero-level buyer object under the control strategy under the management relationships respectively, to obtain a third comparison result; determining the target strategies under the two management relationships based on the first comparison result, the second comparison result and the third comparison result.

[0091] In this embodiment, under the management relationship in which the first-tier supplier leads the second-tier supplier, the calculated equilibrium solution includes the violation probabilities of the first-tier supplier and the second-tier supplier under two strategies (the delegation strategy and the control strategy). By comparing the violation probability of the first-tier supplier under the delegation strategy with the violation probability of the first-tier supplier under the control strategy, a first comparison result can be obtained, and then based on the first comparison result, it can be determined which strategy has a lower risk of default for the first-tier supplier. Similarly, by comparing the violation probability of the second-tier supplier under the delegation strategy with the violation probability of the second-tier supplier under the control strategy, a second comparison result can be obtained, and then based on the second comparison result, it can be determined which strategy has a lower risk of default for the second-tier supplier. By comparing the expected return of the zero-tier buyer under the delegation strategy with the expected return of the zero-tier buyer under the control strategy, a third comparison result can be obtained, and then based on the third comparison result, it can be evaluated which strategy is more beneficial to the zero-tier buyer.

[0092] Optionally, by combining the first, second, and third comparison results, we can analyze which strategy, under the two management relationships, can simultaneously reduce the probability of noncompliance and increase the expected return of the zero-level buyer, and then determine that strategy as the target strategy. Typically, the selection of a target strategy requires balancing the interests of various supply chain entities, ensuring the overall stability and compliance of the supply chain, while also considering the economic interests of the zero-level buyer.

[0093] Alternatively, when a first-tier supplier leads a second-tier supplier, the delegation strategy may be considered the target strategy if it can guarantee a lower probability of violation while also achieving a higher expected benefit for the zero-tier buyer. The control strategy may be considered the target strategy if it can more effectively reduce the probability of violation or outperform in terms of the expected benefit for the zero-tier buyer.

[0094] Optionally, when the second-tier supplier leads the first-tier supplier, the above comparison steps are repeated to determine which strategy (delegation strategy or control strategy) can more effectively address the compliance and economic goals of the supply chain.

[0095] In this step, based on in-depth analysis and comparison, the target strategies under the two management relationships can be determined, which helps to optimize supply chain compliance management, ensure the effective implementation of supply chain compliance strategies, and maximize the economic benefits of the supply chain.

[0096] As an optional implementation, based on the first comparison result, the second comparison result and the third comparison result, the target strategies under the two management relationships are determined, including: in response to the management relationship being that the first-level supplier object manages the second-level supplier object, and the first comparison result indicates that the violation probability of the first-level supplier object under the delegation strategy is lower than the violation probability of the first-level supplier object under the control strategy, and the second comparison result indicates that the violation probability of the second-level supplier object under the delegation strategy is lower than the violation probability of the second-level supplier object under the control strategy, and the third comparison result indicates that the expected benefit of the zero-level buyer object under the delegation strategy is higher than the expected benefit of the zero-level buyer object under the control strategy, determining the delegation strategy as the target strategy; in response to the management relationship being that the first-level supplier object manages the second-level supplier object, and the first comparison result indicates that the violation probability of the first-level supplier object under the delegation strategy is higher than the violation probability of the first-level supplier object under the control strategy, and the second comparison result indicates that the violation probability of the second-level supplier object under the delegation strategy is higher than the violation probability of the second-level supplier object under the control strategy, and the third comparison result indicates that the expected benefit of the zero-level buyer object under the delegation strategy is lower than the expected benefit of the zero-level buyer object under the control strategy. The control strategy is determined as the target strategy in response to the management relationship being that the second-level supplier object manages the first-level supplier object, and the first comparison result indicates that the violation probability of the first-level supplier object under the delegation strategy is lower than the violation probability of the first-level supplier object under the control strategy, and the second comparison result indicates that the violation probability of the second-level supplier object under the delegation strategy is lower than the violation probability of the second-level supplier object under the control strategy, and the third comparison result indicates that the expected benefit of the zero-level buyer object under the delegation strategy is higher than the expected benefit of the zero-level buyer object under the control strategy, the delegation strategy is determined as the target strategy; in response to the management relationship being that the second-level supplier object manages the first-level supplier object, and the first comparison result indicates that the violation probability of the first-level supplier object under the delegation strategy is higher than the violation probability of the first-level supplier object under the control strategy, and the second comparison result indicates that the violation probability of the second-level supplier object under the delegation strategy is higher than the violation probability of the second-level supplier object under the control strategy, and the third comparison result indicates that the expected benefit of the zero-level buyer object under the delegation strategy is lower than the expected benefit of the zero-level buyer object under the control strategy, the delegation strategy is determined as the target strategy.

[0097] In this example, based on a comparative analysis of different strategies in a two-tiered game model, target strategies are determined for two management relationships: a primary supplier object managing a secondary supplier object, and a secondary supplier object managing a primary supplier object. This process involves analyzing three comparison results: a comparison of violation probabilities, a comparison of supply chain compliance strategies, and a comparison of expected returns.

[0098] Optionally, if the management relationship is that the first-level supplier object manages the second-level supplier object, and the first comparison result indicates that the violation probability of the first-level supplier object under the delegation strategy is lower than the violation probability of the first-level supplier object under the control strategy, and the second comparison result indicates that the violation probability of the second-level supplier object under the delegation strategy is lower than the violation probability of the second-level supplier object under the control strategy, and the third comparison result indicates that the expected profit of the zero-level buyer object under the delegation strategy is higher than the expected profit of the zero-level buyer object under the control strategy, then it means that in the process of the first-level supplier object managing the second-level supplier object, the delegation strategy is used to manage the process of executing the supply chain compliance strategy for each supplier object, which has lower risks and higher benefits.

[0099] Optionally, if the management relationship is that the first-level supplier object manages the second-level supplier object, and the first comparison result indicates that the violation probability of the first-level supplier object under the delegation policy is higher than the violation probability of the first-level supplier object under the control policy, and the second comparison result indicates that the violation probability of the second-level supplier object under the delegation policy is higher than the violation probability of the second-level supplier object under the control policy, and the third comparison result indicates that the expected profit of the zero-level buyer object under the delegation policy is lower than the expected profit of the zero-level buyer object under the control policy, then it means that in the process of the first-level supplier object managing the second-level supplier object, the control policy is used to manage the process of executing the supply chain compliance policy for each supplier object, which has lower risks and higher benefits.

[0100] Optionally, if the management relationship is that the second-level supplier object manages the first-level supplier object, and the first comparison result indicates that the violation probability of the first-level supplier object under the delegation strategy is lower than the violation probability of the first-level supplier object under the control strategy, and the second comparison result indicates that the violation probability of the second-level supplier object under the delegation strategy is lower than the violation probability of the second-level supplier object under the control strategy, and the third comparison result indicates that the expected profit of the zero-level buyer object under the delegation strategy is higher than the expected profit of the zero-level buyer object under the control strategy, then it means that in the process of the second-level supplier object managing the first-level supplier object, the delegation strategy is used to manage the process of executing the supply chain compliance strategy for each supplier object, which has lower risks and higher benefits.

[0101] Optionally, if the management relationship is that the second-level supplier object manages the first-level supplier object, and the first comparison result indicates that the violation probability of the first-level supplier object under the delegation strategy is higher than the violation probability of the first-level supplier object under the control strategy, and the second comparison result indicates that the violation probability of the second-level supplier object under the delegation strategy is higher than the violation probability of the second-level supplier object under the control strategy, and the third comparison result indicates that the expected profit of the zero-level buyer object under the delegation strategy is lower than the expected profit of the zero-level buyer object under the control strategy, then it means that in the process of the second-level supplier object managing the first-level supplier object, the control strategy is used to manage the process of executing the supply chain compliance strategy for each supplier object, which has lower risks and higher benefits.

[0102] In this step, based on the three comparison results, the zero-level buyer can determine the target strategy for the two management relationships. The target strategy is the strategy that best optimizes supply chain operations and supply chain compliance management, taking into account non-compliance risk, compliance, and economic benefits. This target strategy is then used to manage the implementation of supply chain compliance policies across supply chain objects, optimizing supply chain operations and ensuring comprehensive compliance with supply chain compliance policies.

[0103] The following describes in detail another optional specific implementation.

[0104] As supply chains become more complex and multi-tiered, managing the compliance of lower-tier suppliers in implementing supply chain compliance policies has become increasingly challenging and has attracted increasing attention. In a typical multi-tier supply chain, there are three main players: the zero-tier buyer, the first-tier supplier that sells to the zero-tier buyer, and the second-tier supplier (i.e., the zero-tier buyer's sub-supplier) that sells to the first-tier supplier. Given the large number and dispersed locations of second-tier suppliers, as well as their indirect business relationships, information asymmetry between the zero-tier buyer and the second-tier suppliers is evident. This information asymmetry makes it difficult for the zero-tier buyer to monitor the second-tier supplier's banking policies and increases the probability that the second-tier supplier will violate the supply chain compliance policy (also known as the banking policy) (hereinafter referred to as the "violation probability").

[0105] In an embodiment of the present application, a three-tier supply chain consisting of a zero-level buyer, a first-level supplier, and a second-level supplier is established. A second-level supplier violating the bank policy will result in losses for all members of the supply chain. The probability of a second-level supplier's violation is directly determined by the level of effort of the first-level and second-level suppliers in the bank policy. The buyer decides whether to provide funds to the first-level supplier (delegation strategy) or to the second-level supplier (control strategy) to attract suppliers to make more efforts. In the case of information asymmetry between the zero-level buyer and the second-level supplier, a model is established under two supply chain leadership relationships: the first-level supplier leads the second-level supplier (hereinafter referred to as "first-level leading second-level"), and the second-level supplier leads the first-level supplier (hereinafter referred to as "second-level leading first-level"). To determine the strategy for managing the bank policy of the supply chain under different leadership relationships.

[0106] For example, in a three-tier supply chain consisting of a zero-tier buyer, a first-tier supplier, and a second-tier supplier, the second-tier supplier sells materials to the first-tier supplier w2 at a unit wholesale price. The first-tier supplier then sells unfinished products to the zero-tier buyer w1 at a unit wholesale price. Finally, the zero-tier buyer sells the finished product to the customer at a unit price p. Assume that the zero-tier buyer faces a one-time, deterministic demand Q and that all transaction or production costs are normalized to zero. Furthermore, all prices (i.e., w2, w1, and p) are exogenous and fixed. In other words, assume that all prices have been negotiated, and all supply chain members determine how to make banking decisions to mitigate the risk of non-compliance at the second tier.

[0107] Alternatively, we use exogenous variables R0 = (p-w1)Q, R1 = (w1-w2)Q, and R2 = w2Q to represent the revenues of the zero-tier buyer, the first-tier supplier, and the second-tier supplier, respectively. Without loss of generality, we assume that p>w1>w2 and that all supply chain members are guaranteed to profit from selling products.

[0108] Alternatively, the zero-level buyer acts as the leader of the entire supply chain. Based on this, two supply chain leadership relationships between the first-level and second-level suppliers are analyzed: the first-level leads the second-level, and the second-level leads the first-level. In each leadership relationship, the buyer can choose a delegation strategy or a control strategy to manage the second-level supplier's banking strategy.

[0109] Alternatively, the probability of a second-tier supplier's violation is directly influenced by the strategic efforts of both the first-tier and second-tier suppliers. Assume that the first-tier supplier exerts an effort, x1∈[0,1], to reduce the probability of a second-tier supplier's violation. The first-tier supplier's efforts can be considered monitoring activities, technical support, and necessary knowledge or training programs provided to the second-tier supplier. Furthermore, the probability of a second-tier supplier's violation is also closely related to the second-tier supplier's own effort. The probability of a second-tier supplier's violation is also closely related to the second-tier supplier's own effort, x2∈[0,1]. Higher values of "second-tier supplier" and higher values of x1 and x2 result in lower probability of violation. The relationship between effort and probability of violation can be captured using linear functions (1-x1) and (1-x2). However, given that both the first-tier and second-tier suppliers are working to reduce second-tier violations, their efforts may be partially substitutable. Therefore, the probability of violation is assumed to be the product of linear functions, namely, V = (1-x1)(1-x2). It should be noted that this assumption also implies that when the first-tier (second-tier) supplier exerts nearly 100% effort, no violation of the bank's policy will occur, regardless of whether the second-tier (first-tier) supplier exerts effort. This is because both the first-tier and second-tier suppliers are working hard to avoid the second-tier supplier's violations. As long as one party fully resolves the violations, no violation will occur, regardless of whether the other party exerts effort.

[0110] Alternatively, the costs associated with the efforts of first-tier and second-tier suppliers are and Where a and b>0 are the effort cost coefficients of the second-tier and first-tier suppliers, respectively. All parties in the three-tier supply chain will work to reduce the probability of violations by the second-tier suppliers. As the leader of the supply chain, the zero-tier buyer can motivate the first-tier or second-tier suppliers to make more efforts through financial support. Assuming that the buyer will share a part of the supplier's burden, t refers to the financial factor and t<1 ensures that the funds provided by the buyer will not exceed the cost of the banking strategy. Therefore, the total funds that the buyer needs to pay are and Under the delegation strategy and the control strategy, the total funds that the buyer needs to pay are and respectively. The fund factor t ensures that the total funds are conditional on the supplier's efforts, which fundamentally motivates the supplier to make more efforts.

[0111] Alternatively, as members of the same supply chain, each party is held accountable for violations by the second layer. For example, a violation of the banking policy of a second-layer supplier will result in losses for all supply chain members.

[0112] Alternatively, in the delegation strategy, the zero-level buyer manages the second-level supplier by subsidizing the first-level supplier. The expected profit functions of the zero-level buyer, the first-level supplier, and the second-level supplier are as follows. The expected profit of the zero-level buyer can be expressed by the following formula:

[0113]

[0114] The expected profit of a first-tier supplier can be expressed by the following formula:

[0115]

[0116] The expected profit of the second-tier supplier can be expressed by the following formula:

[0117]

[0118] Among them, L0, L1, and L2 are used to represent the loss of the 0th-tier buyer, the loss of the 1st-tier supplier, and the loss of the 2nd-tier supplier, respectively.

[0119] Alternatively, in the control strategy, the buyer provides funds directly to the second-tier supplier. The expected profit functions of the zero-tier buyer, the first-tier supplier, and the second-tier supplier are as follows. The expected profit of the zero-tier buyer can be expressed by the following formula:

[0120]

[0121] The expected profit of a first-tier supplier can be expressed by the following formula:

[0122]

[0123] The expected profit of the second-tier supplier can be expressed by the following formula:

[0124]

[0125] Alternatively, using backward induction, we can obtain the equilibrium solutions of the two suppliers and the expected profit of the buyer under the delegation and control strategies.

[0126] Alternatively, when the first-tier supplier leads the second-tier supplier, under the delegation strategy, the equilibrium effort levels of the first-tier and second-tier suppliers can be expressed by the following formula:

[0127]

[0128] Alternatively, the expected profit of a level 0 buyer can be expressed by the following formula:

[0129]

[0130] Alternatively, under the control strategy, the equilibrium effort levels of the first-tier and second-tier suppliers can be expressed by the following formula:

[0131]

[0132] The expected profit of the level 0 buyer can be expressed by the following formula:

[0133]

[0134] Alternatively, according to the equilibrium effort level, the violation probability under the delegation strategy is The violation probability under the control strategy is

[0135] Alternatively, when the second-tier supplier leads the first-tier supplier, under the delegation strategy, the equilibrium effort levels of the first-tier and second-tier suppliers are as follows:

[0136]

[0137] Optionally, the expected profit of the level 0 buyer It is given by the following formula:

[0138]

[0139] Alternatively, under the control strategy, the equilibrium effort levels of the first-tier and second-tier suppliers are as follows:

[0140]

[0141] Optionally, the expected profit of the level 0 buyer It is given by the following formula:

[0142]

[0143] Optionally, similar to the case where level 1 leads level 2, the probability of violation under the delegation strategy is calculated and the violation probability under the control strategy

[0144] Optionally, after determining the violation probabilities and expected profits under two other leadership relationships, the violation probabilities and expected profits in the delegation and control strategies are compared through numerical analysis to determine the optimal strategies under different leadership relationships.

[0145] Alternatively, to reduce the probability of a violation, when the first-tier supplier has a clear cost advantage in the banking strategy, the delegation strategy always ensures a lower probability of a violation. However, if the buyer's losses from a second-tier supplier's violations are relatively small, the buyer will vote for the control strategy. Similarly, when the control strategy ensures a lower probability of a violation, the buyer will choose the delegation strategy if the buyer's losses from a second-tier supplier's violations are relatively small. This phenomenon is known as "institutional failure," where the buyer seeks higher profits and, due to the lower losses from a second-tier supplier's violations, chooses a strategy with a higher probability of a violation. In this case, the buyer chooses to invest in a supplier with a higher effort cost coefficient and a lower effort banking strategy, preventing both the first-tier and second-tier suppliers from exerting effort and resulting in a higher probability of a violation.

[0146] Alternatively, when the buyer's banking strategy funding factor is exogenous, a delegation strategy is more effective in reducing the probability of noncompliance when the second-tier supplier leads the first-tier supplier. Indeed, supply chain leadership influences the banking strategy effort of both first-tier and second-tier suppliers. When a first-tier supplier holds a leadership position, it benefits from its first-mover advantage and reduces its banking strategy effort to mitigate its banking strategy costs. In this scenario, when the buyer sets a uniform funding coefficient and conditions funding on supplier effort, total investment decreases when funding a strong first-tier supplier, further increasing the probability of noncompliance. In an extension of the model, we also consider the case where the first-tier and second-tier suppliers hold equal leadership positions. Compared to the first two leadership scenarios, we find that the higher the first-tier supplier's leadership position, the more likely the zero-tier buyer is to choose a control strategy to reduce the probability of noncompliance.

[0147] It should be noted that the steps shown in the flowcharts of the accompanying drawings can be executed in a computer system such as a set of computer-executable instructions, and that, although a logical order is shown in the flowcharts, in some cases, the steps shown or described can be executed in an order different from that shown here.

[0148] Example 2

[0149] The present application also provides a supply chain management device. It should be noted that the supply chain management device of the present application can be used to execute the supply chain management method provided in the present application. The supply chain management device provided in the present application is introduced below.

[0150] According to an embodiment of the present application, a device for implementing the above supply chain management method is also provided, such as Figure 3 As shown, the supply chain management device 300 includes: a first determination unit 301 , a construction unit 302 , a solution unit 303 , a second determination unit 304 and a management unit 305 .

[0151] The first determining unit 301 is used to determine multiple supply chain objects in the supply chain, wherein the supply chain objects include at least a zero-level buyer object, a first-level supplier object, and a second-level supplier object. The zero-level buyer object trades with the first-level supplier object, and the first-level supplier object trades with the second-level supplier object.

[0152] Construction unit 302 is used to construct a two-layer game model based on multiple supply chain objects, wherein the two-layer game model includes a delegation strategy and a control strategy under two management relationships. The two management relationships include the first-level supplier object managing the second-level supplier object, and the second-level supplier object managing the first-level supplier object. The delegation strategy is used to indicate that the management authority in the process of executing the supply chain compliance strategy on the second-level supplier object is authorized to the first-level supplier object, and the control strategy is used to indicate that the zero-level buyer object directly manages the process of executing the supply chain compliance strategy on the second-level supplier object.

[0153] The solving unit 303 is used to solve the two-layer game model in reverse order to obtain equilibrium solutions corresponding to multiple supply chain objects, wherein the equilibrium solutions are used to reflect the effort costs and violation probabilities of multiple supply chain objects in the process of executing supply chain compliance strategies under two management relationships.

[0154] The second determining unit 304 is configured to determine target strategies under the two management relationships based on the equilibrium solution, wherein the target strategy is one of a delegation strategy and a control strategy.

[0155] The management unit 305 is used to manage the decision and behavior of the supply chain objects in executing the supply chain compliance policy process based on the target policy.

[0156] Optionally, the construction unit 302 is also used to: determine the cost function and benefit function of the process of multiple supply chain objects executing the supply chain compliance strategy, the cost function is used to quantify the effort cost of the corresponding supply chain object to meet the compliance requirements of the supply chain compliance strategy, and the benefit function is used to reflect the benefits of the corresponding supply chain object in the supply chain operation process; determine the information flow and information asymmetry between multiple supply chain objects, wherein the information flow is used to describe the information transmission path within the supply chain, and the information asymmetry is used to describe the differences in the information acquisition of multiple supply chain objects; based on the cost function and benefit function of multiple supply chain objects, and the information flow and information asymmetry between multiple supply chain objects, a two-layer game model is constructed.

[0157] Optionally, the solving unit 303 is further used to: determine the decision sequence of multiple supply chain objects based on the management relationship; and solve the two-layer game model in reverse order starting from the end of the decision sequence to obtain equilibrium solutions for multiple supply chain objects.

[0158] Optionally, the second determination unit 304 is also used to: compare the violation probability of the first-level supplier object under the delegation policy with the violation probability of the first-level supplier object under the control policy under the two management relationships, respectively, to obtain a first comparison result; compare the violation probability of the second-level supplier object under the delegation policy with the violation probability of the second-level supplier object under the control policy under the two management relationships, respectively, to obtain a second comparison result; compare the expected profit of the zero-level buyer object under the delegation policy with the expected profit of the zero-level buyer object under the control policy under the management relationships, respectively, to obtain a third comparison result; determine the target strategies under the two management relationships based on the first comparison result, the second comparison result and the third comparison result.

[0159] Optionally, the second determination unit 304 is further used to: in response to the management relationship being that the first-level supplier object manages the second-level supplier object, and the first comparison result indicates that the violation probability of the first-level supplier object under the delegation policy is lower than the violation probability of the first-level supplier object under the control policy, and the second comparison result indicates that the violation probability of the second-level supplier object under the delegation policy is lower than the violation probability of the second-level supplier object under the control policy, and the third comparison result indicates that the expected benefit of the zero-level buyer object under the delegation policy is higher than the expected benefit of the zero-level buyer object under the control policy, determine the delegation policy as the target policy; in response to the management relationship being that the first-level supplier object manages the second-level supplier object, and the first comparison result indicates that the violation probability of the first-level supplier object under the delegation policy is higher than the violation probability of the first-level supplier object under the control policy, and the second comparison result indicates that the violation probability of the second-level supplier object under the delegation policy is higher than the violation probability of the second-level supplier object under the control policy, and the third comparison result indicates that the expected benefit of the zero-level buyer object under the delegation policy is lower than the expected benefit of the zero-level buyer object under the control policy, determine the control policy as the target policy. The entrustment strategy is determined as the target strategy; in response to the management relationship being that the second-level supplier object manages the first-level supplier object, and the first comparison result indicates that the violation probability of the first-level supplier object under the entrustment strategy is lower than the violation probability of the first-level supplier object under the control strategy, and the second comparison result indicates that the violation probability of the second-level supplier object under the entrustment strategy is lower than the violation probability of the second-level supplier object under the control strategy, and the third comparison result indicates that the expected benefit of the zero-level buyer object under the entrustment strategy is higher than the expected benefit of the zero-level buyer object under the control strategy, the entrustment strategy is determined as the target strategy; in response to the management relationship being that the second-level supplier object manages the first-level supplier object, and the first comparison result indicates that the violation probability of the first-level supplier object under the entrustment strategy is higher than the violation probability of the first-level supplier object under the control strategy, and the second comparison result indicates that the violation probability of the second-level supplier object under the entrustment strategy is higher than the violation probability of the second-level supplier object under the control strategy, and the third comparison result indicates that the expected benefit of the zero-level buyer object under the entrustment strategy is lower than the expected benefit of the zero-level buyer object under the control strategy, the entrustment strategy is determined as the target strategy.

[0160] The supply chain management device provided in the embodiment of the present application constructs a two-tiered game model based on information asymmetry between supply chain objects at different levels in the supply chain and between supply chain objects to optimize compliance management in a multi-tiered supply chain. The two-tiered game model includes a delegation strategy and a control strategy under two management relationships. By solving the equilibrium solution of the two-tiered game model in reverse order, it is possible to determine the most appropriate management relationship and strategy between the zero-level supplier and the second-level supply chain object under information asymmetry. The determined management relationship and target strategy are then used to manage the decisions and behaviors of the supply chain objects in the process of implementing the supply chain compliance strategy. This helps ensure the compliance of the decisions and behaviors of the supply chain objects in the process of implementing the procurement strategy, reduces violations in the supply chain, and thus solves the technical problem in related technologies of difficulty in managing the decisions and behaviors of supply chain objects at different levels in the supply chain.

[0161] It should be noted that the first determination unit 301, construction unit 302, solution unit 303, second determination unit 304, and management unit 305 correspond to steps S201 to S205 in Example 1. The examples and application scenarios implemented by the five units and the corresponding steps are the same, but are not limited to the contents disclosed in the above-mentioned Example 1. It should be noted that the above-mentioned modules or units can be hardware components or software components stored in a memory (e.g., memory 104) and processed by one or more processors (e.g., processors 102a, 102b, ..., 102n). The above-mentioned modules can also be run as part of the device in the computer terminal 10 provided in Example 1.

[0162] Example 3

[0163] An embodiment of the present application may provide an electronic device, Figure 4 This is a structural block diagram of an electronic device according to an embodiment of the present application. Figure 4 As shown, the electronic device may include: one or more ( Figure 4 Only one is shown) processor 402, memory 404, storage controller, and peripheral interface, wherein the peripheral interface is connected to the radio frequency module, audio module and display.

[0164] Among them, the memory can be used to store software programs and modules, such as program instructions / modules corresponding to the methods and devices in the embodiments of the present application. The processor executes various functional applications and data processing by running the software programs and modules stored in the memory, that is, implementing the above-mentioned method. The memory may include a high-speed random access memory, and may also include a non-volatile memory, such as one or more magnetic storage devices, flash memory, or other non-volatile solid-state memory. In some instances, the memory may further include a memory remotely arranged relative to the processor, and these remote memories may be connected to the terminal via a network. Examples of the above-mentioned network include but are not limited to the Internet, an intranet, a local area network, a mobile communication network and a combination thereof.

[0165] The processor can call information and applications stored in the memory through a transmission device to perform the following steps: determining multiple supply chain objects in a supply chain, wherein the supply chain objects include at least a zero-level buyer object, a first-level supplier object, and a second-level supplier object, wherein the zero-level buyer object trades with the first-level supplier object, and the first-level supplier object trades with the second-level supplier object; constructing a two-layer game model based on the multiple supply chain objects, wherein the two-layer game model includes a delegation strategy and a control strategy under two management relationships, wherein the two management relationships include the first-level supplier object managing the second-level supplier object, and the second-level supplier object managing the first-level supplier object, wherein the delegation strategy is used to instruct the first-level supplier object to delegate management authority in the process of executing the supply chain compliance strategy on the second-level supplier object, and the control strategy is used to instruct the zero-level buyer object to directly manage the process of executing the supply chain compliance strategy on the second-level supplier object; solving the two-layer game model in reverse order to obtain equilibrium solutions corresponding to the multiple supply chain objects, wherein the equilibrium solutions are used to reflect the effort costs and violation probabilities of the multiple supply chain objects in the process of executing the supply chain compliance strategy under the two management relationships; determining target strategies under the two management relationships based on the equilibrium solutions, wherein the target strategy is one of a delegation strategy and a control strategy; and managing the decisions and behaviors of the supply chain objects in the process of executing the supply chain compliance strategy based on the target strategies.

[0166] The processor can also call the information and application programs stored in the memory through the transmission device to perform the following steps: determine the cost function and benefit function of multiple supply chain objects in executing the supply chain compliance policy process, the cost function is used to quantify the effort cost of the corresponding supply chain object to meet the compliance requirements of the supply chain compliance policy, and the benefit function is used to reflect the benefits of the corresponding supply chain object in the supply chain operation process; determine the information flow and information asymmetry between multiple supply chain objects, wherein the information flow is used to describe the information transmission path within the supply chain, and the information asymmetry is used to describe the differences in the acquisition of information by multiple supply chain objects; construct a two-layer game model based on the cost function and benefit function of multiple supply chain objects, and the information flow and information asymmetry between multiple supply chain objects.

[0167] The processor can also call the information and applications stored in the memory through the transmission device to perform the following steps: determine the decision-making order of multiple supply chain objects based on the management relationship; starting from the end of the decision-making order, solve the two-layer game model in reverse order to obtain the equilibrium solution of multiple supply chain objects.

[0168] The processor can also call the information and application programs stored in the memory through the transmission device to perform the following steps: respectively, under the two management relationships, compare the violation probability of the first-level supplier object under the delegation strategy with the violation probability of the first-level supplier object under the control strategy to obtain a first comparison result; respectively, under the two management relationships, compare the violation probability of the second-level supplier object under the delegation strategy with the violation probability of the second-level supplier object under the control strategy to obtain a second comparison result; respectively, under the management relationships, compare the expected profit of the zero-level buyer object under the delegation strategy with the expected profit of the zero-level buyer object under the control strategy to obtain a third comparison result; based on the first comparison result, the second comparison result and the third comparison result, determine the target strategy under the two management relationships.

[0169] The processor can also call the information and application stored in the memory through the transmission device to perform the following steps: in response to the management relationship being that the first-level supplier object manages the second-level supplier object, and the first comparison result indicates that the violation probability of the first-level supplier object under the delegation policy is lower than the violation probability of the first-level supplier object under the control policy, and the second comparison result indicates that the violation probability of the second-level supplier object under the delegation policy is lower than the violation probability of the second-level supplier object under the control policy, and the third comparison result indicates that the expected profit of the zero-level buyer object under the delegation policy is higher than the expected profit of the zero-level buyer object under the control policy, determine the delegation policy as the target policy; in response to the management relationship being that the first-level supplier object manages the second-level supplier object, and the first comparison result indicates that the violation probability of the first-level supplier object under the delegation policy is higher than the violation probability of the first-level supplier object under the control policy, and the second comparison result indicates that the violation probability of the second-level supplier object under the delegation policy is higher than the violation probability of the second-level supplier object under the control policy, and the third comparison result indicates that the expected profit of the zero-level buyer object under the delegation policy is lower than the expected profit of the zero-level buyer object under the control policy. expected benefit, the control strategy is determined as the target strategy; in response to the management relationship being that the second-level supplier object manages the first-level supplier object, and the first comparison result indicates that the violation probability of the first-level supplier object under the delegation strategy is lower than the violation probability of the first-level supplier object under the control strategy, and the second comparison result indicates that the violation probability of the second-level supplier object under the delegation strategy is lower than the violation probability of the second-level supplier object under the control strategy, and the third comparison result indicates that the expected benefit of the zero-level buyer object under the delegation strategy is higher than the expected benefit of the zero-level buyer object under the control strategy, the delegation strategy is determined as the target strategy; in response to the management relationship being that the second-level supplier object manages the first-level supplier object, and the first comparison result indicates that the violation probability of the first-level supplier object under the delegation strategy is higher than the violation probability of the first-level supplier object under the control strategy, and the second comparison result indicates that the violation probability of the second-level supplier object under the delegation strategy is higher than the violation probability of the second-level supplier object under the control strategy, and the third comparison result indicates that the expected benefit of the zero-level buyer object under the delegation strategy is lower than the expected benefit of the zero-level buyer object under the control strategy, the delegation strategy is determined as the target strategy.

[0170] An embodiment of the present application provides a supply chain management method. Based on the information asymmetry between supply chain objects at different levels in the supply chain and between supply chain objects, a two-layer game model is constructed to optimize compliance management in a multi-layer supply chain. The two-layer game model includes a delegation strategy and a control strategy under two management relationships. By solving the equilibrium solution of the two-layer game model in reverse order, it is possible to determine the most appropriate management relationship and strategy between the zero-level supplier object and the secondary supply chain object under information asymmetry. Then, using the determined management relationship and target strategy, the decision-making and behavior of the supply chain object in the process of executing the supply chain compliance strategy are managed, which helps to ensure the compliance of the decision-making and behavior of the supply chain object in the process of executing the procurement strategy, reduce violations in the supply chain, and thus solve the technical problem in the related art of difficulty in managing the decision-making and behavior of supply chain objects at different levels in the supply chain.

[0171] It can be understood by those skilled in the art that Figure 4 The structure shown is for illustration only, and the electronic device may also be a terminal device such as a smart phone (such as an Android phone, an iOS phone, etc.), a tablet computer, a PDA, a mobile Internet device (Mobile Internet Devices, abbreviated as MID), a personal access device (Personal Access Device, abbreviated as PAD), etc. Figure 4 It does not limit the structure of the above electronic device. For example, the electronic device may also include Figure 4 More or fewer components (such as network interfaces, display devices, etc.) shown in, or with Figure 4 Different configurations shown.

[0172] Those skilled in the art will understand that all or part of the steps in the various methods of the above embodiments can be completed by instructing the hardware related to the terminal device through a program, and the program can be stored in a computer-readable storage medium, which may include: a flash drive, a read-only memory (ROM), a random access memory (RAM), a magnetic disk or an optical disk, etc.

[0173] Example 4

[0174] The embodiment of the present application further provides a storage medium. Optionally, in this embodiment, the storage medium can be used to store the program code executed by the supply chain management method provided in the first embodiment.

[0175] Optionally, in this embodiment, the storage medium may be located in any computer terminal in a computer terminal group in a computer network, or in any mobile terminal in a mobile terminal group.

[0176] The present application also provides a computer program product, which, when executed on a data processing device, is suitable for executing the program steps of the supply chain management method.

[0177] The serial numbers of the above embodiments of the present application are for description only and do not represent the advantages or disadvantages of the embodiments.

[0178] In the above embodiments of the present application, the description of each embodiment has its own focus. For parts that are not described in detail in a certain embodiment, please refer to the relevant description of other embodiments.

[0179] In the several embodiments provided in this application, it should be understood that the disclosed technical content can be implemented in other ways. Among them, the device embodiments described above are only schematic. For example, the division of the units is only a logical function division. In actual implementation, there may be other division methods, such as multiple units or components can be combined or integrated into another system, or some features can be ignored or not executed. Another point is that the mutual coupling or direct coupling or communication connection shown or discussed can be through some interfaces, indirect coupling or communication connection of units or modules, which can be electrical or other forms.

[0180] The units described as separate components may or may not be physically separate, and the components shown as units may or may not be physical units, that is, they may be located in one place or distributed across multiple network units. Some or all of these units may be selected to achieve the purpose of this embodiment according to actual needs.

[0181] In addition, the functional units in the various embodiments of the present application may be integrated into a single processing unit, or each unit may exist physically separately, or two or more units may be integrated into a single unit. The aforementioned integrated units may be implemented in the form of hardware or software functional units.

[0182] If the integrated unit is implemented in the form of a software functional unit and sold or used as an independent product, it can be stored in a computer-readable storage medium. Based on this understanding, the technical solution of the present application is essentially or the part that contributes to the prior art or all or part of the technical solution can be embodied in the form of a software product, and the computer software product is stored in a storage medium, including a number of instructions for enabling a computer device (which can be a personal computer, a server or a network device, etc.) to execute all or part of the steps of the method described in each embodiment of the present application. The aforementioned storage medium includes: U disk, read-only memory (ROM), random access memory (RAM), mobile hard disk, magnetic disk or optical disk, etc., various media that can store program code.

[0183] The above is only a preferred embodiment of the present application. It should be pointed out that for ordinary technicians in this technical field, several improvements and modifications can be made without departing from the principles of the present application. These improvements and modifications should also be regarded as the scope of protection of the present application.

Claims

1. A supply chain management method, characterized in that: include: Determine a plurality of supply chain objects in a supply chain, wherein the supply chain objects include at least a zero-level buyer object, a first-level supplier object, and a second-level supplier object, the zero-level buyer object transacts with the first-level supplier object, and the first-level supplier object transacts with the second-level supplier object; Based on the multiple supply chain objects, a two-layer game model is constructed, wherein the two-layer game model includes a delegation strategy and a control strategy under two management relationships, the two management relationships including the first-level supplier object managing the second-level supplier object, and the second-level supplier object managing the first-level supplier object, the delegation strategy is used to indicate that the management authority in the process of executing the supply chain compliance strategy on the second-level supplier object is authorized to the first-level supplier object, and the control strategy is used to instruct the zero-level buyer object to directly manage the process of executing the supply chain compliance strategy on the second-level supplier object; Solving the two-level game model in reverse order to obtain equilibrium solutions corresponding to the multiple supply chain objects, wherein the equilibrium solutions are used to reflect the effort costs and violation probabilities of the multiple supply chain objects in executing the supply chain compliance policy under the two management relationships; Based on the equilibrium solution, respectively determining target strategies under the two management relationships, wherein the target strategy is one of the delegation strategy and the control strategy; Based on the target policy, the decision and behavior of the supply chain object in executing the supply chain compliance policy process are managed.

2. The method according to claim 1, characterized in that Based on the multiple supply chain objects, a two-layer game model is constructed, including: Determine a cost function and a benefit function for the multiple supply chain objects to execute the supply chain compliance policy process, wherein the cost function is used to quantify the effort cost expended by the corresponding supply chain objects to meet the compliance requirements of the supply chain compliance policy, and the benefit function is used to reflect the benefits of the corresponding supply chain objects in the supply chain operation process; Determining information flow and information asymmetry between the multiple supply chain objects, wherein the information flow is used to describe the information transmission path within the supply chain, and the information asymmetry is used to describe the differences in the information obtained by the multiple supply chain objects; A two-level game model is constructed based on the cost functions and the benefit functions of the multiple supply chain objects, and the information flow and the information asymmetry between the multiple supply chain objects.

3. The method according to claim 1, characterized in that Solving the two-level game model in reverse order to obtain equilibrium solutions for the multiple supply chain objects includes: determining a decision sequence for the plurality of supply chain objects based on the management relationship; Starting from the end of the decision sequence, the two-layer game model is solved in reverse order to obtain the equilibrium solutions of the multiple supply chain objects.

4. The method according to claim 3, characterized in that The equilibrium solution includes at least: the violation probability of the first-level supplier object in the process of executing the supply chain compliance strategy, the violation probability of the second-level supplier object in the process of executing the supply chain compliance strategy, and the expected profit of the zero-level buyer object in the process of operating the supply chain.

5. The method according to claim 4, characterized in that Based on the equilibrium solution, target strategies under the two management relationships are determined respectively, including: Under the two management relationships, respectively, comparing the violation probability of the first-level supplier object under the delegation strategy with the violation probability of the first-level supplier object under the control strategy to obtain a first comparison result; Under the two management relationships, respectively, comparing the violation probability of the secondary supplier object under the delegation strategy with the violation probability of the secondary supplier object under the control strategy to obtain a second comparison result; respectively comparing the expected benefit of the zero-level buyer object under the delegation strategy with the expected benefit of the zero-level buyer object under the control strategy under the management relationship to obtain a third comparison result; Based on the first comparison result, the second comparison result, and the third comparison result, target strategies under the two management relationships are determined.

6. The method according to claim 5, characterized in that Determining target strategies under the two management relationships based on the first comparison result, the second comparison result, and the third comparison result includes: In response to the management relationship being that the first-level supplier object manages the second-level supplier object, and the first comparison result indicating that the violation probability of the first-level supplier object under the delegation policy is lower than the violation probability of the first-level supplier object under the control policy, and the second comparison result indicating that the violation probability of the second-level supplier object under the delegation policy is lower than the violation probability of the second-level supplier object under the control policy, and the third comparison result indicating that the expected benefit of the zero-level buyer object under the delegation policy is higher than the expected benefit of the zero-level buyer object under the control policy, determining the delegation policy as the target policy; In response to the management relationship being that the first-level supplier object manages the second-level supplier object, and the first comparison result indicating that the violation probability of the first-level supplier object under the delegation policy is higher than the violation probability of the first-level supplier object under the control policy, and the second comparison result indicating that the violation probability of the second-level supplier object under the delegation policy is higher than the violation probability of the second-level supplier object under the control policy, and the third comparison result indicating that the expected benefit of the zero-level buyer object under the delegation policy is lower than the expected benefit of the zero-level buyer object under the control policy, determining the control policy as the target policy; In response to the management relationship being that the secondary supplier object manages the primary supplier object, and the first comparison result indicating that the violation probability of the primary supplier object under the delegation policy is lower than the violation probability of the primary supplier object under the control policy, and the second comparison result indicating that the violation probability of the secondary supplier object under the delegation policy is lower than the violation probability of the secondary supplier object under the control policy, and the third comparison result indicating that the expected benefit of the zero-level buyer object under the delegation policy is higher than the expected benefit of the zero-level buyer object under the control policy, determining the delegation policy as the target policy; In response to the management relationship being that the second-level supplier object manages the first-level supplier object, and the first comparison result indicating that the violation probability of the first-level supplier object under the delegation strategy is higher than the violation probability of the first-level supplier object under the control strategy, and the second comparison result indicating that the violation probability of the second-level supplier object under the delegation strategy is higher than the violation probability of the second-level supplier object under the control strategy, and the third comparison result indicating that the expected benefit of the zero-level buyer object under the delegation strategy is lower than the expected benefit of the zero-level buyer object under the control strategy, the delegation strategy is determined as the target strategy.

7. A supply chain management device, characterized in that: include: a first determining unit, configured to determine a plurality of supply chain objects in a supply chain, wherein the supply chain objects include at least a zero-level buyer object, a first-level supplier object, and a second-level supplier object, the zero-level buyer object transacting with the first-level supplier object, and the first-level supplier object transacting with the second-level supplier object; a construction unit configured to construct a two-tier game model based on the multiple supply chain objects, wherein the two-tier game model includes a delegation strategy and a control strategy under two management relationships, wherein the two management relationships include the first-tier supplier object managing the second-tier supplier object, and the second-tier supplier object managing the first-tier supplier object; the delegation strategy is configured to indicate that management authority in executing the supply chain compliance strategy on the second-tier supplier object is authorized to the first-tier supplier object; and the control strategy is configured to indicate that the zero-tier buyer object directly manages the execution of the supply chain compliance strategy on the second-tier supplier object; a solving unit, configured to solve the two-layer game model in reverse order to obtain equilibrium solutions corresponding to the plurality of supply chain objects, wherein the equilibrium solutions are used to reflect the effort costs and violation probabilities of the plurality of supply chain objects in the process of executing the supply chain compliance policy under the two management relationships; a second determining unit, configured to determine target strategies under the two management relationships based on the equilibrium solution, wherein the target strategy is one of the delegation strategy and the control strategy; A management unit is used to manage the decision and behavior of the supply chain object in executing the supply chain compliance policy process based on the target policy.

8. An electronic device, characterized in that: include: a memory storing an executable program; A processor, configured to run the program, wherein the program executes the method according to any one of claims 1 to 6 when running.

9. A computer-readable storage medium, characterized in that The computer-readable storage medium includes a stored executable program, wherein when the executable program is run, the device where the storage medium is located is controlled to execute the method according to any one of claims 1 to 6.

10. A computer program product, characterized in that The invention comprises a computer program which, when executed by a processor, implements the method according to any one of claims 1 to 6.

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