A control method, device, processor and storage medium for preventing accidental touch of a marine operating handle

Abstract

The present invention relates to the field of ship control, and specifically to a control method, device, processor and storage medium for preventing accidental touch of a ship operating handle, comprising: obtaining ship operation data; judging whether the ship is currently in an accidental touch monitoring condition based on the ship operation data; if so, obtaining the ship operating condition type; performing an accidental touch analysis of the handle corresponding to the ship operating condition type based on the ship operation data, and generating an accidental touch analysis result; judging whether an accidental touch operation has occurred based on the analysis result, and performing a corresponding anti-accidental touch control operation when it is determined that the accidental touch operation has occurred. By obtaining ship operation data in real time and judging whether an accidental touch has occurred based on a preset operating condition judgment logic. Comprehensively considering various key factors in the ship's navigation, an accurate judgment of an accidental touch of the handle is achieved. If it is judged to be an accidental touch, an instruction to limit the speed output is sent to the propulsion control system to avoid abnormalities in the ship's power system caused by an accidental touch, thereby ensuring the safety of the ship's navigation.

Description

Technical Field

[0001] The present invention relates to the field of ship control, and in particular to a control method, device, processor and storage medium for preventing accidental touch of a ship operating handle. Background Art

[0002] With the rapid development of the global shipping industry, the number of ships has increased dramatically, and waterway traffic density has significantly increased, leading to increasingly prominent issues related to ship navigation safety. Statistics show that the proportion of navigation accidents caused by operational errors has increased annually. Collisions, scrapes, and even capsizing caused by drivers' inattention, lack of skill, or accidental manipulation of control handles due to stress are particularly common. The risk of such misoperation is even greater in densely populated areas or complex sea conditions (such as favorable seas and strong winds and waves). Targeted anti-misoperation control technologies are urgently needed to improve navigation safety.

[0003] Currently, there is a lack of research on technologies for preventing accidental touches on operating handles in the marine industry. Existing solutions often draw on methods from the automotive industry, but their applicability is significantly limited. For example, a patent in the automotive field proposes using ultrasonic radar to detect obstacle distances to limit throttle response. However, this requires the installation of high-cost radar equipment, and the complex navigation environment of ships (dynamic sea conditions and the absence of fixed obstacles) makes this solution difficult to transplant.

[0004] Common defects of existing technologies:

[0005] Existing technologies do not design false-touch detection logic for special ship operating conditions (such as transient operations after gear shifting, speed control during sea-turning, etc.), resulting in a high false-touch rate or protection failure.

[0006] Most existing solutions rely on high-cost sensors such as radar and cameras, which not only increase system complexity but are also prone to failure in the humid and vibrating environment of ships.

[0007] The speed limit in the existing technology uses a static threshold, which cannot dynamically adapt to the coupled influence of multiple variables such as steering wheel angle and wave height, especially when turning with the waves, which can easily cause steering out of control. Summary of the Invention

[0008] In order to overcome the above-mentioned technical problems existing in the prior art, the embodiments of the present invention provide a control method, device, processor and storage medium for preventing accidental touch of a ship's operating handle. The handle anti-accidental touch control module obtains the operating handle opening data, opening change rate data, steering wheel angle data, wave height data and wave direction data in real time, and judges whether the operating handle is accidentally touched based on the preset working condition judgment logic. It can comprehensively consider various key factors in the navigation of the ship and realize accurate judgment of accidental touch of the handle. If it is judged to be an accidental touch, an audible and visual alarm will be promptly sent to the captain through the monitoring alarm system, and an instruction to limit the speed output will be sent to the propulsion control system at the same time, effectively avoiding abnormalities in the ship's power system caused by accidental touch, ensuring the safety of ship navigation, and improving the reliability and safety of ship operation.

[0009] To achieve the above-mentioned objectives, an embodiment of the present invention provides a control method and device for preventing accidental touches of a ship's operating handle. The method dynamically identifies accidental touches and monitors the working conditions. Specific, multi-parameter fusion analysis strategies are used for different working conditions (such as gear shifting and following the sea) to determine the occurrence of accidental touch operations, and then corresponding protective measures are implemented, significantly improving the safety of ships during critical operating stages.

[0010] Preferably, the ship operation data includes gear data, operating handle data and running direction data, and the judging whether the ship is currently in the false touch monitoring condition based on the ship operation data includes: judging whether it is currently switched from neutral to the running gear based on the gear data, and judging whether the ship is in the following wave running condition based on the running direction data; when switching from neutral to the running gear, or when the ship is in the following wave running condition, it is determined that the ship is currently in the false touch monitoring condition; otherwise, it is determined that the ship is currently in the normal condition.

[0011] Preferably, the processing of the handle mis-touch analysis corresponding to the ship operating condition type based on the ship operating data to generate a mis-touch analysis result includes: when the ship operating condition type is a gear shift type: obtaining the gear switching time, performing a first mis-touch analysis based on the gear switching time and the operating handle data, and generating a first analysis result; when the ship operating condition type is a down-wave operation type: performing a second mis-touch analysis based on the ship operating data, and generating a second analysis result; and generating a mis-touch analysis result based on the first analysis result and the second analysis result.

[0012] Preferably, the first false touch analysis is performed based on the gear switching time and the operating handle data to generate a first analysis result, including: determining the operating handle opening data and the operating handle change rate data based on the operating handle data; judging whether the gear switching time is greater than a first threshold, and whether the operating handle opening data is greater than a second threshold, and whether the operating handle change rate data is greater than a third threshold; when the gear switching time is greater than the first threshold, and the operating handle opening data is greater than the second threshold, and the operating handle change rate data is greater than the third threshold, generating a first analysis result of a false touch operation.

[0013] Preferably, the ship operation data also includes steering wheel angle data, maximum allowable speed data and downwave wave height data, and the second false touch analysis is performed based on the ship operation data to generate a second analysis result, including: establishing a dynamic correlation relationship between the steering wheel angle data, the maximum allowable speed data and the downwave wave height data; determining the corresponding maximum speed based on the dynamic correlation relationship and the current steering wheel angle data and current wave height data of the ship; performing a differential analysis on the maximum speed according to the current speed of the ship; if the current speed of the ship is less than the maximum speed and the deviation between the current speed and the maximum speed is less than a preset speed deviation threshold: judging whether the operating handle opening data continues to increase; in the case where the operating handle opening data continues to increase, generating a second analysis result of a false touch operation; if the current speed of the ship is greater than the maximum speed: determining the maximum allowable rotational speed; judging whether the current rotational speed of the ship is greater than the maximum allowable rotational speed; in the case where the current rotational speed is greater than the maximum allowable rotational speed, generating a second analysis result of a false touch operation.

[0014] Preferably, the establishing of the dynamic correlation between the steering wheel angle data, the maximum allowable speed data and the following wave height data comprises: determining the actual available steering wheel angle based on the following wave height data: , where Hw is the wave height along the sea, L is the length of the ship, is the actual available steering wheel angle; and a first maximum allowable speed is determined based on the actual available steering wheel angle: ,in, The maximum speed allowed in still water with the steering wheel angle at 0. In still water and the steering wheel angle is The second maximum permissible speed is determined based on the following wave height: ,in, for The maximum permissible speed under wave height, μ is an empirical constant obtained through seakeeping simulation or actual ship testing; the minimum value of the first maximum permissible speed and the second maximum permissible speed is determined, and the minimum value is determined as the actual maximum permissible speed, that is: .

[0015] Correspondingly, the present invention also provides a control device for preventing accidental touch of a ship operating handle, the control device comprising: a data acquisition module for acquiring ship operation data; a working condition judgment module for judging whether the ship is currently in an accidental touch monitoring condition based on the ship operation data; a working condition acquisition module for obtaining the ship working condition type; an accidental touch analysis module for performing an accidental touch analysis of the handle corresponding to the ship working condition type based on the ship operation data, and generating an accidental touch analysis result; an anti-accidental touch execution module for judging whether an accidental touch operation occurs based on the analysis result, and executing a corresponding anti-accidental touch control operation when it is determined that the accidental touch operation occurs.

[0016] On the other hand, the present invention further provides a processor for running a program, wherein the program, when run, is used to execute the method provided by an embodiment of the present invention.

[0017] On the other hand, the present invention further provides a computer-readable storage medium having a computer program stored thereon, which implements the method provided by an embodiment of the present invention when the program is executed by a processor.

[0018] The technical solution provided by the present invention has at least the following technical effects:

[0019] The handle anti-inadvertent touch control module acquires real-time data on the handle opening, opening rate of change, steering wheel angle, wave height, and wave direction, and determines whether an inadvertent touch of the handle has occurred based on pre-set operating condition judgment logic. This module comprehensively considers multiple key factors in a ship's navigation and accurately determines if an inadvertent touch of the handle has occurred. If an inadvertent touch is detected, an audible and visual alarm is promptly issued to the captain via the monitoring and alarm system, while a command to limit the speed output is simultaneously sent to the propulsion control system. This effectively prevents abnormalities in the ship's power system caused by inadvertent touches, ensures safe navigation, and improves the reliability and safety of ship operations.

[0020] Other features and advantages of the embodiments of the present invention will be described in detail in the subsequent detailed description. BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS

[0021] The accompanying drawings are used to provide a further understanding of the embodiments of the present invention and constitute a part of the specification. Together with the following detailed description, they are used to explain the embodiments of the present invention, but do not constitute a limitation of the embodiments of the present invention. In the accompanying drawings:

[0022] Figure 1This is a flow chart of a method for preventing accidental touch of a marine operating handle provided by an embodiment of the present application;

[0023] Figure 2 This is a structural schematic diagram of a control device for preventing accidental touch of a marine operating handle provided in an embodiment of the present application. DETAILED DESCRIPTION

[0024] The following describes the specific implementation of the embodiment of the present invention in detail with reference to the accompanying drawings. It should be understood that the specific implementation described herein is only used to illustrate and explain the embodiment of the present invention and is not used to limit the embodiment of the present invention.

[0025] The terms "system" and "network" in the embodiments of the present invention can be used interchangeably. "Multiple" refers to two or more. In view of this, "multiple" can also be understood as "at least two" in the embodiments of the present invention. "And / or" describes the association relationship of associated objects, indicating that three relationships can exist. For example, A and / or B can represent: A exists alone, A and B exist at the same time, and B exists alone. In addition, the character " / ", unless otherwise specified, generally indicates that the previous and next associated objects are in an "or" relationship. In addition, it should be understood that in the description of the embodiments of the present invention, words such as "first" and "second" are only used to distinguish the purpose of description, and cannot be understood as indicating or implying relative importance, nor can they be understood as indicating or implying order.

[0026] Existing ship operating handles lack a mechanism to detect accidental touches. Crew members accidentally touching the handles may cause the ship to suddenly accelerate or turn, threatening navigation safety. In addition, the risk of accidental touches under different operating conditions (such as gear shifting and sailing with the waves) is not classified and handled, and a single detection strategy is difficult to cover complex scenarios.

[0027] See Figure 1 An embodiment of the present invention provides a method for preventing accidental touch of a marine operating handle, the method comprising:

[0028] S1. Obtain ship operation data;

[0029] S2. determining whether the ship is currently in an accidental trigger monitoring condition based on the ship operation data;

[0030] S3. If yes, obtain the ship operating condition type;

[0031] S4. Performing a handle mis-touch analysis corresponding to the ship operating condition type based on the ship operating data to generate a mis-touch analysis result;

[0032] S5. Determine whether an accidental touch operation occurs based on the analysis result, and if it is determined that the accidental touch operation occurs, perform a corresponding accidental touch prevention control operation.

[0033] In one possible embodiment, the required data (such as gear position, handle position, speed, heading, rudder angle, wave height, etc.) is collected in real time through the ship's sensor network (such as gear position sensor, handle displacement sensor, GPS / speedometer, gyrocompass / electronic compass, wave sensor, etc.). Based on the operating data obtained in step S1, the current state of the ship is analyzed to determine whether it belongs to a high-risk operating condition (i.e., "mistouch monitoring operating condition") that requires special attention to the risk of mistouch. For example, it is determined whether a gear shift has just been completed or whether the ship is in a down-wave sailing state. If step S2 determines that the ship is currently in a mistouch monitoring operating condition, the specific type of operating condition is further determined (e.g., "gear shift type" or "down-wave operation type"). Based on the operating condition type determined in step S3, a specific mistouch analysis algorithm matching the type is selected and executed. For example, for the "gear shift type," a first mistouch analysis is executed; for the "down-wave operation type," a second mistouch analysis is executed. The analysis process utilizes relevant ship operation and transportation to generate a "mistouch analysis result." Finally, based on the false touch analysis result generated in step S4, it is determined whether a false touch operation has occurred. If the analysis result determines that a false touch operation has occurred, the preset "anti-false touch control operation" corresponding to the working condition or false touch type is immediately executed. The anti-false touch control operation includes but is not limited to: limiting the maximum output value of the handle instruction (such as limiting the throttle opening), ignoring or delaying the execution of the current input instruction of the handle, issuing an audible and visual alarm to prompt the operator, automatically switching the handle control to a safer mode, or recording a false touch event log, etc.

[0034] By establishing a complete anti-accidental touch control chain, namely working condition identification - working condition classification - targeted analysis - result judgment - execution of protection, and dynamically obtaining ship operation data to judge the existence of accidental touch monitoring conditions, the system only initiates complex accidental touch analysis when necessary, and can also distinguish different working condition types (i.e. gear shifting, following the sea) and call corresponding analysis strategies (such as first accidental touch analysis, second accidental touch analysis), making accidental touch judgment more accurate and effective, and ultimately triggering the most appropriate protection operation.

[0035] Existing methods struggle to precisely define the "high-risk period" when inadvertent activation monitoring is necessary. Relying on a single condition (such as a gear shift signal) can be incomplete, overlooking equally high-risk conditions like sailing with the current, which aren't triggered by gear shifts.

[0036] In an embodiment of the present invention, the ship operation data includes gear data, operating handle data and running direction data, and the judging whether the ship is currently in a false touch monitoring condition based on the ship operation data includes: judging whether it is currently switched from neutral to the running gear based on the gear data, and judging whether the ship is in a down-wave running condition based on the running direction data; when switching from neutral to the running gear, or when the ship is in the down-wave running condition, it is determined that the ship is currently in the false touch monitoring condition; otherwise, it is determined that the ship is currently in a normal condition.

[0037] In one possible embodiment, the acquired gear position data is used to determine whether the current gear has been switched from neutral to an operating gear (forward or reverse). The acquired running direction data is used to determine whether the vessel's sailing direction is substantially consistent with the direction of the current, that is, whether the vessel is operating in a down-wave condition. If the vessel meets any of these conditions, the vessel is determined to be in a false trigger monitoring condition, and subsequent analysis steps are performed. Otherwise, the vessel is determined to be in a normal operating condition, where the running direction data includes both the vessel's sailing direction data and the current direction data.

[0038] By combining two key trigger points: the gear shift action (i.e., switching from neutral to operating gear) and the navigation environment (i.e., operating in the sea), the system will enter a high-alert state as long as either condition is met. This dual trigger mechanism ensures that the protection system can be activated in major accidental trigger risk scenarios. At the same time, it clearly distinguishes between accidental trigger monitoring conditions and normal operating conditions, avoiding unnecessary analysis burden.

[0039] After identifying high-risk operating conditions, applying the same analysis method to all conditions can lead to inaccurate analysis. Examples include the characteristics of false triggers at the beginning of a gear shift (such as a rapid and large push on the handle) and the false trigger characteristics of excessive throttle acceleration during downwind sailing (such as continued acceleration without regard for rudder efficiency limits).

[0040] In an embodiment of the present invention, the handle mis-touch analysis corresponding to the ship operating condition type is performed based on the ship operating data to generate a mis-touch analysis result, including: when the ship operating condition type is a gear shift type: obtaining the gear switching time, performing a first mis-touch analysis based on the gear switching time and the operating handle data, and generating a first analysis result; when the ship operating condition type is a downwave operation type: performing a second mis-touch analysis based on the ship operating data, and generating a second analysis result; generating a mis-touch analysis result based on the first analysis result and the second analysis result.

[0041] In a possible embodiment, if the ship operating condition type is judged to be a gear shift type, the switching time and operating handle data of the ship successfully switching from neutral gear to operating gear are first obtained, the operating handle data includes the opening degree of the operating handle and its changes, and a first false touch analysis is performed according to the obtained switching time and operating handle data, and a first analysis result is generated; if the ship operating condition type is judged to be a following wave operation type, the ship operation data is first obtained, and a second false touch analysis is performed according to the obtained ship operation data, and a second analysis result is generated; the obtained first analysis result and / or second analysis result is used as the final false touch analysis result, and the false touch analysis result is transmitted to the system for judgment and execution.

[0042] By implementing refined misoperation analysis based on ship operating conditions, the system calls corresponding analysis algorithms based on the type of ship operating condition. The first misoperation analysis focuses on the suddenness, amplitude, and speed of handle operation during the initial period after a gear shift, while the second misoperation analysis focuses on whether the ship's speed is unnecessarily increased under conditions of limited rudder efficiency while sailing down the sea. This categorized processing mechanism makes the misoperation judgment criteria more aligned with actual risk characteristics, significantly improving the accuracy and effectiveness of the analysis. The final misoperation analysis results are generated by combining or independently generating the results of these two analysis submodules.

[0043] In the early stages of a shift, judging a false trigger based solely on the degree of lever opening is overly simplistic. A reasonable, quick operator maneuver (such as a quick accelerator for an emergency evasive maneuver) could be misjudged as a false trigger, while a small, quick false trigger could be missed.

[0044] In an embodiment of the present invention, the first false touch analysis is performed based on the gear switching time and the operating handle data to generate a first analysis result, including: determining the operating handle opening data and the operating handle change rate data based on the operating handle data; judging whether the gear switching time is greater than a first threshold, and whether the operating handle opening data is greater than a second threshold, and whether the operating handle change rate data is greater than a third threshold; when the gear switching time is greater than the first threshold, and the operating handle opening data is greater than the second threshold, and the operating handle change rate data is greater than the third threshold, generating a first analysis result of a false touch operation.

[0045] In one possible embodiment, the operating handle opening data and the operating handle change rate data are first parsed from the operating handle data, and then the gear switching time is obtained. Then, it is simultaneously determined whether the gear switching time is greater than a first threshold, whether the operating handle opening data is greater than a second threshold, and whether the operating handle change rate data is greater than a third threshold. When all three sets of data meet the "greater than" condition, a first analysis result is generated indicating that an erroneous touch operation has occurred. Otherwise, a first analysis result is generated indicating that no erroneous touch operation has occurred. The operating handle opening data refers to the percentage or actual angle / displacement of the current position relative to the zero position, the operating handle change rate data refers to the amount of change in the handle opening per unit time, and the gear switching time refers to the length of time from the moment the gear is successfully switched to the operating gear to the current moment. The first threshold, the second threshold, and the third threshold can be set according to the specific ship type, operating handle characteristics, operating habits, etc. For example, the first threshold is set to 2-5 seconds, the second threshold is set to 30%-50% opening, and the third threshold is set to 20%-40% opening change per second.

[0046] Differentiated analysis models are designed for different working conditions to improve the pertinence of accidental touch judgments; and multi-dimensional parameters such as gear switching time, handle opening and change rate are combined to achieve accurate identification of accidental touch operations.

[0047] When sailing down waves, the greatest risk is loss of steering effectiveness due to excessive speed. However, existing methods lack a scientific and dynamic model to calculate the upper limit of safe speed under current rudder and wave height conditions in real time, and based on this, determine whether the operator's throttle input is a dangerous mis-touch. At the same time, the judgment of speed exceeding the limit also needs to be combined with the operating conditions.

[0048] In an embodiment of the present invention, the ship operation data also includes steering wheel angle data, maximum allowable speed data and downwave wave height data, and the second false touch analysis is performed based on the ship operation data to generate a second analysis result, including: establishing a dynamic correlation relationship between the steering wheel angle data, the maximum allowable speed data and the downwave wave height data; determining the corresponding maximum speed based on the dynamic correlation relationship and the current steering wheel angle data and current wave height data of the ship; performing a differential analysis on the maximum speed according to the current speed of the ship; if the current speed of the ship is less than the maximum speed and the deviation between the current speed and the maximum speed is less than a preset speed deviation threshold: judging whether the operating handle opening data continues to increase; in the case where the operating handle opening data continues to increase, generating a second analysis result of a false touch operation; if the current speed of the ship is greater than the maximum speed: determining the maximum allowable rotational speed; judging whether the current rotational speed of the ship is greater than the maximum allowable rotational speed; in the case where the current rotational speed is greater than the maximum allowable rotational speed, generating a second analysis result of a false touch operation.

[0049] In a possible embodiment, a dynamic correlation is first established among the steering wheel angle data, the maximum allowable speed data and the wave height data, and the maximum allowable speed is calculated based on the dynamic correlation and the current steering wheel angle data and the current wave height data; then the current speed of the ship is obtained, and if the current speed is less than the maximum speed, it is determined whether the deviation between the current speed and the maximum speed is less than a preset speed deviation threshold; if the deviation is less than the preset speed deviation threshold, it indicates that the current speed is close to but does not exceed the safety upper limit, and at the same time, the changing trend of the operating handle opening data is monitored. If it is detected that the handle opening is continuing to increase, a second analysis result of an erroneous touch operation is generated; if it is detected that the handle opening is stable or decreasing, it is a safe operation. If the current speed is greater than the maximum speed, it indicates that the current speed has exceeded the safety upper limit. The current maximum allowable speed is determined or obtained based on factors such as the main engine characteristics and the transmission system limitations, and then the current speed of the ship is obtained, and the current speed and the maximum allowable speed are judged. If the current speed is greater than the maximum allowable speed, a second analysis result indicating that an accidental touch operation has occurred is generated; and even if the current speed is less than or equal to the maximum allowable speed, a second analysis result indicating that an accidental touch operation has occurred is generated, because the speed has exceeded the safety upper limit, regardless of whether the speed has exceeded the safety upper limit, the steering effect may have been lost or is about to be lost.

[0050] Using a two-tiered core protection analysis approach, the first tier addresses situations where the speed is within the limit but acceleration continues. In this case, a dynamic correlation model is established between rudder angle, wave height, and safe speed, allowing the maximum permissible speed under the current conditions to be calculated in real time. If the current speed is below the maximum permissible speed but approaches it (i.e., the deviation between the two is less than a preset speed deviation threshold), and the operator continues to increase the throttle or the joystick opening angle, this is considered an accidental trigger intended to push the vessel into the dangerous speed zone. The second tier addresses situations where the speed or speed limit has been exceeded. In this case, if the current speed exceeds the calculated maximum permissible speed, or the current main engine speed exceeds the maximum permissible speed set for safety reasons, an accidental trigger or dangerous operation is directly identified. This approach not only determines whether speeding is occurring but, more importantly, anticipates improper operator behavior as it approaches critical points, achieving proactive preventative measures.

[0051] When sailing down waves, the safe speed is affected by both the rudder angle and wave height. Existing methods lack a quantitative model based on ship hydrodynamics to accurately calculate the actual upper limit of safe speed for different combinations of rudder angle and wave height. Instead, they typically rely on operator experience or rough estimates, which are neither accurate nor reliable.

[0052] In an embodiment of the present invention, the establishing of a dynamic correlation between the steering wheel angle data, the maximum allowable speed data, and the following wave height data includes: determining an actual available steering wheel angle based on the following wave height data: , where Hw is the wave height along the sea, L is the length of the ship, is the actual available steering wheel angle; and a first maximum allowable speed is determined based on the actual available steering wheel angle: ,in, The maximum speed allowed in still water with the steering wheel angle at 0. In still water and the steering wheel angle is The second maximum permissible speed is determined based on the following wave height: ,in, for The maximum permissible speed under wave height, μ is an empirical constant obtained through seakeeping simulation or actual ship testing; the minimum value of the first maximum permissible speed and the second maximum permissible speed is determined, and the minimum value is determined as the actual maximum permissible speed, that is: , where the maximum allowable speed for wave heights between 0.04L and 0.08L can be obtained by linear interpolation.

[0053] In a possible embodiment, based on the measured or received following wave height data and the Captain , and substitute into formula 1: , calculate the actual available steering wheel angle , if the calculated If it is greater than the maximum physical steering wheel angle of the ship, the maximum physical steering wheel angle is used; then based on the rudder blade hydrodynamic formula and the actual available steering wheel angle The maximum speed allowed in still water with the steering wheel angle at 0 , and substitute into formula 2: , it is calculated that in still water and the steering wheel angle is Maximum speed allowed Based on the empirical constant μ and wave height data obtained through seakeeping simulation or actual ship testing ,captain The maximum speed allowed in still water with the steering wheel angle at 0 , and substitute into Formula 3: , calculated in Maximum speed allowed under wave height The maximum allowable speed for wave heights between 0.04L and 0.08L can be obtained by linear interpolation, that is, assuming the known points: ( 1=0.04L, V1), ( 2=0.08L, V2), if <0.04L, then Maximum speed allowed under wave height = ,like , then the linear interpolation formula is: , and then calculate the corresponding Hw of each group ,like ≥0.08L, then =0.2 Based on the constraints of the steering wheel angle on the maximum speed and the influence of the wave height on the speed, the minimum value of the two is obtained and used as the final maximum allowable speed, that is, Formula 4: .

[0054] Formula 1 takes into account the limitation of wave height on the maximum available steering wheel angle, meaning that the rudder blade may be partially out of water or subjected to abnormal forces in waves. Using the ship's length as a proportional factor, this reflects that in high sea conditions, excessive rudder angles may fail or even be harmful. Formula 2 takes into account the hydrodynamic characteristics of the rudder blade, reflecting the maximum speed allowed to avoid damage to the mechanism or excessive resistance caused by excessive rudder force, and estimates the maximum allowable speed at any rudder angle based on linear interpolation. Formula 3 directly quantifies the limitation of wave height on the ship's safe speed. Formula 4 takes the minimum of the maximum speed under the rudder angle constraint and the maximum speed under the wave height constraint as the final safe speed limit, adopting a conservative principle to better protect the ship's navigation safety. A mathematical model quantifies the constraints of the steering wheel angle and wave height on the speed, dynamically determining the maximum allowable speed and improving the scientific nature of false touch judgments under following wave conditions. Combining the dual judgments of speed deviation and speed threshold, the system comprehensively covers the false touch risk scenarios under following wave conditions.

[0055] For further information, see Figure 2 An embodiment of the present invention further provides a control device for preventing accidental touch of a ship operating handle, the control device comprising: a data acquisition module for acquiring ship operation data; a working condition judgment module for judging whether the ship is currently in an accidental touch monitoring working condition based on the ship operation data; a working condition acquisition module for obtaining the ship working condition type; an accidental touch analysis module for performing an accidental touch analysis of the handle corresponding to the ship working condition type based on the ship operation data to generate an accidental touch analysis result; and an anti-accidental touch execution module for judging whether an accidental touch operation occurs based on the analysis result, and executing a corresponding anti-accidental touch control operation when it is determined that the accidental touch operation occurs.

[0056] Furthermore, an embodiment of the present invention also provides a processor for running a program, wherein the program, when run, is used to execute the method provided by the embodiment of the present invention.

[0057] Furthermore, an embodiment of the present invention also provides a computer-readable storage medium having a computer program stored thereon, which implements the method described in the embodiment of the present invention when the program is executed by a processor.

[0058] The above describes in detail the optional implementation methods of the embodiments of the present invention in conjunction with the accompanying drawings. However, the embodiments of the present invention are not limited to the specific details in the above implementation methods. Within the technical concept of the embodiments of the present invention, various simple modifications can be made to the technical solutions of the embodiments of the present invention, and these simple modifications all fall within the scope of protection of the embodiments of the present invention.

[0059] It should also be noted that the various specific technical features described in the above specific embodiments can be combined in any appropriate manner without contradiction. To avoid unnecessary repetition, the embodiments of the present invention will not further describe various possible combinations.

[0060] Those skilled in the art will understand that all or part of the steps in the above-mentioned embodiments can be implemented by instructing the relevant hardware through a program. The program is stored in a storage medium and includes a number of instructions for causing a single-chip microcomputer, chip, or processor to execute all or part of the steps in the methods described in the various embodiments of the present application. The aforementioned storage medium includes various media that can store program code, such as a USB flash drive, a mobile hard disk, a read-only memory (ROM), a random access memory (RAM), a magnetic disk, or an optical disk.

[0061] In addition, various implementations of the embodiments of the present invention may be arbitrarily combined, and as long as they do not violate the concept of the embodiments of the present invention, they should also be regarded as the contents disclosed in the embodiments of the present invention.

Claims

1. A control method for preventing accidental touch of a marine operating handle, characterized in that: The control method includes: Obtain ship operation data; determining whether the ship is currently in an accidental trigger monitoring condition based on the ship operation data; If yes, obtain the ship operating condition type; Based on the ship operation data, a handle mis-touch analysis corresponding to the ship working condition type is performed to generate a mis-touch analysis result, including: When the ship operating condition type is a gear shift type: Acquire a gear switching time, perform a first mistouch analysis based on the gear switching time and the operating handle data, and generate a first analysis result; When the ship operating condition is following the wave: performing a second false touch analysis based on the ship operation data to generate a second analysis result; generating an accidental touch analysis result based on the first analysis result and the second analysis result; The ship operation data further includes steering wheel angle data, maximum allowable speed data, and following wave height data. The performing of the second false touch analysis based on the ship operation data to generate a second analysis result includes: Establishing a dynamic correlation between the steering wheel angle data, the maximum allowable speed data and the following wave height data; Determining a corresponding maximum speed based on the dynamic association relationship and current steering wheel angle data and current wave height data of the ship; performing a differential analysis on the maximum speed according to the current speed of the ship; If the current speed of the ship is less than the maximum speed and the deviation between the current speed and the maximum speed is less than the preset speed deviation threshold: Determining whether the operating handle opening data continues to increase; When the operating handle opening degree data continues to increase, generating a second analysis result of an erroneous touch operation; If the current speed of the ship is greater than the maximum speed: Determine the maximum permissible speed; Determining whether the current rotation speed of the ship is greater than the maximum allowable rotation speed; When the current rotation speed is greater than the maximum allowable rotation speed, generating a second analysis result of an erroneous touch operation; Based on the analysis result, it is determined whether an accidental touch operation occurs, and if it is determined that the accidental touch operation occurs, a corresponding accidental touch prevention control operation is performed.

2. The control method according to claim 1, characterized in that: The ship operation data includes gear data, operating handle data, and operation direction data. The determining whether the ship is currently in an accidental touch monitoring condition based on the ship operation data includes: Determining whether the gear is currently switched from neutral to running based on the gear data, and determining whether the vessel is in a down-wave running condition based on the running direction data; When the gear is switched from neutral to the operating gear, or the vessel is in the following sea operating condition, determining that the vessel is currently in the false trigger monitoring condition; Otherwise, it is determined that the ship is currently in a normal operating condition.

3. The control method according to claim 2, characterized in that: The performing a first mistouch analysis based on the gear shift time and the operating handle data to generate a first analysis result includes: determining operating handle opening data and operating handle change rate data based on the operating handle data; Determining whether the gear shift time is greater than a first threshold, whether the operating handle opening data is greater than a second threshold, and whether the operating handle change rate data is greater than a third threshold; When the shift switching time is greater than the first threshold, the operating handle opening data is greater than the second threshold, and the operating handle change rate data is greater than the third threshold, a first analysis result indicating that an erroneous touch operation has occurred is generated.

4. The control method according to claim 1, wherein: The establishing of a dynamic correlation between the steering wheel angle data, the maximum allowable speed data and the following wave height data comprises: Determine the actual available steering wheel angle based on the following wave height data: ， Among them, Hw is the wave height along the sea, L is the length of the ship, is the actual available steering wheel angle; Determine a first maximum permissible speed based on the actual available steering wheel angle: ， in, The maximum speed allowed in still water with the steering wheel angle at 0. In still water and the steering wheel angle is The maximum speed allowed when The second maximum permissible speed is determined based on the following wave height: ， in, is the maximum speed allowed under the wave height Hw, μ is an empirical constant obtained through seakeeping simulation or actual ship test; Determine the minimum value of the first maximum allowable speed and the second maximum allowable speed, and determine the minimum value as the actual maximum allowable speed, that is: 。 5. A control device for preventing accidental touch of a marine operating handle, characterized in that: The control device comprises: Data acquisition module, used to obtain ship operation data; A working condition judgment module, configured to judge whether the ship is currently in an erroneous monitoring working condition based on the ship operation data; Working condition acquisition module, used to obtain the ship working condition type; The mis-touch analysis module is used to perform mis-touch analysis of the handle corresponding to the ship operating condition type based on the ship operating data, and generate mis-touch analysis results, including When the ship operating condition type is a gear shift type: Acquire a gear switching time, perform a first mistouch analysis based on the gear switching time and the operating handle data, and generate a first analysis result; When the ship operating condition is following the wave: performing a second false touch analysis based on the ship operation data to generate a second analysis result; generating an accidental touch analysis result based on the first analysis result and the second analysis result; The ship operation data further includes steering wheel angle data, maximum allowable speed data, and following wave height data. The performing of the second false touch analysis based on the ship operation data to generate a second analysis result includes: Establishing a dynamic correlation between the steering wheel angle data, the maximum allowable speed data and the following wave height data; Determining a corresponding maximum speed based on the dynamic association relationship and current steering wheel angle data and current wave height data of the ship; performing a differential analysis on the maximum speed according to the current speed of the ship; If the current speed of the ship is less than the maximum speed and the deviation between the current speed and the maximum speed is less than the preset speed deviation threshold: Determining whether the operating handle opening data continues to increase; When the operating handle opening data continues to increase, generating a second analysis result of an erroneous touch operation; If the current speed of the ship is greater than the maximum speed: Determine the maximum permissible speed; Determining whether the current rotation speed of the ship is greater than the maximum allowable rotation speed; When the current rotation speed is greater than the maximum allowable rotation speed, generating a second analysis result of an erroneous touch operation; The anti-accidental touch execution module is used to determine whether an accidental touch operation occurs based on the analysis result, and execute a corresponding anti-accidental touch control operation when it is determined that the accidental touch operation occurs.

6. A processor, characterized in that: Used to run a program, wherein the program is used to execute the method according to any one of claims 1 to 4 when run.

7. A computer-readable storage medium having a computer program stored thereon, characterized in that: When the program is executed by a processor, the method according to any one of claims 1 to 4 is implemented.

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