Anti-theft authentication method for power battery pack and BMS (battery management system) controller of electric vehicle

Abstract

The invention provides an electric vehicle power battery pack and BMS controller anti-theft authentication method, and relates to the technical field of new energy electric vehicles, a power battery pack, a battery management system (BMS), an anti-theft monitoring chip, a mobile terminal and a remote monitoring platform are included, multi-level verification ensures that the battery pack only works on an authorized vehicle through local and cloud dual encryption, and the safety of the battery pack is ensured. Even if a certain link is cracked, the binding information, the use history and the battery replacement record of the battery pack cannot be recorded by bypassing the overall authentication and the block chain technology, a non-tampering distributed account book is formed, the blank of data credibility under the battery replacement and leasing scenes is filled, the security of the anti-theft system is improved to a brand new height, and the safety of the anti-theft system is improved. A transparent and standardized solution is provided for battery management in the new energy automobile industry, safety supervision of echelon utilization of the power battery after decommissioning is promoted, and the property loss risk of automobile owners and automobile enterprises is greatly reduced.

Description

Technical Field

[0001] The present invention relates to the technical field of new energy electric vehicles, and in particular to an anti-theft authentication method for an electric vehicle power battery pack and a BMS controller. Background Art

[0002] With the popularization of new energy vehicles, power batteries, as their core components, not only play a key role in vehicle operation, but also have a high secondary utilization value after retirement (such as cascade utilization, battery leasing, battery replacement, etc.). However, this also makes power battery packs a target of theft. In the existing technology, after the power battery pack is illegally dismantled, it is difficult for the owner and the car company to monitor its status and track its location in real time, causing serious property losses. In addition, the illegally dismantled battery pack may be modified or installed on other vehicles, posing safety hazards and regulatory loopholes. Therefore, there is an urgent need for an intelligent solution that can effectively prevent the illegal dismantling of power battery packs and realize real-time tracking and anti-theft authentication.

[0003] According to a method and system for monitoring battery replacement of an electric vehicle disclosed in China with publication number "CN102890482A", the method and system for monitoring battery replacement of an electric vehicle are based on state machine and event-driven process chain technology. When an electric vehicle enters a battery replacement station, an RFID scanner at the entrance reads the RFID tag information of the vehicle, and then authenticates the vehicle based on the tag, including authentication of the vehicle identity and authentication of the battery box information required by the vehicle. After successful authentication, it is determined whether the battery box required by the vehicle has been charged. If it has been charged, the vehicle is guided to park at a designated location. Otherwise, the vehicle is prompted to wait. After the vehicle is parked and ready, the battery is replaced. After all batteries are replaced, payment is settled, and finally the vehicle is guided out of the battery replacement station. The present invention realizes automatic control of the entire process of battery replacement of electric vehicles, solves the problem of low automation level of battery replacement operation, and greatly improves the efficiency and reliability of battery replacement.

[0004] The above patent documents and prior art have the following technical problems when used:

[0005] Issue 1: In existing new energy vehicle power battery anti-theft technologies, the authentication mechanism typically relies on a single VIN code comparison or simple local verification, which has significant security vulnerabilities. Authentication can be bypassed by tampering with the BMS firmware, forging the VIN code, or disconnecting the communication module. This can lead to stolen battery packs being illegally modified or installed in other vehicles for continued use. This is particularly true in battery swapping and leasing scenarios. The lack of reliable authentication and usage record tracing increases the risk of illegal circulation of battery packs, which not only causes financial losses to vehicle owners and automakers but also poses a threat to the security of battery management in the industry.

[0006] Problem two: Existing power battery anti-theft tracking technology usually relies on a single GPS positioning system, which has problems such as low positioning accuracy, limited signal coverage, and insufficient response efficiency. In complex environments such as indoors, underground parking lots, or remote areas, GPS signals are easily lost, resulting in the inability to determine the location of the battery pack. Traditional systems lack intelligent abnormal behavior analysis, and alarm information updates slowly, making it difficult to provide effective tracking clues to car owners or car companies in a timely manner. This results in a low recovery rate for stolen battery packs, prolonged recovery time, and increased property losses and safety hazards. Summary of the Invention

[0007] Technical problems solved

[0008] In view of the shortcomings of the existing technology, the present invention provides an anti-theft authentication method for electric vehicle power battery packs and BMS controllers, which solves the following problems:

[0009] 1. The traditional anti-theft authentication mechanism is not secure enough and can be easily tampered with or bypassed, leading to the illegal use or circulation of battery packs;

[0010] 2. Traditional battery tracking technology has low positioning accuracy and poor environmental adaptability, making it difficult to achieve real-time and efficient recovery of stolen battery packs.

[0011] Technical Solution

[0012] To achieve the above objectives, the present invention is implemented through the following technical solutions: a method for anti-theft authentication of an electric vehicle power battery pack and a BMS controller, comprising a power battery pack, a battery management system (BMS), an anti-theft monitoring chip, a mobile terminal, and a remote monitoring platform, the method comprising the following steps:

[0013] Sp1: When the power battery pack leaves the factory, the vehicle identification number (VIN) and the battery pack unique code are bound through an encryption algorithm, stored in the non-volatile storage area of ​​the BMS, and synchronized to the cloud authentication server;

[0014] Sp2: The BMS verifies the compatibility of the battery pack with the vehicle through a multi-level authentication mechanism, including local VIN code authentication, dynamic key authentication, and cloud-based secondary authentication. If authentication fails, the BMS stops charging and discharging functions and sends an alarm signal;

[0015] Sp3: When the high-voltage interlock or low-voltage control line of the power battery pack is detected to be disconnected, the anti-theft monitoring chip triggers an alarm and regularly sends abnormal signals to the mobile terminal or remote monitoring platform via the 4G / 5G network. At the same time, the multi-source positioning function is activated to upload the real-time location;

[0016] Sp4: The cloud authentication server records the battery pack status and movement trajectory, allowing car owners or car manufacturers to locate the battery pack by querying the VIN code.

[0017] Preferably, the multi-level authentication mechanism of step Sp2 includes:

[0018] Sp2.1: Local VIN code authentication, read the stored VIN code through the BMS and compare it with the VIN code provided by the vehicle ECU;

[0019] Sp2.2: Dynamic key authentication: BMS and ECU generate dynamic keys based on VIN code and timestamp, and compare them through encryption algorithm;

[0020] Sp2.3: Secondary cloud authentication: BMS periodically sends authentication requests to the cloud authentication server. The server generates a dynamic authentication code based on the VIN code, battery pack code, and historical records. If the comparison fails, the BMS enters lock mode.

[0021] Preferably, the power battery pack includes a backup power module, which is independent of the main power battery and supplies power to the anti-theft monitoring chip, communication module and GPS module, and supports continuous positioning and alarm functions for at least 72 hours after the main power is disconnected.

[0022] Preferably, the multi-source positioning function in step Sp3 includes GPS positioning, Beidou positioning, base station positioning (LBS) and Wi-Fi positioning. When the GPS signal is unavailable, it automatically switches to other positioning methods and calculates the possible location of the battery pack through the historical trajectory prediction algorithm.

[0023] Preferably, the method further includes an illegal disassembly detection mechanism, which determines whether the battery pack has been illegally disassembled through dual detection of the high-voltage interlock circuit and the low-voltage control circuit. When either circuit is disconnected, the anti-theft monitoring chip outputs a high-level signal to trigger the alarm and positioning functions.

[0024] Preferably, the cloud authentication server in step Sp4 uses blockchain technology to record the binding information, usage history and battery replacement records of the battery pack, and generates an unalterable distributed ledger for each operation, supporting traceability in battery replacement and leasing scenarios.

[0025] Preferably, the method supports a remote destruction function. When it is confirmed that the battery pack cannot be retrieved, the remote monitoring platform sends a destruction instruction, and the BMS performs an irreversible locking operation, including fusing key circuits or erasing firmware, to prevent the battery pack from being illegally used.

[0026] Preferably, the anti-theft monitoring chip supports an intelligent response mechanism, analyzes the movement trajectory and abnormal behavior of the battery pack through an artificial intelligence algorithm, automatically adjusts the alarm priority, and pushes high-risk warnings to a mobile terminal or a remote monitoring platform.

[0027] Preferably, the method supports battery replacement and shared travel scenarios, and allows the battery pack to be switched between authorized vehicles through a temporary key issued by a cloud authentication server, which automatically becomes invalid after the authorization expires.

[0028] Preferably, the anti-theft monitoring chip adopts a wide temperature design with an operating temperature range of -40°C to 85°C and complies with the IP67 waterproof and dustproof standard. The communication module supports 4G / 5G networks, and the alarm signal sending period is configurable, with a minimum of 30 seconds.

[0029] Beneficial effects

[0030] The present invention provides an anti-theft authentication method for an electric vehicle power battery pack and a BMS controller. It has the following beneficial effects:

[0031] 1. The present invention adopts an innovative fusion of multi-level authentication mechanism (local VIN code authentication, dynamic key authentication and cloud-based secondary authentication) and blockchain technology, which significantly improves the robustness and traceability of the power battery pack anti-theft system throughout its life cycle. Multi-level verification ensures that the battery pack only works on authorized vehicles through double encryption locally and in the cloud. Even if a certain link is cracked, the overall authentication cannot be bypassed. Blockchain technology records the binding information, usage history and battery replacement records of the battery pack to form an unalterable distributed ledger, filling the gap in data credibility in battery replacement and leasing scenarios. For example, at a battery replacement station, the blockchain verifies the legal source of the battery pack to prevent illegal circulation; after being stolen, the historical records provide evidence for accountability, which not only elevates the security of the anti-theft system to a new level, but also provides a transparent and standardized solution for battery management in the new energy vehicle industry, promotes the safe supervision of the cascade utilization of power batteries after retirement, and greatly reduces the risk of property loss for car owners and car companies.

[0032] 2. The present invention adopts an intelligent response mechanism that integrates multi-source positioning and artificial intelligence, breaking through the limitations of traditional battery tracking technology and realizing the precise positioning and efficient recovery of stolen battery packs. Through multi-source switching and historical trajectory prediction algorithms, it ensures positioning accuracy (±5 meters outdoors, ±50 meters indoors) in complex environments (such as indoors or remote areas). The intelligent response mechanism uses AI to analyze the movement trajectory of the battery pack, automatically identifies high-risk behaviors (such as abnormal long-distance movement) and adjusts the alarm priority, significantly improving the response efficiency. For example, after the battery pack is stolen, the system uploads the positioning within 30 seconds, and the owner views the trajectory in real time through the APP. The car company combines AI prediction to quickly lock the location and assist the police in recovering it. It not only improves the success rate of recovery, but also supports 72 hours of continuous tracking through backup power supply, providing a guarantee for the rapid recovery of battery packs, greatly enhancing the sense of security of new energy vehicle users, and is of milestone significance to the development of the industry's anti-theft technology. BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS

[0033] Figure 1 This is a flow chart of the anti-theft authentication method of the present invention;

[0034] Figure 2 This is a diagram of the anti-theft authentication method architecture of the present invention;

[0035] Figure 3 This is a hardware structure diagram of the anti-theft authentication method of the present invention. DETAILED DESCRIPTION

[0036] The following will clearly and completely describe the technical solutions in the embodiments of the present invention in conjunction with the accompanying drawings. Obviously, the described embodiments are only part of the embodiments of the present invention, not all of the embodiments. Based on the embodiments of the present invention, all other embodiments obtained by ordinary technicians in this field without making creative efforts are within the scope of protection of the present invention. Specific embodiment one:

[0038] like Figures 1 to 3 As shown, an anti-theft authentication method for an electric vehicle power battery pack and a BMS controller includes a power battery pack, a battery management system (BMS), an anti-theft monitoring chip, a mobile terminal, and a remote monitoring platform. The method includes the following steps:

[0039] Sp1: Identity binding and initialization of power battery packs when leaving the factory: When the power battery pack leaves the factory, the vehicle identification code (VIN) is bound to the unique code of the battery pack (such as the battery serial number) through an encryption algorithm, stored in the non-volatile storage area of ​​the BMS, and synchronized to the cloud authentication server. At the same time, blockchain technology is used to record the binding information to ensure that it cannot be tampered with, and to establish a unique digital identity for the battery pack as the basis for subsequent authentication and tracking to prevent illegal modification or cross-vehicle use; on the battery pack production line, the manufacturer uses dedicated equipment to generate the VIN and The binding information of the battery pack code, such as the VIN code "LFV1234567890" and the battery pack code "BP20250410", is combined and encrypted to generate an irreversible hash value. This binding information is written into the non-volatile storage area of ​​the BMS (such as EEPROM or Flash). A hardware-level one-time write mechanism is used to ensure that the data cannot be tampered with. Even if the firmware is flashed by an external tool, it cannot be changed. At the same time, the binding information is uploaded to the cloud authentication server through a secure 4G / 5G network. The server stores it in a distributed database and uses blockchain technology. Generate tamper-proof records; blockchain records include binding time, battery pack code, VIN code, and production batch. Each operation forms a block, which is linked to subsequent usage records (such as battery replacement and maintenance) to ensure traceability throughout the entire life cycle. For example, when a battery pack is assigned to an electric SUV, the blockchain records its initial state to prevent the forgery of identity information. In actual operation, this binding process provides reliable baseline data for subsequent authentication. For example, when the battery pack is installed in the vehicle, the BMS can read the stored VIN code and compare it with the VIN code of the vehicle ECU to confirm whether it matches. The cloud server verifies the legitimacy of the binding information through the blockchain to eliminate the risk of tampering. The initialization process usually takes no more than 10 seconds, and the amount of data written is approximately 256 bytes. The storage space requirement is extremely low, making it suitable for large-scale production. In addition, the introduction of blockchain technology not only enhances data security but also supports battery replacement and leasing scenarios. For example, when replacing a battery pack at a battery swap station, blockchain records can quickly verify the legitimate source of the battery pack, avoiding the use of battery packs of unknown origin. It gives the battery pack an unforgeable digital identity, which serves as the starting point of the entire anti-theft authentication system and ensures the accuracy and reliability of subsequent authentication and tracking.

[0040] Sp2: Multi-level authentication mechanism verifies the compatibility of battery pack and vehicle: BMS verifies the compatibility of battery pack and vehicle through multi-level authentication mechanism, including local VIN code authentication, dynamic key authentication and cloud secondary authentication. If any authentication fails, BMS immediately stops charging and discharging function and sends alarm signal to mobile terminal or remote monitoring platform through 4G / 5G network. Through multiple verifications, it ensures that battery pack only works on authorized vehicles to prevent illegal modification or cross-vehicle use. At the same time, it triggers alarm in abnormal situations to protect the rights and interests of car owners and car companies. The working process is as follows: When the vehicle is started or the battery pack is powered on with high voltage, BMS first performs local VIN code authentication and reads the VIN code (such as "LFV123 4567890") and compares it with the VIN code provided by the vehicle ECU through the CAN bus. The comparison process takes about 50 milliseconds. If the VIN codes are inconsistent, the BMS determines that the battery pack has been illegally installed and immediately enters the lock mode, stopping all charging and discharging functions. To prevent local authentication from being cracked (such as by tampering with the ECU firmware), the BMS further performs dynamic key authentication and generates a dynamic key by combining the VIN code and the current timestamp. For example, the BMS uses the VIN code and timestamp (such as 2025-04-11 08:00:00) to generate a request key K1 through the AES-128 algorithm, and the ECU generates a response key K2 in the same way. The two parties exchange keys and compare them. If the keys do not match, the BMS locks And send an alarm signal through the communication module. To improve robustness, BMS regularly (for example, every 24 hours or every time high voltage is powered on) initiates cloud secondary authentication to the cloud authentication server through the 4G / 5G network, and sends an authentication request containing the VIN code, battery pack code and current status. The cloud server generates a dynamic authentication code (such as based on the HMAC-SHA256 algorithm) based on the stored binding information, historical usage records and blockchain ledger, and sends it to the BMS. If the authentication code comparison fails, the BMS enters the lock mode, stops working and sends an alarm signal. The signal content includes the battery pack code, abnormal time and failure reason (such as "cloud authentication failed"); in the lock mode, the BMS only maintains the low-power communication function. The backup power module supplies power and sends an alarm to the mobile terminal (such as the owner's mobile phone APP) or the remote monitoring platform (such as the car manufacturer's server) to notify the owner or the car manufacturer that the battery pack may be used illegally. For example, if the battery pack is installed in another vehicle, the VIN code mismatch will trigger a local authentication failure, and the inconsistency of the dynamic key will trigger a secondary verification failure. The cloud authentication further confirms the abnormality and eventually locks the battery pack and issues an alarm. It also supports battery swapping and shared travel scenarios. The temporary key issued by the cloud authentication server allows the battery pack to be switched between authorized vehicles. For example, when replacing the battery pack at a battery swap station, the server generates a temporary key with a validity period of 7 days to authorize the new vehicle to use it. The authorization automatically expires after the expiration to prevent unauthorized long-term use.The entire authentication process takes approximately 100-200 milliseconds (50ms for local authentication, 50ms for dynamic key authentication, and 100ms for cloud authentication, depending on network conditions). This process has no noticeable impact on vehicle startup. A highly secure authentication system has been established through multi-layered verification. Combined with local and cloud-based dual protection, the robustness of the anti-theft system is significantly improved. Even if a single link is cracked, the entire authentication process cannot be bypassed.

[0041] Sp3: Illegal disassembly detection and real-time positioning alarm: When the high-voltage interlock or low-voltage control circuit of the power battery pack is detected to be disconnected, the anti-theft monitoring chip judges the illegal disassembly behavior through the dual detection mechanism of the high-voltage interlock circuit and the low-voltage control circuit, triggers the alarm, and sends the abnormal signal to the mobile terminal or remote monitoring platform through the 4G / 5G network with a configurable period (minimum 30 seconds). At the same time, the multi-source positioning function (including GPS, Beidou, base station positioning and Wi-Fi positioning) is activated to upload the real-time location. The backup power module supports continuous positioning and alarm for at least 72 hours after the main power is disconnected. The system can quickly identify illegal disassembly, notify the owner or car manufacturer in real time, and provide precise positioning to track the battery pack; the working process is as follows: when the power battery pack is working normally, the high-voltage connector and the vehicle form a closed high-voltage interlocking loop, the BMS and the vehicle's low-voltage control line remain connected, and the anti-theft monitoring chip continuously monitors the level status of the two signals. If the battery pack is disassembled, the high-voltage connector is disconnected, resulting in an open interlocking loop. The low-voltage control line may become abnormal due to the cut-off of communication with the ECU. The anti-theft monitoring chip detects any abnormal signal (for example, the high-voltage interlocking level changes from low to high, or the low-voltage line Loss of heartbeat signal), immediately output high-level signal to trigger anti-theft response; first, BMS enters lock mode, stops charging and discharging functions, and only maintains low-power operation of communication and positioning modules, relying on backup power modules (such as lithium-ion batteries with a capacity of 2000mAh or supercapacitors) for power supply, designed to support at least 72 hours of continuous operation (positioning once every 30 seconds, communication power consumption is about 0.1W), then, the anti-theft monitoring chip sends abnormal signals through the 4G / 5G network with a default period of 30 seconds. The signal content includes battery pack code, abnormal time, triggering reason (such as "High-voltage interlock disconnected") and the current status are sent to the owner's mobile phone APP and the car company's remote monitoring platform to ensure real-time notification. To achieve accurate tracking, the anti-theft monitoring chip activates the multi-source positioning function, giving priority to GPS or Beidou positioning (outdoor accuracy ±5 meters). When the GPS signal is unavailable (such as the battery pack is moved to an indoor or underground parking lot), it automatically switches to base station positioning (LBS, accuracy ±50-200 meters) or Wi-Fi positioning (accuracy ±10-50 meters, requires a Wi-Fi hotspot nearby). The positioning data is encrypted using protocols (such as TLS1.3) Upload to the cloud authentication server to prevent interception or tampering. If all positioning signals are temporarily lost, the system uses a historical trajectory prediction algorithm (based on Kalman filtering or Bayesian reasoning) to infer the possible location of the battery pack. For example, it estimates the potential area based on the last positioning point and moving speed. The anti-theft monitoring chip adopts a wide temperature design (operating temperature -40°C to 85°C) and meets the IP67 waterproof and dustproof standards to ensure stable operation in extreme environments (such as cold areas or humid warehouses). The communication module supports 4G / 5G networks, and the signal sending cycle can be configured through the cloud (for example, adjusted to 60 seconds to save power). In addition, the anti-theft monitoring chip integrates an intelligent response mechanism, which analyzes the movement trajectory and abnormal behavior of the battery pack through artificial intelligence algorithms. For example, if an electric If a battery pack is moved long distances in a short period of time (e.g., from city A to city B within an hour), the system automatically flags it as a high-risk activity, elevates the alarm priority, and sends a notification to the mobile device (e.g., a pop-up window appears in the app stating "Battery pack has moved abnormally, please check immediately"). In real-world scenarios, if a battery pack is removed at night, the chip detects the interlock disconnection within 5 seconds, sends the initial alarm within 10 seconds, and uploads the initial location information 30 seconds later. The owner receives a notification via the app and sees that the battery pack is still in a nearby warehouse. The automaker then confirms the anomaly through the platform and contacts the police. This combination of dual detection, multi-source positioning, and intelligent analysis enables rapid response and precise tracking of illegal removals. Even when the battery pack is moved to a complex environment, reliable positioning data is provided, providing critical support for its recovery.

[0042] Sp4: Cloud status recording and battery pack positioning tracking: The cloud authentication server records the status and movement trajectory of the battery pack, uses blockchain technology to store binding information, usage history and battery replacement records, and generates an unalterable distributed ledger. It supports car owners or car companies to locate the battery pack by querying the VIN code, and provides a remote destruction function to prevent the battery pack from being illegally used. It centrally manages the full life cycle data of the battery pack, provides real-time positioning query and ultimate safety protection, and ensures the traceability and controllability of the battery pack under abnormal conditions; the working process is as follows: The cloud authentication server serves as the core data node of the system, and continuously receives status information uploaded by the BMS and anti-theft monitoring chip, including the authentication results of the battery pack (such as "authentication passed" or "lock mode"), positioning data (such as latitude and longitude coordinates), operating status (such as voltage, temperature) and abnormal records (such as "2025-04-1108:05 high voltage interlock disconnected"). This information is stored in a high-availability database and is transmitted through the block Blockchain technology generates a distributed ledger. Each status update (such as battery pack replacement, authentication failure, or location upload) forms a block and is linked to the historical record. For example, when the battery pack is bound in step Sp1, the blockchain records its initial status (VIN code, battery pack code, and production time). When the battery pack is replaced at the battery swap station, the replacement time, new vehicle VIN code, and authorization key are recorded. When the alarm of Sp3 is triggered, the abnormal time and positioning trajectory are recorded. The immutability of the blockchain ensures data integrity. Even if an attempt is made to forge usage records, it cannot be verified by the cloud. The owner or car company can query the battery pack status by entering the VIN code on the mobile terminal or remote monitoring platform. The server retrieves the blockchain ledger and real-time database based on the VIN code and returns the current location of the battery pack (for example, "latitude 39.9042, longitude 116.4074"), a trajectory map (showing the movement path in the past 24 hours), and abnormality details. The query interface uses encrypted authentication (such as OAuth2.0), to prevent unauthorized access, in order to improve the user experience, the platform provides a visual map, marking the real-time location and predicted area of ​​the battery pack, and the owner can click the "positioning" button on the APP to obtain the latest coordinates. The car company can monitor the battery pack status of all vehicles in batches; in actual scenarios, if the owner finds that the battery pack has been stolen, the query shows that it is located in an industrial park. The police quickly lock the location and retrieve the battery pack based on the trajectory information. If the battery pack is transferred to a remote area and cannot be retrieved, the car company can send a destruction instruction through the remote monitoring platform. The instruction is sent to the BMS through the 4G / 5G network. The BMS verifies the legitimacy of the instruction and performs an irreversible locking operation, such as using a built-in relay to fuse the key high-voltage circuit, or erasing the BMS firmware to completely disable the battery pack to prevent it from being used in other vehicles or illegal markets. The destruction process takes approximately 5 seconds. Upon completion, the BMS uploads a confirmation signal to the cloud, which is recorded in the blockchain ledger to ensure traceability. This supports the complex needs of battery swapping and leasing scenarios. For example, at a battery swap station, the server verifies the battery pack's blockchain record and issues a temporary key, allowing the new vehicle to use it. In shared mobility, the platform dynamically adjusts the scope of authorization based on the leasing contract. The entire cloud system typically responds within 1-2 seconds (depending on network conditions), with positioning query accuracy reaching ±5 meters (outdoors) or ±50 meters (indoors). Through centralized cloud management and blockchain technology, battery pack status is transparent, traceable, and highly secure. Combined with positioning tracking and remote destruction capabilities, this provides car owners and automakers with a complete solution from monitoring to final disposal, minimizing property loss and safety risks.

[0043] The operation scheme of the entire anti-theft authentication method is centered on the power battery pack. Through the collaborative work of BMS, anti-theft monitoring chip, mobile terminal and remote monitoring platform, a closed-loop system from identity binding to abnormal response is constructed; the workflow is as follows: First, at the factory stage (Sp1), the battery pack establishes a digital identity through VIN code and coding binding, and the blockchain record ensures that it cannot be tampered with, providing a reliable benchmark for subsequent authentication; when the vehicle is running (Sp2), the BMS verifies the legitimacy of the battery pack through local VIN code authentication, dynamic key authentication and cloud secondary authentication. If the authentication fails, it will be locked and an alarm will be issued to prevent illegal use; when illegal disassembly occurs (Sp3), the anti-theft monitoring chip triggers an alarm through dual detection, combines multi-source positioning and intelligent analysis, uploads location information in real time, and backup power is guaranteed Continuous tracking; finally (Sp4), the cloud server records the data of the entire life cycle, supports positioning query and remote destruction, ensures the controllability of the battery pack, and the entire process is seamlessly connected, covering the entire scenario of production, use, abnormal response and tracking recovery. For example, an electric car was stolen and the battery pack was removed in the parking lot. The system detected the abnormality within 10 seconds and uploaded the positioning within 30 seconds. The owner received an alarm within 1 minute and found the location through the APP. The car company simultaneously monitored and assisted the police in retrieving it; if it cannot be retrieved, the remote destruction function ensures that the battery pack is unavailable, and the blockchain record provides evidence for subsequent investigations. This method significantly improves the robustness and practicality of the anti-theft system through the combination of multi-level authentication, multi-source positioning, blockchain records and intelligent response. It is suitable for various scenarios such as passenger cars, battery swap stations and shared travel. Specific embodiment two:

[0045] like Figures 1 to 3 As shown, based on the content in the above specific embodiments, the following contents are further disclosed:

[0046] In order to further verify the feasibility and practical application scenarios of the solution of this application, the following application cases of each step in practical scenarios are further disclosed with respect to the steps of the above-mentioned specific embodiment 1:

[0047] Case 1: Sp1-Factory initialization and identity binding (applied to power battery pack production):

[0048] Scenario description: On January 10, 2025, Company A, a new energy vehicle manufacturer, produced a batch of 75kWh power battery packs for its flagship pure electric SUV (model: EV-SUV2025) at its Shanghai factory. Identity binding to the anti-theft authentication system was required before shipment to ensure the unique matching of the battery pack and the vehicle and support subsequent tracking. The production workshop, located in Pudong New District, Shanghai, was equipped with automated binding equipment and a blockchain recording system.

[0049] Specific operation process and data content:

[0050] Binding information generation: On the battery pack production line, each battery pack is assigned a unique code, "BP202504110001." The target vehicle's VIN code is "LFV1234567890123." The automated equipment uses the SHA-256 encryption algorithm to combine the VIN code and the battery pack code into the input string "LFV1234567890123-BP202504110001," generating a 256-bit hash value (e.g., "a1 b2c3...x8y9z0"), which takes approximately 5 milliseconds.

[0051] Writing to the non-volatile storage area: The hash value is stored in the BMS's EEPROM (capacity 4KB) through a dedicated writing tool. A hardware-level write-once mechanism is used to prevent tampering. Writing takes about 8 seconds and the data occupies 256 bytes. The BMS firmware version is v2.1.3 and supports AES-128 encryption.

[0052] Cloud synchronization: The binding information is transmitted to the cloud authentication server (located in the data center of Company A in Pudong, Shanghai) via the production line's 4G network (upload speed 10Mbps). The transmission takes about 200 milliseconds, and the data packet size is about 1KB. It contains the VIN code, battery pack code, production time (2025-01-10 09:00:00) and batch number (LOT202501);

[0053] Blockchain record: The cloud server writes the binding information into the blockchain ledger and generates a block (block height #1234567). The record includes the binding time, hash value, and production equipment ID (EQUIP-001). The blockchain adopts a private chain architecture based on Hyperledger Fabric. Each record takes about 1 second, and data encryption uses the ECDSA algorithm.

[0054] Verification: At the end of the production line, a test tool reads the hash value stored in the BMS and compares it with the cloud record to confirm consistency. The entire initialization process takes about 15 seconds per battery pack, and the production line has a daily production capacity of 1,000 battery packs.

[0055] This step establishes an unalterable digital identity for the battery pack, ensuring its unique binding to the vehicle's "LFV1234567890123." For example, after the battery pack "BP202504110001" is bound, illegal modification to other vehicles will fail due to VIN code mismatch. Blockchain records provide a trusted data source for battery swapping or leasing scenarios. For example, a battery swap station can query block #1234567 to verify the legitimacy of the battery pack. In this case, the binding process is efficient (15 seconds / block) and has high data security (SHA-256+blockchain), laying a solid foundation for the anti-theft authentication system and ensuring the reliability of the production process and subsequent tracking capabilities.

[0056] Case 2: Sp2-Multi-level authentication verification (applied to vehicle startup and battery replacement scenarios):

[0057] Scenario description: On January 11, 2025, Mr. Zhang, the owner of the EV-SUV 2025 (VIN: LFV1234567890123), completed charging at a charging station in Chaoyang District, Beijing, and then started the vehicle. The BMS needed to perform multi-level authentication to verify the legitimacy of the battery pack (code: BP202504110001). Mr. Zhang also planned to replace the battery pack at a battery swap station the next day, so the authentication mechanism needed to support temporary authorization.

[0058] Specific operation process and data content:

[0059] Local VIN code authentication: When the vehicle is started, the BMS main control chip (model: STM32H743, operating frequency 400MHz) reads the VIN code "LFV1234567890123" in the EEPROM, communicates with the vehicle ECU (firmware version v3.2.1) via the CAN bus (speed 1Mbps), obtains the VIN code provided by the ECU, and the comparison takes 50 milliseconds. If the result is consistent, the authentication is passed. If it does not match (for example, the ECU returns "LFV9999999999999"), the BMS is immediately locked and discharge stops;

[0060] Dynamic key authentication: The BMS combines the VIN code and timestamp (2025-01-1110:00:00.123) to generate a request key K1 (128 bits, AES-128 algorithm), such as "0x1a2b3c...de4f5g". The ECU generates a response key K2 in the same way. The comparison takes 50 milliseconds. If the keys are inconsistent, the BMS locks and sends an alarm to the car owner's app (mobile phone number: +86-138-1234-5678) via the 4G module (model: QuectelEC25). The alarm content is "Authentication failed, time: 2025-01-1110:00:01". In this example, the keys match and authentication is successful.

[0061] Secondary cloud authentication: The BMS sends a request to the cloud authentication server (IP: 192.168.1.100) every 24 hours (or after the high voltage is powered on), including the VIN code, battery pack code and status hash (generated by SHA-256). The server generates a dynamic authentication code (HMAC-SHA256, 32 bytes) based on the blockchain ledger (block #1234567) and sends it to the BMS. The comparison takes 150 milliseconds (including 50ms of network delay) and the authentication is successful. If it fails, the BMS locks and alarms. In this example, the authentication was completed at 10:00:02 and the status is normal.

[0062] Battery swap scenario support: The next day (January 12), Mr. Zhang replaced the battery pack at the battery swap station (new code: BP202504110002). The battery swap station server issued a temporary key (valid for 7 days, key ID: TEMP20250112001) through the cloud. After the BMS verified the key, it allowed the new vehicle (VIN: LFV9876543210987) to use it. The authorization took effect at 09:00 on January 12 and expired at 09:00 on January 19. The authentication process was recorded in the blockchain (block #1234568);

[0063] Data recording: Each authentication result is uploaded to the cloud and stored in a distributed database (1TB capacity). The record format is "Time: 2025-01-11 10:00:02, VIN: LFV1234567890123, Status: Passed".

[0064] Multi-level authentication ensures that the battery pack only works on authorized vehicles, preventing illegal modifications. For example, if an attempt is made to install the battery pack on another vehicle, local authentication will fail within 50 milliseconds, triggering a lock and alarm. Secondary cloud authentication and blockchain records eliminate the risk of tampering. Temporary keys for battery swapping scenarios support flexible applications. For example, Mr. Zhang can use the new battery pack without worry within 7 days, and the authorization will automatically expire after expiration. In this case, the authentication process is fast (total time is 250 milliseconds) and has no impact on startup, demonstrating the efficiency and safety of the solution in daily use and battery swapping scenarios.

[0065] Case 3: Sp3-Illegal disassembly detection and positioning alarm (applied to battery pack theft scenario):

[0066] Scenario description: At 1:00 AM on January 13, 2025, Mr. Zhang's EV-SUV 2025 (VIN: LFV1234567890123) was stolen from a parking lot in Chaoyang District, Beijing. The anti-theft system needs to detect the illegal removal, trigger an alarm, and provide real-time positioning to assist in recovery.

[0067] Specific operation process and data content:

[0068] Double detection mechanism: When the battery pack is removed, the high-voltage connector is disconnected, and the high-voltage interlock circuit (resistance 1kΩ) changes from low level (0V) to high level (5V), which takes 1 millisecond. The anti-theft monitoring chip (model: NXPi.MXRT1060, operating frequency 600MHz) simultaneously detects the loss of the heartbeat signal of the low-voltage control circuit (CAN signal, frequency 1kHz), which takes 2 milliseconds. The double abnormality confirms illegal removal, and the chip outputs a high-level signal at 01:00:00.003;

[0069] Anti-theft response is triggered: the BMS is immediately locked, the high-voltage relay (model: TE Connectivity KILOVAC) is cut off, discharge stops, and the system enters low-power mode (power consumption 0.1W). The backup power module (lithium-ion battery, capacity 2000mAh) is started, with a voltage of 3.7V and supports 72 hours of operation (positioning is performed once every 30 seconds, and communication power consumption is 0.05W / time);

[0070] Multi-source positioning: The chip activates the positioning module, prioritizing GPS (receiver model: u-blox NEO-7, accuracy of ±5 meters) to obtain coordinates (latitude 39.9042, longitude 116.4074, time 01:00:00.010). Because the battery pack was moved to an underground warehouse, the GPS signal was lost, and the system switched to base station positioning (LBS, accuracy of ±100 meters, base station ID: BS12345). The coordinates were updated to (latitude 39.9045, longitude 116.4080). If LBS is unavailable, Wi-Fi positioning (accuracy of ±50 meters, hotspot SSID: Warehouse-WiFi) is used as a backup. An AI algorithm (based on Kalman filtering) predicts the trajectory and estimates the possible area of ​​the battery pack (radius 200 meters). Positioning data is uploaded every 30 seconds, using the TLS 1.3 encryption protocol.

[0071] Alarm signal transmission: The chip sends an alarm signal to the car owner's app and the car manufacturer's platform via the 4G module. The first signal was sent at 01:00:00.015, with the content "Battery pack BP202504110001, high-voltage interlock disconnected, time: 2025-01-13 01:00:00, coordinates: 39.9042, 116.4074". Subsequent updates are made every 30 seconds. The signal size is 1KB, and the network delay is 50ms. AI analysis of the trajectory found that the battery pack moved 2 kilometers in 1 hour (abnormal speed), marking it as high risk, and sending a pop-up window warning "Battery pack movement abnormal, please check immediately";

[0072] Hardware environment: The anti-theft monitoring chip adopts a wide temperature design (-40℃ to 85℃), and the casing meets the IP67 standard, adapting to the low temperature (0℃) and humid environment of Beijing's January nights. The communication module supports 4G (frequency band B3 / B8) with a signal strength of -70dBm.

[0073] The dual detection mechanism quickly identifies illegal disassembly (within 3 milliseconds), preventing single interlocks from being bypassed. Multi-source positioning ensures tracking capabilities in complex environments, such as seamless switching from outdoor to underground warehouses, with accuracy maintained within ±100 meters. AI intelligent response improves alarm efficiency, and high-risk warnings help car owners contact the police within 15 minutes. Positioning data guided police to find the battery pack at 01:30 (location: an abandoned warehouse). The backup power supply supports long-term tracking, increasing the possibility of recovery. This case demonstrates the real-time and reliability of the solution in theft scenarios.

[0074] Case 4: Sp4-Cloud status recording and tracking (applied to battery pack tracking and destruction):

[0075] Scenario description: On January 14, 2025, Company A's remote monitoring platform received an alert regarding the illegal removal of Mr. Zhang's vehicle battery pack (code: BP202504110001). Location information indicated the battery pack had been moved to a remote area in Tianjin. The vehicle owner and the automaker needed to query the battery pack's location through the cloud and decide whether to destroy it to prevent illegal use.

[0076] Specific operation process and data content:

[0077] Status recording: The cloud-based authentication server (deployed on Alibaba Cloud, with an 8-core CPU and 32GB of memory) continuously receives battery pack status and stores it in a distributed database (MySQL, with a capacity of 1TB). Records include authentication results (failure at 01:00:00 on January 13), abnormal events (high-voltage interlock disconnection), positioning data (latest coordinates: latitude 39.1234, longitude 117.5678, time January 14 08:00:00), and operating parameters (voltage 0V, temperature 15°C). Each record is 2KB in size, with an average daily record volume of 100MB.

[0078] Blockchain record: The server writes the abnormal event into the blockchain (block #1234569), with the content "Battery pack BP202504110001, abnormality: illegal disassembly, time: 2025-01-13 01:00:00, VIN: LFV1234567890123". The battery replacement record (January 12 09:00) is updated in block #1234568 to ensure full life cycle traceability. Blockchain synchronization takes 1.5 seconds, the number of nodes is 10, and the encryption algorithm is ECDSA.

[0079] Positioning query: Mr. Zhang entered the VIN code "LFV1234567890123" through the app (version v1.2.3, Android 14). The query took 1 second and returned a trajectory map (January 13 01:00 to January 14 08:00, moving distance 150 kilometers). Company A monitored 1,000 vehicles in batches through the platform (web terminal, IP: 192.168.1.200) and confirmed that the battery pack was located in a remote warehouse in Tianjin (accuracy ±10 meters). The visual map shows the path (Beijing → Tianjin, speed approximately 50 km / h);

[0080] Remote destruction: Police confirmed the battery pack could not be retrieved (January 14, 10:00 AM). Company A issued a destruction command through the platform (command ID: DESTROY20250114001, encryption algorithm RSA). The BMS verified the command (taking 100 ms), triggered a relay to fuse the high-voltage circuit (current 100A, taking 2 seconds), and erased the firmware (EEPROM cleared, taking 3 seconds). After the destruction was complete, the BMS uploaded a confirmation signal "Destruction successful, time: 2025-01-14 10:00:05", which was recorded in block #1234570.

[0081] Data security: The query interface uses OAuth2.0 authentication and TLS1.3 transmission encryption to prevent data leakage. The server supports 24 / 7 operation with a response time of 500ms.

[0082] Cloud-based records enable transparent management of battery pack status. Blockchain ensures the immutability of abnormal events, providing reliable evidence for police investigations. Positioning queries help car owners and automakers quickly locate the battery pack (with a 1-second response). Track maps improve tracking efficiency. The remote destruction function prevents battery packs from entering the black market. For example, in this case, the battery pack completely failed after destruction, avoiding safety hazards. The solution supports traceability in battery swap scenarios. For example, querying block #1234568 can confirm the legal history of the battery pack. This case demonstrates the efficiency and security of cloud-based tracking and destruction.

[0083] It should be noted that, in this document, relational terms such as first and second, etc., are used only to distinguish one entity or operation from another entity or operation, and do not necessarily require or imply any actual relationship or order between these entities or operations. Moreover, the terms "comprises," "comprising," or any other variants thereof are intended to cover non-exclusive inclusion, such that a process, method, article, or device comprising a series of elements includes not only those elements, but also other elements not explicitly listed, or elements inherent to such process, method, article, or device. In the absence of further restrictions, an element defined by the statement "comprising a reference structure" does not exclude the presence of additional identical elements in the process, method, article, or device comprising the element.

[0084] While embodiments of the present invention have been shown and described, it will be appreciated by those skilled in the art that various changes, modifications, substitutions, and variations may be made to these embodiments without departing from the principles and spirit of the invention, and that the scope of the invention is defined by the appended claims and their equivalents.

Claims

1. A method for anti-theft authentication of an electric vehicle power battery pack and BMS controller, comprising a power battery pack, a battery management system (BMS), an anti-theft monitoring chip, a mobile terminal, and a remote monitoring platform, characterized in that: The method comprises the following steps: Sp1: When the power battery pack leaves the factory, the vehicle identification number (VIN) and the battery pack unique code are bound through an encryption algorithm, stored in the non-volatile storage area of ​​the BMS, and synchronized to the cloud authentication server; Sp2: The BMS verifies the compatibility of the battery pack with the vehicle through a multi-level authentication mechanism, including local VIN code authentication, dynamic key authentication, and cloud-based secondary authentication. If authentication fails, the BMS stops charging and discharging functions and sends an alarm signal; Sp3: When the high-voltage interlock or low-voltage control line of the power battery pack is detected to be disconnected, the anti-theft monitoring chip triggers an alarm and regularly sends abnormal signals to the mobile terminal or remote monitoring platform via the 4G / 5G network. At the same time, the multi-source positioning function is activated to upload the real-time location; Sp4: The cloud authentication server records the battery pack status and movement trajectory, allowing car owners or car manufacturers to locate the battery pack by querying the VIN code.

2. The anti-theft authentication method for an electric vehicle power battery pack and a BMS controller according to claim 1, characterized in that: The multi-level authentication mechanism of step Sp2 includes: Sp2.1: Local VIN code authentication, read the stored VIN code through the BMS and compare it with the VIN code provided by the vehicle ECU; Sp2.2: Dynamic key authentication: BMS and ECU generate dynamic keys based on VIN code and timestamp, and compare them through encryption algorithm; Sp2.3: Secondary cloud authentication: BMS periodically sends authentication requests to the cloud authentication server. The server generates a dynamic authentication code based on the VIN code, battery pack code, and historical records. If the comparison fails, the BMS enters lock mode.

3. The anti-theft authentication method for an electric vehicle power battery pack and a BMS controller according to claim 1, characterized in that: The power battery pack includes a backup power module, which is independent of the main power battery and supplies power to the anti-theft monitoring chip, communication module and GPS module, supporting continuous positioning and alarm functions for at least 72 hours after the main power is disconnected.

4. The anti-theft authentication method for an electric vehicle power battery pack and a BMS controller according to claim 1, characterized in that: The multi-source positioning function in step Sp3 includes GPS positioning, Beidou positioning, base station positioning (LBS) and Wi-Fi positioning. When the GPS signal is unavailable, it automatically switches to other positioning methods and calculates the possible location of the battery pack through the historical trajectory prediction algorithm.

5. The anti-theft authentication method for an electric vehicle power battery pack and a BMS controller according to claim 1, characterized in that: The method further includes an illegal disassembly detection mechanism, which determines whether the battery pack has been illegally disassembled through dual detection of the high-voltage interlock circuit and the low-voltage control circuit. When either circuit is disconnected, the anti-theft monitoring chip outputs a high-level signal to trigger the alarm and positioning functions.

6. The anti-theft authentication method for an electric vehicle power battery pack and a BMS controller according to claim 1, characterized in that: The cloud authentication server in step Sp4 uses blockchain technology to record the binding information, usage history and battery replacement records of the battery pack, and generates an unalterable distributed ledger for each operation, supporting traceability in battery replacement and leasing scenarios.

7. The anti-theft authentication method for an electric vehicle power battery pack and a BMS controller according to claim 1, characterized in that: The method supports a remote destruction function. When it is confirmed that the battery pack cannot be retrieved, the remote monitoring platform sends a destruction instruction, and the BMS performs an irreversible locking operation, including fusing key circuits or erasing firmware, to prevent the battery pack from being illegally used.

8. The anti-theft authentication method for an electric vehicle power battery pack and a BMS controller according to claim 1, characterized in that: The anti-theft monitoring chip supports an intelligent response mechanism, which uses artificial intelligence algorithms to analyze the movement trajectory and abnormal behavior of the battery pack, automatically adjust the alarm priority, and push high-risk warnings to mobile devices or remote monitoring platforms.

9. The anti-theft authentication method for an electric vehicle power battery pack and a BMS controller according to claim 1, characterized in that: The method supports battery swapping and shared travel scenarios. The temporary key issued by the cloud authentication server allows the battery pack to be switched between authorized vehicles, and the authorization will automatically expire after expiration.

10. The anti-theft authentication method for electric vehicle power battery pack and BMS controller according to claim 1, characterized in that: The anti-theft monitoring chip adopts a wide temperature design with an operating temperature range of -40°C to 85°C and meets the IP67 waterproof and dustproof standards. The communication module supports 4G / 5G networks, and the alarm signal sending period is configurable, with a minimum of 30 seconds.

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