Special operation management and control system for chemical industry park

Abstract

The invention discloses a chemical industry park special operation management and control system, and relates to the technical field of chemical industry park special operation management and control, and the system comprises a management and control server and a plurality of terminal devices corresponding to all operation partitions, and the terminal devices are used for collecting state parameters of the operation partitions and sending data collection signals to the management and control server. The management and control server executes the following processing: receiving a data acquisition signal and accepting a first control mode setting of a job partition and a state parameter group; after a first control mode of a first operation partition and a first group of state parameters is established, if a second group of state parameters of the first operation partition are accepted, the control server calculates a difference value between the second group of state parameters and the first group of state parameters, and when the difference value triggers a security threat in the first control mode, according to a preset control rule, the second group of state parameters of the first operation partition are controlled according to the preset control rule. Executing one of the following operations: changing the first control mode and establishing a second control mode; and forbidding the change of the first control mode and maintaining the original control mode.

Description

Technical Field

[0001] The present invention relates to the technical field of special operation control in chemical parks, and in particular to a special operation control system in a chemical park. Background Art

[0002] Chemical industrial parks have long faced technical bottlenecks in the management and control of special operations. Traditional systems struggle to adapt to dynamic and complex environments due to static threshold monitoring, reliance on manual decision-making, and the risk of extreme risk loss. Existing solutions often use fixed thresholds (such as a combustible gas concentration of 10% LEL) as safety warning lines. These solutions fail to predict parameter coupling risks (such as temperature increases accelerating gas volatilization) and evolving trends (such as a step-like increase in concentration), leading to delayed warnings. In one industrial park, the failure to monitor the dynamic relationship between temperature and concentration resulted in combustible gas reaching its explosive limit undetected.

[0003] Manually switching control modes creates significant delays and risks of misoperation. Operators must manually analyze data and execute commands. In one case, a 10-minute delay in ventilation system startup caused flammable gas concentrations to exceed the lower explosion limit. Furthermore, rigid permission management overly restricts operational permissions in low-risk scenarios, while insufficient permissions delay critical actions in high-risk scenarios. During one red-risk event, non-emergency commands tied up system resources, delaying emergency response.

[0004] The lack of specialized risk management exacerbates safety risks. Existing technologies lack a mandatory lockout mechanism for extremely high concentrations of flammable gases (such as hydrogen concentrations >4% LEL). This led to an explosion at a certain industrial park due to uninterrupted hot work. Regarding risk spread prevention and control, traditional systems are limited to monitoring a single operating area and fail to implement cross-regional joint prevention through GIS positioning and spatial risk modeling. In one incident, a sudden increase in flammable gas concentrations in adjacent areas failed to trigger joint prevention mode, leading to the spread of the fire.

[0005] Traditional solutions rely on fixed rules (such as simple concentration thresholds) and are unable to simulate parameter trends after switching. In one industrial park, failure to account for the risk of ventilation system failure led to concentration fluctuations exceeding 30% after switching modes, nearly causing a secondary accident. These shortcomings expose the shortcomings of traditional systems in terms of dynamics, intelligence, and safety. Technological breakthroughs such as real-time interpolation calculation, multi-parameter coupling analysis, and spatial linkage control are urgently needed to build an intelligent, dynamic, and safety-first chemical park management and control system. Summary of the Invention

[0006] 1) Technical issues solved

[0007] The purpose of the present invention is to make up for the deficiencies of the existing technology and provide a special operation management and control system for a chemical park.

[0008] 2) Technical solution

[0009] To achieve the above object, the present invention provides the following technical solutions:

[0010] A chemical park special operation control system includes a control server and multiple terminal devices corresponding to each operation zone. The multiple terminal devices are used to collect status parameters of the operation zone and send data collection signals to the control server. The control server performs the following processing:

[0011] Receive data acquisition signals and accept first control mode settings for operation partitions and status parameter groups;

[0012] After establishing a first control mode for a first operation partition and a first set of status parameters, if a second set of status parameters for the first operation partition is received, the control server calculates the difference between the second set of status parameters and the first set of status parameters. If this difference triggers a security threat under the first control mode, the control server performs one of the following operations according to the preset control rules:

[0013] If the preset control rules allow and changing the mode can reduce the security risk, then changing the first control mode and establishing a second control mode;

[0014] If the preset control rules prohibit or change the mode will increase the safety risk, then the change of the first control mode is prohibited and the original control mode is maintained.

[0015] Furthermore, the control server further receives an operation instruction based on the first job partition. When the operation instruction involves switching the control mode, the control server further determines:

[0016] If the switching operation complies with the preset control rules and does not trigger a security threat, the first control mode is changed and a second control mode is established;

[0017] If the control rules are not met or there is a security threat, the change of the control mode is prohibited and the original control mode is maintained.

[0018] Furthermore, the control server compares the safety thresholds and differences between the first set of state parameters and the second set of state parameters, and if:

[0019] If the difference triggers a security threat in the first control mode, and the preset management and control rules indicate that establishing a second control mode with a second set of state parameters can reduce the risk, the first control mode is changed and the second control mode is established;

[0020] If the difference does not trigger a safety threat, or establishing a second control mode using the second set of state parameters cannot reduce the risk, the change of the control mode is prohibited and the original control mode is maintained.

[0021] Furthermore, the control server determines the type of the second set of state parameters and the type of the first set of state parameters and the impact of the difference, if:

[0022] If the types are different and the difference triggers a security threat in the first control mode, and the preset management and control rules recognize the necessity of the new mode, the first control mode is changed and the second control mode is established;

[0023] If the types are the same or the difference does not trigger a safety threat, and the second set of status parameters does not bring significant monitoring advantages, the change of the control mode is prohibited and the original control mode is maintained.

[0024] Furthermore, when the first set of status parameters includes a special risk parameter, the control server determines the second set of status parameters and the difference between the two, if:

[0025] The second set of status parameters does not contain a special risk parameter and the difference triggers a high safety risk in the first control mode. According to the preset management and control rules, the first control mode is changed and the second control mode is established;

[0026] If the second set of status parameters includes special risk parameters, or the difference does not trigger a high safety risk, the change of the control mode is prohibited and the original control mode is maintained.

[0027] Furthermore, the terminal device is equipped with a positioning module. When the management and control server receives the second set of status parameters:

[0028] Obtaining the current position measured by the positioning module from the terminal device corresponding to the first operation partition, and obtaining the current position measured by the positioning module from the sensor terminal corresponding to the second set of state parameters;

[0029] Analyze the impact of position relationships and state parameter differences on the control mode. If the position relationships and differences trigger a security threat under the first control mode and meet the requirements for spatial layout in the preset control rules, change the first control mode and establish a second control mode. If not, prohibit the change of the control mode and maintain the original control mode.

[0030] Furthermore, the management and control server locks the control mode related to the special risk parameters, and during the locking period, changes to the control mode are prohibited; after the lock is released, it is determined whether to change the control mode based on the preset management and control rules and the status parameter difference evaluation; wherein, the safety acceptance condition for the special risk parameters is that the gas concentration detection meets the standard and the acceptance is qualified.

[0031] Furthermore, the control server activates corresponding control permissions according to the established job partition control mode, and dynamically adjusts the scope and priority of the control permissions according to the status parameter difference and the security threat level.

[0032] The present invention further provides a management and control server, in which the management and control system is embedded. The management and control server includes a control unit, which performs the following processing:

[0033] According to the state parameter collection of the operation partition, the data collection signal is received from the terminal device;

[0034] Accepting the first control mode setting of the operation partition and the state parameter group by signal reception;

[0035] After establishing the first control mode for the first operation partition and the first set of status parameters, if a second set of status parameters is received, the control unit calculates the difference between the two sets of parameters. When the difference triggers a security threat under the first control mode, according to the preset management and control rules, the first control mode is changed and a second control mode is established, or the change of the control mode is prohibited and the original control mode is maintained.

[0036] Furthermore, the control unit compares the safety thresholds and differences between the first and second sets of state parameters. If the difference triggers a safety threat under the first control mode, and the preset management and control rules indicate that establishing a second control mode using the second set of state parameters can reduce the risk, the first control mode is changed and a second control mode is established; if the difference does not trigger a safety threat, or establishing the second control mode using the second set of state parameters cannot reduce the risk, the change of the control mode is prohibited and the original control mode is maintained.

[0037] Furthermore, the control unit determines the difference between the second group of status parameter types and the first group and the impact of the difference. If the types are different and the difference triggers a security threat under the first control mode, and the preset management rules recognize the necessity of the new mode, the first control mode is changed and the second control mode is established; if the types are the same or the difference does not trigger a security threat, and the second group of status parameters does not bring significant monitoring advantages, the change of the control mode is prohibited and the original control mode is maintained.

[0038] Furthermore, when the first set of status parameters includes a special risk parameter, the control unit judges the second set of status parameters and the difference between the two. If the second set of status parameters does not include a special risk parameter and the difference triggers a high safety risk in the first control mode, the first control mode is changed and a second control mode is established according to the preset management and control rules; if the second set of status parameters includes a special risk parameter, or the difference does not trigger a high safety risk, the change of the control mode is prohibited and the original control mode is maintained.

[0039] Furthermore, when accepting the second set of status parameters, the control unit obtains the positioning data of the operation partition terminal and the sensor terminal, analyzes the impact of the position relationship and the difference in status parameters on the control mode, and if the position relationship and difference trigger a security threat under the first control mode and meet the requirements of the spatial layout in the preset management and control rules, the first control mode is changed and a second control mode is established; if not, the change of the control mode is prohibited and the original control mode is maintained.

[0040] Furthermore, the control unit locks the control mode associated with the extreme risk parameters until safety acceptance is passed. During the lockout period, changes to the control mode are prohibited. After the lockout is released, the control mode is determined based on pre-set control rules and a difference assessment of the state parameters to determine whether changes are permitted.

[0041] The present invention also provides a management and control method, which utilizes the management and control server to implement the management and control system, and the management and control server performs the following processing:

[0042] Collect data acquisition signals from receiving terminal devices according to status parameters of the operation partition;

[0043] Accepting the first control mode setting of the operation partition and the state parameter group by signal reception;

[0044] After the first control mode is established, if a second set of status parameters is received, the management and control server calculates the difference between the two sets of parameters. When the difference triggers a security threat under the first control mode, according to the preset management and control rules, it executes the operation of changing the first control mode and establishing the second control mode, or prohibiting the change of the control mode and maintaining the original control mode.

[0045] Furthermore, when the first set of status parameters includes special risk parameters, the management and control server judges the second set of status parameters and the difference between the two. If the second set of status parameters does not include special risk parameters and the difference triggers high security risk under the first control mode, the first control mode is changed and the second control mode is established according to the preset management and control rules; if the second set of status parameters includes special risk parameters, or the difference does not trigger high security risk, the change of the control mode is prohibited and the original control mode is maintained.

[0046] Furthermore, when the control server accepts the second set of status parameters, it obtains the positioning data of the operation partition terminal and the sensor terminal, analyzes the influence of the position relationship and the difference in status parameters on the control mode, and if the position relationship and difference trigger a security threat under the first control mode and meet the requirements of the spatial layout in the preset control rules, then the first control mode is changed and a second control mode is established; if not, the change of the control mode is prohibited and the original control mode is maintained.

[0047] Furthermore, the management and control server locks the control mode related to the special risk parameters until the safety acceptance is qualified. During the locking period, changes to the control mode are prohibited. After the lock is released, it is determined whether changes to the control mode are allowed based on the preset management and control rules and the status parameter difference evaluation.

[0048] The beneficial effects of this application are as follows:

[0049] This application enables dynamic risk response, transitioning from static thresholds to real-time trend prediction. Specifically, through real-time data difference analysis and dynamic rule matching, it achieves an upgrade from "static threshold monitoring" to "dynamic risk response." Traditional monitoring models rely on fixed thresholds (e.g., combustible gas concentration 10%LEL), triggering alarms once a parameter exceeds the limit but failing to predict the development of risk trends. This system, however, calculates parameter differences (e.g., concentration change rate, temperature rise gradient) and combines them with multi-parameter coupling analysis to identify abnormal fluctuation patterns (e.g., a 400% concentration increase in 10 minutes), thereby proactively predicting potential threats. For example, it uses dual indicators—absolute difference (Δconcentration = 25% - 5%LEL = 20%LEL) and relative difference (Δrate = 10°C / minute)—to combine historical data to construct a risk prediction curve. By simulating parameter trends after switching control modes (e.g., concentration drops to 8%LEL within 30 minutes after ventilation system activation), it assesses the probability of risk reduction and avoids ineffective switching. The introduction of combined thresholds (e.g., "temperature > 80°C + combustible gas > 15% LEL" triggers an orange alert), overcoming the limitations of single-parameter monitoring. The system, through real-time monitoring, detects a rise in combustible gas concentration from 5% LEL to 25% LEL, accompanied by a 10°C increase in temperature, immediately triggering a dual-threat response: "high temperature + gas accumulation." System simulations have shown that activating the enhanced ventilation system can reduce concentrations to a safe range, leading to a dynamic switch to "enhanced ventilation mode" and the shutdown of non-explosion-proof equipment to prevent accidents.

[0050] 2. This application implements a precise decision-making mechanism, with rule-driven, two-way verification ensuring effectiveness. Through a pre-set control rule library and real-time data simulation, both the decision to switch and the effectiveness of the switch are verified, preventing blind adjustments from inducing secondary risks. Traditional mode switching relies on manual experience, which can lead to misjudgments. This system, however, utilizes a rule engine and simulation model to ensure that each switch is scientifically determined. Pre-set rules encompass both national standards and customized enterprise strategies, using a weighted scoring mechanism (e.g., 60% for risk reduction and 40% for operational compliance) to determine the optimal path. A built-in machine learning model predicts parameter trends within 30 minutes of the switch. For example, a ventilation system failure could cause concentration fluctuations exceeding 30%. By masking anomalous data (e.g., a pressure sensor masked, resulting in a falsely low displayed value), the system rejects switch requests that appear safe but actually increase risk. The system previously received a manual operator-triggered command to switch to maintenance mode. After verification of permissions (operator authorization) and risk simulation (the risk of missed inspections of key parameters after the switch was less than 5%), the system permitted the switch and activated the "mandatory clock-in every 30 minutes" rule.

[0051] 3. This application implements a lockout mechanism for extreme risk parameters. For extreme risk parameters (e.g., combustible gas concentrations > 4% LEL), the system implements a hard-coded lockout mechanism to ensure that manual intervention in high-risk scenarios requires rigorous verification, preventing catastrophic consequences from misoperation. This implementation utilizes a two-factor authentication unlocking and risk isolation strategy. Specifically, two-factor authentication unlocking requires both "gas concentration compliance (<1% LEL)" and "manual on-site acceptance signature" to unlock the lockout. The risk isolation strategy: During the lockout period, control linkage between high-risk and low-risk areas is severed (e.g., prohibiting the ventilation system in Area A from being affected by parameters in Area B) to prevent the spread of risk. Extreme risk triggering conditions are programmed into the server firmware and cannot be modified through the rule base, ensuring absolute safety priority. For example, upon detecting a concentration of 4.5% LEL, the system immediately locks the control mode, prohibiting any automatic switching. Although the ventilation system can theoretically reduce the concentration, due to the risk of electric sparks, the system maintains "Extreme Risk Lockout Mode" and activates the emergency response plan. Once manual acceptance confirms that the concentration has dropped to 0.5% LEL and the temperature has stabilized, the system unlocks and switches to "Degraded Monitoring Mode."

[0052] 4. This application realizes spatial risk linkage control, that is, cross-regional collaborative defense. Through GIS positioning and spatial risk modeling, the system realizes "single point anomaly, global response" to effectively curb the spread of risks. The traditional monitoring mode is limited to a single operating area, while this system can trigger cross-regional joint defense measures through position relationship analysis. Based on parameters such as wind speed and obstacle distribution, the risk spread path is predicted (such as flammable gas spreads to adjacent areas within 5 minutes under level 3 wind). Define linkage rules (such as "trigger joint defense when the concentration difference is >5%LEL and the distance is <50 meters") to automatically coordinate multi-region response measures. Millisecond-level data interaction among multiple terminals is achieved through the 5G network to ensure that joint defense instructions are issued immediately.

[0053] 5. This system implements dynamic permission management, enabling real-time adaptation of risk levels and control efforts. The system dynamically adjusts user permissions based on risk levels, restricting low-priority operations in high-risk scenarios to ensure the timeliness and authority of security management. Permissions are bound to roles (operator, security officer, administrator), supporting fine-grained configuration (e.g., security officers can switch modes, while operators can only view data). Permission status is updated every minute, and low-priority permissions are frozen in high-risk situations (e.g., equipment maintenance requests must be queued). All instructions record the operator, timestamp, and rehearsal results. When manual instructions conflict with automatic control, safety rules take precedence. BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS

[0054] Figure 1 It is a schematic diagram of the framework principle of the present invention.

[0055] Figure 2 Flow chart of the method of the present invention. DETAILED DESCRIPTION

[0056] The following will clearly and completely describe the technical solutions in the embodiments of the present invention in conjunction with the accompanying drawings. Obviously, the described embodiments are only part of the embodiments of the present invention, not all of the embodiments. Based on the embodiments of the present invention, all other embodiments obtained by ordinary technicians in this field without making creative efforts are within the scope of protection of the present invention.

[0057] Example 1

[0058] like Figure 1-2As shown, the present invention provides a technical solution: a special operation control system for a chemical park, comprising a control server and multiple terminal devices corresponding to each operation partition, the multiple terminal devices being used to collect status parameters of the operation partition and send data acquisition signals to the control server, and the control server performing the following processing: receiving the data acquisition signal and accepting the first control mode setting of the operation partition and the status parameter group; after establishing the first control mode of the first operation partition and the first group of status parameters, if the second group of status parameters of the first operation partition is accepted, the control server calculates the difference between the second group of status parameters and the first group of status parameters, and when the difference triggers a security threat under the first control mode, according to the preset control rules, performs one of the following operations: if the preset control rules allow and changing the mode can reduce the security risk, then change the first control mode and establish the second control mode; if the preset control rules prohibit or changing the mode will increase the security risk, then prohibit the change of the first control mode and maintain the original control mode.

[0059] In the above, a processor is provided in the control server, and the processor is connected to the executor. In the above, the multiple terminal devices are used to collect the status parameters of the job partitions and send data acquisition signals to the control server. The processor processes the data acquisition signals and performs corresponding execution operations through the executor. The present application is based on multi-parameter coupling analysis to determine the impact of differences on security threats.

[0060] In the above embodiment, the terminal devices are distributed in each operation partition, responsible for collecting state parameters (such as temperature, pressure, gas concentration, etc.) and sending data acquisition signals to the server. After receiving the signal, the server establishes a corresponding control mode for the first operation partition and the first set of state parameters. This mode defines the initial security management rules and risk thresholds. When the second set of state parameters of the same operation partition is received, the server calculates the difference between the two sets of parameters. If the difference triggers a security threat under the first control mode (such as exceeding the risk threshold), one of the following operations is performed according to the preset management rules: Switching is allowed: If the rules allow and changing the mode can reduce the risk (such as adjusting the ventilation frequency to reduce the gas concentration), the second control mode is established; Switching is prohibited: If the rules prohibit or switching will increase the risk (such as blind adjustment causing the parameter fluctuation to increase), the original mode is maintained.

[0061] In the aforementioned embodiment, the control system employs a two-tier architecture of "terminal perception and server decision-making." Terminal devices (e.g., sensors and cameras) distributed across each work zone continuously collect state parameters such as temperature, pressure, and gas concentration, transmitting them in real time to the control server via data acquisition signals. The server first initializes the first control mode, establishing a mapping between the first work zone and the first set of state parameters, forming a baseline control model with safety thresholds, risk levels, and response rules (for example, setting the combustible gas concentration threshold in a hot work zone to 10% LEL corresponds to "normal monitoring mode").

[0062] Dynamic control triggering and decision-making involves the following: When a second set of state parameters is input for the same work zone, the server performs a quantitative difference analysis: it calculates the absolute difference (e.g., a 20% difference in concentration from 5% LEL to 25% LEL) and the relative difference (e.g., a 400% increase in concentration within 10 minutes) between the two sets of parameters and compares them with the risk threshold of the first control mode. If the difference triggers a safety threat (e.g., exceeding 20% ​​of the lower explosive limit), a pre-set rule decision chain is entered: If a switch scenario is permitted, the control mode is updated if the rule base includes a policy for "initiating enhanced ventilation when concentration exceeds 15% LEL" and simulations verify that switching to enhanced ventilation mode reduces concentration to a safe range. If a switch scenario is prohibited, the control mode is updated if the rule prohibits ventilation adjustments in high-temperature environments (possibly sparking), or if the parameter fluctuation exceeds 30% after switching, the original mode is maintained and an audible and visual alarm is triggered. For example, for hot work operations in a chemical park, the initial control mode is set to "conventional monitoring" based on an ambient temperature of 25°C, an oxygen concentration of 20%, and a combustible gas concentration of 5% LEL. When the second set of parameters indicated a temperature of 35°C and a combustible gas concentration of 25% LEL, the difference triggered the dual threat of "high temperature + gas accumulation." System verification rules determined that the ventilation system could reduce the concentration to below 10% LEL within 10 minutes. The system then switched to "enhanced ventilation mode," simultaneously shutting down non-explosion-proof electrical equipment within 50 meters of the work area. If a ventilation system failure caused the risk assessment to increase after the switch, the original mode would be maintained and the emergency evacuation plan would be activated.

[0063] Therefore, this application can realize data-driven decision-making formed by upgrading from "condition monitoring" to "trend prediction" through difference calculation, such as early identification of abnormal fluctuations in concentration increase rate exceeding 5% / minute; the core preset rules of the rules integrate national safety standards (such as GB30871-2022) and enterprise customized strategies to form an automated closed loop of "risk identification-rule matching-action execution"; and realize two-way verification of mode switching that not only judges "whether switching is needed", but also verifies "whether the switching is effective" through simulation calculation, thereby avoiding system disturbances caused by invalid operations.

[0064] Through real-time data differential analysis, the system automatically responds to changes in the operating environment, avoiding the lag inherent in static control. Relying on pre-set control rules (such as industry standards and historical accident experience), it ensures that mode switching complies with safety logic and reduces human error. Through a binary "switch / maintain" decision-making process, it enables flexible adjustments to low-risk changes while strictly restricting high-risk ones, balancing efficiency and safety.

[0065] In some embodiments, the control server also receives operation instructions based on the first job partition. When the operation instructions involve switching of control modes, the control server further judges: if the switching operation complies with the preset control rules and will not trigger a security threat after analysis, the first control mode is changed and a second control mode is established; if it does not comply with the control rules or there is a security threat, the change of the control mode is prohibited and the original control mode is maintained.

[0066] In the above-described embodiment, when the server receives an operation instruction for the first operating partition (e.g., a manually initiated mode switch request), it must verify the compliance of the control mode switch involved in the instruction. This is determined using two criteria: first, rule compliance, which analyzes whether the switch operation complies with pre-set control rules (e.g., whether the operator has the required operating permissions or whether the switch is within a permitted time period); and second, security threat assessment, which determines whether the switch triggers a security threat (e.g., switching to low-monitoring mode may result in missed detection). If the rules are met and there is no threat, the switch is executed. If the rules are violated or a threat exists (e.g., an unauthorized person attempts to switch to a dangerous mode), the switch is prohibited and the original mode is maintained.

[0067] In the above embodiment, the operator can send a mode switch command through the system interface or a handheld terminal. After receiving the command, the server performs a double check: it calls the role permission table to verify whether the operator has the switch permission; and it simulates the parameter change trajectory after the switch based on historical data to assess whether it will cause the safety threshold to be exceeded.

[0068] As a result, this application achieves the refinement of decision-making logic. For example, an operator sends a "switch to maintenance mode" command. System verification finds that: ① the operator has the operating authority; ② the monitoring frequency is reduced after the switch, but manual inspections are increased (after simulation, the risk of missing key parameters is <5%). At this time, the switch is executed, and the exclusive rules for "maintenance mode" are activated simultaneously (such as mandatory clocking in every 30 minutes to confirm the safety status); if the "switch to automatic operation mode" command is sent by mistake, the system will recognize that the authority is insufficient and directly reject it; if a senior engineer sends a command but the switch causes the risk of the reactor temperature to get out of control to increase by 20%, the operation is prohibited and a risk warning report is pushed to the management.

[0069] Therefore, this application realizes dynamic binding of permissions, and the permission configuration is strongly associated with the control mode. For example, the "emergency control mode" is only open to security personnel when the threat level reaches red, avoiding the risk of accidental touch under normal circumstances; operation traceability: all instructions record the operator, timestamp, and parameter preview results; when manual instructions conflict with automatic control, the system automatically gives safety rules the highest priority and rejects illegal operations.

[0070] In some embodiments, the control server compares the security thresholds and differences between the first set of state parameters and the second set of state parameters. If: the difference triggers a security threat under the first control mode, and the preset control rules indicate that establishing a second control mode using the second set of state parameters can reduce the risk, then the first control mode is changed and a second control mode is established; if the difference does not trigger a security threat, or establishing a second control mode using the second set of state parameters cannot reduce the risk, then the change of the control mode is prohibited and the original control mode is maintained.

[0071] In the above-described embodiment, the control server compares the safety thresholds (e.g., upper and lower limits, and rate of change thresholds) and the difference between the first and second sets of state parameters to determine whether a threat has been triggered. If the difference triggers a threat, but establishing a new mode using the second set of parameters can reduce the risk (e.g., by adjusting the parameter range to keep the system out of the danger zone), a switch is executed. If the difference does not trigger a threat (e.g., parameter fluctuations are within a safe range), or if the switch fails to reduce the risk (e.g., the second set of parameters is inherently more dangerous), the original mode is maintained. The parameters are set as follows: Absolute threshold: physical safety boundary of the parameter; Relative threshold: parameter change rate limit (e.g., temperature rise rate ≤ 5°C / minute); Combined threshold: multi-parameter coupled risk value (e.g., "temperature > 80°C and combustible gas concentration > 15% LEL" defines an orange alert).

[0072] When the difference between the second set of parameters and the first set exceeds any threshold, the system initiates a risk reduction assessment: the Bayesian network algorithm is used to predict the parameter trend within 30 minutes after the mode is switched to determine whether the risk value has decreased (for example, from "orange" to "yellow").

[0073] This application breaks through the limitations of single parameter monitoring through multi-parameter coupling analysis, for example, it can simultaneously identify the potential safety risks of "temperature anomaly + increased concentration"; build a real-time risk surface based on historical data, intuitively display the mapping relationship between parameter difference and risk level, assist in rule optimization, and block counter-intuitive operations: reject the switch of "parameters that seem to be optimized but actually hide risks" (such as lowering the display value by shielding the pressure sensor signal), and ensure that the control measures are real and effective.

[0074] In some embodiments, the control server determines the impact of the type of the second set of status parameters and the type and difference of the first set of status parameters. If: the types are different and the difference triggers a security threat under the first control mode, and the preset control rules recognize the necessity of the new mode, then the first control mode is changed and a second control mode is established; if the types are the same or the difference does not trigger a security threat, and the second set of status parameters does not bring significant monitoring advantages, then the change of the control mode is prohibited and the original control mode is maintained.

[0075] In some embodiments, when the first set of status parameters includes a special risk parameter, the control server judges the second set of status parameters and the difference between the two. If: the second set of status parameters does not include a special risk parameter and the difference triggers a high safety risk in the first control mode, the first control mode is changed and a second control mode is established according to the preset control rules; the second set of status parameters includes a special risk parameter, or the difference does not trigger a high safety risk, then the change of the control mode is prohibited and the original control mode is maintained. For example, the first set of parameters includes a special risk parameter (such as concentration > 4%LEL, extremely high explosion risk), and the second set of parameters shows that the gas concentration drops to 2%LEL (non-special risk), but the temperature difference triggers a high risk (increase of 15°C / minute).

[0076] In this case, the control server prioritizes determining whether the critical risk parameters have been eliminated. If the second group contains no critical risk parameters (gas concentrations meet standards) and the temperature difference triggers a high risk (possibly causing the volatilization of other flammable substances), the system switches to "high temperature warning mode" and activates the cooling spray system. If the second group still contains critical risk parameters (e.g., gas concentrations have not dropped) or the temperature difference has not reached the high-risk threshold (<5°C / minute), the switch is prohibited, maintaining "critical risk lock mode" and requiring manual intervention. The key rule is that critical risk parameters (such as the critical concentration of flammable gases and high-risk chemical reactants) must be cleared first; otherwise, mode adjustments are prohibited, ensuring that high-risk scenarios are absolutely controllable.

[0077] In some embodiments, the terminal device is equipped with a positioning module. When the management and control server receives the second set of status parameters: the management server obtains the current position measured by the positioning module from the terminal device corresponding to the first operation partition, and obtains the current position measured by the positioning module from the sensor terminal corresponding to the second set of status parameters.

[0078] Analyze the impact of position relationships and state parameter differences on the control mode. If the position relationships and differences trigger a security threat under the first control mode and meet the requirements for spatial layout in the preset control rules, change the first control mode and establish a second control mode. If not, prohibit the change of the control mode and maintain the original control mode.

[0079] For example, the terminal equipment in the hot work area is located in Area A, and the second set of parameters comes from the sensor in the adjacent Area B (30 meters away from Area A), which detects that the concentration of combustible gas in Area B has suddenly risen to 18%LEL. The management and control server analyzes the location relationship (Areas A and B are adjacent) and the parameter difference (the concentration exceeds the threshold by 8%), and determines that the risk may spread to Area A, triggering the "cross-region risk linkage" rule: If the preset rule requires that "when the concentration in the adjacent area exceeds 15%LEL, the main operation area needs to increase the monitoring level", it will switch to the "regional joint defense mode", and start the ventilation systems of Areas A and B at the same time, prohibiting hot work in Area A; if the location relationship is irrelevant (such as the parameters come from an unrelated area 200 meters away) or the rules do not require linkage, the original mode will be maintained, and only an alarm will be issued to Area B. Through GIS positioning and spatial risk modeling, "single-point anomaly, global response" is achieved to avoid the spread of risks leading to chain accidents.

[0080] In some embodiments, the management and control server locks the control mode related to the special risk parameters, and during the locking period, changes to the control mode are prohibited; after the lock is released, it is determined whether to change the control mode based on the preset management and control rules and the status parameter difference evaluation; wherein, the safety acceptance condition for the special risk parameters is that the gas concentration detection meets the standard and the acceptance is qualified.

[0081] For example, if a hot work operation triggers a special risk due to a hydrogen leak, the management and control server will lock the current control mode (prohibiting any automatic switching) and start the safety acceptance process. During the lock period, the system prohibits operators from changing modes until the gas concentration test meets the standard (hydrogen concentration <1%LEL) and the manual acceptance is qualified. After unlocking, the server re-evaluates the difference in status parameters (such as the concentration is stable at 0.5%LEL and there are no abnormalities in temperature). If it meets the preset rules (such as no special risk parameters for 30 consecutive minutes), it is allowed to switch to "normal monitoring mode"; if there is still residual risk (such as temperature fluctuation >8℃ / minute), the "degraded monitoring mode" will be maintained and the inspection frequency will be increased. The locking mechanism prevents misoperation in high-risk scenarios, and the acceptance process ensures that the mode change is allowed only after the risk is completely eliminated.

[0082] In some embodiments, the control server activates corresponding control permissions based on the established work zone control mode and dynamically adjusts the scope and priority of control permissions based on the difference in state parameters and the security threat level. For example, when a hot work operation switches from "routine monitoring" to "enhanced ventilation mode," the control server simultaneously activates the following permission adjustments: ventilation system control permissions are granted to on-site operators, while start / stop permissions for non-explosion-proof equipment are disabled. Priority: When the risk level rises from yellow to orange, the priority of inspection clock-in permissions is increased (mandatory clock-in every 15 minutes), and non-emergency instructions (such as equipment maintenance requests) are temporarily frozen. Dynamic permission binding rules adjust in real time based on risk level. For example, low risk (blue) allows basic data viewing and routine inspection records; high risk (red) allows only safety officers to execute mode switches, and all operations require double-checking. Granular permission control ensures that "risk level matches control intensity" and prevents security vulnerabilities caused by permission abuse.

[0083] Example 2

[0084] In some embodiments, a management and control server is provided, wherein the management and control server has a control unit, and the control unit performs the following processing: based on the status parameter collection of the job partition, a data collection signal is received from the terminal device; a first control mode setting of the job partition and the status parameter group is accepted through signal reception; after the first control mode of the first job partition and the first group of status parameters is established, if a second group of status parameters is accepted, the control unit calculates the difference between the two groups of parameters; when the difference triggers a security threat under the first control mode, according to the preset management and control rules, the first control mode is changed and a second control mode is established, or the change of the control mode is prohibited and the original control mode is maintained.

[0085] In the above-described embodiment, in the hot work scenario, the control server first receives a first set of status parameters (ambient temperature 25°C, oxygen concentration 20%, combustible gas concentration 5% LEL) via a terminal device (gas sensor, temperature sensor). The server establishes "normal monitoring mode" as the first control mode based on a preset safety threshold (combustible gas concentration threshold 10% LEL). When a material leak occurs, the terminal device collects a second set of parameters (temperature 35°C, combustible gas concentration 25% LEL) and transmits a data signal to the server. The server's control unit performs the following steps: 1) Difference calculation: Combustible gas concentration difference = 25% LEL - 5% LEL = 20% LEL (exceeding the threshold of 10% LEL); temperature difference = 35°C - 25°C = 10°C (exceeding the preset temperature change rate threshold).

[0086] The control server determines that the difference between the two sets of parameters triggers the dual security threat of "high temperature + gas accumulation". Then perform the following operations. Rule matching and decision-making: The server calls the preset control rule library to analyze whether the control mode switch is allowed: If the rules allow switching and the risk can be reduced after switching (for example, starting the enhanced ventilation system can reduce the concentration of combustible gas to below 10%LEL within 10 minutes), then the mode switch is executed to establish the "enhanced ventilation mode" (the second control mode); if the rules prohibit switching (for example, a ventilation system failure may cause electric sparks), or the risk increases after switching (for example, the simulation shows that the concentration fluctuates by more than 30%), then the original mode is maintained and the sound and light alarm is triggered.

[0087] In the above-mentioned embodiment, the server uses a real-time difference calculation model to perform dynamic difference quantification analysis, distinguishing between absolute differences (e.g., concentration change) and relative differences (e.g., rate of change). It also integrates multi-parameter coupling risks (e.g., the synergistic effect of temperature and concentration) to comprehensively assess the threat level. A pre-set rule base integrates national safety standards and customized enterprise policies, using a weighted scoring mechanism to determine the optimal decision path. For example, a rule might assign a higher weight to "risk reduction" to ensure effective decision-making.

[0088] In some embodiments, the control unit compares the safety thresholds and differences between the first and second sets of state parameters. If the difference triggers a safety threat under the first control mode, and the preset management rules indicate that establishing a second control mode using the second set of state parameters can reduce the risk, the first control mode is changed and a second control mode is established. If the difference does not trigger a safety threat, or establishing the second control mode using the second set of state parameters cannot reduce the risk, the change of the control mode is prohibited and the original control mode is maintained.

[0089] In the above embodiment, the control unit of the management and control server performs the following comparative analysis: First, it compares safety thresholds: the combustible gas concentration threshold of 10%LEL is breached (actual value: 25%LEL); and the temperature change rate threshold (e.g., 5°C / minute) is exceeded (actual value: 10°C / minute). Next, the management and control server determines whether the difference triggers a security threat and conducts a risk mitigation feasibility assessment. This includes using a Bayesian network algorithm to predict parameter trends after switching to "enhanced ventilation mode." After the ventilation system is activated, the combustible gas concentration is expected to drop to 8%LEL within 10 minutes; and the temperature is expected to drop to 30°C within 15 minutes due to ventilation and heat dissipation. If the simulation results indicate a reduction in the risk level from "red" to "yellow," the mode switch is determined to reduce the risk and is executed. If the simulation indicates a ventilation system failure (e.g., a short circuit risk) after the switch, the original mode is maintained and an alarm is triggered.

[0090] In some embodiments, the control unit determines the difference between the second group of status parameter types and the first group and the impact of the difference. If the types are different and the difference triggers a security threat under the first control mode, and the preset management rules recognize the necessity of the new mode, the first control mode is changed and the second control mode is established; if the types are the same or the difference does not trigger a security threat, and the second group of status parameters does not bring significant monitoring advantages, the change of the control mode is prohibited and the original control mode is maintained.

[0091] In the above embodiment, if the type of the second group of parameters changes (such as the addition of toxic gas detection), the processing logic of the control server is as follows: Type difference judgment: the first group of parameters is temperature, oxygen concentration, and combustible gas concentration; the second group of parameters adds hydrogen sulfide concentration (different type). The control server identifies the difference in parameter types and evaluates its impact on safety. This includes difference impact analysis: if the hydrogen sulfide concentration exceeds the standard (such as 10ppm) and triggers a safety threat, and the preset rules recognize the necessity of additional monitoring (such as regulations requiring that hot work operations must monitor toxic gases), then switch to "comprehensive emergency mode"; if the type difference only involves redundant parameters (such as repeatedly deployed temperature sensors) and the difference does not trigger a threat, then maintain the original mode.

[0092] The above implementation could be supplemented with a parameter type whitelist mechanism: the server maintains a list of allowed parameter types and only accepts switch requests for parameters within the list. Furthermore, a mode compatibility check could be added: before switching to a new mode, the server verifies the compatibility of the old and new parameter types (e.g., whether a ventilation system can handle both flammable and toxic gases).

[0093] In some embodiments, when the first set of status parameters includes a special risk parameter, the control unit judges the second set of status parameters and the difference between the two. If the second set of status parameters does not include a special risk parameter and the difference triggers a high safety risk in the first control mode, the first control mode is changed and a second control mode is established according to the preset management rules; if the second set of status parameters includes a special risk parameter, or the difference does not trigger a high safety risk, the change of the control mode is prohibited and the original control mode is maintained.

[0094] In the above example, suppose a hydrogen leak in a hot work area triggers a critical risk (combustible gas concentration > 4% LEL): Lock trigger: The management server immediately locks the current control mode ("critical risk lock mode"), prohibiting any automatic switching. The safety acceptance process is initiated, requiring manual inspection to confirm that the hydrogen concentration has dropped below 1% LEL. Unlock and mode reassessment: After passing the acceptance, the server releases the lock and recalculates the parameter difference. If the remaining risk (e.g., temperature fluctuation > 8°C / minute) still requires downgraded monitoring, the "degraded monitoring mode" is maintained. If the risk is eliminated, the system switches back to "normal monitoring mode."

[0095] The aforementioned technology was implemented using a two-factor authentication mechanism and a risk isolation strategy. Specifically, the two-factor authentication mechanism requires both concentration compliance (gas sensor data) and manual inspection (on-site signature confirmation) to unlock the system. The risk isolation strategy also requires that during the lockdown period, the server disconnects the control linkage between high-risk and low-risk areas to prevent the spread of risk.

[0096] In some embodiments, when accepting the second set of status parameters, the control unit obtains the positioning data of the operation partition terminal and the sensor terminal, analyzes the impact of the position relationship and the difference in status parameters on the control mode, and if the position relationship and difference trigger a security threat under the first control mode and meet the requirements of the spatial layout in the preset management and control rules, the first control mode is changed and a second control mode is established; if not met, the change of the control mode is prohibited and the original control mode is maintained.

[0097] In the above example, if the combustible gas concentration in adjacent work area B suddenly rises (to 25% LEL) and is adjacent to hot work area A (30 meters away), the control server, upon receiving this data change, performs the following operations, including positional relationship analysis and linkage control. Positional relationship analysis refers to the control server using the GIS system to determine the spatial correlation between areas A and B (such as a shared ventilation system). If the preset rule requires "triggering joint defense when the concentration in the adjacent area exceeds 15% LEL," the system switches to "regional joint defense mode." Linkage control: the ventilation systems in areas A and B are activated simultaneously; hot work in area A is prohibited until the concentration in area B drops to a safe level.

[0098] In the above example, the following technologies are used: Risk Diffusion Model: A server-based risk diffusion algorithm predicts the risk spread path based on factors such as wind speed and obstacle distribution. Spatial Authority Matrix: Defines linkage rules between different zones (e.g., "trigger joint defense when concentration difference > 5% LEL and distance < 50 meters").

[0099] In some embodiments, the control unit locks the control mode associated with the extreme risk parameter until safety acceptance is passed. During the lockout period, changes to the control mode are prohibited. After the lockout is released, the control mode is determined to be allowed based on pre-set control rules and a difference assessment of the state parameters.

[0100] In the above embodiment, for example, in the event of a hydrogen leak, if the acceptance fails (e.g., the concentration is still 2% LEL), the control server performs the following execution operations based on the above data and continues monitoring: the server maintains "degraded monitoring mode" and increases the inspection frequency (e.g., manual inspection every 15 minutes); priority adjustment: locks the security officer's authority and only allows him to perform mode switching operations.

[0101] In the above example, we used tiered acceptance criteria and dynamic permission binding. Specifically, tiered acceptance criteria set differentiated acceptance criteria based on risk level (e.g., requiring double verification for exceptional risk). Dynamic permission binding: In high-risk scenarios, permissions are strongly associated with risk level (e.g., red risk is restricted to the security director).

[0102] Example 3

[0103] The present invention also provides a management and control method, which uses the management and control server to implement the management and control system, including: the management and control server performs the following processing: collecting data acquisition signals from terminal devices based on the status parameters of the job partition; accepting the first control mode setting of the job partition and the status parameter group through signal reception; after establishing the first control mode, if the second group of status parameters is accepted, the management and control server calculates the difference between the two groups of parameters. When the difference triggers a security threat under the first control mode, according to the preset management and control rules, the first control mode is changed and the second control mode is established, or the change of the control mode is prohibited and the original control mode is maintained.

[0104] In the above-mentioned embodiment, in a hot work scenario, the control method executes as follows: Data acquisition and signal reception: Terminal devices (sensors, cameras) collect data such as temperature and combustible gas concentration in real time; this data is transmitted to the control server via a wireless network (such as 4G / 5G). First control mode setting: The server sets "normal monitoring mode" based on initial parameters (temperature 25°C, combustible gas 5% LEL) and defines a safety threshold (concentration 10% LEL). Second set of parameter processing: When a leak occurs, the server receives a second set of parameters (temperature 35°C, concentration 25% LEL), calculates the difference, and triggers a security threat, entering the rule matching phase.

[0105] In the above embodiment, the decision-making and execution include: if the rules allow and the switch can reduce the risk, then switch to "enhanced ventilation mode"; if the switch is not feasible, then maintain the original mode and issue an alarm. The control server in this application performs time synchronization and fusion analysis on multi-source heterogeneous data (temperature, gas, video).

[0106] In some embodiments, when the first set of status parameters includes a special risk parameter, the control server determines the second set of status parameters and the difference between the two. If the second set of status parameters does not include a special risk parameter and the difference triggers a high security risk under the first control mode, the first control mode is changed and a second control mode is established according to the preset control rules; if the second set of status parameters includes a special risk parameter, or the difference does not trigger a high security risk, the change of the control mode is prohibited and the original control mode is maintained.

[0107] In the above embodiment, if the second set of parameters contains an extreme risk (such as a hydrogen concentration of 4.5% LEL), a lock is triggered: the server immediately locks the control mode and prohibits any automatic switching; a manual acceptance process is initiated, requiring on-site testing to confirm that the concentration has dropped below 1% LEL.

[0108] Post-unlock evaluation: After acceptance, the server recalculates parameter differences (such as temperature fluctuations); if the remaining risk still requires downgraded monitoring, the "downgrade mode" is maintained.

[0109] The above implementation uses hard-coded security rules and emergency response plans. Hard-coded security rules: The trigger conditions for extreme risks are written into the underlying server logic and cannot be modified through the rule base. Emergency response plans: Automatically activate emergency plans (such as evacuation announcements and fire system standby) during lockdown.

[0110] In some embodiments, when the control server accepts the second set of status parameters, it obtains the positioning data of the operation partition terminal and the sensor terminal, analyzes the impact of the position relationship and the difference in status parameters on the control mode, and if the position relationship and difference trigger a security threat under the first control mode and meet the requirements of the spatial layout in the preset control rules, the first control mode is changed and a second control mode is established; if not, the change of the control mode is prohibited and the original control mode is maintained.

[0111] In the above example, if the combustible gas concentration in adjacent work area B suddenly rises (to 25% LEL) and is adjacent to hot work area A (30 meters away), the control server, upon receiving this data change, performs the following operations, including positional relationship analysis and linkage control. Positional relationship analysis refers to the control server using the GIS system to determine the spatial correlation between areas A and B (such as a shared ventilation system). If the preset rule requires "triggering joint defense when the concentration in the adjacent area exceeds 15% LEL," the system switches to "regional joint defense mode." Linkage control: the ventilation systems in areas A and B are activated simultaneously; hot work in area A is prohibited until the concentration in area B drops to a safe level.

[0112] In the above example, the following technologies are used: Risk Diffusion Model: A server-based risk diffusion algorithm predicts the risk spread path based on factors such as wind speed and obstacle distribution. Spatial Authority Matrix: Defines linkage rules between different zones (e.g., "trigger joint defense when concentration difference > 5% LEL and distance < 50 meters").

[0113] In some embodiments, the control unit locks the control mode associated with the extreme risk parameter until safety acceptance is passed. During the lockout period, changes to the control mode are prohibited. After the lockout is released, the control mode is determined to be allowed based on pre-set control rules and a difference assessment of the state parameters.

[0114] In the above embodiment, the management and control server locks the control mode related to the special risk parameters until the safety acceptance is qualified. During the locking period, changes to the control mode are prohibited. After the lock is released, it is determined whether changes to the control mode are allowed based on the preset management and control rules and the status parameter difference evaluation.

[0115] In the above embodiment, for example, in the event of a hydrogen leak, if the acceptance fails (e.g., the concentration is still 2% LEL), the control server performs the following execution operations based on the above data and continues monitoring: the server maintains "degraded monitoring mode" and increases the inspection frequency (e.g., manual inspection every 15 minutes); priority adjustment: locks the security officer's authority and only allows him to perform mode switching operations.

[0116] In the above example, we used tiered acceptance criteria and dynamic permission binding. Specifically, tiered acceptance criteria set differentiated acceptance criteria based on risk level (e.g., requiring double verification for exceptional risk). Dynamic permission binding: In high-risk scenarios, permissions are strongly associated with risk level (e.g., red risk is restricted to the security director).

Claims

1. A special operation control system for a chemical park, characterized in that: It includes a control server and multiple terminal devices corresponding to each operation partition. The multiple terminal devices are used to collect status parameters of the operation partition and send data collection signals to the control server. The control server performs the following processing: Receive data acquisition signals and accept first control mode settings for operation partitions and status parameter groups; After establishing a first control mode for a first operation partition and a first set of status parameters, if a second set of status parameters for the first operation partition is received, the control server calculates the difference between the second set of status parameters and the first set of status parameters. If this difference triggers a security threat under the first control mode, the control server performs one of the following operations according to the preset control rules: If the preset control rules allow and changing the mode can reduce the security risk, then changing the first control mode and establishing a second control mode; If the preset control rules prohibit or change the mode will increase the safety risk, then the change of the first control mode is prohibited and the original control mode is maintained.

2. The control system according to claim 1, characterized in that: The control server also receives an operation instruction based on the first job partition. When the operation instruction involves switching the control mode, the control server further determines: If the switching operation complies with the preset control rules and does not trigger a security threat, the first control mode is changed and a second control mode is established; If the control rules are not met or there is a security threat, the change of the control mode is prohibited and the original control mode is maintained.

3. The control system according to claim 1, characterized in that: The control server compares the safety thresholds and differences between the first set of status parameters and the second set of status parameters, and if: If the difference triggers a security threat in the first control mode, and the preset management and control rules indicate that establishing a second control mode with a second set of state parameters can reduce the risk, the first control mode is changed and the second control mode is established; If the difference does not trigger a safety threat, or establishing a second control mode using the second set of state parameters cannot reduce the risk, the change of the control mode is prohibited and the original control mode is maintained.

4. The control system according to claim 1, characterized in that: The control server determines the type of the second set of status parameters and the type of the first set of status parameters and the impact of the difference, if: If the types are different and the difference triggers a security threat in the first control mode, and the preset management and control rules recognize the necessity of the new mode, the first control mode is changed and the second control mode is established; If the types are the same or the difference does not trigger a safety threat, and the second set of status parameters does not bring significant monitoring advantages, the change of the control mode is prohibited and the original control mode is maintained.

5. The control system according to claim 1, characterized in that: When the first set of status parameters includes a special risk parameter, the control server determines the second set of status parameters and the difference between the two, if: The second set of status parameters does not contain a special risk parameter and the difference triggers a high safety risk in the first control mode. According to the preset management and control rules, the first control mode is changed and the second control mode is established; If the second set of status parameters includes special risk parameters, or the difference does not trigger a high safety risk, the change of the control mode is prohibited and the original control mode is maintained.

6. The control system according to claim 1, characterized in that: The terminal device is equipped with a positioning module. When the control server receives the second set of status parameters: Obtaining the current position measured by the positioning module from the terminal device corresponding to the first operation partition, and obtaining the current position measured by the positioning module from the sensor terminal corresponding to the second set of state parameters; Analyze the impact of position relationships and state parameter differences on the control mode. If the position relationships and differences trigger a security threat under the first control mode and meet the requirements for spatial layout in the preset control rules, change the first control mode and establish a second control mode. If not, prohibit the change of the control mode and maintain the original control mode.

7. The control system according to claim 1, characterized in that: The control server locks the control mode related to the special risk parameter, and during the locking period, changes to the control mode are prohibited; After the lock is released, whether to change the control mode is determined based on the preset management and control rules and the status parameter difference evaluation; among which, the safety acceptance condition for the special risk parameter is that the gas concentration test meets the standard and is accepted.

8. The control system according to claim 1, characterized in that: The control server activates corresponding control permissions according to the established job partition control mode, and dynamically adjusts the scope and priority of the control permissions according to the status parameter difference and the security threat level.

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