Equipment inspection anti-cheating method and device, electronic equipment and storage medium

Abstract

The invention discloses an equipment inspection anti-cheating method and apparatus, an electronic device and a storage medium, and through the application, communication between a mobile terminal and a target device can be established to obtain an equipment identifier and an inspection parameter, and a dynamic timestamp is generated and is associated with an equipment state parameter for verification; the identity of a user is compared with authorization information through an encryption algorithm to ensure the legality of the identity, the inspection data after double verification is locally stored in the form of an encrypted database, and the inspection data is uploaded to the cloud through a secure channel after network recovery, so that a full-process data security guarantee mechanism is formed; the technical effects of improving the authenticity and non-tampering property of the inspection data, enhancing the data security in an offline environment, ensuring the accuracy of equipment operation risk assessment and maintaining the industrial production safety are achieved.

Description

TECHNICAL FIELD

[0001] The present disclosure relates to the technical field of data processing, and particularly relates to a device inspection anti-cheating method and device, an electronic device and a storage medium. BACKGROUND

[0002] As an important link of industrial equipment management, device inspection is widely used in high-risk industries such as power, chemical industry and manufacturing. With the deep integration of Internet of Things and mobile Internet technology, the existing inspection system cooperates through NFC near field communication, mobile terminal offline processing and service-oriented architecture to build a whole-process technical system covering data collection, processing analysis and decision control.

[0003] The traditional system relies on manual recording, which has data tamperability. Although the existing Internet of Things scheme introduces technologies such as NFC, it does not realize dynamic correlation verification of device status and timestamp, and lacks protection of composite data models of encrypted databases and digital signatures in offline environments, causing abnormal fluctuations in the risk index of device operation and threatening the safety of industrial production. SUMMARY

[0004] The present disclosure provides a device inspection anti-cheating method, device, electronic device and storage medium.

[0005] According to a first aspect of the present disclosure, a device inspection anti-cheating method is provided, which comprises: establishing a communication connection between a mobile terminal and a target device, obtaining a unique identifier of the target device and inspection task parameters; generating a dynamic timestamp and correlating and verifying the dynamic timestamp with device status parameters; comparing user identity information stored in the mobile terminal with authorized personnel information pre-stored in the encrypted near field communication tag through an encryption algorithm; storing inspection data that passes double verification in the form of an encrypted database in the local mobile terminal; when it is detected that the network is restored to a connected state, uploading the inspection data stored in the local mobile terminal to a cloud server through a secure data transmission channel.

[0006] Optionally, the step of establishing a communication connection between a mobile terminal and a target device, and obtaining a unique identifier of the target device and inspection task parameters comprises: encrypting the device unique identifier and the current inspection task parameters.

[0007] Optionally, the step of generating a dynamic timestamp and correlating and verifying the dynamic timestamp with device status parameters comprises: acquiring temperature and vibration physical parameters as the check factor of the dynamic timestamp. combining the dynamic timestamp with the check factor through a hash function to generate a verification code, and performing consistency comparison between the verification code and a verification code pre-stored in a cloud server.

[0008] Optionally, the encryption of the comparison between the user identity information stored in the mobile terminal and the authorized personnel information pre-stored in the encrypted near field communication tag includes: When the comparison between the user identity information and the authorized personnel information fails, triggering a local caching mechanism of the mobile terminal, binding an operation record of this time of comparison exception with a current timestamp, and marking the operation record as a to-be-audited state.

[0009] Optionally, the storage of the double-verification-passed inspection data in the mobile terminal in the form of an encrypted database includes: generating an independent digital signature for each encrypted inspection data through an elliptic curve digital signature algorithm.

[0010] Optionally, the method further includes: When detecting that there is device state abnormal information in the inspection data, performing visual identification on the device abnormal state and the missed inspection situation through a preset marking rule; real-time pushing the device state abnormal information and the missed inspection situation to the terminal.

[0011] According to a second aspect of the present disclosure, there is provided a device inspection anti-cheating device, including: An acquisition unit is configured to establish a communication connection between a mobile terminal and a target device, and acquire a unique identifier and an inspection task parameter of the target device. A generation unit is configured to generate a dynamic timestamp, and perform association verification on the dynamic timestamp and a device state parameter. An encryption unit is configured to encrypt the comparison between user identity information stored in the mobile terminal and authorized personnel information pre-stored in the encrypted near field communication tag through an encryption algorithm. A storage unit is configured to store double-verification-passed inspection data in the mobile terminal in the form of an encrypted database. An uploading unit is configured to, when detecting that a network is restored to a connected state, upload the inspection data stored in the mobile terminal to a cloud server through a secure data transmission channel.

[0012] Optionally, the acquisition unit is further configured to: perform encryption processing on the device unique identifier and the current inspection task parameter.

[0013] Optionally, the generation unit is further configured to: The collected temperature and vibration physical parameters are used as verification factors for the dynamic timestamp; The dynamic timestamp and the verification factor are combined using a hash function to generate a verification code, which is then compared with a verification code pre-stored on a cloud server for consistency.

[0014] Optionally, the encryption unit is further used for: When the user identity information fails to match the authorized personnel information, the local caching mechanism of the mobile terminal is triggered to bind the operation record of this comparison failure with the current timestamp and mark the operation record as pending review.

[0015] Optionally, the storage unit is further used for: Each encrypted inspection data is generated with an independent digital signature using the elliptic curve digital signature algorithm.

[0016] Optionally, the device further includes: The marking unit is used to visually identify abnormal equipment status and missed inspections by means of preset marking rules when abnormal equipment status information is detected in the inspection data. The push unit is used to push the abnormal status information and missed detection information of the device to the terminal in real time.

[0017] According to a third aspect of this disclosure, an electronic device is provided, comprising: At least one processor; and A memory communicatively connected to the at least one processor; wherein, The memory stores instructions that can be executed by the at least one processor to enable the at least one processor to perform the method described in the first aspect above.

[0018] According to a fourth aspect of this disclosure, a non-transitory computer-readable storage medium is provided storing computer instructions, wherein the computer instructions are configured to cause the computer to perform the method described in the first aspect above.

[0019] According to a fifth aspect of this disclosure, a computer program product is provided, comprising a computer program that, when executed by a processor, implements the method described in the first aspect above.

[0020] The equipment inspection anti-cheating method, device, electronic equipment, and storage medium disclosed herein, through this application, establish communication between the mobile terminal and the target device to obtain the device identifier and inspection parameters, generate dynamic timestamps and verify the association between the timestamps and device status parameters; ensure the legitimacy of the identity by comparing the user's identity and authorization information through an encryption algorithm; store the double-verified inspection data locally in the form of an encrypted database; and upload it to the cloud through a secure channel after the network is restored, forming a full-process data security guarantee mechanism. Therefore, it can solve the technical problems of data tamperability in traditional systems, the lack of dynamic association verification between device status and timestamps in existing IoT solutions, and the lack of composite data model protection in offline environments, which lead to abnormal fluctuations in the equipment operation risk index and threaten industrial production safety. It achieves the technical effects of improving the authenticity and immutability of inspection data, enhancing data security in offline environments, ensuring the accuracy of equipment operation risk assessment, and maintaining industrial production safety.

[0021] It should be understood that the description in this section is not intended to identify key or essential features of the embodiments of this application, nor is it intended to limit the scope of this application. Other features of this application will become readily apparent from the following description. Attached Figure Description

[0022] The accompanying drawings are provided to better understand this solution and do not constitute a limitation of this disclosure. Wherein: Figure 1 This is a flowchart illustrating a method for preventing cheating during equipment inspection, provided in an embodiment of this disclosure. Figure 2 This is a schematic diagram of the structure of an anti-cheating device for equipment inspection provided in an embodiment of the present disclosure; Figure 3 This is a schematic diagram of another anti-cheating device for equipment inspection provided in an embodiment of the present disclosure; Figure 4 A schematic block diagram of an example electronic device provided for embodiments of this disclosure. Detailed Implementation

[0023] The exemplary embodiments of this disclosure are described below with reference to the accompanying drawings, including various details of the embodiments to aid understanding, and should be considered merely exemplary. Therefore, those skilled in the art will recognize that various changes and modifications can be made to the embodiments described herein without departing from the scope and spirit of this disclosure. Similarly, for clarity and brevity, descriptions of well-known functions and structures are omitted in the following description.

[0024] The following description, with reference to the accompanying drawings, outlines an embodiment of a device inspection anti-cheating method, apparatus, electronic device, and storage medium for this disclosure.

[0025] Figure 1This is a flowchart illustrating a method for preventing cheating during equipment inspection, as provided in an embodiment of this disclosure.

[0026] like Figure 1 As shown, the method includes the following steps: Step 101: Establish a communication connection between the mobile terminal and the target device, and obtain the unique identifier of the target device and the inspection task parameters; A communication connection mechanism is established between the mobile terminal and the target device. This mechanism enables the collection of the target device's unique identifier and the acquisition of inspection task parameters matching the target device. The communication connection can be based on near-field communication (NFC) or other suitable inter-device communication technologies. The unique identifier of the target device is used to clearly distinguish different inspection objects to avoid confusion. The inspection task parameters contain the associated information required to complete the inspection of the target device, ensuring that the mobile terminal can accurately obtain the identity of the inspection object and the corresponding task requirements. As one implementation method, NFC can be used. A communication connection is established between the mobile terminal supporting this technology and the inspection point on the target device side, quickly collecting the target device's unique identifier and simultaneously acquiring pre-configured inspection task parameters. Encryption technology can be used to ensure the security of the information collection process.

[0027] This technical solution effectively ensures the accuracy of target device identification and the timeliness of inspection task parameter transmission by establishing a directional communication connection between the mobile terminal and the target device. It avoids inspection deviations caused by misjudgment of identity or missing parameters, and lays a reliable initial information foundation for the standardized and regulated development of subsequent inspection work.

[0028] Step 102: Generate a dynamic timestamp and associate the dynamic timestamp with the device status parameters for verification; A dynamic timestamp generation mechanism is constructed, which generates a unique dynamic timestamp based on the real-time triggering of inspection operations. Simultaneously, a verification logic is established between the dynamic timestamp and the collected device status parameters. This logic ensures that each set of device status parameters is uniquely bound to the corresponding inspection time node, eliminating data distortion caused by non-real-time collection or false associations. As one implementation method, a dynamic timestamp can be generated in real-time through an application on an inspection mobile terminal, and this timestamp can be bound and verified with parameters such as device operating status and abnormal information collected after device identification via NFC technology, further enhancing the reliability of data association.

[0029] This technical solution effectively ensures the time authenticity and parameter correspondence of inspection data by verifying the association between dynamic timestamps and equipment status parameters. It technically eliminates cheating behaviors such as tampering with inspection time or falsely matching equipment status, while providing accurate time dimension basis for the traceability of subsequent inspection records, thus supporting the credibility of inspection data.

[0030] Step 103: The user identity information stored in the mobile terminal is compared with the authorized personnel information pre-stored in the encrypted near-field communication tag using an encryption algorithm to encrypt the information. The system acquires user identity information stored in the mobile terminal and authorized personnel information pre-stored in the encrypted near-field communication tag. It then compares these two types of information using a preset encryption algorithm to verify whether the user's identity falls within the authorized scope. Simultaneously, the entire comparison process and related data are encrypted to prevent illegal theft or tampering, ensuring the security and validity of the identity verification process. As one implementation method, an appropriate encryption technology can be used to compare the inspection personnel identity information stored in the mobile terminal with the authorized personnel information pre-stored in the NFC inspection point tag using an encryption algorithm, ensuring that only authorized personnel can conduct inspection operations, further strengthening the anti-fraud capabilities of identity verification.

[0031] This technical solution uses encryption algorithms to compare and encrypt user identity information with authorized personnel information, effectively preventing unauthorized personnel from participating in inspections, ensuring the legitimacy and uniqueness of inspection personnel's identities, avoiding the risk of inspection fraud from the source of identity, and providing core security guarantees for the compliance and data authenticity of subsequent inspection work.

[0032] Step 104: Store the inspection data that has passed dual verification in the form of an encrypted database on the local mobile terminal. A local encrypted storage mechanism for inspection data is constructed. First, inspection data that has undergone dual verification is screened and confirmed. Then, it is stored locally on the mobile terminal in the form of an encrypted database. This encrypted database must have data encryption storage and access control capabilities to prevent unauthorized reading or tampering of locally stored inspection data. It must also be compatible with the mobile terminal's storage resources and operating environment to ensure stable data storage without affecting other terminal functions. As one implementation method, inspection records and equipment status parameters, after dual verification of personnel identity and equipment information, can be stored locally on the NFC-enabled mobile inspection terminal in the form of an encrypted database. Once the network is restored, the data will be automatically uploaded to the backend system.

[0033] This technical solution achieves local storage of inspection data after dual verification through an encrypted database. This not only ensures that inspection data is not lost or leaked in offline scenarios, but also avoids the risk of local data being tampered with. It provides secure and complete basic data support for subsequent data synchronization and traceability, while also being adaptable to the complex network environment in inspection work.

[0034] Step 105: When the network connection is restored, the inspection data stored locally on the mobile terminal is uploaded to the cloud server through a secure data transmission channel.

[0035] A technical architecture is constructed that integrates a network connectivity detection mechanism and a secure data transmission channel. The network connectivity detection mechanism monitors the network connection status of mobile terminals in real time. When the network is determined to have recovered to a valid connectivity state, a data upload process is automatically triggered. Simultaneously, relying on a pre-built secure data transmission channel, the inspection data stored locally on the mobile terminal is transmitted to the cloud server. This secure channel must have data encryption and integrity verification capabilities to resist unauthorized access and data tampering during transmission, and must be compatible with the data interaction protocol between the mobile terminal and the cloud server to ensure stable transmission. As one implementation method, the network status can be detected in real time through the mobile terminal's application. When network connectivity is detected to have recovered, a secure synchronization mechanism is used to automatically upload the double-verified inspection data from the local encrypted database to the cloud server via the secure data transmission channel, achieving local and cloud data synchronization.

[0036] This technical solution combines automatic network connectivity detection with a secure transmission channel, ensuring that offline inspection data can be uploaded promptly after the network is restored, preventing data loss, while also guaranteeing data transmission security. It provides a complete and reliable data source for cloud servers to conduct statistical analysis and visual management of inspection data, supporting the efficient implementation of subsequent equipment management work.

[0037] In some embodiments, establishing a communication connection between the mobile terminal and the target device, and obtaining the unique identifier of the target device and inspection task parameters, includes: The unique identifier of the device and the parameters of the current inspection task are encrypted.

[0038] In establishing a communication connection between the mobile terminal and the target device and obtaining the target device's unique identifier and current inspection task parameters, the mobile terminal first establishes a near-field wireless communication connection with the NFC inspection tag pre-installed on the target device through its own NFC module. It reads the target device's unique identifier (such as an unmodifiable electronic serial number written at the factory) and the current inspection task parameters (including mandatory inspection items, parameter acceptable ranges, and inspection operation sequence requirements) stored in the NFC tag, which will be sent to the NFC tag from the cloud system. Subsequently, the inspection application running on the mobile terminal automatically triggers the built-in encryption module. This module uses the SM4 symmetric encryption algorithm, which conforms to domestic security standards, and uses a dedicated encryption key stored in the mobile terminal's local security chip as the key source. It performs encryption operations on each field of the read device unique identifier string and current inspection task parameters, generating corresponding encrypted data blocks. After encryption, the system appends a SHA-based encryption algorithm to the encrypted data blocks. The hash check value generated by the 256 algorithm combines the encrypted data block with the hash check value to form an indivisible encrypted data unit. This encrypted data unit will be directly stored in the encrypted storage partition of the mobile terminal and can only be read by the inspection application after key verification by calling the decryption interface.

[0039] This specific implementation method uses a domestic standard encryption algorithm to encrypt the unique identifier of the equipment and the inspection task parameters. This not only adapts to the requirements of the project's domestic operating environment, but also prevents the equipment identity information from being forged and the inspection task parameters from being maliciously tampered with from the data source. At the same time, the addition of hash verification values ​​can verify the integrity of the data in real time, laying the foundation for the security of subsequent inspection data storage and transmission, and effectively avoiding the risk of inspection failure due to data leakage or tampering.

[0040] In some embodiments, generating a dynamic timestamp and associating the dynamic timestamp with device status parameters for verification includes: The collected temperature and vibration physical parameters are used as verification factors for the dynamic timestamp; The dynamic timestamp and the verification factor are combined using a hash function to generate a verification code, which is then compared with a verification code pre-stored on a cloud server.

[0041] In the process of generating a dynamic timestamp and verifying it in association with device status parameters, the mobile terminal first collects real-time temperature parameters (such as the real-time temperature value of the core components of the device, accurate to 0.1℃) and vibration parameters (such as the vibration frequency and amplitude of the device casing, accurate to 0.001mm) of the target device through sensor modules (such as the device's built-in temperature sensor and external vibration sensor). These two types of physical parameters are then used as verification factors for the dynamic timestamp. Subsequently, the mobile terminal's inspection application generates a dynamic timestamp based on the current system time synchronized with the cloud server (accurate to milliseconds), and then calls a preset hash function (such as the SHA-256 hash function) according to the "dynamic timestamp + temperature parameter + vibration parameter" verification. The data format is defined, and the three elements are combined to form a raw data string, which is then input into a hash function for calculation to generate a fixed-length hexadecimal verification code. After the verification code is generated, if the mobile terminal is online, the verification code is sent to the cloud server in real time; if it is offline, it is temporarily stored in the local encrypted storage area and uploaded after the network is restored. After receiving the verification code, the cloud server calls the same hash function and data combination format as the mobile terminal, and generates a corresponding pre-stored verification code based on the pre-stored parameter collection standards (including the collection frequency and accuracy requirements of temperature and vibration parameters) for the target equipment inspection period. By comparing the character sequence of the uploaded verification code with the pre-stored verification code, a consistency check is completed. If the two are completely consistent, the association verification is deemed successful; if there are character differences, it is marked as data anomaly.

[0042] This specific implementation uses the real-time physical parameters of the equipment as the verification factor for the timestamp, thus strongly binding the dynamic timestamp to the actual operating status of the equipment and preventing the timestamp generated solely based on time from being forged. At the same time, by leveraging the uniqueness of the hash function and the cloud comparison mechanism, it can accurately identify whether the inspection data has been tampered with, effectively preventing the entry of false inspection data and further ensuring the authenticity of the inspection records, which meets the project's requirement of "preventing inspection fraud and achieving traceability of inspection data".

[0043] In some embodiments, the step of encrypting the user identity information stored in the mobile terminal by comparing it with the authorized personnel information pre-stored in the encrypted near-field communication tag using an encryption algorithm includes: When the user identity information fails to match the authorized personnel information, the local caching mechanism of the mobile terminal is triggered to bind the operation record of this comparison failure with the current timestamp and mark the operation record as pending review.

[0044] In the process of comparing the user identity information stored in the mobile terminal with the authorized personnel information pre-stored in the encrypted near-field communication (NFC) tag using an encryption algorithm, the mobile terminal first retrieves the stored user identity information (including the inspector's unique employee number, identity code, and job authority identifier) ​​from its local security chip. Simultaneously, it establishes communication with the target device's encrypted NFC tag through its own NFC module, reading the pre-stored authorized personnel information within the tag (this information is pre-encrypted and written by the cloud management system using the SM4 algorithm, including a list of authorized employee numbers and the corresponding range of operable devices). Then, it performs a comparison operation using a preset RSA asymmetric encryption algorithm. When the operation results in a match between the user identity information and the authorized personnel information (i.e., the comparison fails), the mobile terminal... The terminal's inspection application immediately triggers a local caching mechanism, which automatically creates an abnormal operation log file in the terminal's encrypted storage partition. The file contains the user's employee ID, the unique NFC tag code, the comparison initiation time, and the failure reason identifier for this failed comparison. At the same time, the system generates a dynamic timestamp based on the real-time time (accurate to the millisecond level) calibrated between the current terminal and the cloud, binds this timestamp to the index field of the abnormal operation log file, ensures a unique correspondence between the record and the time, and explicitly marks it as "pending review" in the status attribute of the log file. In addition, the locally cached abnormal records can only be decrypted and viewed by accounts with administrator privileges after initiating an review command through the cloud backend; ordinary inspection accounts do not have access to this information.

[0045] This specific implementation method triggers local caching, binds timestamps, and marks a pending review status when a comparison fails. This not only intercepts unauthorized personnel's inspection operations in real time but also retains key traceability information of abnormal operations. This provides administrators with accurate evidence for subsequent verification of unauthorized access behavior and identification of security risks. At the same time, the permission restriction mechanism can prevent abnormal records from being tampered with, further enhancing the security of the identity verification process. This meets the core requirements of the project to ensure the presence of supervisory and inspection personnel and to prevent cheating.

[0046] In some embodiments, storing the double-authenticated inspection data locally on the mobile terminal in the form of an encrypted database includes: Each encrypted inspection data is generated with an independent digital signature using the elliptic curve digital signature algorithm.

[0047] In the process of storing the double-authenticated inspection data locally on the mobile terminal in the form of an encrypted database, it is first clarified that the double-authenticated inspection data includes structured data such as the device's unique identifier, real-time collected device status parameters (such as temperature and vibration values), dynamic timestamps, and user authentication results. The mobile terminal's inspection application first calls the preset encryption module and uses an encryption algorithm that conforms to domestic security standards to encrypt the above inspection data as a whole, generating an independent encrypted data block. Subsequently, the system automatically triggers the signature process of the elliptic curve digital signature algorithm (using the SM2 elliptic curve cryptography algorithm, adapted to the requirements of the project's domestic operating environment), retrieving the exclusive private key (this...) from the mobile terminal's local security chip. The private key is pre-distributed by the cloud server and bound to the terminal's unique identifier (it can only be accessed within the security chip and cannot be exported). Using the original binary data of the encrypted data block as input, an elliptic curve digital signature algorithm is used to generate a fixed-length independent digital signature. The generated digital signature is directly appended to the end of the corresponding encrypted data block, forming a combined data unit of "encrypted data block + digital signature." This combined data unit is stored in the mobile terminal's encrypted database in chronological order, and the encrypted database establishes a unique index for each combined data unit. The index information includes the data generation time, device identifier, and signature generation time, ensuring that the corresponding data unit can be quickly located and the signature validity verified during subsequent calls or uploads.

[0048] This specific implementation generates an independent digital signature for each encrypted inspection data block using the elliptic curve digital signature algorithm. It not only adapts to the requirements of the domestic operating environment by relying on the SM2 algorithm, but also ensures the integrity and immutability of each inspection data block through the non-exportable private key and independent signature mechanism. When data is called or uploaded later, the legality of the data source can be quickly verified through the public key, which further enhances the security of local storage of inspection data and provides key technical support for achieving traceability of inspection records.

[0049] In some embodiments, the method further includes: When abnormal equipment status information is detected in the inspection data, the abnormal equipment status and missed inspections are visually identified by preset marking rules. The abnormal status information and missed detection information of the device are pushed to the terminal in real time.

[0050] During the inspection data processing, the mobile terminal's inspection application parses the stored inspection data in real time, extracting equipment status parameters (such as temperature and vibration values) and comparing them with the system's preset normal operating parameter ranges. If a parameter exceeds the acceptable threshold (e.g., temperature exceeding 60℃, vibration amplitude greater than 0.05mm), it is determined that there is abnormal equipment status information in the data. Simultaneously, the system compares the completed inspection locations with the target locations in the task list based on the built-in inspection task list. If any location fails to generate a corresponding inspection record within the specified time, it is determined to be a missed inspection. Subsequently, the system will mark abnormal equipment locations with red highlighted icons and missed inspection locations with yellow highlighted icons in the APP's inspection map interface and data list interface according to preset marking rules. A text description of the abnormal parameter type (e.g., "abnormal temperature") or the missed inspection location number will be added next to the icons, providing a visual identification of abnormalities and missed inspections. Once the identification is completed, the system immediately triggers a push mechanism. Within 10 seconds, information including the abnormal device number, abnormal parameter value, location of the missed detection point, and discovery time will be simultaneously pushed to the preset management personnel's mobile terminals and cloud management platform terminals via mobile data network or enterprise internal communication network, in the form of APP message pop-ups and back-end management system notifications, to ensure that relevant personnel receive information in a timely manner.

[0051] This specific implementation method, through clear criteria for judging anomalies and missed inspections and intuitive visual labels, allows managers to quickly locate problematic equipment and missed inspection points. The real-time push mechanism avoids the risk of escalation of faults due to delays in the transmission of abnormal information, effectively supporting the goal of "visualized control of inspection work and improvement of equipment management level" in the document, and providing timely and accurate basis for subsequent anomaly handling and supplementary inspection arrangements.

[0052] Corresponding to the aforementioned equipment inspection anti-cheating method, this invention also proposes an equipment inspection anti-cheating device. Since the device embodiments of this invention correspond to the aforementioned method embodiments, details not disclosed in the device embodiments can be referred to the aforementioned method embodiments, and will not be repeated here.

[0053] Figure 2 This is a schematic diagram of the structure of an anti-cheating device for equipment inspection provided in an embodiment of this disclosure, as shown below. Figure 2 As shown, it includes: Acquisition unit 21 is used to establish a communication connection between the mobile terminal and the target device, and to acquire the unique identifier of the target device and the inspection task parameters; The generation unit 22 is used to generate a dynamic timestamp and associate the dynamic timestamp with the device status parameters for verification. Encryption unit 23 is used to encrypt the user identity information stored in the mobile terminal by comparing it with the authorized personnel information pre-stored in the encrypted near-field communication tag using an encryption algorithm; Storage unit 24 is used to store the inspection data that has passed dual verification in the form of an encrypted database on the local mobile terminal. The uploading unit 25 is used to upload the inspection data stored locally on the mobile terminal to the cloud server through a secure data transmission channel when the network connection is detected to be restored.

[0054] Furthermore, in one possible implementation of this disclosure, the acquisition unit 21 is further configured to: The unique identifier of the device and the parameters of the current inspection task are encrypted.

[0055] Furthermore, in one possible implementation of this disclosure embodiment, the generation unit 22 is further configured to: The collected temperature and vibration physical parameters are used as verification factors for the dynamic timestamp; The dynamic timestamp and the verification factor are combined using a hash function to generate a verification code, which is then compared with a verification code pre-stored on a cloud server for consistency.

[0056] Furthermore, in one possible implementation of this disclosure embodiment, the encryption unit 23 is further used for: When the user identity information fails to match the authorized personnel information, the local caching mechanism of the mobile terminal is triggered to bind the operation record of this comparison failure with the current timestamp and mark the operation record as pending review.

[0057] Furthermore, in one possible implementation of this disclosure, the storage unit 24 is further used for: Each encrypted inspection data is generated with an independent digital signature using the elliptic curve digital signature algorithm.

[0058] Furthermore, in one possible implementation of the embodiments of this disclosure, such as Figure 3 As shown, the device further includes: The marking unit 26 is used to visually identify the abnormal equipment status and the missed inspections by means of a preset marking rule when abnormal equipment status information is detected in the inspection data. The push unit 27 is used to push the abnormal status information and missed detection information of the device to the terminal in real time.

[0059] It should be noted that the foregoing explanation of the method embodiments also applies to the apparatus of the embodiments of this disclosure, and the principle is the same. Therefore, the embodiments of this disclosure are not limited thereto.

[0060] According to embodiments of this disclosure, this disclosure also provides an electronic device, a readable storage medium, and a computer program product.

[0061] Figure 4 A schematic block diagram of an example electronic device 400 that can be used to implement embodiments of the present disclosure is shown. The electronic device is intended to represent various forms of digital computers, such as laptop computers, desktop computers, workstations, personal digital assistants, servers, blade servers, mainframe computers, and other suitable computers. The electronic device may also represent various forms of mobile devices, such as personal digital assistants, cellular phones, smartphones, wearable devices, and other similar computing devices. The components shown herein, their connections and relationships, and their functions are merely illustrative and are not intended to limit the implementation of the present disclosure described and / or claimed herein.

[0062] like Figure 4 As shown, device 400 includes a computing unit 401, which can perform various appropriate actions and processes based on a computer program stored in ROM (Read-Only Memory) 402 or a computer program loaded from storage unit 408 into RAM (Random Access Memory) 403. RAM 403 may also store various programs and data required for the operation of device 400. The computing unit 401, ROM 402, and RAM 403 are interconnected via bus 404. I / O (Input / Output) interface 405 is also connected to bus 404.

[0063] Multiple components in device 400 are connected to I / O interface 405, including: input unit 406, such as keyboard, mouse, etc.; output unit 407, such as various types of monitors, speakers, etc.; storage unit 408, such as disk, optical disk, etc.; and communication unit 409, such as network card, modem, wireless transceiver, etc. Communication unit 409 allows device 400 to exchange information / data with other devices through computer networks such as the Internet and / or various telecommunications networks.

[0064] The computing unit 401 can be various general-purpose and / or special-purpose processing components with processing and computing capabilities. Some examples of the computing unit 401 include, but are not limited to, CPUs (Central Processing Units), GPUs (Graphics Processing Units), various special-purpose AI (Artificial Intelligence) computing chips, various computing units running machine learning model algorithms, DSPs (Digital Signal Processors), and any suitable processor, controller, microcontroller, etc. The computing unit 401 performs the various methods and processes described above, such as the device inspection anti-cheating method. For example, in some embodiments, the device inspection anti-cheating method may be implemented as a computer software program, which is tangibly contained in a machine-readable medium, such as storage unit 408. In some embodiments, part or all of the computer program may be loaded and / or installed on device 400 via ROM 402 and / or communication unit 409. When the computer program is loaded into RAM 403 and executed by the computing unit 401, one or more steps of the methods described above may be performed. Alternatively, in other embodiments, the computing unit 401 may be configured to perform the aforementioned device inspection anti-cheating method by any other suitable means (e.g., by means of firmware).

[0065] Various implementations of the systems and techniques described above herein can be implemented in digital electronic circuit systems, integrated circuit systems, FPGAs (Field Programmable Gate Arrays), ASICs (Application-Specific Integrated Circuits), ASSPs (Application-Specific Standard Products), SOCs (System-on-Chips), CPLDs (Complex Programmable Logic Devices), computer hardware, firmware, software, and / or combinations thereof. These various implementations may include implementations in one or more computer programs that can be executed and / or interpreted on a programmable system including at least one programmable processor, which may be a dedicated or general-purpose programmable processor, capable of receiving data and instructions from a storage system, at least one input device, and at least one output device, and transmitting data and instructions to the storage system, the at least one input device, and the at least one output device.

[0066] The program code used to implement the methods of this disclosure may be written in any combination of one or more programming languages. This program code may be provided to a processor or controller of a general-purpose computer, special-purpose computer, or other programmable data processing apparatus, such that when executed by the processor or controller, the program code causes the functions / operations specified in the flowcharts and / or block diagrams to be implemented. The program code may be executed entirely on a machine, partially on a machine, as a standalone software package partially on a machine and partially on a remote machine, or entirely on a remote machine or server.

[0067] In the context of this disclosure, a machine-readable medium can be a tangible medium that may contain or store a program for use by or in conjunction with an instruction execution system, apparatus, or device. A machine-readable medium can be a machine-readable signal medium or a machine-readable storage medium. A machine-readable medium can be, but is not limited to, electronic, magnetic, optical, electromagnetic, infrared, or semiconductor systems, apparatus, or devices, or any suitable combination of the foregoing. More specific examples of machine-readable storage media include electrical connections based on one or more wires, portable computer disks, hard disks, RAM, ROM, EPROM (Electrically Programmable Read-Only Memory) or flash memory, optical fiber, CD-ROM (Compact Disc Read-Only Memory), optical storage devices, magnetic storage devices, or any suitable combination of the foregoing.

[0068] To provide interaction with a user, the systems and techniques described herein can be implemented on a computer having: a display device for displaying information to the user (e.g., a CRT (Cathode-Ray Tube) or LCD (Liquid Crystal Display) monitor); and a keyboard and pointing device (e.g., a mouse or trackball) through which the user provides input to the computer. Other types of devices can also be used to provide interaction with the user; for example, feedback provided to the user can be any form of sensory feedback (e.g., visual feedback, auditory feedback, or tactile feedback); and input from the user can be received in any form (including sound input, voice input, or tactile input).

[0069] The systems and technologies described herein can be implemented in computing systems that include backend components (e.g., as data servers), or computing systems that include middleware components (e.g., application servers), or computing systems that include frontend components (e.g., user computers with graphical user interfaces or web browsers through which users can interact with implementations of the systems and technologies described herein), or any combination of such backend, middleware, or frontend components. The components of the system can be interconnected via digital data communication of any form or medium (e.g., communication networks). Examples of communication networks include LANs (Local Area Networks), WANs (Wide Area Networks), the Internet, and blockchain networks.

[0070] Computer systems can include clients and servers. Clients and servers are generally geographically separated and typically interact via communication networks. The client-server relationship is created by computer programs running on the respective computers and having a client-server relationship with each other. A server can be a cloud server, also known as a cloud computing server or cloud host, a hosting product within the cloud computing service system that addresses the shortcomings of traditional physical hosts and VPS (Virtual Private Server) services, such as high management difficulty and weak business scalability. Servers can also be servers for distributed systems or servers incorporating blockchain technology.

[0071] It's important to note that artificial intelligence (AI) is the study of enabling computers to simulate certain human thought processes and intelligent behaviors (such as learning, reasoning, thinking, and planning). It encompasses both hardware and software technologies. AI hardware technologies generally include sensors, dedicated AI chips, cloud computing, distributed storage, and big data processing. AI software technologies primarily include computer vision, speech recognition, natural language processing, machine learning / deep learning, big data processing, and knowledge graph technologies.

[0072] It should be understood that the various forms of processes shown above can be used to rearrange, add, or delete steps. For example, the steps described in this disclosure can be executed in parallel, sequentially, or in different orders, as long as the desired result of the technical solution disclosed in this disclosure can be achieved, and this is not limited herein.

[0073] The specific embodiments described above do not constitute a limitation on the scope of protection of this disclosure. Those skilled in the art should understand that various modifications, combinations, sub-combinations, and substitutions can be made according to design requirements and other factors. Any modifications, equivalent substitutions, and improvements made within the spirit and principles of this disclosure should be included within the scope of protection of this disclosure.

Claims

1. A method for preventing cheating during equipment inspection, characterized in that, include: Establish a communication connection between the mobile terminal and the target device, and obtain the unique identifier of the target device and the inspection task parameters; Generate a dynamic timestamp and associate the dynamic timestamp with the device status parameters for verification; The encryption algorithm compares the user identity information stored in the mobile terminal with the authorized personnel information pre-stored in the encrypted near-field communication tag to encrypt the information. The inspection data that has passed dual verification is stored locally on the mobile terminal in the form of an encrypted database; When network connectivity is restored, the inspection data stored locally on the mobile terminal is uploaded to the cloud server via a secure data transmission channel.

2. The method according to claim 1, characterized in that, The process of establishing a communication connection between the mobile terminal and the target device, and obtaining the unique identifier and inspection task parameters of the target device, includes: The unique identifier of the device and the parameters of the current inspection task are encrypted.

3. The method according to claim 1, characterized in that, The step of generating a dynamic timestamp and associating the dynamic timestamp with device status parameters for verification includes: The collected temperature and vibration physical parameters are used as verification factors for the dynamic timestamp; The dynamic timestamp and the verification factor are combined using a hash function to generate a verification code, which is then compared with a verification code pre-stored on a cloud server.

4. The method according to claim 1, characterized in that, The step of encrypting the user identity information stored in the mobile terminal by comparing it with the authorized personnel information pre-stored in the encrypted near-field communication tag using an encryption algorithm includes: When the user identity information fails to match the authorized personnel information, the local caching mechanism of the mobile terminal is triggered to bind the operation record of this comparison failure with the current timestamp and mark the operation record as pending review.

5. The method according to claim 1, characterized in that, The step of storing the double-verified inspection data locally on the mobile terminal in the form of an encrypted database includes: Each encrypted inspection data is generated with an independent digital signature using the elliptic curve digital signature algorithm.

6. The method according to claim 1, characterized in that, The method further includes: When abnormal equipment status information is detected in the inspection data, the abnormal equipment status and missed inspections are visually identified by preset marking rules. The abnormal status information and missed detection information of the device are pushed to the terminal in real time.

7. A device for preventing cheating during equipment inspection, characterized in that, include: The acquisition unit is used to establish a communication connection between the mobile terminal and the target device, and to acquire the unique identifier of the target device and the inspection task parameters. A generation unit is used to generate a dynamic timestamp and associate the dynamic timestamp with device status parameters for verification. The encryption unit is used to encrypt the user identity information stored in the mobile terminal by comparing it with the authorized personnel information pre-stored in the encrypted near-field communication tag using an encryption algorithm. A storage unit is used to store the inspection data that has passed dual verification in the form of an encrypted database on the local mobile terminal. The upload unit is used to upload the inspection data stored locally on the mobile terminal to the cloud server through a secure data transmission channel when the network connection is detected to be restored.

8. An electronic device, characterized in that, include: At least one processor; as well as A memory communicatively connected to the at least one processor; wherein, The memory stores instructions that can be executed by the at least one processor to enable the at least one processor to perform the method of any one of claims 1-6.

9. A non-transitory computer-readable storage medium storing computer instructions, characterized in that, The computer instructions are used to cause the computer to perform the method according to any one of claims 1-6.

10. A computer program product, characterized in that, Includes a computer program that, when executed by a processor, implements the method according to any one of claims 1-6.

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