A method for updating a TESLA key chain, an electronic device, and a storage medium

Abstract

This invention relates to a method for updating a TESLA keychain, an electronic device, and a storage medium, belonging to the field of information security technology, and solves the technical problem of how to reduce the cost of TESLA keychain reset. The TESLA keychain update method includes: an authentication device generating a TESLA keychain; the authentication device generating a chameleon hash function and using the chameleon hash function to calculate the chameleon hash value of the TESLA keychain root; in response to entering a keychain replacement cycle, the authentication device broadcasting, or broadcasting through a broadcast node, the TESLA keychain root and a first random number generated to obtain the chameleon hash value; a terminal receiver using the first random number to verify whether the received chameleon hash value is correct, and determining whether to update the TESLA keychain based on the verification result.

Description

Technical Field

[0001] This invention relates to the field of information security technology, and in particular to a method for updating a key chain, an electronic device, and a storage medium for a time-effect flow loss-tolerant authentication mechanism. Background Technology

[0002] In satellite communication, there are scenarios where low-bandwidth one-way broadcasting is used to transmit information. In this communication model, only the satellite acts as the center to broadcast information in one direction, and the receiver cannot send information to the satellite. At the same time, due to the characteristics of satellite signal transmission, broadcast communication often has low bandwidth.

[0003] The BeiDou Navigation Satellite System is a global satellite navigation and positioning system (GNSS system) that provides navigation, positioning, timing, and short message communication services. It can provide reliable time and space references and navigation and positioning information for various platforms and users.

[0004] The BeiDou Navigation Satellite System provides public signal positioning services to civilian users. The carrier frequency, modulation method, spreading code, and navigation message format of its navigation signals are all publicly available in the interface control file. Therefore, there is a possibility that attackers may use the publicly available signal information structure to forge and send false navigation signals to deceive navigation information and interfere with the navigation and timing functions of GNSS receivers.

[0005] Existing solutions to spoofing of public broadcast signals mainly focus on adding authentication methods on the system side. Current information authentication methods primarily utilize the Timed Efficient Stream Loss-tolerant Authentication (TESLA) key chain to calculate authentication keys for messages. However, the TESLA key chain has limited capacity, and it needs to be reset once all keys are used. Therefore, reducing the cost of TESLA key chain resets is a key technical challenge that needs to be addressed. Summary of the Invention

[0006] Based on the above analysis, the embodiments of the present invention aim to provide a method, electronic device and storage medium for updating the key chain of a time-effect flow loss fault-tolerant authentication mechanism, in order to solve the technical problem of how to reduce the cost of TESLA key chain reset.

[0007] In a first aspect, embodiments of the present invention provide a method for updating a key chain of a time-effect stream loss-tolerant authentication mechanism, comprising the following steps:

[0008] The authentication device generates a time-effect stream loss-tolerant authentication key chain;

[0009] The authentication device generates a chameleon hash function and uses the chameleon hash function to calculate the chameleon hash value of the key chain root of the time-effect stream loss fault-tolerant authentication mechanism.

[0010] In response to entering the key chain switching cycle, the authentication device broadcasts or broadcasts through a broadcast node the root of the time-effect stream loss tolerance authentication mechanism key chain and the first random number generated to obtain the chameleon hash value.

[0011] The terminal receiver uses the first random number to verify whether the received chameleon hash value is correct, and determines whether to update the key chain of the time-effect stream loss fault-tolerant authentication mechanism based on the verification result.

[0012] Based on further improvements to the above update method, the authentication device generates a time-effect stream loss-tolerant authentication key chain including:

[0013] The authentication device generates a second random number to produce the key chain for the time-effect stream loss-tolerant authentication mechanism;

[0014] Based on the second random number, the root of the key chain for the time-effect flow loss tolerance authentication mechanism is calculated using a hash function;

[0015] Based on the root of the time-effect flow loss fault-tolerant authentication mechanism key chain, a hash function is used to calculate the time-effect flow loss fault-tolerant authentication mechanism key chain.

[0016] Based on further improvements to the above update method, the authentication device generates a chameleon hash function including:

[0017] The authentication device generates a public and private key for the Chameleon hash function;

[0018] Furthermore, calculating the chameleon hash value of the key chain root of the time-effect stream loss tolerance authentication mechanism using the chameleon hash function includes:

[0019] The chameleon hash value is calculated based on the public key of the chameleon hash function, the first random number, and the root of the key chain of the time-effect flow loss tolerance authentication mechanism.

[0020] Based on a further improvement to the above update method, the terminal receiver verifies the correctness of the received chameleon hash value using the first random number, including:

[0021] The terminal receiver verifies the correctness of the received Chameleon hash value based on the root of the time-effect flow loss fault-tolerant authentication mechanism key chain and the first random number during the current key chain switching cycle, as well as the root of the time-effect flow loss fault-tolerant authentication mechanism key chain and the first random number during the next key chain switching cycle.

[0022] Based on a further improvement to the above update method, the terminal receiver verifies the correctness of the received chameleon hash value using the first random number, including:

[0023] The terminal receiver verifies the correctness of the received chameleon hash value CH according to the following formula:

[0024]

[0025] Where Hash() is the chameleon hash function, p k The public key for the chameleon hash function. and r t These are the root key chain and the first random number of the time-effect stream loss-tolerant authentication mechanism key chain, broadcast during the t-th round of key chain switching. and r t+1 These are the root key chain and the first random number of the time-effect stream loss-tolerant authentication mechanism key chain, which are broadcast during the (t+1)th round of key chain switching.

[0026] Based on further improvements to the above-mentioned update method, the authentication device, the broadcast node, and the terminal receiver constitute a one-way broadcast information system.

[0027] Based on a further improvement to the above-mentioned update method, the broadcast node is an artificial satellite in a global satellite navigation and positioning system.

[0028] Based on a further improvement to the above update method, the hash function is any one of the following:

[0029] Chinese national cryptographic algorithms: SM3, SHA, and MD.

[0030] In a second aspect, embodiments of the present invention provide an electronic device, comprising:

[0031] At least one processor; and

[0032] A memory communicatively connected to the at least one processor; wherein the memory stores instructions executable by the at least one processor, the instructions being executed by the at least one processor to enable the at least one processor to perform the time-effect stream loss fault-tolerant authentication mechanism keychain update method according to any one of the first aspects of the present invention.

[0033] Fourthly, embodiments of the present invention provide a non-transitory computer-readable storage medium storing computer instructions, the computer instructions being used to cause the computer to execute the method for updating the key chain of the time-effect stream loss fault-tolerant authentication mechanism as described in any of the first aspects of the present invention.

[0034] Compared with the prior art, the present invention can achieve at least one of the following beneficial effects:

[0035] 1. The Chameleon Hash Replacement Method adopted in this invention requires less communication bandwidth resources during the replacement process, thereby reducing the cost of TESLA key chain reset and making it effective for applications in satellite navigation and other fields.

[0036] 2. The TESLA key chain replacement method proposed in this invention can achieve rapid key chain replacement in broadcast information authentication, which is more efficient than traditional signature methods.

[0037] In this invention, the above-described technical solutions can be combined with each other to achieve more preferred combinations. Other features and advantages of this invention will be set forth in the following description, and some advantages may become apparent from the description or be learned by practicing the invention. The objects and other advantages of this invention can be realized and obtained from what is particularly pointed out in the description and drawings. Attached Figure Description

[0038] The accompanying drawings are for illustrative purposes only and are not intended to limit the invention. Throughout the drawings, the same reference numerals denote the same parts.

[0039] Figure 1 A flowchart illustrating a key chain update method for a time-effect flow loss-tolerant authentication mechanism according to an embodiment of the present invention is shown.

[0040] Figure 2 A schematic block diagram of an example electronic device 200 that can be used to implement embodiments of the present disclosure is shown. Detailed Implementation

[0041] Preferred embodiments of the present invention will now be described in detail with reference to the accompanying drawings, which form part of this application and are used together with the embodiments of the present invention to illustrate the principles of the present invention, but are not intended to limit the scope of the present invention.

[0042] Figure 1 A flowchart illustrating a key chain update method for a time-effect stream loss-tolerant authentication mechanism according to an embodiment of the present invention is shown. Figure 1 As shown, the key chain update method for this time-effect flow loss tolerance authentication mechanism includes the following steps:

[0043] Step S100: The authentication device generates a time-effect stream loss-tolerant authentication key chain.

[0044] Time-Effected Stream Loss Tolerance (TESLA) is a method for authenticating streaming data. TESLA generates a key sequence using a sequence of pseudo-random function applications. The sender selects a random key and pre-computes a sequence containing multiple key values; this sequence is called a key chain. Each key appears as a pseudo-random number to an attacker. The receiver can derive all previous keys from the received key, thus verifying the authenticity of the data packet. This scheme tolerates any number of packet losses, and discarding insecure packets does not affect the authentication of subsequent packets.

[0045] For example, the BeiDou navigation message authentication method based on BeiDou short messages employs a Time Effect Stream Loss Tolerance (TESLA) authentication mechanism. The ground control center generates a key and uses it to encrypt basic navigation data to generate an information authentication code. This information authentication code is then added to the reserved bytes of the BeiDou navigation message and sent as authentication information to each medium Earth orbit satellite. The medium Earth orbit satellites then send the BeiDou navigation message with the added authentication information to each user.

[0046] In this embodiment, the authentication device can be the ground control center in the BeiDou navigation system.

[0047] In some embodiments, the process of an authentication device generating a TESLA keychain includes the following steps:

[0048] Step S10: Generate a second random number to generate the TESLA key chain.

[0049] Step S20: Calculate the TESLA key chain root using a hash function based on the second random number.

[0050] Step S30: Calculate the TESLA key chain using a hash function based on the TESLA key chain root.

[0051] Steps S10 to S30 will be described below with a specific implementation method.

[0052] First, the authentication device generates a second random number r0 to generate the TESLA key chain. The root key of the TESLA key chain is denoted as K0. Then:

[0053] K0 = H N (r0)

[0054] Among them, H N (·) indicates that the hash function is calculated N times, then:

[0055] K i-1 =H(K) i )

[0056] Among them, Ki Let represent the i-th key in the TESLA key chain, denoted as . Let i be a key chain generated by random numbers, where i represents the i-th key in the key chain and k represents the k-th key chain generated by the Beidou navigation authentication device.

[0057] Step S200: The authentication device generates a chameleon hash function and uses the chameleon hash function to calculate the chameleon hash value of the root of the time-effect flow loss fault-tolerant authentication mechanism key chain.

[0058] Step S300: In response to entering the key chain switching cycle, the authentication device broadcasts or broadcasts through the broadcast node the root key chain of the time-effect stream loss tolerance authentication mechanism and the first random number generated to obtain the chameleon hash value.

[0059] The chameleon hash function is a hash function with a trapdoor. By mastering the trapdoor, the hash preimage can be deduced from the hash value; without mastering the trapdoor, the hash preimage cannot be calculated.

[0060] In this embodiment, the authentication device can select a given security constant λ to generate the public key p of the chameleon hash function. k and private key k The authentication device can calculate the Chameleon hash value based on the root K0 of the key chain to be updated. Specifically, the public key p can be used to... k The first random number r and the root of the key chain to be updated K0 are used as inputs to the Chameleon hash function to calculate the Chameleon hash value CH.

[0061] In this embodiment, the private key s k This is the trapdoor of the chameleon hash function.

[0062] In this embodiment, the authentication device broadcasts the first random number r and the root key chain K0 to be updated through a broadcast node when entering the TESLA key chain replacement cycle.

[0063] In some embodiments, the authentication device can be integrated on the broadcast node. In this embodiment, the authentication device can directly broadcast the first random number r and the root key chain K0 to be updated when entering the TESLA key chain replacement cycle.

[0064] In this embodiment, the TESLA key chain switching cycle can be determined by the TESLA key chain switching strategy. For example, if the TESLA key chain switching strategy is to initiate the switching when the last key in the TESLA key chain is generated, then the TESLA key chain switching cycle begins when the last key in the TESLA key chain is generated.

[0065] For example, record The first TESLA keychain generated for the certified device. The second TESLA keychain generated for the authentication device. for The root of the chain, for The root of the chain, r 1 According to The first random number r is found by obtaining the chameleon hash value CH. 2 According to The first random number is found by obtaining the chameleon hash value CH. (After entering...) to During the chain switching cycle, the broadcast node can broadcast r 1 , r 2 .

[0066] Step S400: The terminal receiver uses the first random number to verify whether the received Chameleon hash value is correct, and determines whether to update the key chain of the time-effect stream loss fault-tolerant authentication mechanism based on the verification result.

[0067] In this embodiment, the terminal receiver can obtain the public key p generated by the authentication device through a third-party channel. k And the chameleon hash value CH, and verify whether the chameleon hash value CH is correct based on the first random number received.

[0068] Specifically, once the terminal receiver verifies that the Chameleon hash value CH obtained from the third-party channel is correct, it can receive and use the key in the next TESLA key chain, thereby completing the update of the TESLA key chain.

[0069] In some embodiments, the terminal receiver verifies whether the received chameleon hash value is correct using the first random number. This includes the terminal receiver verifying whether the received chameleon hash value is correct based on the root of the time-effect flow loss fault-tolerant authentication mechanism key chain and the first random number during the current key chain switching cycle, as well as the root of the time-effect flow loss fault-tolerant authentication mechanism key chain and the first random number during the next key chain switching cycle.

[0070] For example, the terminal receiver obtains the public key p generated by the authentication device. k After obtaining the chameleon hash value CH and the TESLA keychain root broadcast by the broadcast node, the correctness of the chameleon hash value CH can be verified. The terminal receiver verifies the correctness of the received chameleon hash value CH according to the following formula:

[0071]

[0072] Where Hash() is the chameleon hash function, p k The public key for the chameleon hash function. and r t These are the root key chain and the first random number of the time-effect stream loss-tolerant authentication mechanism key chain, broadcast during the t-th round of key chain switching. and r t+1 These are the root key chain and the first random number of the time-effect stream loss-tolerant authentication mechanism key chain, which are broadcast during the (t+1)th round of key chain switching.

[0073] In this embodiment of the invention, the information broadcast by the broadcast node is the TESLA key chain root and a first random number. Compared with the traditional signature authentication method, the length of the first random number is much smaller than the signature length, which can make more effective use of the broadcast channel bandwidth resources.

[0074] Figure 2 A schematic block diagram of an example electronic device 200 that can be used to implement embodiments of the present disclosure is shown. See also Figure 2 The present invention describes a structural block diagram of an electronic device 200 that can serve as a server or client of the present disclosure, which is an example of a hardware device that can be applied to various aspects of the present disclosure. The electronic device is intended to represent various forms of digital computers, such as laptop computers, desktop computers, workstations, personal digital assistants, servers, blade servers, mainframe computers, and other suitable computers. The electronic device can also represent various forms of mobile devices, such as personal digital processors, cellular phones, smartphones, wearable devices, and other similar computing devices. The components shown herein, their connections and relationships, and their functions are merely illustrative and are not intended to limit the implementation of the present disclosure described and / or claimed herein. Figure 2 As shown, the electronic device 200 includes a computing unit 201, which can perform various appropriate actions and processes according to a computer program stored in a read-only memory (ROM) 202 or a computer program loaded from a storage unit 208 into a random access memory (RAM) 203. The RAM 203 may also store various programs and data required for the operation of the device 200. The computing unit 201, ROM 202, and RAM 203 are interconnected via a bus 204. An input / output (I / O) interface 205 is also connected to the bus 204. Multiple components in the device 200 are connected to the I / O interface 205, including: an input unit 206, such as a keyboard, mouse, etc.; an output unit 207, such as various types of displays, speakers, etc.; a storage unit 208, such as a disk, optical disk, etc.; and a communication unit 209, such as a network card, modem, wireless transceiver, etc. The communication unit 209 allows the device 200 to exchange information / data with other devices through computer networks such as the Internet and / or various telecommunications networks.

[0075] The computing unit 201 can be a variety of general-purpose and / or special-purpose processing components with processing and computing capabilities. Some examples of the computing unit 201 include, but are not limited to, a central processing unit (CPU), a graphics processing unit (GPU), various special-purpose artificial intelligence (AI) computing chips, various computing units running machine learning model algorithms, a digital signal processor (DSP), and any suitable processor, controller, microcontroller, etc. The computing unit 201 performs the various methods and processes described above, such as the method for updating a time-effect flow loss tolerance authentication mechanism keychain. For example, in some embodiments, the method for updating a time-effect flow loss tolerance authentication mechanism keychain can be implemented as a computer software program tangibly contained in a machine-readable medium, such as storage unit 208. In some embodiments, part or all of the computer program can be loaded and / or installed on device 200 via ROM 202 and / or communication unit 209. When the computer program is loaded into RAM 203 and executed by the computing unit 201, one or more steps of the gift package recommendation method described above can be performed. Alternatively, in other embodiments, computing unit 201 may be configured by any other suitable means (e.g., by means of firmware) to perform a method for updating the time-effect stream loss fault-tolerant authentication mechanism keychain.

[0076] Compared with the prior art, the embodiments of the present invention can achieve at least one of the following beneficial effects:

[0077] 1. The Chameleon Hash Replacement Method adopted in this invention requires less communication bandwidth resources during the replacement process, thereby reducing the cost of TESLA key chain reset and making it effective for applications in satellite navigation and other fields.

[0078] 2. The TESLA key chain replacement method proposed in this invention can achieve rapid key chain replacement in broadcast information authentication, which is more efficient than traditional signature methods.

[0079] This invention provides a non-transitory computer-readable storage medium storing computer instructions, which are used to cause the computer to execute the key chain update method of the time-effect stream loss fault-tolerant authentication mechanism described in any embodiment of this invention.

[0080] The above description is only a preferred embodiment of the present invention, but the scope of protection of the present invention is not limited thereto. Any changes or substitutions that can be easily conceived by those skilled in the art within the scope of the technology disclosed in the present invention should be included within the scope of protection of the present invention.

Claims

1. A method for updating a key chain in a time-effect flow loss-tolerant authentication mechanism, characterized in that, Includes the following steps: The authentication device generates a time-effect stream loss-tolerant authentication key chain; The authentication device generates a chameleon hash function and uses the chameleon hash function to calculate the chameleon hash value of the key chain root of the time-effect stream loss fault-tolerant authentication mechanism. In response to entering the key chain switching cycle, the authentication device broadcasts or broadcasts through a broadcast node the root of the time-effect stream loss tolerance authentication mechanism key chain and the first random number generated to obtain the chameleon hash value. The terminal receiver uses the first random number to verify whether the received chameleon hash value is correct, and determines whether to update the key chain of the time-effect stream loss fault-tolerant authentication mechanism based on the verification result.

2. The update method according to claim 1, characterized in that, The authentication device generates a time-effect stream loss-tolerant authentication keychain, which includes: The authentication device generates a second random number to produce the key chain for the time-effect stream loss-tolerant authentication mechanism; Based on the second random number, the root of the key chain for the time-effect flow loss tolerance authentication mechanism is calculated using a hash function; Based on the root of the time-effect flow loss fault-tolerant authentication mechanism key chain, a hash function is used to calculate the time-effect flow loss fault-tolerant authentication mechanism key chain.

3. The update method according to claim 1, characterized in that, The chameleon hash function generated by the authentication device includes: The authentication device generates a public and private key for the Chameleon hash function; Furthermore, calculating the chameleon hash value of the key chain root of the time-effect stream loss tolerance authentication mechanism using the chameleon hash function includes: The chameleon hash value is calculated based on the public key of the chameleon hash function, the first random number, and the root of the key chain of the time-effect flow loss tolerance authentication mechanism.

4. The updating method according to claim 1 or 3, characterized in that, The terminal receiver verifies the correctness of the received chameleon hash value using the first random number, including: The terminal receiver verifies the correctness of the received Chameleon hash value based on the root of the time-effect flow loss fault-tolerant authentication mechanism key chain and the first random number during the current key chain switching cycle, as well as the root of the time-effect flow loss fault-tolerant authentication mechanism key chain and the first random number during the next key chain switching cycle.

5. The updating method according to claim 4, characterized in that, The terminal receiver verifies the correctness of the received chameleon hash value using the first random number, including: The terminal receiver verifies the correctness of the received chameleon hash value CH according to the following formula: Where Hash() is the chameleon hash function, p k The public key for the chameleon hash function. and r t These are the root key chain and the first random number of the time-effect stream loss-tolerant authentication mechanism key chain, broadcast during the t-th round of key chain switching. and r t +1 These are the root key chain and the first random number of the time-effect stream loss-tolerant authentication mechanism key chain, which are broadcast during the (t+1)th round of key chain switching.

6. The updating method according to claim 1, characterized in that, The authentication device and broadcast node are a one-way broadcast information system.

7. The updating method according to claim 6, characterized in that, The broadcast node is an artificial satellite in the Global Navigation Satellite System.

8. The updating method according to claim 2, characterized in that, The hash function is any one of the following: Chinese national cryptographic algorithms: SM3, SHA, and MD.

9. An electronic device, comprising: At least one processor; as well as A memory communicatively connected to the at least one processor; wherein the memory stores instructions executable by the at least one processor, the instructions being executed by the at least one processor to enable the at least one processor to perform the update method of the time-effect stream loss fault-tolerant authentication mechanism keychain according to any one of claims 1-8.

10. A non-transitory computer-readable storage medium storing computer instructions for causing the computer to perform a method for updating the keychain of a time-effect stream loss-tolerant authentication mechanism according to any one of claims 1-8.

Images