Security monitoring method, device, equipment, storage medium and computer program product

Abstract

The application discloses a safety monitoring method, device and equipment, a storage medium and a computer program product, and aims to solve the problem that the existing safety monitoring scheme has poor monitoring accuracy in a complex operation environment, unnecessary alarms may occur, the whole locomotive loses power, and the continuity and availability of railway transportation are affected. The method comprises the following steps: obtaining operation data and gas detection data of a hydrogen energy locomotive to be monitored; determining an alarm threshold corresponding to a current operation state according to the operation data; judging whether there is gas leakage based on the alarm threshold and the gas detection data; when the judgment result is yes, determining pressure data and to-be-monitored gas concentration data of a main pipeline and each branch pipeline in a hydrogen supply system based on a pipeline topological structure of the hydrogen supply system; and determining a leakage source position according to the pressure data and the to-be-monitored gas concentration data; and executing a hierarchical protection strategy according to the leakage source position and a leakage degree.

Description

Technical Field

[0001] This application relates to the field of safety control technology for hydrogen-powered transportation equipment, and in particular to a safety monitoring method, device, equipment, storage medium, and computer program product. Background Technology

[0002] Hydrogen-powered locomotives, with their advantages of zero carbon emissions and high energy density, have gradually become a key direction for the green transformation of the rail transit sector. As the core energy unit, the onboard hydrogen supply system's operational safety directly impacts the overall vehicle's safety. Due to hydrogen's low ignition energy, wide explosion limits, high diffusion rate, and colorless and odorless properties, leaks and accumulations can easily lead to combustion or deflagration accidents. Therefore, establishing a reliable safety monitoring and protection system is a prerequisite for ensuring the safe operation of hydrogen-powered locomotives.

[0003] Currently, the mainstream safety technology for hydrogen supply systems generally adopts a monitoring method that involves placing hydrogen concentration sensors at key locations and combining this with preset alarm thresholds to detect leaks. When the detected hydrogen concentration exceeds the threshold, the system determines it as a leak event and triggers corresponding protective actions, such as cutting off the hydrogen supply path or shutting down the system.

[0004] However, as hydrogen-powered locomotives move from experimental verification to commercial operation on main lines, their operating environment becomes increasingly complex and variable, encompassing various alternating conditions such as high-speed cruising, tunnel travel, and station stops. In practical applications, this complex operating environment may limit the effectiveness of existing safety monitoring solutions. For example, under high-speed operation, it is difficult to detect minute leaks in a timely manner; while in poorly ventilated conditions such as tunnels or parking areas, existing safety monitoring solutions may generate unnecessary alarms and trigger protective actions. Furthermore, when a localized leak occurs in the hydrogen supply system, current technologies often resort to a complete shutdown, causing the entire locomotive to lose power and affecting the continuity and availability of railway transportation.

[0005] Therefore, how to more accurately identify the risk of hydrogen leakage in complex and ever-changing operating environments, and maintain the locomotive's operational capability as much as possible while ensuring safety, has become a technical problem that needs to be solved by existing technologies. Summary of the Invention

[0006] This application provides a safety monitoring method to address the problem that existing safety monitoring schemes have poor monitoring accuracy in complex operating environments, which may lead to unnecessary alarms, causing the entire locomotive to lose power and affecting the continuity and availability of railway transportation.

[0007] This application also provides a safety monitoring device to address the problem that existing safety monitoring schemes have poor monitoring accuracy in complex operating environments, which may lead to unnecessary alarms, causing the entire locomotive to lose power and affecting the continuity and availability of railway transportation.

[0008] This application also provides a safety monitoring device to address the problem that existing safety monitoring schemes have poor monitoring accuracy in complex operating environments, which may lead to unnecessary alarms, causing the entire locomotive to lose power and affecting the continuity and availability of railway transportation.

[0009] This application also provides a computer-readable storage medium to address the problem that existing safety monitoring schemes have poor monitoring accuracy in complex operating environments, which may lead to unnecessary alarms, causing the entire locomotive to lose power and affecting the continuity and availability of railway transportation.

[0010] A computer program product is provided to address the problem that existing product recommendation schemes suffer from poor monitoring accuracy in complex operating environments, which may lead to unnecessary alarms, causing the entire locomotive to lose power and affecting the continuity and availability of railway transportation.

[0011] The embodiments of this application adopt the following technical solutions: A safety monitoring method includes: acquiring operational data of a hydrogen-powered locomotive to be monitored, and gas detection data from multiple sensors installed in the hydrogen supply system of the locomotive, wherein the gas detection data includes gas concentration data, pressure data, and temperature data; determining an alarm threshold corresponding to the current operational state based on the operational data; determining whether a gas leak exists based on the alarm threshold and the gas detection data; when the determination result is yes, determining the pressure data and gas concentration data of the main pipeline and each branch pipeline in the hydrogen supply system based on the pipeline topology of the hydrogen supply system, and determining the location of the leak source based on the pressure data and the gas concentration data; and implementing a graded protection strategy based on the location of the leak source and the degree of leakage.

[0012] A safety monitoring device includes: a data acquisition unit, configured to acquire operating data of a hydrogen-powered locomotive under monitoring, and gas detection data from multiple sensors installed in the hydrogen supply system of the locomotive, wherein the gas detection data includes gas concentration data, pressure data, and temperature data; a leak identification unit, configured to determine an alarm threshold corresponding to the current operating state based on the operating data, and determine whether a gas leak exists based on the alarm threshold and the gas detection data; a leak source determination unit, configured to, when the determination result is yes, determine the pressure data and gas concentration data of the main pipeline and each branch pipeline in the hydrogen supply system based on the pipeline topology of the hydrogen supply system, and determine the location of the leak source based on the pressure data and the gas concentration data; and a leak protection unit, configured to execute a graded protection strategy based on the location of the leak source and the degree of leakage.

[0013] A safety monitoring device, comprising: The system includes a processor and a memory configured to store computer-executable instructions, which, when executed, cause the processor to perform the following operations: acquire operating data of the hydrogen-powered locomotive to be monitored, and gas detection data from multiple sensors installed in the hydrogen supply system of the locomotive, wherein the gas detection data includes gas concentration data, pressure data, and temperature data; determine an alarm threshold corresponding to the current operating state based on the operating data, and determine whether a gas leak exists based on the alarm threshold and the gas detection data; when the determination result is yes, determine the pressure data and gas concentration data of the main pipeline and each branch pipeline in the hydrogen supply system based on the pipeline topology of the hydrogen supply system, and determine the location of the leak source based on the pressure data and the gas concentration data; and execute a graded protection strategy based on the location of the leak source and the degree of leakage.

[0014] A computer-readable storage medium stores one or more programs that, when executed by an electronic device including multiple applications, cause the electronic device to perform the following operations: acquire, respectively, operational data of a hydrogen-powered locomotive to be monitored, and gas detection data from multiple sensors installed in the hydrogen supply system of the locomotive, wherein the gas detection data includes gas concentration data, pressure data, and temperature data; determine an alarm threshold corresponding to the current operational state based on the operational data, and determine whether a gas leak exists based on the alarm threshold and the gas detection data; when the determination result is yes, determine the pressure data and gas concentration data of the main pipeline and each branch pipeline in the hydrogen supply system based on the pipeline topology of the hydrogen supply system, and determine the location of the leak source based on the pressure data and the gas concentration data; and execute a graded protection strategy based on the location of the leak source and the degree of leakage.

[0015] A computer program product includes a computer program that, when executed by a processor, performs the following: acquiring operational data of a hydrogen-powered locomotive to be monitored, and gas detection data from multiple sensors installed in the hydrogen supply system of the locomotive, wherein the gas detection data includes gas concentration data, pressure data, and temperature data; determining an alarm threshold corresponding to the current operational state based on the operational data; determining whether a gas leak exists based on the alarm threshold and the gas detection data; when the determination result is yes, determining the pressure data and gas concentration data of the main pipeline and each branch pipeline in the hydrogen supply system based on the pipeline topology of the hydrogen supply system, and determining the location of the leak source based on the pressure data and the gas concentration data; and executing a graded protection strategy based on the location of the leak source and the degree of leakage.

[0016] The above-described technical solutions adopted in the embodiments of this application can achieve the following beneficial effects: Using the safety monitoring method provided in this application embodiment, when monitoring the safety of locomotive operation, the operating data of the hydrogen-powered locomotive to be monitored and the gas detection data of multiple sensors installed in the hydrogen supply system of the hydrogen-powered locomotive can be acquired respectively. Then, based on the operating data, an alarm threshold corresponding to the current operating state is determined, and based on the alarm threshold and each gas detection data, it is determined whether there is a gas leak. When the determination result is yes, based on the pipeline topology of the hydrogen supply system, the pressure data of the main pipeline and each branch pipeline in the hydrogen supply system and the gas concentration data to be monitored are determined, and the location of the leak source is determined based on the pressure data and the gas concentration data to be monitored. Finally, a graded protection strategy can be executed according to the location of the leak source and the degree of leakage. The safety monitoring method provided in this application has two advantages. First, by acquiring real-time operating data of the hydrogen-powered locomotive (such as speed and tunnel status), an alarm threshold matching the current operating state is dynamically determined, rather than using a fixed threshold as in traditional solutions. This dynamic setting allows the leak detection logic to adaptively match the hydrogen diffusion characteristics under different operating conditions. In poorly ventilated conditions such as tunnels or parking, it can effectively avoid false alarms caused by the slow accumulation of hydrogen and unnecessary shutdowns, thereby achieving dynamic adaptation to the complex and ever-changing railway operating environment and significantly improving the sensitivity and reliability of leak detection. Second, after determining that a leak exists, the pressure and concentration data of the main pipeline and each branch can be jointly analyzed based on the inherent pipeline topology of the hydrogen supply system. By comparing the changes in pressure difference, concentration distribution patterns, and the rate of pressure drop in the main pipeline, the method can effectively detect leaks. By utilizing multi-dimensional information such as leakage rate, the system can accurately distinguish leakage sources, enabling it to take differentiated measures for leaks at different locations. Finally, the invention can implement a tiered protection strategy based on the location and severity of the leakage source. When a minor leak is detected, only enhanced ventilation measures are activated and an early warning is issued, without cutting off the hydrogen supply path, minimizing disruption to normal operation. When a leak is detected in a specific branch, only the faulty branch is isolated, while the remaining healthy branches are controlled to maintain the locomotive's degraded operation, allowing the vehicle to continue to travel to the maintenance station with partial power. When a rupture in the main hydrogen supply pipeline or multiple serious leaks are detected, an emergency shutdown of the entire system is executed. Through this tiered protection strategy, while ensuring locomotive operation safety, the continuity and availability of railway transportation are maximized, effectively reducing the huge operational losses and secondary safety risks caused by the shutdown of the entire train due to minor local faults. Attached Figure Description

[0017] The accompanying drawings, which are included to provide a further understanding of this application and form part of this application, illustrate exemplary embodiments and are used to explain this application, but do not constitute an undue limitation of this application. In the drawings: Figure 1This is a schematic diagram of the specific structure of a security monitoring system provided in an embodiment of this application; Figure 2 This is a schematic diagram illustrating a specific process of a security monitoring method provided in an embodiment of this application; Figure 3 This is a schematic flowchart illustrating a method for locating a leakage source provided in an embodiment of this application. Figure 4 This is a schematic diagram illustrating a tiered prevention and control method provided in an embodiment of this application. Figure 5 This is a schematic diagram of the specific structure of a safety monitoring device provided in an embodiment of this application; Figure 6 This is a schematic diagram of the specific structure of a safety monitoring device provided in an embodiment of this application. Detailed Implementation

[0018] To make the objectives, technical solutions, and advantages of this application clearer, the technical solutions of this application will be clearly and completely described below in conjunction with specific embodiments and corresponding drawings. Obviously, the described embodiments are only a part of the embodiments of this application, and not all of them. Based on the embodiments in this application, all other embodiments obtained by those skilled in the art without creative effort are within the scope of protection of this application.

[0019] This application provides a safety monitoring method to address the problem that existing safety monitoring schemes have poor monitoring accuracy in complex operating environments, which may lead to unnecessary alarms, causing the entire locomotive to lose power and affecting the continuity and availability of railway transportation.

[0020] For ease of description, the following description uses a safety monitoring system installed on a hydrogen-powered locomotive as an example to illustrate the implementation of this method. It should be understood that using a safety monitoring system as the implementing entity is merely an illustrative example and should not be construed as a limitation of the method.

[0021] In this embodiment of the application, the specific structure of the security monitoring system is as follows: Figure 1 As shown, it mainly includes a multi-point distributed sensor network, an environmental sensing module, a zoned valve matrix, and a Safety Domain Controller (SDC).

[0022] The multi-point distributed sensor network can consist of multiple hydrogen concentration sensors, pressure sensors, and temperature sensors. In this embodiment, these sensors can be installed at several key locations, including: the outlet valves of each hydrogen storage cylinder, the joint nodes along the main hydrogen supply pipeline, the inlet and outlet of each fuel cell stack hydrogen supply branch, the internal space of the stack housing, and the exhaust port area on the top of the locomotive.

[0023] In this embodiment, the hydrogen concentration sensor can adopt the infrared absorption principle, with a detection range covering 0 to 100% of the lower explosive limit (LEL), a resolution of not less than 0.1% LEL, and a response time of less than 3 seconds; the pressure sensor has a range of 0 to 50 MPa, an accuracy class of 0.5, and a sampling frequency of not less than 10 Hz; the temperature sensor adopts the platinum resistance thermometer Pt100 type, with a temperature measurement range of -40℃ to +150℃ and an accuracy of ±0.5℃.

[0024] This environmental perception module can be integrated into the locomotive's onboard control system and includes a speed sensor, a Global Navigation Satellite System (GNSS) receiver, a tunnel identification unit, and an ambient temperature sensor. The speed sensor detects the locomotive's real-time operating speed v (km / h) with an update cycle of 100 ms; the GNSS receiver detects the locomotive's current latitude, longitude, and altitude; and the tunnel identification unit outputs a binary tunnel status signal (Tunnel) based on track circuit signals or preset geofence information. Flag Among them, Tunnel Flag =1 indicates that the locomotive is in a sealed environment, Tunnel Flag =0 indicates that the locomotive is in an open environment; the ambient temperature sensor is used to measure the ambient air temperature T. env Accuracy ±1℃.

[0025] The valve matrix of this zone mainly includes a main shut-off valve and multiple branch isolation valves. The main shut-off valve is located between the outlet of the hydrogen storage tank group and the starting end of the main hydrogen supply pipeline. The branch isolation valves are located at the hydrogen supply inlet and exhaust outlet of each fuel cell stack. Each stack corresponds to two independently controlled solenoid valves, and their opening / closing response time does not exceed 50 ms.

[0026] This safety domain controller is an embedded computing unit that conforms to the IEC 61508 SIL 3 functional safety level. It communicates with the sensor network, environmental sensing module, and central control unit (CCU) of the locomotive via CAN FD bus, and directly drives the zoned valve matrix through a hard-wired control interface. The SDC internally stores a "flow field-concentration mapping model", a "leakage source location algorithm module", and "graded response decision logic".

[0027] Based on the aforementioned security monitoring system, a schematic diagram illustrating the specific implementation process of the security monitoring method provided in this application is shown below. Figure 2 As shown, the main steps include the following: Step 11: Obtain the operating data of the hydrogen-powered locomotive to be monitored, as well as the gas detection data from multiple sensors installed in the hydrogen supply system of the hydrogen-powered locomotive. In this embodiment of the application, the safety monitoring system can acquire the operating data of the hydrogen fuel cell vehicle to be monitored in real time through the safety domain controller, and acquire the gas detection data of the hydrogen fuel cell vehicle to be monitored through multiple sensors installed in the hydrogen supply system.

[0028] In one embodiment, the operating data may include locomotive operating speed v and environmental status indicators. The locomotive operating speed v can be monitored in real time by a speed sensor installed at the bottom of the locomotive. This sensor is based on the principle of electromagnetic induction, detects the frequency of wheel rotation to calculate the locomotive operating speed, and uploads the data to the vehicle operation safety monitoring equipment with a time resolution of milliseconds.

[0029] It should be noted that the locomotive's operating speed, v, is a crucial input parameter for safety monitoring. It not only reflects the locomotive's dynamic characteristics but also provides a key basis for setting subsequent alarm thresholds. For example, at high speeds, hydrogen leaks diffuse more rapidly due to the dilution effect of external airflow, thus requiring stricter concentration thresholds to ensure safety.

[0030] Furthermore, in this embodiment, the environmental status identifier can be the binarized tunnel status signal Tunnel output by the tunnel identification unit. Flag Together with the positioning information collected by the GNSS receiving unit, it is determined that the Tunnel Flag =1 indicates that the locomotive is in a sealed environment, Tunnel Flag=0 indicates that the locomotive is in an open environment. It should be noted that, in this embodiment, an open environment typically refers to the locomotive traveling in an open area or outside a tunnel, where hydrogen leakage is easily dispersed; while a confined environment includes tunnels, garages, and other space-limited areas, where hydrogen leakage may cause a rapid increase in local concentration, thereby increasing safety risks. Subsequently, by combining operating speed and environmental status indicators, the likelihood of hydrogen leakage and its potential hazards can be assessed more accurately.

[0031] In this embodiment, the gas detection data may include: hydrogen concentration data measured by concentration sensors at the outlet of each hydrogen storage cylinder valve, hydrogen concentration data measured by concentration sensors at each joint node along the main pipeline, hydrogen concentration data measured by concentration sensors at the inlet of each branch, hydrogen concentration data measured by concentration sensors at the fuel cell stack exhaust port, as well as the main pipeline pressure, the corresponding branch pressure, the cylinder pressure of each cylinder group, and the ambient temperature and equipment compartment temperature measured by temperature sensors. All data is transmitted to the safety domain controller (SDC) via the CAN FD bus at a sampling frequency of not less than 10 Hz.

[0032] Step 12: Based on the operating data obtained by executing Step 11, determine the alarm threshold corresponding to the current operating status, and based on the alarm threshold and each gas detection data, determine whether there is a gas leak. In this embodiment, the Safety Domain Controller (SDC) can determine an alarm threshold corresponding to the current operating state based on the locomotive operating speed v and environmental status indicators, following the sub-steps below, and determine whether a gas leak exists based on the threshold and various gas detection data, including: Sub-step 1201: Classify the current operating scenario of the hydrogen-powered locomotive to be monitored based on the locomotive's operating speed v and the environmental status indicator; Specifically, the Safety Domain Controller (SDC) reads the current locomotive operating speed v and the environmental status flags: If the locomotive's operating speed v > 80 km / h and the environmental status is marked as open environment, then the locomotive's current operating scenario is determined to be a high-speed open environment scenario, which will be referred to as scenario A below for ease of description.

[0033] If the locomotive's operating speed v ≤ 5 km / h and the environmental status is marked as a closed environment, or v=0 and the duration exceeds 30 seconds, then the locomotive's current operating scenario is determined to be a low-speed / stopped closed environment scenario, which will be referred to as scenario B below for ease of description.

[0034] If the locomotive's operating speed v ∈ [5, 80] km / h and the environmental status is identified as an open environment, then the locomotive's current operating scenario is determined to be a transitional scenario, which will be referred to as scenario C for ease of description.

[0035] Sub-step 1202: Set the alarm threshold corresponding to scenario A, and determine whether there is a gas leak based on the set alarm threshold and the gas detection data. In high-speed, open environments, the external airflow has a strong dilution effect on leaked hydrogen, easily causing distortion in instantaneous concentration readings. Therefore, the Safety Domain Controller (SDC) can set the system's alarm threshold to a first concentration threshold. In this embodiment, the SDC can set a first-level alarm threshold C based on the first concentration threshold. warn The threshold is 2% LEL, and the secondary alarm threshold is C. alarm It is 4% LEL.

[0036] Meanwhile, in order to improve the anti-interference capability of concentration data processing, the safety monitoring system can perform moving average filtering on the gas concentration sequence collected by each sensor to obtain the moving average value, as shown in the following formula [1]: [1] The size of the filter window can be dynamically adjusted according to the sampling frequency, and is usually set to the number of sampling points within 10 seconds.

[0037] In this embodiment of the application, only when If the gas leak is detected, a potential gas leak is identified, triggering an early warning status; if the gas leak is detected, an early warning status is triggered. If the leakage persists for more than 1 second, the process enters the leakage confirmation phase.

[0038] Sub-step 1203: Set the alarm threshold corresponding to scenario B, and determine whether there is a gas leak based on the set alarm threshold and the gas detection data. In scenario B, due to the slow locomotive speed and the confined environment (such as a tunnel), hydrogen diffusion is limited, and the concentration accumulates slowly. Therefore, the safety domain controller SDC maintains the alarm threshold C. alarm The concentration rise rate is 4% LEL, but the concentration rise rate is introduced as an auxiliary criterion. The Safety Domain Controller (SDC) performs first-order difference calculation on the concentration signal of each sensor channel to obtain the rise rate, as shown in the following formula [2]: [2] in, .

[0039] In this embodiment of the application, only when both conditions are met... and Only when this occurs is it considered an effective leakage trend, and an early warning state is entered; if and If it lasts for 2 seconds, it is confirmed as a leak.

[0040] Sub-step 1204: Set the alarm threshold corresponding to scenario C, and determine whether there is a gas leak based on the set alarm threshold and the gas detection data. For scenario C, the security domain controller (SDC) can dynamically adjust the alarm threshold using linear interpolation. The normalized velocity factor α is defined as shown in the following formula [3]: [3] This allows setting a first-level alarm threshold C. warn As shown in the following formula [4]: [4] The secondary alarm threshold remains unchanged at 4% LEL. Meanwhile, the integral judgment time window is also linearly adjusted according to the following formula [5]: [5] This ensures that sensitivity and anti-interference capabilities are balanced during medium-speed operation.

[0041] Step 13: When it is determined that there is a gas leak by performing the above step 12, the pressure data and gas concentration data of the main pipeline and each branch in the hydrogen supply system are determined based on the pipeline topology of the hydrogen supply system, and the location of the leak source is determined according to the pressure data and the gas concentration data. In this embodiment, it is assumed that the hydrogen-powered locomotive under monitoring is equipped with N hydrogen storage cylinders (N≥2) and M fuel cell stacks (M≥2). The main hydrogen supply pipeline connects all the outlets of the hydrogen storage cylinders via a single main pipeline, and supplies each fuel cell stack through M independent branch pipelines. A total pressure sensor is installed at the beginning of the main pipeline. A branch pressure sensor is installed at the entrance of each branch. (j=1,2,…,M), a hydrogen concentration sensor is installed at the end of each branch. .

[0042] In this embodiment of the application, when any concentration sensor After a warning or alarm is triggered, the safety monitoring system can confirm the location of the leak source by following these sub-steps: Sub-step 1301: Obtain the total pressure data corresponding to the main pipeline and the branch pressure data of each branch pipeline; In this embodiment of the application, the security monitoring system can read the current time in real time. ,all and The values ​​are then used to obtain the total pressure data corresponding to the main pipeline and the branch pressure data of each branch.

[0043] Sub-step 1302: Based on the total pressure data and branch pressure data obtained by executing sub-step 1301, determine the real-time pressure drop gradient corresponding to each branch. For each branch j, the pressure difference between its upstream and downstream sides, i.e., the pressure drop gradient, can be calculated according to the following formula [6]: [6] Under normal hydrogen supply conditions, the flow rate in each branch is balanced. It should be within the preset reference range. Within this range, the value was obtained through bench testing and calibration; a typical value is... , .

[0044] Sub-step 1303: Differential comparison to locate the leakage source; Specifically, the location of the leak source is determined by differentially comparing the real-time pressure drop gradient with a preset reference pressure drop range. The specific location process is as follows: Figure 3 As shown, it includes: 1. Single branch leakage determination: If there exists a branch j satisfying ,and Δ, where (δ is the abnormal pressure drop threshold, taken as 0.05 MPa), and the hydrogen concentration C_branch_j* in this branch ≥ 1%LEL (abnormal), while the concentrations of other branches k≠j are... ,and If the leak source is located in the hydrogen supply pipeline corresponding to branch j or inside the fuel cell stack, then the leak source is determined to be located in the fuel cell stack. Furthermore, if the concentration at the exhaust port of that branch is also detected... A significant increase (≥1% LEL) confirms that the leak occurred in the reactor chamber or its sealed interface.

[0045] 2. Judgment of leakage due to main pipeline rupture: If the real-time pressure drop gradient of each branch does not exceed the reference pressure drop range, that is, all ΔP j ∈ [ΔP min , ΔP max (), but the overall pressure A sudden drop occurs within a unit of time (1 second), the amount of which is ΔP. main If the pressure is ≥2 MPa and the concentration sensors at at least two different locations along the main pipeline exceed 10% LEL, it is determined that the main hydrogen supply pipeline has ruptured and leaked.

[0046] 3. Judgment of anomalies in multiple branches and upstream micro-leakage: If two or more non-adjacent branches occur simultaneously And corresponding Abnormally high, but main pipe pressure No sudden drop occurred. If the leak is detected, it is determined that there is a minor leak in the shared upstream pipeline (such as the main pipeline being close to the hydrogen storage cylinder section).

[0047] 4. Determination of leakage in the hydrogen storage cylinder itself: If the outlet concentration of a certain hydrogen storage cylinder valve is... And the rate of pressure drop in the bottle If the pressure in other cylinder groups is stable, then the source of the leak is identified as hydrogen storage cylinder number i.

[0048] It should be noted that in this embodiment, the relationship between pressure drop gradient and leakage can be verified based on the Hagen-Poiseuille law, according to the following formula [7]: [7] Where μ is the dynamic viscosity of hydrogen (which varies with temperature), L is the branch length, d is the inner diameter of the pipe, and Q is the volumetric flow rate. Under steady-state hydrogen supply conditions, Q can be inferred from the power demand of the fuel cell stack. In the embodiments of this application, the safety monitoring system can determine whether there is an abnormal local resistance by comparing the deviation between the measured ΔP and the theoretical ΔP, thereby assisting in locating the leak point.

[0049] Step 14: Based on the location and extent of the leak determined by step 13, implement a graded protection strategy; In this embodiment of the application, the safety monitoring system can implement a graded protection strategy based on the location of the leakage source determined in step 13 and the degree of leakage quantified by concentration value, pressure drop rate, etc.

[0050] In one implementation, this embodiment can define the following three-level response: Level 1 response strategy (micro-leakage warning), Level 2 response strategy (branch fault isolation), Level 3 response strategy (main pipe rupture or multiple serious leaks).

[0051] In one implementation, the execution conditions and execution process of the above-mentioned response strategies at each level are as follows: Figure 4 As shown, it includes: 1. Level 1 Response Strategy (Micro-Leakage Early Warning): The Level 1 response strategy is executed when the following conditions are met: the operating speed v of the hydrogen-powered locomotive under monitoring is greater than 80 km / h, it is in an open environment, and the triggering conditions for Level 2 or 3 response are not met (i.e., only a slight concentration fluctuation is detected but no leak is confirmed, or it is determined to be a minor leak). At this time, the safety monitoring system does not cut off any hydrogen supply path, but sends a command to the locomotive's ventilation control system to forcibly turn on the roof exhaust fan 27 to its maximum speed (≥3000 rpm) and activate the positive pressure airflow mode of the bottom air intake grille 28, forming a directional airflow from the bottom to the top of the equipment compartment to accelerate hydrogen exhaust. Simultaneously, the safety monitoring system uploads a warning message to the CCU, alerting the driver and recording the event in the log.

[0052] 2. Second-level response strategy (branch fault isolation): Specifically, when a leak is confirmed in a branch j* through step 13, the safety monitoring system immediately outputs two hard-wired control signals to simultaneously close the inlet solenoid valve of that branch. With outlet solenoid valve Physical isolation is achieved. After the isolation action is completed, the safety monitoring system recalculates the power allocation strategy for the remaining M-1 healthy fuel cell stacks and issues a degraded operation command to the fuel cell management system (FCS) through the CCU, limiting the total output power to 75% of the rated power. In this mode, the locomotive maintains traction capability, allowing the driver to drive to the nearest maintenance station or terminal station, achieving "returning to the depot with defects". At the same time, the system continuously monitors the pressure decay of the isolated branch, and if... If the downstream pressure does not drop below 0.1 MPa within 5 minutes, it is determined that there is internal leakage in the isolation valve, triggering a secondary upgrade alarm.

[0053] 3. Three-level response strategy (main pipe rupture or multiple severe leaks): In this embodiment of the application, a three-level response strategy is triggered when any of the following conditions are met: (1) (2) The concentration of the main body decreases by ≥2 MPa within 1 second; (3) Two or more non-adjacent branches report simultaneously and At this point, the security domain controller immediately executes a system-wide emergency shutdown: first, it closes the main circuit shut-off valve. First, all hydrogen sources are cut off; then, an emergency stop command is sent to the CCU to disconnect the electrical connection between the fuel cell and the traction converter; simultaneously, the inert gas injection system is activated to release nitrogen into the equipment compartment to dilute the residual hydrogen. The entire process is completed within 200 ms and is ensured to be irreversible through hard-wired interlocking.

[0054] Using the safety monitoring method provided in this application embodiment, when monitoring the safety of locomotive operation, the operating data of the hydrogen-powered locomotive to be monitored and the gas detection data of multiple sensors installed in the hydrogen supply system of the hydrogen-powered locomotive can be acquired respectively. Then, based on the operating data, an alarm threshold corresponding to the current operating state is determined, and based on the alarm threshold and each gas detection data, it is determined whether there is a gas leak. When the determination result is yes, based on the pipeline topology of the hydrogen supply system, the pressure data of the main pipeline and each branch pipeline in the hydrogen supply system and the gas concentration data to be monitored are determined, and the location of the leak source is determined based on the pressure data and the gas concentration data to be monitored. Finally, a graded protection strategy can be executed according to the location of the leak source and the degree of leakage. The safety monitoring method provided in this application has two advantages. First, by acquiring real-time operating data of the hydrogen-powered locomotive (such as speed and tunnel status), an alarm threshold matching the current operating state is dynamically determined, rather than using a fixed threshold as in traditional solutions. This dynamic setting allows the leak detection logic to adaptively match the hydrogen diffusion characteristics under different operating conditions. In poorly ventilated conditions such as tunnels or parking, it can effectively avoid false alarms caused by the slow accumulation of hydrogen and unnecessary shutdowns, thereby achieving dynamic adaptation to the complex and ever-changing railway operating environment and significantly improving the sensitivity and reliability of leak detection. Second, after determining that a leak exists, the pressure and concentration data of the main pipeline and each branch can be jointly analyzed based on the inherent pipeline topology of the hydrogen supply system. By comparing the changes in pressure difference, concentration distribution patterns, and the rate of pressure drop in the main pipeline, the method can effectively detect leaks. By utilizing multi-dimensional information such as leakage rate, the system can accurately distinguish leakage sources, enabling it to take differentiated measures for leaks at different locations. Finally, the invention can implement a tiered protection strategy based on the location and severity of the leakage source. When a minor leak is detected, only enhanced ventilation measures are activated and an early warning is issued, without cutting off the hydrogen supply path, minimizing disruption to normal operation. When a leak is detected in a specific branch, only the faulty branch is isolated, while the remaining healthy branches are controlled to maintain the locomotive's degraded operation, allowing the vehicle to continue to travel to the maintenance station with partial power. When a rupture in the main hydrogen supply pipeline or multiple serious leaks are detected, an emergency shutdown of the entire system is executed. Through this tiered protection strategy, while ensuring locomotive operation safety, the continuity and availability of railway transportation are maximized, effectively reducing the huge operational losses and secondary safety risks caused by the shutdown of the entire train due to minor local faults.

[0055] In one embodiment, this application also provides a safety monitoring device to address the problem that existing safety monitoring schemes suffer from poor monitoring accuracy in complex operating environments, potentially leading to unnecessary alarms, loss of power for the entire locomotive, and impacting the continuity and availability of railway transportation. A schematic diagram of the specific structure of this safety monitoring device is shown below. Figure 5As shown, it includes: a data acquisition unit 51, a leakage identification unit 52, a leakage source determination unit 53, and a leakage protection unit 54.

[0056] The data acquisition unit 51 is used to acquire the operating data of the hydrogen-powered locomotive to be monitored, as well as the gas detection data of multiple sensors installed in the hydrogen supply system of the hydrogen-powered locomotive. The gas detection data includes the concentration data, pressure data and temperature data of the gas to be monitored. The leakage identification unit 52 is used to determine an alarm threshold corresponding to the current operating state based on the operating data, and to determine whether there is a gas leak based on the alarm threshold and each of the gas detection data. The leak source determination unit 53 is used to determine the pressure data and gas concentration data of the main pipeline and each branch pipeline in the hydrogen supply system based on the pipeline topology of the hydrogen supply system when the judgment result is yes, and to determine the location of the leak source based on the pressure data and the gas concentration data. The leakage protection unit 54 is used to implement a graded protection strategy based on the location of the leakage source and the degree of leakage.

[0057] In one embodiment, the data includes the locomotive's operating speed and an environmental status indicator. The leakage detection unit 52 is specifically configured to: when the operating speed is greater than a first preset speed threshold, and the environmental status indicator indicates that the hydrogen-powered locomotive under monitoring is in an open environment, set the alarm threshold to a first concentration threshold, perform a moving average filtering process on the concentration data in the gas detection data to obtain a first average concentration value, and determine whether a gas leak exists based on the comparison between the first average concentration value and the first concentration threshold; when the operating speed is less than a second preset speed threshold, and the environmental status indicator indicates that the hydrogen-powered locomotive under monitoring is in a closed environment, set the alarm threshold to the first concentration threshold, determine the rising rate corresponding to the concentration data, perform a moving average filtering process on the concentration data in the gas detection data to obtain a first average concentration value, and determine whether a gas leak exists based on the comparison between the first average concentration value, the first concentration threshold, and the rising rate; when the operating speed is between the first preset speed threshold and the second preset speed threshold, dynamically set the alarm threshold based on the operating speed using a linear interpolation method.

[0058] In one embodiment, the leak source determination unit 53 is specifically configured to: acquire the total pressure data corresponding to the main pipeline and the branch pressure data of each branch; determine the real-time pressure drop gradient corresponding to each branch based on the total pressure data and the branch pressure data; perform a differential comparison between the real-time pressure drop gradient and a preset reference pressure drop range; if it is determined that the real-time pressure drop gradient of a single branch exceeds the reference pressure drop range and the concentration data of the branch is abnormal, then the single branch is determined to be the location of the leak source; if it is determined that the real-time pressure drop gradient of each branch does not exceed the reference pressure drop range, the pressure data of the main pipeline drops sharply within a unit time, and the concentration data along the main pipeline is abnormal, then the main pipeline is determined to have ruptured and leaked.

[0059] In one embodiment, the leakage protection unit 54 is specifically used for: when it is determined that a single branch is the source of leakage and the degree of leakage does not reach a preset severity level, executing a secondary response strategy, wherein the secondary response strategy includes physically isolating the leaking branch and redetermining the power allocation strategy for the remaining branches; when it is determined that the main pipeline has ruptured and leaked, or that multiple branches are the source of leakage, executing a tertiary response strategy, wherein the tertiary response strategy includes shutting down the main pipeline, disconnecting the electrical connection between the fuel cell and the traction converter, and starting the inert gas injection system to inertify the equipment compartment.

[0060] In one embodiment, the leakage protection unit 54 is specifically used to: execute a first-level response strategy when the operating speed of the hydrogen fuel cell vehicle to be monitored is greater than a first preset speed threshold, the hydrogen fuel cell vehicle to be monitored is in an open environment, and the triggering conditions of the second-level response strategy are not met. The first-level response strategy includes activating the ventilation control system of the hydrogen fuel cell vehicle to be monitored, turning on the roof exhaust fan to its maximum speed, and activating the positive pressure air supply mode of the bottom air intake grille.

[0061] In one embodiment, a verification unit is further included, specifically used to collect pressure decay data of the downstream pipeline of the leaking branch according to the pipeline topology of the hydrogen supply system after executing the secondary response strategy and completing the physical isolation of the leaking branch; when the collected pressure decay data is greater than the preset safe pressure threshold within the preset monitoring time, an alarm escalation signal is triggered.

[0062] Using the safety monitoring device provided in this application embodiment, when monitoring the safety of locomotive operation, it can acquire the operating data of the hydrogen-powered locomotive to be monitored, as well as the gas detection data of multiple sensors installed in the hydrogen supply system of the hydrogen-powered locomotive. Then, based on the operating data, it determines the alarm threshold corresponding to the current operating state, and based on the alarm threshold and each gas detection data, it determines whether there is a gas leak. When the determination result is yes, based on the pipeline topology of the hydrogen supply system, it determines the pressure data of the main pipeline and each branch pipeline in the hydrogen supply system and the gas concentration data to be monitored, and based on the pressure data and the gas concentration data to be monitored, it determines the location of the leak source. Finally, it can execute a graded protection strategy according to the location of the leak source and the degree of leakage. The safety monitoring device provided in this application has two advantages. First, by acquiring real-time operating data of the hydrogen-powered locomotive (such as speed and tunnel conditions), it dynamically determines an alarm threshold that matches the current operating state, rather than using a fixed threshold as in traditional solutions. This dynamic setting allows the leak detection logic to adaptively match the hydrogen diffusion characteristics under different operating conditions. In poorly ventilated conditions such as tunnels or parking, it effectively avoids false alarms caused by the slow accumulation of hydrogen and unnecessary shutdowns, thereby achieving dynamic adaptation to the complex and ever-changing railway operating environment and significantly improving the sensitivity and reliability of leak detection. Second, after determining that a leak exists, it can analyze the pressure and concentration data of the main pipeline and each branch based on the inherent pipeline topology of the hydrogen supply system. By comparing the changes in pressure difference, concentration distribution patterns, and the rate of pressure drop in the main pipeline, it can effectively detect leaks. By utilizing multi-dimensional information such as leakage rate, the system can accurately distinguish leakage sources, enabling it to take differentiated measures for leaks at different locations. Finally, the invention can implement a tiered protection strategy based on the location and severity of the leakage source. When a minor leak is detected, only enhanced ventilation measures are activated and an early warning is issued, without cutting off the hydrogen supply path, minimizing disruption to normal operation. When a leak is detected in a specific branch, only the faulty branch is isolated, while the remaining healthy branches are controlled to maintain the locomotive's degraded operation, allowing the vehicle to continue to travel to the maintenance station with partial power. When a rupture in the main hydrogen supply pipeline or multiple serious leaks are detected, an emergency shutdown of the entire system is executed. Through this tiered protection strategy, while ensuring locomotive operation safety, the continuity and availability of railway transportation are maximized, effectively reducing the huge operational losses and secondary safety risks caused by the shutdown of the entire train due to minor local faults.

[0063] Figure 6 This is a schematic diagram of the structure of an electronic device according to an embodiment of this application. Please refer to it. Figure 6At the hardware level, the electronic device includes a processor, and optionally also includes an internal bus, a network interface, and memory. The memory may include main memory, such as high-speed random-access memory (RAM), or non-volatile memory, such as at least one disk drive. Of course, the electronic device may also include other hardware required for other business operations.

[0064] The processor, network interface, and memory can be interconnected via an internal bus, which can be an ISA (Industry Standard Architecture) bus, a PCI (Peripheral Component Interconnect) bus, or an EISA (Extended Industry Standard Architecture) bus, etc. This bus can be divided into address bus, data bus, control bus, etc. For ease of representation, Figure 6 The symbol is represented by a single double-headed arrow, but this does not mean that there is only one bus or one type of bus.

[0065] Memory is used to store programs. Specifically, programs may include program code, which includes computer operation instructions. Memory may include main memory and non-volatile memory, and provides instructions and data to the processor.

[0066] The processor reads the corresponding computer program from non-volatile memory into main memory and then runs it, forming a security monitoring device at the logical level. The processor executes the program stored in memory and specifically performs the following operations: The system acquires operational data from the hydrogen-powered locomotive under monitoring, as well as gas detection data from multiple sensors installed in the hydrogen supply system of the locomotive. The gas detection data includes the concentration, pressure, and temperature of the gas to be monitored. Based on the operational data, an alarm threshold corresponding to the current operational state is determined. Based on the alarm threshold and the gas detection data, it is determined whether a gas leak exists. If the determination is positive, based on the pipeline topology of the hydrogen supply system, the pressure data and the concentration data of the gas to be monitored for the main pipeline and each branch pipeline in the hydrogen supply system are determined. The location of the leak source is determined based on the pressure data and the concentration data of the gas to be monitored. A graded protection strategy is implemented based on the location of the leak source and the degree of leakage.

[0067] The above is as stated in this application. Figure 6The methods performed by the security monitoring electronic equipment disclosed in the illustrated embodiments can be applied to a processor or implemented by a processor. The processor may be an integrated circuit chip with signal processing capabilities. During implementation, each step of the above method can be completed by integrated logic circuits in the processor's hardware or by instructions in software form. The processor can be a general-purpose processor, including a Central Processing Unit (CPU), a Network Processor (NP), etc.; it can also be a Digital Signal Processor (DSP), an Application Specific Integrated Circuit (ASIC), a Field-Programmable Gate Array (FPGA), or other programmable logic devices, discrete gate or transistor logic devices, or discrete hardware components. It can implement or execute the methods, steps, and logic block diagrams disclosed in the embodiments of this application. The general-purpose processor can be a microprocessor or any conventional processor. The steps of the methods disclosed in the embodiments of this application can be directly manifested as being executed by a hardware decoding processor, or executed by a combination of hardware and software modules in the decoding processor. The software module can reside in a mature storage medium in the field, such as random access memory, flash memory, read-only memory, programmable read-only memory, electrically erasable programmable memory, or registers. This storage medium is located in memory, and the processor reads information from the memory and, in conjunction with its hardware, completes the steps of the above method.

[0068] Of course, in addition to software implementation, the electronic device of this application does not exclude other implementation methods, such as logic devices or a combination of hardware and software, etc. In other words, the execution subject of the following processing flow is not limited to each logic unit, but can also be hardware or logic devices.

[0069] This application also proposes a computer-readable storage medium that stores one or more programs, the programs including instructions that, when executed by a portable electronic device including multiple applications, enable the portable electronic device to perform... Figure 2 The security monitoring method shown in the embodiment is specifically used to perform the following operations: The system acquires operational data from the hydrogen-powered locomotive under monitoring, as well as gas detection data from multiple sensors installed in the hydrogen supply system of the locomotive. The gas detection data includes the concentration, pressure, and temperature of the gas to be monitored. Based on the operational data, an alarm threshold corresponding to the current operational state is determined. Based on the alarm threshold and the gas detection data, it is determined whether a gas leak exists. If the determination is positive, based on the pipeline topology of the hydrogen supply system, the pressure data and the concentration data of the gas to be monitored for the main pipeline and each branch pipeline in the hydrogen supply system are determined. The location of the leak source is determined based on the pressure data and the concentration data of the gas to be monitored. A graded protection strategy is implemented based on the location of the leak source and the degree of leakage.

[0070] Those skilled in the art will understand that embodiments of the present invention can be provided as methods, systems, or computer program products. Therefore, the present invention can take the form of a completely hardware embodiment, a completely software embodiment, or an embodiment combining software and hardware aspects. Furthermore, the present invention can take the form of a computer program product embodied on one or more computer-usable storage media (including, but not limited to, disk storage, CD-ROM, optical storage, etc.) containing computer-usable program code.

[0071] This invention is described with reference to flowchart illustrations and / or block diagrams of methods, apparatus (systems), and computer program products according to embodiments of the invention. It will be understood that each block of the flowchart illustrations and / or block diagrams, and combinations of blocks in the flowchart illustrations and / or block diagrams, can be implemented by computer program instructions. These computer program instructions can be provided to a processor of a general-purpose computer, special-purpose computer, embedded processor, or other programmable data processing apparatus to produce a machine, such that the instructions, which execute via the processor of the computer or other programmable data processing apparatus, generate instructions for implementing the flowchart illustrations and / or block diagrams. Figure 1 One or more processes and / or boxes Figure 1 A device that provides the functions specified in one or more boxes.

[0072] These computer program instructions may also be stored in a computer-readable storage medium that can direct a computer or other programmable data processing device to function in a particular manner, such that the instructions stored in the computer-readable storage medium produce an article of manufacture including instruction means, which are implemented in a process Figure 1 One or more processes and / or boxes Figure 1 The function specified in one or more boxes.

[0073] These computer program instructions may also be loaded onto a computer or other programmable data processing equipment to cause a series of operational steps to be performed on the computer or other programmable equipment to produce a computer-implemented process, thereby providing instructions that execute on the computer or other programmable equipment for implementing the process. Figure 1 One or more processes and / or boxes Figure 1 The steps of the function specified in one or more boxes.

[0074] In a typical configuration, a computing device includes one or more processors (CPU), input / output interfaces, network interfaces, and memory.

[0075] Memory may include non-persistent storage in computer-readable media, such as random access memory (RAM) and / or non-volatile memory, such as read-only memory (ROM) or flash RAM. Memory is an example of computer-readable media.

[0076] Computer-readable media includes both permanent and non-permanent, removable and non-removable media that can store information using any method or technology. Information can be computer-readable instructions, data structures, modules of programs, or other data. Examples of computer storage media include, but are not limited to, phase-change memory (PRAM), static random access memory (SRAM), dynamic random access memory (DRAM), other types of random access memory (RAM), read-only memory (ROM), electrically erasable programmable read-only memory (EEPROM), flash memory or other memory technologies, CD-ROM, digital versatile optical disc (DVD) or other optical storage, magnetic tape, magnetic magnetic disk storage or other magnetic storage devices, or any other non-transferable medium that can be used to store information accessible by a computing device. As defined herein, computer-readable media does not include transient computer-readable media, such as modulated data signals and carrier waves.

[0077] It should also be noted that the terms "comprising," "including," or any other variations thereof are intended to cover non-exclusive inclusion, such that a process, method, article, or apparatus that comprises a list of elements includes not only those elements but also other elements not expressly listed, or elements inherent to such a process, method, article, or apparatus. Without further limitation, an element defined by the phrase "comprising one..." does not exclude the presence of other identical elements in the process, method, article, or apparatus that includes said element.

[0078] Those skilled in the art will understand that embodiments of this application can be provided as methods, systems, or computer program products. Therefore, this application can take the form of a completely hardware embodiment, a completely software embodiment, or an embodiment combining software and hardware aspects. Furthermore, this application can take the form of a computer program product embodied on one or more computer-usable storage media (including, but not limited to, disk storage, CD-ROM, optical storage, etc.) containing computer-usable program code.

[0079] The above description is merely an embodiment of this application and is not intended to limit the scope of this application. Various modifications and variations can be made to this application by those skilled in the art. Any modifications, equivalent substitutions, improvements, etc., made within the spirit and principles of this application should be included within the scope of the claims of this application.

Claims

1. A safety monitoring method, characterized by, include: The operation data of the hydrogen-powered locomotive to be monitored and the gas detection data of multiple sensors installed in the hydrogen supply system of the hydrogen-powered locomotive are acquired respectively. The gas detection data includes the concentration data, pressure data and temperature data of the gas to be monitored. Based on the operational data, an alarm threshold corresponding to the current operational status is determined. Based on the alarm threshold and each of the gas detection data, it is determined whether there is a gas leak. When the judgment result is yes, based on the pipeline topology of the hydrogen supply system, the pressure data and gas concentration data of the main pipeline and each branch in the hydrogen supply system are determined, and the location of the leak source is determined according to the pressure data and the gas concentration data. A graded protection strategy is implemented based on the location of the leakage source and the extent of the leakage.

2. The method of claim 1, wherein, The operational data includes locomotive speed and environmental status indicators; The step of determining an alarm threshold corresponding to the current operating state based on the operating data, and determining whether a gas leak exists based on the alarm threshold and the gas detection data, specifically includes: When the operating speed is greater than the first preset speed threshold, and the monitored hydrogen fuel cell vehicle is determined to be in an open environment according to the environmental status indicator, the alarm threshold is set to the first concentration threshold, and the concentration data in the gas detection data is subjected to moving average filtering to obtain the first average concentration value. Based on the comparison result between the first average concentration value and the first concentration threshold, it is determined whether there is a gas leak. When the operating speed is less than the second preset speed threshold, and the monitored hydrogen locomotive is determined to be in a closed environment according to the environmental status indicator, the alarm threshold is set to the first concentration threshold, and the rising rate corresponding to the concentration data is determined. The concentration data in the gas detection data is subjected to moving average filtering to obtain the first average concentration value. Based on the comparison result of the first average concentration value, the first concentration threshold, and the rising rate, it is determined whether there is a gas leak. When the operating speed is between the first preset speed threshold and the second preset speed threshold, the alarm threshold is dynamically set based on the operating speed using linear interpolation.

3. The method of claim 1, wherein, Based on the pipeline topology of the hydrogen supply system, the pressure data and gas concentration data of the main pipeline and each branch pipeline in the hydrogen supply system are determined, and the location of the leak source is determined according to the pressure data and the gas concentration data. Specifically, this includes: Obtain the total pressure data corresponding to the main pipeline and the branch pressure data of each branch pipeline; Based on the total pressure data and the branch pressure data, determine the real-time pressure drop gradient corresponding to each branch; The real-time pressure drop gradient is compared differentially with a preset reference pressure drop range; If it is determined that the real-time pressure drop gradient of a single branch exceeds the reference pressure drop range, and the concentration data of the branch is abnormal, then the single branch is determined to be the location of the leakage source. If the real-time pressure drop gradient of each branch does not exceed the reference pressure drop range, the pressure data of the main pipeline drops sharply within a unit time, and the concentration data along the main pipeline is abnormal, then it is determined that the main pipeline has ruptured and leaked.

4. The method of claim 1, wherein, The step of implementing a graded protection strategy based on the location and extent of the leak source specifically includes: When it is determined that a single branch is the source of leakage and the degree of leakage has not reached the preset severity level, a secondary response strategy is executed. The secondary response strategy includes physically isolating the leaking branch and redetermining the power allocation strategy for the remaining branches. When it is determined that the main pipeline has ruptured and leaked, or that multiple branch pipelines are the source of the leak, a three-level response strategy is executed. The three-level response strategy includes shutting down the main pipeline, disconnecting the electrical connection between the fuel cell and the traction converter, and starting the inert gas injection system to inertify the equipment compartment.

5. The method of claim 4, wherein, The method further includes: When the operating speed of the hydrogen fuel cell vehicle under monitoring exceeds the first preset speed threshold, the hydrogen fuel cell vehicle under monitoring is in an open environment, and the triggering conditions of the secondary response strategy are not met, the primary response strategy is executed. The primary response strategy includes activating the ventilation control system of the hydrogen fuel cell vehicle under monitoring, turning on the roof exhaust fan to its maximum speed, and activating the positive pressure air supply mode of the bottom air intake grille.

6. The method of claim 4, wherein, The method further includes: After implementing the secondary response strategy and completing the physical isolation of the leaking branch, pressure decay data of the downstream pipeline of the leaking branch is collected according to the pipeline topology of the hydrogen supply system. If the pressure decay data collected within the preset monitoring time exceeds the preset safe pressure threshold, an alarm escalation signal will be triggered.

7. A safety monitoring device, characterized in that, include: The data acquisition unit is used to acquire the operating data of the hydrogen-powered locomotive to be monitored, as well as the gas detection data of multiple sensors installed in the hydrogen supply system of the hydrogen-powered locomotive. The gas detection data includes the concentration data, pressure data and temperature data of the gas to be monitored. The leak detection unit is used to determine an alarm threshold corresponding to the current operating state based on the operating data, and to determine whether there is a gas leak based on the alarm threshold and each of the gas detection data. The leak source determination unit is used to determine the pressure data and gas concentration data of the main pipeline and each branch pipeline in the hydrogen supply system based on the pipeline topology of the hydrogen supply system when the judgment result is yes, and to determine the location of the leak source based on the pressure data and the gas concentration data. The leakage protection unit is used to implement a graded protection strategy based on the location of the leakage source and the degree of leakage.

8. A safety monitoring device, comprising: processor; as well as A memory configured to store computer-executable instructions, which, when executed, cause the processor to perform the following operations: The operation data of the hydrogen-powered locomotive to be monitored and the gas detection data of multiple sensors installed in the hydrogen supply system of the hydrogen-powered locomotive are acquired respectively. The gas detection data includes the concentration data, pressure data and temperature data of the gas to be monitored. Based on the operational data, an alarm threshold corresponding to the current operational status is determined. Based on the alarm threshold and each of the gas detection data, it is determined whether there is a gas leak. When the judgment result is yes, based on the pipeline topology of the hydrogen supply system, the pressure data and gas concentration data of the main pipeline and each branch in the hydrogen supply system are determined, and the location of the leak source is determined according to the pressure data and the gas concentration data. A graded protection strategy is implemented based on the location of the leakage source and the extent of the leakage.

9. A computer-readable storage medium storing one or more programs, which, when executed by an electronic device including a plurality of applications, cause the electronic device to perform the security monitoring method as described in any one of claims 1-6.

10. A computer program product, characterized in that, It includes a computer program that, when executed by a processor, implements the security monitoring method as described in any one of claims 1-6.

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