A secure startup method, radar chip, radar module, and device.
By using a hash algorithm in the secure boot method to store the hash values of all root public keys in a storage medium that supports only one write, the problem of inflexibility and reliability of secure boot in the prior art is solved. This achieves secure protection and flexible switching of any number of root public keys, ensuring information security.
Patent Information
- Application Number
- CN202510589249.9
- Authority / Receiving Office
- CN · China
- Patent Type
- Applications(China)
- Current Assignee / Owner
- Filing Date
- 2025-05-07
- Publication Date
- 2026-11-10
AI Technical Summary
Existing secure boot methods cannot effectively guarantee information security when private keys are leaked or asymmetric encryption algorithms are cracked. Furthermore, storage media that only support write-once cannot store the hash values of multiple root public keys, making secure boot inflexible and unreliable.
A secure boot method is adopted, which stores the hash values of all root public keys in a first storage medium that supports only one write. The hash algorithm is used to map data of arbitrary length to a fixed length, thereby achieving security for any number of root public keys. After successful verification, the method switches to a trusted root public key for signature verification.
Without altering the storage medium, it provides security for any number of root public keys, ensuring that a trusted root public key still supports secure boot even if the private key is leaked or the asymmetric encryption algorithm is cracked, thus improving the flexibility and reliability of secure boot.
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Figure CN123074718A_ABST
Abstract
Description
Technical Field
[0001] This application relates to the field of information security technology, and in particular to a secure boot method, radar chip, radar module and device. Background Technology
[0002] Secure Boot is a technology that uses asymmetric encryption algorithms to verify signatures step by step and boot the image (and / or software) to achieve trusted firmware loading.
[0003] However, the current Secure Boot still harbors security vulnerabilities. If private keys are leaked or asymmetric encryption algorithms are cracked, information security cannot be guaranteed. Summary of the Invention
[0004] This application provides a secure boot method, radar chip, radar module, and device, which enables the provision of security guarantees for any number of root public keys without changing the storage medium that only supports one-time writes. Any one of the root public keys with security guarantees can independently support the execution of the secure boot method, ensuring that regardless of security risks such as private key leakage or asymmetric encryption algorithm cracking, there is always a trustworthy root public key that can support the execution of the secure boot method.
[0005] According to some embodiments of this application, a first aspect of this application provides a secure boot method, comprising: verifying all second hash values in a second storage medium based on a first hash value in a first storage medium; wherein the first storage medium is a write-once storage medium, the first hash value is the hash value of all second hash values in the second storage medium, and each second hash value is a hash value of a root public key; if the second hash value passes verification, verifying the currently used root public key based on the second hash value; and if the currently used root public key passes verification, performing signature verification based on the currently used root public key.
[0006] According to some embodiments of this application, a second aspect of this application also provides a radar chip, including: for performing the secure boot method as described in the first aspect.
[0007] According to some embodiments of this application, a third aspect of this application also provides a radar module, including: a radar chip, wherein the radar chip includes a first storage medium for storing a first hash value; a second storage medium for storing a second hash value; wherein the first storage medium is a write-once storage medium, the first hash value is the hash value of all the second hash values in the second storage medium, and each second hash value is the hash value of a root public key; the radar chip also stores a firmware program, the firmware program being used to read the first hash value in the first storage medium and the second hash value stored in the second storage medium, and to execute the secure boot method as described in any one of the first aspects based on the first hash value and the second hash value.
[0008] According to some embodiments of this application, a fourth aspect of this application also provides an apparatus, including: a radar chip as described in the second aspect, or a radar module as described in the third aspect.
[0009] In this embodiment, since the first hash value is the hash value of all second hash values in the second storage medium, and the first hash value is stored in the first storage medium that only supports one-time writes, the first storage medium can provide security for all second hash values in the second storage medium. Furthermore, since the hash algorithm maps data of arbitrary length to a fixed length, the first storage medium only needs to provide storage space for one hash value, unaffected by the number of second hash values; that is, the first storage medium can provide security for any number of second hash values. Simultaneously, since each second hash value is a hash value of a root public key, the second hash values in the second storage medium can provide security for the verification of a single root public key without revealing the root public key. Thus, without changing the one-time write-only storage medium, security can be provided for any number of root public keys, and any one of the any number of secure root public keys can independently support the execution of the secure boot method. This ensures that regardless of security risks such as private key leakage or the cracking of asymmetric encryption algorithms, there is always a trustworthy root public key that can support the execution of the secure boot method. Attached Figure Description
[0010] One or more embodiments are illustrated by way of example with reference numerals in the accompanying drawings. These illustrations do not constitute a limitation on the embodiments. Elements with the same reference numerals in the drawings are denoted as similar elements. Unless otherwise stated, the figures in the drawings are not to be limited by scale.
[0011] Figure 1 This is a flowchart of a secure boot method provided in the embodiments of this application;
[0012] Figure 2 This is another flowchart of the secure boot method provided in the embodiments of this application;
[0013] Figure 3 This is another flowchart of the secure startup method provided in the embodiments of this application;
[0014] Figure 4 This is a data flow diagram of a secure boot method provided in the embodiments of this application;
[0015] Figure 5 This is a schematic diagram of a radar module provided in an embodiment of this application;
[0016] Figure 6 This is another structural schematic diagram of the radar module provided in the embodiments of this application. Detailed Implementation
[0017] To make the objectives, technical solutions, and advantages of the embodiments of this application clearer, the various embodiments of this application will be described in detail below with reference to the accompanying drawings. However, those skilled in the art will understand that many technical details have been presented in the various embodiments of this application to enable readers to better understand this application. However, the technical solutions claimed in this application can be implemented even without these technical details and various changes and modifications based on the following embodiments.
[0018] The division of the following embodiments is for ease of description and should not constitute any limitation on the specific implementation of this application. The various embodiments can be combined with and referenced by each other without contradiction.
[0019] In secure boot technology, a trusted root public key (Root PUK) is crucial for information security. To ensure its security, the root public key is typically stored on an immutable (i.e., write-once) storage medium. However, because write-once storage media are expensive, each chip (including System-on-Chips (SoCs)) usually stores only one root public key. This means each chip only needs a few kilobytes (KB) of write-once storage space, keeping the chip cost relatively low.
[0020] Therefore, once the private key (PRV) is leaked or the asymmetric encryption algorithm is cracked, the signature can be forged. Even if the root public key is trusted, illegal images and / or software can still pass the signature verification, and the information is no longer secure.
[0021] In addition, related technologies also provide a solution for storing the hash value of the root public key in a write-once storage medium to address the aforementioned private key leakage scenario. This is combined with a secure startup method that verifies the root public key before using it for signature verification. This allows the write-once storage medium to store the hash values of two or more root public keys, thereby providing security for two or more root public keys. Even if one private key is leaked, the other root public key can still be used to provide information security.
[0022] However, the improvement achieved by storing the root public key's hash value in a write-once storage medium is still unsatisfactory. This is because, in this scheme, only one root public key is used for each secure boot, meaning that signature verification for a single root public key is required. Therefore, the storage of each root public key's hash value must be independent within the write-once storage medium. Otherwise, the inability to determine the hash value of a single root public key would prevent signature verification and thus fail to provide security for that single key. Furthermore, even with independent storage of each root public key's hash value, the number of hash values that a write-once storage medium can store is still very limited, resulting in a very limited number of root public keys that can provide security.
[0023] Based on this, the first aspect of this application provides a secure boot method that, without changing the write-once storage medium, provides overall security for any number of root public keys, as well as security for individual root public keys among any number of root public keys. This ensures that regardless of security risks such as private key leakage or asymmetric encryption algorithm cracking, there is always a trustworthy root public key to support the execution of the secure boot method, achieving a more flexible, secure, and reliable secure boot. The following will describe the secure boot method and its effects provided by this application embodiment with reference to different flowcharts.
[0024] In some embodiments, such as Figure 1 As shown, the secure boot method includes at least the following steps:
[0025] Step 101: Verify all second hash values in the second storage medium based on the first hash value in the first storage medium; wherein, the first storage medium is a storage medium that supports only one write, the first hash value is the hash value of all second hash values in the second storage medium, and each second hash value is the hash value of a root public key.
[0026] Step 102: If the second hash value is verified, verify the currently used root public key based on the second hash value.
[0027] Step 103: If the currently used root public key is verified, perform signature verification based on the currently used root public key.
[0028] exist Figure 1 In the illustrated embodiment, since the first hash value is the hash value of all second hash values in the second storage medium, and the first hash value is stored in the first storage medium that only supports one-time writes, the first storage medium can provide security for all second hash values in the second storage medium. Furthermore, since the hash algorithm maps data of arbitrary length to a fixed length, the first storage medium only needs to provide storage space for one hash value, regardless of the number of second hash values; that is, the first storage medium can provide security for any number of second hash values. Simultaneously, since each second hash value is a hash value of a root public key, the second hash values in the second storage medium can provide security for the verification of a single root public key without revealing the root public key. Thus, without changing the one-time write-only storage medium, security can be provided for any number of root public keys, and any one of the any number of secure root public keys can independently support the execution of the secure boot method. This ensures that regardless of security risks such as private key leakage or the cracking of asymmetric encryption algorithms, there is always a trusted root public key that can support the execution of the secure boot method.
[0029] For ease of understanding, the following will be... Figure 1 The steps of the illustrated embodiment will be explained.
[0030] In step 101, based on the first hash value in the first storage medium, all second hash values in the second storage medium are verified. The first storage medium is a write-once storage medium, and the first hash value is the hash value of all second hash values in the second storage medium. Each second hash value is the hash value of a root public key. That is, the second hash value is obtained by hashing a single root public key, and the first hash value is obtained by hashing all second hash values in the second storage medium. Therefore, regardless of the number of root public keys requiring security, the first storage medium always provides storage space of a hash value length, enabling security for any number of root public keys. This embodiment does not limit the specific hash algorithm used for obtaining the hash value or hash calculation; for example, SHA256, SHA512, etc., can be used. Furthermore, this embodiment does not limit the number of times the hash algorithm is run during the process of obtaining the hash value; these will not be listed here.
[0031] It should be noted that the embodiments of this application do not limit the media types of the first storage medium and the second storage medium. The first storage medium can be any storage medium that supports only one write, and the second storage medium can be any storage medium.
[0032] In some embodiments, the first storage medium may be a One-Time Programmable (OTP) storage medium.
[0033] In some embodiments, the first storage medium may also be an electronic fuse (eFuse).
[0034] In some embodiments, the second storage medium may be a Flash memory.
[0035] Of course, the above are only examples of the first and second storage media, and do not mean that storage media other than those in the above examples cannot be used as the first and second storage media. They will not be listed here.
[0036] It should also be noted that the embodiments of this application do not limit the number and type of root public keys from which the first hash value originates, and these can be configured according to application scenarios, requirements, or hardware performance.
[0037] The number of root public keys from which the first hash value originates can be 2, 5, 11, 32, etc., which will not be listed here.
[0038] Regarding the type of root public key from which the first hash value originates, it can be categorized from the perspective of supported asymmetric encryption algorithms. It can support either the same asymmetric encryption algorithm or different asymmetric encryption algorithms. Furthermore, if it supports different asymmetric encryption algorithms, the number of root keys supporting the same asymmetric encryption algorithm can also be one or more.
[0039] In other words, different second hash values include: hash values of root public keys that support different asymmetric encryption algorithms, and / or hash values of different root public keys that support the same asymmetric encryption algorithm.
[0040] When different second hash values contain hash values of root public keys supporting different asymmetric encryption algorithms, security can be maintained by switching to another root public key that supports the same asymmetric encryption algorithm, even if the private key (specifically the root private key (Root PRV) corresponding to the root public key) is leaked. This eliminates the security risks caused by the private key leak. Furthermore, it eliminates the need to change the asymmetric encryption algorithm used, resulting in fewer adjustments required for secure startup, higher switching efficiency, and a better user experience.
[0041] When different second hash values contain hash values of different root public keys that support the same asymmetric encryption algorithm, it is possible to continue providing security by switching to the root public key that supports another asymmetric encryption algorithm when the asymmetric encryption algorithm is cracked, thereby eliminating the security risks caused by the cracking of the asymmetric encryption algorithm.
[0042] It should be noted that the embodiments of this application do not limit the asymmetric encryption algorithms involved. In some embodiments, the asymmetric encryption algorithm includes one or more of the following algorithms: RSA1024, RSA1024, RSA2048, RSA3072, RSA4096, SM2, ECC P-256, ECC P-384, and ECC P521. Of course, the above are just examples, and other asymmetric encryption algorithms can also be used, which will not be listed here.
[0043] Of course, the problem of private key leakage can also be eliminated by switching to a root public key that supports another asymmetric encryption algorithm to continue providing security. This will not be elaborated on here.
[0044] It should also be noted that, even without any security vulnerabilities, the root public key can still be switched to adjust the security level and execution efficiency of Secure Boot.
[0045] Furthermore, regarding the type of root public key from which the second hash value originates, from the perspective of data length, it can be either a root public key with the same length but different data content, or a root public key with different lengths, which will not be elaborated on here.
[0046] As for the verification process, since the first hash value is the hash value of all the second hash values in the second storage medium, the verification process involves performing a hash calculation on all the second hash values in the second storage medium, and then comparing the result of the hash calculation with the first hash value in the first storage medium. If the comparison matches, the verification is successful. The hash calculation and comparison processes have been described in relevant technologies and will not be elaborated upon here.
[0047] In step 102, if the second hash value passes verification, the currently used root public key is verified based on the second hash value. Passing verification indicates that all second hash values in the second storage medium are secure (i.e., trustworthy). Therefore, based on the trustworthiness of the second hash value, the currently used root public key can be verified to determine its trustworthiness, thus providing security for a single root public key.
[0048] As for the verification process, since each second hash value is a hash value of a root public key, the verification is carried out in the following way: perform a hash calculation on the currently used root public key, and then compare the result of the hash calculation with the second hash value in the second storage medium. If the comparison is consistent, the verification is successful.
[0049] It should be noted that there is only one root public key currently in use, while there are multiple second hash values in the second storage medium. Therefore, the comparison will involve the hash value of the currently used root public key, as well as all the second hash values in the second storage medium. To address this, we can consider whether there is a correlation between the root public key and the second hash values, and provide a corresponding comparison scheme. Assuming the root public key and the second hash values are associated through a tag (a tag is just one example of an association method, but it does not mean that only tags can be used for association), then a second hash value can be uniquely identified through the tag for comparison with the hash value of the currently used root public key, without considering other second hash values. Therefore, the comparison will be completed efficiently. When there is no association between the root public key and the second hash values, the hash value of the currently used root public key can be compared one by one with the second hash values in the second storage medium until a match is found, indicating successful verification; or, if all second hash value comparisons are inconsistent, verification fails. Of course, the above is just an example; other methods can be used in some embodiments, which will not be listed here.
[0050] It should also be noted that the hash calculation and comparison of the two hash values described above have been documented in relevant technologies, and will not be elaborated upon here.
[0051] In step 103, if the currently used root public key is verified, signature verification is performed based on the currently used root public key. As mentioned earlier, if the currently used root public key is verified, it is considered trustworthy. Related technologies have already described implementation processes for signature verification based on trusted root public keys, and these implementation processes are also applicable to the signature verification in this step. Therefore, these related technology processes will not be elaborated upon here. Instead, the focus is on the solution provided in this application embodiment to further enhance the flexibility and reliability of secure startup.
[0052] Understandably, signature verification using a trusted root public key typically involves two stages: verifying the currently used user public key (User PUK) against the currently used root public key; and, if the currently used user public key passes the verification, verifying the user data against the currently used user public key. The user data (also known as the "payload") refers to the software or image data that requires signature verification for secure boot, such as bootloaders, operating system kernels, and drivers.
[0053] Therefore, further enhancing the flexibility and reliability of safe startup can be achieved by improving the flexibility and reliability of the two stages mentioned above.
[0054] In some embodiments, the verification of currently used user public keys can be made more flexible and secure.
[0055] Considering the aforementioned verification of the root public key, which shares a similar principle with the verification of user public keys—both involve processing the object to be verified (or verified) and comparing it with pre-stored content—the main difference lies in the fact that root public key verification uses hash calculation, while user public key verification uses asymmetric encryption algorithms. Therefore, in some embodiments, as with the aforementioned root public key verification, multiple user public keys can be configured, and verification of a single user public key can be supported, thereby providing verification services for more user public keys. In other words, the second storage medium contains at least two third hash values, each of which is a hash value of a user public key. Regardless of whether a private key is leaked or the asymmetric encryption algorithm is cracked, there will always be a trusted user public key capable of supporting the execution of the secure boot method.
[0056] It should be noted that the second storage medium generally refers to any medium on a device or chip other than the first storage medium. Therefore, the second hash value and the third hash value can be stored on the same storage medium, such as on the same Flash memory, or they can be stored on different storage media, such as one Flash memory storing the second hash value and another Flash memory storing the third hash value. It is not necessary to store the second hash value and the third hash value on the same storage medium.
[0057] At this point, in order to support the signature verification of a single user's public key while ensuring the security of each user's public key, it is possible to first verify the signature of all user public keys, and then verify the individual public key to confirm whether it is trustworthy.
[0058] Based on this, in some embodiments, such as Figure 2 As shown, the secure boot method includes at least the following steps:
[0059] Step 201: Verify all second hash values in the second storage medium based on the first hash value in the first storage medium; wherein, the first storage medium is a storage medium that supports only one write, the first hash value is the hash value of all second hash values in the second storage medium, and each second hash value is the hash value of a root public key.
[0060] Step 202: If the second hash value is verified, verify the currently used root public key based on the second hash value.
[0061] Step 203: If the currently used root public key is verified, the first signature is verified based on the currently used root public key. The first signature is obtained by signing the currently used root public key, the root private key corresponding to the currently used root public key, and all the second hash values and third hash values in the second storage medium. Each third hash value is a hash value of a user's public key.
[0062] Step 204: If the first signature passes verification, verify the currently used user public key based on the third hash value.
[0063] Step 205: If the currently used user public key is verified, verify the signature of the user data based on the currently used user public key.
[0064] exist Figure 1 Based on the illustrated embodiment, Figure 2 The illustrated embodiment further configures at least two third hash values of user public keys for signature verification of user public keys. Therefore, it can provide security for at least two user public keys, thereby further supporting the switching of user public keys and enabling more flexible, secure and reliable support for the execution of the secure boot method.
[0065] also, Figure 2 The embodiment shown first verifies the first signature to ensure the security of all user public keys. Then, it verifies the current user public key individually. This ensures that even if the user public key changes, the same signature is still verified. Therefore, it is not necessary to store too many signatures, which reduces the complexity of storage management. It is also not necessary to search for the signature used for verification among multiple signatures, resulting in high execution efficiency.
[0066] For ease of understanding, the following will be... Figure 2 The steps of the illustrated embodiment will be explained. Steps 201-202 are basically the same as steps 101-102 in the previous embodiment, and will not be described again here.
[0067] In step 203, if the currently used root public key is verified, the first signature is verified based on the currently used root public key. The first signature is obtained by signing the currently used root public key, along with all the second and third hash values in the second storage medium, using the root private key corresponding to the currently used root public key. Each third hash value is a hash value of a user's public key. Since the currently used root public key has been verified and is considered trustworthy, verifying the first signature actually verifies whether all the third hash values in the second storage medium are trustworthy, thus providing security for all the third hash values in the second storage medium.
[0068] It should be noted that the embodiments of this application do not limit the number and type of user public keys from which the third hash value originates, and these can be configured according to application scenarios, requirements, or hardware performance.
[0069] The number of user public keys from which the third hash value originates can be 2, 6, 11, 32, etc., which will not be listed here.
[0070] Regarding the type of user public key from which the third hash value originates, it can be categorized from the perspective of supported asymmetric encryption algorithms. It can support either the same asymmetric encryption algorithm or different asymmetric encryption algorithms. In the case of supporting different asymmetric encryption algorithms, the number of user keys supporting the same asymmetric encryption algorithm can also be one or more.
[0071] In other words, different third hash values include: hash values of user public keys that support different asymmetric encryption algorithms, and / or hash values of different user public keys that support the same asymmetric encryption algorithm.
[0072] Specifically, when different third hash values contain hash values of user public keys supporting different asymmetric encryption algorithms, security can be maintained even if the private key (specifically, the user's private key (Use Private Key, User PRV) corresponding to the user's public key) is leaked. This is achieved by switching to another user public key that supports the same asymmetric encryption algorithm, thus eliminating the security risks caused by the private key leak. Furthermore, it eliminates the need to change the asymmetric encryption algorithm used, resulting in fewer adjustments required for secure startup, higher switching efficiency, and a better user experience.
[0073] When different third hash values contain hash values of different user public keys that support the same asymmetric encryption algorithm, it is possible to continue providing security by switching to a user public key that supports another asymmetric encryption algorithm when the asymmetric encryption algorithm is cracked, thereby eliminating the security risks caused by the cracking of the asymmetric encryption algorithm.
[0074] It should be noted that the embodiments of this application do not limit the asymmetric encryption algorithms involved. In some embodiments, the asymmetric encryption algorithm includes one or more of the following algorithms: RSA1024, RSA4096, SM2, and ECC P-384. Of course, the above are just examples, and other asymmetric encryption algorithms can also be used, which will not be listed here.
[0075] Of course, the problem of private key leakage can also be eliminated by switching to a user's public key that supports another asymmetric encryption algorithm to continue providing security, which will not be elaborated on here.
[0076] It should also be noted that, even without any security vulnerabilities, the user's public key can still be switched to adjust the security level and execution efficiency of Secure Startup.
[0077] Furthermore, regarding the type of user public key from which the third hash value originates, from the perspective of data length, it can be either a user public key with the same length but different data content, or a user public key with different lengths, which will not be elaborated on here.
[0078] As for the signature verification process, since the first signature is obtained by signing the current root public key, the private key corresponding to the current root public key, and all the second and third hash values in the second storage medium, the signature verification process corresponding to the signature verification is adopted accordingly. The relevant technologies have already recorded the signature verification process, so it will not be elaborated here.
[0079] In step 204, if the first signature passes verification, the currently used user public key is verified based on the third hash value. As mentioned earlier, the first signature passing verification means that all hash values in the second storage medium are trustworthy. Based on this, the third hash value can be used to verify whether the user public key is trustworthy, thereby providing security for a single user public key.
[0080] As for the verification process, since each third hash value is a hash value of a user's public key, the verification is carried out in the following way: perform a hash calculation on the currently used user's public key, and then compare the result of the hash calculation with the third hash value in the second storage medium. If the comparison is consistent, the verification is successful.
[0081] It should be noted that there is only one public key currently in use, while there are multiple third hash values in the second storage medium. Therefore, the comparison will involve the hash value of the currently used public key, as well as all the third hash values in the second storage medium. To address this, we can consider whether there is a correlation between the public key and the third hash values, and provide a corresponding comparison scheme. Assuming the public key and the third hash values are associated through a tag (a tag is just one example of an association method, but it does not mean that only tags can be used for association), then a third hash value can be uniquely identified through the tag for comparison with the hash value of the currently used public key, without considering other third hash values. Therefore, the comparison will be completed efficiently. When there is no association between the public key and the third hash values, the hash value of the currently used public key can be compared one by one with the third hash values in the second storage medium until a match is found, indicating successful verification; or, if all third hash value comparisons are inconsistent, verification fails. Of course, the above is just an example; other methods can be used in some embodiments, which will not be listed here.
[0082] It should also be noted that the hash calculation and comparison of the two hash values described above have been documented in relevant technologies, and will not be elaborated upon here.
[0083] In step 205, if the currently used user public key is verified, the user data is verified based on the currently used user public key. The verification of the currently used user public key means that the currently used user public key is considered trustworthy. Related technologies have already described implementation processes for verification based on trusted user public keys, and these implementation processes are also applicable to the verification in this step; therefore, the processes described in these related technologies will not be elaborated upon here.
[0084] In some embodiments, the verification of user data can be made more flexible and secure.
[0085] Based on this, in some embodiments, such as Figure 3 As shown, the secure boot method includes at least the following steps:
[0086] Step 301: Verify all second hash values in the second storage medium based on the first hash value in the first storage medium; wherein, the first storage medium is a storage medium that supports only one write, the first hash value is the hash value of all second hash values in the second storage medium, and each second hash value is the hash value of a root public key.
[0087] Step 302: If the second hash value is verified, verify the currently used root public key based on the second hash value.
[0088] Step 303: If the currently used root public key is verified, verify the signature of the currently used user public key based on the currently used root public key.
[0089] Step 304: If the currently used user public key passes the signature verification, verify the second signature based on the currently used user public key. The second signature is obtained by signing the currently used user public key and user data using the private key corresponding to the currently used user public key.
[0090] exist Figure 1 Based on the illustrated embodiment, Figure 3 The illustrated embodiment further demonstrates that the second signature obtained by combining the currently used user public key and user data is used as the signature that the user data needs to verify. Therefore, the signature complexity is increased, making it more secure and reliable.
[0091] Steps 301-302 are essentially the same as steps 101-102 in the aforementioned embodiments. Related technologies have described processes for verifying user public keys based on trusted root public keys, and these processes are also applicable to step 303. Therefore, these processes will not be elaborated upon here. Of course, step 303 can also be implemented using steps 203-204 in the aforementioned embodiments, as detailed above. Related technologies have described processes for verifying user data based on trusted user public keys. The main difference between these processes and step 304 is that the verified signature in step 304 is combined with the currently used user public key in addition to the user data. This will not be elaborated upon here.
[0092] To help those skilled in the art better understand the secure boot method and its effects provided in the above embodiments, the following will be combined with... Figure 4 The data flow diagram shown in the secure boot method is used to illustrate this.
[0093] like Figure 4 As shown, assuming there are four root public keys: public key 1, public key 2, public key 3, and public key 4, each of these four root public keys undergoes a hash calculation, resulting in four second hash values: hash value 1, hash value 2, hash value 3, and hash value 4. These four second hash values are then concatenated sequentially and hashed to obtain the first hash value: hash value 5. Each of the four user public keys (public key 5, public key 6, public key 7, and public key 8) undergoes a hash calculation, resulting in four third hash values: hash value 6, hash value 7, hash value 8, and hash value 9.
[0094] Hash value 5 (first hash value) is written into the first storage medium. Hash values 1, 2, 3, and 4 (all second hash values) are written into the root public key hash value table in the second storage medium (Table 1 in the figure). Hash values 6, 7, 8, and 9 (all third hash values) are written into the user public key hash value table in the second storage medium (Table 2 in the figure).
[0095] And, as Figure 4 As shown, the currently used root public key is public key x1, and the currently used user public key is public key x2, where x1 = 1, 2, 3 or 4, and x2 = 5, 6, 7 or 8.
[0096] Based on public key x1, using the asymmetric encryption algorithm it supports and the corresponding private key x1, all the second hash values in Table 1 and all the third hash values in Table 2 of public key x1 are signed to obtain the first signature corresponding to public key x1.
[0097] Based on public key x2, using the asymmetric encryption algorithm it supports and the corresponding private key x2, we sign public key x2 and user data to obtain the second signature corresponding to public key x2.
[0098] The following secure boot process will be performed during device startup:
[0099] First, perform hash calculations on all the second hash values (including hash value 1, hash value 2, hash value 3, and hash value 4) in Table 1, and compare the resulting hash value with hash value 5 in the first storage medium. If they match, continue with the subsequent process; otherwise, the startup fails.
[0100] Next, a hash calculation is performed on public key x1, and the resulting hash value is compared with the corresponding hash value in Table 1. If they match, the subsequent process continues; otherwise, the startup fails.
[0101] Then, based on public key x1 and the first signature, the signature is verified against all second hash values (including hash value 1, hash value 2, hash value 3, and hash value 4) in Table 1, all third hash values (including hash value 6, hash value 7, hash value 8, and hash value 9) in Table 2, and public key x1. If the signature verification passes, the subsequent process continues; otherwise, the startup fails.
[0102] Next, a hash calculation is performed on the public key x2, and the resulting hash value is compared with the corresponding hash value in Table 2. If they match, the subsequent process continues; otherwise, the startup fails.
[0103] Next, based on the public key x2 and the second signature, the user data and the public key x2 are verified. If the verification passes, the subsequent process continues; otherwise, the startup fails.
[0104] Finally, load the user data.
[0105] It should be noted that the above process is a brief description of the secure boot process for ease of understanding. In actual applications, data reading and other processing are also involved, which will not be elaborated here.
[0106] The above examples employ a two-level signature mechanism. The first-level signature (i.e., the first signature) supports using different root public keys for secure boot throughout the device's lifecycle. By switching the root public key, it allows the use of either the same asymmetric encryption algorithm (but with different keys) or different asymmetric encryption algorithms. The second-level signature (i.e., the second signature) supports using different user public keys for secure boot throughout the device's lifecycle. By switching the user public key, it allows the use of either different keys or different asymmetric encryption algorithms. Both mechanisms enable adjustments to the security level of the secure boot method throughout the product lifecycle.
[0107] The steps of the various methods described above are only for clarity. In practice, they can be combined into one step or some steps can be split into multiple steps. As long as they include the same logical relationship, they are all within the scope of protection of this patent. Adding insignificant modifications or introducing insignificant designs to the algorithm or process, but without changing the core design of the algorithm and process, are also within the scope of protection of this patent.
[0108] A second aspect of this application also provides a radar chip for executing the secure boot method as described in any of the above embodiments.
[0109] It is not difficult to see that this embodiment is a chip embodiment corresponding to the method embodiment, and this embodiment can be implemented in conjunction with the method embodiment. The relevant technical details mentioned in the method embodiment are still valid in this embodiment, and will not be repeated here to reduce repetition. Correspondingly, the relevant technical details mentioned in this embodiment can also be applied to the method embodiment.
[0110] A third aspect of the embodiments of this application also provides a radar module, such as... Figure 5 As shown, it includes: a radar chip and a second storage medium, wherein the radar chip includes a first storage medium for storing a first hash value and a second storage medium for storing a second hash value.
[0111] The first storage medium is a storage medium that supports only one write, and the first hash value is the hash value of all the second hash values in the second storage medium. Each second hash value is the hash value of a root public key.
[0112] Furthermore, the radar chip also stores a firmware program, which is used to read the first hash value in the first storage medium and the second hash value stored in the second storage medium, and execute the secure boot method as described in any of the foregoing embodiments based on the first hash value and the second hash value.
[0113] It should be noted that the first storage medium is located inside the radar chip and has limited storage space; the second storage medium is located outside the radar chip and its capacity can be configured according to the customer's application requirements.
[0114] To help those skilled in the art better understand how radar modules work, the following will combine... Figure 6 The given examples illustrate this.
[0115] like Figure 6 The radar module shown uses OTP as the first storage medium in the radar chip and NOR Flash as the second storage medium. The NOR Flash is connected to the radar chip through the radar's QSPI (Queued Serial Peripheral Interface) interface.
[0116] also, Figure 6 The image also shows the Hardware Security Module (HSM) and Static Random-Access Memory (SRAM) in the radar chip. The HSM is connected to the SRAM via a system bus (BUS), and the HSM provides hardware models related to various encryption algorithms. Figure 6 The diagram only shows three types of encryption algorithms: AES, ECC, and RSA.
[0117] During secure boot, the first hash value in OTP and the second hash value in NOR Flash are loaded into SRAM. Under the control of the Central Processing Unit (CPU), HSM operates on the data in SRAM to perform operations such as signature verification, and transmits the results to the CPU for judgment / arbitration, thereby determining the flow of the secure boot method and whether to allow loading data or programs.
[0118] It is not difficult to see that this embodiment is a module embodiment corresponding to the method embodiment, and this embodiment can be implemented in conjunction with the method embodiment. The relevant technical details mentioned in the method embodiment are still valid in this embodiment, and will not be repeated here to reduce repetition. Accordingly, the relevant technical details mentioned in this embodiment can also be applied to the method embodiment.
[0119] Furthermore, in order to highlight the innovative aspects of this application, no units that are not closely related to solving the technical problems proposed in this application are introduced in this embodiment, but this does not mean that there are no other units in this embodiment.
[0120] A fourth aspect of this application also provides an apparatus including a radar chip or radar module as described above.
[0121] It is not difficult to see that this embodiment is a device embodiment corresponding to the chip embodiment, and this embodiment can be implemented in conjunction with the chip embodiment. The relevant technical details mentioned in the chip embodiment are still valid in this embodiment, and will not be repeated here to reduce repetition. Correspondingly, the relevant technical details mentioned in this embodiment can also be applied to the chip embodiment.
[0122] Those skilled in the art will understand that the above embodiments are specific embodiments for implementing this application, and in practical applications, various changes can be made to them in form and detail without departing from the spirit and scope of this application.
Claims
1. A secure boot method, characterized in that, include: Based on the first hash value in the first storage medium, verify all the second hash values in the second storage medium; wherein, the first storage medium is a storage medium that supports only one write, the first hash value is the hash value of all the second hash values in the second storage medium, and each second hash value is the hash value of a root public key; If the second hash value is verified, the currently used root public key is verified based on the second hash value; If the currently used root public key is verified, the signature is verified based on the currently used root public key.
2. The secure startup method according to claim 1, characterized in that, The different second hash values include: hash values of root public keys supporting different asymmetric encryption algorithms, and / or hash values of different root public keys supporting the same asymmetric encryption algorithm.
3. The safe startup method according to claim 1 or 2, characterized in that, The signature verification based on the currently used root public key includes: Verify the signature of the currently used user public key based on the currently used root public key; If the currently used user public key passes the signature verification, the user data is verified based on the currently used user public key.
4. The safe startup method according to claim 3, characterized in that, The second storage medium has at least two third hash values, each of which is a hash value of a user's public key.
5. The safe startup method according to claim 4, characterized in that, The step of verifying the signature of the currently used user public key based on the currently used root public key includes: The first signature is verified based on the currently used root public key, wherein the first signature is obtained by signing the currently used root public key, as well as all the second hash values and third hash values in the second storage medium, using the private key corresponding to the currently used root public key. If the first signature passes verification, the currently used user public key is verified based on the third hash value.
6. The secure startup method according to claim 4, characterized in that, The different third hash values include: hash values of user public keys supporting different asymmetric encryption algorithms, and / or hash values of different user public keys supporting the same asymmetric encryption algorithm.
7. The safe startup method according to claim 3, characterized in that, The step of verifying the signature of user data based on the currently used user public key includes: The second signature is verified based on the currently used user public key, wherein the second signature is obtained by signing the currently used user public key and user data using the private key corresponding to the currently used user public key.
8. The safe startup method according to claim 2 or 6, characterized in that, The asymmetric encryption algorithm includes one or more of the following algorithms: RSA1024, RSA1024, RSA2048, RSA3072, RSA4096, SM2, ECC P-256, ECC P-384, and ECC P521.
9. A radar chip, characterized in that, Used to perform the secure boot method as described in any one of claims 1 to 8.
10. A radar module, characterized in that, include: A radar chip, wherein the radar chip includes a first storage medium for storing a first hash value; A second storage medium is used to store the second hash value; Wherein, the first storage medium is a storage medium that supports only one write, the first hash value is the hash value of all the second hash values in the second storage medium, and each second hash value is the hash value of a root public key; The radar chip also stores a firmware program, which is used to read the first hash value in the first storage medium and the second hash value stored in the second storage medium, and execute the secure boot method as described in any one of claims 1 to 8 based on the first hash value and the second hash value.
11. A device, characterized in that, include: The radar chip as described in claim 9, or the radar module as described in claim 10.
