Vehicle-mounted data transmission method and vehicle

By acquiring and converting security level metadata into security tag encoding in the vehicle gateway device, the problem of high gateway device cost is solved, and the reliability and efficiency of data transmission are achieved.

CN123123385APending Publication Date: 2026-11-17DEEPAL AUTOMOBILE TECH CO LTD
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Patent Information

Application Number
CN202611270106.2
Authority / Receiving Office
CN · China
Patent Type
Applications(China)
Current Assignee / Owner
Filing Date
2026-08-20
Publication Date
2026-11-17

AI Technical Summary

Technical Problem

In existing technologies, gateway devices need to achieve the same highest ASIL level as the data being forwarded in order to ensure reliable transmission of high-security data, resulting in high costs.

Method used

By acquiring security level metadata of data samples during data transmission, converting it into security label encoding and writing it into reserved fields of the message, calculating the check value and appending it to the end of the message, the target node independently verifies the integrity of the message, and the gateway device only needs to identify and forward the security level metadata without reaching the highest ASIL level.

Benefits of technology

It reduces the hardware and software development costs of gateway devices, ensures the reliability and efficiency of data transmission, and reduces the possibility of loss or downgraded interpretation of security level information.

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Abstract

The embodiment of the application relates to the field of automobile electronics, and discloses a vehicle-mounted data transmission method and a vehicle, the method is applied to a vehicle-mounted gateway device, and the method comprises the following steps: obtaining security level metadata of a data sample; wherein the security level metadata is used for indicating a functional safety level identifier of the data sample in a first protocol network; writing the security level metadata into a first message in a second protocol network; calculating a first check value of the first message, and attaching the first check value to a tail of the first message to form a second message; sending the second message to a target node; and receiving a check result of a check operation of the target node on the second message. Through the technical scheme, the hardware and software development cost of the vehicle-mounted gateway device can be reduced, and the data transmission efficiency of the vehicle-mounted network can be ensured.
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Description

Technical Field

[0001] This invention relates to the field of automotive electronics technology, specifically to an in-vehicle data transmission method and a vehicle. Background Technology

[0002] With the development of automotive intelligence, in-vehicle networks are exhibiting typical heterogeneous characteristics. As the hub connecting these heterogeneous networks, the gateway is crucial for reliable data transmission. This requires the gateway to meet the highest ASIL (Automotive Safety Integrity Level) as the data it forwards, resulting in high costs. Summary of the Invention

[0003] In view of the shortcomings of the prior art, the purpose of this application is to provide an in-vehicle data transmission method and vehicle, which aims to solve the problem of high requirements for gateways and high costs in the prior art.

[0004] In a first aspect, embodiments of this application provide an in-vehicle data transmission method, the method being applied to an in-vehicle gateway device, the method comprising: Obtain the security level metadata of the data sample; wherein, the security level metadata is used to represent the functional security level identifier of the data sample in the first protocol network; Write the security level metadata into the first message of the second protocol network; Calculate a first checksum for the first message and append the first checksum to the end of the first message to form a second message; The second message is sent to the target node, and the verification result of the target node performing a verification operation on the second message is received.

[0005] The vehicle data transmission method provided in this embodiment is applied to a vehicle gateway device. This method acquires security level metadata of a data sample and writes it into a first message to be forwarded. This allows the security level metadata to be transmitted end-to-end with the data in a form independent of the payload during protocol conversion, thus maintaining the integrity of the security level metadata during heterogeneous network protocol conversion and reducing the possibility of security level information being lost or degraded during cross-domain forwarding. Based on this, a first checksum is calculated on the first message carrying the security level metadata and appended to the message tail to form a second message; this ensures that the security level metadata and message payload are both included in the integrity protection scope. The second message is sent to the target node, and the target node performs a checksum operation on the second message and receives the checksum result. The target node can independently check the integrity of the second message to ensure end-to-end data trustworthiness. Since the security level metadata is transmitted as an independent label along with the data, the vehicle gateway device only needs to identify and forward the security level metadata without needing to reach the same highest ASIL level as the forwarded data sample, thus reducing the hardware and software development costs of the vehicle gateway device. Meanwhile, security level metadata is embedded in the message in a lightweight manner, which has a small impact on network bandwidth and helps to ensure the data transmission efficiency of the vehicle network.

[0006] In one possible embodiment, writing the security level metadata into a first message in a second protocol network includes: Convert the security level metadata into security tag encoding; The security label is encoded and written into a reserved field of the first message in the second protocol network; wherein the reserved field is located between the standard header and the payload of the first message.

[0007] By converting security level metadata into independent security label encoding and writing it into a reserved field between the standard header and payload of the message, the security level information is transmitted end-to-end with the data in the form of an independent label. It is not easy to lose or degrade the interpretation during the protocol conversion process, and at the same time, it has little impact on the overhead of the message header.

[0008] In one possible embodiment, calculating the first checksum for the first message includes: Based on the functional safety level identifier represented by the security label encoding, a target verification algorithm matching the functional safety level identifier is determined; The initial value is calculated according to the target verification algorithm to obtain the first verification value of the first message; wherein, the initial value includes: the calculation result between the first verification value of the message corresponding to the previous frame of data and the hash value of the functional safety level identifier.

[0009] By dynamically matching target verification algorithms of different strengths based on functional safety level identifiers, data streams with different security levels receive differentiated integrity protection strengths, which helps reduce the risk of high-security-level data streams being subjected to low-intensity attacks. The dynamic initial value mechanism establishes a correlation between the verification values ​​of each frame, which is beneficial for improving the detection capability of tampering with consecutive frames.

[0010] In one possible embodiment, the method further includes: In response to the successful delivery of the second message to the target node, a timer is started to begin counting. If the next frame of data for the data sample is not received within the timer's timing period, a timeout alarm signal is generated.

[0011] By starting a timer after a message is successfully sent and monitoring the arrival of the next frame of data within the timer period, the gateway device can promptly detect interruptions or delays in the data stream, which helps to improve its ability to perceive the status of the communication link and the source node.

[0012] In one possible embodiment, the method further includes: In response to establishing a communication session corresponding to the data stream, a timer is created; wherein the timing period of the timer includes the sum of the standard data period and the guard interval duration, and the standard data period is used to represent the interval between two consecutive data frames sent by the data stream.

[0013] By creating a timer that is linked to the standard data cycle for the data stream, the monitoring cycle can adaptively match the sending frequency of different data streams. This helps to keep the link anomaly detection delay within a reasonable range and reduces the risk of false alarms caused by the mismatch between the fixed timeout period and the data cycle.

[0014] In one possible embodiment, the method further includes: In response to a failure event, the severity level of the failure event is determined, and a security degradation strategy matching the severity level is executed; wherein the failure event includes: the verification result being a verification failure, and / or a timeout alarm signal.

[0015] By determining the severity level of a fault event and matching it with a corresponding security degradation strategy, different types and degrees of faults can receive differentiated responses, which helps improve the system's ability to handle abnormal situations in an orderly manner.

[0016] In one possible embodiment, the step of determining the severity level of the failure event and executing a security degradation strategy matching the severity level in response to a failure event includes: In response to a fault event that meets a first condition, a first severity level is determined, the fault time is sent to the vehicle safety controller, and the data stream continues to be transmitted. The first condition includes at least one of the following: the verification result is that the verification failures occur non-continuously and the cumulative number of failures is within the first failure count range; the timeout alarm signals occur non-continuously and the cumulative number of timeouts is within the first timeout count range; and the timeout duration corresponding to a single timeout alarm signal is within the first duration range.

[0017] By classifying occasional non-continuous verification failures or single minor timeouts as the highest severity level and only performing notifications and logging, anomaly detection can be completed without interrupting data stream transmission in the event of minor anomalies, which helps maintain the continuity of data streams and system availability.

[0018] In one possible embodiment, the step of determining the severity level of the failure event and executing a security degradation strategy matching the severity level in response to a failure event includes: In response to a fault event that meets a second condition, a second severity level is determined, and the data stream is switched to a backup communication path or a backup gateway device; wherein the second condition includes at least one of the following: the number of consecutive failures of the verification result is within the second failure count range, the number of consecutive timeouts corresponding to the timeout alarm signal is within the second timeout count range, and the timeout duration corresponding to a single timeout alarm signal is within the second duration range.

[0019] By classifying continuous verification failures or timeouts as the second most serious level and proactively switching to the backup path, resource switching can be completed before persistent anomalies escalate into data flow interruptions, which helps reduce the risk of data transmission interruptions caused by persistent communication link anomalies.

[0020] In one possible embodiment, the step of determining the severity level of the failure event and executing a security degradation strategy matching the severity level in response to a failure event includes: In response to a failure event that meets a third condition, a third severity level is determined, and the previous frame data stored in the local cache is used as the alternative transmission data for the data sample, and the timeliness of the alternative transmission data is marked; wherein, the third condition includes at least one of the following: the number of consecutive failures of the verification result is within the third failure number range, the number of consecutive timeouts corresponding to the timeout alarm signal is within the third timeout number range, and the backup communication path fails.

[0021] By classifying multiple consecutive verification failures, multiple consecutive timeouts, or backup path failures as the third severity level and enabling local data caching, temporary output of the data stream can still be maintained even when all available communication paths are unavailable, which helps reduce the risk of system function loss due to momentary data interruption.

[0022] In one possible embodiment, the step of determining the severity level of the failure event and executing a security degradation strategy matching the severity level in response to a failure event includes: In response to a fault event that meets a fourth condition, a fourth severity level is determined, the data stream is stopped, and a fault code is reported to the vehicle safety controller; wherein the fourth condition includes at least one of the following: the timeliness of the alternative transmission data exceeds a preset validity period.

[0023] By classifying cached data as exceeding the preset validity period as the fourth severity level and stopping data transmission, the forwarding of data streams is proactively terminated when cached data expires. This helps prevent target nodes from making incorrect control decisions based on outdated data, reducing the risk of damage to vehicle safety.

[0024] Secondly, embodiments of this application provide a vehicle-mounted data transmission method, the method being applied to a target node, the method comprising: Receive a second message; wherein the second message carries security level metadata, the security level metadata being used to represent the functional security level identifier of a data sample in the first protocol network; Extract the first checksum from the tail of the second message, and calculate the second checksum for the remaining part of the second message excluding the tail. If the second check value matches the first check value, the verification is confirmed to be successful. Alternatively, in response to the second check value being different from the first check value, the check is determined to have failed.

[0025] The vehicle data transmission method provided in this embodiment involves a target node receiving a second message carrying safety level metadata, extracting a first checksum from the end of the message, recalculating a second checksum on the remaining portion of the message, and then comparing the two checksums to determine the verification result. Since the safety level metadata is carried in the second message and is protected by integrity verification along with the message payload, the target node verifies the integrity of the message while also verifying the credibility of the safety level information, thus obtaining safety level metadata with end-to-end integrity protection. Through this method, the target node, as the end user of the data, can independently verify the integrity of the message, improving the credibility of the data used by the target node for functional safety-related decisions and contributing to ensuring the functional safety of the entire vehicle.

[0026] Thirdly, embodiments of this application provide an electronic device, the electronic device comprising: processor; Memory used to store the processor's executable instructions; The processor is configured to read the executable instructions from the memory and execute the instructions to implement the method described in any one of claims 1-10.

[0027] Fourthly, vehicles, including: processor; Memory used to store the processor's executable instructions; The processor is configured to read the executable instructions from the memory and execute the instructions to implement the above-described vehicle data transmission method. Attached Figure Description

[0028] To more clearly illustrate the technical solutions in the embodiments of this application or the background art, the accompanying drawings used in the embodiments of this application will be described below.

[0029] Figure 1 This is a flowchart of a vehicle data transmission method disclosed in an embodiment of this application; Figure 2 This is a schematic diagram of the functional safety protection system disclosed in an embodiment of this application; Figure 3 This is a schematic diagram illustrating the format of the first message disclosed in an embodiment of this application; Figure 4 This is a schematic diagram of the vehicle data transmission process disclosed in an embodiment of this application; Figure 5 This is a flowchart of another vehicle data transmission method disclosed in an embodiment of this application. Detailed Implementation

[0030] The terms "first," "second," etc., are used for descriptive purposes only and have no sequential or technical meaning, nor should they be construed as indicating or implying relative importance or implicitly specifying the number of technical features indicated. Directional terms used in this application, such as "upper," "lower," "front," "rear," "left," "right," "inner," and "outer," are merely for reference to the orientation shown in the accompanying drawings. The use of directional terms is for better and clearer explanation and understanding of this application, and does not indicate the orientation of the referred device or component in an actual application scenario.

[0031] In the embodiments of this application, "and / or" is merely a description of the relationship between related objects, indicating that three relationships can exist. For example, A and / or B can represent: A existing alone, A and B existing simultaneously, or B existing alone. Additionally, the character " / " in this document generally indicates that the preceding and following related objects have an "or" relationship.

[0032] With the rapid development of automotive intelligence and connectivity technologies, Advanced Driver Assistance Systems (ADAS) and Autonomous Driving (AD) systems are placing increasingly stringent demands on in-vehicle communication networks. Taking Automatic Emergency Braking (AEB) as an example, it relies on high-frequency, massive amounts of environmental perception data generated by sensors such as LiDAR (Light Detection and Ranging) and millimeter-wave radar. In some road vehicle functional safety standards, the data relied upon by such control functions involving personal safety typically requires a maximum Automotive Safety Integrity Level (ASIL) of D.

[0033] Meanwhile, current in-vehicle networks exhibit typical heterogeneous characteristics. Different communication protocols may be used between different functional domains, and even between different ECUs (Electronic Control Units) within the same domain. For example, high-performance sensors and domain controllers often use the DDS (Data Distribution Service) protocol to meet the requirements of high throughput and low latency data distribution, while actuators and controllers within the body control domain mostly use the SOME / IP (Scalable service-oriented Middleware over IP) protocol to achieve service-oriented communication. Gateways, as the hub connecting these heterogeneous networks, play a crucial role in protocol conversion and data routing.

[0034] In the process of heterogeneous network protocol conversion based on gateways, in order to meet the reliable transmission requirements of high-security data in vehicular networks, how to achieve secure cross-domain forwarding of data and reduce system costs without requiring the gateway itself to reach the highest ASIL level has become an urgent problem to be solved.

[0035] To alleviate at least one of the above problems, this disclosure provides an in-vehicle data transmission method and a vehicle. The embodiments of this application are described below with reference to the accompanying drawings.

[0036] Figure 1 A flowchart illustrating an in-vehicle data transmission method provided herein is shown. This in-vehicle data transmission method can be executed by an in-vehicle data transmission device configured in an in-vehicle gateway device, wherein the device can be implemented in software and / or hardware, and is generally integrated into an electronic device.

[0037] In this embodiment, the in-vehicle data transmission method is applied to an in-vehicle gateway device, which is deployed in a vehicle and connects at least one first protocol network and at least one second protocol network for data forwarding between different network protocols. As an example, the first protocol network is a communication network using the DDS protocol, and the second protocol network is a communication network using the SOME / IP protocol. The in-vehicle gateway device, acting as a communication hub between heterogeneous networks, performs protocol conversion and data routing functions, converting data samples from the first protocol network and forwarding them to target nodes in the second protocol network.

[0038] like Figure 1 As shown, the vehicle data transmission method may include the following steps S102 to S108.

[0039] S102, Obtain the security level metadata of the data sample; wherein, the security level metadata is used to represent the functional security level identifier of the data sample in the first protocol network.

[0040] In this embodiment, the vehicle-mounted gateway device connects to at least one first protocol network and at least one second protocol network. In this example, the gateway device receives data samples from the first protocol network. Here, a data sample is any data frame of a data stream, and a data stream refers to a communication session consisting of a series of consecutive data samples with the same source, destination, and security level.

[0041] At the data link layer or application layer of the vehicle gateway device, the data sample is parsed to obtain security level metadata. Security level metadata is the functional safety level identifier assigned to the data sample at the source. For example, security level metadata may include vehicle safety integrity level information as defined by the ISO 26262 standard, specifically including levels such as QM, ASIL A, ASIL B, ASIL C, and ASIL D.

[0042] As a specific example, a lidar sensor continuously publishes point cloud data via the DDS protocol, forming a data stream. The header metadata of each data sample indicates that the security level of the data stream is ASIL D. The gateway device, as a subscriber to the DDS protocol, receives this data sample and extracts the security level metadata from the header metadata of the data sample, indicating that the security level of the data stream to which this data sample belongs is ASIL D.

[0043] In this way, the gateway device can identify the functional security level identifier of the data stream to which the data sample belongs before protocol conversion, providing a basis for subsequent message writing and avoiding the loss of security level information during cross-protocol forwarding.

[0044] S104, write the security level metadata into the first message in the second protocol network.

[0045] In this embodiment, when the vehicle gateway device forwards data samples from the first protocol network to the second protocol network, it writes the extracted security level metadata into the first message of the second protocol network to be forwarded.

[0046] Specifically, the security level metadata is carried in a designated field of the first message in a preset encoded form, so that the security level metadata is transmitted to the target node along with the first message. In this way, the security level information is transmitted end-to-end with the data stream during the protocol conversion process, providing a basis for the target node to identify the security attributes of the data stream.

[0047] S106, calculate the first check value for the first message, and append the first check value to the end of the first message to form the second message.

[0048] The first message typically includes a standard header, fields carrying security level metadata, and a payload. This embodiment can employ a preset integrity verification algorithm to calculate the entire content of the first message and generate a corresponding first checksum. This first checksum is used to protect the integrity of the first message, ensuring that any tampering or bit flipping of the first message's content (including security level metadata) can be detected.

[0049] The calculated first checksum is appended to the end of the first message to form a security-enhanced second message, which is then sent to the target node via the second protocol network.

[0050] Through the above methods, security level metadata and message payload are included in the scope of integrity protection, effectively realizing the binding protection of security level information.

[0051] S108, send the second message to the target node, and receive the verification result of the target node performing the verification operation on the second message.

[0052] In this embodiment, the vehicle gateway device sends the security-enhanced second message to the target node through the communication interface of the second protocol network, completing the transmission operation of the second message. The target node is the receiver of the data stream, such as a body controller or domain controller.

[0053] After receiving the second message, the target node performs a verification operation on the second message.

[0054] Specifically, the target node extracts the first checksum from the tail of the second message and recalculates the second checksum for the remaining part of the second message excluding the tail; wherein, the remaining part of the second message excluding the tail may include: standard header, fields carrying security level metadata, and payload.

[0055] The second checksum is compared with the first checksum to verify whether the message has been tampered with during transmission. Specifically, if the second checksum matches the first checksum, the verification is successful; this indicates that the message has not been tampered with during transmission, and the target node can further process the payload data in the message. Alternatively, if the second checksum differs from the first checksum, the verification is failed; this indicates that the message may have been tampered with or bit-flipped during transmission, and the target node immediately discards the second message and reports a fault event to the vehicle safety controller.

[0056] In this way, the target node can independently verify message integrity and ensure that the data used for functional safety-related decisions has not been tampered with.

[0057] The vehicle data transmission method provided in this embodiment is applied to a vehicle gateway device. This method acquires security level metadata of a data sample and writes it into a first message to be forwarded. This ensures that the security level information is transmitted end-to-end with the data in a form independent of the payload during protocol conversion, maintaining the integrity of the security level information during heterogeneous network protocol conversion and reducing the possibility of loss or degraded interpretation of the security level information during cross-domain forwarding. Based on this, a first checksum is calculated on the first message carrying the security level metadata and appended to the message tail to form a second message; thus, the security level metadata and the message payload are included in the integrity protection scope together. The second message is sent to the target node, and the target node performs a checksum operation on the second message and receives the checksum result. The target node can independently check the integrity of the second message to ensure end-to-end data trustworthiness. Since the security level metadata is transmitted as an independent label along with the data, the vehicle gateway device only needs to identify and forward the security level metadata without needing to reach the same highest ASIL level as the forwarded data sample, thus reducing the hardware and software development costs of the vehicle gateway device. Meanwhile, security level metadata is embedded in the message in a lightweight manner, which has a small impact on network bandwidth and helps to ensure the data transmission efficiency of the vehicle network.

[0058] To better understand the solution, the following will be combined with Figure 2 The functional safety protection system shown herein will be described in more detail with respect to the vehicle data transmission method provided in the embodiments of this disclosure.

[0059] The functional safety protection system is deployed in the vehicle gateway device. This system performs data conversion and forwarding between a first protocol network (such as a DDS protocol communication network) and a second protocol network (such as a SOME / IP protocol communication network). The communication domain of the first protocol network includes, for example, the chassis domain controller, the body domain controller, and other DDS protocol communication controllers. The communication domain of the second protocol network includes, for example, the cockpit domain controller, the intelligent driving domain controller, and other SOME / IP protocol communication controllers.

[0060] A functional safety protection system may include a metadata awareness module, a tag mapping and insertion module, an integrity verification module, a communication session monitoring module, and a security degradation and recovery module.

[0061] The metadata awareness module takes the first protocol data sample as input, parses the data sample, and obtains the security level metadata.

[0062] The tag mapping and insertion module takes security level metadata as input, converts the security level metadata into security tag encoding, and writes the security tag encoding into the reserved field of the first message in the second protocol network; wherein, the reserved field is located between the standard header and payload of the first message.

[0063] The integrity verification module takes a first message from a second protocol network with a security label encoding as input; determines a target verification algorithm that matches the functional safety level identifier based on the functional safety level identifier represented by the security label encoding; calculates the initial value based on the target verification algorithm to obtain the first verification value of the first message; and appends the first verification value to the end of the first message to form a second message.

[0064] The communication session monitoring module is used to maintain an independent timer for each communication session corresponding to each data stream, and outputs a timeout alarm signal.

[0065] The security degradation and recovery module is used to receive the time when the verification result is a verification failure and the timeout alarm signal, and to execute a graded security degradation strategy based on this.

[0066] Currently, security level information lacks an independent end-to-end transmission mechanism. Some solutions either treat security levels as static attributes during the system design phase or attach them to the payload as part of the verification parameters. There is a lack of a mechanism that abstracts security levels into independent labels, transmits them end-to-end along with the data stream, and is protected by integrity.

[0067] In this context, this embodiment provides the following implementation: security level metadata is written into a first message in a second protocol network. This implementation may include: Convert security level metadata into security label encoding; write the security label encoding into the reserved field of the first message in the second protocol network; wherein the reserved field is located between the standard header and the payload of the first message.

[0068] In this embodiment, the vehicle gateway device converts the functional safety level identifier represented by the security level metadata into an N+Q bit security tag code according to a preset mapping logic. For example, N is 2, used to store the functional safety level identifier, and Q is 1, used for freshness marking or random number seed to prevent replay attacks.

[0069] According to the preset encoding mapping logic, the security level metadata is converted into security label encoding. For example, QM is converted to binary 00, ASIL A is converted to binary 01, ASIL B is converted to binary 10, and ASIL C and ASIL D are uniformly converted to binary 11; this simplifies the encoding and reflects the highest security requirements of ASIL C and ASIL D.

[0070] Subsequently, when constructing the first message of the second protocol network, the security label is encoded and written into the reserved field of the first message.

[0071] like Figure 3 As shown, the first message may include a standard header, a reserved field in the application header, a payload, and a checksum tail. The reserved field is located between the standard header and the payload of the first message, and has a length of M bytes (M≥1). Its lower N+Q bits are used to carry the security tag encoding. The position of this reserved field ensures that it will not be stripped or modified by intermediate nodes when processed by the standard protocol stack, and at the same time, it can be protected for integrity along with the payload.

[0072] Taking the conversion of DDS protocol to SOME / IP protocol as an example, when the vehicle gateway device constructs the SOME / IP message, it inserts a 1-byte (M=1) reserved field between the standard header and the payload, writes the above N+Q bit security tag encoding into the lower 3 bits (Bit0 to Bit2, N=2, Q=1) of the reserved field, and reserves the remaining bits Bit3 to Bit7 for later use.

[0073] Through the above method, security level information is converted into independent security label codes and embedded in the reserved fields of the message. This allows the security level information to be transmitted end-to-end with the data as an independent label during the heterogeneous network protocol conversion process, reducing the possibility of the security level information being lost or degraded. At the same time, the security label encoding only occupies a very small amount of reserved field resources in the message, having a minimal impact on network bandwidth and helping to ensure the data transmission efficiency of the vehicular network.

[0074] In one embodiment, calculating a first checksum for a first message encoded with a security tag includes: First, based on the functional safety level identifier represented by the safety label code, determine the target verification algorithm that matches the functional safety level identifier.

[0075] In this embodiment, the vehicle gateway device parses the functional safety level identifier (FSL) of the data sample from the security tag encoding, and determines the target verification algorithm from multiple preset verification algorithms based on the FSL identifier. The verification algorithms corresponding to different FSL identifiers have different verification strengths. As some possible examples, when the FSL identifier is ASIL D, the CRC-64 verification algorithm is used; when the FSL identifier is ASIL B, the CRC-32 verification algorithm is used; and when the FSL identifier is QM, the CRC-16 verification algorithm is used. By matching data samples of different security levels with verification algorithms of different strengths, the ability of high-security-level data to resist attacks is improved.

[0076] After determining the target verification algorithm, the initial value is calculated according to the target verification algorithm to obtain the first verification value of the first message; wherein, the initial value includes: the calculation result between the first verification value of the message corresponding to the previous frame of data and the hash value of the functional safety level identifier.

[0077] In this embodiment, the initial value is not a fixed constant, but is dynamically generated based on the calculation result between the first checksum of the message corresponding to the previous frame of data and the hash value of the functional safety level identifier. Specifically, after obtaining the security level metadata, a hash operation is performed on the functional safety level identifier represented by the metadata to obtain the hash value corresponding to the functional safety level identifier. For example, for ASIL D level, it is input into a preset hash function (such as a lightweight hash algorithm like CRC-8 or SHA-256) to generate a fixed-length hash digest as the hash value of the functional safety level identifier.

[0078] Calculate the first message P corresponding to the current data sample i The first check value S i At that time, the vehicle gateway device obtains the packet P corresponding to the previous frame of data. i-1 The first check value S i-1 The first checksum S of the previous frame i-1 Perform bitwise XOR or cyclic shift and add operations with the hash value of the functional safety level identifier of the current frame to generate the initial value for the current frame verification calculation.

[0079] Subsequently, based on the target verification algorithm that matches the functional safety level identifier, the first message is subjected to integrity verification calculation starting from the dynamically generated initial value to obtain the first verification value of the current frame; and the first verification value is appended to the end of the first message to form the second message.

[0080] Specifically, taking CRC-64 as an example, the target verification algorithm, when calculating the first checksum, includes: loading the initial value into the initial register of the CRC-64 calculation engine; inputting the entire content of the first message into the CRC-64 calculation engine in byte order; and performing the following iterative calculations for each byte: Perform an XOR operation between the current register value and the input byte; starting from the least significant bit (LSB), check bit by bit. If the current LSB is 1, shift the register value 1 bit to the right and then perform an XOR operation with the generator polynomial; if the current LSB is 0, simply shift the register value 1 bit to the right.

[0081] Repeat the shift and XOR operations described above until all 8 bits of the byte have been processed. After all bytes have been processed, perform an XOR operation between the register value and the preset final XOR value to obtain the first checksum of the message.

[0082] In the above embodiment for calculating the first check value, by combining the dynamically generated initial value, the first check value of each frame of the first message is associated with the first check value of the previous frame and the functional safety level identifier of the current frame, forming a chain dependency relationship of check values. This makes it possible that tampering with any frame of data will affect the check value verification results of all subsequent frames, which helps to achieve proactive fault isolation.

[0083] Furthermore, for high-security-level data such as ASIL C or ASIL D, the vehicle gateway device can call the CRC engine to perform verification calculations to reduce the impact of soft errors on the reliability of the verification process; for lower-security-level data such as ASIL A or QM, verification calculations can be performed in software.

[0084] By employing the above methods, the integrity of the first message is protected, and the security tag encoding and message payload are included in the verification scope together, which helps reduce the possibility that the security tag encoding may be tampered with separately during transmission without being detected. At the same time, matching different security levels with verification algorithms of varying strengths facilitates the rational allocation of gateway device computing resources and reduces the risk of high-security-level data streams being subjected to low-intensity attacks.

[0085] Traditional communication security protection schemes focus on the verification and protection of single-frame messages, but fail to establish lifecycle monitoring for data flow sessions, resulting in the inability to detect persistent faults such as data flow interruption and source node failure in a timely manner.

[0086] Therefore, in one embodiment, the in-vehicle data transmission method may further include: In response to the establishment of a communication session corresponding to the data stream, a timer is created; wherein the timing period of the timer includes the sum of the standard data period and the guard interval duration, and the standard data period is used to represent the interval between two consecutive data frames sent by the data stream.

[0087] Specifically, when establishing a communication session corresponding to a data stream, a separate watchdog timer is created for that data stream. The timing period of this timer can be determined based on the sum of the standard data period of the data stream and the guard interval duration, i.e.: T wd = T dl +δ(1) Among them, T wd T represents the timing period of the timer; dl δ represents the standard data period; δ represents the protection interval, which can be, for example, 10% to 25% of the standard data period.

[0088] Taking the lidar data stream as an example, its standard data period is 100ms, the protection interval can be 20ms, then the timing period of the timer is 120ms.

[0089] By setting an independent timer for each data stream, the communication session monitoring of each data stream does not interfere with each other, which is conducive to achieving precise flow-level fault location.

[0090] Based on creating independent timers for each data stream, combined with Figure 4 In one embodiment, data transmission can be monitored by referring to the following method: In response to the successful transmission of the second message to the target node, a timer is started to begin counting; in response to the failure to receive the next frame of data sample within the timer's timing period, a timeout alarm signal is generated.

[0091] Specifically, after the second message is successfully sent to the target node, the timer corresponding to the data stream session is reset to start counting, and the system monitors whether the next frame of data is successfully received within the timing period.

[0092] If the next frame of data for the data sample is not received within the timer's timing period, it can be determined that an anomaly has occurred in the current data stream's communication link or source node, and a timeout alarm signal will be generated. The generation of a timeout alarm signal indicates a fault event has occurred.

[0093] If the next frame of data is successfully received within the timer period, it is determined whether a successful verification event has been received from the target node. If the vehicle gateway device does not receive a successful verification event, i.e., receives a failed verification event, a fault event is identified. If the vehicle gateway device receives a successful verification event, indicating that the data has been successfully forwarded, the timer is reset and restarted to continuously monitor the transmission status of the data stream. This process continues, resetting the corresponding timer after each frame of data is successfully forwarded and starting to monitor the next frame.

[0094] In this way, the vehicle gateway device can continuously monitor the data flow session lifecycle and control the link anomaly detection delay within a reasonable fluctuation range of the standard data cycle (generally within 1.1 to 1.25 times the standard data cycle), which helps to detect data flow transmission anomalies in a timely manner.

[0095] Current fault recovery strategies for vehicle gateway devices are typically simplistic and lack a tiered degradation mechanism linked to security levels. This results in data streams of different security levels not receiving matching recovery strategies when a fault occurs.

[0096] Based on this, in one embodiment, the vehicle data transmission method can also provide a graded security degradation strategy that is linked to the severity level of the fault.

[0097] This embodiment mainly includes: in response to a fault event, determining the severity level of the fault event, and executing a security degradation strategy that matches the severity level; wherein, the fault event includes: the verification result returned by the target node is a verification failure, and / or a timeout alarm signal generated locally by the vehicle gateway device.

[0098] The severity level of a fault event can include at least two levels with different degrees of severity, and different severity levels correspond to different security degradation strategies. For example, the severity levels from low to high can include: Level 1, Level 2, Level 3, and Level 4, which correspond to Level 1, Level 2, Level 3, and Level 4 security degradation strategies, respectively.

[0099] The trigger thresholds corresponding to each severity level can be dynamically configured based on the functional safety level identifier. The higher the functional safety level identifier, the stricter the trigger threshold setting. For example, for ASIL D level data streams, two consecutive verification failures trigger the second severity level, while for ASIL A level data streams, four consecutive verification failures trigger the second severity level. In this way, data streams of different safety levels can obtain a safety degradation strategy that matches their safety level when a fault occurs, which helps to ensure that the functional safety of the entire vehicle is not compromised due to cross-domain transmission.

[0100] To better understand, in this embodiment, in response to a failure event, the severity level of the failure event is determined, and a security degradation strategy matching the severity level is executed. The following four scenarios can be referenced.

[0101] Scenario 1. In response to a fault event that meets the first condition, a first severity level is determined, a fault time is sent to the vehicle safety controller, and data stream transmission continues; wherein, the first condition includes at least one of the following: the verification result is that the verification failures are not consecutive and the cumulative number of failures is within the first failure count; the timeout alarm signals are not consecutive and the cumulative number of timeouts is within the first timeout count; and the timeout duration corresponding to a single timeout alarm signal is within the first duration.

[0102] In this embodiment, a non-continuous occurrence of verification failures indicates an occasional, single integrity check failure or a minor anomaly such as slight jitter. The cumulative number of failures is within the first failure count range. For example, if only a single verification failure occurs in multiple cycles, and subsequent message verifications are normal, and the cumulative number of failures is less than 2, it indicates that the verification failure is an occasional event rather than a persistent fault.

[0103] If the timeout alarm signal occurs discontinuously and the cumulative number of timeouts is within the first timeout range, it indicates that the watchdog timer experienced a single timeout within a few cycles, but the timeouts did not continue. For example, only one timeout alarm occurred in multiple cycles, and the next frame of data arrived normally in subsequent cycles, indicating that the timeout was caused by a brief network jitter. If the timeout duration corresponding to the timeout alarm signal is within the first duration range, it indicates that the delay time of a single timeout is short, for example, only exceeding the timing period by a small offset and not exceeding the upper limit of the protection interval, indicating that although the data is slightly delayed, it is still within an acceptable jitter range.

[0104] Therefore, if at least one of the above-mentioned occasional or slight vibrations or other mild abnormalities are met, the fault event can be determined to be of the first severity level.

[0105] Accordingly, the vehicle gateway device triggers a Level 1 security degradation policy that matches the first severity level. This Level 1 security degradation policy includes: sending a fault event to the vehicle safety controller while continuing normal data transmission; and logging anomalies for subsequent fault analysis and system diagnostics.

[0106] Once the fault event is subsequently detected and the fault is resolved (e.g., subsequent data frame verifications pass consecutively without further timeouts), the vehicle gateway device can return to normal and continue data forwarding as usual. This method allows for the reporting and recording of occasional, non-persistent minor anomalies without interrupting data transmission, helping to maintain data flow continuity and system availability while avoiding unnecessary path switching triggered by sporadic events.

[0107] Scenario 2. In response to a fault event that meets the second condition, a second severity level is determined, and the data stream is switched to a backup communication path or a standby gateway device; wherein the second condition includes at least one of the following: the number of consecutive failures with verification results of verification failure is within the second failure count range, the number of consecutive timeouts corresponding to timeout alarm signals is within the second timeout count range, and the timeout duration corresponding to a single timeout alarm signal is within the second duration range.

[0108] In this embodiment, the verification result is defined as the number of consecutive verification failures falling within the second failure range (N1≤N<N2). This indicates that multiple consecutive integrity verification failures demonstrate a persistent fault rather than an isolated event. For example, two consecutive verification failures (e.g., N1=2) indicate that the transmission quality of the current communication path has been consistently substandard.

[0109] The consecutive timeout count corresponding to the timeout alarm signal is within the second timeout count range (M1≤M<M2), indicating that the timer has timed out in multiple consecutive periods. For example, two consecutive timeouts (M1=2) indicate that there may be a persistent anomaly in the source node or communication link. The timeout duration corresponding to the single timeout alarm signal is within the second duration range, indicating that the delay duration of a single timeout is relatively long, such as exceeding the upper limit of the protection interval, indicating that the data delay has exceeded the acceptable jitter range, and the link may be congested or partially failed.

[0110] If at least one of the above persistent anomalies is met, the fault event can be classified as the second severity level.

[0111] Accordingly, the vehicle gateway device triggers a secondary security degradation strategy matching the second severity level. This secondary security degradation strategy includes switching the data flow to a backup communication path or a standby gateway device to bypass the currently abnormal communication path or gateway node and ensure the continuous transmission of the data flow.

[0112] When subsequent monitoring shows that the backup communication path has returned to normal and the fault event has been eliminated, the vehicle gateway device can return the data stream from the second-level degraded state to the normal state or the first-level degraded state, depending on the recovery status.

[0113] By employing the above methods, for persistent moderate anomalies, proactively switching to backup resources before the data stream is completely interrupted helps reduce the risk of data stream interruption caused by persistent communication link anomalies and improves the reliability of data transmission.

[0114] Scenario 3. In response to a fault event that meets the third condition, the third severity level is determined, and the data of the previous frame stored in the local cache is used as the alternative transmission data for the data sample, and the timeliness of the alternative transmission data is marked; wherein, the third condition includes at least one of the following: the number of consecutive failures of the verification result is within the third failure number range, the number of consecutive timeouts corresponding to the timeout alarm signal is within the third timeout number range, and the backup communication path fails.

[0115] In this embodiment, if the number of consecutive verification failures is within the range of the third number of failures (N≥N2), it indicates that the verification failure of the communication path has shown serious and continuous characteristics. For example, if there are 4 consecutive verification failures (e.g., N2=4), it indicates that the quality of the current communication link has seriously deteriorated.

[0116] If the number of consecutive timeouts corresponding to the timeout alarm signal is within the range of the third timeout number (M≥M2), it indicates that the timer has been continuously timed out in multiple consecutive periods. For example, if there are 4 consecutive timeouts (such as M2=4), it indicates that the source node may have failed or the communication link may be seriously abnormal.

[0117] The failure of the backup communication path indicates that the backup communication path or standby gateway device switched to after triggering the second-level downgrade is also not working properly, and all available communication paths are no longer available.

[0118] If at least one of the above severe anomalies is met, the fault event can be classified as the third severity level.

[0119] Accordingly, the vehicle gateway device triggers a Level 3 security degradation strategy matching the third severity level. This Level 3 security degradation strategy includes: enabling the previous frame's valid data stored in the local cache as alternative transmission data for the current cycle, and marking the timeliness of this alternative transmission data. The previous frame's data stored in the local cache is a valid data frame that has passed integrity verification in a previous normal transmission cycle. Although it reflects the vehicle status information at the previous moment, it can be used as temporary alternative data for the target node's reference when the current frame is unavailable. While enabling the alternative transmission data, the vehicle gateway device marks the alternative transmission data with a timeliness tag, which indicates the validity period of the alternative transmission data.

[0120] When subsequent monitoring shows that the source data stream has returned to normal, such as when the next frame of data from the source is received again and the verification passes, or when the backup communication path is restored to availability, the vehicle gateway device can return to normal status.

[0121] In the above manner, even in the event of severe communication link failure or failure of all available paths, the temporary output of the data stream can still be maintained by using the valid data of the previous frame cached locally. This helps to reduce the risk of functional loss due to instantaneous data interruption and buys time for system recovery.

[0122] Scenario 4. In response to a fault event that meets the fourth condition, the fourth severity level is determined, the data stream is stopped, and a fault code is reported to the vehicle safety controller; wherein the fourth condition includes at least one of the following: the timeliness of the alternative data transmission exceeds the preset validity period.

[0123] In this embodiment, the timeliness of the alternative transmission data exceeding the preset validity period indicates that the continuous use of the alternative transmission data has exceeded the allowed safe time limit. For example, the vehicle gateway device starts a timeliness timer when enabling alternative transmission data. When the usage time of the alternative transmission data reaches or exceeds the preset validity period T... valid When this happens, the alternative transmitted data is considered expired and no longer suitable for functional safety-related control decisions. The preset validity period is dynamically configured based on the functional safety level identifier; the higher the functional safety level identifier, the shorter the preset validity period, to ensure that high-safety-level data streams receive more stringent data freshness guarantees.

[0124] In this case, the fault event is classified as Level 4 Severity.

[0125] Accordingly, the onboard gateway device triggers a Level 4 safety degradation strategy matching the fourth severity level. This Level 4 safety degradation strategy includes: stopping the transmission of the data stream and reporting a fault code to the vehicle safety controller. Stopping transmission means that the onboard gateway device will no longer forward any data frames of this data stream to the target node, to prevent the target node from making erroneous control decisions using expired cached data, thereby reducing the risk to personal safety. Reporting a fault code to the vehicle safety controller allows the upper-level system to know the specific fault status of the data stream, facilitating the initiation of a higher-level system-level safety response, such as prompting the driver to take over through human-machine interaction.

[0126] Meanwhile, the onboard gateway maintains normal communication for other non-safety-related data streams to ensure the availability of other vehicle functions. Once the fault is cleared, the gateway can resume normal transmission of the data stream upon manual confirmation or external command. By proactively stopping data stream transmission and reporting the fault in the event of expired alternative transmission data or a fatal failure, this helps prevent target nodes from performing erroneous control actions based on outdated data, reducing the risk of compromised vehicle safety.

[0127] In the above scenarios, the trigger thresholds corresponding to different severity levels can be dynamically configured based on the functional safety level identifier. The higher the functional safety level identifier, the more stringent the trigger threshold setting. For example, refer to Table 1 below.

[0128] Table 1

[0129] In Table 1 above, taking N1, which triggers the second severity level, as an example, its specific value is dynamically configured according to the functional safety level identifier, namely: ASIL D corresponds to N1=1, ASIL C corresponds to N1=2, ASIL B corresponds to N1=3, ASIL A corresponds to N1=4, and QM corresponds to N1=5. The configuration principles of other thresholds in Table 1, as well as thresholds such as M1 and M2 related to the number of consecutive timeouts, are similar and will not be elaborated further.

[0130] The aforementioned tiered security degradation strategy enables the onboard gateway device to perform tiered recovery actions commensurate with the severity of the fault event when communication links are abnormal, data is tampered with, or the gateway experiences partial failure. This helps reduce the risk of vehicle functional safety failure due to cross-domain transmission. Fault detection and degradation actions can be completed within a short time after a fault occurs; the total delay from fault occurrence to degradation action execution is generally less than two message cycles according to testing. Furthermore, the multi-level security degradation strategy, combined with dynamic thresholds linked to functional safety level identifiers, ensures that data streams of different safety levels receive appropriate fault recovery actions, thus improving system availability.

[0131] In summary, the vehicle data transmission method provided in the above embodiments, by acquiring the security level metadata of the data sample and writing it into the first message to be forwarded as an independent tag, ensures that the security level information is transmitted end-to-end with the data stream during protocol conversion without loss or degradation in interpretation. By calculating a checksum for the first message carrying the security tag encoding and appending it to the message tail, the security tag encoding and message payload are included in the integrity protection scope together, reducing the risk of the security tag encoding being tampered with separately. By establishing an independent timer for each data stream for lifecycle monitoring, persistent faults such as data stream interruption or source failure can be detected in a timely manner. By executing a security degradation strategy linked to the security level according to the severity of the fault, data streams of different security levels can receive differentiated fault recovery processing when anomalies occur.

[0132] The aforementioned technical means work together to form a full-link protection framework from security level transmission, integrity protection, session monitoring to graded degradation, enabling vehicle gateway devices to complete cross-protocol secure forwarding without having to reach the same highest security level as the data being forwarded. While ensuring end-to-end functional security attributes, this helps reduce the hardware and software development costs of gateway devices and improves the availability and robustness of the system in abnormal scenarios.

[0133] Reference Figure 5 This embodiment provides a vehicle-mounted data transmission method, which is applied to a target node and includes: S502, Receive the second message; wherein the second message carries security level metadata, which is used to represent the functional security level identifier of the data sample in the first protocol network; S504, extract the first checksum from the tail of the second message, and calculate the second checksum for the remaining part of the second message excluding the tail. S506, in response to the second check value being consistent with the first check value, the check is confirmed to be successful; Alternatively, S508, in response to the second check value being different from the first check value, determines that the check has failed.

[0134] The vehicle data transmission method provided in this embodiment involves a target node receiving a second message carrying safety level metadata, extracting a first checksum from the end of the message, recalculating a second checksum on the remaining portion of the message, and then comparing the two checksums to determine the verification result. Since the safety level metadata is carried in the second message and is protected by integrity verification along with the message payload, the target node verifies the integrity of the message while also verifying the credibility of the safety level information, thus obtaining safety level metadata with end-to-end integrity protection. Through this method, the target node, as the end user of the data, can independently verify the integrity of the message, improving the credibility of the data used by the target node for functional safety-related decisions and contributing to ensuring the functional safety of the entire vehicle.

[0135] This embodiment provides an in-vehicle data transmission device, which is applied to an in-vehicle gateway device, and the device includes the following modules: An acquisition module is used to acquire security level metadata of a data sample; wherein the security level metadata is used to represent the functional security level identifier of the data sample in the first protocol network; The writing module is used to write the security level metadata into the first message in the second protocol network; The first calculation module is used to calculate a first check value for the first message and append the first check value to the end of the first message to form a second message; The generation module is used to send the second message to the target node and receive the verification result of the target node performing a verification operation on the second message.

[0136] This embodiment provides a vehicle-mounted data transmission device, which is applied to a target node and includes the following modules: A receiving module is configured to receive a second message; wherein the second message carries security level metadata, the security level metadata being used to represent the functional security level identifier of a data sample in the first protocol network; The second calculation module is used to extract the first check code from the tail of the second message and calculate the second check value for the remaining part of the second message excluding the tail. The verification success module is used to determine that the verification is successful in response to the second verification value being consistent with the first verification value. Alternatively, a verification failure module may be used to determine verification failure in response to the second verification value being different from the first verification value.

[0137] The device provided in this embodiment has the same implementation principle and technical effect as the aforementioned method embodiment. For the sake of brevity, any parts not mentioned in the device embodiment can be referred to the corresponding content in the aforementioned method embodiment.

[0138] This application also provides an electronic device, which may include a processor and a memory. The processor and the memory are communicatively connected. The memory is used to store programs, and the processor is used to execute the programs, specifically performing the relevant steps described in the embodiments of the vehicle data transmission method.

[0139] Specifically, the program may include program code, which includes computer-executable instructions. The memory may include high-speed RAM, and may also include non-volatile memory, such as at least one disk storage device. The processor may be a central processing unit (CPU), a microcontroller unit (MCU), or an application-specific integrated circuit (ASIC).

[0140] This application also provides a computer-readable storage medium storing at least one executable instruction that, when executed on an in-vehicle data transmission device, causes the in-vehicle data transmission device to perform the in-vehicle data transmission method in any of the above method embodiments.

[0141] This application provides a computer program product, which includes a computer program / instructions that, when executed by a processor, implement the in-vehicle data transmission method provided herein.

[0142] This application embodiment also provides a vehicle, which includes a processor; a memory for storing executable instructions of the processor; the processor is configured to read the executable instructions from the memory and execute the instructions to implement the above-described vehicle data transmission method.

[0143] It should be understood that the application of this application is not limited to the examples above. Those skilled in the art can make improvements or modifications based on the above description, and all such improvements and modifications should fall within the protection scope of the appended claims. Those skilled in the art can understand that implementing all or part of the processes of the above embodiments and making equivalent changes according to the claims of this application still fall within the scope of this application.

Claims

1. A vehicle-mounted data transmission method, characterized in that, The method is applied to an in-vehicle gateway device, and the method includes: Obtain the security level metadata of the data sample; wherein, the security level metadata is used to represent the functional security level identifier of the data sample in the first protocol network; Write the security level metadata into the first message of the second protocol network; Calculate a first checksum for the first message and append the first checksum to the end of the first message to form a second message; The second message is sent to the target node, and the verification result of the target node performing a verification operation on the second message is received.

2. The method as described in claim 1, characterized in that, The step of writing the security level metadata into the first message in the second protocol network includes: Convert the security level metadata into security tag encoding; The security label is encoded and written into a reserved field of the first message in the second protocol network; wherein the reserved field is located between the standard header and the payload of the first message.

3. The method as described in claim 1, characterized in that, The calculation of the first checksum for the first message includes: Based on the functional safety level identifier represented by the security label encoding, a target verification algorithm matching the functional safety level identifier is determined; The initial value is calculated according to the target verification algorithm to obtain the first verification value of the first message; wherein, the initial value includes: the calculation result between the first verification value of the message corresponding to the previous frame of data and the hash value of the functional safety level identifier.

4. The method as described in claim 1, characterized in that, The method further includes: In response to the successful delivery of the second message to the target node, a timer is started to begin counting. If the next frame of data for the data sample is not received within the timer's timing period, a timeout alarm signal is generated.

5. The method as described in claim 1 or 4, characterized in that, The method further includes: In response to establishing a communication session corresponding to the data stream, a timer is created; wherein the timing period of the timer includes the sum of the standard data period and the guard interval duration, and the standard data period is used to represent the interval between two consecutive data frames sent by the data stream.

6. The method as described in claim 1, characterized in that, The method further includes: In response to a failure event, the severity level of the failure event is determined, and a security degradation strategy matching the severity level is executed; wherein the failure event includes: the verification result being a verification failure, and / or a timeout alarm signal.

7. The method as described in claim 6, characterized in that, In response to a failure event, determining the severity level of the failure event and executing a security degradation strategy matching the severity level includes: In response to a fault event that meets a first condition, a first severity level is determined, the fault time is sent to the vehicle safety controller, and the data stream continues to be transmitted. The first condition includes at least one of the following: the verification result is that the verification failures occur non-continuously and the cumulative number of failures is within the first failure count range; the timeout alarm signals occur non-continuously and the cumulative number of timeouts is within the first timeout count range; and the timeout duration corresponding to a single timeout alarm signal is within the first duration range.

8. The method as described in claim 6, characterized in that, In response to a failure event, determining the severity level of the failure event and executing a security degradation strategy matching the severity level includes: In response to a fault event that meets a second condition, a second severity level is determined, and the data stream is switched to a backup communication path or a backup gateway device; wherein the second condition includes at least one of the following: the number of consecutive failures of the verification result is within the second failure count range, the number of consecutive timeouts corresponding to the timeout alarm signal is within the second timeout count range, and the timeout duration corresponding to a single timeout alarm signal is within the second duration range.

9. The method as described in claim 8, characterized in that, In response to a failure event, determining the severity level of the failure event and executing a security degradation strategy matching the severity level includes: In response to a failure event that meets a third condition, a third severity level is determined, and the previous frame data stored in the local cache is used as the alternative transmission data for the data sample, and the timeliness of the alternative transmission data is marked; wherein, the third condition includes at least one of the following: the number of consecutive failures of the verification result is within the third failure number range, the number of consecutive timeouts corresponding to the timeout alarm signal is within the third timeout number range, and the backup communication path fails.

10. The method as described in claim 9, characterized in that, In response to a failure event, determining the severity level of the failure event and executing a security degradation strategy matching the severity level includes: In response to a fault event that meets a fourth condition, a fourth severity level is determined, the data stream is stopped, and a fault code is reported to the vehicle safety controller; wherein the fourth condition includes at least one of the following: the timeliness of the alternative transmission data exceeds a preset validity period.

11. A vehicle-mounted data transmission method, characterized in that, The method is applied to the target node, and the method includes: Receive a second message; wherein the second message carries security level metadata, the security level metadata being used to represent the functional security level identifier of a data sample in the first protocol network; Extract the first checksum from the tail of the second message, and calculate the second checksum for the remaining part of the second message excluding the tail. If the second check value matches the first check value, the verification is confirmed to be successful. Alternatively, in response to the second check value being different from the first check value, the check is determined to have failed.

12. A vehicle, characterized in that, The vehicles include: processor; Memory used to store the processor's executable instructions; The processor is configured to read the executable instructions from the memory and execute the instructions to implement the vehicle data transmission method according to any one of claims 1 to 11.