Non-contact two-wire safety sensor
The non-contact two-wire safety switch with changeover contacts and variable resistance ensures reliable detection of switching states and errors, enhancing safety and compliance with functional safety standards in hazardous environments.
Patent Information
- Application Number
- DE102022124299
- Authority / Receiving Office
- DE · DE
- Patent Type
- Patents
- Current Assignee / Owner
- Filing Date
- 2022-09-21
- Publication Date
- 2024-12-05
- Estimated Expiration
- 2042-09-21
AI Technical Summary
Existing two-wire safety sensors fail to meet the required safety standards due to undetectable errors in contact states, such as a faulty contact remaining closed, leading to a loss of risk-reducing measures in potentially explosive and hazardous environments.
A non-contact two-wire safety switch with changeover contacts and a variable internal resistance, influenced by an external physical quantity, allows the evaluation unit to reliably detect switching states and errors, ensuring compliance with safety standards like IEC 62061 and ISO 13849.
The solution provides enhanced safety and reliability by detecting individual errors and maintaining the safety function even in the presence of faults, meeting the criteria for functional safety and reducing risks in hazardous environments.
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Abstract
Description
[0001] The invention relates to a contactless two-wire safety sensor according to the preamble of claim 1.
[0002] Non-contact two-wire safety sensors are used in many areas, particularly in industrial safety technology.
[0003] The primary goal of safety technology is to protect people and the environment from sources of danger that can arise, for example, in systems and machinery. Systems or machinery can be monitored for potential risks using sensors. Should a situation arise in which an unacceptable risk exists, a safety measure is necessary.
[0004] Two-wire sensors are often used to reduce risk, particularly in the process industry. This is because the systems are frequently used in potentially explosive atmospheres. With a two-wire arrangement, the normative requirements for electrical, electronic sensor systems in potentially explosive atmospheres can be met relatively easily, especially for circuit arrangements in which the electrical circuits themselves must not cause the ignition of an explosive atmosphere (equipment protection by intrinsic safety "i" according to IEC 60079-11). A possible technical implementation for two-wire sensors, which are operationally connected to a control input of an evaluation unit, also known as a switching amplifier, via a two-wire connecting cable (two-wire arrangement / two-wire arrangement), is defined in IEC 60947-5-6.
[0005] In order to understand the problem underlying the invention and the terminology used, which is common in the field of security technology, a detailed description of the prior art is necessary.
[0006] They show: Fig. 1 two-wire arrangement with sensor with evaluation unit Fig. 2 schematic structure of a safety sensor Fig. 2a Current switching state characteristic curve Fig. 3 schematic view of an industrial plant with various protective devices Fig. 4 schematic view of a movable guard Fig. 5 schematic view of an arrangement with an evaluation unit connected to two redundant REED contacts Fig. 6 Two-wire safety sensor according to the state of the art first example Fig. 7 Table I Overview of various error cases Fig. 8 Two-wire safety sensor according to the state of the art second example
[0007] Fig. Figure 1 schematically shows a two-wire arrangement with a non-contact safety sensor connected to an evaluation unit (e.g., switching amplifier) in two different switching states SZ1 and SZ2, each assigned different impedance values (1 kΩ and 11 kΩ, respectively). In the first switching state SZ1, the switch in the safety sensor is closed. In the second switching state SZ2, the switch in the safety sensor is open. The switch represents a non-contact proximity switch in general (inductive, capacitive, optical, magnetic, etc.).
[0008] In the AWE evaluation unit, an impedance evaluation is carried out via which the switching state SZ1, SZ2 of the safety sensor can be determined.
[0009] The evaluation unit includes a DC power source to supply the control circuit, which passes through the safety sensor and is influenced by the variable impedance (internal resistance) of the safety sensor.
[0010] This two-wire arrangement can be used in potentially explosive atmospheres if it also meets the requirements of the IEC 60079-11 standard.
[0011] The two-wire arrangements used for risk reduction, such as sensor systems, often also require additional safety features to not only reduce hazards from an explosive atmosphere, but also simultaneously provide risk-reducing measures for hazards that arise, for example, from the movement of system components, crushing injuries as a result of unintentional / unexpected start-up, or ejection as a result of a break. For this purpose, applicable functional safety standards such as IEC 61508, IEC 61511, IEC 62061, or ISO 13849 must be applied.
[0012] Fig. Figure 2 shows the simplified structure of a two-wire safety sensor. These generally meet specific standards, such as IEC 60947-5-6. The internal resistance Z of these two-wire safety sensors can be changed using a switchable contact. However, two-wire safety sensors constructed in this way do not meet the relevant requirements in terms of functional safety, because in the event of a faulty contact (e.g. contact always remains "closed") a change in the internal resistance Z is no longer possible or can no longer be detected by a downstream evaluation unit. In process and factory automation in the area of functional safety, however, a defined safety-related reliability is expected from a two-wire safety sensor depending on the required risk reduction, for example for monitoring the position of a protective device (e.g. door).
[0013] Fig. 2a shows the possible switching states 'On' or 'Off' depending on the current value.
[0014] The current-voltage curve U(I) should be within the range specified in IEC 60947-5-6. Above 2.1 mA, the switch is in the "on" state. Below 1.2 mA, it is in the "off" state. The response range for the change in switching state is between 1.2 and 2.1 mA.
[0015] The 'off' switching state (also called "blocking" in IEC 60947-5-6) is between 0.35 mA and 1.2 mA. The 'on' switching state (also called "conducting" in IEC 60947-5-6) is above 2.1 mA.
[0016] Particularly in systems that pose a potential hazard to people, interlocking devices are used in conjunction with movable, separating protective devices ( Fig. 3). Interlocking devices are devices that monitor the protective position of a guard and prevent the operation of a dangerous system or machine function if the guard is not in the intended protective position (e.g. door closed).
[0017] A movable separating locking device ( Fig. 4) consists, for example, of a door, an actuator 'M', and a safety-related sensor 'S'. Safety-related sensors are often used to implement electrical, electronic locking devices, for example, to monitor the protective position of doors of a guard in a system. The safety-related sensors can be, for example, inductive, magnetic, RFID safety sensors, or safety sensors using other technologies.
[0018] A common approach in the design of safety-related (sensor) systems, especially for interlocking devices, is to switch devices with potential-free contacts (e.g., magnetic safety sensors with reed contacts). Different types of interlocking devices exist, which are described in detail in ISO 14119. The reed contacts are usually designed redundantly to achieve safety-related reliability. Through downstream evaluation, the status and potential errors can be detected and treated accordingly using suitable diagnostic measures ( Fig. 5).
[0019] Fig. Figure 5 shows two redundant REED contacts that are connected to an evaluation unit and can be actuated jointly with a magnet.
[0020] These measures increase safety reliability and the systems are suitable for reducing hazards, for example, in the case of movable, separating protective devices.
[0021] For two-wire safety sensors or signal transmitters with a simple structure according to Fig. 2 Even a single error (e.g., a change in a resistance value, or the failure to open or close a contact) can result in the actual state of the two-wire arrangement no longer being detected or diagnosed, thus losing the risk-reducing measure (protective effect). Currently, no two-wire safety sensors with contacts are known that offer a minimum level of safety-related reliability in accordance with the relevant safety standards.
[0022] From EP 3116012 A1 a contactless two-wire safety sensor is known ( Fig. 6), which is used to monitor the closed state of a door, e.g., an elevator door. The safety sensor is actuated by two magnets that act on two reed contacts as switching elements. The evaluation unit is not shown.
[0023] The two reed contacts are arranged in a bridge circuit with two branches, with two resistors connected in series and the two reed contacts connected in parallel. The elevator door may only open when both reed contacts are closed, thus signaling the release state. Otherwise, the elevator door must be prevented from opening.
[0024] A short circuit in the two supply lines of this safety sensor would signal a release to the signal receiver, e.g. an evaluation unit for safety sensors, even though the two REED contacts are not closed.
[0025] To account for this fault scenario, the NAMUR standard specifically considers short-circuit and line breakage in addition to the "contact open" (= "blocking") and "contact closed" (= "conductive") cases (see Table I). This allows for the implementation of a fail-safe system that always switches to the safe state in the event of a fault.
[0026] The response range for a change in the switching state of a NAMUR sensor is between 1.2 and 2.1 mA, depending on the resistance value.
[0027] While the redundant arrangement of two reed contacts increases the safety level, various fault scenarios can occur that generate a resistance value that cannot be clearly assigned. This would be the case, for example, if one of the two contacts can no longer be released. In this case, the current value would be within the response range and could not be clearly assigned. This scenario would have to be considered separately in the evaluation unit.
[0028] From DE202009001474U1 another contactless safety sensor in two-wire technology is known ( Fig. 7). Here, the two reed contacts, commonly referred to as proximity sensors, are connected in parallel with two resistors each.
[0029] With this circuit arrangement, both a line break and a short circuit can be reliably detected.
[0030] However, if a malfunction causes one of the two reed contacts to "jam," meaning it can no longer be released, the evaluation unit cannot clearly distinguish this error from a normal switching state. This results in a faulty switching operation.
[0031] Example: R1 = 1kΩ, R2 = 10kΩ according to IEC 60947-5-6 If in this configuration R1 can no longer open, the resulting total impedance of R1||R2 = 910Ω cannot be clearly distinguished from the conductive state (1 kΩ).
[0032] The object of the invention is to provide a contactless two-wire safety switch which does not have the above-mentioned disadvantages, which has a higher level of safety in terms of safety technology and which can be manufactured easily and inexpensively.
[0033] The essential idea of the invention is to provide changeover contacts in a non-contact two-wire safety switch, which is supplied by a defined DC power source of a safety-related evaluation unit (e.g., NAMUR switching amplifier) and has a variable internal resistance Z. The internal resistance Z is changed by an external physical quantity (e.g., magnetic field) between the defined states "blocking" and "conductive," whereby the safety-related evaluation unit (e.g., NAMUR switching amplifier) can detect a state change via the current through the two-wire safety sensor. For example, according to IEC 60947-5-6, the current through the two-wire safety sensor in the "blocking" state is less than 1.2 mA, and that for the "conductive" state is more than 2.1 mA.The safety-related state “Blocking” of the two-wire safety sensor can be reliably detected by the safety-related evaluation unit in accordance with a required safety level according to the relevant safety standard (such as IEC 62061 or ISO 13849).
[0034] Individual faults such as line breaks or short circuits or faults in individual components can be reliably detected and safely distinguished from a regular switching state.
[0035] The invention is explained in more detail below using an embodiment shown in the drawing.
[0036] They show: Fig. 9 Schematic diagram of a contactless two-wire safety sensor Fig. 10 contactless two-wire safety sensor according to the invention according to a first embodiment Fig. 11 inventive contactless two-wire safety sensor according to a second embodiment Fig. 12 contactless two-wire safety sensor according to the invention according to a third embodiment Fig. 13 Current-voltage characteristic with standard states
[0037] Fig. Figure 9 shows a schematic diagram of a simple non-contact two-wire safety sensor (Namur sensor) 2, which is connected to an AWE evaluation unit via a two-wire cable. In the AWE evaluation unit, impedance evaluation at resistor R is carried out via a comparator circuit, which generates a switching signal at the comparator output. The safety sensor 2 detects a moving target 1 located in the explosion-protected area. The AWE evaluation unit is located in the non-hazardous area. When using the safety sensor 2 in explosion-protected areas, the AWE evaluation unit must meet special approval criteria. This requires intrinsically safe control circuits in the AWE evaluation unit. Evaluation units that meet these special criteria are often also referred to as switching amplifiers or isolating switching amplifiers.
[0038] Fig. 10 shows a contactless two-wire safety sensor 2 according to the invention, which is connected to an evaluation unit AWE for impedance evaluation, according to a first embodiment
[0039] The safety sensor contains two switching elements S1, S2, which can be influenced by a common actuator (target).
[0040] The safety sensor features an H-shaped bridge circuit with a high point N+ and a low point N-. It is powered by the AWE evaluation unit via a two-wire connection ZDA. The safety sensor is therefore completely passive.
[0041] The actuator is usually located on a moving part of a safety device, e.g. a safety door that blocks access to a dangerous part of the system
[0042] The H-shaped bridge circuit has two longitudinal bridge branches LBZ, RBZ and a bridge shunt branch BQ, which connects different sections of the left bridge branch LBZ and the right bridge branch RBZ depending on the switch position of the switching elements S1, S2.
[0043] The two bridge arms LBZ, RBZ are each interrupted at a changeover contact point K. This forms two upper half-bridge arms HBZ1, HBZ2 and two lower half-bridge arms HBZ3, HBZ4, each separated from the other. Changeover switches S1, S2, designed as switching elements, are arranged at the two contact points K1, K2.
[0044] The base connection points of the two switching elements S1, S2 are connected to each other via the bridge shunt arm BQ. They are arranged in such a way that, regardless of the switching state, they cannot generate a conductive connection between the respective half-bridge arms HBZ1, HBZ2 or HBZ3, HBZ4.
[0045] In the illustrated embodiment, resistors of different sizes R1=10 kΩ and R2=1 kΩ are provided in the two upper half-bridge branches HBZ1, HBZ2, which represent different impedance values for the evaluation unit.
[0046] In the normal functioning case of the safety sensor 2, the switching state of the safety sensor 2 is represented by two different impedance values.
[0047] The drawing shows a first switching state SZ1. In this switching state, a first conductive connection V1 is connected between the high point N+ and the low point N- via the half-bridge branches HBZ2 and HBZ3 by means of the switching elements S1 and S2.
[0048] In a case not shown in the drawing, in a second switching state SZ2, a second conductive connection V2 is switched between the high point N+ and the low point N- via the half-bridge branches HBZ1 and HBZ4 by means of the switching elements S1, S2.
[0049] As already mentioned, the two conductive connections V1, V2 have different impedance values Z1, Z2.
[0050] Fig. 11 shows a modification of the embodiment according to Fig. 10 with two minor changes. In this case, resistors of different sizes, R6=500 Ω and R4=5 kΩ, are additionally provided in the half-bridge branches HBZ3 and HBZ4. Furthermore, resistors R1=10 kΩ and R2=1 kΩ have been replaced with resistors R3=5 kΩ and R5=500 Ω, respectively. Depending on the position of switching elements S1 and S2, a total impedance of either 1 kΩ or 10 kΩ is generated.
[0051] Fig. 12 shows a modification of the embodiment according to Fig. 10 with two minor changes. Here, additional switching elements S3 or S4 are arranged in the half-bridge branches HBZ3 and HBZ4. These are controlled with the same physical size as the switching elements S1, S2, since they are actuated by the same actuator 1.
[0052] According to the invention, depending on the definition of the desired safety function, the additional switches S3 and S4 are not necessarily both necessary, but either S3 or S4, or both.
[0053] Fig. Figure 13 shows the states and various fault cases specified in the IEC 60947-5-6 standard for a two-wire circuit arrangement shown in the diagram in the current-voltage diagram. The two normal states are "blocking" and "conducting."
[0054] The other areas are the fault cases line break B or short circuit D and E, as well as the not clearly assignable transition area A between 'conductive' and 'blocking'.
[0055] The function of the invention is explained in more detail below.
[0056] The present embodiments each show a contactless two-wire safety sensor with which a protective device can be monitored to reduce risks.
[0057] The safety sensor contains at least two switching elements S1 and S2 designed as changeover contacts. These redundant switching elements are essential for risk reduction (safety level - functional safety).
[0058] The safety sensor is supplied by a DC power source located in the safety-related evaluation unit AWE (e.g. NAMUR switching amplifier).
[0059] The position of the switching elements S1, S2 (changeover contacts) is influenced by at least one physical property of the target. In a reed switch, the influence is caused by the target's magnetic field. An inductive proximity switch, for example, is influenced by the eddy currents generated in the target.
[0060] In the event of a change in the physical quantity, either the internal resistance Z1 or the internal resistance Z2 is presented to the safety-related evaluation unit (switching amplifier) at terminals N+ and N-, according to the two-wire circuit arrangement of the safety sensor shown, and is evaluated by it in a safety-related manner. The internal resistance Z1 is calculated accordingly. Fig. 10 is formed by R1 (position S of the changeover contacts S1 and S2). If a physical quantity causes both changeover contacts to switch (switch position L), the internal resistance Z2, formed by R2, is presented at the terminals N+ and N-. If the internal resistances Z1 and Z2 are dimensioned, for example, according to the specifications of IEC 60947-5-6 (NAMUR) (R1=10kΩ, R2=1kΩ), as shown in Fig. 10, a safety-related, external evaluation of the internal resistances of the two-wire arrangement can be performed. In the event of possible faults, for example of the changeover contacts S1 or S2 (e.g., mechanical breakage of a contact or contact remains closed), either the safety-related function is always maintained or an impermissible value of the internal resistance Z of the two-wire circuit arrangement, which can be diagnosed by the safety-related evaluation unit AWE, is detected. The safety-related evaluation unit AWE (switching amplifier) in Fig. 10 must assume a state defined as safe in the event of a detectable fault. Since the possible (individual) faults of the components of this two-wire circuit arrangement either have no impact on the safety-related function or can be diagnosed, this circuit arrangement enables use in the area of functional safety.
[0061] Optionally, a switching status indicator AZ in the form of a double diode (LED) can be integrated by evaluating the current direction in the bridge branch between the switching elements S1 and S2 ( Fig. 10).
[0062] As already described, in the embodiment according to Fig. 11 resistors are arranged in all four half-bridge branches HBZ1, HBZ2, HBZ3 and HBZ4. The resistor R1 in the left bridge branch LBZ is Fig. 11 in the first embodiment is divided into the resistors R3 and R4. R3 is assigned to the upper half-bridge branch HBZ1 and resistor R4 to the lower half-bridge branch HBZ4. The resistor R2 in the right-hand bridge branch RBZ accordingly Fig. 10 is divided into resistors R5 and R6 in this embodiment. R5 is assigned to the upper half-bridge branch HBZ2, and resistor R6 to the lower half-bridge branch HBZ3. The individual resistors R3, R4, R5, and R6 can be implemented by a series connection or parallel connection of additional resistors. The sum of the impedances of R3 and R4 results in the impedance value of R1 according to the first embodiment ( Fig. 10). The sum of the impedance of R5 and R6 gives the impedance value of R2 according to the first embodiment ( Fig. 10). The assignment of the resistors can also be mirrored. The switching elements S1, S2 can also be influenced by a common physical quantity, e.g., a magnetic field. These again represent a cross connection between an upper half-bridge branch HBZ1, HBZ2 and a lower half-bridge branch HBZ3, HBZ4, respectively. Fig. 11. The advantage of this extended (second) embodiment lies in the fact that the percentage of safe component faults can be increased. For these faults, either the safety-related function is always maintained or an inadmissible value of the internal resistance Z of the two-wire circuit arrangement, which can be diagnosed by the safety-related evaluation unit, is detected. In the sense of functional safety, the metric of the relative proportion of "safe faults" required, among other things, is increased in this embodiment. "Safe faults" within the meaning of relevant safety standards are faults for which the safety-related function is maintained in the event of a fault (e.g., in the case of component faults) or are detected (diagnosed) within a defined process safety time of a system or machine.In the event of a detectable (component) fault, the safety-related evaluation unit (switching amplifier) must assume the state defined as safe within the defined process safety time.
[0063] Optionally, a switching state indicator can be integrated by evaluating the current direction in the bridge transverse branch BQ between the switching elements S1 and S2.
[0064] The circuit arrangement according to the third embodiment ( Fig. 12) is extended by at least one further break contact S3 or break contact S4 in a half-bridge branch ( Fig.12). The break contact S3 can be assigned to the left bridge branch LBZ, and the break contact S4 to the right bridge branch RBZ, which can be influenced by the same physical variable as the switching elements S1, S2. The break contact S3 and the break contact S4 can also be present simultaneously in the two-wire circuit arrangement. The resistors R1 and R2 can also be divided according to the second embodiment of the invention.
[0065] This third embodiment of the two-wire circuit arrangement differs from the previously listed ones in terms of safety-related reliability in that the circuit is "single-fault safe," meaning that a fault does not lead to the loss of the safety-related function, for example, in a design according to IEC 60947-5-6. This behavior of the two-wire circuit arrangement fulfills, among other things, an important basic parameter regarding fault resistance. In the ISO 13849-1 standard "Safety of machinery - Safety-related parts of control systems - Part 1: General principles for design," this basic parameter is referred to as a category.
[0066] According to the standards IEC 62061 and IEC 61508, this safety-related property of the two-wire circuit arrangement can be described using the term hardware fault tolerance (HFT). The term hardware fault tolerance describes the property of the two-wire circuit arrangement to potentially lose the safety-related function in the event of at least N+1 faults. A hardware fault tolerance of N means that N+1 faults in the two-wire circuit arrangement can cause a loss of the safety-related function. The two-wire circuit arrangement described here has an HFT of 1 (N=1) according to the relevant standards. According to this invention, the safety-related function of the two-wire circuit arrangement can potentially only be lost in the event of two faults (N+1).
Claims
[1] Non-contact two-wire safety sensor for safety-related protective devices, which has a bridge circuit, wherein the bridge circuit has at least two resistors R1, R2, with the first resistor R1 in a left bridge branch LBZ, with the second resistor R2 in a right bridge branch RBZ and at least two changeover switches S1, S2 which can be influenced by a physical quantity and with which a cross connection can be generated between an upper half-bridge branch HBZ1, HBZ2 and a lower half-bridge branch HBZ3, HBZ4, wherein the switch position of the changeover switches S1, S2 can be influenced by an actuator M via a physical quantity and is thereby controlled in such a way that if no actuator is detected, the half-bridge branches HBZ1 and HBZ4 are connected to one another and if the actuator is detected, the complementary half-bridge branches HBZ2 and HBZ3 are connected to one another,which changes the impedance value of the safety-related two-wire arrangement. [2] Contactless two-wire safety sensor according to claim 1, characterized by that the changeover switches S1 and S2 react invertingly to the actuator M. [3] Contactless two-wire safety sensor according to claim 1 or 2, characterized by that the changeover switches S1 and S2 are reed switches, which have contact tongues that can be influenced by a magnetic field. [4] Contactless two-wire safety sensor according to one of the preceding claims, characterized by that the changing impedance value complies with the requirements of the IEC 60947-5-6 (NAMUR) standard. [5] Contactless two-wire safety sensor according to one of the preceding claims, characterized bythat at least one further break contact S3, S4 is provided in the half-bridge branches HBZ2 or HBZ3 in order to achieve single-fault safety of the two-wire arrangement. [6] Contactless two-wire safety sensor according to one of the preceding claims, characterized by that the two-wire safety sensor is used as a safety-related two-wire output stage. [7] Contactless two-wire safety sensor according to one of the preceding claims characterized by that the contacts can be operated mechanically. [8] Contactless two-wire safety sensor according to one of the preceding claims characterized by that the switches are semiconductor switches / semiconductor contacts. [9] Contactless two-wire safety sensor according to one of the preceding claims, characterized bythat the changeover contacts S1 and S2 are each realized by a combination of normally open and normally closed contacts. [10] Contactless two-wire safety sensor according to one of the preceding claims characterized by that the respective impedance value of the resistors R1 and R2 is realized by distributing this impedance value to the half-bridge branches HBZ1 and HBZ4 or HBZ2 and HBZ3. [11] Contactless two-wire safety sensor according to one of the preceding claims, characterized by that the resistors R1 and R2 are designed as a parallel and series arrangement of individual resistors. [12] Contactless two-wire safety sensor according to one of the preceding claims, characterized by that the changeover switches S1 and S2 can be influenced by different physical quantities. [13] Non-contact two-wire safety sensor for connection to an evaluation unit for impedance evaluation with two switching elements S1, S2 which can be jointly influenced by an actuator M and which are arranged in a bridge circuit in H-shape, one of whose high point N+ and one of whose low point N- are supplied via a two-wire connection, wherein the actuator M is arranged on a movable part of a safety device, wherein the H-shaped circuit has two longitudinal bridge branches LBZ, RBZ and a bridge shunt branch BQ which connects the left bridge branch LBZ and the right bridge branch RBZ to each other, characterized bythat the two bridge branches LBZ, RBZ are each separated at a changeover contact point K into two upper half-bridge branches HBZ1, HBZ2 and two lower half-bridge branches HBZ3, HBZ4 and the two switching elements S1, S2, which are designed as changeover contacts, are arranged in the bridge shunt branch BQ, wherein in the normal functioning case of the safety sensor, the switching state of the safety sensor is represented by two different impedance values, wherein in a first switching state SZ1 by means of the switching elements S1, S2 a first conductive connection V1 is switched between the high point N+ and the low point N- via the half-bridge branches HBZ1 and HBZ4 and in a second switching state SZ2 by means of the switching elements S1, S2 a second conductive connection V2 is switched between the high point N+ and the low point N- via the half-bridge branches HBZ2 and HBZ3, wherein the conductive connections V1, V2 have different impedance values Z1, Z2.
Citation Information
Patent Citations
Proximity sensor with fault detection
DE202009001474U1
Safety switch
EP3116012A1
