Tamper-evident gas release device

Description

TECHNICAL FIELD

[0001] The present disclosure relates to the technical field of transporting and delivering gas, in particular hydrogen gas or natural gas, to end customers. Furthermore, the present disclosure relates to the technical field of tamper-proof transmission of measurement data relating to a quantity of gas delivered to an end user. BACKGROUND

[0002] Increasingly, filling stations are offering natural gas and hydrogen refueling alongside gasoline and diesel. Hydrogen filling stations are used, for example, to refuel fuel cell vehicles. In this case, the billing and payment of the gas delivered to the end customer must be in compliance with German law, particularly in Germany. For example, the German Measurement and Calibration Act (MessEG) ensures that neither the buyer nor the seller are disadvantaged when purchasing a good such as hydrogen or natural gas. The MessEG defines requirements for devices used to measure the good.

[0003] At gas station pumps, the so-called dispensing point is crucial for determining the amount of gas dispensed to an end customer. The dispensing point is the location where the gas is delivered to the end customer. At a gas station, the dispensing point is the end of the nozzle, which is connected to the pump via a gas hose, since the end customer only has access to the purchased amount of gas from this point onward.

[0004] One problem is that a legally compliant metering device (e.g., a calibrated gas meter) is usually not provided at the dispensing point. The legally compliant metering device is usually located inside the gas station or pump. This creates a transmission path between the legally compliant metering device and the dispensing point that is not covered or monitored by the legally compliant metering device. For example, gas can diffuse outward through a transmission path designed as a gas hose during a refueling process, preventing the calibrated metering device from measuring the actual amount of gas dispensed at the dispensing point.

[0005] For charging stations for electric vehicles, especially direct current charging stations, manufacturers must demonstrate that there are no significant line losses along the transmission line between the charging station and the power delivery point at the end of the charging cable, and that the customer is billed for less energy than received. Similar requirements also apply to hydrogen and natural gas filling stations.

[0006] WO 2012 / 023015 A2 relates to a hydrogen refueling station with a hydrogen storage tank and a hydrogen meter, at which a hydrogen-powered vehicle can be refueled. The vehicle includes a pressure sensor. Using the data measured by the hydrogen meter and the pressure sensor, a relationship between the pressure in the hydrogen storage tank and an output voltage of the pressure sensor can be corrected. For this purpose, measurement data from the pressure sensor is sent from the vehicle to a control device arranged in the hydrogen refueling station.

[0007] JP 6611026 B1 relates to a calibration device for a hydrogen filling station with a reference gas flow meter.

[0008] DE 112010005532 B4 relates to a device for detecting a fuel leak when fuel is being filled from a fuel pump into a vehicle's tank. For this purpose, the fuel pump comprises a flow meter, and the vehicle comprises a pressure sensor and a temperature sensor.

[0009] EP 1205704 A1 relates to a method for filling a vehicle tank with a gas, in which the vehicle tank is connected to a dispensing device via a pressure-resistant line. A sensor device arranged in the vehicle tank determines the current value of a parameter representative of the current fill level of the vehicle tank during filling. Filling is terminated when the parameter has reached a final value.

[0010] US 2017 / 0074707 A1 relates to a hydrogen refueling station for filling a vehicle with hydrogen. The vehicle includes a compressed hydrogen storage system and at least one sensor that measures data relating to the compressed hydrogen storage system. These measurement data are checked by the hydrogen refueling station for measurement errors.

[0011] DE 10 2018 127 336 A1 concerns a measuring adapter for the pressure-tight connection of a pressure tank to a refueling hose. BRIEF SUMMARY

[0012] The present disclosure is based on the object of providing a gas dispensing device in which gas data measured at an end-customer gas dispensing point are protected from attacks and manipulation attempts by third parties (ie, unauthorized persons).

[0013] Within the scope of the present invention, it was recognized that an insufficiently protected point of attack for manipulation attempts can be a sensor provided at the end customer gas dispensing point for measuring a specified gas quantity, in particular if measurement data are output by this sensor and transmitted to another device.

[0014] To solve this problem, a gas dispensing device according to claim 1 is proposed, which comprises the following: a gas hose with a first end for receiving gas and a second end for dispensing gas, a first sensor which is arranged at the first end and is configured to determine a first measured value relating to a quantity of gas received at the first end, a second sensor which is arranged at the second end and is configured to determine and output a second measured value relating to a quantity of gas dispensed at the second end, and a communication device which is configured to send the second measured value from the second sensor to the first sensor, wherein the second measured value is protected from unauthorized and / or unnoticed access by third parties (i.e., unauthorized persons) from the time of output by the second sensor until receipt by the first sensor.

[0015] The first and second sensors may be gas meters, such as flow meters, pressure sensors and / or temperature sensors, with the aid of which values ​​can be measured on the basis of which a gas quantity can be determined.

[0016] The first sensor can, in particular, be a calibrated gas meter that, in accordance with calibration law, determines a metered value corresponding to the amount of energy emitted by the gas delivery device. It can be an intelligent measuring system (a so-called "smart meter") that measures gas output in cubic meters (m3<). The gas meter can also be calibrated according to the current Measuring Instruments Directive (MID) of the European Parliament. The second measured value relates to the amount of gas actually emitted at the second end of the gas hose. The second sensor can also be a calibrated gas meter or a smart meter. The gas is preferably hydrogen gas or natural gas.

[0017] The first and second sensors can be arranged locally at, in, or around respective ends of the gas hose. Thus, the first sensor measures the amount of gas introduced into the gas hose from a gas source (e.g., a gas tank), and the second sensor measures the amount of gas delivered from the gas hose to the end customer at the delivery point. The measurement data output by the second sensor is sent to the first sensor via the communication device. For example, a measurement value in cubic meters is sent from the second sensor to the first sensor.

[0018] The communication device can be any type of communication means configured to send data from the second sensor to the first sensor. In particular, the communication device can send data packets to the first sensor. The communication device can be a wireless or wired communication device, such as a mobile radio device, a Bluetooth device, or Ethernet modules with a data line that establishes a communication connection via an air interface or via the Internet. For example, the second sensor comprises a transmitter module, and the first transmitter comprises a receiver module. Whenever reference is made to a data line in the present disclosure, this can always also refer to a plurality of data lines, such as a network cable with a plurality of wires and PINs.

[0019] If the first sensor and the second sensor are connected via a data line, the connections between the two ends of the data line and the first sensor and the second sensor can be sealed with seals and / or signal varnish. This ensures that any tampering with the data line or connections is detected. It is also conceivable for the entire data line to be coated with signal varnish, so that any actuation of the data line can be detected. These protective measures also offer the advantage of relatively simple implementation.

[0020] The signal varnish can in particular be a sealing varnish or a packing varnish, i.e. a mass (for example a resin) which adheres firmly to a substrate and must be destroyed in order to access the substrate.

[0021] The seal can be a small disc (e.g., 6-10 mm in diameter) with one or two holes through which a sealing wire is inserted. The seal is then compressed with sealing pliers. This clamps the sealing wire securely in place. At the same time, the sealing pliers imprint a stamp on both sides of the seal. The disc can be made of plastic (polycarbonate) or soft aluminum, for example.

[0022] In particular, the data line can comprise connectors at both ends that are plugged into respective couplings in the first sensor and the second sensor, respectively. The connectors and couplings are provided with seals and / or signaling varnish. The seals can be designed as sealing clamps that surround a connector and a coupling, whereby the sealing clamps must be destroyed to gain access to the connector or coupling. A connector seal secured with a consecutively numbered wire rope can also be used.

[0023] Furthermore, the data line can be completely covered with signal varnish so that the data line is protected over its entire length.

[0024] If the first sensor and the second sensor are connected via a data line, the data line can additionally or alternatively be mechanically shielded from external access to prevent mechanical access to the data line. In particular, the gas hose can mechanically shield the data line from external access. In this case, the data line is located within the gas hose (e.g., running along the inner wall of the gas hose), and the gas hose serves a dual function of transporting gas and protecting the data line from unauthorized access.

[0025] In principle, the data line can also run outside the gas hose. For example, the data line can run inside an additional hose attached to the outside of the gas hose. The data line running inside the additional hose can then be covered with signal paint.

[0026] According to one embodiment, the mechanical shielding can comprise a pipe and / or a hose extending from the first sensor to the second sensor. The pipe or hose can be the gas hose or an additional pipe or hose surrounding the gas hose. In particular, the pipe and / or hose can be made of a material (e.g., metal or a hard plastic) that only allows access to the data line with considerable mechanical effort. It is also conceivable for the pipe and / or hose to be made of a material (e.g., a plastic) that is easy to destroy but must be destroyed to allow access to the data line so that access to the data line can be detected. In particular, the pipe can be a corrugated pipe.The pipe and / or hose can also be additionally coated with a signaling varnish over their entire outer surface. This protective measure provides effective protection against unauthorized access by third parties. A further advantage of protection through mechanical components is that it simplifies approval of the gas delivery device by the relevant authorities, as the implementation of the protective measure is easily visible to the authorities.

[0027] If the first sensor and the second sensor are connected to each other via a data line, the connections of the two ends of the data line to the first sensor and the second sensor, respectively, can be provided with seals and / or signal varnish and, in addition, the data line can be mechanically shielded from external access.

[0028] Furthermore, the data line and / or the data line connectors can be protected against signal interception by electromagnetic induction. For this purpose, the data line and / or the connectors can be optimized for electromagnetic compatibility (EMC). The data line and / or the connectors can include EMC protection. For example, the data line and / or the connectors can be coated with conductive copper ink, vapor-deposited with copper-chromium-nickel, and / or vapor-deposited with aluminum.

[0029] For easy installation and removal of the second sensor, it can be located in a nozzle on the gas hose, so that only one module—the nozzle—needs to be installed or removed. The nozzle can also be secured with a seal and / or signaling paint.

[0030] The second sensor can be configured to digitally sign and / or encrypt the second measured value before it is output by the second sensor, and the first sensor can be configured to receive and process the digitally signed and / or encrypted second measured value. For this purpose, the second sensor can comprise a signature device configured to digitally sign the second measured value. The signature device can be configured to access a private key stored in the second sensor and a public key stored in the second sensor. For example, the private key and the public key can be measuring device keys stored in the second sensor. The public key can also be stored on a secure, central server, for example a server of a calibration authority.The second measured value can also be combined with one or more additional information elements to form a data packet, and the data packet can be digitally signed. The additional information elements can be further data generated in the second sensor, such as data relating to the identification of the second sensor and / or a date or time of a measurement process. The digital signature can ensure that the second measured value or the data packet containing the second measured value cannot be subsequently tampered with.

[0031] Digital signing can be achieved using two electronic keys, a public key and a private key, via an asymmetric process. Data encrypted with the private key can only be decrypted with the public key. The private key always remains secret, whereas the public key is accessible to everyone. In particular, the private key cannot be calculated using the public key. Therefore, the hash value of the data to be digitally signed is first calculated using a mathematical method, resulting in the so-called "hash value." This hash value is then encrypted using the private key. The signature can be verified using the public key by restoring the original hash value.At the same time, a checksum is again calculated from the signed data and then compared with the existing decrypted checksum. A match is proof that the data is authentic. The authenticity check can be performed at the data receiver, i.e., in the first sensor.

[0032] According to one embodiment, the signature device is arranged in the second sensor. According to this embodiment, the second measured value is digitally signed in the second sensor. If the second sensor is a calibrated gas meter that has been sealed, it is already protected from unnoticed access by third parties, which can further improve security against tampering.

[0033] According to a further embodiment, the signature device is physically separated from the second sensor. This has the advantage of keeping the complexity of the second sensor to a minimum. In this case, the second sensor and signature device can be arranged separately in the nozzle, with the nozzle housing being sealed and / or coated with a signaling varnish so that unauthorized access to the second sensor or the signature device can be detected.

[0034] Additional information elements can be sent from the second sensor to the first sensor. These additional information elements are related to the second sensor. Thus, in addition to an identification code ("who"), a gas quantity or a count value from the second sensor ("what"), information about the second sensor ("where"), and / or time information about the dispensing process ("when") can be sent from the second sensor to the first sensor. These additional information elements can also be digitally signed and / or encrypted.

[0035] The processing of the second measured value received by the first sensor can involve a calculation of the amount of gas actually delivered at the second end of the gas hose. In particular, the amount of gas actually delivered at the second end of the gas hose can be calculated based on a correlation between the first and second measured values. The correlation calculation can be carried out, for example, using a lookup table. The calculation can be carried out within the first sensor, i.e., the calibrated gas meter. However, an external computing unit can also be provided in a fuel pump, which calculates the amount of gas actually delivered at the second end of the gas hose. The amount of gas actually delivered at the second end of the gas hose can then be further processed for billing purposes to the customer.For this purpose, a purchase price can be assigned to the amount of gas actually delivered at the second end of the gas hose.

[0036] To prevent the first sensor from receiving manipulated data from a transmitter posing as the first sensor, the second sensor can be a sensor that has been trained on the first sensor. In particular, the second sensor can be a certified sensor. For this purpose, the second sensor can include a stored identification code, with the first sensor only accepting data from sensors with known identification codes.

[0037] Instead of communication via a data line, communication can also be wireless. For this purpose, the communication device can comprise a first radio module assigned to the first sensor and a second radio module assigned to the second sensor and arranged at the second end of the gas hose, which are configured to communicate with a cloud server. Communication with the cloud server can take place, for example, via a wireless local area network (WLAN) and / or the internet.

[0038] The communication device can further comprise a first mobile radio module assigned to the first sensor and a second mobile radio module assigned to the second sensor and arranged at the second end, which are configured to communicate with one another, wherein the second mobile radio module comprises a built-in subscriber identity module, eSIM. Communication can take place, for example, via mobile radio standards such as Long Term Evolution (LTE) or 5G. The eSIM is a chip permanently installed in the second mobile radio module, in which at least one eSIM profile for at least one network operator is stored. With the help of the communication authorized by the eSIM, it can be ensured that no other transmitter can pose as the mobile radio module assigned to the second sensor or as the second sensor. This provides further protection against manipulation of the second measured value output by the second sensor.

[0039] If the second sensor sends the second measured value to the first transmitter via a radio module or a mobile radio module and no data line is provided between the first sensor and the second sensor, it can be complex to supply the second sensor or the radio module or mobile radio module associated with the second sensor with power. In order to avoid a separate power line for the second sensor and the radio or mobile radio module, the gas delivery device can comprise an energy generation device arranged in the gas hose, which is designed to supply the second sensor with energy to operate the second sensor. For example, the energy generation device can comprise a piston engine that converts gas pressure in the gas hose into electricity. This electricity can be used to supply power to not only the second sensor but also to the radio module or mobile radio module.

[0040] The present disclosure further relates to a filling station, in particular a hydrogen filling station or a natural gas filling station, comprising a gas pump, a gas dispensing device as described above and a gas source.

[0041] Furthermore, the present disclosure relates to a multi-unit building with a gas source and a gas dispensing device as described above.

[0042] The aspects and variants described above can be combined without this being explicitly described. Each of the described embodiment variants is thus optional to each embodiment variant or even to combinations thereof. The present disclosure is therefore not limited to the individual embodiments and variants in the described order or to a specific combination of the aspects and embodiment variants. BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS

[0043] Further advantages, details and features of the devices and systems described here emerge from the following description of embodiments and the figures. Fig. 1 shows a schematic representation of a first embodiment of a hydrogen filling station at which a fuel cell vehicle is charged; Fig. 2 shows a schematic representation of an embodiment of a gas dispensing device with a data line; Fig. 3 shows a schematic representation of a second embodiment of a hydrogen filling station at which a fuel cell vehicle is charged; Fig. 4 shows a schematic representation of a first embodiment of an apartment building with a hydrogen line; and Fig. 5 shows a schematic representation of a second embodiment of an apartment building with a hydrogen line. DETAILED DESCRIPTION

[0044] The following embodiments relate to the release of hydrogen. However, all embodiments are also applicable to other gases, such as natural gas. Furthermore, the inventive features disclosed in the respective embodiments can also be used in other embodiments.

[0045] The Fig. 1 shows a schematic representation of a first embodiment of a hydrogen filling station at which a fuel cell vehicle 40 is charged.

[0046] The fuel cell vehicle 40 comprises a hydrogen tank 45 and a filler neck 47. The hydrogen filling station comprises a filling pump 50 with a gas hose 10. The filling pump 50 contains a first gas meter 21, a hydrogen tank 52, and a control device 60 for controlling and billing a filling process. The hydrogen tank 52 is connected to the first gas meter 21 via a gas line 55. The gas hose 10 is attached to the first gas meter 21 such that the hydrogen tank 45 of the fuel cell vehicle 40 can be filled with hydrogen stored in the hydrogen tank 52. The fuel cell vehicle 40 and the filling pump 50 of the hydrogen filling station comprise further devices and elements necessary for the filling process, which are known to those skilled in the art and are not explained in detail here to simplify the present disclosure.

[0047] The gas hose 10 comprises a first end 11, at which the first gas meter 21 is arranged, and a second end 12, at which a nozzle 25 is arranged. The nozzle 25 is inserted into the filler neck 47 of the fuel cell vehicle 40. A second gas meter 22 is located in the nozzle 25. In particular, the nozzle 25 and the second gas meter 22 are designed as a module, so that the module can be replaced to replace the second gas meter 22. The first gas meter 21 is a calibrated gas meter that measures a quantity of hydrogen that is introduced from the hydrogen tank 52 via the first gas meter 21 into the gas hose 10. The second gas meter 22 measures a quantity of hydrogen that is supplied to the fuel cell vehicle 40 via the nozzle 25, i.e. at the end customer hydrogen dispensing point.

[0048] Since hydrogen can diffuse out of the gas hose 10, i.e. between the first end 11 and the second end 12 of the gas hose 10, from the interior of the gas hose 10 to the outside, it can happen that a quantity of hydrogen measured by the first gas meter 21 at the end of a refueling process is greater than a quantity of hydrogen dispensed to the fuel cell vehicle 40 at the nozzle 25. However, since the second end 12 of the gas hose 10 is the hydrogen dispensing point relevant for billing in accordance with legal metrology, billing exclusively based on a quantity of hydrogen measured by the first gas meter 21 cannot represent a measurement in accordance with legal metrology. For this reason, the second gas meter 22 is provided, which measures the quantity of hydrogen dispensed to the fuel cell vehicle 40 at the nozzle 25.For this purpose, the measured value determined by the second gas meter 22 is transmitted to the calibrated first gas meter 21, in which a value of the amount of hydrogen actually dispensed at the nozzle 25 is calculated from the measured values ​​determined by the two gas meters 21 and 22. The calculation can be a correlation calculation performed in the first gas meter 21 or in the control device 60.

[0049] A data line 30 is provided for transmitting the second measured value determined by the second gas meter 22 to the calibrated first gas meter 21. The communication device further comprises a transmitting module on or in the second gas meter 22 and a receiving module on or in the first gas meter 21 (in Fig. 1 not shown). The transmitter module and the receiver module can be Ethernet modules, for example.

[0050] Since measurement data compliant with legal metrology are required for billing a purchased quantity of hydrogen, it must be ensured that the second measured value determined by the second gas meter 22 is not tampered with. In particular, it must be ensured that a larger amount of hydrogen than actually delivered is not transmitted to the first gas meter 21 for calculating the actual amount of hydrogen dispensed at the nozzle 25 by an incorrect transmitter, resulting in the owner of the fuel cell vehicle 40 being billed for a larger amount of hydrogen than actually purchased.

[0051] This disclosure proposes several options for protecting the data line 30 or the transmitting and receiving modules from undetected access by unauthorized persons. These options can be combined. For example, the connections of the two ends of the data line 30 to the first gas meter 21 and the second gas meter 22 can be provided with seals and / or signal varnish. This can ensure that any tampering with the data line 30 or the connections is detected. It is also conceivable for the entire data line to be provided with signal varnish so that any operation on the data line 30 can be detected. Furthermore, the nozzle 25 with the second gas meter 22 contained therein can be sealed to the second end 12 of the gas hose 10 or covered with signal varnish.

[0052] Furthermore, the data line 30 can be mechanically shielded from external access to prevent mechanical access to the data line 30. In particular, the gas hose 10 can mechanically shield the data line 30 from external access. In this case, the gas hose 10 has a dual function of transporting hydrogen and protecting the data line 30 from unauthorized access. Thus, a corrugated pipe can be arranged around the gas hose 10, protecting the data line 30 from unauthorized and unnoticed access. The corrugated pipe can also be provided in addition to the gas hose 10.

[0053] Furthermore, the second gas meter 22 can be a gas meter that has been trained on the first gas meter 21, ie, a certified gas meter, so that the first gas meter 21 only receives authenticated data from the trained second gas meter 22.

[0054] The Fig. 2 shows a schematic representation of an embodiment of a gas delivery device with a data line 30. In the embodiment of the Fig. 2 It can be the gas delivery device with the data line 30 of the embodiment of the Fig. 1 or other gas delivery device.

[0055] The data line 30 comprises a first plug 31 at a first end 11 at the first gas meter 21 and a second plug 32 at a second end 12 at the second gas meter 22. The first gas meter 21 comprises a first coupling 26 and a receiving module 61. The first plug 31 is plugged into the first coupling 26. The second gas meter 22 comprises a second coupling 27 and a transmitting module 62. The second plug 32 is plugged into the second coupling 27. Thus, values ​​measured by the second gas meter 22 can be sent from the transmitting module 62 via the second coupling 27, the second plug 32, the data line 30, the first plug 31 and the first coupling 26 to the receiving module 61. The second gas meter 22 and the transmitting module 62 can also be supplied with power via the data line 30.

[0056] The first gas meter 21 further comprises a computing unit 65, which calculates the actual amount of hydrogen delivered to the end customer from the measured values ​​of the second gas meter 22 and the first gas meter 21. This prevents hydrogen diffusing outward between the first end 11 and the second end 12 from being ignored in the customer billing.

[0057] To protect against data manipulation of hydrogen quantities determined by the second gas meter, the plugs 31, 32 and the couplings 26, 27 can be provided with seals and / or signal varnish (in Fig. 2 (not shown). For this purpose, the seals can be designed as sealing clamps that surround a plug and a coupling, whereby the sealing clamps must be destroyed in order to access the plugs 31, 32 or the couplings 26, 27. A plug seal secured with a consecutively numbered wire rope can also be used.

[0058] Furthermore, the data line 30 and / or the connectors 31, 32 and the couplings 26, 27 can be protected against signal tapping by electromagnetic induction. For this purpose, the data line 30, the connectors 31, 32 and / or the couplings 26, 27 can be optimized for electromagnetic compatibility (EMC). Thus, the data line 30, the connectors 31, 32 and / or the couplings 26, 27 can include EMC protection, for example, by being coated with conductive copper ink, vapor-deposited with copper-chromium-nickel, and / or vapor-deposited with aluminum.

[0059] Furthermore, the gas hose 10 can be designed as a corrugated pipe or surrounded by a corrugated pipe.

[0060] The Fig. 3 shows a schematic representation of a second embodiment of a hydrogen filling station at which a fuel cell vehicle 40 is charged.

[0061] The second embodiment of the Fig. 3 differs from the first embodiment of the Fig. 1 by not providing a data line 30 and sending the measured values ​​determined by the second gas meter 22 wirelessly to the first gas meter 21. For this purpose, the hydrogen filling station comprises a first radio module 71 in the first gas meter 21 and a second radio module 72 in the second gas meter 22. The further Fig. 3 The elements shown correspond to the elements of the Fig. 1 with the corresponding reference symbols and a repeated description of these elements is omitted here.

[0062] The first and second radio modules 71, 72 are WLAN modules. They can also be radio modules for other radio standards, in particular mobile radio modules. If the second radio module 72 is designed as a mobile radio module, it preferably comprises an eSIM, which allows only authenticated communication with the first radio module 71, providing further protection against data misuse.

[0063] To prevent manipulation of the second measured value output by the second gas meter 22, the second gas meter 22 is configured to digitally sign and / or encrypt the second measured value before it is output by the second gas meter 22. Accordingly, the first gas meter 21 is configured to receive and process the digitally signed and / or encrypted second measured value. For this purpose, the second gas meter 22 comprises a signature device (in Fig. 3 (not shown) configured to digitally sign the second measured value. The signature device is configured to access a private key stored in the second gas meter 22 and a public key stored in the second gas meter 22. The digital signing is performed using an asymmetric method, with the authenticity check of the received data taking place in the first gas meter 21.

[0064] In addition to direct communication between the first radio module 71 and the second radio module 72 or communication via a mobile radio network, it is also conceivable that the first radio module 71 and the second radio module 72 transmit the measurement data to a cloud server in which the amount of hydrogen actually delivered at the end customer delivery point is calculated.

[0065] In order to avoid a separate power line for the second gas meter 22 and the second radio module 72, an energy generation device arranged in the gas hose 10 can also be provided (in Fig. 3 (not shown) that supplies power to the second gas meter 22 and the second radio module 72. For example, the energy generation device can comprise a piston engine that converts gas pressure in the gas hose 10 into electricity. Alternatively, a battery can also be provided in the nozzle.

[0066] The Fig. 4 shows a schematic representation of a first embodiment of a multi-family house 100 with a gas line 10'. The multi-family house 100 shown comprises, for example, a basement W1 and six apartments W2 to W7. Fig. 4 The structure shown is similar to that in the Fig. 1 The hydrogen filling station is shown in the layout shown. A first gas meter 21 is located in the basement W1, and a second gas meter 22 is located in the apartment W7. The apartment building 100 is supplied with hydrogen via a gas supply line 90, which is then delivered to the apartment W7 via the gas line 10'.

[0067] The calibrated first gas meter 21 measures a quantity of hydrogen supplied at the first end 11 of the gas line 10'. Since this quantity of hydrogen cannot correspond to the hydrogen supplied to the apartment W7, for example because hydrogen diffuses on the way from the first end 11 to the second end 12 of the gas line 10', the second gas meter 22 is provided in the apartment W7. To calculate the quantity of hydrogen actually delivered at the second end 12 of the gas line 10', the second gas meter 22 transmits a second measured value of a quantity of hydrogen to the first gas meter 21. For this purpose, the second gas meter 22 is connected to the first gas meter 21 via the data line 30. The calibrated first gas meter 21 measures a first measured value of the quantity of hydrogen. The quantity of hydrogen actually delivered at the second end 12 of the gas line 10' can then be calculated from the first and second measured values.

[0068] In order to prevent undetected manipulation of the second measured value output by the second gas meter 22, the data line 30 or the connections of the data line 30 with corresponding communication modules to the first and second gas meters 21, 22 can be similar to the embodiments of the Figs. 1 bis 3 This can be done, in particular, using seals and signal varnish. Furthermore, trained, second gas meters 22 can be used, so that no data manipulation can occur due to the receipt of false data. Furthermore, the measurement data output by the second gas meter 22 can be processed accordingly, as in the exemplary embodiment of the Fig. 3 described and / or encrypted.

[0069] In the embodiment of the Fig. 4 Only one gas line 10' is shown. Corresponding gas lines 10' and second meters 22 can also be provided in or to the other apartments W2 to W6. Accordingly, it can be prevented that false or manipulated data are taken into account to determine a quantity of hydrogen actually delivered at a second end 12 of the gas line 10'. Furthermore, it can be prevented that measurement data from another apartment is accidentally used for measurement data of an apartment to be billed, for example, that a quantity of hydrogen measured at a second gas meter 22 in apartment W2 is mistakenly used for billing for apartment W7.

[0070] The Fig. 5 shows a schematic representation of a second embodiment of a multi-family house 100 with a gas line 10'. The embodiment of the Fig. 5 differs from the embodiment of the Fig. 4 in which no data line 30 is provided and the communication between the second gas meter 22 and the first gas meter 21 takes place via a wireless communication connection. For this purpose, the first gas meter 21 comprises a first mobile radio module 81 and the second gas meter 22 comprises a second mobile radio module 82. The same reference numerals of the Figs. 1 bis 5 concern the same elements and a further explanation is omitted here.

[0071] In the Fig. 5 A cloud server 95 is shown, which is configured to communicate with the first mobile radio module 81 and the second mobile radio module 82. The communication between the first mobile radio module 81 or the second mobile radio module 82 and the cloud server 95 is signed and encrypted. This ensures that the second measured value actually determined by the second gas meter 22 is used to calculate the amount of hydrogen actually delivered at the second end 12 of the gas hose 10'. For this purpose, the second mobile radio module 82 can also comprise an eSIM.

[0072] As in the example of the Fig. 4 can be used in the embodiment of Fig. 5 Some or all of the apartments W2 to W6 may be equipped with second gas meters 22. Since the first gas meter 21 is located in the basement W1, the radio modules 81 and 82 can also operate according to a LoRa radio standard, for example, the LoRaWAN standard optimized for communication down to the basement.

[0073] Further protective measures to prevent data manipulation, such as those described above in the embodiments of the Figs. 1 bis 4 explained mechanical protective measures can also be used in the embodiment of the Fig. 5 be used.

[0074] In the presented examples, various features and functions of the present disclosure have been described separately and in specific combinations. However, it is understood that many of these features and functions can be freely combined with one another, unless explicitly excluded. Thus, it is conceivable that in the embodiments with data line 30, in addition to the mechanical protective measures, a digital signature and / or encryption of the transmitted second measured value is performed.

Claims

1. A gas dispensing device comprising a gas hose (10; 10') with a first end (11) for receiving gas and a second end (12) for dispensing gas; a first sensor (21), which is arranged at the first end (11) and configured to determine a first measured value relating to an amount of gas received at the first end (11); a second sensor (22), which is arranged at the second end (12) and configured to determine and output a second measured value relating to an amount of gas dispensed at the second end (12); and a communication device (30; 71, 72; 81, 82), which is configured to send the second measured value from the second sensor (22) to the first sensor (21), characterized in that the second measured value, from its output by the second sensor (22) until its reception by the first sensor (21), is protected from unauthorized and / or unnoticed access by third parties by the fact that the first sensor (21) and the second sensor (22) are connected to each other by a data line (30), that the connections of the two ends of the data line (30) to the first sensor (21) and to the second sensor (22) are provided with signaling paint, and that the data line (30) is mechanically shielded from external access, wherein the mechanical shielding comprises a pipe and / or a hose (30) extending from the first sensor (21) to the second sensor (22).

2. The gas dispensing device according to claim 1, wherein the data line (30) comprises plugs (31, 32) at both ends, which are inserted into respective sockets (26, 27) in the first sensor (21) and the second sensor (22), and wherein the plugs (31, 32) and sockets (26, 27) are provided with the signaling paint.

3. The gas dispensing device according to claim 1 or 2, wherein the data line (30) is completely covered with signaling paint.

4. The gas dispensing device according to claim 1, wherein the gas hose (10; 10') mechanically shields the data line (30) from external access.

5. The gas dispensing device according to claim 1, wherein the data line (30) comprises an electromagnetic compatibility, EMC, protection.

6. The gas dispensing device according to claim 1, wherein the second sensor (22) is configured to digitally sign and / or encrypt the second measured value before outputting it, and the first sensor (21) is configured to receive and process the digitally signed and / or encrypted second measured value.

7. The gas dispensing device according to any one of the preceding claims, wherein the second sensor (22) is a sensor trained at the first sensor (21); and / or the first sensor (21) is a calibrated gas meter and the second measured value relates to an amount of gas actually dispensed at the second end (12) of the gas hose (10; 10').

8. The gas dispensing device according to any one of the preceding claims, wherein the second sensor (22) is arranged in a dispensing valve (25) of the gas hose (10; 10').

9. The gas dispensing device according to claim 1, wherein the communication device comprises a first radio module (81) associated with the first sensor (21) and a second radio module (82) associated with the second sensor (22) and arranged at the second end (12), which are configured to communicate with a cloud server (95); and / or the communication device comprises a first mobile communication module (71) associated with the first sensor (21) and a second mobile communication module (72) associated with the second sensor (22) and arranged at the second end (12), which are configured to communicate with each other, wherein the second mobile communication module (72) comprises an embedded subscriber identity module, eSIM.

10. The gas dispensing device according to any one of the preceding claims, further comprising an energy generation device arranged in the gas hose (10; 10'), which is configured to supply the second sensor (22) with energy for operating the second sensor (22).

11. A filling station comprising a gas pump (50), a gas dispensing device according to any one of the preceding claims, and a gas source (52).

12. A multi-party building (100) comprising a gas source (90) and a gas dispensing device according to any one of the preceding claims.