IoT device and exchange method of secure element

The IoT device with dual secure element slots facilitates secure element switching with authentication and data migration, addressing the challenge of cryptographic algorithm updates without disrupting service.

JP2024168368APending Publication Date: 2024-12-05DAI NIPPON PRINTING CO LTD
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Patent Information

Application Number
JP2023084970
Authority / Receiving Office
JP · JP
Patent Type
Applications
Current Assignee / Owner
Filing Date
2023-05-23
Publication Date
2024-12-05

AI Technical Summary

Technical Problem

Existing IoT devices face challenges in updating cryptographic algorithms due to limitations in firmware storage, necessitating replacement of secure elements when vulnerabilities are detected, which is inconvenient and disruptive.

Method used

The IoT device is equipped with two slots for secure elements, allowing seamless switching between existing and new secure elements, with authentication and data migration processes to ensure uninterrupted operation and enhanced security.

Benefits of technology

Enables secure element replacement without service interruption, ensuring continuous functionality and improved security by authenticating and transferring secret information to the new secure element.

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Abstract

To provide an IoT device capable of exchanging a secure element.SOLUTION: A smart meter 2 as an IOT device comprises: two slots 201 that mount a secure element 3 (SE3); and an MCU 200 that executes a switching processing for switching an existed SE3 (an insecurity SE3a) mounted to the other one slot 201 (a first slot 201a) to be invalid when it is detected that a new SE3 (a countermeasured SE3b) is mounted to one slot 201 (a second slot 201b) that becomes a blank slot.SELECTED DRAWING: Figure 4
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Description

[Technical field]

[0001] The invention disclosed in this application relates to an IoT device. [Background technology]

[0002] The Internet of Things (IoT), which is a network made up of physical objects, is becoming more widespread. The devices that make up the IoT are called IoT devices. IoT devices communicate with remote servers via the IoT network.

[0003] IoT devices are often installed outdoors. For example, smart meters, which are one type of IoT device, are installed in a location in a building where the readings displayed on the smart meter can be easily checked visually. This increases the risk of data being tampered with or leaked when it is exchanged between the IoT device and a remote server. For this reason, it is recommended that data exchanged between the IoT device and the remote server be encrypted.

[0004] If an IoT device has low tamper resistance against external cyber attacks, there is a high risk of leakage of secret information (e.g., encryption key) used for data encryption. For this reason, a secure element with high tamper resistance against external cyber attacks is implemented in the IoT device, and the process related to encryption of data exchanged between the IoT device and a remote server is performed by this secure element (e.g., Patent Document 1). [Prior art documents] [Patent documents]

[0005] [Patent Document 1] JP 2012-113670 A Summary of the Invention [Problem to be solved by the invention]

[0006] If a vulnerability is found in a cryptographic algorithm used to encrypt data exchanged between an IoT device and a remote server and this cryptographic algorithm is deprecated, the deprecated cryptographic algorithm must be updated to a cryptographic algorithm that is not deprecated.

[0007] One method for updating the cryptographic algorithm is to update the firmware implemented in the secure element, but this method is limited to cases where the firmware of the secure element is stored in an electrically rewritable non-volatile memory.If the firmware of the secure element is stored in an electrically non-rewritable non-volatile memory, it is necessary to replace the secure element in order to update the cryptographic algorithm.

[0008] This application provides an IoT device that is capable of replacing a secure element. [Means for solving the problem]

[0009] The first invention disclosed in this application is an IoT device having two slots for installing secure elements, and an MCU (Micro Controller Unit) that, when it detects that a new secure element has been installed in one of the empty slots, executes a switching process to switch the secure element to be used from an existing secure element installed in the other slot to the new secure element. The IoT device according to the first invention is provided with two slots for mounting secure elements. Therefore, the IoT device according to the first invention has an empty slot for mounting the new secure element in addition to the existing secure element. When the new secure element is mounted in the empty slot, both the existing secure element and the new secure element are enabled. In the IoT device according to the first invention, after the new secure element is mounted, the MCU disables only the existing secure element, thereby switching the secure element used by the IoT device according to the present application without interrupting processing related to a service. In the first invention, in order to confirm that an unauthorized secure element is not attached, it is desirable for the MCU to perform an authentication process in which the new secure element and the existing secure element mutually authenticate each other before performing the switching process, and to perform the switching process only if the authentication process is successful. Furthermore, in the first invention, it is preferable that, after the authentication process is successful, the MCU executes a secret information migration process to obtain the secret information stored in the existing secure element and write it to the new secure element, so that the secret information stored in the existing secure element can be migrated to the new secure element, and then executes the switching process. In the first invention, it is preferable that the secure element whose cryptographic algorithm has been compromised is set as the existing secure element, and the secure element for which measures have been taken to prevent the cryptographic algorithm from being compromised is set as the new secure element.

[0010] The second invention disclosed in this application is a method for replacing a secure element, including a step a in which an MCU (Micro Controller Unit) of an IoT device having two slots for installing secure elements detects that a new secure element has been installed in one of the slots, which is an empty slot, and a step b in which the MCU executes a switching process to switch the secure element to be used from an existing secure element installed in the other slot to the new secure element. In the second invention, it is preferable to include a step c in which the MCU executes an authentication process in which the new secure element and the existing secure element authenticate each other, so as to confirm that an unauthorized secure element is not attached, and the MCU executes step c after executing step a, and executes step b only if the authentication process is successful in step c. In addition, in the second invention, it is preferable to include a step d in which the MCU executes a secret information migration process to obtain the secret information stored in the existing secure element and write it to the new secure element so that the secret information stored in the existing secure element can be migrated to the new secure element, and the MCU executes the step c before executing the step d. Effect of the Invention

[0011] In the invention disclosed in this application, one IoT device is provided with two slots for mounting secure elements, and the IoT device is configured so that the secure element to be used can be switched. [Brief description of the drawings]

[0012] [Figure 1] FIG. 1 is a diagram explaining a smart meter system. [Diagram 2] A diagram showing the structure of a smart meter. [Diagram 3] Block diagram of a secure element (SE). [Figure 4] Block diagram of a smart meter. [Diagram 5] FIG. 2 is a diagram for explaining a procedure for switching a secure element (SE). [Figure 6] Figure 1 explains the processing performed by the MCU of a smart meter. [Figure 7] Figure 2 explains the processing performed by the MCU of the smart meter. DETAILED DESCRIPTION OF THE PREFERRED EMBODIMENTS

[0013] From here, an embodiment of the present invention will be described. This embodiment is intended to facilitate understanding of the invention disclosed in this application. The invention disclosed in this application is not limited to this embodiment. Furthermore, unless otherwise specified, the drawings are schematic diagrams drawn to facilitate understanding of the invention disclosed in this application.

[0014] In this embodiment, the IoT device to which the invention disclosed in this application is applied is a smart meter. This is because, at present, smart meters are one of the IoT devices that are widespread in the world. Naturally, the IoT device to which the invention disclosed in this application is applied is not limited to smart meters. The invention disclosed in this application is applicable to various IoT devices used in the automotive field, home security field, medical field, etc.

[0015] Fig. 1 is a diagram explaining a smart meter system 1 that uses a smart meter 2. The smart meter system 1 illustrated in Fig. 1 includes a smart meter 2 equipped with a function for digitally measuring the amount of electricity usage in a home or the like, and a remote server 4 that manages the measurement data of the amount of electricity usage for each smart meter 2.

[0016] The remote server 4 is connected to a WAN 6 (Wide Area Network). There is not just one mode in which the smart meter 2 is connected to the WAN 6. The smart meter 2a shown in Fig. 1 is connected to the WAN 6 via a FAN 5 (Field Area Network). The smart meter 2b is connected to the WAN 6 without via the FAN 5.

[0017] The FAN 5 is a private network constructed so that the measurement data of the smart meters 2a connected to the FAN 5 is collected by an aggregation device 5a, also called a concentrator, and transmitted to a remote server 4. The smart meters 2a connected to the FAN 5 transmit the measurement data to the aggregation device 5a using a wireless multi-hop method. The wireless multi-hop method is a communication method that uses another device (here, the smart meter 2a) as a repeater. The communication method of the smart meter 2b connected to the WAN 6 without going through the FAN 5 is 1:N wireless communication (for example, 5G) or PLC (Power Line Communication).

[0018] In this way, the metering data relating to the amount of electricity usage metered by the smart meter 2 reaches the remote server 4 via the WAN 6, which is a public network. In the case of a smart meter 2a connected to the FAN 5, the metering data of the smart meter 2a reaches the aggregation device 5a via another smart meter 2a, and then reaches the remote server 4 via the aggregation device 5a. For this reason, in the field of smart meters 2, it is recommended that the metering data that the smart meter 2 transmits to the remote server 4 be encrypted with a key unique to the smart meter 2.

[0019] Fig. 2 shows the structure of a smart meter 2, which is an IoT device to which the invention disclosed in this application is applied. As shown in Fig. 2, the smart meter 2 includes a metering unit 20, a terminal unit 21, and a communication unit 22. By separating the metering unit 20 and the terminal unit 21, the replacement work for the metering unit 20 can be performed without causing a power outage in the vicinity of the smart meter 2 in which the metering unit 20 is to be replaced. By separating the metering unit 20 and the communication unit 22, the communication method can be changed according to the installation location of the smart meter 2.

[0020] The metering unit 20 of the smart meter 2 has a function of measuring the amount of electricity usage per unit time (e.g., 30 minutes). The metering unit 20 of the smart meter 2 is provided with a display 203 that displays measurement data related to the amount of electricity usage. The communication unit 22 is equipped with a communication circuit that enables the smart meter 2 to exchange data with the remote server 4.

[0021] As described above, it is recommended that the smart meter 2 encrypt the metering data to be transmitted to the remote server 4 with a key unique to the smart meter 2. In this embodiment, in order to enhance the security of the smart meter 2, a secure element 3 (hereinafter referred to as SE, where SE is an abbreviation for Secure Element) that has tamper resistance against external cyber attacks and a function of encrypting the metering data is implemented in the smart meter 2. In this embodiment, confidential information such as an encryption key used to encrypt the metering data to be transmitted to the remote server 4 is stored in the SE 3.

[0022] FIG. 3 is a block diagram of the SE3 according to the present embodiment. As shown in FIG. 3, the SE3 includes a central processing unit (CPU) 30, a read only memory (ROM) 31, a random access memory (RAM) 32, a non-volatile memory (NVM) 33, a coprocessor 34, and peripheral functions 35. The CPU 30 is a calculation device that controls the SE3. The ROM 31 is an electrically non-rewritable non-volatile memory. The RAM 32 is an electrically rewritable volatile memory. The NVM 33 is an electrically rewritable non-volatile memory. The coprocessor 34 is a calculation device specialized for cryptographic calculations. The peripheral functions 35 refer to various circuits not shown in the figure that are necessary for the operation of the SE3. For example, the peripheral functions 35 include a communication circuit of the SE3.

[0023] The NVM 33 included in the SE3 stores secret information such as an encryption key used to encrypt data to be transmitted to the remote server 4. The RAM 32 of the SE3 temporarily stores information received from the terminal and the like. The ROM 31 of the SE3 implements a computer program for causing the CPU 30 to perform processes required for the smart meter 2, such as encryption processing of data to be transmitted to the remote server 4. Implementing the computer program in the ROM 31 makes it possible to prevent tampering with the computer program. However, if a vulnerability is found in the encryption algorithm used to encrypt data to be transmitted to the remote server 4 and this encryption algorithm is compromised, making it necessary to update the encryption algorithm, it will be necessary to replace the SE3.

[0024] In this embodiment, the SE3 mounted on the smart meter 2 is made replaceable in preparation for the compromise of the encryption algorithm used in the encryption process of data to be transmitted to the remote server 4. To facilitate replacement of the SE3, the SE3 illustrated in Fig. 3 is mounted on a card medium 36 having a SIM card shape. The SE3 is mounted on the back surface of the contact terminal 37 in a resin molded state.

[0025] Fig. 4 is a block diagram of the smart meter 2 according to this embodiment. Although not shown in Fig. 4, the terminal unit 21 of the smart meter 2 has a terminal for connecting to an electric wire of an electric power company and a terminal for connecting to the metering unit 20. Power is supplied to the metering unit 20 and the communication unit 22 via the terminal unit 21. The communication unit 22 is a circuit for performing a communication method compatible with the smart meter 2. For example, the communication unit 22 is a circuit for communicating by wireless multi-hop.

[0026] The metering unit 20 has a function of measuring the amount of power usage related to the location (e.g., a building) where the smart meter 2 is installed. As shown in Fig. 4, the metering unit 20 includes an MCU 200 (Micro Controller Unit), a power sensor 202, and a display 203. In Fig. 4, the power sensor 202 and the display 203 are each connected to the MCU 200.

[0027] The power sensor 202 is a sensor that is connected to an electric wire by using the terminal portion 21, and measures the current flowing through the electric wire and the voltage between the electric wires.

[0028] Display 203 is a meter that displays measurement data related to power usage. A liquid crystal display is used for display 203. The value displayed on display 203 is not measurement data per unit time (e.g., 30 minutes), but an integrated value of measurement data measured in the past.

[0029] The metering unit 20 of the smart meter 2 according to this embodiment includes a slot 201 for mounting the SE 3. Although details of the slot 201 are not shown in Fig. 4, the slot 201 includes pin terminals for contacting with the respective terminals included in the contact terminal 37.

[0030] In this embodiment, the SE3 mounted in the smart meter 2 can be replaced. For this reason, the smart meter 2 according to this embodiment has two slots 201 for mounting the SE3. The two slots 201 for mounting the SE3 have the same structure. In this embodiment, for convenience, one of the two slots 201 is called the first slot 201a (left side in FIG. 4) and the other is called the second slot 201b (right side in FIG. 4). Each of the first slot 201a and the second slot 201b is connected to the MCU 200.

[0031] One of the two slots 201 becomes an empty slot. An empty slot means a slot 201 to which an SE3 is not attached. In this embodiment, for convenience, an SE3 whose encryption algorithm has been compromised is called a compromised SE3a, and an SE3 in which measures have been taken to address the compromise of the encryption algorithm is called a post-measure SE3b. In FIG. 4, the compromised SE3a is attached to the other first slot 201a that is not an empty slot. When the compromised SE3a is switched to the post-measure SE3b, the post-measure SE3b is attached to the second slot 201b that is an empty slot.

[0032] The MCU 200 is a chip that integrates a microprocessor, a memory, and the like. The MCU 200 has, as functions realized by a computer program, a function of measuring the amount of power consumption per unit time (e.g., 30 minutes) using a power sensor 202, and a function of communicating with a remote server 4 using a communication unit 22. Furthermore, in this embodiment, the MCU 200 has, as a function realized by a computer program, a function of executing processing related to switching of the SE 3.

[0033] FIG. 5 is a diagram for explaining the procedure for replacing an SE3. When replacing an SE3 used in a smart meter 2, a new SE3 is attached to an empty slot 201 by an operator (step S1). When the new SE3 is attached to an empty slot 201, the smart meter 2 detects the new SE3 attached to the empty slot 201 (step S2). When the new SE3 attached to the empty slot is detected, the smart meter 2 executes a switching process for switching the secure element to be used from the existing secure element attached to the other slot to the new secure element (step S3). In the switching process for switching the SE3, the smart meter 2 invalidates the existing SE3. After executing the switching process, the smart meter 2 instructs removal of the existing SE3 (step S4), and the existing SE3 is removed from the smart meter 2 by an operator (step S5). When the existing SE3 is removed from the smart meter 2, the slot 201 in which the existing SE3 was attached becomes an empty slot (step S6).

[0034] The MCU200 executes the process of implementing the procedure described with reference to Fig. 5 as the process related to the replacement of the SE3. Fig. 6 is a first diagram for explaining the process executed by the MCU200 of the smart meter 2. Fig. 7 is a second diagram for explaining the process executed by the MCU200 of the smart meter 2. The explanations of Figs. 6 and 7 also serve as an explanation of the secure element replacement method according to the present application. In Figs. 6 and 7, the existing SE3 is a compromised SE3a whose encryption algorithm has been compromised, and the new SE3 is a countermeasured SE3b in which a countermeasure has been taken against the compromise of the encryption algorithm. In addition, before the countermeasured SE3b is attached to the smart meter 2, the second slot 201b is an empty slot.

[0035] When the MCU 200 detects that the post-measure SE3b, which will be a new SE3, is mounted in the second slot 201b, which is an empty slot (step S10), the MCU 200 resets the post-measure SE3b mounted in the second slot 201b (step S11), and the post-measure SE3b returns a reset response to the MCU 200 (step S12). The MCU 200 detects the post-measure SE3b mounted in the empty slot by receiving the reset response from the post-measure SE3b. Any method can be used to detect that the post-measure SE3b is mounted in the second slot 201b. A sensor may be used to detect that the post-measure SE3b is mounted in the second slot 201b. Alternatively, it may be electrically detected that the pin terminal of the slot 201 is in contact with the contact terminal 37.

[0036] When detecting the post-countermeasure SE3b installed in the second slot 201b, the MCU 200 may proceed to step S21 in FIG. 6 and execute a switching process to switch the SE3 used in the smart meter 2. In this embodiment, in order to enhance security related to the switching of the SE3, the MCU 200 executes an authentication process for mutually authenticating the compromised SE3a and the post-countermeasure SE3b, and checks whether an unauthorized SE3 is installed in the smart meter 2. Note that when executing the authentication process for mutually authenticating the compromised SE3a and the post-countermeasure SE3b, it is desirable to build a secure channel between the compromised SE3a and the post-countermeasure SE3b.

[0037] When the compromised SE 3a and the countermeasured SE 3b are to be mutually authenticated, the MCU 200 of the smart meter 2 requests the compromised SE 3a to transmit an authentication command message (step S13), and the compromised SE 3a returns the authentication command message of the compromised SE 3a to the MCU 200 (step S14). A conceivable method for requesting the SE 3 to transmit the authentication command message is to store the authentication command message as data in the SE 3 and read this data by a read command. Another conceivable method is to have the SE 3 implement a special command that requests the transmission of a command message.

[0038] Upon receiving the authentication command message of the compromised SE 3a, the MCU 200 transmits the authentication command message of the compromised SE 3a to the countermeasured SE 3b (step S15). The authentication command message of the compromised SE 3a includes authentication information of the compromised SE 3a. When a public key cryptography is used, for example, the authentication information of the compromised SE 3a can be a public key certificate of the compromised SE 3a and an electronic signature of the public key certificate generated using a private key of the compromised SE 3a. When a common key cryptography is used, for example, the authentication information of the compromised SE 3a can be a ciphertext of random numbers obtained by encrypting all or part of the common key with the common key.

[0039] When the post-countermeasure SE 3b receives the authentication command message for the compromised SE 3a from the MCU 200, it authenticates the authentication information for the compromised SE 3a included in the authentication command message for the compromised SE 3a, and returns the execution result of the authentication command message for the compromised SE 3a to the MCU 200 (step S16).

[0040] When the execution result of the authentication command message of the compromised SE 3a indicates authentication success, the MCU 200 requests the post-measure SE 3b to transmit an authentication command message (step S17), and the post-measure SE 3b returns the authentication command message of the post-measure SE 3b to the MCU 200 (step S18). Note that, in this embodiment, the post-measure SE 3b is requested to transmit an authentication command message, but the execution result of the authentication command message of the compromised SE 3a may include the authentication command message of the post-measure SE 3b.

[0041] Upon receiving the authentication command message of the post-countermeasure SE3b, the MCU200 transmits the authentication command message of the post-countermeasure SE3b to the compromised SE3a (step S19). As with the authentication command message of the compromised SE3a, the authentication command message of the post-countermeasure SE3b includes authentication information of the post-countermeasure SE3b. Upon receiving the authentication command message of the post-countermeasure SE3b from the MCU200, the compromised SE3a authenticates the authentication information of the post-countermeasure SE3b included in the authentication command message of the post-countermeasure SE3b, and returns the execution result of the authentication command message of the post-countermeasure SE3b to the MCU200 (step S20). Steps S13 to 20 in FIG. 6 are a detailed description of the authentication process executed by the MCU200.

[0042] When the execution result of the authentication command message of the countermeasured SE3b indicates that the authentication is successful, the MCU200 executes a switching process to switch the SE3 used in the smart meter 2 from the compromised SE3a to the countermeasured SE3b (step S21). In the switching process, the MCU200 disables the compromised SE3a that becomes the existing SE3. The method of disabling the compromised SE3a is arbitrary. The compromised SE3a can be disabled by changing the slot 201 used by the MUC of the smart meter 2 from the first slot 201a in which the compromised SE3a is installed to the second slot 201b in which the countermeasured SE3b is installed. In addition, the compromised SE3a can be disabled by stopping the power supply to the compromised SE3a. Furthermore, when the SE3 is accessed using the identification number of the SE3, the compromised SE3a can be disabled by deleting the identification number of the compromised SE3a stored in the MCU200.

[0043] When the SE3 used in the smart meter 2 is switched from the compromised SE3a to the countermeasured SE3b, the MCU 200 displays an instruction to remove the compromised SE3a on the display (step S22), and the compromised SE3a is removed by the worker performing the work. Next, the MCU 200 determines whether the first slot 201a in which the compromised SE3a was installed is an empty slot (step S23). For example, it can be determined that the first slot 201a has become an empty slot by electrically determining whether the pin terminal of the first slot 201a is not in contact with the contact terminal 38 of the SE3. When the MCU 200 determines that the first slot 201a has become an empty slot, it transmits a message that the SE3 has been switched to the remote server 4 (step S24), and the procedure in FIG. 6 ends.

[0044] Secret information such as an encryption key used for communication with the remote server 4 may be stored in the SE 3. When switching from the compromised SE 3a to the countermeasured SE 3b, it is desirable to automatically transfer the secret information of the compromised SE 3a to the countermeasured SE 3b. Steps S30 to S33 in Fig. 7 are steps added from Fig. 6, and are steps related to the secret information transfer process. Here, only the steps added in Fig. 7 will be explained.

[0045] 6, if the execution result of the authentication command message of the countermeasured SE3b indicates authentication success, the MCU200 requests the compromised SE3a to transmit a secret information setting command message (step S30), and the compromised SE3a returns the secret information setting command message of the compromised SE3a to the MCU200 (step S31). The secret information setting command message includes secret information stored in the NVM33 of the compromised SE3a. The secret information setting command message is a command to write information to the NVM33 of the SE3.

[0046] When the MCU 200 acquires the secret information setting command message from the compromised SE 3a, the MCU 200 transmits the secret information setting command message obtained from the compromised SE 3a to the countermeasured SE 3b (step S32). The countermeasured SE 3b stores the secret information included in the secret information setting command message in the NVM 33 of the countermeasured SE 3b, and then transmits the execution result of the secret information setting command message back to the MCU 200 (step S33). Only when the execution result of the secret information setting command message indicates success, the MCU 200 switches the SE 3 used in the smart meter 2 from the compromised SE 3a to the countermeasured SE 3b (step S21). [Explanation of symbols]

[0047] 1. Smart meter system 2. Smart meters 200 MCU 3 Secure Element (SE)

Claims

1. Two slots for installing secure elements, an MCU (Micro Controller Unit) that, when detecting that a new secure element has been attached to one of the slots that is an empty slot, executes a switching process to switch the secure element to be used from an existing secure element attached to the other slot to the new secure element; Equipped with IoT devices.

2. the MCU is provided with an MCU that performs an authentication process for mutually authenticating the new secure element and the existing secure element before performing the switching process, and performs the switching process only when the authentication process is successful. An IoT device as claimed in claim 1.

3. the MCU executes a secret information transfer process for acquiring secret information stored in the existing secure element and writing it to the new secure element after the authentication process is successful, and then executes the switching process; An IoT device as claimed in claim 2.

4. A secure element whose encryption algorithm has been compromised is defined as the existing secure element, and a secure element in which measures have been taken to address the compromise of the encryption algorithm is defined as the new secure element. An IoT device according to any one of claims 1 to 3.

5. A step a) in which an MCU (Micro Controller Unit) of an IoT device having two slots for mounting secure elements detects that a new secure element has been mounted in one of the slots that is an empty slot; a step b in which the MCU executes a switching process for switching the secure element to be used from an existing secure element attached to the other of the slots to the new secure element; A method for replacing a secure element, including:

6. The method further includes a step c of the MCU performing an authentication process for mutually authenticating the new secure element and the existing secure element; the MCU executes the step c after executing the step a, and executes the step b only if the authentication process is successful in the step c; A method for replacing a secure element according to claim 5.

7. The method further includes a step d of executing a secret information transfer process in which the MCU acquires secret information stored in the existing secure element and writes the secret information to the new secure element; The MCU executes step c and then executes step d. A method for replacing a secure element according to claim 6.

Citation Information

Patent Citations

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    JP2012113670A