Non-repudiable acceptance of private certificates

The method and system for non-repudiable authorization of private certificates address the trust and verification challenges by binding users to certificates through key pair generation and signed server proofs, enhancing trust and reducing verification costs.

JP2024544683AActive Publication Date: 2024-12-03THALES DIS FRANCE SA
View PDF 5 Cites 0 Cited by

Patent Information

Application Number
JP2024533204
Authority / Receiving Office
JP · JP
Patent Type
Applications
Current Assignee / Owner
Priority Date
2021-12-03
Filing Date
2022-12-02
Publication Date
2024-12-03
Estimated Expiration
2042-12-02

AI Technical Summary

Technical Problem

Digital certificates from private attribute providers are often suspect and lack trust, as they are not tied to a master list or trust list, making verification costly and time-consuming, and there is no single standard for device certification of user identity, leading to privacy issues and reluctance from governments to verify credentials.

Method used

A method and system for non-repudiable authorization of private certificates, involving binding users to certificates through a key pair generation, authenticating with an issuing authority, and generating a signed server proof to create an endorsed certificate, ensuring the authenticity and trustworthiness of private certificates.

Benefits of technology

Enhances the trustworthiness of private certificates by providing strong non-repudiation and privacy-enabled approval, reducing the need for costly verification processes and enabling seamless integration with existing standards like elDAS2, while ensuring compliance with GDPR.

✦ Generated by Eureka AI based on patent content.

Smart Images

  • Figure 2024544683000001_ABST
    Figure 2024544683000001_ABST
Patent Text Reader

Abstract

A method (200) is provided for unrepudiable recognition of a private certificate (111). The method includes receiving a certificate from a private attribute provider (110) in response to a request from a user to declare the certificate, securely binding a critical attribute in the certificate selected by the user after being authenticated by an issuing authority (120), and securely binding the user to the certificate via a connected device (100). The method generates an approved certificate (400) including a signed server proof (360), which is provided by the user to a service provider via the connected device to receive a service (151) that would otherwise require a third-party trusted attestation. Other embodiments are also disclosed.
Need to check novelty before this filing date? Find Prior Art

Description

[Technical field]

[0001] The present invention relates to the technical field of electronic authentication and certification. One or more embodiments of the present invention relate generally to the field of cryptographic authentication. More specifically, embodiments relate to methods and systems for credential validation.

[0002] The present invention relates to a newly developed method for verifying and attesting the authenticity of personal documents issued by an attribute provider to an independent service provider in the absence of a chain of trust.

[0003] The present invention contemplates a means of mitigating trust concerns regarding the authenticity of privately certified documents. Advantageously, the present invention provides a technical mechanism for certificate approval for users who wish to increase the trust in their private certificates. [Background technology]

[0004] Authentication is the security process of verifying a user's identity in a system that authorizes the individual to access the system, for example, a sign-on process. Authentication is important because it assigns responsibility to users for the entries they create, modify, or view. Authorship is the attribution of the creation or origination of a particular unit of information to a particular individual or entity acting at a particular time.

[0005] Certification is the act of witnessing the signing of a public document and signing to ensure that it was properly signed by those who are bound by its contents. Certification is a legal acknowledgement of the authenticity of a document and confirmation that proper process was followed. Certification can also be the act of electronically signing content, indicating authorship and legal responsibility for a particular unit of information. Electronic signature is a generic, technology-neutral term that refers to various methods of signing and attesting electronic records.

[0006] Problem: Digital certificates (e.g., diplomas, qualifications, etc.) from private attribute providers (e.g., academic institutions, companies, associations, etc.) are generally considered suspicious, even if they are delivered by official or formal means. These certificates have varying degrees of trust and are not tied to a master or trust list. In many cases, private attribute providers are unknown issuing authorities from the relying party's perspective. Such private certificates would be untrustworthy if delivered independently by a user to a relying party, since the user may have altered them or they may be counterfeit copies. Thus, when a relying party requests a user to present a digital certificate issued by a private attribute provider (e.g., an academic institution), the relying party wants to be confident that the digital certificate belongs to the user who presents it and that its authenticity has been verified by a trusted source.

[0007] Currently, organizations must access separate resources to verify specific existing information regarding electronic signatures, certifications, and authorship of user documents. Such types of verification are costly and time-consuming. Verification, especially related to user identity, raises privacy concerns regarding sharing of user information and personal data. There is no common system that holds all identity information for individual users. Also, there is no single, universally accepted standard, law, or regulation for device verification of user identity.

[0008] Certain specifications (GP, ISO, ETSI, CEN / CENELEC, W3C, GSMA) disseminate abstract concepts regarding authentication and trust of digital user identity documents but do not provide concrete implementations. In this regard, ISO / IEC 18013-5 proposes a standardized way of interacting with mobile IDs (mIDs) and mobile driver licenses (mDLs) for identity and driving privileges use cases. An open mDL / mID ecosystem that adheres to global interoperability standards will provide a level of trust comparable to traditional passports or user identification. The ISO / IEC 18013-5 international mDL draft standard aims to provide mechanisms to retrieve and trust identity document data from a mobile driver's license, but the specification is complex and does not provide any implementation details.

[0009] The problem with these proposed standards is that they do not provide for enforcement of digital certificates from private attribute providers. Such identity proofing is time-consuming and costly, and there is generally little benefit to relying parties in independently verifying complex credentials. Also, governments or public agencies are reluctant to agree to provide more data than their insurance liability will allow when asked to verify digital credentials.

[0010] The present invention provides a solution that overcomes existing limitations and advantageously provides for closer involvement of private attribute providers and commercial service providers in the encryption ecosystem where users seek to increase trust in private certificates, for example via connected devices. Summary of the Invention

[0011] In a first embodiment, a method for non-repudiable acceptance of a private certificate is provided, the method comprising the steps of receiving a certificate from a private attribute provider (PAP), the certificate including attributes having corresponding attribute names and values, and an optional PAP signature signed by the PAP; Binding users of connected devices to certificates; and Binding critical attributes to equivalent attributes in the issuing authority It is further characterized by:

[0012] The above two bindings provide a stronger trust enhancement than the state of the art. The step of binding a user of a connected device to a certificate includes collecting a set of user authentication attribute names from attributes selected by the user, authenticating the user to the issuing authority, generating a key pair for the user including a public key (PuK) and a private key (PrK), and sending the public key (PuK) to the issuing authority. The step of binding the critical attributes to the equivalent attributes of the issuing authority includes requesting the issuing authority to authenticate the user and approve the certificate based thereon, and verifying the set of user authentication attribute names. If verified, the method includes receiving a signed Server Proof from the Issuing Authority, aggregating the signed Server Proof with a Verifier Challenge to generate a Verifier Blob, signing the Verifier Blob with a Private Key (PrK) to generate a Mobile Signed Blob, packaging the Attestation with the Mobile Signed Blob to generate an Endorsed Attestation, and presenting the Endorsed Attestation to the verifier to access the service provided by the verifier. In the step of binding the critical attributes, the Issuing Authority performs the steps of checking the validity of the set of user authentication attribute names against the equivalent corresponding attribute values, and if valid, endorsing the certificate together with the set of user authentication attribute names and the hashed certificate and hashed public key, returning the signed Server Proof, and otherwise not endorsing the certificate if not valid.

[0013] The step of approving includes signing the server proof to generate a signed server proof including the hashed certificate, the hash of the user authentication attribute name, the issuing authority challenge, and the hashed public key. The approved certificate includes the certificate and optional PAP signature, and the connected device signature on the verifier blob using a private key (PrK), and a mobile signed blob including the verifier blob. The verifier blob includes the verifier challenge and the signed server proof. The signed server proof includes the hashed certificate, the hash of the user authentication attribute name, the issuing authority challenge, the hashed public key, and the issuing authority signature. The step of checking the validity includes authenticating the user authentication attribute name against a civil registry, an identity card registry, an administrative registry, or any source of pre-registered information for the connected device authentication of the user of the connected device. Access to the service gives rights or privileges to the user of the device who holds the device key.

[0014] The certificate may further include a purpose using attributes to restrict access by the PAP, and the purpose in the certificate may include terms of use, expiration dates, or other conditional measures for using the approved certificate. Terms of use, expiration dates, or other conditional measures may be included in the issuing authority challenge to restrict the use of the approved certificate by the issuing authority. Approving the certificate together with the set of user authentication attribute names and the hashed certificate and hashed public key binds the user to the connected device's key pair, thereby preventing the user from repudiating the connected device signature.

[0015] In a second embodiment, a method for non-repudiable pre-approval of a private certificate via a connected device is provided. The method includes receiving a certificate from a private attribute provider (PAP), the certificate including attributes, corresponding attribute names and values, and a PAP challenge, and is further characterized by 1) binding a user of the connected device to the certificate, and 2) binding critical attributes to equivalent attributes of an issuing authority. The step of binding a user of the connected device to the certificate includes collecting a set of user authentication attribute names from attributes selected by the user, authenticating the user to the issuing authority, generating a key pair for the user including a public key (PuK) and a private key (PrK), and sending the public key (PuK) to the issuing authority. The step of binding the critical attributes to the equivalent attributes of the issuing authority includes requesting permission from the issuing authority to approve the certificate based thereon and verifying the set of user authentication attribute names.

[0016] If verified, the method further includes receiving a signed server proof from the issuing authority, aggregating the signed server proof with the PAP challenge to generate a pre-approved blob, signing the pre-approved blob with a private key to generate a mobile-signed pre-approved blob, and presenting the mobile-signed pre-approved blob to the PAP for authentication. If authentication is successful, the method includes receiving a PAP-signed certificate and reconstructing an approved certificate with a verifier challenge. Reconstructing an approved certificate includes aggregating the signed server proof with the verifier challenge to generate a verifier blob, signing the verifier blob with a private key (PrK) to generate a mobile-signed blob, packaging the PAP-signed certificate with the mobile-signed blob to generate an approved certificate, and presenting the approved certificate to the verifier to access services provided by the verifier.

[0017] In a third embodiment, a system for unrepudiable acceptance of private certificates is provided. The system includes an issuing authority, a verifier, and a private attribute provider (PAP) for providing a certificate including attributes and corresponding attribute values. A connected device operated by a user is further characterized in that it binds the user to the certificate and binds the critical attributes to the equivalent attributes of the issuing authority. In response to binding, it aggregates a signed server proof received from the issuing authority with a verifier challenge from the verifier to generate a verifier blob, signs the verifier blob to generate a mobile signed blob, packages the certificate with the mobile signed blob to generate an approved certificate, and presents the approved certificate to the verifier to access a service provided by the verifier. The connected device collects a set of user authentication attribute names, rather than attribute values, from the attributes selected by the user, authenticates the user to the issuing authority, generates a key pair for the user including a public key (PuK) and a private key (PrK), and binds the user to the certificate by sending the public key (PuK) to the issuing authority.

[0018] The connected device binds the critical attributes to the equivalent attributes of the issuing authority by requesting permission from the issuing authority to approve a certificate based thereon, verifying the set of user authentication attribute names, and if verified, receiving a signed server proof from the issuing authority. The issuing authority checks the validity of the set of user authentication attribute names against its own corresponding attribute values, and if valid, approves the certificate together with the set of user authentication attribute names and the hashed certificate and hashed public key, and returns a signed server proof, otherwise does not approve the certificate if it is not valid. The issuing authority signs the server proof to generate a signed server proof that includes the hashed certificate, the hash of the user authentication attribute names, the issuing authority challenge, and the hashed public key.

[0019] In a fourth embodiment, a connection device for unrepudiable acceptance of private certificates is provided. The device includes a power source for providing power, a memory for storing instructions and data, a communication module for transmitting and receiving data, a display for presenting information and receiving user input, and a processor for executing a computer program. The computer program includes a non-transitory computer-readable medium storing program code executed by at least one central processing unit (CPU) in a computing environment, whereby execution of the program code causes the at least one CPU to perform the operations of the method described above. In one configuration, the method includes receiving a certificate from a private attribute provider (PAP), the certificate including attributes and corresponding attribute values, and further characterized by binding a user of the connection device to the certificate and binding a critical attribute of the attributes to an equivalent attribute of the issuing authority.

[0020] The system presented herein is designed to be compatible with the Electronic Identification and Trust Service for Electronic Transactions (elDAS2) rules. For example, the system may be applied to an elDAS2 context and subject to the rules by introducing a role called "Gov Server" that is enacted by an elDAS Qualified Trust Service Provider (TSP). Through this practice, a user may ask the TSP to provide a QEAA (Qualified Attestation of Attributes) that will act to approve private certificates delivered by any private attribute provider. In this configuration, the TSP signs a compound (e.g., attributes, certificate, proof, etc.) called a "Signed Gov Proof". In this way, private certificates may be approved by the TSP except by verifying the EAA of the QEAA (Qualified / Electronic Attestation of Attributes), providing a reliable way to achieve a bridge between private and public certificates while preserving privacy. [Brief description of the drawings]

[0021] The features of the invention that are believed to be novel and are set forth with particularity in the appended claims. The invention, together with further objects and advantages thereof, may best be understood by reference to the following description taken in conjunction with the accompanying drawings, in which like reference numerals identify like elements in the several views.

[0022] [Figure 1] FIG. 13 is a use case diagram for approving private certificates according to an embodiment. [Diagram 2] 1 illustrates a method for unrepudiable acceptance of private certificates according to an embodiment. [Diagram 3] 3 is a schematic diagram of an approved certificate generated by the method of FIG. 2 according to one embodiment. [Figure 4A] 4 illustrates a binding path in the approved certificate of FIG. 3 according to an embodiment. [Figure 4B] 4 illustrates a binding point in the approved certificate of FIG. 3 according to an embodiment. [Diagram 5] FIG. 1 illustrates a method for reusing a signed server proof in an approved certificate according to an embodiment. [Figure 6] 1 illustrates a method for non-repudiable pre-approval of private certificates according to an embodiment. [Figure 7] 1 is an exemplary schematic diagram of a machine suitable for use in performing the method according to an embodiment; [Figure 8] FIG. 1 illustrates a hardware platform suitable for use in performing the method according to an embodiment. DETAILED DESCRIPTION OF THE PREFERRED EMBODIMENTS

[0023] While the specification concludes with claims defining the features of the invention which are believed to be novel, it is believed the invention will be better understood from a consideration of the following description in conjunction with the drawings in which like reference numbers are carried forward.

[0024] In computing, an attribute is a specification that defines a property of an object, element, or file. It may also refer to or set a particular value for a particular instance. Many object-oriented languages ​​also allow certain attributes to be declared private, making it difficult, if not impossible, for users of a class to directly see or change their values. Developers of classes are provided with a way to control how these attributes can be manipulated or used. The protocol for accepting private certificates described here may be used by users to accept certificates signed with attributes of their choice, and may be required by private attribute providers before applying a signature to a certificate.

[0025] Attributes from private attribute providers need to be endorsed with two powerful performance enhancements: 1) a tie to the owner, and 2) a tie to certified, critical attributes from the issuing authority. Identity proofing is costly, and relying parties in such a position see little benefit from independently checking complex credentials. Also, contractual liability is typically a challenge when third parties, such as government agencies, are included as trusted sources to assist with attestation. Delivering data with consent in response to digital credential endorsement requests is difficult. The embodiments herein provide a solution that overcomes these limitations.

[0026] Referring to Fig. 1, a high level use case diagram for authorizing a private certificate according to a first embodiment is shown. In this use case, a user ultimately wants to obtain a service 151 from a service provider 130. The service provider can also be considered as a verifier (130) or relying party. To obtain the service 151, the service provider needs a private certificate 111 from a private attribute provider (PAP) 110, and must be assured that the certificate 111 is in fact trustworthy. To provide this assurance, an issuing authority 120 is included as a party that increases the user's trust.

[0027] The issuing authority approves the private certificate by means described herein to generate an approved private certificate. Approval assures the service provider that the private certificate 111 is genuine and trustworthy. The user then presents the approved private certificate to the service provider 130 as a condition to receiving the service 151. Access to the service 151 confers rights or privileges to the user of the mobile device that holds the device key.

[0028] Use case diagram 100 illustrates a general high level method (steps 141-146) for non-repudiable endorsement of private certificates as a solution for users to increase the trust in their private certificates before delivering them to a service provider 130 (or relying party). This introduces the issuing authority 120 to users and service providers as a trusted source and intermediary for endorsement. In this use case, the service provider 130 requests a digital certificate from a user issued by a private attribute provider and receives assurance via the endorsed certificate from the issuing authority that the received digital document is the user's and that the key (critical) user identity attributes featured in the certificate have been verified and validated.

[0029] For example, a user may be a former student who has graduated from an academic institution (e.g., PAP 110) and is seeking privileges from an alumni association (e.g., service provider 130). The user obtains a digital diploma from the PAP 110 that has awarded the user a degree, including relevant user identification information, and the degree includes the user's name, graduation date, awarding institution, and academic field. In this example, the service provider 130 is an alumni association that may grant privileges (e.g., services 151) to the user, but requires that the user attend and receive a diploma from the institution in order to receive the service or privilege, i.e., the terms of the service. The service provider 130 may also be a third-party verifier acting to authorize the user on behalf of the alumni association. The user may have a copy of the diploma, or a photo of the diploma (real or on a mobile device) to present to the alumni association as evidence, but this would impose time and cost efforts on the alumni association (or a third-party affiliate) to verify the authenticity of the diploma (copy or photo). The diploma is preferably received directly from the degree-granting institution. This is because the PAP is a more trusted source than the user alone, but again, the burden is placed on both the PAP (e.g., the academic institution) and the service provider (e.g., the alumni association) to communicate and establish a foundation of trust.

[0030] In this example, in step 141, the user requests a digital document that identifies the user, and the PAP 110 responds in step 142 with a private certificate 111, i.e. proof that the provided digital document is in fact true and authentic. This proves the personal information in the digital document. The user can present the private certificate at this point. Another configuration of the use case 100 considered above provides a solution where the private attribute provider (PAP) requires pre-approval to mitigate the risk of "misdelivery" of the certificate.

[0031] However, as mentioned above, there is a need to endorse certificates from trusted sources other than the user. An endorsement is an approval, similar to a digital certificate, to attest to the authenticity of something. To provide this assurance, the user authenticates to the issuing authority 120 in step 143 and, upon authentication, selects critical attributes (e.g., first name, last name, date of birth, place of birth) in the private certificate 111 for the issuing authority 120 to independently verify. If the issuing authority verifies the critical attributes in step 144, it responds with a server proof, i.e., the private certificate corresponds to the user. In step 145, the server proof is combined with the private certificate to generate an endorsed private certificate 400. In step 146, the user presents the endorsed private certificate to the service provider 130 to obtain the service 151.

[0032] Referring to Figure 2, a method 200 for unrepudiable acceptance of private certificates by a mobile device is shown. The method may include more or fewer steps than shown and is not limited to the order of steps shown. In discussing the method, reference is made to other figures to illustrate possible components. The method is shown in the context of a computing ecosystem in which a user with a connected device 100 requests a service provided by a verifier 130. The connected device may be a mobile phone, laptop, or other electronic communication device.

[0033] Method 200 may begin at step 201, where a user requests a (private) certificate from a PAP 110 on a connected device 100. The user collects the certificate from the PAP. In this example, the certificate asserts a graduation granted to John Smith, born in Utopia on October 23, 1980. The PAP controls how private attributes may be attested. For example, an academic institution is a PAP that may attest that a particular degree was awarded to a particular student on a particular date. A company that provides user identification badges (ID) is another example of a PAP that may attest that a particular badge was given to a particular employee for a particular period of time, for admission to a particular area, or for access to a particular computer system. An entity that provides access to services to registered users is another example of a PAP that may provide attestation services.

[0034] In step 202, the PAP responds with a certificate, which the connected device 100 stores. The certificate contains attributes with corresponding attribute values. In the exemplary use case of FIG. 1, an exemplary list of attribute names and attribute values ​​is shown below:

[0035] [Table 1]

[0036] In step 206, the mobile device presents the user with a list of attribute names in the certificate and prompts the user to select a subset of the attribute names, but not the attribute values, to protect privacy. This is the set of user-authenticated attribute names, which are also considered "critical" attributes. With brief reference to FIG. 3, the critical attributes 302 selected by the user are identified and marked (e.g., A, B, C) in the certificate 300 that includes all attributes. Notably, although attribute values ​​may be included with the corresponding attribute names in the certificate 300, the manner in which the approved certificate 400 is generated depends only on the (user-authenticated) attribute names selected by the user, and does not require the attribute values. In this step, the user can approve the certificate by binding its configuration attributes (attribute name-value pairs) to equivalent attributes (attribute name-value pairs) in a variable source (e.g., user input, elDCard, cloud service, Gov service). The user is prompted to select attribute names (not attribute values) as the critical attributes (e.g., first name, last name, date of birth, place of birth) that he or she wants to use to approve the certificate.

[0037] In step 208, the user authenticates to the issuing authority 120 via the connected device 100. The user authenticates from his mobile to the issuing authority 120, e.g., a government server (e.g., login / pass or additional authentication vector or elDCard, or OOB pre-obtained secret, etc.). In this step, the user generates a key pair <user public key (PuK) and user private key (PrK)> on his mobile and sends an approval request to the government server to approve the certificate along with a set of critical attribute names {e.g., first_name, last_name, birthdate, place_of_birth}, a hash of the certificate (certificate is not revealed in plain text for privacy reasons) and a hash of the user public key (HPuK). The step of approving the certificate along with a set of user authentication attribute names and the hashed certificate and hashed public key binds the user to the generated key pair of the mobile device, which prevents the user from refusing to approve the certificate (and the mobile device signature).

[0038] In step 210, the issuing authority 120 1) gets the user attributes, 2) hashes the user attributes, 3) signs the token as a server proof, and 4) records {hash(PAP.certificate)+UID+hash of usage attributes}. Specifically, the issuing authority 120 independently verifies the critical attribute names against attribute values ​​it already has from the user's authorization or that it finds through a search of its own trusted sources. Validating the critical attributes against the issuing authority's equivalent attributes is a validation operation. This is one element of the server proof. Once the issuing server 120 has its own independent attribute values ​​for the selected critical attribute names, it will check the certificate to ensure that the corresponding attribute name and value pairs are consistent, i.e., the attribute values ​​for the names in the certificate are correct from the perspective of its own investigation / search. For example, a government server may check the validity of the attributes in the certificate to ensure that the authenticated user has attribute name / value pairs that match those in, for example, a civil registry, identity card registry, or administrative registry.

[0039] In step 212, the Issuing Authority 120 returns a signed server proof if the matching exercise resulting from the investigation is successful. For example, a government server would return a signed Gov Server Proof if the check was successful. This proof consists of a hash of the attributes, the challenge (or unique identifier UID) and the hashed certificate. In step 214, the mobile device stores the signed server proof for later use. At this point, the user has a server proof that is needed to satisfy the verifier's user identification request. The communication with the Issuing Authority 120 can be terminated. The user can now proceed to communicate with the verifier 130.

[0040] In step 216, the user requests access to a service provided by the verifier (or source provider or relying party). In the example that follows, the service could be an alumni privilege for a student who attended a particular academic institution. The user logs into the verifier service on a mobile device and requests the service. The verifier 130 responds in step 218 with a verifier challenge that is provided to the user's mobile device. At this point, the user will instruct the mobile device to generate an approved certificate, as shown in step 220. The connected device 100, under the user's direction, aggregates the Gov server proofs with the verifier challenges from the verifiers / SPs / RPs and signs the entire package (using the user's device key-user private key PrK), resulting in the approved certificate. A detailed description of an exemplary approved certificate 400 is shown and provided in FIG. 3.

[0041] Once the mobile device generates the approved certificate 400, the user sends it to the verifier 130 in step 222. That is, the user delivers the approved certificate to the verifier / SP / RP in order to access services and be granted privileges, such as alumni web page access. The verifier 130 checks the payload of the approved certificate 400 (see FIG. 3) to determine if the user-supplied certificate matches the server proof. This allows the verifier to extract the necessary attribute names / values ​​from the certificate to determine and provide the service to the user. The verifier will perform the normal PKI actions required to validate the key usage and certificate.

[0042] Referring to FIG. 3, a schematic diagram of an approved certificate 400 is shown. Approved certificate 400 is composed of a certificate 300 and a mobile signed blob 320. A particular selection of attributes 303 are considered critical attributes 302 (e.g., A, B, C, also called user authentication attribute names). These are "critical" in the sense that the user selects the particular attribute names (not values) from within the certificate and the issuing authority independently verifies them. Approved certificate 400 is composed of a certificate 300 with an optional PAP signature 304 and a mobile signed blob 320. Note that the PAP signature is optional and is not a required element of an approved certificate. Rather, certificate approval refers to the combined presentation (combination) of certificate 300 and mobile signed blob 320, regardless of whether the PAP signature is present.

[0043] The certificate 300 includes the intended use of each attribute, such as conditions of use, expiration date, or other conditional means for using the approved certificate 400. The intended purpose may be provided by the PAP 110 or by the user. The certificate 300 includes a signature 304 that verifies that it was signed by the PAP. However, the PAP signature 304 is optional to be attached to the certificate 400 if it is considered a prerequisite for the issuing authority to approve the certificate 300.

[0044] The mobile signed blob 320 comprises a verifier blob 340 and a mobile signature 322 (shown as a key). The mobile signature 322 is created by the connected device 100 (see Figures 2 and 3B) when it signs the verifier blob 340 using a stored user private key (PrK). The verifier blob 340 comprises a signed server proof 360 and a verifier challenge 342. The signed server proof 360 comprises the server proof provided by the issuing authority 120, together with an issuing authority signature 362 (shown as a key) to verify that it was signed by the issuing authority 120. The server proof 360 comprises a hash of the certificate 300 (hashed certificate 370), a hash of the user authentication attribute names (hashed user authentication attributes 371), an issuing authority challenge 372, and a hash of the user public key (PuK) (hashed user public key 373). The user private key (PrK) and user public key (PuK) are corresponding key pairs that are created by the user and stored on the connected device 100. The key pairs are generated according to Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) guidelines and recommendations. Thus, the signed server proof 360 comprises the server proof (elements 370-373) and the issuing authority signature 362.

[0045] Briefly, Figures 4A and 4B respectively show the binding paths and binding points of the various entities involved in the approval of the resulting certificate provided by the method 200 for creating the approved certificate 400 (see Figure 3) of Figure 2. The binding points are the result of the creation of a corresponding non-repudiation binding path where a user or an involved entity (issuing authority or verifier) ​​cannot deny the validity of the assembled / packaged components of the approved certificate 400 (Figure 3). The binding points and paths also establish how the components may be reused. For example, once approved, a user may reuse a signed server proof when seeking services from different verifiers. However, a user may only reuse a server proof signed with the same certificate.

[0046] Referring now to FIG. 4A, binding paths of various entities involved in approving a certificate are shown. Binding path 401 occurs between PAP 110 and certificate 300 when PAP 110 creates and signs a certificate, thereby generating PAP signature 362 (FIG. 3A). Binding path 402 occurs when PAP 101 includes one or more purposes that use critical attributes 302 and signs the certificate. Binding path 403 occurs when issuing authority 120, including hashed certificate 370, signs a server proof with its issuing authority signature 362. Binding path 404 occurs when issuing authority 120, including hashed user authentication attribute name 371, signs a server proof with its issuing authority signature 362. This binds the critical attributes selected by the user (user authentication attribute name 302, e.g., A, B, and C) to the equivalent attributes verified by the issuing authority. Binding path 405 occurs when the issuing authority 120, in generating the signed server proof 360, signs the server proof with its issuing authority signature 362. Binding path 406 occurs because the issuing authority 120 includes an issuing authority challenge 372 in the signed server proof 360.

[0047] Bindings 407-408 bind the user of the connected device 100 to the certificate 300, creating a non-repudiation path where the user cannot deny that they selected the critical attributes used by the issuing authority to approve the requested certificate or deny that they did not create the verifier blob 340 to request a service from the verifier 130. The binding path 407 occurs when the user's mobile device signs the verifier blob 340 with the user's private key (PrK) to generate the mobile signed blob 320. The binding path 408 occurs when the user provides the issuing authority with the user's public key (PuK) to request authentication and approval of the certificate 300. The binding 388 is non-repudiable because the hashed user public key (PuK) 373 is embedded in the signed server proof 360. The binding path 409 binds the user to the verifier 130 when the mobile device constructs the approved certificate 400 specific to the challenge provided by the verifier (or source provider, or relying party).

[0048] Referring now to FIG. 4B, the binding points of the various entities involved in the creation of the approved certificate 400 are shown. The components previously shown in FIG. 4B will also be referenced numerically. The binding point 420 establishes that only the critical attributes (user authentication attribute name 302, FIG. 3) can be approved by the issuing authority. The binding point 421 connects the certificate 300 to the mobile device and establishes the user's commitment. At this point, the issuing authority approved the certificate at the user's request, and since the certificate contains the critical attributes 302 selected by the user, this is the user's commitment. The binding point 422 establishes that the user cannot deny that he willingly approved the certificate. The binding point 423 establishes that the user cannot deny the selection of the critical attributes involved in the approval.

[0049] Binding point 424 obligates the user to only regenerate the server proof for the same certificate. Binding point 425 binds the user to the authorization from the issuing server. This binding may include properties or usage conditions established by the issuing authority, such as the expiration date of the server proof or other conditions, as well as the purpose field of the certificate. Binding point 426 binds the user to a user private key (PrK) that the user created and stored on the mobile device. Thus, the user cannot repudiate the signing of the signed server proof because it contains a copy of the corresponding user public key (PuK).

[0050] The binding point 427 establishes the uniqueness of the selected verifier and binds the approved certificate to that particular verifier. The inclusion of the verifier challenge 342 in the verifier blob 340 is under the control of the user and the connected device 100, so the user can create other approved certificates specific to other verifiers. That is, by embedding the verifier challenge 342 in the verifier blob 340 and signing the package with the mobile device's user private key (PrK), a verifier-specific mobile signed blob 320 is generated. This configurability of including the verifier challenge 342 in the mobile signed blob is what enables an "approve once, use many times" approach. The user can reuse signed server proofs, but some can only be done by using the same certificate.

[0051] Referring to Figure 5, a method 500 is shown for reusing a server proof signed with a different verifier to subscribe to another service or privilege. In this method, a user has already received a signed server proof, for example, according to method steps 201-214 of Figure 2. As seen in that figure, in step 214, the signed server proof is stored for later use, for example, in this example where the user desires a service from a different verifier.

[0052] In method 500, in step 502, a user requests a service from the verifier 130. In step 504, the verifier 130 responds with a verifier challenge. In step 506, the user generates an approved certificate 400 via the connected device 100, similar to the steps and description shown in Figure 2, except that now the mobile device embeds the new (different) verifier challenge in a verifier blob 340 and signs this blob with a user private key (PrK) 102 stored in the connected device 100. The steps of method 500 are similar to those of method 200, but include a different verifier challenge.

[0053] In step 508, the user presents the approved certificate to the verifier 130. The verifier checks the package for its content and correctness in step 510 (checks the user signature and attributes) and decides what service to provide in step 512 where it grants access to the service in case of OK, i.e. after verifying that the provided certificate matches the server proof. This allows the user to reuse the same server proof from the government server with several different verifiers (service providers or relying parties). In particular, only the verifier / RP's challenge binds the user to the verifier / RP. Thus, the government server proof can be reused with several verifiers / RPs as long as the terms of use allow it.

[0054] With reference to FIG. 6, a method 600 for non-repudiable pre-approval of a private certificate via a mobile device is provided. The method 600 may include more or less steps than shown and is not limited to the order of steps shown. In discussing this method, reference will be made to other figures to show possible components. The method is shown in the context of a computing ecosystem in which a user with a connected device 100 requests a certificate provided by a PAP 110. Here, the user supplements the method steps 201-204 of FIG. 2 in conjunction with the communication of information provided to the PAP 110 to receive a digital certificate. This use case occurs when the PAP is unsure of the validity of the user's certificate request and wants to obtain assurance in the form of pre-approval by the issuing authority before releasing the certificate to the user. That is, the user must first seek out a signed server proof and send it back to the PAP 110 as a condition of receiving the certificate. This is necessary because the PAP 110 does not have a simple means of authenticating the user (requester) and wants to avoid handing the certificate over to an imposter. Thus, the PAP 110 requires reliance on the issuing authority as a condition for issuing a certificate.

[0055] In step 602, the user sends a request for a certificate (e.g., a diploma) to the PAP 110. The user receives a certificate from a private attribute provider (PAP) that includes attributes, corresponding attribute values, and a PAP challenge 604. However, in step 606, the PAP 110 requests pre-approval before adding a signature 388 to the certificate. Notably, the unsigned certificate 299 returned by the PAP 110 in step 606 does not include a signature. Rather, the PAP challenge 604 is included as signaling of pre-approval. Thus, the user cannot continue to use the certificate 299 as was done in method 200 because the PAP signature is not present in this step 606. Note that at this point, it is an "unsigned" certificate.

[0056] As done in method 200, method 600 now involves binding the user of the mobile device to the certificate. Thus, similarly, the user must first select a set of user authentication attribute names (critical attributes) from the attributes identified in the unsigned certificate 299, rather than attribute values. The user authenticates to the issuing authority 120 (see FIG. 2), generates the user's key pair including a public key (PuK) and a private key (PrK), and sends the public key (PuK) to the issuing authority. The issuing authority then binds the critical attributes to the equivalent attributes of the issuing authority. The user requests permission from the issuing authority via the mobile device to accept the unsigned certificate 299 (still lacking the PAP signature) based thereon, verifies the set of user authentication attribute names (critical attributes), and if verified, receives a signed server proof from the issuing authority. This is part of step 608 (Performing Pre-Authorization), which involves the mobile device aggregating the signed server proof with the PAP challenge to generate a pre-authorized blob, signing the pre-authorized blob with the private key (PrK) 102 to generate a mobile-signed pre-authorized blob, and presenting the mobile-signed pre-authorized blob to the PAP for authentication in step 610. Note that the hash (certificate) here is of the "unsigned" certificate.

[0057] In step 612, the PAP authenticates the pre-approved data package by checking the signature and hashed attributes of the mobile signed pre-approved blob (similar to the approved certificate 400, but including the PAP challenge 604 instead of the verifier challenge 342). If authenticated, the PAP sends a PAP signed certificate in step 614, including the PAP signature 388, which is received by the connected device 100. Note that the certificate is "signed" here. In this case, the certificate 300 is of the same format as the certificate in method 200 of FIG. 2, and the PAP optionally signs the certificate so that it now includes the PAP signature 388. In step 616, the mobile device reconstructs the approved certificate using the selected verifier challenge, as described / illustrated by method 500 of FIG. 5, i.e., reusing the server proof. Reconstructing the approved certificate involves aggregating the signed server proof with the verifier challenge to generate a verifier blob 620, signing the verifier blob with a private key (PrK) to generate a mobile signed blob 630, packaging the PAP-signed certificate with the mobile signed blob to generate an approved certificate, and presenting the approved certificate to the verifier to access services offered by the verifier.

[0058] Advantages provided by the embodiments herein include, but are not limited to: About the user: Easy to use certificates and simplified steps towards RP (no ID proof process) Privacy-enabled recognition that enhances the value of private certificates with reference attributes (see Figures 1 and 2) Possibility to use reference attributes from different sources (elDCard, cloud, direct input, etc.) Possibility to reuse the same Gov Server proof across multiple validators / RPs (see Figure 5) About the verifier / SP / RP: No need for costly ID proof (saves the cost of ID verification to RP) Strong non-repudiation of certificates, increasing the level of trust (see Figure 4A / B) About private attribute providers: No risk of spoofing or transferring the certificate to an unauthorized person Optional pre-approval to reduce the risk of "misdelivery" at no real additional cost Benefit from the invention by requiring pre-approval before signing a certificate (see Figure 6) About the issuing authority (government server): Governments do not have access to private certificate content (GDPR compliant) and are in no good position to verify it anyway The government does not reveal any attribute values ​​(after authenticating the user, the government simply provides a signature of a hash of selected attributes and a way to bind it to the user and document hashes) Proofs from governments may optionally carry terms of use and validity periods (see Figure 4B)

[0059] system In one embodiment, a system for non-repudiable acceptance of private certificates is provided. The system includes an issuing authority, a verifier, a private attribute provider (PAP), and a mobile device. The PAP provides a certificate including attributes and corresponding attribute values. A mobile device operated by a user binds the user to the certificate and binds the critical attributes to equivalent attributes of the issuing authority. In response to the binding, the mobile device aggregates a signed server proof received from the issuing authority and a verifier challenge from the verifier to generate a verifier blob, signs the verifier blob to generate a mobile-signed blob, packages the certificate with the mobile-signed blob to generate an approved certificate, and presents the approved certificate to the verifier to access a service provided by the verifier.

[0060] The mobile device binds the user to the certificate by collecting a set of user authentication attribute names, rather than attribute values, from attributes selected by the user. The mobile device authenticates the user to the issuing authority, generates a key pair for the user, including a public key (PuK) and a private key (PrK), and sends the public key (PuK) to the issuing authority. The mobile device binds the critical attributes to the equivalent attributes of the issuing authority by requesting permission from the issuing authority to approve the certificate based on it, and by verifying the set of user authentication attribute names. If verified, the mobile device receives a signed server proof from the issuing authority.

[0061] The issuing authority checks the validity of the user authentication attribute name set against its corresponding attribute values, and if valid, accepts the certificate along with the user authentication attribute name set and the hashed certificate and hashed public key. The issuing authority returns a signed server proof, or does not accept the certificate if it is not valid. The issuing authority signs the server proof to generate a signed server proof. The signed server proof includes the hashed certificate, the hash of the user authentication attribute name, the issuing authority challenge, and the hashed public key.

[0062] 7 illustrates an exemplary schematic diagram of a machine 700 in the form of a computer system 700, a set of instructions in which, when executed, may cause the machine to perform any one or more of the techniques discussed above (e.g., by the PAP 110, the issuing authority 120, or the service provider 130). In some embodiments, the machine operates as a standalone device, such as a computer, laptop, mobile device, remote control, or display. In some embodiments, the machine may be connected (e.g., using a network) to other machines. In a networked deployment, the machine may operate in a capacity as a server or client user machine in a server-client-user network environment, or as a peer machine in a peer-to-peer (or distributed) network environment.

[0063] The machine may include a server computer, a client user computer, a personal computer (PC), a tablet PC, a laptop computer, a desktop computer, a mobile device, a cell phone, a control system, a network router, a switch or bridge, or any machine capable of executing a set of instructions (sequential or otherwise) that specify actions to be taken by the machine. It will be understood that the devices of the present disclosure broadly include any electronic device that provides voice, video or data communications. Furthermore, although a single machine is illustrated, the term "machine" should also be considered to include a collection of machines that individually or collectively execute a set (or sets) of instructions to perform any one or more of the methodologies discussed herein.

[0064] The computer system 700 may include a processor 702 (e.g., a central processing unit (CPU), a graphics processing unit (GPU), or both), a main memory 704, and a static memory 706, which communicate with each other via a bus 708. The computer system 700 may further include a video display device 710 (e.g., a liquid crystal display or LCD), a flat panel, a solid state display, or a cathode ray tube (CRT). The computer system 700 may include input devices 712 (e.g., a keyboard, the touchless sensing unit 110), a cursor control device 714 (e.g., a mouse, the touchless sensing unit 110), a disk drive unit 716, a signal generating device 718 (e.g., a speaker or a remote control), and a network interface device 720.

[0065] The disk drive unit 716 includes a machine-readable medium 722 having stored thereon one or more sets of instructions (e.g., software 724) that embody any one or more of the techniques or functions described herein, including the methods described above. The instructions 724 may reside, completely or at least partially, within the main memory 704, the static memory 706, and / or the processor 702 during execution by the computer system 700. The main memory 704 and the processor 702 may also constitute machine-readable media.

[0066] Dedicated hardware implementations, including but not limited to application specific integrated circuits, programmable logic arrays, and other hardware devices, can also be constructed to implement the methods described herein. Applications that may include the apparatus and systems of the various embodiments broadly include various electronic and computer systems. Some embodiments implement functions in two or more specific interconnected hardware modules or devices, with associated control and data signals communicated between or through the modules, or as part of an application specific integrated circuit. Thus, this exemplary system is applicable to software, firmware, and hardware implementations.

[0067] According to various embodiments of the present disclosure, the methods described herein are intended to operate as software programs executed on a computer processor. Furthermore, software implementations include, but are not limited to, distributed processing or component / object distributed processing, parallel processing, or virtual machine processing can also be constructed to execute the methods described herein.

[0068] Although machine-readable medium 722 is shown as a single medium in the exemplary embodiment, the term "machine-readable medium" should be interpreted to include a single medium or multiple media (e.g., a centralized or distributed database and / or associated caches and servers) that store one or more sets of instructions. The term "machine-readable medium" should also be interpreted to include any medium that can store, encode, or carry a set of instructions for execution by a machine, causing the machine to perform any one or more of the techniques of this disclosure.

[0069] The term "machine-readable medium" shall therefore be deemed to include, but not be limited to, solid-state memory, such as a memory card or other package containing one or more read-only (non-volatile) memories, random access memories, or other re-writable (volatile) memories, magnetic-optical or optical media, such as disks or tapes, and carrier wave signals, such as signals embodied in computer instructions on a transmission medium, and / or digital file attachments to email or other self-contained information archive or archive set, shall be deemed to be distribution media equivalent to tangible storage media. The disclosure shall therefore be deemed to include any one or more of the machine-readable medium or distribution medium enumerated herein, including art-recognized equivalents and successor media on which the software implementation herein may be stored.

[0070] The illustrations of the embodiments described herein are intended to provide a general understanding of the structure of the various embodiments, and are not intended to serve as a complete description of all elements and features of devices and systems that may utilize the structures described herein. Many other embodiments will be apparent to those skilled in the art upon reviewing the above description. Other embodiments may be utilized and derived therefrom, with structural and logical substitutions and changes being made without departing from the scope of the present disclosure. The figures are also merely representative and may not be drawn to scale. Certain proportions thereof may be exaggerated, while others may be minimized. The specification and drawings are therefore to be regarded in an illustrative sense, and not in a restrictive sense.

[0071] Such embodiments of the inventive subject matter may be referred to herein, individually and / or collectively, under the term "invention" for convenience, without the intention of spontaneously limiting the scope of this application to any single invention or inventive concept when multiple inventions or inventive concepts are in fact disclosed. Thus, although specific embodiments have been illustrated and described herein, it should be understood that any configuration calculated to achieve the same purpose may be substituted for the specific embodiment shown. The present disclosure is intended to cover any adaptations or modifications of the various embodiments. Combinations of the above embodiments, as well as other embodiments not specifically described herein, will be apparent to those of skill in the art upon reviewing the above description.

[0072] Mobile Devices(110) In one embodiment, a mobile device for unrepudiable acceptance of private certificates is provided. The device may include a power source for providing power, a memory for storing instructions and data, a communication module for transmitting and receiving data, a display for presenting information and receiving user input, and a processor for executing a computer program. The computer program includes a non-transitory computer-readable medium storing program code executed by at least one central processing unit (CPU) in a computing environment, where execution of the program code causes the at least one CPU to perform operations including receiving a certificate including attributes and corresponding attribute values ​​from a private attribute provider (PAP), binding a user of the mobile device to the certificate, and binding a critical attribute of the attribute to a comparable attribute of an issuing authority.

[0073] Binding the user includes collecting a set of user authentication attribute names, rather than attribute values, from attributes selected by the user via the display, authenticating the user to the issuing authority, generating and storing in memory a key pair for the user including a public key (PuK) and a private key (PrK), transmitting the public key (PuK) to the issuing authority via the communication module, requesting the issuing authority permission to approve the certificate based thereon, and verifying the set of user authentication attribute names. If verified, it includes receiving a signed server proof from the issuing authority, aggregating the signed server proof and a verifier challenge to generate a verifier blob, signing the verifier blob with the private key (PrK) to generate a mobile signature blob, packaging the certificate with the mobile signature blob to generate an approved certificate, and presenting the approved certificate to the verifier to access services provided by the verifier.

[0074] 8 illustrates a hardware platform 800 suitable for use as or within a computing environment for executing the aforementioned method steps of the connected device 100. The platform 800 includes a processor 810, memory 820, and security 830, sensors 240, a communication module illustrated as a wired interface 850 and / or a wireless interface, a power source 870, a battery 875, and a user interface (UI) 880. These components may be communicatively coupled as illustrated in the figure or where appropriate by direct hardware interfaces therebetween, including but not limited to electronics, circuits, wiring, lines, logic, or gates.

[0075] The processor 810 may include one or more data processing circuits, such as general-purpose and / or special-purpose processors, e.g., microprocessors and / or digital signal processors (e.g., GPUs, □Ps, ASICs, DSPs, CPLDs, ICs, etc.). The processor 810 is configured to execute computer program code in the memory 820, described below as a non-transitory computer-readable medium, to perform at least some of the operations described herein as being performed by particular components, modules, or software blocks. The computer program code may include computer instructions, assembly code, firmware, or embedded code, machine code, that, when executed by the processor 810, causes the processor 810 to perform operations according to one or more embodiments disclosed herein.

[0076] Specific examples (non-exhaustive list) of computer-readable storage media exemplified by memory 820 may include a hard disk, a random access memory (RAM), a read-only memory (ROM), an erasable programmable read-only memory (EPROM), a flash memory (NAND, NOR), a solid-state device (SSD), a suitable optical fiber with repeaters (FICON), an optical storage device, a magnetic storage device, or any suitable combination of the foregoing.

[0077] The processor 810 may also be communicatively attached to a coprocessor 811 (on-board or off-board) that assists in offloading computational or processing tasks, one or more CPU cores 812, and one or more cryptographic processors 813 (e.g., HW cryptographic accelerators).

[0078] The sensors 840 can detect or measure physical properties and record, indicate, or respond to sensory information. The sensors 840 measure temperature, humidity, radio frequency, electromagnetic, light, force, pressure, acceleration, motion, position, tilt, and other physical interactions and environmental conditions. The sensors 840 may also include signal comparators, phase comparators, analog-to-digital converters, amplifiers, signal filters, etc., that enable the processor 810 to receive and process signals from one or more sensors.

[0079] Security module 830 monitors for security violations, security risks, misuse, and attacks on platform 800. Security module 830 may be a mixed-signal low-power microcontroller with decision logic, memory, or software that is communicatively coupled to sensors 840 and processor 810. Security module 830 may include software and logic or share resources and responsibilities with processor 810 to detect security events, such as tamper levels, thresholds, and conditions.

[0080] The platform 800 may include a wired network communication interface 850 and / or a wireless interface 860, such as a wireless access communication transceiver. The wired network interface may include standard computer networking interfaces used in local area networks (LANs), wide area networks (WANs), over the cloud, the Internet, and other frame-based or packet-based networks. The Ethernet interface may use TCP / IP and UDP protocols for 10 / 100 / 1000 Mbps transmission over standard Cat5, Cat5e, or Cat6 cables. The wireless access communication transceiver may include, but is not limited to, an LTE or other cellular transceiver, a WLAN transceiver (IEEE 802.11), a WiMAX transceiver, a Bluetooth transceiver, an NFC transceiver, a radio frequency identification (RFID), or other wireless communication transceiver configured to communicate directly or indirectly with a network node (e.g., via a wireless access node).

[0081] The platform 800 may include a user interface (UI) communications (COMM) module 880, such as electronic data exchange or general purpose communications, such as a universal serial bus (USB), an RS-232 serial port, a smart card reader, a graphical user interface (GUI), a light emitting diode (LED), or other user related I / O interface.

[0082] Power supply 870 may include regulators and converters to power and provide the necessary voltage and current requirements for the electronic components of platform 800. Battery 875 may also provide power when needed, for example, in low power modes or for security reasons, such as to maintain protected memory contents.

[0083] Further definitions and embodiments: Consumers are increasingly using mobile devices for various uses of electronic signatures, such as securely storing and using credit cards to authorize credit card transactions. The idea of ​​using mobile phones as identity management devices has been proposed before. In such a configuration, the key authentication process may depend on the service provider (SP) performing a series of steps that result in an X.509 certificate chain that traces the device's provenance back to a certificate authority. However, individual phones are not fully trusted, so a common trusted approach is needed in the industry. The protocol for authorizing private certificates described here could be a strong differentiator for the use of attributes on mobile devices. It is applicable to a variety of businesses, including mobile wallets, CNIe, MultiAppvX, mobile ID, e-ID, mobile wallets, ISO IEC23220 on building blocks for mobile ID from the ISO SC17 WG4 committee. CNIe is carte nationale idetentite electronicique, a French digital ID based on a physical card.

[0084] Device authentication allows organizations to know the security state of a device attempting to connect to a network app or workspace. The purpose of authentication is to provide trusted evidence or proof of something. Identity authentication allows a device to prove its hardware identifiers, such as serial number or IMEI. The concept of device authentication may be applied to the user or owner of the device as well. For example, in the case of a cybersecurity ecosystem, this would imply that relying parties (RPs), such as banks or cloud providers, can be confident about the data they are receiving from the device, e.g. user documentation related to the identity of the user presenting the device.

[0085] In the above description of various embodiments of the present disclosure, aspects of the present disclosure may be illustrated and described herein in any of a number of patentable classes or contexts, including any new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof. Accordingly, aspects of the present disclosure may be embodied in entirely hardware, entirely software (including firmware, resident software, microcode, etc.), or a combination of software and hardware implementations, all of which may be generally referred to herein as "circuits," "modules," "components," or "systems." Furthermore, aspects of the present disclosure may take the form of a computer program product including one or more computer-readable media having computer-readable program code embodied thereon.

[0086] Any combination of one or more computer readable media may be used. The computer readable medium may be a computer readable signal medium or a computer readable storage medium. The computer readable storage medium may be, for example, but not limited to, an electronic, magnetic, optical, electromagnetic, or semiconductor system, apparatus, or device, or any suitable combination of the foregoing. In the context of this document, a computer readable storage medium may be any tangible medium that can store or retain a program for use by or in connection with an instruction execution system, apparatus, or device.

[0087] A computer-readable signal medium may include a propagated data signal in which computer-readable program code is embodied, for example, in baseband or as part of a carrier wave. Such a propagated signal may take any of a variety of forms, including, but not limited to, electrical, magnetic, optical, or any suitable combination thereof. A computer-readable signal medium is not a computer-readable storage medium, but may be any computer-readable medium that can communicate, propagate, or transport a program by or in association with an instruction execution system, apparatus, or device. The program code embodied on a computer-readable signal medium may be transmitted using any suitable medium, including, but not limited to, wireless, wired, fiber optic cable, RF, or the like, or any suitable combination of the foregoing.

[0088] Computer program code for carrying out operations for aspects of the present disclosure may be written in any combination of one or more programming languages, including object-oriented programming languages ​​such as Java, Scala, Smalltalk, Scheme, Go, C++, C#, VB.NET, Python, the "C" programming language, traditional procedural programming languages ​​such as Perl, PHP, dynamic programming languages ​​such as Python, Ruby and Groovy, or other programming languages. The program code may run completely on the user's computer, partially on the user's computer, as a standalone software package, partially on the user's computer and partially on a remote computer, completely on a remote computer or server, or in a cloud or other computer network. In the latter scenario, the remote computer may be connected to the user's computer through any type of network, including a local area network (LAN) or a wide area network (WAN), or the connection may be to an external computer (e.g., through the Internet using an Internet Service Provider), or in a cloud computing environment, or provided as a service, such as Software as a Service (SaaS), Backend as a Service (BaaS) for connecting mobile apps to cloud-based services, and Security as a Service (SECaas).

[0089] Aspects of the present disclosure are described herein with reference to flowchart illustrations and / or block diagrams of methods, apparatus (systems), and computer program products according to embodiments of the present disclosure. It will be understood that each block of the flowchart illustrations and / or block diagrams, and combinations of blocks in the flowchart illustrations and / or block diagrams, can be implemented by computer program instructions. These computer program instructions may be provided to a processor of a general purpose computer, special purpose computer, or other programmable data processing apparatus to generate a machine such that the instructions, executed via the processor of the computer or other programmable instruction execution device, create mechanisms for implementing the function / act specified in the block or blocks of the flowchart illustrations and / or block diagrams.

[0090] These computer program instructions may also be stored on a computer-readable medium and, when executed, may direct a computer, other programmable data processing apparatus, or other device to function in a particular manner, such that when stored on a computer-readable medium, the instructions, when executed, produce a product including instructions that cause a computer to implement the function / acts specified in the block or blocks of the flowcharts and / or block diagrams. The computer program instructions may also be loaded into a computer, other programmable instruction execution apparatus, or other device to cause a series of operational steps to be performed on the computer, other programmable apparatus, or other device to produce a computer-implemented process, such that the instructions executing on the computer or other programmable apparatus provide a process for implementing the function / acts specified in the block or blocks of the flowcharts and / or block diagrams.

[0091] It should be understood that the terms used herein are for the purpose of describing specific embodiments only and are not intended to limit the present invention. Unless otherwise defined, all terms used herein (including technical and scientific terms) have the same meaning as commonly understood by those skilled in the art to which this disclosure belongs. It will be further understood that terms such as those defined in commonly used dictionaries should be interpreted to have a meaning consistent with their meaning in the light of this specification and related art, and should not be interpreted in an ideal or overly formal sense unless expressly defined in this specification.

[0092] The flowcharts and block diagrams in the figures illustrate the architecture, functionality, and operation of possible implementations of systems, methods, and computer program products according to various aspects of the disclosure. In this regard, each block in the flowcharts or block diagrams may represent a module, segment, or portion of code, including one or more executable instructions for implementing a specified logical function. It should also be noted that in some alternative implementations, the functions described in the blocks may occur out of the order described in the figures. For example, two blocks shown in succession may in fact be executed substantially simultaneously, or the blocks may be executed in the reverse order, depending on the functionality involved. It should also be noted that each block of the block diagrams and / or flowchart diagrams, as well as combinations of blocks in the block diagrams and / or flowchart diagrams, may be implemented by a dedicated hardware-based system that performs a particular function or function, or a combination of dedicated hardware and computer instructions.

[0093] The terms used herein are for the purpose of describing particular aspects only and are not intended to be limiting of the disclosure. As used herein, the singular forms "a", "an" and "the" are intended to include the plural unless the context clearly indicates otherwise. It will be further understood that as used herein, the terms "comprise" and / or "comprising" specify the presence of the stated features, integers, steps, operations, elements, and / or components, but do not preclude the presence or addition of one or more other features, integers, steps, operations, elements, components, and / or groups thereof. As used herein, the term "and / or" includes any and all combinations of one or more of the associated listed items. Like reference numbers refer to like elements throughout the description of the figures.

[0094] The corresponding structures, materials, acts, and equivalents of any means or steps and functional elements in the following claims are intended to include any disclosed structures, materials, or acts to perform a function in combination with other claimed elements, specifically as claimed. The description of the present disclosure has been presented for purposes of illustration and description, and is not intended to be exhaustive or limited to the disclosure in the disclosed form. Many modifications and variations will be apparent to those skilled in the art without departing from the scope and spirit of the present disclosure. The aspects of the disclosure herein have been selected and described in order to best explain the principles and practical applications of the present disclosure, and to enable those skilled in the art to understand the present disclosure with various modifications suited to the particular use contemplated.

Claims

1. A method (200) for unrepudiable authentication of private certificates, the method comprising: receiving (202) a certificate (111) from a private attribute provider (PAP) that includes attributes (303) with corresponding attribute names and attribute values, and an optional PAP signature (304); The method further comprising: Binding (407) the user of the connected device (100) to said certificate (111), Collecting a set of user authentication attribute names (302) from the attributes (302) selected by the user; authenticating said user to an issuing authority (120); generating a key pair for said user, consisting of a public key (PuK) and a private key (PrK) (102); Transmitting said public key (PuK) to said issuing authority (120). and Binding (408) the critical attributes (302) to equivalent attributes of said issuing authority, requesting the issuing authority to authorize the user and approve the certificate accordingly; Verifying the set of user authentication attribute names (302); If verified, receiving a signed server proof (360) from the issuing authority; The method is characterized by being carried out by

2. aggregating the signed server proof (360) with a verifier challenge (342) to generate a verifier blob (340); signing said verifier blob (340) with said private key (PrK) (102) to generate a mobile signed blob; packaging said certificate (111) with said mobile signed blob (320) to generate an approved certificate (400); and 2. The method of claim 1, further comprising presenting the approved certificate to a verifier to access a service offered by the verifier.

3. The step of binding the critical attributes, the issuing authority: checking 210 the validity of the set of user authentication attribute names against equivalent corresponding attribute values; if valid, accepting the certificate along with the set of user authentication attribute names and the hashed certificate and hashed public key; Returning the signed server proof (212); otherwise performing the step of not accepting the certificate if it is not valid; 2. The method of claim 1, wherein the approving comprises signing the server proof to generate the signed server proof including the hashed certificate (370), a hash of the user authentication attribute name (371), an issuing authority challenge (372), and the hashed public key (373).

4. The approved certificate (400) said certificate (300) and, optionally, said PAP signature (304); the mobile signed blob (320); The mobile signed blob (320), A connecting device signs on the verifier blob using a private key (PrK); the verifier blob (340); The verifier blob (340), the verifier challenge (372); and the signed server proof (360); The signed server proof (360) the hashed certificate (370); and the hash of the user authentication attribute name (373); and The issuing authority challenge (342); and The hashed public key (373); and and an issuing authority signature (322).

5. 5. The method of claim 4, wherein approving the certificate together with the set of user authentication attribute names and the hashed certificate and hashed public key binds (407) the user to the key pair of the connected device, thereby preventing the user from repudiating the connected device signature.

6. 3. The method of claim 2, wherein the step of checking validity (210) comprises authenticating the user authentication attribute name against a civil registry, an identity card registry, an administrative registry, or any source of pre-registered information for connected device authentication of a user of the connected device.

7. 2. The method of claim 1, wherein the access to the service confers a right or privilege to a user of a device holding the device key, and the certificate further includes a purpose for which the attribute is used to limit the access by the PAP, the purpose in the certificate including terms of use, expiration dates, or other conditional measures for using the approved certificate.

8. 2. The method of claim 1, further comprising including in the issuing authority challenge terms of use, an expiration date, or other conditional measures to limit use of the approved certificate by the issuing authority.

9. A method (600) for non-repudiable pre-approval of a private certificate via a connected device (100), the method comprising: receiving an unsigned certificate (299) from a private attribute provider (PAP) (110), the method further comprising: the certificate includes attributes, corresponding attribute names and values, and a PAP challenge (604); Binding (602) a user of the connected device to the certificate; Collecting a set of user authentication attribute names from the attributes selected by the user; authenticating the user to an issuing authority; generating a key pair for said user, said key pair including a public key (PuK) and a private key (PrK); Transmitting said public key (PuK) to said issuing authority. and Binding (608) the critical attributes to equivalent attributes of the issuing authority; requesting permission from the issuing authority to approve the certificate thereon; Verifying the set of user authentication attribute names; If verified, receiving a signed server proof from the issuing authority; aggregating the signed server proof with the PAP challenge to generate a pre-approved blob; signing the pre-approved blob with the private key to generate a mobile-signed pre-approved blob; The mobile device presents (610) the signed pre-approved blob (630) to the PAP (110) for authentication, and if authenticated (612), Receive (614) the PAP signed (388) certificate (300); Reconstructing (616) the approved certificate (400) with the verifier challenge (342) The method (600) is characterized by being performed by:

10. the step of reconstructing the approved certificate comprises: aggregating the signed server proof with the verifier challenge to generate a verifier blob (630); signing the verifier blob with the private key (PrK) to generate a mobile signed blob; packaging said PAP signed certificate (300) with said mobile signed blob (630) to generate an approved certificate (400); and 10. The method of claim 9, further comprising presenting the approved certificate to the verifier to access a service offered by the verifier.

11. 1. A system for non-repudiable authentication of private certificates, comprising: An issuing authority (120); A verifier (130); a Private Attribute Provider (PAP) (110) that provides a certificate (400) that includes attributes and corresponding attribute values; and a connection device (100) operated by a user, the connection device further comprising: Binding the user to the certificate; Binding the critical attributes to equivalent attributes of said issuing authority; In response to said binding, aggregating a signed server proof received from the issuing authority with a verifier challenge from the verifier to generate a verifier blob; signing the verifier blob to generate a mobile signed blob; packaging the certificate with the mobile signed blob to generate an approved certificate; The system further comprises: presenting the approved certificate to the verifier to access a service provided by the verifier.

12. The connected device binding the user to the certificate. Collecting a set of user authentication attribute names, rather than attribute values, from the attributes selected by the user; authenticating the user to the issuing authority; generating a key pair for said user, said key pair including a public key (PuK) and a private key (PrK); Send the public key (PuK) to the issuing authority. The system of claim 11 , wherein the system is performed by:

13. said connected device binding a critical attribute to an equivalent attribute of said issuing authority; requesting permission from the issuing authority to approve the certificate thereon; Verifying the set of user authentication attribute names; If verified, receiving the signed server proof from the issuing authority; The system of claim 12, wherein the system is performed by:

14. The issuing authority: checking the validity of said set of user authentication attribute names against its corresponding attribute values; If valid, accepting the certificate along with the set of user authentication attribute names and the hashed certificate and hashed public key; return the signed server proof, or not accepting said certificate if it is not valid; 14. The system of claim 13, wherein the issuing authority signs the server proof to generate the signed server proof, the signed server proof including the hashed certificate, a hash of the user authentication attribute name, an issuing authority challenge, and the hashed public key.

15. A connection device (100) for undeniable authentication of private certificates, comprising: A power supply (870) for supplying power; A memory (820) for storing instructions and data; A communication module (850) for transmitting and receiving data; a display (880) for presenting information and receiving user input; A processor (810) for executing a computer program; The computer program comprises a non-transitory computer readable medium storing program code for execution by at least one central processing unit (CPU) in a computing environment, execution of the program code causing the at least one CPU to perform operations including receiving a certificate including attributes and corresponding attribute values ​​from a private attribute provider (PAP); and Binding a user of the connected device to the certificate; collecting a set of user authentication attribute names, rather than attribute values, from the attributes selected by the user via the display; authenticating the user to an issuing authority; generating and storing in said memory a key pair for said user, said key pair including a public key (PuK) and a private key (PrK); transmitting said public key (PuK) to said issuing authority via said communication module; and Binding critical attributes of said attributes to equivalent attributes of the issuing authority; requesting permission from the issuing authority to approve the certificate thereon; Verifying the set of user authentication attribute names; If verified, receiving a signed server proof from the issuing authority; aggregating the signed server proof with a verifier challenge to generate a verifier blob; signing the verifier blob with the private key (PrK) to generate a mobile signed blob; packaging the certificate with the mobile signed blob to generate an approved certificate; Presenting the approved certificate to a verifier to access services offered by the verifier. A connection device (100) characterized by:

Citation Information

Patent Citations

  • System and method for providing reliability to meta- information

    JP2003248737A

  • Authentication authority transfer system, information terminal, token issuing station, service providing device, authentication authority transfer method, and program

    JP2013175040A

  • Access control system, and program

    JP2016051451A

  • Identity Attribute Exchange and Validation Ecosystem

    US20140173697A1

  • Electronic Identity and Credentialing System

    US20150095999A1