Data sharing methods and systems for intelligent connected roads

Abstract

We provide data sharing methods and systems for intelligent connected roads. [Solution] The method includes the target vehicle responding to area control trigger information, transmitting an encryption key to the roadside unit RSU via a control channel, transmitting the control radius and encrypted first position coordinates to the RSU via a data channel, the RSU verifying the encryption key of the control channel, performing a control area zero-knowledge proof, generating a corresponding zero-knowledge proof packet, and then transmitting the zero-knowledge proof packet to non-target vehicles around the control area, and the non-target vehicle generating a position commitment based on the non-target vehicle's second position coordinates, further performing a zero-knowledge proof based on the position commitment and the zero-knowledge proof packet, generating a corresponding zero-knowledge proof result, and if the zero-knowledge proof result indicates that the non-target vehicle has entered the control area, triggering a driving operation to automatically avoid the control area.

Description

[Technical Field]

[0001] This application relates to the field of communications technology, and more particularly to a data sharing method and system for intelligent connected roads. [Background technology]

[0002] Intelligent Connected Roads (Smart Road Infrastructure) are a specific area centered on upgrading road infrastructure to make it smarter, enabling real-time communication between vehicles (connected vehicles, autonomous vehicles) and other road users. Through the introduction of sensors, communication devices, and edge computing units, the aim is to achieve comprehensive sensing of the road environment, information exchange, and collaborative control, thereby improving traffic efficiency, safety, and service levels.

[0003] At automotive testing grounds, the deep integration of vehicle-road cooperation technology and edge computing has made intelligent connected data sharing systems a crucial infrastructure for supporting advanced autonomous driving tests and vehicle performance verification. This system enables high-precision vehicle positioning, holographic intersection detection, dynamic path planning, and multi-vehicle cooperation through real-time data exchange between roadside sensing devices, in-vehicle terminals, and cloud control platforms. Its typical architecture relies on edge computing nodes locally aggregating and processing large amounts of vehicle trajectory and status information, providing low-latency, highly reliable cooperation and support for various test vehicles within the testing grounds, and has become the mainstream model for current intelligent connected testing ground construction.

[0004] For example, in certain test scenarios such as autonomous driving hazard scenario simulations and functional tests requiring high safety levels, the requirements for intelligent connected data sharing systems in some target test vehicles (e.g., simulated hazardous materials transport vehicles and high-value test platforms) are becoming more stringent. Specifically, in special parts transport scenarios such as hazardous materials transport and cash transport, the special requirements for intelligent connected road systems in special vehicles (i.e., target vehicles described later) are becoming more stringent. First, a high degree of confidentiality of real-time position coordinates is required to protect against potential security threats. In addition, such vehicles need to enforce the maintenance of a dynamic safety distance (e.g., a radius of 200 meters) from surrounding general vehicles to minimize the risk of accidents due to collisions or interference.

[0005] However, data sharing solutions commonly used in current test sites have architectural limitations and are not suitable for the high-security test scenarios described above. Centralized geofencing solutions violate the principle of minimizing privacy because the trajectories of both specialized and general vehicles are exposed, as vehicles upload raw location data to the edge cloud and the platform calculates geofences before issuing commands. In V2V broadcast solutions, the center coordinates are transmitted in plain text, making them interceptable by software-defined radio devices, allowing attackers to further reverse-locate general vehicles based on their evasive maneuvers. As these shortcomings demonstrate, conventional technologies have problems achieving reliable and secure collaboration that can meet high privacy requirements, making the development of new data sharing methods for intelligent connected roads an urgent task. [Overview of the project]

[0006] This invention provides a data sharing method and system for intelligent connected roads to address the challenge that conventional intelligent connected road data sharing solutions cannot achieve reliable and secure collaboration that meets high privacy protection requirements.

[0007] In a first aspect, in the embodiment of the present application, the target vehicle generates an encryption key in response to area control trigger information, obtains the control radius of the corresponding control area, encrypts the first position coordinates of the target vehicle using the encryption key, transmits the encryption key to the roadside unit RSU through the control channel, and transmits the control radius and the encrypted first position coordinates to the RSU through the data channel. The RSU verifies the encryption key of the control channel, and after successful verification of the encryption key, performs a control area zero-knowledge proof based on the control radius and the encrypted first position coordinates of the data channel, generates a corresponding zero-knowledge proof packet, transmits the zero-knowledge proof packet to non-target vehicles around the control area, and the zero-knowledge proof packet indicates that a control area exists with the control radius as its radius and the encrypted first position coordinates as its center. The present invention provides a data sharing method for intelligent connected roads, which includes: any of the non-target vehicles generating a position commitment based on the second position coordinates of the non-target vehicle; further performing a zero-knowledge proof based on the position commitment and the zero-knowledge proof packet to generate a corresponding zero-knowledge proof result; and if the zero-knowledge proof result indicates that the non-target vehicle has entered the control area, triggering a driving operation to automatically avoid the control area.

[0008] In one selectable embodiment of the present invention, the target vehicle generating an encryption key in response to area control trigger information means that, upon receiving the area control trigger information, the target vehicle generates an entropy source using an on-board quantum chip and obtains a first encryption key by hash extraction. Obtain the current timestamp, perform a hash chain calculation using the first encryption key, the current timestamp, and the hash value of the previous first encryption key, and obtain the second encryption key. This includes performing an identity-based signature on the second cryptographic key and obtaining the cryptographic key.

[0009] In one selectable embodiment of the present application, the RSU verifying the cryptographic key of the control channel includes: extracting a timestamp in the cryptographic key and performing validity verification on the cryptographic key based on the timestamp; extracting the previous first cryptographic key in the cryptographic key and performing hash chain sequential verification on the cryptographic key based on the previous first cryptographic key; and extracting the identity signature and verifying the identity signature using a pre-configured public key. If the validity verification is successful, the hash chain sequential verification is successful, and the identity signature is valid, then the verification of the cryptographic key is successful.

[0010] In one selectable embodiment of the present application, obtaining the control radius of the corresponding control area is equivalent to obtaining the basic control radius of the control area based on the road type. Based on the actual vehicle speed, lateral acceleration, and load type, the dynamic control radius of the control area is obtained, This includes obtaining the control radius of the control area based on the basic control radius and the dynamic control radius.

[0011] In one selectable embodiment of the present application, the dynamic control radius is

number

[0012] In one selectable embodiment of the present application, implementing the zero-knowledge proof of the control area based on the control radius of the data channel and the ciphertext of the encrypted first position coordinate includes converting the control radius and the ciphertext of the encrypted first position coordinate into symbolized variables that can be processed by the zero-knowledge proof of the control area, based on the symbolized variables, constructing the constraints of the control area, obtaining the corresponding R1CS constraint system, and the R1CS constraint system indicating that the position of any of the non-target vehicles is outside the control area, based on the R1CS constraint system, performing proof calculation by the Groth16 protocol, generating three points on the elliptic curve, and generating the zero-knowledge proof packet based on the three points on the elliptic curve and the control radius.

[0013] In one selectable embodiment of the present application, implementing the zero-knowledge proof based on the position commitment and the zero-knowledge proof packet includes performing verification by bilinear pairing based on the position commitment and the three points on the elliptic curve in the zero-knowledge proof packet, and if the verification is successful, indicating that the non-target vehicle has not invaded the control area, and if the verification fails, indicating that the non-target vehicle has invaded the control area.

[0014] In a second aspect, an embodiment of the present invention includes a control area generation module for a target vehicle to generate an encryption key in response to area control trigger information, obtain the control radius of the corresponding control area, encrypt the first position coordinates of the target vehicle using the encryption key, transmit the encryption key to a roadside unit RSU through a control channel, and transmit the control radius and the encrypted first position coordinates to the RSU through a data channel, The RSU verifies the encryption key of the control channel, and after successful verification of the encryption key, performs a control area zero-knowledge proof based on the control radius of the data channel and the encrypted ciphertext of the first position coordinates, generates a corresponding zero-knowledge proof packet, transmits the zero-knowledge proof packet to non-target vehicles around the control area, and the zero-knowledge proof packet indicates that a control area exists with the control radius as its radius and the encrypted first position coordinates as its center, and the RSU verifies the encryption key of the control channel, and after successful verification of the encryption key, performs a control area zero-knowledge proof proof based on the control radius of the data channel and the encrypted first position coordinates as its center, and the RSU verifies the encryption key of the control channel, and the RSU verifies the encryption key of the control channel, and after successful verification of the encryption key, performs a control area zero-knowledge proof proof based on the control radius of the data channel and the encrypted ciphertext of the first position coordinates, and generates a corresponding zero-knowledge proof packet, and transmits the zero-knowledge proof packet to non-target vehicles around the control area, and the RSU verifies the encryption key of the control area zero-knowledge proof packet The system provides a data sharing system for intelligent connected roads, which includes a control area intrusion verification module for any of the non-target vehicles to generate a position commitment based on the second position coordinates of the non-target vehicle, and further performs a zero-knowledge proof based on the position commitment and the zero-knowledge proof packet to generate a corresponding zero-knowledge proof result, and if the zero-knowledge proof result indicates that the non-target vehicle has entered the control area, it triggers a driving operation to automatically avoid the control area.

[0015] In one selectable embodiment of the present invention, the target vehicle generating an encryption key in response to area control trigger information means that, upon receiving the area control trigger information, the target vehicle generates an entropy source using an on-board quantum chip and obtains a first encryption key by hash extraction. Obtain the current timestamp, perform a hash chain calculation using the first encryption key, the current timestamp, and the hash value of the previous first encryption key, and obtain the second encryption key. This includes performing an identity-based signature on the second cryptographic key and obtaining the cryptographic key.

[0016] In one selectable embodiment of the present application, the RSU verifying the cryptographic key of the control channel includes: extracting a timestamp in the cryptographic key and performing validity verification on the cryptographic key based on the timestamp; extracting the previous first cryptographic key in the cryptographic key and performing hash chain sequential verification on the cryptographic key based on the previous first cryptographic key; and extracting the identity signature and verifying the identity signature using a pre-configured public key. If the validity verification is successful, the hash chain sequential verification is successful, and the identity signature is valid, then the verification of the cryptographic key is successful.

[0017] In one selectable embodiment of the present application, obtaining the control radius of the corresponding control area is equivalent to obtaining the basic control radius of the control area based on the road type. Based on the actual vehicle speed, lateral acceleration, and load type, the dynamic control radius of the control area is obtained, This includes obtaining the control radius of the control area based on the basic control radius and the dynamic control radius.

[0018] In one selectable embodiment of the present application, the dynamic control radius is

number

number

[0019] In one selectable embodiment of the present application, performing a control area zero-knowledge proof based on the control radius and the encrypted first position coordinates of the data channel involves converting the control radius and the encrypted first position coordinates into a symbolized variable that can be processed by a control area zero-knowledge proof, Based on the aforementioned symbolized variables, constraints for the control area are constructed, and the corresponding R1CS constraint system is obtained, which indicates that the position of any of the non-target vehicles is outside the control area. This includes performing a proof calculation using the Growth16 protocol based on the R1CS constraint system, generating three points on an elliptic curve, and generating the zero-knowledge proof packet based on the three points on the elliptic curve and the control radius.

[0020] In a third aspect, the present invention further provides an electronic device comprising memory, a processor, and a computer program stored in the memory and executable on the processor, wherein the processor enables any of the above-described data sharing methods for intelligent connected roads when executing the program.

[0021] In a fourth aspect, the present invention further provides a non-temporary computer-readable storage medium on which a computer program is stored, which enables any of the above-described data sharing methods for intelligent connected roads when the computer program is executed by a processor.

[0022] In a fifth aspect, the present invention further provides a computer program product including a computer program, which, when the computer program is executed by a processor, enables any of the above-described data sharing methods for intelligent connected roads.

[0023] According to the present invention, a target vehicle generates an encryption key in response to area control trigger information, obtains the control radius of the corresponding control area, encrypts the first position coordinates of the target vehicle using the encryption key, transmits the encryption key to a roadside unit RSU through a control channel, and transmits the control radius and the encrypted first position coordinates to the RSU through a data channel. The RSU verifies the encryption key in the control channel, and after successful verification of the encryption key, performs a control area zero-knowledge proof based on the ciphertext of the control radius and the encrypted first position coordinates in the data channel, generates a corresponding zero-knowledge proof packet, and transmits the zero-knowledge proof packet to non-target vehicles around the control area. Any of the non-target vehicles generates a position commitment based on the second position coordinates of the non-target vehicle, and further performs a zero-knowledge proof based on the position commitment and the zero-knowledge proof packet, generates a corresponding zero-knowledge proof result, and if the zero-knowledge proof result indicates that the non-target vehicle has entered the control area, it triggers a driving operation to automatically avoid the control area. This invention enables reliable and secure cooperation that meets high privacy protection requirements by performing zero-knowledge proofs and verification based on the encrypted first position coordinates of the target vehicle during the data sharing process of roadway cooperation, while ensuring that non-target vehicles avoid the control area of ​​the target vehicle, and by never disclosing the position coordinates of the target vehicle. [Brief explanation of the drawing]

[0024] To provide a clearer explanation of the invention in this application or the prior art, the following is a brief introduction of the drawings necessary for describing the examples or the prior art. The drawings described below are some examples of the present application, and it is understood that those skilled in the art can obtain other drawings based on these drawings without requiring any special ingenuity. [Figure 1] This is a flowchart of the data sharing method for intelligent connected roads provided in this application. [Figure 2] This is a structural block diagram of the data sharing system for intelligent connected roads provided in this application. [Figure 3] This is a diagram illustrating the structure of the electronic device provided in this application. [Modes for carrying out the invention]

[0025] The embodiments of the present invention will be described clearly and completely below with reference to the drawings of the embodiments. It should be understood that the embodiments described below do not cover all embodiments, but only a selection of embodiments. All other embodiments that a person skilled in the art could make without ingenuity based on the embodiments of the present invention are included within the scope of protection of the present invention.

[0026] The intelligent connected road data sharing method provided in the embodiment of this application is realized by relying on the intelligent connected road vehicle cooperation system. Participants in this system include vehicles traveling on the road, RSUs (Road Side Units), various sensors, and communication equipment. The embodiment of this application mainly focuses on communication between vehicles and RSUs, and the data processing processes of the vehicles and RSUs themselves. In the embodiment of this application, the intelligent connected road data sharing solution ensures absolute anonymity of target vehicles (no leakage of information such as location, vehicle type, and mission) while requiring surrounding non-target vehicles to take automatic evasive action and maintain a safe distance, thereby achieving both privacy protection and safe cooperation. The invention will be described in detail below.

[0027] Figure 1 is a flowchart of a data sharing method for intelligent connected roads provided in this application. As shown in Figure 1, this method may include the following steps.

[0028] Step S101: The target vehicle generates an encryption key in response to area control trigger information, obtains the control radius of the corresponding control area, encrypts the first position coordinates of the target vehicle using the encryption key, transmits the encryption key to the roadside unit RSU through the control channel, and transmits the control radius and the encrypted first position coordinates to the RSU through the data channel.

[0029] Here, a target vehicle refers to a vehicle that needs to maintain a certain distance from other vehicles, i.e., a vehicle that requires the establishment of a control area, and is usually intended to ensure the safety of the target vehicle or to avoid risks to the surrounding area caused by the target vehicle. Examples include vehicles transporting dangerous goods, vehicles transporting valuables, and vehicles carrying special VIPs, and all of these vehicles can be target vehicles in the embodiments of this application. On the other hand, vehicles that are driving normally and do not require the establishment of a control area are non-target vehicles in the embodiments of this application. For example, if the target vehicle is a vehicle transporting valuables, it is desirable to ensure the safety of the valuables by ensuring that there are no other vehicles in a certain area (i.e., a control area) around the target vehicle through road cooperation, while also ensuring that the specific location of the target vehicle is not known to other vehicles, thus achieving safe road cooperation while concealing the target vehicle.

[0030] The control area refers to an area centered on the target vehicle and with a control radius, which is set up in the embodiment of this application to isolate the target vehicle from the non-target vehicle. The data sharing solution in the embodiment of this application prevents the non-target vehicle from entering and driving within the control area. Naturally, the control area may be a planar area or a spatial area, and in complex spatial sections (e.g., elevated sections), the control area may be a spatial area. In the embodiment of this application, the control area is described as a planar area, but the principle is also applicable when the control area is a spatial area. This can be achieved by adding geometric constraint information of the space when acquiring control area information, for example, by adding the height range of the airspace to the control area information.

[0031] Here, the first position coordinates of the target vehicle can be obtained by fusing multi-source data acquired by multi-sensors mounted on the target vehicle. For example, it can be obtained by fusing multi-source data such as GNSS data, RTK differential data, IMU data, and LiDAR SLAM, and the number and type of data can be selected according to the desired accuracy.

[0032] Specifically, the area control trigger information may be transmitted by the driver of the target vehicle, for example, by pressing a specific button on the target vehicle. After receiving the area control trigger information, the target vehicle needs to complete the acquisition of control area information and the generation of an encryption key. Here, since the control area information includes the center of the control area, i.e., the vehicle's position, it is necessary to acquire the vehicle's first position coordinates. This position can be acquired by the target vehicle using various positioning sensors mounted on the vehicle. The control area information further includes the control radius of the control area. Since various driving parameters fluctuate while the target vehicle is driving, the control radius needs to be acquired based on various driving parameters.

[0033] Specifically, after the target vehicle acquires area control trigger information, it immediately acquires control area information and generates a corresponding encryption key. Then, to prevent its own position from being exposed during the communication process and the subsequent road cooperation process, it is necessary to encrypt the first position coordinates and transmit the encrypted ciphertext to a nearby RSU via the data channel. Since the control radius does not expose the actual position of the target vehicle, it can be transmitted in plaintext to a nearby RSU via the data channel. Then, the encryption key is transmitted to a nearby RSU via the control channel. In the above process, by encrypting the first position coordinates before transmission, it is ensured that the target vehicle's position is not revealed during the transmission process, while the channel binding mechanism between the control channel and the data channel prevents relay attacks, further ensuring that the target vehicle's position is not revealed.

[0034] Step S102: The RSU verifies the encryption key of the control channel, and after successful verification of the encryption key, performs a control area zero-knowledge proof based on the control radius and the encrypted first position coordinates of the data channel, generates a corresponding zero-knowledge proof packet, and then transmits the zero-knowledge proof packet to non-target vehicles around the control area, indicating that the zero-knowledge proof packet indicates the existence of a control area with the control radius as its radius and the encrypted first position coordinates as its center.

[0035] Here, a control area zero-knowledge proof can be divided into four steps in principle. Step 1: Convert the proposition to be proven into a zero-knowledge proof circuit system. In the embodiment of this application, the proposition to be proven is that a control area exists with the control radius as its radius and the encrypted first position coordinate as its center, or that the position of any of the non-target vehicles is outside the control area. Here, the format of the circuit system is R1CS (Rank One Constrain System, a language for describing circuits). It is understood that calculation logic such as the evaluation of calculation formulas and the calculation of hash values ​​can all be expressed as R1CS circuits. Step 2: Using a generation algorithm, public input parameters, prover-private input parameters, and verifier-private input parameters are generated for the proposition to be proven. Of the generated data, the public input parameters are generated randomly and must not be leaked. If they are leaked, the security of the proof will be compromised. Step 3: The prover uses the R1CS circuit system converted from the proposition to be proven to generate a zero-knowledge proof packet by a control area zero-knowledge proof. Step 4: The verifier verifies the zero-knowledge proof packet using verifier-confidential input parameters.

[0036] Specifically, in the embodiment of this application, the prover is the RSU, the verifier is the subsequent non-target vehicle, the prover's confidential input parameter is the ciphertext of the first position coordinates of the target vehicle, and the verifier's confidential input parameter is the second position coordinates of the non-target vehicle. In this embodiment, when performing a zero-knowledge proof, the ciphertext of the first position coordinates is not decrypted. This allows the RSU to perform a control area zero-knowledge proof without knowing the actual position of the target vehicle, thus ensuring a high level of privacy for the target vehicle. After the RSU completes the undecrypted control area zero-knowledge proof, it confirms that a proposition to be proven exists, i.e., that one of the non-target vehicles is outside the control area of ​​the target vehicle, and generates a corresponding zero-knowledge proof packet. The RSU then broadcasts the zero-knowledge proof packet to non-target vehicles in the vicinity of the target vehicle. Upon receiving this, the non-target vehicle performs a zero-knowledge proof to confirm whether it has entered the control area.

[0037] Step S103: Any of the non-target vehicles generates a position commitment based on the second position coordinates of the non-target vehicle, and further performs a zero-knowledge proof based on the position commitment and the zero-knowledge proof packet to generate a corresponding zero-knowledge proof result. If the zero-knowledge proof result indicates that the non-target vehicle has entered the control area, a driving operation to automatically avoid the control area is triggered.

[0038] Specifically, after receiving a zero-knowledge proof packet broadcast by the RSU, any non-target vehicle acts as a verifier and performs a zero-knowledge proof to determine whether it has entered the control area. First, the non-target vehicle generates a position commitment based on its second position coordinates, and then verifies the received zero-knowledge proof packet based on that position commitment. If the verification is successful, the non-target vehicle has not entered the control area; if the verification fails, the non-target vehicle has entered the control area, and it becomes necessary to trigger an evasive maneuver, such as applying the brakes or turning the steering wheel at a certain angle and in a certain direction. It should be noted that during the process of performing the zero-knowledge proof, the non-target vehicle cannot know the first position coordinates of the target vehicle, thereby protecting the target vehicle's privacy, and it is also impossible to inversely estimate the target vehicle's position from the non-target vehicle's second position coordinates.

[0039] According to the present invention, a target vehicle generates an encryption key in response to area control trigger information, obtains the control radius of the corresponding control area, encrypts the first position coordinates of the target vehicle using the encryption key, transmits the encryption key to a roadside unit RSU through a control channel, and transmits the control radius and the encrypted first position coordinates to the RSU through a data channel. The RSU verifies the encryption key in the control channel, and after successful verification of the encryption key, performs a control area zero-knowledge proof based on the ciphertext of the control radius and the encrypted first position coordinates in the data channel, generates a corresponding zero-knowledge proof packet, and transmits the zero-knowledge proof packet to non-target vehicles around the control area. Any of the non-target vehicles generates a position commitment based on the second position coordinates of the non-target vehicle, and further performs a zero-knowledge proof based on the position commitment and the zero-knowledge proof packet, generates a corresponding zero-knowledge proof result, and if the zero-knowledge proof result indicates that the non-target vehicle has entered the control area, it triggers a driving operation to automatically avoid the control area. This invention enables reliable and secure cooperation that meets high privacy protection requirements by performing zero-knowledge proofs and verification based on the encrypted first position coordinates of the target vehicle during the data sharing process of roadway cooperation, while ensuring that non-target vehicles avoid the control area of ​​the target vehicle, and by never disclosing the position coordinates of the target vehicle.

[0040] In one selectable embodiment of the present invention, the target vehicle generating an encryption key in response to area control trigger information means that, upon receiving the area control trigger information, the target vehicle generates an entropy source using an on-board quantum chip and obtains a first encryption key by hash extraction. Obtain the current timestamp, perform a hash chain calculation using the first encryption key, the current timestamp, and the hash value of the previous first encryption key, and obtain the second encryption key. This includes performing an identity-based signature on the second cryptographic key and obtaining the cryptographic key.

[0041] Furthermore, the RSU's verification of the control channel's encryption key includes extracting a timestamp in the encryption key and performing validity verification on the encryption key based on the timestamp; extracting the previous first encryption key in the encryption key and performing hash chain sequential verification on the encryption key based on the previous first encryption key; and extracting the identity signature and verifying the identity signature using a pre-configured public key. If the validity verification is successful, the hash chain sequential verification is successful, and the identity signature is valid, then the verification of the cryptographic key is successful.

[0042] Specifically, the process of generating the first cryptographic key includes step 1: quantum entropy source collection, step 2: entropy enhancement processing, and step 3: SM3 hash extraction. The cryptographic key in the control channel needs to be further supplemented with validity verification information, hash chain sequential verification information, and identity signature information. Here, the validity verification information may be the current timestamp obtained from a trusted time source. The hash chain sequential verification information can be obtained by hash chain calculation based on the previous first cryptographic key, and the previous first cryptographic key can be read from the RSU's stored data. The identity signature information is generated by identity signing by the target vehicle. In this step, it is understood that validity verification information, hash chain sequential verification information, and identity signature information are further added to the control channel in addition to the first cryptographic key. This invention combines four elements—quantum cryptographic key, trusted time, chain hash, and hardware signature—to construct all the elements for control channel verification during cryptographic key generation, providing an unalterable trust foundation for highly secure road cooperation.

[0043] In one selectable embodiment of the present application, obtaining the control radius of the corresponding control area is equivalent to obtaining the basic control radius of the control area based on the road type. Based on the actual vehicle speed, lateral acceleration, and load type, obtain the dynamic control radius of the control area; Based on the basic control radius and the dynamic control radius, obtain the control radius of the control area, including.

[0044] And the dynamic control radius is

Number

Number

[0045] Here, the basic control radius is determined based on the road type. For example, the basic control radius of a highway is 150 m, the basic control radius of an urban road is 50 m, the basic control radius of a tunnel and a bridge is 80 m, and the basic control radius of a road near a school or a hospital is 100 m.

[0046] Here, the actual vehicle speed can be obtained by the wheel speed sensor of the target vehicle, the lateral acceleration can be obtained by the 6-axis IMU sensor of the target vehicle, and the load type can be obtained from the electronic tag of the cargo. For example, the ρ risk of general cargo, flammable goods, and highly toxic substances can be 0.8, 1.2, and 1.5 respectively.

[0047] Furthermore, if the curvature of the road the target vehicle is traveling on exceeds a set value, for example, on an elevated road ramp, dynamic correction of lateral acceleration is necessary. This can be achieved using the above formula, and the problem of trajectory deviation due to centrifugal force on curves can be solved.

[0048] And ΔR is the dynamic control radius of the target vehicle, in meters (m), v is the actual speed of the target vehicle, in meters per second (m / s), and a lat0 This represents the lateral acceleration of the target vehicle, in meters per second. 2 (m / s 2 ) and ρ risk k1 is the cargo type risk coefficient for the target vehicle, a dimensionless numerical value that indicates the hazard class of the cargo (for example, the value for general cargo is 0.8, the value for flammable materials is 1.2, and the value for toxic and hazardous materials is 1.5). k1 is the speed weighting coefficient, in units of seconds (s), and indicates the degree to which vehicle speed affects the control radius. k2 is the acceleration weighting coefficient, in units of seconds squared (s). 2 ) indicates the degree to which lateral acceleration affects the control radius. k3 is the risk weighting coefficient, in meters (m), and indicates the risk adjustment based on the type of cargo (e.g., hazardous materials, general cargo).

[0049] For example, the numerical range of k1 is 0.5s to 3s, where k1 essentially represents the reaction time required for a vehicle to apply the brakes after sensing something. This value matches the reaction time of a human driver and the response time of an autonomous driving system. The lower limit of 0.5s corresponds to a low-speed scenario on an urban road, where the vehicle speed is typically less than 15 m / s (54 km / h), and in this case, the contribution of the speed term is 7.5 m, meeting the small safety distance requirement in an urban environment. The upper limit of 3s corresponds to a highway scenario, where, when the vehicle speed reaches 33 m / s (120 km / h), the contribution of the speed term is approximately 100 m, meeting the safe following distance standard on highways (e.g., distance converted according to the "2-second rule").

[0050] The numerical range of k2 is 0.1s 2 ~2s 2 Therefore, the lower limit is 0.1s 2This applies to straight roads and gently curving roads, where the lateral acceleration is typically 1 m / s². 2 It is less than 0.1m, and the contribution value is approximately 0.1m, indicating basic security. Upper limit 2s 2 This applies to sharp curves and ramp scenarios, where the lateral acceleration is 3-4 m / s². 2 It can reach a contribution value of 6-8 m, effectively correcting trajectory deviation due to centrifugal force. This range is based on the vehicle's lateral dynamics model, with a maximum lateral acceleration of 4 m / s². 2 (Approaching the lateral stability limit of a typical passenger car), the contribution from the acceleration term is kept below 8m, and an overly conservative control radius is avoided.

[0051] The numerical range of k3 is 1.0m to 10m, and the lower limit is 1.0m for general cargo (ρ risk It corresponds to (=0.8~1.0), and the contribution of the risk term is about 1m, providing a basic risk buffer. The upper limit of 10m is for hazardous materials such as explosives (ρ risk Applied to =2), the contribution of the risk term reaches 20m, satisfying the additional safety distance required by the safety regulations for the transport of dangerous goods.

[0052] The specific setting of each weighting coefficient is, for example, that urban roads have small k1 (0.5~1s) and k2 (0.1~0.5s). 2 ) is adopted, and the risk coefficient k3 is set relatively large (3-5m), with a relatively large k1 (1.5-3s) and a moderate k2 (0.3-1s) for highways. 2 The scenario adaptation principle should be followed, such as adopting a basic value (2-3m) as k3, prioritizing setting k3 to 5-10m for hazardous materials transport, and adopting moderate values ​​for other coefficients.

[0053] In one selectable embodiment of the present application, performing a control area zero-knowledge proof based on the control radius and the encrypted first position coordinates of the data channel involves converting the control radius and the encrypted first position coordinates into a symbolized variable that can be processed by a control area zero-knowledge proof, Based on the aforementioned symbolized variables, constraints for the control area are constructed, and the corresponding R1CS constraint system is obtained, which indicates that the position of any of the non-target vehicles is outside the control area. This includes performing a proof computation using the Growth16 protocol (a concise, non-interactive zero-knowledge proof used in zero-knowledge proof systems) based on the R1CS constraint system, generating three points on an elliptic curve, and generating the zero-knowledge proof packet based on the three points on the elliptic curve and the control radius.

[0054] Furthermore, performing a zero-knowledge proof based on the position commitment and the zero-knowledge proof packet includes performing a bilinear pairing verification based on the position commitment and three points on the elliptic curve within the zero-knowledge proof packet, and if the verification is successful, it indicates that the non-target vehicle has not entered the control area, and if the verification fails, it indicates that the non-target vehicle has entered the control area.

[0055] Specifically, after successful cryptographic key verification of the control channel, the RSU performs a zero-knowledge proof of the control area based on the data in the data channel to prove that the position of any non-target vehicle satisfies the geometric condition given in the control area, i.e., that any non-target vehicle is outside the control area. Specifically, the RSU first analyzes the ciphertext of the first position coordinates directly into elements of a finite field (i.e., converts it into a symbolized variable) without decrypting it, and uses this as part of the private input parameters, while quantizing the control radius into elements of a finite field and using this as a public input parameter. It identifies the mathematical form of the proposition to be proven and converts this mathematical form into an R1CS constraint system. Finally, based on the Growth16 protocol, it generates three sets of proofs (i.e., three points on an elliptic curve) using CRS (trusted configuration parameters) and the R1CS constraint system and obtains a zero-knowledge proof packet.

[0056] Then, after any non-target vehicle receives a zero-knowledge proof packet, it obtains its second position coordinates and generates a position commitment based on these second coordinates. Based on the Growth16 protocol, it calls a verification function, assigns the CRS, three sets of proofs, and the position commitment to the function, and outputs the verification result by bilinear pairing. If the verification is successful, it indicates that the non-target vehicle is outside the control area and no action is required; however, if the verification fails, it indicates that the non-target vehicle is inside the control area and an operation to avoid the control area needs to be triggered.

[0057] In both the RSU's proof process and the non-target vehicle's verification process, only the control radius is known, and the non-target vehicle only knows its own position; it cannot know or estimate the first position coordinates. Therefore, the privacy of the target vehicle's position is ensured. Furthermore, after the RSU broadcasts proof, the non-target vehicle can verify independently without requiring any further interaction, thus further ensuring the privacy of data sharing.

[0058] Figure 2 is a structural block diagram of a data sharing system for intelligent connected roads provided in an embodiment of the present invention. As shown in Figure 2, the system includes a control area generation module 201 for a target vehicle to generate an encryption key in response to area control trigger information, obtain the control radius of the corresponding control area, encrypt the first position coordinates of the target vehicle using the encryption key, transmit the encryption key to a roadside unit RSU via a control channel, and transmit the control radius and the encrypted first position coordinates to the RSU via a data channel. The RSU verifies the encryption key of the control channel, and after successful verification of the encryption key, performs a control area zero-knowledge proof based on the control radius of the data channel and the encrypted first position coordinates ciphertext, generates a corresponding zero-knowledge proof packet, transmits the zero-knowledge proof packet to non-target vehicles around the control area, and the zero-knowledge proof packet indicates that a control area exists with the control radius as its radius and the encrypted first position coordinates as its center, and the control area proof module 202 The system may include a control area intrusion verification module 203 for which any of the non-target vehicles generates a position commitment based on the second position coordinates of the non-target vehicle, and further performs a zero-knowledge proof based on the position commitment and the zero-knowledge proof packet to generate a corresponding zero-knowledge proof result, and if the zero-knowledge proof result indicates that the non-target vehicle has entered the control area, it triggers a driving operation to automatically avoid the control area.

[0059] According to the present invention, a target vehicle generates an encryption key in response to area control trigger information, obtains the control radius of the corresponding control area, encrypts the first position coordinates of the target vehicle using the encryption key, transmits the encryption key to a roadside unit RSU through a control channel, and transmits the control radius and the encrypted first position coordinates to the RSU through a data channel. The RSU verifies the encryption key in the control channel, and after successful verification of the encryption key, performs a control area zero-knowledge proof based on the ciphertext of the control radius and the encrypted first position coordinates in the data channel, generates a corresponding zero-knowledge proof packet, and transmits the zero-knowledge proof packet to non-target vehicles around the control area. Any of the non-target vehicles generates a position commitment based on the second position coordinates of the non-target vehicle, and further performs a zero-knowledge proof based on the position commitment and the zero-knowledge proof packet, generates a corresponding zero-knowledge proof result, and if the zero-knowledge proof result indicates that the non-target vehicle has entered the control area, it triggers a driving operation to automatically avoid the control area. This invention achieves reliable and secure cooperation that meets high privacy requirements by performing zero-knowledge proofs and verification based on the encrypted first position coordinates of the target vehicle during the data sharing process of roadway cooperation, while ensuring that non-target vehicles avoid the control area of ​​the target vehicle, and by never disclosing the position coordinates of the target vehicle.

[0060] In one selectable embodiment of the present invention, the target vehicle generating an encryption key in response to area control trigger information means that, upon receiving the area control trigger information, the target vehicle generates an entropy source using an on-board quantum chip and obtains a first encryption key by hash extraction. Obtain the current timestamp, perform a hash chain calculation using the first encryption key, the current timestamp, and the hash value of the previous first encryption key, and obtain the second encryption key. This includes performing an identity-based signature on the second cryptographic key and obtaining the cryptographic key.

[0061] In one selectable embodiment of the present application, the RSU verifying the cryptographic key of the control channel includes: extracting a timestamp in the cryptographic key and performing validity verification on the cryptographic key based on the timestamp; extracting the previous first cryptographic key in the cryptographic key and performing hash chain sequential verification on the cryptographic key based on the previous first cryptographic key; and extracting the identity signature and verifying the identity signature using a pre-configured public key. If the validity verification is successful, the hash chain sequential verification is successful, and the identity signature is valid, then the verification of the cryptographic key is successful.

[0062] In one selectable embodiment of the present application, obtaining the control radius of the corresponding control area is equivalent to obtaining the basic control radius of the control area based on the road type. Based on the actual vehicle speed, lateral acceleration, and load type, the dynamic control radius of the control area is obtained, This includes obtaining the control radius of the control area based on the basic control radius and the dynamic control radius.

[0063] In one selectable embodiment of the present application, the dynamic control radius is

number

number

[0064] In one selectable embodiment of the present application, performing a control area zero-knowledge proof based on the control radius and the encrypted first position coordinates of the data channel involves converting the control radius and the encrypted first position coordinates into a symbolized variable that can be processed by a control area zero-knowledge proof, Based on the aforementioned symbolized variables, constraints for the control area are constructed, and the corresponding R1CS constraint system is obtained, which indicates that the position of any of the non-target vehicles is outside the control area. This includes performing a proof calculation using the Growth16 protocol based on the R1CS constraint system, generating three points on an elliptic curve, and generating the zero-knowledge proof packet based on the three points on the elliptic curve and the control radius.

[0065] Figure 3 is an example of a diagram illustrating the physical structure of an electronic device. As shown in Figure 3, the electronic device may include a processor 310, a communications interface 320, a memory 330, and a bus 340, where the processor 310, communications interface 320, and memory 330 communicate with each other via the bus 340. The processor 310 calls instructions stored in the memory 330 to generate an encryption key in response to area control trigger information from the target vehicle, obtain the control radius of the corresponding control area, encrypt the first position coordinates of the target vehicle using the encryption key, transmit the encryption key to the roadside unit RSU through the control channel, and transmit the control radius and the encrypted first position coordinates to the RSU through the data channel. The RSU verifies the encryption key on the control channel, and after successful verification of the encryption key, performs a control area zero-knowledge proof based on the ciphertext of the control radius and the encrypted first position coordinates on the data channel, generates a corresponding zero-knowledge proof packet, and then the zero A data sharing method for intelligent connected roads can be implemented, which includes transmitting a knowledge proof packet to non-target vehicles around the control area, the zero knowledge proof packet indicating the existence of a control area with the control radius as its radius and the encrypted first position coordinates as its center; any of the non-target vehicles generating a position commitment based on the second position coordinates of the non-target vehicle, further performing a zero knowledge proof based on the position commitment and the zero knowledge proof packet to generate a corresponding zero knowledge proof result, and if the zero knowledge proof result indicates that the non-target vehicle has entered the control area, triggering a driving operation to automatically avoid the control area. Furthermore, the instructions stored in the memory 330 can be stored in a computer-readable storage medium if they are executed as a software function unit and can be sold or used as an independent product. Based on this understanding, the present invention can be embodied fundamentally, or in part with respect to the prior art, or in part with respect to the invention, as a software product.This computer software product includes a plurality of instructions that enable a single computer device (such as a personal computer, server, or network device) to perform all or part of the steps of the methods described in each embodiment of the present invention, and is stored in a storage medium. The storage medium includes various media capable of storing stored program code, such as USB memory, portable data storage, read-only memory (ROM), random access memory (RAM), disks, and optical discs.

[0066] In another aspect, the present invention further provides a computer program product which includes a computer program which may be stored in a non-temporary computer-readable storage medium. When the computer program is executed by a processor, the computer provides, in each of the above methods, a target vehicle that generates an encryption key in response to area control trigger information, obtains the control radius of the corresponding control area, encrypts the first position coordinates of the target vehicle using the encryption key, transmits the encryption key through a control channel to a roadside unit RSU, transmits the control radius and the encrypted first position coordinates to the RSU through a data channel, and the RSU verifies the encryption key in the control channel, and after successful verification of the encryption key, performs a control area zero-knowledge proof based on the ciphertext of the control radius and the encrypted first position coordinates in the data channel and generates a corresponding zero-knowledge proof packet. A data sharing method for intelligent connected roads can be implemented, which includes: transmitting the zero-knowledge proof packet to non-target vehicles around the control area, indicating that the zero-knowledge proof packet indicates the existence of a control area with the control radius as its radius and the encrypted first position coordinates as its center; any of the non-target vehicles generating a position commitment based on the second position coordinates of the non-target vehicle, further performing zero-knowledge proof based on the position commitment and the zero-knowledge proof packet to generate a corresponding zero-knowledge proof result, and if the zero-knowledge proof result indicates that the non-target vehicle has entered the control area, triggering a driving operation to automatically avoid the control area.

[0067] In yet another aspect, the present invention further relates to a non-temporary computer-readable storage medium on which a computer program is stored, and when the computer program is executed by a processor, the computer program provides the following: a target vehicle generates an encryption key in response to area control trigger information, obtains the control radius of the corresponding control area, encrypts the first position coordinates of the target vehicle using the encryption key, transmits the encryption key to a roadside unit RSU through a control channel, transmits the control radius and the encrypted first position coordinates to the RSU through a data channel, and the RSU verifies the encryption key in the control channel, and after successful verification of the encryption key, performs a control area zero-knowledge proof based on the ciphertext of the control radius and the encrypted first position coordinates in the data channel. The present invention provides a non-temporary computer-readable storage medium that enables a data sharing method for intelligent connected roads, which includes generating a corresponding zero-knowledge proof packet, transmitting the zero-knowledge proof packet to non-target vehicles around the control area, the zero-knowledge proof packet indicating that a control area exists with the control radius as its radius and the encrypted first position coordinates as its center, and any of the non-target vehicles generating a position commitment based on the second position coordinates of the non-target vehicle, further performing zero-knowledge proof based on the position commitment and the zero-knowledge proof packet to generate a corresponding zero-knowledge proof result, and if the zero-knowledge proof result indicates that the non-target vehicle has entered the control area, triggering a driving operation to automatically avoid the control area.

[0068] The embodiments of the apparatus described above are merely illustrative. The units described as separate components may or may not be physically separate, and the components referred to as units may or may not be physical units; that is, they may be located in one place or distributed across multiple network units. Depending on actual needs, some or all of these modules can be selected to realize the objective of the invention of this embodiment. Those skilled in the art can understand and implement this without special ingenuity.

[0069] Based on the above description of the embodiments, those skilled in the art will see that each embodiment can be implemented by adding a general-purpose hardware platform required for the software, or it can be implemented by hardware alone. Based on this understanding, the above inventions, or parts that contribute to the prior art, can be embodied as a software product. This computer software product can be stored in a computer-readable storage medium, such as ROM / RAM, disk, or optical disk, which contains a number of instructions that enable a computer device (such as a personal computer, server, or network device) to perform the methods described in each embodiment or part of the embodiment.

[0070] Finally, the above embodiments are for illustrative purposes only and are not limited thereto. Although the above embodiments have described the present invention in detail, those skilled in the art will understand that they may modify the embodiments described above or replace some of the constituent elements with equivalent ones, and that such modifications or substitutions will not cause such embodiments to deviate from the spirit and scope of the embodiments described above.

Claims

1. The target vehicle generates an encryption key in response to area control trigger information, obtains the control radius of the corresponding control area, encrypts the first position coordinates of the target vehicle using the encryption key, transmits the encryption key to the roadside unit RSU via the control channel, and transmits the control radius and the encrypted first position coordinates to the RSU via the data channel. The RSU verifies the encryption key of the control channel, and after successful verification of the encryption key, performs a control area zero-knowledge proof based on the control radius and the encrypted first position coordinates of the data channel, generates a corresponding zero-knowledge proof packet, transmits the zero-knowledge proof packet to non-target vehicles around the control area, and the zero-knowledge proof packet indicates that a control area exists with the control radius as its radius and the encrypted first position coordinates as its center. A data sharing method for intelligent connected roads, comprising: any of the non-target vehicles generating a position commitment based on the second position coordinates of the non-target vehicle; further performing a zero-knowledge proof based on the position commitment and the zero-knowledge proof packet to generate a corresponding zero-knowledge proof result; and, if the zero-knowledge proof result indicates that the non-target vehicle has entered the control area, triggering a driving operation to automatically avoid the control area.

2. The target vehicle generating an encryption key in response to area control trigger information means that, upon receiving the area control trigger information, the target vehicle generates an entropy source using an on-board quantum chip and obtains a first encryption key by hash extraction. Obtain the current timestamp, perform a hash chain calculation using the first encryption key, the current timestamp, and the hash value of the previous first encryption key, and obtain the second encryption key. The method according to claim 1, characterized by comprising: performing an identity-based signature on the second cryptographic key and obtaining the cryptographic key.

3. The RSU's verification of the control channel's encryption key includes: extracting a timestamp in the encryption key and performing validity verification on the encryption key based on the timestamp; extracting the previous first encryption key in the encryption key and performing hash chain sequential verification on the encryption key based on the previous first encryption key; and extracting an identity signature and verifying the identity signature using a pre-configured public key. The method according to the previous invention, characterized in that if the validity verification is successful, the hash chain sequential verification is successful, and the identity signature is valid, then the verification of the cryptographic key is successful.

4. Obtaining the control radius of the corresponding control area involves obtaining the basic control radius of the area based on the road type, Based on the actual vehicle speed, lateral acceleration, and load type, the dynamic control radius of the control area is obtained, The method according to claim 1, characterized in that it includes obtaining the control radius of the control area based on the basic control radius and the dynamic control radius.

5. The dynamic control radius is, [Math 1] (In the formula, ΔR is the dynamic control radius of the target vehicle, v is the actual speed of the target vehicle, alat is the lateral acceleration of the target vehicle, ρrisk is the type of cargo carried by the target vehicle, and k1, k2, and k3 are the corresponding weighting coefficients.) If the curvature of the road on which the target vehicle is traveling is greater than or equal to a set value, [Math 2] (In the formula, alat0 is the initial lateral acceleration of the target vehicle, and g is the acceleration due to gravity.) The method according to 4, characterized by obtaining by

6. Performing a control area zero-knowledge proof based on the control radius of the data channel and the encrypted ciphertext of the first position coordinates means converting the control radius and the encrypted ciphertext of the first position coordinates into symbolized variables that can be processed by a control area zero-knowledge proof, Based on the aforementioned symbolized variables, constraints for the control area are constructed, and a corresponding R1CS constraint system is obtained, which indicates that the position of any of the non-target vehicles is outside the control area. The method according to claim 1, comprising: performing a proof calculation using the Growth16 protocol based on the R1CS constraint system; generating three points on an elliptic curve; and generating the zero-knowledge proof packet based on the three points on the elliptic curve and the control radius.

7. The method according to 6, characterized in that performing a zero-knowledge proof based on the position commitment and the zero-knowledge proof packet includes performing a bilinear pairing verification based on the position commitment and three points on the elliptic curve in the zero-knowledge proof packet, and if the verification is successful, it indicates that the non-target vehicle has not entered the control area, and if the verification fails, it indicates that the non-target vehicle has entered the control area.

8. A control area generation module for a target vehicle to generate an encryption key in response to area control trigger information, obtain the control radius of the corresponding control area, encrypt the first position coordinates of the target vehicle using the encryption key, transmit the encryption key to the roadside unit RSU via a control channel, and transmit the control radius and the encrypted first position coordinates to the RSU via a data channel, The RSU verifies the encryption key of the control channel, and after successful verification of the encryption key, performs a control area zero-knowledge proof based on the control radius of the data channel and the encrypted first position coordinates ciphertext, generates a corresponding zero-knowledge proof packet, transmits the zero-knowledge proof packet to non-target vehicles around the control area, and the zero-knowledge proof packet indicates that a control area exists with the control radius as its radius and the encrypted first position coordinates as its center, and the RSU verifies the encryption key of the control channel, and after successful verification of the encryption key, performs a control area zero-knowledge proof proof based on the control radius of the data channel and the encrypted first position coordinates ciphertext, and a control area proof module for indicating that the zero-knowledge proof packet indicates the existence of a control area with the control radius as its radius and the encrypted first position coordinates as its center, A data sharing system for intelligent connected roads, comprising: a control area intrusion verification module for which any of the non-target vehicles generates a position commitment based on the second position coordinates of the non-target vehicle, further performs zero-knowledge proof based on the position commitment and the zero-knowledge proof packet to generate a corresponding zero-knowledge proof result, and if the zero-knowledge proof result indicates that the non-target vehicle has entered the control area, triggers a driving operation to automatically avoid the control area.

9. An electronic device comprising memory, a processor, and a computer program stored in the memory and executable on the processor, characterized in that when the processor executes the computer program, the method according to any one of claims 1 to 7 is implemented.

10. A non-temporary computer-readable storage medium in which a computer program is stored, characterized in that when the computer program is executed by a processor, the method described in any one of claims 1 to 7 is implemented.

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