Secure multi-rail control for sparsely encoded signals

Secure multi-rail control using sparsely encoded signals with distinct finite state machines and inspection modules protects ICs from fault injection attacks, maintaining performance and compatibility with circuit synthesis tools.

KR103045691B1Active Publication Date: 2026-11-06GOOGLE LLC
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Patent Information

Application Number
KR1020247018977
Authority / Receiving Office
KR · KR
Patent Type
Patents
Current Assignee / Owner
Priority Date
2021-12-03
Filing Date
2022-12-02
Publication Date
2026-11-06
Estimated Expiration
2042-12-02

AI Technical Summary

Technical Problem

Existing integrated circuits (ICs) are vulnerable to fault injection attacks due to modern circuit synthesis tools optimizing operations to eliminate redundancy designed for security, leading to reduced performance, increased costs, and decreased compatibility.

Method used

Implementing secure multi-rail control using sparsely encoded signals with a minimum Hamming distance, where each signal is transmitted across multiple rails controlled by distinct finite state machines, and incorporating an inspection module to detect fault injection attempts.

Benefits of technology

Enhances IC security against fault injection attacks while maintaining performance and compatibility with circuit synthesis tools, providing an economical and scalable solution.

✦ Generated by Eureka AI based on patent content.

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Abstract

This document discloses techniques, devices, and systems for secure multi-rail control of sparsely encoded signals. Integrated circuits (ICs) can transmit various signals to manage interactions between circuit components of the IC. These threshold signals are common targets for malicious attacks because, when altered, they can cause the IC to perform differently than intended and, in some cases, bypass security measures. While various strategies can be used to protect against such attacks, modern circuit synthesis tools can optimize these security measures, making the IC vulnerable to manipulation. In contrast, the secure multi-rail control of sparsely encoded signals described herein utilizes multiple rails to transmit sparsely encoded threshold signals. Each rail may be controlled by a distinct finite state machine (FSM) to reduce vulnerabilities that may arise from circuit synthesis, provide an adjustable solution that can be leveraged differently based on the embodiment, and provide compatibility with different ICs.
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Description

Background Technology

[0001] Electronic devices typically include at least one integrated circuit (IC) that enables various functions on the device. To perform some of these functions securely, the electronic device may store or operate secret information restricted to specific access levels within the IC. An attacker may attempt to gain unauthorized access to this secret information of the electronic device to compromise or alter the operations of the IC. However, existing approaches to prevent unauthorized access are generally inadequate to address the evolving software, hardware, and wireless attacks employed by malicious attackers attempting to access the secret information of electronic devices.

[0002] This document discloses techniques, devices, and systems for secure multi-rail control of sparsely encoded signals. Integrated circuits (ICs) can transmit various signals to manage interactions between circuit components of the IC. These critical signals are common targets for malicious attacks because, when altered, they can cause the IC to perform differently from what was intended and, in some cases, bypass security measures. While various strategies can be used to protect against such attacks, modern circuit synthesis tools can reduce or eliminate the effectiveness of these security measures, making the IC vulnerable to manipulation. In contrast, the secure multi-rail control of sparsely encoded signals described herein utilizes multiple rails to transmit sparsely encoded critical signals. Each rail can be controlled by a distinct finite state machine (FSM) to reduce vulnerabilities that may arise from circuit synthesis, provide an adjustable solution that can be leveraged differently based on the embodiment, and provide compatibility with different ICs.

[0003] An IC comprising a first component and a second component is described. The first component may include a plurality of FSMs. In embodiments, the first component and the second component are coupled to each other through a plurality of individual data lines. Sparsely encoded signals having a minimum Hamming distance are used to communicate between the first component and the second component. Each of the first plurality of FSMs may be coupled to the second component through each of the data lines of the plurality of individual data lines. Each of the plurality of data lines may communicate a single bit of the sparsely encoded signal between the first component and the second component. In this way, the IC may be protected from a fault injection attack, and the IC may be resistant to unwanted circuit synthesis. The second component may include, for example, a second plurality of FSMs. In embodiments, the first component may be any component of the IC, and the second component may be any different component of the IC. The described systems and techniques may be utilized at any point on a hardware device where sensitive operations occur, for example, in any process involving access control or privilege levels of operation (e.g., power, register access, system reset). In some embodiments, the described techniques may be utilized between any two components of an IC that perform these sensitive operations. In one example, the described security multi-rail control logic is implemented within a cryptographic IP block of the IC (e.g., between two components of the cryptographic IP block). As additional examples, the second component may be a multiplexer device or may include a store register or a configuration and set register.

[0004] The content of this invention is provided to introduce simplified concepts for implementing secure multi-rail control for sparsely encoded signals. These simplified concepts are further explained in the detailed description below. The content of this invention is not intended to identify essential features of the claimed invention, nor is it intended to be used to determine the scope of the claimed invention. Brief explanation of the drawing

[0005] Details of one or more embodiments of the described technologies, devices, and systems for secure multi-rail control of sparsely encoded signals are described below. The use of the same reference numbers in different instances in the description and drawings indicates similar elements: FIG. 1 illustrates an exemplary operating environment including electronic devices capable of implementing secure multi-rail control for sparsely encoded signals; FIG. 2 illustrates an exemplary embodiment of an exemplary security circuit comprising a plurality of circuit components that can be implemented to support aspects of secure multi-rail control for sparsely encoded signals; FIG. 3 illustrates an exemplary cryptographic intellectual property (IP) block capable of implementing secure multi-rail control for sparsely encoded signals according to one or more embodiments; FIG. 4 illustrates exemplary logic for an AND operation on sparsely encoded signals vulnerable to attacks caused by circuit synthesis; FIG. 5 illustrates exemplary logic for an AND operation using secure multi-rail control for sparsely encoded signals according to one or more modalities; FIGS. 6a and 6b illustrate exemplary logic for implementing secure multi-rail control for sparsely encoded signals according to one or more embodiments; FIG. 7 illustrates an exemplary method for transmitting sparsely encoded signals using multiple rails; and FIG. 8 illustrates an exemplary electronic device capable of implementing secure multi-rail control for sparsely encoded signals. Specific details for implementing the invention

[0006] Generally, there are various methods that attackers can use to gain access to confidential information (e.g., keys) maintained by an integrated circuit (IC). For example, fault injection attacks can be used to inject faults into signals transmitted between different circuit components of an integrated circuit. Various methods can be used to inject faults into an IC. For example, faults can be injected into an IC by using a high-power laser to expose the IC to electromagnetic interference, tuning the IC's clock, changing the IC's power supply, or any combination of these methods. In some embodiments, a high-power laser can be used to inject faults with high precision. For example, the laser can be directed toward the surface of a transistor to flip the transistor and transmit a signal having a different value.

[0007] ICs can use different signals to control circuit operations and, more specifically, manage interactions between different circuit components. In this way, these threshold signals can directly influence or control not only which operations are performed by the IC but also when those operations are performed. When faults are injected along with (or instead of) these signals, ICs can perform unintended operations and, in some cases, bypass security measures (e.g., security boot / trust point processes). For example, a fault can be injected into the handshake to cause the IC to prematurely release intermediate values ​​during the process of circuit operations. In this way, attackers can obtain or gain access to confidential information about the circuit (e.g., a secret key) by bypassing operations that have not yet been performed when the value is released prematurely. In other embodiments, the values ​​themselves may represent confidential information maintained by the integrated circuit, for example, the value may represent a private key used by the IC.

[0008] While various techniques can be employed to reduce IC vulnerability to fault injection attacks, the increased capabilities of modern circuit synthesis tools can introduce complexity when implementing these measures. Specifically, modern circuit synthesis tools are designed to identify and reduce redundancy in circuit operations to improve IC performance. Some security measures may utilize redundancy to increase the complexity of successfully executing malicious attacks on ICs (e.g., successfully releasing confidential information). Consequently, when employed within cryptographic ICs, these circuit synthesis tools optimize operations to generate more efficient circuits that do not include redundancy intentionally designed for security purposes, thereby potentially eliminating critical security features. To overcome these issues, cryptographic ICs may need to disable circuit synthesis tools, which may require the generation of custom multi-bit gates; this can result in reduced performance, increased costs and manufacturing complexity, reduced scalability, and decreased compatibility.

[0009] In contrast to other solutions, the techniques discussed below utilize sparse encodings for signals (e.g., threshold signals) transmitted between two circuit components. For example, each signal can be defined to have a predetermined minimum Hamming distance (e.g., a different number of bits between any two valid solutions). Specifically, if a value can be represented by a 1-bit representation (e.g., 1'b0 for LOW (defined by transmitting a low voltage value, e.g.), or 1'b1 for HIGH (defined by transmitting a high voltage value, e.g.), and the predetermined minimum Hamming distance is 3, the LOW value can be represented as 3'b010 and the HIGH value as 3'b101. In this way, an attacker may be required to flip multiple bits immediately (or within a short period of time) to successfully inject a flaw that generates different valid solutions.

[0010] In general, in information theory, the Hamming distance between two data items of the same length (e.g., 32 bits) is the number of positions where corresponding symbols or bit positions of the data items differ. For example, given two integers each represented by 16 bits and each integer being a valid solution, the Hamming distance between these two integers can be the number of positions where corresponding bits differ between two 16-bit data structures.

[0011] In some embodiments, HIGH and LOW values ​​may be represented as a mixture of 1 bit and 0 bit to increase the difficulty of a successful fault injection attack. Generally, it may be easier to flip all bits within a signal to a single value (either HIGH or LOW, e.g., 1 or 0). Accordingly, at least one HIGH bit and at least one LOW bit may be used to represent each sparsely encoded signal. To transmit the sparsely encoded signals, the IC described below may utilize a plurality of rails (e.g., dedicated data lines that can be used to transmit signals between a first circuit component and a second circuit component) each carrying a single bit of the sparsely encoded signal. Due to the mixing of values, the plurality of rails may include both positive rails and negative rails, which is further explained in relation to FIG. 3.

[0012] In some embodiments, multiple rails may transmit threshold signals between two components of the IC. As a specific example, multiple rails may communicatively combine an FSM (e.g., in the first component of the IC) with another circuit component to transmit control signals (e.g., initialization, acknowledgment, termination) between the FSM and the circuit component. Some control signals are single-bit signals that can be represented as either a single HIGH or a single LOW value. In some embodiments, a sparsely encoded signal (e.g., sparse encodings) may include signaling (e.g., transmitted logic values) having set encoded values ​​having non-contiguous codewords and / or codewords having a Hamming distance of at least 2. For example, valid codewords transmitted as bits on separate data lines are codewords that may not be obtained from another codeword by glitching or flipping one bit value during an attack.

[0013] Due to the redundancy used to satisfy the minimum Hamming distance, circuit synthesis tools can reduce the effect of sparse encodings of these threshold signals (explained in more detail in relation to Fig. 4). Accordingly, to ensure that the described techniques are robust for circuit optimization, the first circuit component (described above) may include a number of FSMs equal to the number of rails. In this way, each FSM within the first circuit component can be communicably coupled to each single rail of the multiple rails and can be used to drive a single bit of a sparsely encoded signal. In this manner, the IC described below can be robust for circuit optimization across multiple FSMs / rails without disabling circuit synthesis tools or requiring custom circuitry.

[0014] In another embodiment, each of the multiple rails may be connected to a test module that can be used to compare a transmitted signal with multiple valid states, thereby enabling the IC to detect possible fault injection attempts. If the test module determines that the transmitted signal does not match any of the predefined valid states, the test module may signal an error and initiate an error handling process. Thus, the techniques, systems, and devices for secure multi-rail control of sparsely encoded signals described below can provide an economical, scalable, and comfortable solution for increasing the security of the IC against fault injection attacks.

[0015] FIG. 1 illustrates an exemplary environment (100) comprising a device (102) in which aspects of secure multi-rail control for sparsely encoded signals can be implemented. The device (102) can be implemented as any suitable device, some of which are exemplified as a smartphone (102-1), a tablet computer (102-2), a laptop computer (102-3), a gaming console (102-4), a desktop computer (102-5), a server computer (102-6), a wearable computing device (102-7) (e.g., a smart watch), and a broadband router (102-8) (e.g., a mobile hotspot). Although not illustrated, the device (102) may also be implemented as any one of a mobile station (e.g., fixed or mobile STA), a mobile communication device, a client device, user equipment, a mobile phone, an entertainment device, a mobile gaming console, a personal media device, a media playback device, a health monitoring device, a drone, a camera, an internet home device capable of wireless internet access and browsing, an IoT device, and / or other types of electronic devices. The device (102) may provide other functions or include components or interfaces omitted in FIG. 1 for clarity or visual simplicity.

[0016] The device (102) includes one or more processors (106) that may include a memory medium or a storage medium, and an integrated circuit (IC 104) utilizing a computer-readable medium (108). The processor (106) may be implemented as a general-purpose processor (e.g., a multi-core CPU (central processing unit) or an application processor (AP)), an application-specific integrated circuit (ASIC), a graphics processing unit (GPU), or a system on chip (SoC), in which other components of the device (102) are integrated. The computer-readable medium (108) may include any suitable type of memory medium or storage medium, such as read-only memory (ROM), programmable ROM (PROM), random access memory (RAM), dynamic RAM (DRAM), static RAM (SRAM), or flash memory. In the context of this discussion, the computer-readable medium (108) of the device (102) is implemented as at least one hardware-based or physical storage device that does not contain a transient signal or carrier. Applications, firmware, and / or an operating system (not shown) of the device (102) may be implemented as processor-executable instructions on a computer-readable medium (108), which may be executed by a processor (106) to provide various functions described herein. The computer-readable medium (108) may also store device data (110), such as user data or user media, which is accessible through the applications, firmware, or operating system of the device (102).

[0017] In this example, the IC (104) includes a security circuit (112). The device (102), the IC (104), or the security circuit (112) may implement a security cryptographic processor. The security circuit (112) may be implemented using one or more circuit components (114), for example, circuit component (114-1) to circuit component (114-n). The circuit component (114) may be configured to perform any number of operations to enable the function of the device (102). Examples of circuit components include a processor and a number of functional components as described in FIG. 2. The security circuit (112) may be realized as, for example, a protection enclave, a trust chip platform, a hardware-based root of trust (RoT) chip (e.g., a silicon RoT), etc. Regardless of how or where the security circuit (112) is integrated into the electronic device, the security circuit (112) can respond to many different types of attacks.

[0018] The security circuit (112) may include at least one cryptographic intellectual property (IP) block (116) that performs various cryptographic operations of the IC (104). In some embodiments, at least one cryptographic IP block (116) may be implemented within an AES (advanced encryption security) unit. In some embodiments, the AES unit or the cryptographic IP block (116) may implement one or more cryptographic operations, for example, an operation to encrypt or decrypt data; the data may be, for example, image data (e.g., captured by a camera or video camera) or sound data (e.g., captured by a microphone). In one example, pseudo-random or true-random values ​​may be used to generate a private / public key pair. The public key is transmitted out of the device (102) through transceivers (126) and / or I / O ports (128). The private key can be used to decrypt data (e.g., image / sound data) that is received by the device (102) through transceivers (126) and / or I / O ports (128) and encrypted using the public key. Alternatively or additionally, data such as image or sound data (e.g., obtained using a sensor (130)) can be hashed using the private key to generate a hash digest, and the data and hash digest can be transmitted out of the device (102) through transceivers (126) and / or I / O ports (128), so that the hash digest functions as a signature for the data, which can be verified by a third party using the public key.

[0019] In another example, the cryptographic IP block (116) may perform Boolean masking and remasking operations on data processed by the IC (104) based on pseudo-randomness provided by a pseudo-random number or true random number generator. The cryptographic IP block (116) may handle device secrets, e.g., cryptographic keys or other confidential information, used to ensure proper use and performance of the IC (104). To protect the confidential information handled by the cryptographic IP block (116), cryptographic security operations may be performed to protect against various attacks that could release device secrets or information regarding the IC (104).

[0020] In some embodiments, the cryptographic IP block (116) may be configured to perform cryptographic security operations according to security multi-rail control of sparsely encoded signals as described herein. For example, the cryptographic IP block (116) may include one or more finite state machine blocks (FSMs (118)) that control the operations of the cryptographic processor within the IC (104). As further described in connection with FIG. 3, the cryptographic IP block (116) may include a main control FSM block that manages the interaction between the cryptographic IP block (116) and the processor (106). For example, the main control FSM may transmit signals that control when values ​​are written to registers to be accessed by the processors (106). The FSMs (118) may also include a core control FSM block (shown in FIG. 3) that coordinates the internal operations of the cryptographic IP block (116).

[0021] In some embodiments, the FSMs (118) may be implemented using multiple copies of the same FSM. For example, the main control FSM or the core control FSM may be implemented as a set of identical (or similar) FSMs. In this way, each bit of a sparsely encoded signal containing a multi-bit representation may be handled by an individual FSM. As such, each FSM of the first component (e.g., the main control FSM) may be communicably coupled to each FSM of the second component (e.g., the core control FSM) and may be used to communicate a single bit of the sparsely encoded signal. In this way, the cryptographic IP block (116) or IC (104) may generally be resistant to undesirable circuit synthesis that would detract from the security components.

[0022] A cryptographic IP block (116) may include multiple rails (120) between different components of the cryptographic IP block (116) (e.g., FSMs (118)). In embodiments, the rails (120) may be used to transmit sparsely encoded signals between different components of the cryptographic IP block (116) or the IC (104). When communicating between the FSMs (118) implemented through multiple copies of the FSM (e.g., the main FSM or core FSM of the cryptographic IP block (116)) and the first circuit component, each rail of the rails (120) may combine a single FSM from the first component to the second component. In this way, each FSM and each of the rails (120) may communicate a single bit of the sparsely encoded signals, thereby overcoming issues related to circuit synthesis tools.

[0023] As described above, sparsely encoded signals can be represented through a combination of HIGH and LOW bits. Accordingly, the rails (120) may include both positive and negative rails. In some embodiments, the positive rail may carry a HIGH signal, while the negative rail may carry a LOW signal. In some other embodiments, the signal carried by a specific rail (e.g., a negative rail) may be inverted to carry a desired signal state (e.g., a HIGH signal). In some embodiments, the negative rails, or a component (e.g., an FSM) transmitting one or more bits of a signal across the negative rails, may include an inverter that inverts the output of the value communicated by the first component. This also applies to the positive rails, or a component transmitting one or more bits of a signal across the positive rails. For example, if an FSM wants to transmit a HIGH signal (e.g., 1), the negative rail can transmit a LOW signal, and the inverter of the FSM can invert the LOW signal into a HIGH signal. Accordingly, the LOW signal can be transmitted as a HIGH signal through the negative rail, and the HIGH signal can be transmitted as a LOW signal through the positive rail. The control logic for the negative rails is described in more detail in relation to FIG. 6.

[0024] In some embodiments, the rails (120) may be coupled to at least one inspection module (not shown) to ensure that a sparsely encoded signal transmitted across the rails (120) indicates a valid signal state (e.g., predetermined HIGH and LOW signal representations). The inspection module may compare the transmitted signal with a set of predetermined valid states of threshold signals stored within the inspection module (or elsewhere in the computer-readable medium (108)). If the inspection module determines that the transmitted signal does not correspond to a valid signal state, for example, if a fault has been injected into the signal, it may be passed up-chain so that the fault is properly handled (further described in connection with FIG. 2).

[0025] As described, the security circuit section (112) is coupled to the interconnect (122). The interconnect (122) can be realized, for example, using a bus, switching fabric, or bus network that enables various circuit components to communicate. Each of the circuit components (114) can be coupled directly or indirectly to the interconnect (122). Although described in relation to the cryptographic IP block (116), any part of the interconnect (122) may utilize multiple rails (e.g., buses or wires) to enable the use of sparsely encoded signals. In other words, multi-rail control for sparsely encoded signals may be used to communicate signals between any two components of the IC (104), not just those within the cryptographic IP block (116). In some examples, the interconnect (122) may transmit all signals using multiple rails and sparse encodings. In other examples, multi-rail control for sparsely encoded signals may be implemented only for threshold signals (e.g., signals used to directly control the operations of the IC (104) or to facilitate operations involving confidential data such as private keys).

[0026] The device (102) may also include a display (124), transceivers (126), input / output ports (I / O ports (128)), and / or sensors (130). The display (124) may be operably coupled with one of the processors (106) (e.g., a GPU (graphics processing unit)) and configured to graphically display the operating system or applications of the device (102). The transceivers (126) may be configured to enable wired or wireless communication of data (e.g., device data (110)) over wired or wireless networks according to any suitable communication protocol. The I / O ports (128) of the device (102) may include a USB (universal serial bus) port, a coaxial cable port, and other serial or parallel connectors (including internal connectors) useful for coupling the electronic device to various components, peripherals, or accessories such as a keyboard, microphone, or camera.

[0027] The device (102) also includes sensors (130) that enable the device (102) to detect various attributes, variations, stimuli, or characteristics of the environment in which the device (102) operates. For example, the sensors (130) may include various motion sensors, ambient light sensors, acoustic sensors, capacitive sensors, infrared sensors, temperature sensors, radar sensors, or magnetic sensors. Alternatively, or additionally, the sensors (130) may enable interaction with the user of the device (102) or receive input from the user, such as through touch detection or proximity detection.

[0028] FIG. 2 illustrates an exemplary embodiment (200) of an exemplary security circuit (112) comprising a plurality of circuit components, including a plurality of exemplary circuit components (114) that can be implemented to support embodiments of security multi-rail control for sparsely encoded signals. As illustrated, the security circuit (112) includes a processor (106) coupled to an interconnect (122). Each of the processors (106), a plurality of memories, and a plurality of other circuit components (114) may be coupled directly or indirectly to the interconnect (122). In embodiments, the components of FIG. 2 may be implemented as a security computing platform or a security system-on-chip that implements a Root of Truth (RoT) and / or other security cryptographic features.

[0029] In exemplary embodiments, a plurality of memories may include read-only memory (ROM 202), static random access memory (SRAM 204), and flash memory (206). In embodiments, the ROM (202), SRAM (204), or flash memory (206) may be implemented within the security circuit (112) or within the computer-readable medium (108). A plurality of components (114) may include an alarm handler (208), an AES unit (not shown), a cryptographic IP block (116) inside or outside the AES unit, a hash-based message authentication code (HMAC) engine (HMAC 210), and a serial peripheral interface (SPI) device (SPI device (212)). A plurality of components (114) may also include a universal asynchronous receiver / transmitter (UART) unit (UART unit (214)), a general-purpose input / output (GPIO) interface (GPIO interface (216)), a pin multiplexer (pin mux 218)), and a pad controller (220). A plurality of components (114) may further include a random number generator (RNG 222) and a timer (224). Additionally, the components (114) may include any memory as illustrated in FIG. 2. While specific examples of memory and other components (114) are illustrated in FIG. 2 or described herein, a given embodiment of the security circuit (112) may include more, fewer, and / or different instances of a processor, controller, memory, module, or peripheral device, including duplicates thereof.

[0030] The illustrated circuit components (114) may operate synchronously based on one or more clock signals. Although not illustrated in FIG. 2, the security circuit (112) may include at least one clock generator for generating clock signals, or a reset circuit for resetting one or more individual components independently, a number of components together, or the entire IC chip. Alternatively, the security circuit (112) may receive at least one clock signal or reset signal from a source outside the security circuit (112), and this source may or may not be on a separate chip. One or more distinct components (114) may operate in each individual clock domain. For example, the circuit components (114) may be synchronized to a clock local to each component. Components (114) within different clock domains may operate or communicate asynchronously with respect to one another.

[0031] Exemplary implementations of the illustrated components (114) are described below. The processor (106) may be realized as a "main," "central," or "core" processor for the security circuitry (112). The processor (106) may be implemented, by example only, as a 32-bit in-order RISC (reduced instruction set computing) core with a multi-stage pipeline. For example, using RISC-V capabilities, the processor (106) may implement M (machine) and U (user) modes. Activating a reset pin (not shown) (e.g., through de-assertion of an active low reset pin) may cause the processor (106) to terminate the reset and begin executing code from that reset vector. The reset vector may start from the ROM (202), which verifies the code in the emulated embedded flash (e-flash) before jumping. In other words, the code is expected to be instantiated into e-flash before the reset is released. In some cases, resets across the entire security circuit (112) may be asynchronous active-low according to compatibility specifications to support interoperability between various circuit components. The reset may be generated as a security measure by an alarm handler (208); by a watchdog timer; and so on. Reset signals may also be transmitted to other circuit components, such as one of the memories or one of the other components (114).

[0032] A debug module (226) (DM) and an interrupt controller (228) (ItC) may be combined with the processor (106), and either of these may also be comfortable. The debug module (226) provides debug access to the processor (106). By interfacing with specific pins of the IC, the logic within the debug module (226) enables the processor (106) to enter debug mode and provides the ability to inject code into the device (e.g., by emulating instructions) or memory. The interrupt controller (228) may be placed in close proximity to the processor (106). The interrupt controller (228) may receive a vector of interrupt sources from within the security circuit (112). The interrupt controller (228) can also level and prioritize the interrupts before forwarding them to the processor (106) for handling.

[0033] The processor (106) may provide any desired level of performance or include any internal circuit components. For example, the processor (106) may include at least one arithmetic logic unit (ALU) (e.g., including an “additional” ALU for calculating branch targets to eliminate cycles of latency for executed conditional branches) and a plurality of pipeline stages. In the plurality of pipeline stages, the pipeline may perform register post-writes to reduce latency cycles from loads and stores and prevent pipeline stalls where a response to a load or store is available in a cycle after a request. The processor (106) may implement a single-cycle multiplier or generate an incorrect exception for an error response to a store, which allows the processor to continue execution past the store without waiting for a response. Although not illustrated, specifically the processor (106), or generally the security circuit (112), may include an instruction cache to provide single-cycle access times for instructions.

[0034] In the illustrated example (200), the components of the security circuit (112) may include or access three memory address spaces for instructions and data. The ROM (202) is a target for the processor (106) after the release of the reset. The ROM (202) contains hardcoded instructions to perform a subset of platform checks before checking the next stage of code. The next stage of code—for example, a boot loader stored in e-flash memory—may be a first piece of code that is not hardcoded into the device's silicon. Accordingly, this next stage of code is signature-checked for integrity to increase security. The ROM (202) may perform this signature-check by implementing the RSA-check (Rivest-Shamir-Adleman-check) algorithm on the entire contents of the boot loader.

[0035] The flash memory (206) can be implemented as an e-flash memory for storing code. This e-flash can house the boot loader mentioned herein, as well as the operating system and applications layered on top. An SPI device (212) can be used to bulk load the e-flash memory. A debug module (226) can also be used for code loading. The SRAM (204) can operate as a scratchpad SRAM available for data storage by the processor (106) (e.g., for stack and heap information). The SRAM (204) can also store code.

[0036] The security circuit section (112) may include circuit components (114) which may be secondary execution units coupled to the processor (106) via an interconnect (122). Each of these components (114) may follow an interface framework that ensures compatibility with each other and with the processor (106). The compatibility technique may specify how the processor (106) communicates with a given circuit component (114) (e.g., using the interconnect (122)), how the circuit component communicates with the processor (106) (e.g., using an interrupt) (114), how the circuit component (114) communicates security events to other circuit components (114), such as an alarm handler (208), (e.g., using an alarm indicator); how the circuit component communicates with peripheral devices (e.g., via chip I / O); or combinations thereof. The illustrated components (114) may include circuit components for alarm-related functions provided by the alarm handler (208), a processor (106), one or more memories, chip I / O, etc. Accordingly, the memories may also include components for each other or other illustrated circuit components (114).

[0037] The circuit or chip I / O includes a pin mux (218) and a pad controller (220). The pin mux (218) provides signaling routes between at least some of the components (114) and available multiplexable I / O nodes of the security circuit (112) (e.g., pins of the chip where various components are integrated or interfaces to other parts of the SoC). The pad controller (220) manages control or pad attributes such as drive strength, technique, pull-up versus pull-down, etc. of each of the components of the circuit. The pin mux (218) and the pad controller (220) may themselves be peripheral devices on the interconnect (122). Thus, each may have at least one collection of registers that provide software configurability, or otherwise may be associated with it.

[0038] The UART unit (214) can implement UART features such as a single-lane duplex UART function. The outputs and their inputs can be configured to be connected to any circuit I / O via pin mux (218). The GPIO interface (216) generates a G bit for bidirectional communication to the external circuit via pin mux (218), where G is a positive integer such as 16, 32, or 64. Regarding memory I / O, the SPI device (212) can implement a firmware mode. Here, the firmware mode can enable a feature that provides the ability for external drivers to transmit firmware upgrade code to a bank of flash memory (206) for in-field firmware updates. The firmware mode may include addressing of memories using SPI transactions. Although not illustrated, the security circuit (112) may include an I2C host to enable commands for inter-integrated circuit (I2C) devices. These commands for I2C devices can include standard, full, and high-speed modes.

[0039] Several “core security” components, including encryption engines and an alarm handler (208), are also illustrated. A cryptographic IP core (116), which can be implemented as described with reference to FIG. 1, may provide various symmetric encryption and decryption functions by using, for example, one or more protocols and / or various key sizes such as 128b, 192b, or 256b. In some embodiments, the cryptographic IP block (116) may be integrated within an AES unit and may implement the methods described herein. The component may, for example, select the encryption or decryption of data arriving in an amount of 16 bytes to be encrypted or decrypted using different block cipher operation modes. The cryptographic IP block (116) may support electronic codebook (ECB) mode, cipher block chaining (CBC) mode, cipher feedback (CFB) mode, output feedback (OFB) mode, counter (CTR) mode, etc. Data transmission may be made available to the processor, for example, key and data materials may be transmitted to the cryptographic engine via register records. Alternatively, private channels for the transmission of key and data materials may be included to reduce exposure to potentially untrusted processor activity.

[0040] The HMAC engine (210) may, for example, use the secure hash algorithm (SHA) SHA-256 as the hashing algorithm. SHA-256 is a member of the SHA-2 family of hashing algorithms whose digest (or hash output) is 256 b in length, regardless of the size of the data of the input to be hashed. Data is transmitted to the HMAC engine (210) after declaring the start of the hash request. This zeros out the internal state at once to initial conditions, for example, 32 b. When data is transmitted by the component client, the client may indicate the completion of the hash request (with an optional partial word final record). According to an exemplary portability interface technique, the HMAC engine (210) generates a hash result and makes it available in a register read by the requesting client. Data transmission may be performed privately or made available to the processor to reduce exposure to potentially untrusted processor activity.

[0041] HMAC is a message authentication protocol layered on top of a hashing function (e.g., SHA-256), and HMAC is mixed with a secret key for cryptographic purposes. HMAC is a specific application that attaches a secret key around the hashing of a message (via SHA-256) in a predefined manner, for example, twice. To provide this functionality, a 256b key can be programmed into a circuit component before the message hashing begins. The timing of authentication completion can vary, and latency may be longer than when using native SHA-256. Here again, the hashing information or secret key may be made available to the processor for convenience or processing efficiency, or rendered private in some way for increased security.

[0042] The alarm handler (208) is responsible for processing and responding to alarms (e.g., errors), including those provided by other components (114) (e.g., inspection modules). An alarm may be considered a security-sensitive interrupt that must be handled in a timely manner to respond to a perceived security threat. Unlike "standard" interrupts, an alarm may not be handled by software running on the processor (106). An alarm may trigger a first-stage request to be handled by software as a "regular" interrupt. However, if the software cannot respond to the alarm-triggered interrupt and resolve it appropriately, the alarm handler (208) triggers a second-stage response. The second-stage response may include specifying security measures, such as terminating the process, erasing or otherwise deleting data, drawing power from a circuit part, or resetting the IC chip or part thereof. This ensures that the underlying issue—a perceived security threat—is addressed even when the processor (106) is crowded and / or wedged and / or under attack.

[0043] Accordingly, the alarm may be implemented as a rising interrupt type signal or alarm indication that the alarm handler (208) receives from other circuit components (114) and indicates a potential security threat. When operating, the alarm handler (208) collects the alarm from other circuit components (114) of the security circuit (112) and converts it into an interrupt that the processor (106) can handle. However, if the processor (106) does not clear the interrupt, the alarm handler (208) provides hardware responses to handle the potential security threat.

[0044] Generally, the alarm handler (208) may store a partial indication of an alarm received from any one of the components (114). In some cases, this indication may be presented after the IC (104) or one or more circuit components (114) have performed a reset. As a specific example, the alarm handler (208) may record the time, location, or type of the alarm in a register and allow the operation of the IC (104) or circuit components (114) to continue normal operation. When operations are completed or a predetermined time interval has elapsed, the resulting data may be discarded so that confidential information is not revealed and the operation of the IC (104) is not altered due to the potential event that caused the alarm. In this way, a malicious agent may not be able to determine when the alarm is provided to the alarm handler (208).

[0045] The security circuit (112) may also include an RNG (222). Generally, randomness can contribute to security functions by providing variations in execution that prevent attackers from predicting a good time to launch an attack. For example, random numbers can provide secret data used for identity and cryptographic purposes. The RNG (222) can be seeded into algorithmic calculations to obscure sensitive data values. Generally, the RNG (222) provides better performance as its number generation becomes increasingly truly randomized and can also be strengthened against attacks. In some cryptographic processes, strong randomness guarantees may not be required. The RNG (222) may be implemented as a "true" RNG (TRNG) that may involve a design having an analog portion to utilize some non-deterministic physical events or processes. Exemplary TRNG designs may include metastability, electronic noise, timing variation, thermal noise, quantum variation, etc. The TRNG filters the resulting variable(s) and transmits them to an entropy pool, allowing the device to sample against a currently randomized function at a given time. In some cases, the interface to the entropy pool may include a request to read available random bits. The TRNG interface indicates how many bits are available, and requesting circuit components or software can read from this pool up to the available range of bits. Attempted readings of unavailable entropy bits may trigger an interrupt or alarm.

[0046] Two other components (114) include a timer (224) and a flash controller (not shown), the latter of which is described in the following paragraph. The timer (224) can support precise performance by, for example, the processor (106). The timer (224) is formed of multiple bits (e.g., 64 bits) and operates as a free-run timer having a guaranteed frequency within some percentage. The timer (224) can enable the circuit components (114) to determine appropriate time intervals for performing operations. For example, FSMs (118) or other components of the cryptographic IP block (116) can transmit or receive signals according to the timer (224). Another timer (not explicitly shown) can act as a watchdog timer to backstop the processor (106) in the event that the processor becomes unresponsive. Unresponsiveness may be due to wedge development code, security attacks, etc.

[0047] Although not illustrated, the flash controller can control the flash memory (206) available for storing code and data. The primary read path for this data may be in the standard memory address space. However, since the flash is not written in a standard manner, writing to that address space may be ignored. Instead, to write to the flash memory (206), the software interacts with the flash controller. The flash function may include three main commands: read, erase, and program. Read commands may be standardized and may use the chip memory address space. Erase commands are performed at the page level, where the page size may be parameterized by the flash controller. Upon receiving an erase request, the flash controller erases the contents of the target page, rendering the data to a "1" state (e.g., 0xFFFFFFFF for each word). Subsequently, the software may program individual words to arbitrary values. Since the flash bit does not return to a "1" state without further erasure, future contents are effectively changed to the AND of the current contents and the written value. The erase and program commands are relatively slow. Typical erase times are measured in milliseconds, and program times are in the microsecond range. Security is also a concern because secret data can be stored in flash memory (206). Accordingly, some memory protection may be provided by the flash controller.

[0048] The security circuit (112) is illustrated in FIG. 2 as a specific set of circuit components (114). However, a given security circuit (112) may have more, fewer, or different circuit components. The circuit components may also operate or be interconnected differently in ways other than the exemplary ways described herein. Additionally, some circuit components (114) may be omitted, while other circuit components (114) are implemented in multiple instances. For example, the alarm handler (208) may be duplicated or distributed, or multiple cryptographic IP blocks (116) may exist in some of the security circuit (112). Additionally, the GPIO interface (216) may be omitted from the components (114) of the security circuit (112) for an IC chip that forms one of the tens of cores.

[0049] In some embodiments, any one of the circuit components (114) may include a cryptographic processor (230) that executes cryptographic operations of the component. In some embodiments, the cryptographic processor (230) is separate from the processor (106) of FIG. 1. In other embodiments, the cryptographic processor (230) is implemented within the processors (106). Additionally, any one of the circuit components (114) may include a cryptographic processor (230) (or processing core) for performing specific functions of the component.

[0050] FIG. 3 illustrates an exemplary cryptographic IP block (116) capable of implementing secure multi-rail control for sparsely encoded signals according to one or more embodiments. The cryptographic IP block (116) may provide symmetric encryption and decryption using one or more protocols and various key sizes such as 128b, 192b, or 256b. The component may select the encryption or decryption of data arriving in an amount of 16 bytes to be encrypted or decrypted using, for example, different block cipher operation modes.

[0051] A cryptographic IP block (116) may be connected to an IC interconnect (122) as a peripheral module. Communication with a processor may be performed through a set of control and status registers (302) capable of inputting or outputting data, keys, and / or status and control information. In embodiments, the registers (302) may provide an interface that allows a key manager to provide or receive keys without exposing them to a processor or other host connected to the IC interconnect (122). The cryptographic IP block (116) includes a plurality of components that are coupled to communicate with each other through one or more rails (120). In embodiments, rails (120) that transmit threshold signals are represented by thick arrows in FIG. 3, and these rails (120) may include a plurality of rails that implement secure multi-rail control for sparsely encoded signals.

[0052] As illustrated, the cryptographic IP block (116) includes a main control FSM (304) that controls access to software, registers, and other parts of the IC, and a core control FSM (308) that controls the operations of circuit components within the cryptographic core (306), and the cryptographic core (306) (e.g., an example of a cryptographic processor (230)). The main control FSM (304) and the core control FSM (308) may communicate handshake signals across the rails (120). In some embodiments, the main control FSM (304) may transmit signals to the core control FSM (308) to initiate and terminate the operations of the cryptographic core (306). For example, when data is input into the registers (302), the main control FSM (304) may transmit a handshake signal to the core control FSM (308) along the rails (120) to indicate that data has been input into the registers (302) for cryptographic operations. In response, the core control FSM (308) may transmit a handshake signal to the main control FSM (304) along the rails (120) to acknowledge or accept a request to the cryptographic core (306) to perform operations for data input to the registers (302). Then, the main control FSM (304) may transmit a signal to the registers (302) to write lock the registers (302) from releasing data to the cryptographic core (306) and / or inputting or outputting data.

[0053] To initiate operation, the core control FSM (308) may transmit multiplexer (MUX) selector signals to the MUXs (310) for multiplexing input data (e.g., using MUX (310-1)) or input keys (e.g., using MUX (310-2)). In some embodiments, the data and / or keys may be masked based on randomness provided to the MUXs (310). Once the data and / or keys have been multiplexed, the core control FSM (308) may transmit a write enable signal along the rails (120) to the status register (312) and / or key register (314) to allow the data / key to be written to each register.

[0054] Then, the data and key can be passed to data path logic (316) where various operations are performed on the values. For example, the data may undergo non-linear operations within the data path logic (316). The data path logic (316) may include any number of permutation boxes or GF (Galois-Field) multipliers. The data path logic (316) may perform multiple rounds of encryption / decryption on the data using the key. To protect against various attacks, the data path logic (316) may execute multiple parallel operations using multiple permutation boxes. The core control FSM (308) may communicate various signals to circuit components within the data path logic (316) to enable or disable operations within the data path logic (316) or to acknowledge that an operation has been performed.

[0055] When data passes through the data path logic (316), it can be multiplexed again using a set of MUXs (318). The core control FSM (308) can transmit MUX selector signals that control the operation of the MUXs (318) using rails (120). By doing so, the data can be multiplexed in MUX (318-1) to generate encrypted / decrypted data after the first round of operations, and the key can be multiplexed in MUX (318-2) to generate a round key used for encryption / decryption during the next round of operations. Then, the data and the round key can be passed back to the status register (312) and key register (314) via MUX (310) for another iteration of encryption / decryption.

[0056] When the data has completed operations (e.g., when the data has completed all rounds of encryption / decryption), the core control FSM (308) may transmit a handshake signal to the main control FSM (304) across the rails (120) to indicate that the data is ready to be output to the registers (302). In response, the main control FSM (304) may transmit a handshake signal across the rails (120) to acknowledge or accept a request to release the data to the registers. Then, the main control FSM (304) may transmit a signal (e.g., a write enable signal or a read enable signal) to the registers (302) along the rails (120) to allow the data to be written to the registers and then released along the interconnect (122). As a result, the data can be output from the cryptographic core (306) and written to the registers (302).

[0057] As described above, various signals may be transmitted by the main control FSM (304) or the core control FSM (308) to manage the operations of the cryptographic IP block (116), and as a result, handshake signals and other control signals within the cryptographic and other IP blocks are common targets for fault injection attacks. By successfully injecting a single fault into these signals, the IC may prematurely terminate the current operation (e.g., cause termination), prematurely start a new operation, or release intermediate data, thereby enabling a series of other attacks. In some cases, these attacks are directed at the cryptographic IP blocks because they may be used to maintain confidential information or to implement security features such as trust points or secure boot processes.

[0058] In some cases, threshold signals can be targeted by fault injection attacks (e.g., handshakes and other control signals) that utilize targeted lasers to flip transistors within IP blocks. For example, by changing bits of a threshold signal, logic flow can be redirected to terminate the execution of a chip process, release intermediate data related to the chip process, or repeat the process out of order. Information released as a result of fault injection attacks or logic redirections can provide an attacker with confidential information regarding the on-chip logic, which can be used to bypass security measures or design other attacks against the IC. With respect to cryptographic IP blocks, fault injection attacks can enable the release of cryptographic private keys to unauthorized individuals or systems. Accordingly, in some examples, the described security multi-rail control logic may be implemented only within cryptographic IP blocks. In other embodiments, the described sparse encoding may be used at any point on a hardware device where sensitive operations occur, for example, at any process involving access control or privilege levels of operation (e.g., power, register access, system reset). For example, the described security multi-rail control logic may be used between any two components of an IC that perform these sensitive operations.

[0059] Generally, threshold signals may have bit representations that do not require a set minimum Hamming distance, or circuit synthesis tools may reduce the validity of larger bit representations that follow the minimum Hamming distance. Accordingly, a fault injection attack may change these signals to an unintended but otherwise valid state, thereby directly affecting the operation of the IC. For example, when handshakes are out of order or changed out of time, interactions between the cryptographic IP block (116) and the cryptographic core (306) may be initiated (e.g., out-of-time output or termination from the cryptographic core (306)). As another example, manipulating the operations of MUX devices (e.g., MUX (310) or MUX (318)) may directly affect the data output to the registers (302) (e.g., affecting the type of data being latched).

[0060] To protect against fault injection attacks, sparse encoding may be used for any critical signals that directly affect circuit operations. For example, instead of using a single-bit representation to communicate critical signals over a single wire (or rail), n wires may be used for these critical signals, where n is greater than 1. In this way, each rail (120) used to connect circuit components can communicate a single bit of the sparsely encoded signal. Additionally, the critical signals may require the use of a minimum Hamming distance so that flipping a single bit (or a number of bits smaller than the Hamming distance) does not result in a valid solution. Specifically, an attacker may be required to flip a number of bits equal to the minimum Hamming distance simultaneously (or within a short amount of time) to change the critical signal into a different valid signal. As a non-limiting example, the minimum Hamming distance may be between 2 and 5 bits, but it should be understood that the minimum Hamming distance can be scaled to increase security enhancement. For two state signals (e.g., 1 bit, HIGH, or LOW), the number of rails (120) (e.g., between any two components) may be equal to the minimum Hamming distance. Accordingly, the number of rails (120) may be a scalable parameter for security enhancement.

[0061] In the non-security-enhanced case, the bit representation of the valid signal may be 1'b1, and the other valid signal may be represented as 1'b0. Thus, a single bit flip can change one valid signal into a different valid signal. In contrast, as an example of the described sparse encoding, the bit representation of one valid signal may be 3'b101, while the second valid signal may be 3'b010. In this case, since 3 bits must be changed to achieve a different valid signal, the Hamming distance is 3. Since attackers need to flip multiple bits of the signal simultaneously to maliciously change the signal into a different valid signal, a larger Hamming distance can strengthen the security parameters of the cryptographic IP block (116). This can be particularly difficult because a laser fault injection attack may require separate lasers to trigger different transistors simultaneously (or within a short time interval) to flip multiple bits of the signal. Generally speaking, an attacker will need to insert a number of faults equal to the Hamming distance to trigger a successful attack (e.g., generate a successful signal).

[0062] In some implementations, valid signals must be selected so that the bit representation does not include all bits having the same binary value. For example, in a 3-bit scenario, the bit representation of the valid signal must not be 3'b111 or 3'b000. Generally, attackers are more likely to succeed in flipping all bits in a signal to a single value than flipping multiple single bits in a word to different values. For example, attackers may be able to clear a word by converting all bits within the word to a binary value of 0 or a binary value of 1. Accordingly, to increase the security of the IC against fault injection attacks, valid signals may be defined to include both zero and non-zero bits.

[0063] To communicate valid signals as a mixture of HIGH and LOW bits, negative rails containing negative logic may be implemented. For example, if the first component wants to transmit a HIGH value (e.g., 1'b1), the HIGH 3-bit signal may be selected as (3'b100). In this example, the rail transmitting the most significant bit is a positive rail because it transmits the same value communicated by the first component. In contrast, the rail transmitting the second most significant bit and the rail transmitting the third most significant bit are negative rails because they transmit values ​​different from the value transmitted from the first component. In this example, the HIGH value (e.g., 1'b1) will be transmitted as 3'b100, and the LOW value (e.g., 1'b0) will be transmitted as 3'b011. As illustrated, positive and negative rails can be determined once the multi-bit representation of the HIGH or LOW value is determined. Once determined, multi-bit signals can be automatically generated by placing inverters on negative rails or at the output of a transmitting component (e.g., FSM). As a result, sparsely encoded signals can be represented as a combination of both HIGH and LOW signals.

[0064] In embodiments, inverters can be merged into a given rail (e.g., integrated with a given rail). For example, through the appropriate configuration of the synthesis tool (e.g., constraints, instructions), the synthesis tool can be made to merge inverters into a negative rail.

[0065] Considering that increasing the Hamming distance of valid signal values ​​may require a larger word size (e.g., more bits to describe the value), the elements of the cryptographic IP block (116) may be designed to accommodate a larger number of bits used for each signal. For example, MUX devices operating on the values ​​(e.g., MUXs (310) and MUXs (318)) may now be required to support a larger number of bits. Additionally, other logic (e.g., data path logic (316)) or registers (e.g., registers (302), status register (312), or key register (314)) within the cryptographic IP block (116) may need to be modified to accommodate the larger Hamming distance. In this way, the components may essentially operate in a higher bit format.

[0066] In the modalities, the multi-bit size of the MUX control signals presents additional challenges when using sparse encoding to increase security. For example, the MUX control signal may require more bits to reach the same minimum Hamming distance compared to a control signal that can be represented by a single bit. In these cases, the amount of rails (120) may be greater than or equal to the minimum Hamming distance.

[0067] As an example of multi-bit, multi-value MUX control signals, a suitable encoding can be determined with the minimum required number of bits to achieve a minimum Hamming distance of n for a sparse signal with three values. For example, if n is equal to 3, the following 5-bit values ​​can be used: 5'b01110, 5'b11000, and 5'b00001. For these signals, all FSM rails can drive a charged multi-bit signal (e.g., core control FSMs (308-1 - 308-n) drive the entire 5-bit signal). Additionally, a check unit (e.g., check unit (320)) can combine n copies into a single signal, for example, through bitwise OR. As a result, if the first control core FSM drives 5'b01110 and the second control core FSM drives 5'b11000, the combined signal is 5'b11110, which is invalid. In additional embodiments, the check unit may compare all signals with each other before bitwise OR combination.

[0068] While some of the components may simply be modified to accommodate larger bit signals, such changes may be more complex for the FSMs responsible for driving control signals (e.g., main control FSM (304) and core control FSM (308)), for example, if they include circuit synthesis devices that reduce circuit logic to allow the FSMs to operate more efficiently. In these cases, circuit synthesis can reduce the effect of redundant multi-bit representations used in sparse encodings when operations are performed through optimization, as further described in FIG. 4. As such, circuit synthesis tools can eliminate sparse encodings, thereby leaving the circuit vulnerable to fault injection attacks and, in some cases, increasing the attack surface. To counter this, some techniques can generate custom multi-bit gates that do not allow synthesis. Other techniques can disable circuit synthesis tools to ensure that security measures are not unintentionally removed. However, each of these techniques may not be optimal because custom multi-bit gates are expensive, not scalable, and can be spatially disadvantageous. Additionally, disabling circuit synthesis tools can disable other circuit synthesis operations that do not affect security measures and can enable higher performance of the IC.

[0069] In contrast to these techniques, multi-rail control for sparsely encoded signals essentially operates in a multi-bit format and may utilize multiple copies of each FSM to eliminate circuit synthesis across multiple rails (120) and FSMs (e.g., main control FSM (304) or core control FSM (308)). For example, each FSM (e.g., main control FSM (304) or core control FSM (308)) may be implemented as multiple FSMs (e.g., main control FSMs (304-1 to 304-n) or core control FSMs (308-1 to 304-n)). Each of the multiple FSMs may be communicably coupled to a single rail of the rails (120) and may communicate and receive a single bit of the sparsely encoded signals. In this way, the entire signal is not dependent on a single logic operation due to circuit synthesis. Additionally, the use of multiple FSMs may not require custom multi-bit gates, as identical copies of the comfortable FSMs can be placed in the circuit. In this way, these techniques can provide a scalable solution in which the number of FSMs and rails (120) can be scaled based on security, space, and cost constraints. Furthermore, these techniques can be scaled with the evolution of attacks. For example, if an attacker can now flip 3 bits simultaneously, the number of FSMs, rails (120), and minimum Hamming distances can be increased, for example, to 4.

[0070] In addition to using sparse encoding to increase the minimum Hamming distance between valid signals, the inspection modules (320) may be placed in areas where handshake or control signals are communicated. For example, the inspection modules (320) may be placed on rails (120) between the main control FSM (304) and the register (302), or the inspection modules (320) may be placed on rails (120) between the main control FSM (304) and the core control FSM (308), or the inspection modules (320) may be placed between the core control FSM (308) and the cryptographic core register (e.g., status register (312) or key register (314)) or MUX devices (e.g., MUXs (310) or MUXs (318)).

[0071] Inspection modules (320) can monitor signals transmitted across rails (120) and inspect to ensure that the transmitted signals represent valid encoding (e.g., that no faults are injected). For example, an inspection module of inspection modules (320) may store a predetermined set of valid states that a signal transmitted across rails (120) may represent. For a signal transmitting either a HIGH or LOW value, the inspection module may store a multi-bit representation of the HIGH value and a multi-bit representation of the LOW state. For signals that cannot be represented by only two states (e.g., MUX selector signals), the corresponding inspection module (320) may include a set of valid states containing more than two valid states. When storing a predetermined set of valid states, the inspection modules (320) may compare a signal transmitted along rails (120) with the predetermined set of valid states and determine whether the signal matches any valid state within the set of valid states. If the signal matches any of the valid states, the IC or cryptographic IP block (116) can continue normal operation. If the signal transmitted from the first component to the second component is determined not to represent a valid encoding (e.g., not in the list of valid states because a fault injection attack occurred), the error can be flagged for error handling and transmitted up-chain.

[0072] In some embodiments, error handling may be modified based on specific implementations. For example, when an error is triggered by a check module (e.g., suspected of being a fault injection attack), control FSMs (e.g., the main control FSM block and the core control FSM block of FIG. 3) may be locked or reset to limit the ability to modify processes running on the cryptographic IP block (116). In other embodiments, a shutdown or reset of the entire IC may be triggered when a sufficient number of errors are reached. Generally, the device may need to be reset to restore the state of the locked FSM or the locked chip. In other examples, the process may continue until the termination of the current process, but the output will be discarded. In this way, an attacker may not know when an attack triggers an error, and the mechanisms of the security system may remain hidden. Generally, errors detected by the check modules (320) may be handled in a number of ways, as described in relation to the alarm handler of FIG. 2. However, generally, the inspection modules (320) can maintain a record of the determined error by storing an indication of the error in the IC's register to ensure that the cryptographic IP block (116) recognizes that an error has occurred.

[0073] By implementing inspection modules (320) along rails (120), the cryptographic IP block (116) can determine whether a fault injection attack occurs before circuit operations can be altered by the attack. Furthermore, to trigger a successful fault injection, attackers may need to inject multiple faults into the signal simultaneously or within a short amount of time. For example, the first valid solution delivered may have a bit representation of 3'b100. During the first attack, the attacker may flip the first bit of the signal to have a bit representation of 3'b000. Subsequently, in the second attack, the attacker may flip the second bit of the signal to 3'b010. Finally, in the third attack, the attacker may flip the third bit of the signal to generate a valid solution of 3'b011. If there is no inspection module (320) at a location near the handshake or control signal, the cryptographic IP block (116) can operate on the valid signal 3'b011 even if it has been altered by a fault injection attack.

[0074] However, if inspection modules (320) are implemented, the cryptographic IP block (116) can identify the signal resulting from the first or second attack as an invalid signal and trigger an alarm. In this way, inspection modules can determine a fault injection attack even when the final result is a valid signal. In some embodiments, inspection modules can detect an attack even when bits are flipped rapidly in succession. In this manner, an attacker attempting to flip multiple bits to reach a different valid signal may need to flip each bit simultaneously, which may require multiple lasers and precise timing. Additionally, inspection modules may increase the overall difficulty of performing a successful fault injection attack because the altered signal will be inspected immediately after the attack. In this way, a potential attacker may need to flip multiple bits accurately in a single attempt.

[0075] In some embodiments, the inspection modules (320) between the main control FSM (304) and the core control FSM (306) may be removed from the cryptographic IP block (116) because faults injected into these signals can be propagated through signals controlling the data path (e.g., enabled signals or MUX selector signals) and flagged by the inspection modules (320) placed on these rails (120). In this way, circuit space and cost can be preserved without adversely affecting the security of the IC.

[0076] FIG. 4 illustrates exemplary logic (400) for an AND operation on sparsely encoded signals that are vulnerable to fault injection attacks due to circuit synthesis. In embodiments, the AND operator may be used to determine whether a signal is a HIGH value or a LOW value (e.g., by using the AND operator on a signal having a HIGH value as an input). In this example, the illustrated control logic utilizes 3-bit control signals. The logic (400) is used to perform an AND operation on signal A (402) and signal B (404). In embodiments, signal A (402) or signal B (404) may generally represent either the handshake or control signal described herein. Signal A (402) is a 3-bit signal having a most significant bit A0 (402-0), a second most significant bit A1 (402-1), and a third most significant bit A2 (402-2). Similarly, signal B is a 3-bit signal having a most significant bit B0 (404-0), a second most significant bit B1 (404-1), and a third most significant bit B2 (404-2). In embodiments, signals A (402) and B (404) may be sparsely encoded signals implemented using a minimum Hamming distance requirement.

[0077] The logic (400) represents synthetic logic optimized for redundancy, similar to the logic that can result from optimization by modern circuit synthesis tools. Each signal is originally transmitted in a 3-bit format by rails illustrated by arrows (thick arrows indicate rails transmitting multi-bit signals). Then, each bit is separated from the signals, and the most significant bit and the second most significant bit of each signal are input into a NAND operation. Specifically, bit A0 (402-0) and bit A1 (402-1) are input into a NAND operator, and bit B0 (404-0) and bit B1 (404-1) are input into a NAND operator. Then, the output is input into the third most significant bit of each signal and, respectively, into a NOR and an OR operator. As illustrated, the output of the NAND operation for bit A0 (402-0), bit A1 (402-1), and bit A2 (402-2) is input into a NOR operator. Similarly, the output of the NAND operation for bit B0 (404-0), bit B1 (404-1), and bit B2 (404-2) is input to the OR operator. The outputs of the NOR operator and the OR operator are passed to the ORNOT operator and the ANDNOT operator, respectively, and their outputs are input to each operator. As a result, the output of the ANDNOT gate becomes bit C1 (406-1), the second most significant bit of the output signal C (406), and the output of the ORNOT gate becomes bit C2 (406-2), the third most significant bit of the output signal C (406). As illustrated, the 3-bit representation is optimized into a 2-bit format, and the bit of the representation, in this case, the most significant bit C0 (not illustrated), is excluded from the output.

[0078] Throughout the logic (400), there are multiple locations where a single fault can be injected to flip the output of both bits (e.g., C1 (406-1), C2 (406-2)) within C (406) (exemplified by the dashed arrow in FIG. 4). Thus, the use of sparse encodings not only did not increase security against fault injection attacks as a result of circuit synthesis, but the attack surface actually increased because faults can now be injected into multiple rails to successfully change the signal to a different valid state. In this way, synthesis tools can cause the use of sparse encoding to simply shift the point where a successful fault injection attack can occur, and in some cases, instead of allowing multiple faults to generate a successful injection attack, they can increase the attack surface. Furthermore, due to circuit synthesis, the inspection module placed on the rails has become less optimal due to the removal of redundant bits in the circuit. Accordingly, careful control of the sparsely encoded signals is required to protect against possible fault injection attacks.

[0079] Although a 3-bit implementation example is illustrated, it should be noted that similar problems caused by circuit synthesis may occur in implementations using any number of bits. Therefore, multiple rail control can be useful for implementing sparsely encoded signals regardless of the specific number of bits used.

[0080] FIG. 5 illustrates exemplary logic (500) for an AND operation using secure multi-rail control for sparsely encoded signals according to one or more modalities. In this example, the illustrated control logic utilizes 3-bit control signals. Similar to the logic (400) of FIG. 4, the logic (500) is used to perform an AND operation between signal A (402) and signal B (404). Signal A (402) or signal B (404) may generally represent either the handshake or control signal described herein. Signal A (402) is a 3-bit signal having a most significant bit A0 (402-0), a second most significant bit A1 (402-1), and a third most significant bit A2 (402-2). Similarly, signal B is a 3-bit signal having a most significant bit B0 (404-0), a second most significant bit B1 (404-1), and a third most significant bit B2 (404-2). In this example, the rails carrying bit A2 (402-2) and bit B2 (404-2) are negative rails, and these bits are the negative values ​​of the bits transmitted by the first component (e.g., if the first component transmits a signal indicating a HIGH value, these bits will carry a LOW value and vice versa). Negative bits can be automatically generated using an inverter. In embodiments, signals A (402) and B (404) may be sparsely encoded signals implemented using a minimum Hamming distance requirement. Unlike the logic (400) of FIG. 4, each bit of the signals may be driven individually across each rail to protect against circuit synthesis across different rails (e.g., by a single FSM among the plurality of FSMs described in FIG. 3).

[0081] In an exemplary multi-rail control logic, all bits of sparsely encoded signals are processed and communicated individually. In this way, the multi-rail control logic can operate in a multi-bit environment by default to reduce the effects of fault injection attacks. In the logic (500), the signals are first transmitted as 3-bit signals across multi-bit rails (exemplified by thick arrows) until each bit is separated and transmitted across individual rails. Each set of corresponding bits of the signals (e.g., the most significant bit of A (402) and the most significant bit of B (404), the least significant bit of A (402) and the least significant bit of B (404), etc.) is input to an AND operator. For example, bits A0 (402-0) and B0 (404-0) are input to the AND operator, bits A1 (402-1) and B1 (404-1) are input to the AND operator, and bits A2 (402-2) and B2 (404-2) are input to the negative rail AND operator. In some embodiments, the negative rail AND operator is implemented on negative rails. In the negative rail AND operator, the inputs are inverted, the AND operator is performed, and then the output of the AND operator is negativeed. Although described in relation to the AND operator, it should be noted that the negative operator can be similarly performed for any other operation (e.g., OR, XOR, NOR, NAND). For example, inputs can be negativeed, operations can be performed, and outputs can be negativeed. The negative rail AND operator is further described in relation to FIG. 6. The outputs of the two AND operators and the negative rail AND operator are bit C0 (406-0), bit C1 (406-1), and bit C2 (406-2), respectively. Then, these bits are collected to become the output signal C (406).

[0082] Then, the output signal C (406) is provided as an input to a tester (506) (e.g., an example of the test modules (320) of FIG. 3). The tester (506) can compare the output signal C (406) with a set of predetermined valid states stored in the IC. If the tester (506) determines that the signal C does not correspond to one of the predetermined valid states stored in the IC, an error (502) may be flagged. The error may be passed up-chain for error handling, for example, as described in relation to the alarm handler of FIG. 2. The output signal C (504) may be provided to a second component of the IC to which the signal was transmitted. When it is determined that the signal C (406) corresponds to one of the valid states, the output signal C (504) may correspond to the output signal C (406). When the output signal C (406) does not correspond to an effective state, the output signal C (504) may not be output, may be a different value that does not correspond to the output signal (406), or may be a value that corresponds to the output signal (406). In this way, errors may be handled in a number of ways based on the embodiment.

[0083] Unlike the logic (400) of FIG. 4, the output signal C (406) of FIG. 5 has the same number of bits as the input signal A (402) and the input signal B (404). Accordingly, since the output signal C (406) corresponds to a format of predetermined states, the checker (506) can be effective in determining whether the signal has been altered by a fault injection attack. Additionally, the logic (500) does not include a position where injecting a single fault can flip each bit of the output signal C (406). In this way, the logic (500) may not be vulnerable to a single fault injection like the logic (400) of FIG. 4.

[0084] FIGS. 6a and 6b illustrate exemplary logic for implementing secure multi-rail control for sparsely encoded signals according to one or more embodiments. For example, FIG. 6a illustrates how control logic for multiple rails is automatically determined for positive and negative rails. The logic determines whether each rail is a positive rail or a negative rail by determining whether a HIGH value is represented as a 1'b1 signal. If so, the rail is determined to be a positive rail, and appropriate positive rail logic (e.g., the AND operator described in FIG. 5) can be used to control operations on the signals transmitted by the rail. Otherwise, negative rail logic (e.g., the negative rail AND operator described in FIG. 5) can be used to control operations on the signals transmitted by the rail.

[0085] FIG. 6b illustrates examples of a positive rail AND operator and a negative rail AND operator. For example, a positive rail operator can perform an AND operation on the bits input to the operator and provide an output from the operation. In contrast, a negative rail AND operator can invert the inputs for the AND operation, perform an AND operation on the inverted inputs, and invert the resulting output. In this way, negative rail logic can generate true negative logic using inverters within the negative rail. Although described for AND operators, negative rail logic can be applied to any other operation. For example, a negative OR operator can negative the inputs for the operation, perform an OR operation, and negative the output. The logic can be similarly applied to NAND operations, XOR operations, NOR operations, or any other logical operations.

[0086] In the embodiments, the synthesis tool may be configured to merge inverters into a given rail (e.g., constrained). For example, by placing a synthesis constraint on the and_n hierarchy (as exemplified in FIG. 6b), the synthesis tool may merge inverters into a negative rail. In this way, the synthesis tools may not perform logic optimization across the hierarchy boundaries of, for example, the AND_n module. Consequently, maintenance of a single copy of the code (e.g., and_p) can be achieved (e.g., and_n may be implemented as a wrapper having some inverters). This implementation is useful when the system includes one or more FSMs with tens, hundreds, or thousands of logic gates, and in some cases, the logic within the rails may not be limited to simple logic gates (e.g., AND, NAND, OR, NOR). These hierarchy constraints are described only as examples, and any various additional configurations including hierarchy constraints may be implemented to eliminate redundant rails and / or security measures.

[0087] FIG. 7 illustrates an exemplary method (700) for transmitting sparsely encoded signals using multiple rails. The method (700) is illustrated as a set of blocks specifying operations that may be performed, but are not necessarily limited to the order or combinations illustrated for performing operations by each block. Additionally, any one or more operations may be repeated, combined, rearranged, or linked to provide a wide range of additional and / or alternative methods. These techniques are not limited to being performed by a single entity or by multiple entities operating on a single device. In some embodiments, the operations or behaviors of the method (700) are implemented or managed by any one of a cryptographic IP block (116), an FSM (e.g., a main control FSM (304) and / or a core control FSM (308)), and / or circuit components (114). For clarity, the method is described with reference to the elements of FIGS. 1 through 6.

[0088] In 702, a first signal representing a first bit of a sparsely encoded signal is transmitted by the first component and to the second component through a first rail that communicably couples the first component to the second component. In embodiments, the first rail is a single rail from a plurality of rails (120). The first rail may be a positive rail or a negative rail. The first signal may be transmitted by each FSM of a plurality of FSMs (e.g., a main control FSM (304) or a core control FSM (308)). The first or second component may be a main control FSM (304), a core control FSM (308), a register (e.g., register (302), status register (312), or key register (314)), a MUX device (e.g., MUXs (310) or MUXs (318), or any other circuit component (114) within the IC (104). In embodiments, the sparsely encoded signal may represent a handshake signal, a write-enabled signal, a register set signal, or a MUX selector signal. Additionally, the first signal may be a HIGH signal or a LOW signal.

[0089] In 704, a second signal representing a second bit of a sparsely encoded signal is transmitted to the second component by the first component and through a first rail that commutatively couples the first component to the second component. The second rail may be a rail different from the first rail from a plurality of rails (120). In embodiments, the second signal may be a HIGH or LOW signal. In some embodiments, at least one of the first or second rails is a negative rail so that the sparsely encoded signal may be represented as a combination of HIGH and LOW values. In embodiments, the first component and the second component each include a plurality of FSMs, and each FSM of the first component commutatively couples to each FSM of the second component through each rail.

[0090] In 706, the first signal and the second signal are received in the second component. In the embodiments, the first rail and the second rail are coupled to the inspection module (320), and the output of the inspection module (320) is coupled to the second component. The inspection module (320) may store a plurality of predetermined valid states in its own memory or in any other memory of the IC. The inspection module (320) may compare a sparsely encoded signal with the predetermined valid states stored in memory. If the sparsely encoded signal does not match a predetermined valid state of the sparsely encoded signal, the inspection module (320) may output an error (502) to the alarm handler (208). If the sparsely encoded signal matches a predetermined valid state, the sparsely encoded signal may be output from the inspection module (320) to the second component.

[0091] In 708, the IC (104) performs circuit operations based on the first signal and the second signal. For example, the IC (104) may perform write to memory, MUX operations, or any other circuit operations. In some embodiments, the circuit operations may be used to perform encryption or decryption of data. As such, the first component and the second component may be implemented within the cryptographic IP block (116) of the IC (104). Alternatively, one or both of the first and second components may be implemented outside the cryptographic IP block (116) but within the IC (104).

[0092] FIG. 8 illustrates various components of an exemplary electronic device (800) capable of implementing secure multi-rail control for sparsely encoded signals according to one or more embodiments. The electronic device (800) may be implemented as any single or multiple fixed, mobile, standalone, or embedded devices; as a consumer, computer, portable, user, server, communication, telephone, navigation, gaming, audio, camera, messaging, media playback, and / or other type of electronic device (800), such as a smartphone illustrated as device (102) in FIG. 1. One or more of the illustrated components may be realized as individual components or as integrated components on at least one IC of the electronic device (800). Generally, the various components of the electronic device (800) are combined through an interconnect (122) and / or one or more fabrics that support communication between the components according to one or more embodiments of secure multi-rail control for sparsely encoded signals.

[0093] The electronic device (800) may include one or more communication transceivers (126) that enable wired and / or wireless communication of device data (110), such as received data, transmitted data, or other information identified in the present specification. Exemplary communication transceivers (126) include a near-field communication (NFC) transceiver, a wireless personal area network (PAN) (WPAN) radio compliant with various IEEE 802.15 (Bluetooth™) standards, a wireless near-field network (LAN) (WLAN) radio compliant with any of the various IEEE 802.11 (WiFi™) standards, a wireless wide area network (WAN) (WWAN) radio for cellular phones (e.g., one compliant with the 3G Partnership Project (3GPP)), a wireless metropolitan area network (MAN) (WMAN) radio compliant with various IEEE 802.16 (WiMAX™) standards, an infrared (IR) transceiver compliant with the IrDA (Infrared Data Association) protocol, and a wired near-field network (LAN) (WLAN) Ethernet transceiver.

[0094] The electronic device (800) may also include one or more data input ports (128) through which any type of data, media content, and / or other inputs, such as user-selectable inputs, messages, applications, music, television content, recorded video content, and sensors such as microphones or cameras, and any other type of audio, video, and / or image data received from any content and / or data sources may be received. The data input ports (128) may include a USB port, a coaxial cable port, a fiber optic port for fiber interconnects or cabling, and other serial or parallel connectors (including internal connectors) for flash memory, DVD, CD, etc. These data input ports (128) may be used to connect the electronic device to components, peripherals, or accessories such as keyboards, microphones, cameras, or other sensors.

[0095] The electronic device (800) of such example comprises at least one processor (106) (e.g., any one of an application processor, a microprocessor, a digital signal processor (DSP), a controller, etc.), which may comprise a combined processor and memory system (e.g., implemented as part of an SoC), which processes (e.g., executes) computer-executable instructions to control the operation of the device. The processor (106) may be implemented as an application processor, an embedded controller, a microcontroller, a security processor, an artificial intelligence (AI) accelerator, etc. Generally, the processor or processing system may be implemented at least partially in hardware, which may include components of an integrated circuit or on-chip system, a digital signal processor (DSP), an application-specific integrated circuit (ASIC), a field programmable gate array (FPGA), a complex programmable logic device (CPLD), and other embodiments in silicon and / or other materials.

[0096] Alternatively or additionally, the electronic device (800) may be implemented as any one or combination of electronic circuits, which may include software, hardware, firmware, or fixed logic circuits implemented in conjunction with processing and control circuits generally denoted as 802 (as electronic circuit (802)). The electronic circuit (802) may implement executable or hardware-based modules (not shown in FIG. 8) through, for example, processing / computer-executable instructions stored on a computer-readable medium, logic circuits and / or hardware (e.g., FPGA, etc.).

[0097] In embodiments, the electronic device (800) includes an interconnect (122) which may include any one or more of a system bus, interconnect, crossbar, data transmission system, or other switch fabric that combine various components within the device to enable various modes of signaling and / or communication through sparse encoding. The system bus or interconnect may include any one or a combination of different bus structures, such as a memory bus or memory controller, a peripheral bus, a parity block, an error correction code (ECC) block, a universal serial bus, and / or a processor or local bus utilizing any of various bus architectures.

[0098] The electronic device (800) also includes one or more memory devices (804) that enable data storage, examples of which include random access memory (RAM), non-volatile memory (e.g., read-only memory (ROM), flash memory, erasable programmable read-only memory (EPROM), electrically erasable programmable read-only memory (EEPROM), and disk storage devices. Accordingly, the memory device(s) (804) may be distributed across different logical storage levels of the system as well as across different physical components. The memory device(s) (804) provide a data storage mechanism for storing device data (110), other types of code and / or data, and various device applications (806) (e.g., software applications or programs). For example, an operating system (808) may be maintained as software instructions within the memory device (804) and executed by the processor (106).

[0099] In some embodiments, the electronic device (800) also includes an audio and / or video processing system (810) that processes audio data and / or transmits audio and video data to an audio system (812) and / or display system (814) (e.g., a video buffer or the screen of a smartphone or camera). The audio system (812) and / or display system (814) may include any devices that process, display, and / or otherwise render audio, video, display, and / or image data. Display data and audio signals may be communicated to the audio component and / or display component via an RF (radio frequency) link, an S-video link, an HDMI (high-definition multimedia interface), a composite video link, a component video link, a DVI (digital video interface), an analog audio connection, a video bus, or other similar communication link, such as a media data port (816). In some embodiments, the audio system (812) and / or display system (814) are external or separate components of the electronic device (800). Alternatively, the display system (814) may be an integrated component of an exemplary electronic device (800), such as part of an integrated touch interface, for example.

[0100] The electronic device (800) of FIG. 8 is an exemplary implementation of the device (102) of FIG. 1 and is an exemplary implementation of a device capable of implementing secure multi-rail control for sparsely encoded signals as described with reference to FIG. 1 through 7. Accordingly, the electronic device (800) may include a security circuit (112) which may be a separate IC chip or may be included as part of another IC chip or device, such as a processor (106), an electronic circuit (802), or a memory device (804). Thus, one or more of the exemplary components may be integrated on the same IC chip, such as an SoC, or at least on a single printed circuit board (PCB).

[0101] The security circuit section (112) may include a cryptographic IP block (116) that performs cryptographic security operations using encryption or decryption. The cryptographic IP block (116) may include various circuit components configured to communicate sparsely encoded signals according to one or more aspects of security multi-rail control for sparsely encoded signals. For example, the cryptographic IP block (116) may include a plurality of rails that each transmit a single bit of the sparsely encoded signals. Each of the plurality of rails may be communicably coupled to one of a plurality of FSMs that communicate each bit of the sparsely encoded signal through each rail. Thus, the principles of security multi-rail control for sparsely encoded signals as described herein may be implemented by or together with the electronic device (800) of FIG. 8.

[0102] Unless the context indicates otherwise, the use of the word “or” herein may be considered as a use of a term that allows for the inclusion or application of one or more items linked by the word “or” (e.g., the phrase “A or B” may be interpreted as allowing only “A,” or only “B,” or both “A” and “B)). Additionally, as used herein, a phrase referring to “at least one” of a list of items refers to any combination of these items comprising a single member. For example, “at least one of a, b, or c” may cover a, b, c, ab, ac, bc, and abc, as well as any combination of multiple identical elements (e.g., aa, aaa, aab, aac, abb, acc, bb, bbb, bbc, cc, and ccc, or any other order of a, b, and c). Additionally, items shown in the accompanying drawings and terms discussed herein may represent one or more items or terms, and thus single or multiple forms of items and terms described herein may be referred to interchangeably. Although embodiments of a secure cryptographic processor have been described in language specific to specific features and / or methods, the subject matter of the appended claims is not necessarily limited to the specific features or methods described. Rather, specific features and methods are disclosed as exemplary embodiments for secure cryptographic processing.

[0103] Examples of secure multi-rail control for sparsely encoded signals are provided below:

[0104] Example 1: An integrated circuit comprising: a first component including a first plurality of finite state machines (FSMs); a second component; and a plurality of individual data lines configured to communicate a sparsely encoded signal having a predetermined minimum Hamming distance between the first component and the second component — each FSM of the first plurality of FSMs is communicably coupled to the second component through each of the individual data lines, and each of the individual data lines is configured to communicate each single bit of the sparsely encoded signal.

[0105] Example 2: An integrated circuit in which, in any one of the examples described above, the second component comprises a second plurality of FSMs. Optionally, each FSM of the first plurality of FSMs can be communicateably coupled to each FSM of the second plurality of FSMs through each of the data lines of the plurality of individual data lines.

[0106] Example 3: In any one of the examples described above, the sparsely encoded signal represents a handshake between the first component and the second component.

[0107] Example 4: An integrated circuit in which, in any one of the examples described above, a plurality of individual data lines comprises: at least one positive data line; and at least one negative data line configured to transmit a second signal different from a first signal transmitted by at least one positive data line.

[0108] Example 5: In any one of the examples described above, one or more of the first plurality of FSMs are communicably coupled to a second component through each of the negative data lines of at least one negative data line; and each negative data line or one or more of the first plurality of FSMs includes an inversion circuit configured to invert the output of a single bit of a sparsely encoded signal, wherein the single bit is communicated using each negative data line.

[0109] Example 6: An integrated circuit in which, in any one of the examples described above, at least one positive data line includes logic that causes a first signal to perform a positive circuit operation and / or; and at least one negative data line includes logic that causes a second signal to perform a negative circuit operation.

[0110] Example 7: An integrated circuit in which, in any one of the examples described above, a plurality of individual data lines comprises a plurality of data lines equal to the minimum Hamming distance of a sparsely encoded signal.

[0111] Example 8: An integrated circuit comprising, in any one of the examples described above, a cryptographic intellectual property block comprising a first component, a second component, and a plurality of individual data lines.

[0112] Example 9: An integrated circuit, wherein in any one of the examples described above, further comprises a test module coupled to a plurality of individual data lines, the test module being configured to determine the validity of a sparsely encoded signal communicated using a plurality of individual data lines.

[0113] Example 10: In any one of the examples described above, the inspection module is configured to: store a predefined set of valid states; compare the predefined set of valid states with a sparsely encoded signal communicated using a plurality of individual data lines; and determine whether the sparsely encoded signal matches any one valid state among the predefined set of valid states based on the comparison between the predefined set of valid states and the sparsely encoded signal.

[0114] Example 11: An integrated circuit, wherein in any one of the examples described above, the inspection module is configured to report an error in response to a determination that a sparsely encoded signal does not match any one of a predefined set of valid states.

[0115] Example 12: An integrated circuit in which, in any one of the aforementioned examples, a predefined set of effective states includes a high state and a low state.

[0116] Example 13: An integrated circuit in which, in any one of the examples described above, the second component comprises a multiplexer device. Optionally, a sparsely encoded signal may represent a multiplexer selector control signal between the first component and the second component.

[0117] Example 14: An integrated circuit in which, in any one of the examples described above, the second component comprises a storage register or a configuration and setting register. Optionally, a sparsely encoded signal represents: a register setting configured by the first component; or at least one of a write-enabled control signal between the first component and the second component.

[0118] Example 15: A method for communicating a sparsely encoded signal performed by an integrated circuit as described by any one of the examples above. For example, the method may include: transmitting a first signal representing a first bit of a sparsely encoded signal through a first rail that commutatively couples the first component to a second component of the integrated circuit by a first component of the integrated circuit; transmitting a second signal representing a second bit of a sparsely encoded signal through a second rail that commutatively couples the first component to a second component by a first component of the integrated circuit; receiving the first signal and the second signal by a second component of the integrated circuit; and performing a circuit operation based on the first signal and the second signal. The circuit operation may be performed by the integrated circuit.

[0119] Although aspects of the described apparatuses, systems, and methods for implementing secure multi-rail control for sparsely encoded signals have been described in language specific to the features and / or methods, the subject matter of the appended claims is not necessarily limited to the specific features or methods described. Rather, specific features and methods are disclosed as exemplary embodiments of secure multi-rail control for sparsely encoded signals, and other equivalent features and methods are intended to be within the scope of the appended claims. Furthermore, it should be understood that various aspects of secure multi-rail control for sparsely encoded signals are described, and each described aspect may be implemented independently or in relation to one or more other described aspects.

Claims

Claim 1 An integrated circuit comprising: a first component including a first plurality of finite state machines (FSMs); a second component; and a plurality of individual data lines configured to communicate a sparsely encoded signal having a predetermined minimum Hamming distance between the first component and the second component—each FSM of the first plurality of FSMs is communicably coupled to the second component through each of the plurality of individual data lines, and each of the plurality of individual data lines is configured to communicate a single bit of the sparsely encoded signal, and the plurality of individual data lines include at least one positive data line and at least one negative data line configured to transmit a second signal different from a first signal transmitted by the at least one positive data line. Claim 2 An integrated circuit according to claim 1, wherein the second component comprises a second plurality of FSMs; wherein each FSM of the first plurality of FSMs is communically coupled to each FSM of the second plurality of FSMs through each data line of the plurality of individual data lines. Claim 3 An integrated circuit according to paragraph 2, wherein the sparsely encoded signal represents a handshake between the first component and the second component. Claim 4 An integrated circuit according to claim 1, wherein the sparsely encoded signal comprises a signaling having non-adjacent codewords or a set of encoded values ​​having a Hamming distance of at least 2. Claim 5 An integrated circuit according to claim 1, wherein one or more of the first plurality of FSMs are communicably coupled to the second component through each of the at least one negative data line; and each of the negative data line or one or more of the first plurality of FSMs includes an inversion circuit configured to invert the output of a single bit of the sparsely encoded signal, wherein the single bit is communicated using each of the negative data lines. Claim 6 An integrated circuit according to claim 1, wherein at least one positive data line includes logic that causes the first signal to perform a positive circuit operation; and at least one negative data line includes logic that causes the second signal to perform a negative circuit operation. Claim 7 An integrated circuit according to claim 1, wherein the plurality of individual data lines comprises a plurality of data lines equal to the minimum Hamming distance of the sparsely encoded signal. Claim 8 An integrated circuit according to claim 1, further comprising a cryptographic intellectual property block including the first component, the second component, and the plurality of individual data lines. Claim 9 An integrated circuit according to claim 1, further comprising a test module coupled to the plurality of individual data lines, wherein the test module is configured to determine the validity of the sparsely encoded signal communicated using the plurality of individual data lines. Claim 10 An integrated circuit according to claim 9, wherein the inspection module is configured to: store a predefined set of valid states; compare the predefined set of valid states with the sparsely encoded signal communicated using the plurality of individual data lines; and determine whether the sparsely encoded signal matches any one valid state among the predefined set of valid states based on the comparison between the predefined set of valid states and the sparsely encoded signal. Claim 11 An integrated circuit according to claim 10, wherein the inspection module is configured to report an error in response to a determination that the sparsely encoded signal does not match any one of the predefined sets of valid states. Claim 12 An integrated circuit according to claim 10, wherein the predefined set of effective states includes a high state and a low state. Claim 13 An integrated circuit according to claim 1, wherein the second component includes a multiplexer device; and the sparsely encoded signal represents a multiplexer selector control signal between the first component and the second component. Claim 14 An integrated circuit according to claim 1, wherein the second component comprises a storage register or a configuration and setting register; and the sparsely encoded signal represents at least one of: a register setting configured by the first component; or a write-enabled control signal between the first component and the second component. Claim 15 An integrated circuit according to claim 11, wherein the inspection module is further configured to place at least one of the first component or the second component in a secure state in response to a determination that the sparsely encoded signal does not match any one of the valid states in a predefined set of valid states. Claim 16 An integrated circuit according to paragraph 15, wherein the security state includes a locked state or a reset state. Claim 17 An integrated circuit according to claim 11, wherein the inspection module is further configured such that the output of a process performed by the first component and the second component is discarded after a predetermined time has elapsed following the completion of the processor or the completion of the process. Claim 18 In claim 9, the integrated circuit is further configured such that the inspection module combines multiple signals received from the plurality of individual data lines into a single signal. Claim 19 An integrated circuit according to claim 1, wherein the first plurality of FSMs comprises a plurality of identical FSMs. Claim 20 An integrated circuit according to claim 1, wherein each valid state of the sparsely encoded signal comprises at least one first bit having a High value and at least one second bit having a Low value. Claim 21 A method for communicating a sparsely encoded signal performed by an integrated circuit of any one of claims 1 to 20.

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