Autonomous device comprising a control subsystem, control subsystem, method to operate a control subsystem, computer program product and computer-readable storage medium

The autonomous device's control subsystem enhances safety function testing by using input and test patterns to detect faults in complex processing chains, ensuring reliable operation and safety through redundant control lanes and database verification, addressing the limitations of existing testing methods.

WO2024245579A1PCT designated stage expired Publication Date: 2024-12-05SIEMENS AG
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Patent Information

Application Number
PCT/EP2023/064849
Authority / Receiving Office
WO · WO
Patent Type
Applications
Current Assignee / Owner
Filing Date
2023-06-02
Publication Date
2024-12-05

AI Technical Summary

Technical Problem

Current methods are inadequate for thoroughly testing complex safety function processing chains in autonomous devices, particularly in complex hardware systems, as they may not detect faults that arise from diverse instructions or limited bit patterns, leading to potential safety hazards.

Method used

An autonomous device with a control subsystem that performs control cycles, providing input and test patterns to safety functions to determine safety outputs, activating safety modes when necessary, and initiating test operations to detect faults, including the use of redundant control lanes and database patterns to verify safety function reliability.

Benefits of technology

Enables comprehensive validation of safety functions, detecting faults that might be missed by traditional testing methods, ensuring safer operation of autonomous devices by activating appropriate safety modes and reducing mission time through efficient fault detection and correction.

✦ Generated by Eureka AI based on patent content.

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Abstract

The invention is related to an autonomous device (1) comprising a control subsystem (2) configured to perform a control operation of a device module (3) of the autonomous device (1), comprising control cycles, wherein the control subsystem (2) is configured to, in the respective control cycle, provide an input pattern (16) to a safety function (14) of the control subsystem (2) to determine a safety function (14) output (18) for the input pattern (16) by means of the safety function (14). The control subsystem (2) is configured to perform a test operation to test the safety function (14), the test operation comprising test cycles, wherein the control subsystem (2) is configured to, in the respective test cycle, provide a test pattern (17) to the safety function (14) of the control subsystem (2) to determine the safety function (14) output (18) for the test pattern (17) by means of the safety function (14).
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Description

[0001] Description

[0002] Autonomous device comprising a control subsystem, control subsystem, method to operate a control subsystem, computer program product and computer-readable storage medium

[0003] Independent of the grammatical term usage , individuals with male , female or other gender identities are included within the term .

[0004] The invention relates to an autonomous device comprising a control subsystem, a control subsystem, a method to operate a control subsystem, a computer program product , and a computer-readable storage medium .

[0005] Autonomous devices like robots and machines are configured to operate autonomously in a factory . Such an autonomous device , may be an autonomous mobile robot for pallet transport . The autonomous device may be controlled by a control subsystem that is split into sensing, logic, and actuation subfunctions .

[0006] In order to allow a safe operation of the autonomous device so called safety functions are used . Safe in this context could mean, that the autonomous devices is safe to be operated without further precautions in spaces where trained humans are working at the same time , in spaces where untrained humans are working at the same time , and in spaces where other machines are working at the same time or trained or untrained humans are pursuing leisure activities , or any combination of the above .

[0007] The safety of the autonomous device is related to functional safety . Functional safety is provided by the safety functions operated by the autonomous device . Safety functions are automatic functions that are configured to perform predefined actions in response to detected dangerous patterns in the input pattern in order to avoid a risk from the operation of the autonomous device .

[0008] In order to ensure reliable operation of the safety function, audits involving tests are required . The audit is not limited to the safety function itsel f but includes all components of the processing chain of the autonomous device involved to ensure functional safety . Therefore , the sensing devices , the hardware operating the safety function and the software of the safety function must be validated .

[0009] Until now, the current state of the art has been to test subcomponents of the system, such as the hardware and its internal building blocks , such as memory, integer processing unit , floating point processing unit , with power-up and continuous built-in sel f-tests . The aim of the tests is to detect possible sleeping faults in the components , faults that are not yet detected . In the case of complex hardware , this is not suf ficient to diagnose faults in the concrete , complex processing chains of the safety functions . As an example , it may take too long to actually test an entire RAM of a modern computer . There may also be too many di f ferent instructions that may be in error and / or a set of bit patterns may be too limited to test them all .

[0010] It is an obj ective of the present invention to provide a solution that allows validation of complex safety function processing chains .

[0011] This obj ective is solved by an autonomous device comprising a control subsystem, a control subsystem, a method to operate a control subsystem, a computer program product and a computer- readable storage medium according to the independent claims . Advantageous forms of configuration are presented in the dependent claims .

[0012] A first aspect of the invention is related to an autonomous device comprising a control subsystem configured to perform a control operation of a device module of the autonomous device . In other words , the control subsystem is configured to control the device module of the autonomous device in a control operation . The control operation comprises control cycles . In other words , the control subsystem is configured to perform the control cycles of the control operation .

[0013] The control subsystem is configured to , in the respective control cycle , provide an input pattern to a safety function of the control subsystem to determine a safety function output for the input pattern by means of the safety function . In other words the control subsystem is configured to provide the input pattern to the safety function in the respective control cycle . The safety function provides the safety function output of the respective control cycle for the input pattern . The input pattern may comprise sensor data of sensor devices of the autonomous device describing an environment of the autonomous device . The safety function may be configured to ensure a safe operation of the autonomous device by analysing the input pattern for the presence of a dangerous pattern . A dangerous pattern may be related to the presence of an obstacle in the way of the autonomous device . The safety function output may indicate the presence of a dangerous pattern in the input pattern, a type of the dangerous pattern or a level of a safety hazard .

[0014] The control subsystem is configured to activate a predefined safety mode of the control subsystem when the safety function output ful fils a predefined safety criterion . Activation of the predefined safety mode may involve the control subsystem applying a brake to the autonomous device or changing the operating parameters to operate the autonomous device . The predefined safety criterion may comprise a detection of a predefined safety hazard or a predefined level of the safety hazard .

[0015] The control subsystem is configured to perform a test operation to test the safety function . In test mode , the predefined safety mode will not be initiated . The test operation comprises test cycles , wherein the control subsystem is configured to , in the respective test cycle , provide a test pattern to the safety function of the control subsystem to determine the safety function output for the test pattern by means of the safety function . In other words , the control subsystem is configured to perform the test operation . The test operation comprises the test cycles . The control subsystem is configured to provide the test pattern to the safety function in the respective test cycle . The safety function provides the safety function output investigated by the safety function in the test cycle for the test pattern of the test pattern .

[0016] The test operation may be designed to determine whether the safety function is reliable . The test operation may be provided to detect faults in the safety function . The control subsystem is configured to determine the safety function output for the test pattern wherein the control subsystem does not activate the safety mode of the control subsystem when the safety function output in the test cycle ful fils the predefined safety criterion . A respective of the test cycles may be performed after a predefined number of control cycles . The test pattern may be a random pattern or a predefined pattern similar to the input pattern . The test pattern may comprise randomised sensor data or may be configured to trigger a predefined safety function output . By providing the test patterns to the safety function it may be possible to enlarge a data space of patterns provided to the safety function . By providing the test patterns , it may be possible to detect faults in safety function that may not be detected by providing solely the input patterns . For example , the autonomous device may operate in an environment with suf ficient light . The input patterns may include sensor data consisting of photographs with suf ficient illumination . In this case , a failure of the safety function that may occur when input patterns with underexposed photos are provided to the safety function may go undetected . The test patterns may therefore contain underexposed photographs to compensate for the absence of underexposed photographs in the input patterns . By providing test patterns with underexposed photos , the error can be detected even i f the input patterns contain only suf ficiently exposed photos .

[0017] The control subsystem is configured to initiate a predefined failure mode of the control subsystem, when the respective safety function output of at least one of the test cycles and / or the safety function outputs of the test operation ful fils a predefined failure criterion . The failure mode may comprise a sending of a predefined signal to a central device outside the autonomous device to inform the central device about an occurrence of the failure . The failure criterion may comprise an occurrence of a speci fic output of the safety function output related to a mal function of the safety function .

[0018] The invention has the advantage that failures may be detected by an inj ection of the test patterns .

[0019] According to a further embodiment of the invention the control subsystem is configured to log the input patterns provided to the safety function during the control operation . In other words the input patterns provided to the safety function are stored by the control subsystem . The control subsystem is configured to initiate the predefined test operation when the logged input patterns ful fil a predefined input pattern condition within a predefined number of control cycles and / or a predefined time . In other words the control subsystem may initiate the predefined test operation when the predefined input pattern condition is ful filled . The predefined condition of the input pattern can be related to a particular input pattern or to the input patterns as a whole . The input pattern condition has to be ful filled within the number of control cycles and / or within the predefined time . As an example the predefined input pattern condition may be related to a data space of the input patterns provided to the safety function within a predefined number of control cycles . The predefined input pattern condition may require that a speci fic kind of the input pattern has to be provided within the predefined number of control cycles . As an example the predefined kind of the input pattern may be related to a dark pattern . When the number of input patterns comprising dark pattern is below a predefined number the control subsystem initiates the predefined test operation to provide test patterns to the safety function comprising dark patterns . The invention has the advantage that the test patterns may be provided to the safety function when the input patterns are not suf ficient to check the reliability of the safety function .

[0020] According to further embodiment of the invention the control subsystem is configured to log the safety function outputs provided by the safety function during the control operation and to initiate the predefined test operation when the logged safety function outputs ful fil a predefined output condition within a predefined number of control cycles and / or within a predefined time . In other words the control subsystem stores the safety function outputs provided by the safety function during the control operation . The control subsystem is configured to initiate the predefined test operation when the predefined output condition is ful filled within the predefined number of control cycles and / or within the predefined time . As an example the predefined output condition may require that at least one safety function output related to a detection of the dangerous pattern in the input pattern has to be detected within the predefined number of control cycles . The documents of the predefined safety function output may indicate that the safety function is configured to detect dangerous patterns . I f the respective output is not detected within the predefined number of control cycles it may be necessary to provide test patterns to prove whether the safety function is configured to detect dangerous patterns . According to a further embodiment of the invention the control subsystem comprises a database comprising database patterns and respective expected safety function outputs for the database patterns . In other words the database may be stored in the control subsystem . The database comprises the database patterns . Each of the database patterns may be linked to a respective expected safety function output . The respective expected safety function output may describe the safety function output that is expected from the safety function, when the respective database pattern is provided to the safety function . The expected safety function output may be set as a reference . When the safety function output provided by the safety function is not consistent with the expected safety function output the safety function may comprise a failure . The control subsystem is configured to detect a consistency of the input pattern with the respective database pattern and or the control system is configured to provide the respective database pattern to the safety function as a test pattern . The control subsystem is configured to detect an inconsistency between the expected safety function output for the database pattern and the safety function output for the database pattern provided by the safety function . The predefined failure criterion comprises the inconsistency between the expected safety function output for the database pattern and the safety function output for the database pattern provided by the safety function .

[0021] In other words a first alternative describes a passive approach wherein the control subsystem proves whether the input pattern is consistent with one of the database patterns . In a next step the control subsystem proves whether the safety function output for the input pattern consistent with the database pattern is consistent with the expected safety function output .

[0022] A second alternative describes an active approach wherein the control subsystem extracts the database pattern of the database and provides the database pattern as the test pattern to the safety function of a test cycle . The control subsystem proves whether the safety function output for the provided test pattern is consistent with the expected safety function output of the database . The failure criterion is ful filled when the function output for the database pattern is inconsistent with the expected safety function output .

[0023] The invention has the advantage that the safety function can be veri fied by comparing the output of the safety function with the expected output of the safety function .

[0024] According to a further embodiment of the invention the control subsystem comprises at least one lane group of redundant control lanes . Each of the control lanes of the lane group is configured to execute an instance of the safety function . Each instance of the safety function is configured to return a respective instance output of the respective control lane for the input pattern provided to the respective control lane . In other words the control subsystem is configured to operate multiple instances of the safety function . The instances of the safety function are operated in respective control lanes . Each instance of the safety function is configured to provide a respective instance output for the input pattern or the test pattern provided to the instance of the safety function . The control subsystem is configured to provide the input pattern to the instances of the safety function of the respective control lanes of the Lane group and to compare the instance outputs of the safety functions of the respective control lanes of the lane group for a consistency .

[0025] In other words the control subsystem provides the input pattern of the control cycle to the instances of the safety function . Each of the instances of the safety function provides the respective instance output for the input pattern . The control subfunction is configured to check whether the instance outputs provided by the instances of the safety function are consistent . The instance outputs are consistent , when the instance outputs ful fil a predefined consistence condition . The control subsystem is configured to investigate the safety function output based on the instance outputs i f the consistence condition is met by the instance outputs . As an example i f the instance outputs are equal , the control subsystem may provide the instance outputs as the safety function output for the input pattern . The predefined failure criterion comprises that the consistence condition is not ful filled by the instance outputs . In other words the predefined failure mode may be activated by the control subsystem when the instance outputs do not meet the consistency criterion . The consistency criterion may require that at least two consistent instance outputs are provided by the control lanes .

[0026] According to a further embodiment of the invention the control subsystem is configured to activate a predefined fallback mode of the control subsystem i f at least one inconsistency between the instance outputs is detected by the control subsystem . In other words , the control subsystem is configured to activate the predefined fallback mode when at least two of the instance outputs are inconsistent . It may be possible that the instance outputs the consistency criterion, because suf ficient consistent instance outputs are provided to the control subsystem to determine the safety function output . Therefore it may not be necessary to activate the failure mode of the control subsystem . However, it may be necessary to modi fy the operation of the control subsystem to take into account the failure of at least one instance of the safety function . The predefined fallback mode may for example comprise a deactivation of at least one of the control lanes providing inconsistent instance outputs . The invention has the advantage that corrupted control lanes may be considered .

[0027] According to a further embodiment of the invention the control subsystem is configured to reduce a predefined mission time of the autonomous device in the predefined fallback mode . In other words a duration of the control operation of the autonomous device may be reduced, when the predefined fallback mode is active . For an example the mission time may describe a maximum duration of the control operation between two maintenance operations . The mission time may be reduced to increase the frequency of maintenance when at least one of the control lanes is corrupted .

[0028] According to a further embodiment of the invention, the control subsystem is configured to investigate a corrupted control lane of the control lanes of the lane group in the predetermined fallback mode , the corrupted control lane providing instance outputs that are inconsistent with the instance outputs of one or more of the control lanes of the lane group . The control subsystem is configured to disable the corrupted control lane of the lane group for the future control cycle . In other words , the control subsystem is configured to identi fy the corrupt control lane of the lane group that has provided instance outputs that are inconsistent with the instance outputs provided by the other control lanes of the lane group . The control subsystem is configured to avoid the corrupted control lane in the future control cycle or to ignore the instance outputs provided by the corrupted control lane in the future control cycle for the provision of the safety function output .

[0029] According to a further embodiment of the invention, the predefined failure criterion comprises that a number of the non-deactivated control lanes falls below a predefined number of non-deactivated control lanes . In other words , the control subsystem is configured to activate the predefined failure mode of the control subsystem i f the number of nondeactivated control lanes falls below the predefined number of non-deactivated control lanes . In other words , the control subsystem is configured to monitor the number of nondeactivated control lanes . I f the number of the nondeactivated control lanes falls below the predefined number of non-deactivated control lanes , the control subsystem activates the predefined failure mode of the control subsystem .

[0030] According to a further embodiment of the invention, the control subsystem comprises at least two of the lane groups of respective control lanes . In other words , the control subsystem comprises two or more of the lane groups , each of the lane groups comprising the respective control lanes . The control subsystem is configured to provide the input pattern to the at least two of the lane groups . In other words , the input pattern is provided to each of the lane groups . The control lanes of the lane groups are configured to determine the instance outputs for the input pattern . A group output of the lane group may be generated based on the instance outputs of the control lanes of the lane group . The control subsystem is configured to check the group outputs of the at least two of the lane groups for consistency . In other words , the control subsystem determines whether the group outputs provided by the lane groups are consistent . The checking of consistency may also be performed by the lane groups themselves . The control subsystem is configured to use the group outputs of the lane group providing consistent instance outputs in the control cycle to generate the safety function output . In other words , i f the group outputs of the lane groups are consistent , the group outputs are used by the control subsystem to generate the safety function output . I f the group outputs provided by the lane groups are inconsistent , the control subsystem investigates which of the lane groups has inconsistent instance outputs and which of the lane groups has consistent instance outputs . The control subsystem provides the safety function outputs based on the group output of the lane group with consistent instance outputs .

[0031] According to a further embodiment of the invention, the control subsystem is configured to provide the instance outputs of the control lanes of the lane group to the control lanes of the lane group . In other words , the control subsystem is configured to provide the instance output investigated by the respective control lane of the lane group to the other control lanes of the lane group . Each of the control lanes of the lane group is configured to compare the instance outputs of the respective control lanes of the lane group for consistency . In other words , the control lanes of the lane group are each configured to check the consistency of the instance outputs provided by the control lanes of the lane group .

[0032] According to a further embodiment of the invention, the control subsystem is configured to operate at least two of the safety functions and to execute respective instances of the safety functions in the respective control lane in a respective order, wherein the respective orders di f fer between the control lanes . In other words , the control lanes are configured to operate instances of the at least two of the safety functions . The instances of the at least two safety functions are executed in the predefined order within the control lane . For example , the input pattern may be analysed by a first of the safety functions and then by a second of the safety functions . In another control lane of the lane group, the order of execution of the instances of the safety functions may be reversed or permuted . The control subsystem is configured to compare the instance outputs of the respective instances of the safety functions of the respective control lanes of the lane group for consistency . In other words , the control subsystem determines whether the instance outputs of the safety functions are independent of the order of execution .

[0033] According to a further embodiment of the invention, the control subsystem is configured to run the test cycle in parallel to the control cycle wherein the test pattern of the test cycle is provided to the instance of the safety function separate from the instance of the safety function of the control cycle . In other words , the control cycle and the test cycle are run in parallel . The control cycle provides two instances of the same safety function . One instance of the safety function is used for the test cycle while the other instance of the safety function is used by the control cycle . The input pattern of the control cycle is provided to the instance of the safety function of the control cycle . The test pattern of the test cycle is provided to the instance of the safety function of the test cycle . The invention has the advantage that an operation of the control cycle and the test cycle can be parallelised .

[0034] According to a further embodiment of the invention, the control subsystem is configured to control the autonomous device to set the autonomous device to a predefined investigation state and / or to perform a predefined investigation operation for providing additional input patterns . In other words , the control subsystem is configured to activate the predefined investigation state of the autonomous device and / or to control the autonomous device to perform the predefined investigation operation in order to gain the additional input patterns . The control subsystem is configured to compare the additional input patterns , recorded by the autonomous device during the predefined investigation operation with expected additional input patterns , wherein the predefined failure criterion comprises an inconsistency between the additional input patterns , recorded by the autonomous device during the predefined investigation operation and the expected additional input patterns . In other words , the control subsystem is configured to check the additional input patterns of the sensor devices and / or the safety function outputs of the control lanes provided in the predefined investigation state or during the predefined investigation operation . The control subsystem is configured to activate the failure mode i f the safety function output di f fers from the expected result and / or the additional input pattern di f fers from the expected additional input pattern . A second aspect of the invention is related to a control subsystem configured to control a device module of an autonomous device .

[0035] The control subsystem is configured to control the device module of the autonomous device in a control operation . The control operation comprises control cycles . In other words , the control subsystem is configured to perform the control cycles of the control operation .

[0036] The control subsystem is configured to , in the respective control cycle , provide an input pattern to a safety function of the control subsystem to determine a safety function output for the input pattern by means of the safety function . In other words the control subsystem is configured to provide the input pattern to the safety function in the respective control cycle . The safety function provides the safety function output of the respective control cycle for the input pattern . The input pattern may comprise sensor data of sensor devices of the autonomous device describing an environment of the autonomous device . The safety function may be configured to ensure a safe operation of the autonomous device by analysing the input pattern for the presence of a dangerous pattern . A dangerous pattern may be related to the presence of an obstacle in the way of the autonomous device . The safety function output may indicate the presence of a dangerous pattern in the input pattern, a type of the dangerous pattern or a level of a safety hazard .

[0037] The control subsystem is configured to activate a predefined safety mode of the control subsystem when the safety function output ful fils a predefined safety criterion . Activation of the predefined safety mode may involve the control subsystem applying a brake to the autonomous device or changing the operating parameters to operate the autonomous device . The predefined safety criterion may comprise a detection of a predefined safety hazard or a predefined level of the safety hazard . The control subsystem is configured to perform a test operation to test the safety function . In test mode , the predefined safety mode will not be initiated . The test operation comprises test cycles , wherein the control subsystem is configured to , in the respective test cycle , provide a test pattern to the safety function of the control subsystem to determine the safety function output for the test pattern by means of the safety function . In other words , the control subsystem is configured to perform the test operation . The test operation comprises the test cycles . The control subsystem is configured to provide the test pattern to the safety function in the respective test cycle . The safety function provides the safety function output investigated by the safety function in the test cycle for the test pattern of the test pattern .

[0038] The test operation may be designed to determine whether the safety function is reliable . The test operation may be provided to detect faults in the safety function . The control subsystem is configured to determine the safety function output for the test pattern wherein the control subsystem does not activate the safety mode of the control subsystem when the safety function output in the test cycle ful fils the predefined safety criterion . A respective of the test cycles may be performed after a predefined number of control cycles . The test pattern may be a random pattern or a predefined pattern similar to the input pattern . The test pattern may comprise randomised sensor data or may be configured to trigger a predefined safety function output . By providing the test patterns to the safety function it may be possible to enlarge a data space of patterns provided to the safety function . By providing the test patterns , it may be possible to detect faults in safety function that may not be detected by providing solely the input patterns . . For example , the autonomous device may operate in an environment with suf ficient light . The input patterns may include sensor data consisting of photographs with suf ficient illumination . In this case , a failure of the safety function that may occur when input patterns with underexposed photos are provided to the safety function may go undetected . The test patterns may therefore contain underexposed photographs to compensate for the absence of underexposed photographs in the input patterns . By providing test patterns with underexposed photos , the error can be detected even i f the input patterns contain only suf ficiently exposed photos .

[0039] The control subsystem is configured to initiate a predefined failure mode of the control subsystem, when the respective safety function output of at least one of the test cycles and / or the safety function outputs of the test operation ful fils a predefined failure criterion . The failure mode may comprise a sending of a predefined signal to a central device outside the autonomous device to inform the central device about an occurrence of the failure . The failure criterion may comprise an occurrence of a speci fic output of the safety function output related to a mal function of the safety function .

[0040] A third aspect of the invention is related to a method to operate the control subsystem for the autonomous device .

[0041] The method comprises a step of performing a control operation of a device module of the autonomous device , comprising control cycles by the control subsystem . In the respective control cycle the control subsystem provides an input pattern to a safety function of the control subsystem to determine a safety function output for the input pattern by means of the safety function .

[0042] The control subsystem initiates a predefined safety mode of the control subsystem when the safety function output ful fils a predefined safety criterion .

[0043] The control subsystem performs a test operation to test the safety function, wherein the initiation of the predefined safety mode is void in the test operation . The test operation comprises test cycles , wherein in the respective test cycle the control subsystem provides a test pattern to the safety function of the control subsystem to determine the safety function output for the test pattern by means of the safety function .

[0044] The control subsystem initiates a predefined failure mode of the control subsystem, when the respective safety function output of at least one of the test cycles and / or the safety function outputs of the test operation ful fils a predefined failure criterion .

[0045] For use cases or use situations which may arise during the procedure and which are not explicitly described here , it may be provided that , in accordance with the procedure , an error message and / or a request for user feedback is issued and / or a default setting and / or a predetermined initial state is set .

[0046] A fourth aspect of the invention is related to a computer program product comprising program code for performing a method according to the second aspect . The computer program product may also be regarded to a computer program .

[0047] A fi fth aspect of the invention is related to a computer- readable storage medium comprising at least the computer program product according to the preceding aspect .

[0048] A module can be understood as a hardware module or as a software module . In particular, a module may also comprise a hardware and a software portion implemented on the hardware . A software module may be understood as a portion of software code functionally connected and combined to a unit . A software module may comprise or implement several processing steps and / or data structures . A method step of providing a software module may be understood to comprise providing a respective software code in a computer readable fashion on a computer readable storage medium . Independent of the grammatical term usage , individuals with male , female or other gender identities are included within the term .

[0049] The control subsystem may comprise computing units to perform steps of the method .

[0050] A computing unit may in particular be understood as a data processing device , which comprises processing circuitry . The computing unit may therefore in particular process data to perform computing operations . This may also include operations to perform indexed accesses to a data structure , for example a look-up table , LUT .

[0051] In particular, the computing unit may include one or more computers , one or more microcontrollers , and / or one or more integrated circuits , for example , one or more applicationspeci fic integrated circuits , AS IC, one or more field- programmable gate arrays , FPGA, and / or one or more systems on a chip, SoC . The computing unit may also include one or more processors , for example one or more microprocessors , one or more central processing units , CPU, one or more graphics processing units , GPU, and / or one or more signal processors , in particular one or more digital signal processors , DSP . The computing unit may also include a physical or a virtual cluster of computers or other of said units .

[0052] In various embodiments , the computing unit includes one or more hardware and / or software interfaces and / or one or more memory units .

[0053] A memory unit may be implemented as a volatile data memory, for example a dynamic random access memory, DRAM, or a static random access memory, SRAM, or as a non-volatile data memory, for example a read-only memory, ROM, a programmable read-only memory, PROM, an erasable read-only memory, EPROM, an electrically erasable programmable read-only memory, EEPROM, a flash memory or flash EEPROM, a ferroelectric random access memory, FRAM, a magnetoresistive random access memory, MRAM, or a phase-change random access memory, PCRAM .

[0054] Further features of the invention are apparent from the claims , the figures and the figure description . The features and combinations of features mentioned above in the description as well as the features and combinations of features mentioned below in the description of figures and / or shown in the figures may be comprised by the invention not only in the respective combination stated, but also in other combinations . In particular, embodiments and combinations of features , which do not have all the features of an originally formulated claim, are also comprised by the invention . Moreover, embodiments and combinations of features which go beyond or deviate from the combinations of features set forth in the recitations of the claims are comprised by the invention .

[0055] In the following, the invention will be explained in detail with reference to speci fic exemplary implementations and respective schematic drawings . In the drawings , identical or functionally identical elements may be denoted by the same reference signs . The description of identical or functionally identical elements is not necessarily repeated with respect to di f ferent figures .

[0056] FIG 1 shows a schematic illustration of an autonomous device ;

[0057] FIG 2 shows a schematic illustration of a control subsystem of an autonomous device ;

[0058] FIG 3 shows a schematic illustration of an autonomous device comprising the control subsystem .

[0059] FIG 4 shows a schematic illustration of a lane group comprising redundant control lanes ; FIG 5 shows a schematic illustration of a method to operate a control subsystem .

[0060] FIG 1 shows a schematic illustration of an autonomous device 1 .

[0061] The autonomous device 1 may be designed as an autonomous mobile robot for pallet transport . The autonomous device 1 may be controlled by a control subsystem 2 that may be split into sensing subfunctions 4 , logic subfunctions 5 , and actuation subfunctions . The control subsystem 2 may comprise additional subfunctions , such as communication subfunctions . The autonomous device 1 without a safety-related control logic subsystem may be considered as a device module 3 .

[0062] FIG 2 shows a schematic illustration of a control subsystem 2 of an autonomous device 1 .

[0063] The sensing subfunction 4 may comprise sensor devices 15 , configured to observe an environment of the autonomous device 1 . The sensor devices 15 may be implemented by LIDAR angle- resolved distance measuring sensor devices 15 and / or optical proximity sensor devices 15 as well as rotary encoders and weight sensors . The sensor devices 15 may provide input patterns 16 describing the environment of the autonomous device 1 to the logic subfunction 5 . The logic subfunction 5 may be implemented by a safe and a non-safe software stack running on a safe programmable logic controller and an industriali zed personal computer, respectively . The logic subfunction 5 may be configured to use the input patterns 16 to control the actuating subfunctions 6 . The actuating subfunctions 6 may be implemented by brakes , drives , motors and servo motors actuating the autonomous device 1 .

[0064] FIG 3 shows a schematic illustration of an autonomous device 1 comprising the control subsystem 2 . The features disclosed in FIG 3 form an embodiment , which in itsel f can already be regarded as an independent invention .

[0065] The control subsystem 2 may be configured to perform the control operation of the device module 3 of the autonomous device 1 . The control subsystem 2 may be configured to perform the control operation in control cycles . The control subsystem 2 may be configured to provide an input pattern 16 to a safety function 14 in the respective control cycle . The safety function 14 may be configured to ensure a safe operation of the autonomous device 1 . The input pattern 16 may be provided by a sensor device 15 of the autonomous device 1 describing environment of the autonomous device 1 . The safety function 14 may be configured to analyse the provided input pattern 16 for a presence of a dangerous pattern . A dangerous pattern may be a pattern related to a possible safety hazard . The dangerous pattern may for example be related to an obstacle in the environment of the autonomous device 1 . The safety function 14 may be related to a speci fic kind of possible safety hazard or to a speci fic sensor device 15 . The safety function 14 is configured to provide a safety function output 18 for the input pattern 16 . The safety function output 18 may for example indicate a presence of the safety hazard or a level of safety hazard investigated by the safety function 14 for the input pattern 16 . The control subsystem 2 may be configured to receive the safety function output 18 and to initiate a predefined safety mode of the control subsystem 2 depending on the safety function output 18 . The control subsystem 2 may be configured to activate the predefined safety of the control subsystem 2 when the safety function output 18 indicates the presence of a dangerous pattern in the input pattern 16 .

[0066] The predefined safety mode may comprise a transmission of a speci fic command to an actuation subfunction of the control subsystem 2 to perform a predefined action by the respective actuator . The predefined action may comprise an activation of a brake in order to step the autonomous device 1 . A problem may arise i f the safety function 14 contains a hidden fault . The hidden fault may prevent the safety function 14 from providing the correct safety function output 18 in the presence of a dangerous pattern . Therefore , for a safe operation of the autonomous device 1 , it may be necessary to ensure that the safety function 14 does not include the hidden fault .

[0067] The control subsystem 2 may be configured to perform a predefined test operation comprising respective test cycle . The control subsystem 2 may be configured to perform respective test cycle after the predefined number of control cycles .

[0068] The control subsystem 2 may be configured to provide a test pattern 17 to the safety function 14 in the respective test cycle . The test pattern 17 may be a random or a given pattern similar to the input pattern 16 . The control subsystem 2 may be configured not to activate the safety mode of the control subsystem 2 i f the safety function output 18 examined for the test pattern 17 meets the predefined safety criterion .

[0069] The test operation may be performed by the control subsystem 2 by default . The test operation may also be initialised by the control subsystem 2 on occasion .

[0070] The control subsystem 2 may be configured to log the input patterns 16 provided to the safety function 14 during the control operation . In other words the control subsystem 2 may record the input patterns 16 of the control operation . The control subsystem 2 may be configured to initialise the test operation when the logged input patterns 16 ful fil a predefined input pattern condition within a predefined number of control cycles and / or a within a predefined time . As an example the predefined input pattern condition may describe that the input patterns 16 cover a predefined data space after the predefined number of control cycles . It may be necessary for at least a predefined sub-space of possible input patterns 16 to be covered after a certain number of control cycles . I f the input patterns 16 do not cover the predefined subspace , it is possible that the sleep fault will not be detected . It may be necessary to cover the relevant subspace by inj ecting the test patterns 17 .

[0071] The control subsystem 2 may also be configured to log the safety function outputs 18 provided by the safety function 14 during the control operation . The subsystem may be configured to initiate the predefined test operation when the logged safety function outputs 18 ful fil a predefined output condition in the predefined number of control cycles and / or the predefined time . It may be necessary to provide at least one of the safety function outputs 18 indicates the presence of the dangerous pattern during the predefined time . It may also be necessary for the safety function outputs 18 , to provide a predefined subspace of a data space of the safety function outputs 18 .

[0072] The control subsystem 2 may comprise a check subfunction, wherein the check subfunction is configured to initiate the test operation i f the predefined input pattern condition is ful filled by the input pattern 16 and / or the predefined output condition is ful filled by the safety function output 18 . In other words , the check subfunction is configured to initiate the test operation . The test operation may be initiated, when the inj ection of the test pattern 17 may be necessary to prove the safety function 14 .

[0073] The check subfunction may monitor a coverage of the data space of the input patterns 16 and / or the safety function outputs 18 . For example , i f at least predefined important di f ferent safety function outputs 18 are reached at least once during a pre-determined test period, the coverage of the data space of the safety function outputs 18 may be assumed to be suf ficiently high . This may be used to monitor the diagnostic coverage of the safety function outputs 18 achieved at runtime . The predefined input condition and / or the predefined output condition may be ful filled, when the coverage of the respective data space is not met .

[0074] In a concrete implementation of the check subfunction, with a safety function 14 that has only two possible values of the safety function output 18 , for example " safe" and "unsafe" , the check subfunction may veri fy that the "unsafe" value of the safety function outputs 18 is achieved at least once per shi ft .

[0075] In another concrete implementation of the check subfunction, with a safety function 14 that has a discrete , limited set of possible values of the safety function outputs 18 , for example less than 1000 possible output values , the check subfunction may maintain a list of all possible values of the safety function outputs 18 in a list and a maximum observation period per possible value of the safety function outputs 18 . Whenever a speci fic value of the safety function outputs 18 is provided by the safety function 14 , the check subfunction may add a current timestamp to a list entry corresponding to the respective value of the safety function outputs 18 produced by the safety function 14 , replacing a previous timestamp . Periodically for example , once per cycle , for each list entry corresponding to the respective output value of the safety function outputs 18 , the check subfunction may subtract the stored timestamp from the current time and compares the calculated time di f ference with the maximum observation period . I f the maximum observation period is smaller than the calculated time di f ference , the check subfunction may initiate the test operation .

[0076] The control subsystem 2 may be configured to initiate a predefined failure mode of the control subsystem 2 when the respective safety function output 18 of at least one of the test cycle and / or test operation safety function outputs 18 meets a predefined criterion . The predefined failure criterion may be , for example , an output of the respective safety function output 18 indicating a fault or an invalid safety function output 18 . The failure mode of the control subsystem 2 may be a mode where the control subsystem 2 uses di f ferent parameters to control the autonomous device 1 . The failure mode may also include an abort of the control operation of the device module 3 of the autonomous device 1 . In general , the predefined failure mode may describe a mode of operation of the autonomous device 1 which is a response to the possible detection of the hidden fault .

[0077] The control subsystem 2 may comprise database 19 comprising database 19 patterns 20 and respective expected safety function outputs 18 for the database 19 patterns 20 . The expected safety function outputs 18 may describe the safety function output 18 to be provided by the safety function 14 when the respective database 19 patterns 20 provided to the safety function 14 . The control subsystem 2 may be configured to detect a consistency of the input pattern 16 of the respective database 19 pattern 20 . In other words the control subsystem 2 may be configured to check whether the input pattern 16 of the control cycle is consistent with one of the database 19 patterns 20 of the database 19 . The control subsystem 2 may be configured to control whether the safety function output 18 of the control cycle provided for the input pattern 16 is consistent with the expected safety function output 18 .

[0078] The control subsystem 2 may also be configured to use the database 19 in the test operation . The control subsystem 2 may be configured to greet the database 19 pattern 20 of the database 19 and to provide the database 19 pattern 20 is test pattern 17 to the safety function 14 in test cycle . The control subsystem 2 may be configured to check a consistency of the safety function output 18 in the test cycle for the provide database 19 pattern 20 with the expected safety function output 18 . In another concrete implementation of the control subsystem 2 , with the safety function 14 that has a discrete but large set of values of the safety function outputs 18 , for example , more than 1000 possible values of the safety function outputs 18 , the control subsystem 2 may use the database 19 comprising the database 19 patterns 20 . The database 19 patterns 20 may be designed to trigger a change of the safety function output 18 of the safety function 14 . For example , for the safety function 14 that may identi fy a closest obj ect in a picture of the input pattern 16 and that may measure a distance to the closest obj ect , the database 19 of test patters could contain picture sequences with quickly approaching obj ects as the database 19 patterns 20 . The control subsystem 2 would then veri fy that the value of the safety function output 18 , of the safety function 14 changes while the database 19 pattern 20 is being provided to the safety function 14 .

[0079] The predefined failure criteria comprises the inconsistency between the expected safety function 14 but for the database 19 patterns 20 are safety function output 18 for the database 19 pattern 20 provided by the safety function 14 .

[0080] In an extension of the above , the predefined test patterns 17 contained in the database 19 of expected test patterns 17 could also be observed in regular operation in the control cycles . In other words , the predefined test patterns 17 may be detected without any inj ection of the test patterns 17 into the input pattern 16 . I f the check subfunction detects such a predefined test pattern 17 in the input pattern 16 and the corresponding safety function output 18 18 in regular operation, the check subfunction will store the current time stamp in the database 19 with the respective predefined test pattern 17 . The check subfunction may regularly check the di f ference between the current time and the timestamp comprising the last time of observation for each of the predefined test patterns 17 in the database 19 and compare the time di f ference with the maximum observation period for that predefined test pattern 17 in the database 19 .

[0081] In a straightforward extension of the above , upon detecting the violation of the maximum observation period, the check subfunction may emit a safety warning or ensures that the respective predefined test pattern 17 is observed within a predefined grace period .

[0082] In an extension of the sensor check described above , the check subfunction may maintain a checklist of value ranges or value classes that must be present in the input pattern 16 of the sensor device 15 and the maximum time period between two measurements of the same value class . I f any of the time periods are violated, the check subfunction may trigger a procedure that may bring the autonomous device into circumstances under which a measurement inside the violated value range or value class is triggered .

[0083] In a concrete implementation, the sensor may be a LIDAR and a value class would be a distance of between 0 and 1 meters under any angle . A set of value classes would be distances of between 0 and 1 meters , 1 and 3 meters , 3 and 10 meters and more than 10 meters .

[0084] In a more complex extension of the above , the checklist would be a database 19 of classes fusing multiple sensors . In a concrete example , single-angle detections from a LIDAR at a distance of between 5 and 10m would be required without concurrent detection from sonar, whereas single-angle detections below Im from the LIDAR would be required to appear with concurrent sonar detections more than 90% of the time .

[0085] In a more complex extension of the above , the checklist would be a database 19 of classes intermixing multiple sensor devices 15 16 and algorithmic results . In a concrete example , the database 19 would demand the concurrent detection of a human by an algorithm based on camera input and the detection of a distance of less than Im by the LIDAR in the direction of the human shape at least once per every 100 hours of operation; the detection of a human shape and the detection of a distance of between 1 and 3 m; the detection of an unmoving obstacle , ground-level obstacle at less than 1 and between 1 and 3m every 200 hours ; the detection of an unmoving, ceiling-suspended obstacle at less than 1 and between 1 and 3m every 400 hours .

[0086] A sel f-test of relevant hardware and / or of relevant software of the safety function 14 itsel f may be achieved by an insertion of the predefined test patterns 17 into the input pattern 16 , replacing or augmenting actual sensor measurements within the logic component , and comparing the safety function outputs 18 of that insertion between at least two control lanes 8 to detect di f ferences due to any residual fault . The test patterns 17 may trigger elements of the software and / or the hardware that may not be triggered by the input pattern 16 in regular operations but could be crucial for operation of the safety function 14 in a dangerous case .

[0087] The test patterns 17 may be inserted into input pattern 16 of a sensor data stream or the test patterns 17 may be used to modi fy the sensor data stream of the input pattern 16 in isolated groups of the test cycles . In a preferable variation, a safety function 14 execution environment 13 may be modi fied so that the safety actuators are not triggered while the sensor data stream of the input pattern 16 is modi fied . In another variation the actuators may be too slow relative to the mission time of the control lanes 8 to be influenced by single-cycle deviations .

[0088] The test patterns 17 may only be inserted in the input pattern 16 in the isolated test cycles , so that by ignoring the safety function output 18 in these test cycles , there may be no false activations of the safety functions 14 . In a possible implementation of the embodiment , the test patterns 17 may be chosen to be random patterns . A pseudorandom number generator is chosen so that eventually, the random patterns will cover a full space of possible input pattern 16 . Alternatively, the pseudo- random number generators may be chosen so that the random patterns cover a predefined subspace that is particularly relevant for testing the safety function 14 . This may be achieved for example by randomly choosing a known-dangerous test pattern 17 from a catalogue of test patterns 17 that is stored in a computing platform . In addition, the known-dangerous pattern can be subj ected to randomly generated perturbations . In a concrete example , a picture of a nearby factory worker could be the dangerous pattern . Small perturbations could be shi fting of a hue , saturation and / or brightness of each pixel by a small , random amount .

[0089] In a variation of the above , test patterns 17 may be chosen to be modi fications of the actual , measured input pattern 16 . Such modi fications could be random in nature . In other words , the control subsystem 2 is configured to combine the predefined test patterns 17 with original input pattern 16 to the input pattern 16 of the test cycle . For example , in a sequence of distance measurements , a randomly chosen element of a sequence in the input pattern 16 could be replaced by a much shorter distance for example , 1 / 1000 of the measured distance or randomly modi fied for example , by choosing a factor between 1 / 1000 and 1000 at random . In another example , the test patterns 17 could be generated by randomly choosing an overlay image from a catalogue of overlay images stored in the compute platform 9 , each overlay image representing an obstacle or a dangerous pattern, covering only a cut-out of a full frame in the input pattern 16 . The overlay image could be randomly scaled and superimposed on an image in the input pattern 16 measured by a sensor device 15 .

[0090] FIG 4 shows a schematic illustration of an autonomous device 1 comprising the control subsystem 2 . The features disclosed in FIG 4 form an embodiment , which in itsel f can already be regarded as an independent invention .

[0091] The control subsystem 2 may be configured to perform the control operation of the device module 3 of the autonomous device 1 . The control subsystem 2 may be configured to perform the control operation in control cycles . The control subsystem 2 may be configured to provide an input pattern 16 to a safety function 14 in the respective control cycle . The safety function 14 may be configured to ensure a safe operation of the autonomous device 1 . The input pattern 16 may be provided by a sensor device 15 of the autonomous device 1 describing environment of the autonomous device 1 . The safety function 14 may be configured to analyse the provided input pattern 16 for a presence of a dangerous pattern . A dangerous pattern may be a pattern related to a possible safety hazard . The dangerous pattern may for example be related to an obstacle in the environment of the autonomous device 1 . The safety function 14 may be related to a speci fic kind of possible safety hazard or to a speci fic sensor device 15 . The safety function 14 is configured to provide a safety function output 18 for the input pattern 16 . The safety function output 18 may for example indicate a presence of the safety hazard for level of safety hazard investigated by the safety function 14 for the input pattern 16 . The control subsystem 2 may be configured to receive the safety function output 18 and to initiate a predefined safety mode of the control subsystem 2 depending on the safety function output 18 . May be possible that the control subsystem 2 is configured to activate the predefined safety of the control subsystem 2 when the safety function output 18 indicates a presence of a dangerous pattern in the input pattern 16 .

[0092] The predefined safety mode may comprise a transmission of the speci fic command to and actuation subfunctions of the control subsystem 2 to perform the predefined action by the respective actuator . The predefined action may comprise and activation of the break in order . The moving autonomous device 1 is reaction to the presence of the obstacle in the environment of the autonomous device 1 .

[0093] The control subsystem 2 may be configured to perform a predefined test operation comprising respective test cycle . The control subsystem 2 may be configured to perform respective test cycle after the predefined number of control cycles .

[0094] The control subsystem 2 may be configured to provide a test pattern 17 to the safety function 14 in the respective test cycle . Test pattern 17 may be a random or given pattern similar to the input pattern 16 . The control subsystem 2 may be configured to not to activate the safety mode of the control subsystem 2 when the safety function output 18 investigated for the test pattern 17 ful fils the predefined safety criterion .

[0095] The control subsystem 2 may be configured to initiate a predefined failure mode of the control subsystem 2 when the respective safety function output 18 of at least one of the test cycle and or of the safety function outputs 18 of the test operation ful fils a predefined criteria . Failure Terry on . The predefined failure Terry on may for example comprise an output of the speci fic safety function output 18 indicating an error or an invalid safety function output 18 . The failure mode of the control subsystem 2 may be a mode wherein the control subsystem 2 uses di f ferent metres to control the autonomous device 1 . The failure mode may also comprise an abort of the control operation of the device module 3 of the autonomous device 1 . In general the predefined failure mode may describe a mode of operation of the autonomous device 1 is an reaction of possible detection of the hidden for .

[0096] The control subsystem 2 may comprise the lane group 9 of redundant control lanes 8 . The control subsystem 2 may be composed of a software and a hardware layer . Computing platform modules of the control lanes 8 of the lane group 9 may be redundant with each other . The security function execution environments and the security functions of the lane group 9 may be redundant to each other . Each redundant stack of computing hardware 10 , hypervisor 11 and operating system 12 may be the computing platform module of the respective control lane 8 . The control lanes 8 may be connected by redundant data links 21 . The data links 21 may be links of an Ethernet network for example .

[0097] Each of the control lanes 8 of the lane group 9 may comprise a respective safety function 14 execution environment 13 . The safety function 14 execution environment 13 may be provided on the respective computing platform module of the control lane 8 . The safety function 14 execution environment 13 of the respective control lane 8 may be configured to execute an instance of the safety function 14 . In other words the safety function 14 may be operated in respective instances by the control lanes 8 . Each instance of the safety function 14 may be configured to provide an instance output 22 of the respective control lane 8 for the input pattern 16 provided to the respective control lane 8 . In other words the control lanes 8 may be configured to investigate respective instance outputs 22 for the input pattern 16 .

[0098] In a basic implementation, the control subsystem 2 may comprise one lane group 9 comprising two of the control lanes 8 . As the input pattern 16 provided to the instances of the safety function 14 and the safety function 14 itsel f may be the same , the instance outputs 22 provided by the di f ferent control lanes 8 may be consistent i f no fault is present .

[0099] A fault in at least one of the control lanes 8 may lead to inconsistent instance outputs 22 provided by the control lanes 8 . Therefore the control subsystem 2 may be configured to provide the input pattern 16 to the instances of the safety function 14 of the respective control lanes 8 of the lane group 9 . The control subsystem 2 may be configured to compare the instance outputs 22 provided by the instances of the safety function 14 of the respective control lanes 8 of the lane group 9 for the consistency . The control subsystem 2 may be configured to provide the safety function output 18 based on the instance outputs 22 , when a predefined consistency criterion is ful filled by the instance outputs 22 . The predefined failure criterion may comprise that a consistency criterion is not ful filled by the instance outputs 22 . In other words , when the two control lanes 8 of the lane group 9 provide inconsistent instance outputs 22 , the predefined failure mode may be activated by the control subsystem 2 , as no safety function output 18 may be provided because of the inconsistent two instance outputs 22 .

[0100] It may be possible that more than two instance outputs 22 may be provided . For example there may be three instance outputs 22 , wherein two of the instance outputs 22 are consistent and one of the instance outputs 22 is inconsistent with the two other instance outputs 22 . It may be possible that the safety function output 18 may be provided on the two consistent instance outputs 22 . In that case a safe operation of the autonomous device 1 may be possible . Therefore the consistency criterion may require at least two consistent instance outputs 22 because the initiation of the failure mode may not be required . However it may be required to adapt the control operation of the subsystem to consider the inconsistent instance output 22 in a fallback mode .

[0101] The control subsystem 2 may be configured to initiate a predetermined fallback operation when at least one inconsistency between the instance outputs 22 of the control lanes 8 of the lane group 9 is detected by the control subsystem 2 . I f , for example , contradicting instance outputs 22 are provided by the control lanes 8 of the lane group 9 , the instance outputs 22 of the lane group 9 may not ful fil the predefined consistency criterion . The control subsystem 2 may be configured to initiate the predetermined fallback mode of the control subsystem 2 to allow a safe operation of the autonomous device 1 .

[0102] The control subsystem 2 may be configured to investigate the corrupted control lane 8 of the control lanes 8 of the lane group 9 in the predetermined fallback operation providing the instance output 22 that is inconsistent with the instance outputs 22 of one or more of the control lanes 8 of the lane group 9 . The control subsystem 2 may be configured to disable the corrupted control lane 8 of the lane group 9 for the future control cycles . In other words , the control subsystem 2 may be configured to identi fy the corrupt control lane 8 of the lane group 9 that provided the instance outputs 22 that are inconsistent with the instance outputs 22 provided by the other control lanes 8 of the lane group 9 . The control subsystem 2 may be configured to avoid the corrupted control lane 8 in the future control cycle or to ignore the instance output 22 provided by the corrupted control lane 8 in the future control cycle .

[0103] In a possible implementation, the lane group 9 may comprise three of the control lanes 8 . A teller module of the lane group 9 may be configured such that the voter module identi fies and shuts down the corrupted control lane 8 which provides the instance output 22 which is inconsistent with the instance outputs 22 of the other two control lanes 8 of the lane group 9 , or at least isolates the corrupted control lane 8 from safety-related actuating subfunctions 6 . This implementation would have the advantage of allowing the device module 3 to continue operating, but perhaps at a more limited cycle time of the control cycles or with reduced performance . The disadvantage would be the requirement for a suf ficiently reliable teller module .

[0104] The lane group 9 may comprise three of the control lanes 8 , wherein the three control lanes 8 may be configured in such a way that any combination of two control lanes 8 , i f they are in agreement , can cut of f the power supply to the third, corrupted control lane 8 . Alternatively, the combination of the two control lanes 8 could cut the third lane from the actuator subfunctions and proceed to provide the safety function outputs 18 to the actuators themselves . In a concrete implementation, i f an actuator of the actuating subfunction 6 was a brake , the remaining control lanes 8 could output a high signal as the safety function output 18 to the brake to keep it from engaging . This implementation would have the advantage of continued operation without the need for a computeri zed teller module .

[0105] According to a further embodiment of the invention, the control subsystem 2 is configured to activate the predefined failure mode of the control subsystem 2 i f a number of nondeactivated control lanes 8 falls below a predefined number of non-deactivated control lanes 8 . In other words , the control subsystem 2 is configured to determine the number of non-deactivated control lanes 8 in the lane group 9 . I f the number of non-deactivated control lanes 8 of the lane group 9 falls below the predefined number of non-deactivated control lanes 8 , the control subsystem 2 activates the predefined failure mode of the control subsystem 2 .

[0106] In a possible implementation of the embodiment , two lane groups 9 each comprising a pair of two control lanes 8 may be provided . The input pattern 16 may be provided to the control lanes 8 of the lane groups 9 . A gateway may be provided, configured to receive the safety function outputs 18 of the lane groups 9 . The gateway may be configured so that the gateway accepts and forwards the safety function output 18 coming from that lane group 9 providing safety function outputs 18 that are internally consistent . In addition, the lane group 9 providing the safety function outputs 18 that are internally consistent could detect the inconsistency in the safety function outputs 18 of the lane group 9 and thus continue to operate safely, but for the more limited mission time . This implementation would have the advantage of only requiring the transmission of safety function outputs 18 between each pair of lanes . It would have require the suf ficiently reliable gateway .

[0107] In another possible implementation of the embodiment , two lane group 9 may be provided . Each of the lane group 9 may comprise a pair of control lanes 8 . The control lanes 8 may be configured so that each control lane 8 will shut down or isolate from safety-relevant actuators the pair of control lanes 8 that it is a part of after detecting inconsistencies within the pair . A second pair of control lanes 8 would either also detect the inconsistency in a first pair of control lanes 8 and take over control of the actuators that the first pair isolated itsel f from, or simply detect the shutdown of the first pair and continue normal operation, in each case with limited performance and / or further limited mission time . The latter implementation can be easily scaled to three or even n pairs of control lanes 8 , since communication requirements are limited to sharing safety function outputs 18 . Each pair may count the remaining number of pairs and adj ust the mission time accordingly; for example , not at all in a suf ficiently overprovisioned system . The excess capacity of such an n-pair system could be used to run non-safe functions of ever higher complexity, which may be unnecessary for basic safe operations and can thus be deactivated as pairs fail .

[0108] The embodiment provides an additional mechanism for detecting di f ferences between safety function outputs 18 of control lanes 8 and thus faults in the computing platforms . The idea of the embodiment is to vary an execution order of the safety functions 14 scheduled on the control lanes 8 comprising the computing platforms . For example , two safety functions 14 SFB1 and SFB2 may be executed in a first control lane 8 in a sequence SFB1 , SFB2 , while in a second control lane 8 the two safety functions 14 SFB1 and SFB2 may be executed in a sequence SFB2 , SFB1 . An unwanted dependency between the two safety functions 14 is revealed because the safety function outputs 18 of the respective safety functions 14 will be di f ferent between the two control lanes 8 . Such a dependency may be in the implementation of the safety function 14 , e . g . writing and reading the same process variables , or it may be due to an error in the control and data flow of the hardware and software involved, e . g . SFB1 " accidentally" writes into the memory of SFB2 . This includes errors in the memory handling of the operating system 12 and the memory protection / management unit of the processors . In a variation of the example , more than two of the safety functions 14 may be executed . To reveal any dependencies between any pair of the safety functions 14 , the order of execution of the safety functions 14 on the control lanes 8 must be permuted in each cycle of execution . For example , the second control lane 8 may execute the sequence SFB3 , SFB2 , SFB1 in a first control cycle , the sequence SFB2 , SFB3 , SFB1 in a second control cycle , the sequence SFB1 , SFB3 , SFB2 in a third control cycle and so on until all possible sequences have been checked . In the case of a known and intended data flow dependency between two safety functions 14 , this pair or, in general , sequence of safety functions 14 can be kept in strict order in all permutations .

[0109] In an alternative implementation, the random data would be inserted into instantaneous copies of the safety function 14 , which contain all current state , data, and which use the same HW / SW logic as the original . In this way the original function needs not to be isolated and it is not touched at all . Its implementation might keep state so that after inserting test patterns 17 it is not able to continue with "normal input pattern 16" in subsequent cycles . We would need a cleanup after testing . Instantaneous copies , which can be discarded after testing, is a way to handle this clean up .

[0110] The comparison of the safety function outputs 18 between the at least two control lanes 8 may provide a test oracle for residual and latent faults in that the faults mani fest in di f ferences of the components ' outputs that are detected by simple comparison of the safety function outputs 18 . The oracle does not need to evaluate the safety function outputs 18 itsel f , it may j ust compare the safety function outputs 18 of the control lanes 8 . By examining a given, suf ficiently large phase space covered by the test samples , enough repetitions of the lane group 9 testing, all latent faults in the processing chains of the logic may be detected .

[0111] The subsystem may be configured to control the autonomous device 1 to set the autonomous device 1 to a predefined state and / or to perform a predefined operation . The subsystem may be configured to compare input patterns 16 , recorded by the autonomous device 1 during the predefined operation with expected additional patterns , wherein the predefined failure criterion comprises an inconsistency between the additional patterns , recorded by the autonomous device 1 during the predefined operation and the expected input patterns 16 .

[0112] Sleeping faults inside the sensor device 15 may be identi fied by presenting physical , danger-indicating test patterns 17 to the sensor device 15 and comparing measurements from two heterogeneously redundant or simply redundant sensor devices 15 . In a straightforward application of the principles described above , the input pattern 16 from the sensor devices 15 provided during the predefined operation may be checked for a presence of a dangerous pattern . I f the dangerous pattern is identi fied, a current time of detection may be stored by the check subfunction . I f the last time stored in the check subfunction is found to be more than a configurable time period in a past , the control subsystem 2 may control the autonomous device 1 to set the autonomous device 1 to a predefined state and / or to perform a predefined operation to provide additional patterns .

[0113] The control subsystem 2 may control the autonomous device 1 during the predefined operation to provoke danger-indicating features to the sensor device 15 , allowing the veri fication of the sensor devices 15 function under danger-indicating conditions . The control subsystem 2 may record a respective data space of the investigated values of the safety function outputs 18 and / or may record a respective data space of values of the input pattern 16 provided to the safety functions 14 . I f at least one of the data spaces does not ful fill a predefined condition within the predefined time and / or a predefined number of control cycles , the check function may start the predefined operation . The predefined condition may be related to a coverage of at least one of the data spaces .

[0114] In a concrete implementation of the above , the externally assisted set of tests could be to present an obstacle to the autonomous device which is being moved ever closer to the autonomous device , thus triggering an unobserved output value of a safety function 14 limiting the maximum speed of the autonomous device . The testing site can be used to complete the needed sel f-tests i f not enough data was seen by the check subfunction during normal operation . Generally, we have to test three parts of the safety function 14 : input sensor data, safety function 14 execution, and output action eg . emergency stop . Each part must regular proof to operate correctly . Using the testing site can enforce checks of any of these three parts input , function, output .

[0115] In other words , the he control subsystem 2 may perform the predefined operation to detect sleeping faults it tests with established ground truth by programming the navigation logic of the autonomous device with one or more known, deterministic locations and orientations of the autonomous device , for example a spot before a wall , where unchanging sensor input pattern 16 can be expected . The intended reaction of the safety function 14 the command to the actuator / brake component to stop is observed by the software layer as a test of the end-to-end functionality of the safety function 14 .

[0116] In a concrete implementation, the autonomous device could be an autonomous mobile robot that is set up commissioned in a specified corner spot in a production hall. In an "initialization session" a human operator observes the correct reaction of the robot while moving towards the wall, recording its movements, positions, and braking. These measurements are stored as test data for the repeated, automated self-test in that location of the production hall. Within operation, for example once per shift, the autonomous mobile robot would return to the corner spot and compare its current measurements at that time with the recorded test data of confirmed integrity. The comparison of current and recorded data is done in the safety function 14 execution environment 13 as part of its runtime test functions. During the original measurements as well as the data verification measurements, the robot would be moving at a speed slow enough not to trigger any safety function 14. If such a speed were not available, for example, due to the presence of a safe brake control function, the functions execution could be safely stopped upon reaching the corner spot at the time of a test .

[0117] In a variation of the concrete implementation described above, the robot would be subjected to the test patterns 17 at the test site, for example: bright light, a fast moving object, a slow-moving object, a low profile object, a slim object, a human-shaped object and a dark object.

[0118] In another of the concrete implementation, describe above, the robot would perform object recognition in regular operation, identifying walls, pillars and other, not usually moving, objects. It was safe the location of these objects together with its current location in a database 19, comparing measurement and location with previous locations and measurements.

[0119] FIG 5 shows a schematic illustration of a method to operate a control subsystem 2. In a step S I the control subsystem 2 may performing a control operation to control a device module 3 of an autonomous device 1 .

[0120] The control operation may comprise control cycles , wherein in the respective control cycle the control subsystem 2 provides an input pattern 16 to a safety function 14 of the control subsystem 2 to determine a safety function output 18 for the input pattern 16 by means of the safety function 14 .

[0121] In a step S2 the control subsystem 2 may check whether the safety function output 18 ful fils a predefined safety criterion .

[0122] I f the safety function output 18 ful fils the predefined safety criterion the control subsystem 2 may initiate a predefined safety mode of the control subsystem 2 in a step S3 . In the predefined safety mode the control subsystem 2 may perform a predefined safety mode .

[0123] In a step S4 , the control subsystem 2 may perform a test operation to test the safety function 14 , wherein the initiation of the predefined safety mode is void in the test operation . The test operation may comprising test cycles , wherein in the respective test cycle the control subsystem 2 may provide a test pattern 17 to the safety function 14 of the control subsystem 2 to determine the safety function output 18 for the test pattern 17 by means of the safety function 14 .

[0124] In a step S5 , the control subsystem 2 may check whether the respective safety function output 18 of at least one of the test cycles and / or the safety function outputs 18 of the test operation ful fils a predefined failure criterion .

[0125] In a step S 6 the control subsystem 2 may initiate a predefined failure mode of the control subsystem 2 , when the respective safety function output 18 of at least one of the test cycles and / or the safety function outputs 18 of the test operation ful fils a predefined failure criterion .

Claims

Claims1. Autonomous device (1) comprising a control subsystem (2) configured to perform a control operation of a device module (3) of the autonomous device (1) , comprising control cycles, wherein the control subsystem (2) is configured to, in the respective control cycle, provide an input pattern (16) to a safety function (14) of the control subsystem (2) to determine a safety function output (18) for the input pattern (16) by means of the safety function (14) , and to initiate a predefined safety mode of the control subsystem (2) when the safety function output (18) fulfils a predefined safety criterion, characterised in that the control subsystem (2) is configured to perform a test operation to test the safety function (14) , wherein the initiation of the predefined safety mode is void in the test operation, the test operation comprising test cycles, wherein the control subsystem (2) is configured to, in the respective test cycle, provide a test pattern (17) to the safety function (14) of the control subsystem (2) to determine the safety function output (18) for the test pattern (17) by means of the safety function (14) , wherein the control subsystem (2) is configured to initiate a predefined failure mode of the control subsystem (2) , when the respective safety function output (18) of at least one of the test cycles and / or the safety function outputs (18) of the test operation fulfils a predefined failure criterion.

2. Autonomous device (1) according to claim 1, characterised in that the subsystem is configured to log the input patterns (16) provided to the safety function (14) during the control operation, and to initiate the predefined test operation, when the logged input patterns (16) fulfil a predefined input pattern (16) condition within a predefined number of control cycles and / or a predefined time.

3. Autonomous device (1) according to claim 1 or 2, characterised in that the subsystem is configured to log the safety function outputs (18) provided by the safety function (14) during the control operation, and to initiate the predefined test operation, when the logged safety function outputs (18) fulfil a predefined output condition within a predefined number of control cycles and / or a predefined time.

4. Autonomous device (1) according to one of the preceding claims , characterised in that the subsystem comprises a database (19) comprising database (19) patterns (20) and respective expected safety function outputs (18) for the database (19) patterns (20) , wherein the control subsystem (2) is configured to detect a consistency of the input pattern (16) with a respective database (19) pattern (20) and / or wherein the control subsystem (2) is configured to provide the respective database (19) pattern (20) to the safety function (14) as the test pattern (17) , wherein the control subsystem (2) is configured to detect an inconsistency between the expected safety function output (18) for the database (19) pattern (20) and the safety function output (18) for the database (19) pattern (20) provided by the safety function (14) , and wherein the predefined failure criterion comprises the inconsistency between the expected safety function output (18) for the database (19) pattern (20) and the safety function output (18) for the database (19) pattern (20) provided by the safety function (14) .

5. Autonomous device (1) according to one of the preceding claims , characterised in that- the control subsystem (2) comprises at least one lane group (9) of redundant control lanes (8) , each of the control lanes (8) of the lane group (9) configured to execute an instanceof the safety function (14) , each instance of the safety function (14) configured to return a respective instance output (22) of the respective control lane (8) for the input pattern (16) provided to the respective control lane (8) , and- the control subsystem (2) is configured to provide the input pattern (16) to the instances of the safety function (14) of the respective control lanes (8) of the lane group (9) , and to compare the instance outputs (22) of the safety functions (14) of the respective control lanes (8) of the lane group (9) for a consistency,- provide the safety function output (18) based on the instance outputs (22) when a consistency criterion is fulfilled by the instance outputs (22) , and wherein the predefined failure criterion comprises that the consistency criterion is not fulfilled by the instance outputs ( 22 ) .

6. Autonomous device (1) according to claim 5, characterised in that- the control subsystem (2) is configured to activate a predetermined fallback mode of the control subsystem (2) in the event of at least one inconsistency between the instance outputs ( 22 ) .

7. Autonomous device (1) according to claim 6, characterised in that the control subsystem (2) is configured to reduce a predefined control cycle time of a future control cycle in the predetermined fallback operation.

8. Autonomous device (1) according to one of the claims 5 to7, characterised in that- the control subsystem (2) is configured to investigate a corrupted control lane (8) of the control lanes (8) of the group in the predetermined fallback mode, wherein the corrupted control lane (8) provided instance outputs (22) notconsistent with the instance outputs (22) of two or more of the other control lanes (8) of the lane group (9) , and to deactivate the corrupted control lane (8) of the lane group (9) for the future control cycle.

9. Autonomous device (1) according to one of the claims 5 to8, characterised in that the predefined failure criterion comprises that a number of non-deactivated control lanes (8) falls below a predefined number of non-deactivated control lanes (8) .

10. Autonomous device (1) according to one of the claims 5 to 9, characterised in that- the control subsystem (2) comprises at least two of the lane group (9) of redundant control lanes (8)- the control subsystem (2) is configured to provide the input pattern (16) to the at least two of the lane group (9) ,- the control subsystem (2) is configured to check the instance outputs (22) of the at least two of the lane group (9) for consistency, and- the control subsystem (2) is configured to use the instance outputs (22) of the lane group (9) providing consistent instance outputs (22) as the safety function output (18) of the control cycle.

11. Autonomous device (1) according to one of the claims 5 to 10, characterised in that- the control subsystem (2) is configured to provide the instance outputs (22) of the control lanes (8) of the lane group (9) , to the control lanes (8) of the lane group (9) , wherein each of the control lanes (8) of the lane group (9) is configured to compare the instance outputs (22) of the respective control lanes (8) of the lane group (9) for the consistency .

12. Autonomous device (1) according to one of the claims 5 to 11, characterised in that- the control subsystem (2) is configured to operate at least two safety functions (14) , and to execute instances of the safety functions (14) in the respective control lane (8) in a respective order, wherein the respective orders differ between the control lanes (8) ,- the control subsystem (2) is configured to compare the instance outputs (22) of the safety functions (14) of the respective control lanes (8) of the lane group (9) for the consistency .

13. Autonomous device (1) according to one of the claims 5 to 12, characterised in that the control subsystem (2) is configured to run the test cycle in parallel to the control cycle, wherein the test pattern (17) of the test cycle is provided to the instance of the safety function (14) separate from the instance of the safety function (14) of the control cycle.

14. Autonomous device (1) according to one of the preceding claims , characterised in that the subsystem is configured to control the autonomous device (1) to perform a predefined operation, compare input patterns (16) , recorded by the autonomous device (1) during the predefined operation with expected input patterns (16) , wherein the predefined failure criterion comprises an inconsistency between the input patterns (16) , recorded by the autonomous device (1) during the predefined operation and the expected input patterns (16) .

15. Control subsystem (2) for an autonomous device (1) , configured to perform a control operation of a device module (3) of the autonomous device (1) , comprising control cycles, wherein the control subsystem (2) is configured to, in therespective control cycle, provide an input pattern (16) to a safety function (14) of the control subsystem (2) to determine a safety function output (18) for the input pattern (16) by means of the safety function (14) , and to initiate a predefined safety mode of the control subsystem (2) when the safety function output (18) fulfils a predefined safety criterion, characterised in that the control subsystem (2) is configured to perform a test operation to test the safety function (14) , wherein the initiation of the predefined safety mode is void in the test operation, the test operation comprising test cycles, wherein the control subsystem (2) is configured to, in the respective test cycle, provide a test pattern (17) to the safety function (14) of the control subsystem (2) to determine the safety function output (18) for the test pattern (17) by means of the safety function (14) , wherein the control subsystem (2) is configured to initiate a predefined failure mode of the control subsystem (2) , when the respective safety function output (18) of at least one of the test cycles and / or the safety function outputs (18) of the test operation fulfils a predefined failure criterion.

16. Method to operate a control subsystem (2) for an autonomous device (1) according to claim 15, comprising steps of :- performing a control operation of a device module (3) of the autonomous device (1) , comprising control cycles, wherein in the respective control cycle the control subsystem (2) provides an input pattern (16) to a safety function (14) of the control subsystem (2) to determine a safety function output (18) for the input pattern (16) by means of the safety function (14) , and to initiate a predefined safety mode of the control subsystem (2) when the safety function output (18) fulfils a predefined safety criterion,- performing a test operation to test the safety function (14) , wherein the initiation of the predefined safety mode is void in the test operation, the test operation comprisingtest cycles, wherein in the respective test cycle the control subsystem (2) provides a test pattern (17) to the safety function (14) of the control subsystem (2) to determine the safety function output (18) for the test pattern (17) by means of the safety function (14) ,- initiating a predefined failure mode of the control subsystem (2) , when the respective safety function output (18) of at least one of the test cycles and / or the safety function outputs (18) of the test operation fulfils a predefined failure criterion.

17. A computer program product comprising program code for performing a method according to claim 16.

18. A computer-readable storage medium comprising at least the computer program product according to claim 17.

Citation Information

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