Torque control method for automatic parking, electronic device, and vehicle

Abstract

Provided are a torque control method for automatic parking, an electronic device, and a vehicle. The torque control method for automatic parking comprises: monitoring a parking control signal corresponding to an automatic parking control system, and a request control signal corresponding to a chassis braking system (S101); on the basis of a current operation signal, performing safety verification on the request control signal and the parking control signal, to obtain a verification result (S102); on the basis of the verification result, determining whether there is a parking safety risk, and when there is a parking safety risk, performing torque reduction control (S103). Thus, the safety of the vehicle and a user in the vehicle is ensured.

Description

Torque control method for automatic parking, electronic device and vehicle

[0001] The present application claims priority to the application with the application number 202411381657.7, the title of "Torque control method for automatic parking, electronic device and vehicle", which was filed with the China Patent Office on September 30, 2024, and the entire content of which is incorporated herein by reference. TECHNICAL FIELD

[0002] The present application relates to the technical field of vehicles, and in particular to a torque control method for automatic parking, an electronic device and a vehicle. BACKGROUND

[0003] When the automatic parking function is activated, the driver does not need to control the vehicle throughout the entire process, which results in that the driving of the vehicle is completely completed by the output torque of the automatic parking function in the automatic parking process. The vehicle and the user in the vehicle may appear unexpected control due to abnormal motor torque output, which may cause damage to the user and the vehicle. SUMMARY

[0004] Therefore, the purpose of the present application is to provide a torque control method for automatic parking, an electronic device and a vehicle to avoid the safety risks caused by unexpected control in the automatic parking process.

[0005] To achieve the above purpose, the present application provides a torque control method for automatic parking, comprising:

[0006] Monitoring a parking control signal corresponding to an automatic parking control system and a request control signal corresponding to a chassis brake system;

[0007] Performing safety verification on the request control signal and the parking control signal according to a current running signal to obtain a verification result;

[0008] Determining whether there is a parking safety risk according to the verification result, and performing torque reduction control when there is a parking safety risk.

[0009] Based on the same inventive concept, the present application further provides an electronic device comprising a memory, a processor and a computer program stored in the memory and executable by the processor, wherein the processor implements the method as described above when executing the computer program.

[0010] Based on the same inventive concept, the present application further provides a vehicle comprising the electronic device as described above.

[0011] It can be seen from the above that the torque control method for automatic parking, the electronic device and the vehicle provided in the application can monitor a parking control signal corresponding to an automatic parking control system and a request control signal corresponding to a chassis brake system; perform safety verification on the request control signal and the parking control signal according to a current running signal to obtain a verification result; determine whether there is a parking safety risk according to the verification result, and perform torque reduction control when there is a parking safety risk. By monitoring the parking control signal in real time, the control demand of the automatic parking control system when performing automatic parking can be determined, by monitoring the request control signal in real time, the control request of the chassis brake system can be determined, and by obtaining the current running signal, the current actual control condition of the vehicle can be determined. The process of performing safety verification on the request control signal and the parking control signal according to the current running signal is to verify the control demand and the control request according to the actual control condition of the vehicle, so as to determine whether there is an error signal of the request control signal and the parking control signal that causes a parking safety risk in the automatic parking control process, and when it is determined that there is a corresponding error signal according to the verification result, it is determined that there is a parking safety risk. At this time, the actual danger caused by the parking safety risk is reduced by performing torque reduction control, so as to ensure the safety of the vehicle and the user in the vehicle. BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF DRAWINGS

[0012] In order to more clearly illustrate the technical solutions in the application or the related art, the drawings needed to be used in the embodiments or the related art description will be briefly introduced. Obviously, the drawings in the following description are only embodiments of the application, and other drawings can be obtained by those skilled in the art without creative labor.

[0013] FIG. 1 is a flowchart of the torque control method for automatic parking according to an embodiment of the application;

[0014] FIG. 2 is a flowchart of the safety verification of the request control signal and the parking control signal according to the current running signal according to an embodiment of the application;

[0015] FIG. 3 is a flowchart of the determination of whether there is a parking safety risk according to the verification result according to an embodiment of the application;

[0016] FIG. 4 is a flowchart of one torque reduction control according to an embodiment of the application;

[0017] FIG. 5 is a flowchart of another torque reduction control according to an embodiment of the application;

[0018] FIG. 6 is a structural schematic diagram of the torque control device for automatic parking according to an embodiment of the application;

[0019] FIG. 7 is a structural schematic diagram of the electronic device according to an embodiment of the application. DETAILED DESCRIPTION

[0020] In order to make the objects, technical solutions and advantages of the present application clearer, the present application will be further described in detail below with reference to specific embodiments and drawings.

[0021] It should be noted that, unless otherwise defined, technical terms or scientific terms used in the embodiments of the present application should be understood as their common meanings to those skilled in the art to which the present application pertains. The terms "first", "second" and similar terms used in the embodiments of the present application do not denote any order, quantity or importance, but are only used to distinguish different components. The terms "include", "contain" and similar terms mean that the elements or objects before the terms encompass the elements or objects listed after the terms and their equivalents, and do not exclude other elements or objects. The terms "connect" or "connected" and similar terms do not mean physical or mechanical connection, but can include electrical connection, whether direct or indirect. The terms "upper", "lower", "left", "right" and the like are only used to represent relative positional relationships, and when the absolute positions of the described objects are changed, the relative positional relationships can also be changed accordingly.

[0022] In this document, it should be understood that any number of elements in the drawings is used for illustration and not limitation, and any naming is only used for differentiation and does not have any limiting meaning.

[0023] Based on the description of the above background art, there are also the following situations in the related art:

[0024] The current new energy vehicles are generally equipped with an automatic parking function. The role of the automatic parking function is that an automatic parking assist system (APA) scans the parking spaces on both sides of the vehicle and the surrounding obstacles through ultrasonic sensors and cameras, and when a suitable parking space is scanned, the APA automatically plans a parking path through an internal algorithm, and the vehicle automatically parks in the parking space. During the entire parking process, the driver does not need to intervene, and the APA interacts with the electronic power steering system (EPS), the vehicle control unit (VCU) and the chassis brake system to realize automatic parking. The APA controls the steering of the vehicle through the EPS, controls the gear shifting and driving of the vehicle through the VCU, and controls the deceleration and parking of the vehicle through the chassis brake system, such as the electronic stability program (ESP).

[0025] Therefore, when the automatic parking function is activated, the driver does not need to control the vehicle throughout the entire process, and thus the driving of the vehicle is completely completed by the output torque of the automatic parking function, which may cause unexpected control of the vehicle and the user in the vehicle due to abnormal torque output of the motor, and may cause damage to the user and the vehicle.

[0026] The torque control method for automatic parking, the electronic device, and the vehicle provided in the application can monitor a parking control signal corresponding to an automatic parking control system and a request control signal corresponding to a chassis brake system, perform safety verification on the request control signal and the parking control signal according to a current running signal to obtain a verification result, determine whether there is a parking safety risk according to the verification result, and perform torque reduction control when there is a parking safety risk. By monitoring the parking control signal in real time, the control demand of the automatic parking control system when the automatic parking control system performs automatic parking can be determined, by monitoring the request control signal in real time, the control request of the chassis brake system can be determined, and by obtaining the current running signal, the current actual control condition of the vehicle can be determined. The process of performing safety verification on the request control signal and the parking control signal according to the current running signal is to verify the control demand and the control request according to the actual control condition of the vehicle, so as to determine whether there is an error signal of the request control signal and the parking control signal that causes a parking safety risk in the automatic parking control process, and when it is determined that there is a corresponding error signal according to the verification result, it is determined that there is a parking safety risk. At this time, the actual danger caused by the parking safety risk is reduced by performing torque reduction control, so as to ensure the safety of the vehicle and the user in the vehicle.

[0027] The torque control method for automatic parking provided in the embodiments of the application will be described in detail below with reference to the accompanying drawings.

[0028] In some embodiments, as shown in FIG. 1, a torque control method for automatic parking includes the following steps.

[0029] Step 101: Monitor a parking control signal corresponding to an automatic parking control system and a request control signal corresponding to a chassis brake system.

[0030] In specific implementation, the control process of automatic parking is as follows: after the APA receives a signal that the driver requests automatic parking function activation, the automatic parking function is activated, and the automatic parking activation state a is sent to the chassis brake system and the VCU. At the same time, the APA will send the longitudinal acceleration activation state b, the longitudinal acceleration request value c, and the target parking gear d1 to the chassis brake system in real time according to the vehicle state during parking. At the same time, the APA will send the vehicle steering demand (such as the steering direction and the parking steering angle) to the EPS during parking. When the EPS receives the steering demand signal, it first judges whether the steering demand signal meets the requirements, and then executes the steering demand signal that meets the requirements.

[0031] The chassis brake system receives the longitudinal acceleration activation state b and the longitudinal acceleration request value c sent by the APA, and converts them into a request driving torque state e and a request driving torque f. When the vehicle needs to be driven, the chassis brake system activates the request driving torque state e, i.e. sets the request driving torque state e, and sends the request driving torque f to the VCU.

[0032] When the vehicle needs to be decelerated or parked, the chassis brake system does not activate the request driving torque state e, i.e. does not set the request driving torque state e, and replaces the request driving torque f with an alternative value (for example -1000 Nm) to the VCU. At this time, the chassis brake system controls the vehicle to decelerate or park through braking force.

[0033] The chassis brake system receives the target parking gear d1 sent by the APA, and converts it into a request gear activation state g and a target request gear d2 and sends a signal to the VCU.

[0034] When the VCU receives the automatic parking activation state a from the APA and the set state of the request driving torque state e sent by the chassis brake system, and the current vehicle speed is less than or equal to the vehicle speed threshold h, the VCU function layer determines that the automatic parking function under torque request is normal (indicated by the set state of the torque function state i), and the request driving torque f sent by the chassis brake system can be sent to the motor controller (Micro Controller Unit, MCU), and the motor controller controls the motor to output the corresponding request driving torque f. If any of the conditions in the automatic parking activation state a / request driving torque state e / current vehicle speed comparison result is not met, the VCU function layer determines that the parking torque control function is not normal (indicated by the unset state of the torque function state i), and the VCU will not execute the request torque f sent by the chassis brake system.

[0035] When the VCU receives the automatic parking activation state a from the APA, the set state of the request gear activation state g and the target request gear d2 sent by the chassis brake system, and determines that the current vehicle speed is less than or equal to the vehicle speed threshold h, the VCU function layer determines that the parking function under gear request is normal (indicated by the set state of the gear function state j), and the target request gear d2 sent by the chassis brake system can be sent to the APA, the chassis brake system and the MCU, indicating that the gear has completed the gear update according to the target request gear d2. If any of the conditions in the automatic parking activation state a / request gear activation state g / current vehicle speed comparison result is not met, the VCU function layer determines that the parking gear control function is not normal (indicated by the unset state of the gear function state j), and the VCU will not execute the target request gear d2 sent by the chassis brake system, and maintain the original gear state unchanged.

[0036] The control of vehicle automatic parking is realized by the VCU through the function layer and the monitoring layer. The function layer can be understood as the VCU normally receiving signals from the APA and the chassis brake system, executing corresponding requests to ensure the realization of the automatic parking function.

[0037] The monitoring layer can be understood as the VCU performing rationality monitoring according to the relevant signals sent by the APA and the chassis brake system and the results judged by the VCU function layer to determine whether there is a corresponding parking safety risk in the automatic parking process.

[0038] Therefore, the monitoring layer needs to monitor the parking control signals corresponding to the automatic parking control system and the request control signals corresponding to the chassis brake system (such as the electronic stability system) in real time, wherein the parking control signals include the automatic parking activation state a, the longitudinal acceleration activation state b, the longitudinal acceleration request value c, and the target parking gear d1. The request control signals include the request driving torque state e, the request driving torque f, the request gear activation state g, and the target request gear d2.

[0039] Monitoring the automatic parking activation state a can determine whether the APA has started the automatic parking function, monitoring the longitudinal acceleration activation state b, the longitudinal acceleration request value c, and the target parking gear d1 can determine the parking control demand of the APA. Monitoring the driving torque state e, the request driving torque f, the request gear activation state g, and the target request gear d2 can determine whether there is a corresponding gear or torque request of the chassis brake system and the corresponding request control demand.

[0040] By monitoring the request control signals and the parking control signals, it can be determined in real time whether there is an error signal, and when there is an error signal, the output torque can be reduced by activating the functional safety state to reduce the actual danger degree caused by the parking safety risk caused by the error signal, and to ensure the safety of the vehicle and the user in the vehicle.

[0041] Step 102: According to the current running signal, the safety of the request control signal and the parking control signal is verified, and the verification result is obtained.

[0042] In specific implementation, when judging whether there is an error signal in the request control signal and the parking control signal, the current running signal of the functional layer synchronization needs to be combined for judgment. The current running signal includes the current vehicle speed, the current output torque, the master cylinder pressure value, the gear function state and the torque function state. According to the current running signal, it can be determined whether the execution condition corresponding to the request is met, and the actual running state of the vehicle in the automatic parking process is determined according to the current running signal, so as to determine whether the request control signal and the parking control signal are reasonable, and then determine whether there is a fault signal. Therefore, according to the current running signal, the safety check of the request control signal and the parking control signal can be determined, including whether there is a fault signal and the specific content of the corresponding fault signal, and according to the check result, it is judged whether there is a corresponding parking safety risk.

[0043] Among them, the safety check includes state safety check, motion safety check and consistency safety check, and the check process can be summarized as follows: according to the parking function state and the current vehicle speed in the current running signal, the state safety check of the request control signal and the parking control signal is performed; according to the master cylinder pressure value in the current running signal, the motion safety check of the request control signal and the parking control signal is performed; and the consistency safety check is performed by comparing the request control signal and the parking control signal. Among them, the check processes of the three check items are performed at the same time.

[0044] Step 103: determining whether there is a parking safety risk according to the check result, and performing the torque reduction control when there is a parking safety risk.

[0045] In specific implementation, since the check processes of the state safety check, the motion safety check and the consistency safety check are performed at the same time, any one check item that fails to pass the check can determine that there is a corresponding parking safety risk. Only when all three check items pass the check, it can be determined that there is no parking safety risk. When there is a parking safety risk, the torque reduction control is performed to reduce the degree of danger caused by the actual danger of the parking safety risk, and reducing the current output torque can reduce the speed of changing the state of the vehicle, leaving sufficient reaction time for the user in the vehicle to correct the wrong operation or fault, and ensuring the safety of the vehicle and the user in the vehicle.

[0046] In summary, the torque control method for automatic parking provided in the application can monitor a parking control signal corresponding to an automatic parking control system and a request control signal corresponding to a chassis brake system; perform safety verification on the request control signal and the parking control signal according to a current running signal to obtain a verification result; determine whether there is a parking safety risk according to the verification result, and perform torque reduction control when there is a parking safety risk. By monitoring the parking control signal in real time, the control demand of the automatic parking control system when performing automatic parking can be determined, by monitoring the request control signal in real time, the control request of the chassis brake system can be determined, and by obtaining the current running signal, the current actual control condition of the vehicle can be determined. The safety verification process of the request control signal and the parking control signal according to the current running signal is to verify the control demand and the control request according to the actual control condition of the vehicle to determine whether there is an error signal in the request control signal and the parking control signal that causes a parking safety risk in the automatic parking control process, and when it is determined that there is a corresponding error signal according to the verification result, it is determined that there is a parking safety risk. At this time, the actual danger caused by the parking safety risk is reduced by performing torque reduction control, thereby ensuring the safety of the vehicle and the user in the vehicle.

[0047] In some embodiments, the safety verification includes state safety verification, motion safety verification, and consistency safety verification; as shown in FIG. 2, the safety verification of the request control signal and the parking control signal according to the current running signal includes:

[0048] Step 201: performing state safety verification on the request control signal and the parking control signal according to the parking function state in the current running signal and the current vehicle speed.

[0049] In specific implementation, the state safety verification is to determine whether there is an error state signal in the request control signal and the parking control signal, which requires verification from the torque and gear dimensions.

[0050] In some embodiments, the state safety verification includes torque safety verification and gear safety verification; the state safety verification of the request control signal and the parking control signal according to the parking function state in the current running signal and the current vehicle speed includes:

[0051] Step 2011: determining the automatic parking activation state in the parking control signal and the request driving torque state in the request control signal in response to the torque function state in the parking function state being in a set state.

[0052] In specific implementation, the torque function state i in the function layer vehicle function state needs to be monitored to determine whether the function layer has sent the requested driving torque f to the MCU. When the torque function state i is in the set state, i.e., i = 1, it can be determined that the function layer has sent the requested driving torque f to the MCU, and the theoretical control at this time is to drive the vehicle to move forward to perform automatic parking.

[0053] At this time, it is necessary to verify whether the function layer correctly sends the requested driving torque f to the MCU. The prerequisite for the function layer to send the requested driving torque f to the MCU is to receive the set automatic parking activation state a sent by the APA, i.e., a = 1, and to receive the set requested driving torque state e sent by the chassis brake system, i.e., e = 1, and to meet the vehicle speed limit condition for sending the requested driving torque f to the MCU, i.e., the current vehicle speed is less than or equal to the preset vehicle speed threshold. Therefore, the automatic parking activation state in the monitored parking control signal and the requested driving torque state in the requested control signal need to be determined to judge the real torque control demand of the APA and the chassis brake system.

[0054] Step 2012: In response to the automatic parking activation state and the requested driving torque state being in the set state, and the current vehicle speed being less than or equal to the preset vehicle speed threshold, it is determined that the torque safety verification is passed.

[0055] In specific implementation, if the automatic parking activation state a is in the set state, i.e., a = 1, it indicates that the APA activates the automatic parking activation state a, and it is determined that the real control demand of the APA is to perform automatic parking, and the function layer can send the requested driving torque f to the MCU. If the requested driving torque state e is in the set state, i.e., e = 1, it indicates that the chassis brake system activates the requested driving torque state e and sends e = 1 to the function layer, and it is determined that the real control demand of the chassis brake system is to request the vehicle to perform automatic parking, and the function layer can send the requested driving torque f to the MCU. If the current vehicle speed is less than or equal to the preset vehicle speed threshold, it indicates that the automatic parking function is allowed to be executed, and the function layer is allowed to send the requested driving torque f to the MCU. Therefore, when a = 1, e = 1, and the current vehicle speed is less than or equal to the vehicle speed threshold are monitored at the same time, it is determined that the function layer torque function state i = 1 is normally activated, there is no abnormal requested torque, and the torque safety verification is passed.

[0056] If the automatic parking activation state a is not in the set state, i.e., a = 0, it indicates that the APA does not activate the automatic parking function, and the function layer sending the requested driving torque f to the MCU belongs to an error judgment fault, and it is determined that the torque safety verification is not passed.

[0057] If the request driving torque state e is not set state, i.e. e = 0, it means that the chassis brake system does not receive the request driving torque f sent by the functional layer, and the functional layer sends the request driving torque f to the MCU, which belongs to an error judgment fault, and it is determined that the torque safety check is not passed.

[0058] If the current vehicle speed is greater than the vehicle speed threshold, it is determined that the vehicle speed limit condition for the functional layer to send the request driving torque f to the MCU is not met, and the functional layer is not allowed to send the request driving torque f to the MCU, and the functional layer sends the request driving torque f to the MCU, which belongs to an error judgment fault, and it is determined that the torque safety check is not passed.

[0059] Step 2013: In response to the gear function state in the parking function state being set state, the automatic parking activation state in the parking control signal and the request gear activation state in the request control signal are determined.

[0060] In specific implementation, the gear function state j in the functional layer vehicle function state needs to be monitored to determine whether the functional layer has sent the request driving torque f to the MCU. When the gear function state j is set state, i.e. i = 1, it is determined that the functional layer has sent the target request gear d2 to the MCU, and the theoretical control of automatic parking is to control the vehicle to switch to the target request gear d2.

[0061] At this time, it is necessary to check whether the functional layer correctly sends the target request gear d2 to the MCU. The prerequisite for the functional layer to send the target request gear d2 to the MCU is to receive the set automatic parking activation state a sent by the APA, i.e. a = 1, and to receive the set request gear activation state g sent by the chassis brake system, i.e. g = 1, and to meet the vehicle speed limit condition for sending the target request gear d2 to the MCU, i.e. the current vehicle speed is less than or equal to the preset vehicle speed threshold. Therefore, the automatic parking activation state in the parking control signal and the request gear activation state in the request control signal need to be monitored to determine the real gear control demand of the APA and the chassis brake system.

[0062] Step 2014: In response to the automatic parking activation state and the request gear activation state being set state, and the current vehicle speed being less than or equal to the preset vehicle speed threshold, it is determined that the gear safety check is passed.

[0063] In specific implementation, if the automatic parking activation state a is in the set state, i.e., a = 1, it indicates that the APA activates the automatic parking activation state a, and it is determined that the real control requirement of the APA is to perform automatic parking. The function layer can send the target request gear d2 to the MCU. If the request gear activation state g is in the set state, i.e., g = 1, it indicates that the chassis brake system activates the request gear activation state g, and g = 1 is sent to the function layer. It is determined that the real control requirement of the chassis brake system is to request the driving vehicle to shift gears. The function layer can send the target request gear d2 to the MCU. If the current vehicle speed is less than or equal to the preset vehicle speed threshold, it indicates that the automatic parking function is allowed to be executed, and the function layer is allowed to send the target request gear d2 to the MCU. Therefore, when the three signals of a = 1, g = 1 and the current vehicle speed being less than or equal to the vehicle speed threshold are monitored at the same time, it is determined that the gear function state j = 1 of the function layer belongs to normal activation, there is no abnormal gear control, and it is determined that the gear safety check is passed.

[0064] If the automatic parking activation state a is in the unset state, i.e., a = 0, it indicates that the APA does not activate the automatic parking function, and the function layer sending the target request gear d2 to the MCU belongs to an error judgment fault, and it is determined that the gear safety check is not passed.

[0065] If the request gear activation state g is in the unset state, i.e., g = 0, it indicates that the chassis brake system does not request the function layer to send the target request gear d2, and the function layer sending the target request gear d2 to the MCU belongs to an error judgment fault, and it is determined that the gear safety check is not passed.

[0066] If the current vehicle speed is greater than the vehicle speed threshold, it is determined that the vehicle speed limit condition for the function layer to send the target request gear d2 to the MCU is not met, the function layer is not allowed to send the target request gear d2 to the MCU, and the function layer sending the target request gear d2 to the MCU belongs to an error judgment fault, and it is determined that the gear safety check is not passed.

[0067] Step 2015: In response to passing the gear safety check and passing the torque safety check, it is determined that the state safety check is passed.

[0068] In specific implementation, if the gear safety check and the torque safety check are passed at the same time, it indicates that the torque control and the gear control of the VCU function layer do not have faults, the request driving torque state e and the request gear activation state g of the VCU function layer do not have error judgments, and it is determined that the state safety check is passed. The situation of unexpected torque output and unexpected gear control is avoided, and the safety of the vehicle and the user in the vehicle is protected.

[0069] Step 202: According to the master cylinder pressure value in the current running signal, the motion safety check is performed on the request control signal and the parking control signal.

[0070] In specific implementation, the motion safety verification is to determine whether there is an error motion signal in the request control signal and the parking control signal, which needs to be verified from two dimensions of driving direction and running direction.

[0071] In some embodiments, the motion safety verification includes same-direction driving verification and same-direction running verification; and the motion safety verification on the request control signal and the parking control signal according to the master cylinder pressure value in the current running signal includes:

[0072] Step 2021: In response to the master cylinder pressure value being greater than or equal to the preset pressure threshold, determining a request driving torque state in the request control signal.

[0073] In specific implementation, if the master cylinder pressure value is greater than or equal to the preset pressure threshold, it indicates that the actual control type is a request vehicle braking. At this time, it is necessary to monitor the request driving torque state e in the request control signal to determine whether there is a driving control conflict. If the request driving torque state e is a set state, it indicates that the chassis brake system requests driving, but the actual response result of the function layer is braking, indicating that a driving control conflict occurs at this time. If the request driving torque state e is an unset state, it indicates that the chassis brake system does not request driving, and the function layer can brake, indicating that there is no driving control conflict at this time.

[0074] Step 2022: In response to the request driving torque state being an unset state, determining that the same-direction driving verification is passed.

[0075] In specific implementation, if the request driving torque state e is an unset state, i.e., e = 0 is monitored, it indicates that the chassis brake system does not request driving, and the function layer can brake, indicating that there is no driving control conflict between the function layer braking and the chassis brake system at this time, and it is determined that the same-direction driving verification is passed.

[0076] Step 2023: In response to the request driving torque state being a set state, determining that there is a reverse driving risk, and determining that the same-direction driving verification is not passed.

[0077] In specific implementation, if the request driving torque state e is a set state, i.e., e = 1 is monitored, it indicates that the chassis brake system requests driving, i.e., requests the function layer to control the motor to drive the vehicle with the request driving torque f, and if the master cylinder pressure value at this time is greater than or equal to the preset pressure threshold, the vehicle is in a braking state, which is contrary to the request of the chassis brake system, indicating that there is a request vehicle braking and a request vehicle driving at this time. Since the master cylinder pressure value is the reaction of the real control, it is determined at this time that the chassis brake system has an error request, which may cause the vehicle to have an abnormal driving torque, resulting in unintended acceleration, and it is determined that there is a reverse driving conflict, and the same-direction driving verification is not passed.

[0078] Step 2024: in response to the master cylinder pressure value being less than the preset pressure threshold value and the request driving torque state in the request control signal being the set state, determining the longitudinal acceleration request value in the parking control signal.

[0079] In specific implementation, if the master cylinder pressure value is less than the preset pressure threshold value, it indicates that the actual control type is to request the vehicle to drive. If the request driving torque state e in the request control signal is the set state, it indicates that the chassis brake system requests to drive the vehicle, there is no driving control conflict, (if e = 0, the chassis brake system will not limit how the VCU functional layer controls the torque, so there is no need to consider the driving control conflict when the master cylinder pressure value is less than the preset pressure threshold value), and both the chassis brake system and the VCU functional layer control the vehicle to accelerate. At this time, it is necessary to monitor the longitudinal acceleration request value in the parking control signal to determine the original control requirement of the APA when performing automatic parking.

[0080] Step 2025: in response to the longitudinal acceleration request value being a negative value, determining that there is a reverse running risk and determining that the same direction running check is failed.

[0081] In specific implementation, the longitudinal acceleration request value is a negative value, which indicates that the original control requirement of the APA when performing automatic parking is to request braking deceleration, but the chassis brake system sets the request driving torque state e, resulting in the functional layer incorrectly executing the request of driving acceleration. It is determined that at this time the APA requests the vehicle to decelerate, but the chassis brake system requests the vehicle to accelerate, which has a reverse running risk, and it is determined that the same direction running check is failed. If the VCU functional layer responds to the driving request of the chassis brake system at this time, it may cause the motor to output an abnormal automatic parking torque, and further cause the vehicle to accelerate unexpectedly, so the VCU needs to activate the functional safety state of the monitoring layer to perform torque reduction control, thereby reducing the corresponding risk degree.

[0082] Step 2026: in response to the longitudinal acceleration request value being a positive value, determining that the same direction running check is passed.

[0083] In specific implementation, the longitudinal acceleration request value is a positive value, which indicates that the original control requirement of the APA when performing automatic parking is to request driving acceleration, which is consistent with the request of the chassis brake system and the control of the VCU, and it is determined that the same direction running check is passed.

[0084] Step 203: performing consistency safety check by comparing the request control signal and the parking control signal.

[0085] In specific implementation, since the APA does not directly send a request control signal to the VCU, the chassis braking system and the electronic power steering system need to analyze and convert the parking control signal of the APA to obtain the request control signal requested by the VCU. In order to avoid incorrect analysis and conversion of the chassis braking system and the electronic power steering system, consistency safety verification can be performed by comparing the request control signal and the parking control signal to ensure that the original request of the APA is consistent with the actual request of the chassis braking system or the electronic power steering system, and to ensure that there is no parking safety risk caused by signal forwarding.

[0086] In some embodiments, the consistency safety verification includes gear consistency verification and steering consistency verification; the consistency safety verification by comparing the request control signal and the parking control signal includes:

[0087] Step 2031: determining a target parking gear, a parking steering direction and a parking steering angle according to the parking control signal.

[0088] In specific implementation, the original request of the APA during automatic parking is determined according to the target parking gear d1, the parking steering direction and the parking steering angle in the parking control signal. That is, the original request is to switch to the target parking gear d1 and turn to the parking steering direction by the parking steering angle.

[0089] Step 2032: determining a target request gear, a request steering direction and a request steering angle according to the request control signal.

[0090] In specific implementation, the actual gear request of the chassis braking system after conversion of the original request is determined according to the target request gear d2 in the request control signal. The actual steering request of the electronic power steering system after conversion of the original request is determined according to the request steering direction and the request steering angle. That is, the actual request is to switch to the target request gear d2 and turn to the request steering direction by the request steering angle.

[0091] Step 2033: determining that the gear consistency verification fails in response to the target parking gear being inconsistent with the target request gear.

[0092] In specific implementation, if the target parking gear d1 in the original request is inconsistent with the target request gear d2 in the actual request, it indicates that the chassis braking system has performed incorrect gear signal conversion, which may cause unintended gear output. It is determined that the gear consistency verification fails.

[0093] Step 2034: determining that the gear consistency verification passes in response to the target parking gear being consistent with the target request gear.

[0094] In specific implementation, if the target parking gear d1 in the original request is consistent with the target gear d2 in the actual request, it indicates that the gear signal conversion of the chassis brake system is correct, and it is determined that the gear consistency check is passed.

[0095] Step 2035: In response to the parking steering direction being inconsistent with the requested steering direction, it is determined that the steering consistency check is not passed.

[0096] In specific implementation, if the parking steering direction is inconsistent with the requested steering direction, it indicates that the electronic power steering system has made an error in steering signal conversion, which will cause an unintended steering output, and it is determined that the steering consistency check is not passed.

[0097] Step 2036: In response to the parking steering direction being consistent with the requested steering direction, the absolute value of the difference between the parking steering angle and the requested steering angle is determined to obtain an angle difference.

[0098] In specific implementation, if the parking steering direction is consistent with the requested steering direction, it indicates that the steering signal conversion of the electronic power steering system is correct, and it is further determined whether the steering angle meets the original request. It is necessary to determine the absolute value of the difference between the parking steering angle and the requested steering angle to obtain an angle difference representing the error between the original request and the actual request. The larger the angle difference, the greater the error in the angle signal conversion of the electronic power steering system.

[0099] Step 2037: In response to the angle difference being greater than or equal to a preset angle threshold, it is determined that the steering consistency check is not passed.

[0100] In specific implementation, if the angle difference is greater than or equal to the preset angle threshold, it indicates that the error between the original request and the actual request is large, which exceeds the allowable error range and will cause an unintended over-steering or under-steering output, and it is determined that the steering consistency check is not passed.

[0101] Step 2038: In response to the angle difference being less than the preset angle threshold, it is determined that the steering consistency check is passed.

[0102] In specific implementation, if the angle difference is greater than or equal to the preset angle threshold, it indicates that the error between the original request and the actual request is small and does not exceed the allowable error range, and it will not cause an unintended over-steering or under-steering output, and it is determined that the steering consistency check is passed.

[0103] The three verification items of state safety verification, motion safety verification and consistency safety verification are simultaneously verified. If any one of the verification items fails the verification, it is determined that there is a corresponding parking safety risk. The monitoring layer will take over the control of the vehicle, perform torque reduction control, and reduce the risk degree of the possible danger to ensure that the vehicle is in a safe state in the automatic parking state, thereby ensuring the safety of the vehicle and the user.

[0104] In the intelligent automatic parking process, the power system is the only driving source, and the VCU is the final arbitration coordination requester of the torque output of the power system. The VCU needs to improve the safety of the vehicle while outputting power. The monitoring layer of the VCU monitors and controls the torque output results in various situations after the automatic parking function is activated, avoids unexpected acceleration, unexpected gear changes, and unexpected steering, so as to ensure the safety of the driver when using the intelligent automatic parking function, and improve the driving experience while performing safety control on the vehicle through the VCU monitoring layer.

[0105] In some embodiments, as shown in FIG. 3, determining whether there is a parking safety risk according to the verification result includes:

[0106] Step 301: In response to the verification result that the state safety verification, the motion safety verification and the consistency safety verification are all passed, it is determined that there is no parking safety risk.

[0107] In specific implementation, if the verification result is that the state safety verification, the motion safety verification and the consistency safety verification are all passed, it indicates that there is no danger of state control conflict, no danger of operation conflict control, and no danger of inconsistent signal conversion control. At this time, it can be determined that the actual control in the automatic parking process is consistent with the original request of the APA, and it is determined that there is no parking safety risk.

[0108] Step 302: In response to the verification result that there is a verification item that fails among the state safety verification, the motion safety verification and the consistency safety verification, it is determined that there is a parking safety risk.

[0109] In specific implementation, if the verification result is that there is a verification item that fails among the state safety verification, the motion safety verification and the consistency safety verification, it indicates that there is at least one control conflict, and there will be unexpected control output inconsistent with the original request. It is determined that there is a parking safety risk, and torque reduction control needs to be performed.

[0110] In some embodiments, as shown in FIG. 4, the torque reduction control includes:

[0111] Step 401: Determine the torque adjustment coefficient corresponding to the current output torque and the current vehicle speed according to a preset coefficient relationship.

[0112] In a specific implementation, the preset coefficient relationship is a three-dimensional function relationship or a three-dimensional map relationship among the output torque, the vehicle speed, and the torque adjustment coefficient. When the torque adjustment coefficient is determined, the current output torque and the current vehicle speed are taken as input data for coefficient retrieval, and the retrieved coefficient is the torque adjustment coefficient.

[0113] Step 402: determining the product of the current output torque and the torque adjustment coefficient as the modified request torque, and controlling the motor output according to the modified request torque.

[0114] In a specific implementation, when the output torque is constant, the vehicle speed is inversely proportional to the torque adjustment coefficient, and the greater the vehicle speed, the smaller the torque adjustment coefficient; when the vehicle speed is constant, the output torque is inversely proportional to the torque adjustment coefficient, and the greater the output torque, the smaller the torque adjustment coefficient. By determining the product of the current output torque and the torque adjustment coefficient as the modified request torque, it is ensured that the more intense the current motion state of the vehicle is, the more the torque is reduced, and it is ensured that the corresponding protection effect can be achieved by controlling the motor output according to the modified request torque after the torque is reduced, so as to protect the safety of the vehicle and the user. The torque reduction control according to the current output torque and the current vehicle speed has higher torque reduction precision.

[0115] In some embodiments, as shown in FIG. 5, the torque reduction control includes:

[0116] Step 501: determining the risk level of the parking safety risk according to the verification result, and determining the modified torque according to the risk level and a preset risk torque relationship.

[0117] In some embodiments, the determination of the risk level of the parking safety risk according to the verification result includes:

[0118] determining the target verification item that fails the safety verification according to the verification result;

[0119] determining the total danger score according to the target verification item, and determining the risk level according to the total danger score.

[0120] In some embodiments, the determination of the total danger score according to the target verification item includes:

[0121] if the motion safety verification exists in the target verification item, determining a preset first score as the motion item score; if the motion safety verification does not exist in the target verification item, determining zero as the motion item score;

[0122] if the state safety verification exists in the target verification item, determining a preset second score as the state item score; if the state safety verification does not exist in the target verification item, determining zero as the state item score;

[0123] If the target check item contains a consistency safety check, a preset third score is determined as the consistency score; if the target check item does not contain a consistency safety check, zero is determined as the consistency score.

[0124] The sum of the motion item score, the state item score and the consistency score is determined as the total risk score.

[0125] In specific implementation, the motion safety check corresponds to the risk of unexpected acceleration, the first score of the case that the motion safety check is not passed is determined as 1. The state safety check corresponds to the risk of unexpected acceleration and unexpected gear shifting, the second score of the case that the state safety check is not passed is determined as 2. The consistency safety check corresponds to the risk of unexpected gear change and unexpected steering, the third score of the case that the consistency safety check is not passed is determined as 2. The score of the check item that passes the verification is uniformly determined as 0, indicating that it will not affect the driving safety. Then, the final risk level is determined according to the total risk score (the sum of the motion item score, the state item score and the consistency score) of the target check item that does not pass the check result, and the higher the total risk score, the higher the risk level.

[0126] In some embodiments, determining the risk level of the parking safety risk according to the check result comprises:

[0127] Determining the target check item that does not pass the safety check according to the check result;

[0128] Determining the number of items of the target check item, and determining the number of items as the risk level.

[0129] In specific implementation, the same score can also be set for each check item that does not pass the check, and then the number of check items that do not pass can be directly used as the corresponding risk level to simplify the determination process of the risk level and reduce the occupation of resources.

[0130] After determining the risk level, the modified torque needs to be determined according to the risk level and a preset risk-torque relationship. The risk-torque relationship is a two-dimensional relationship between the risk level and the modified torque, which can be a two-dimensional function relationship or a two-dimensional table relationship. The risk level is used as an input to query the risk-torque relationship, and the corresponding modified torque can be obtained.

[0131] Step 502: determining the difference between the current output torque and the modified torque as the modified request torque, and controlling the motor output according to the modified request torque.

[0132] In a specific implementation, the higher the danger level, the greater the correction torque, and the smaller the correction request torque determined by the difference between the current output torque and the correction torque, so as to ensure that the correction request torque after the torque reduction can successfully reduce the danger level of the unintended parking safety risk, so as to protect the safety of the vehicle and the user in the vehicle. The torque reduction control according to the danger level can ensure the effect of reducing the danger level.

[0133] It should be noted that the method of the embodiments of the present application can be executed by a single device, such as a computer or a server. The method of the embodiments of the present application can also be applied to a distributed scenario, and be completed by multiple devices cooperating with each other. In the case of such a distributed scenario, one of the multiple devices can only execute one or more steps in the method of the embodiments of the present application, and the multiple devices can interact with each other to complete the method.

[0134] It should be noted that some embodiments of the present application have been described above. Other embodiments are within the scope of the appended claims. In some cases, the actions or steps recited in the claims can be performed in a different order than the order described above and still achieve desirable results. In addition, the processes depicted in the figures do not necessarily require the particular order shown, or sequential order, to achieve the desired results. In certain implementations, multitasking and parallel processing can be advantageous.

[0135] Based on the same inventive concept, the present application also provides an automatic parking torque control device corresponding to the method of any of the above embodiments.

[0136] Referring to FIG. 6, the automatic parking torque control device comprises:

[0137] The signal monitoring module 10 is configured to monitor a parking control signal corresponding to the automatic parking control system and a request control signal corresponding to the chassis brake system.

[0138] The signal verification module 20 is configured to perform safety verification on the request control signal and the parking control signal according to the current running signal to obtain a verification result.

[0139] The torque reduction control module 30 is configured to determine whether there is a parking safety risk according to the verification result, and perform torque reduction control when there is a parking safety risk.

[0140] For the convenience of description, the above device is described in various modules according to functions. Of course, the functions of the modules can be implemented in the same or multiple software and / or hardware when implementing the present application.

[0141] The device of the above embodiment is used to implement the corresponding automatic parking torque control method of any one of the above embodiments, and has the beneficial effects of the corresponding method embodiments, which are not described here again.

[0142] Based on the same inventive concept, the present application also provides an electronic device corresponding to the method of any one of the above embodiments, comprising a memory, a processor and a computer program stored in the memory and executable on the processor, wherein the processor implements the automatic parking torque control method of any one of the above embodiments when executing the program.

[0143] Fig. 7 shows a more specific hardware structure of an electronic device according to the present embodiment. The device can include a processor 1010, a memory 1020, an input / output interface 1030, a communication interface 1040 and a bus 1050. The processor 1010, the memory 1020, the input / output interface 1030 and the communication interface 1040 are connected to each other through the bus 1050 for communication within the device.

[0144] The processor 1010 can be implemented by a general-purpose CPU (Central Processing Unit), a microprocessor, an ASIC (Application Specific Integrated Circuit) or one or more integrated circuits, etc., for executing related programs to implement the technical solutions provided by the present embodiment.

[0145] The memory 1020 can be implemented by a ROM (Read Only Memory), a RAM (Random Access Memory), a static storage device, a dynamic storage device, etc. The memory 1020 can store an operating system and other application programs, and when the technical solutions provided by the present embodiment are implemented by software or firmware, the related program codes are stored in the memory 1020 and executed by the processor 1010.

[0146] The input / output interface 1030 is used to connect input / output modules to realize information input and output. The input / output modules can be configured as components in the device (not shown in the figure) or externally connected to the device to provide corresponding functions. The input devices can include a keyboard, a mouse, a touch screen, a microphone, various sensors, etc., and the output devices can include a display, a speaker, a vibrator, an indicator light, etc.

[0147] The communication interface 1040 is configured to connect a communication module (not shown in the figure) to realize the communication interaction between the device and other devices. The communication module can realize communication through wired mode (such as USB, network cable, etc.), or can realize communication through wireless mode (such as mobile network, WIFI, Bluetooth, etc.).

[0148] The bus 1050 includes a path for transmitting information between various components (such as the processor 1010, the memory 1020, the input / output interface 1030, and the communication interface 1040) of the device.

[0149] It should be noted that although the above device only shows the processor 1010, the memory 1020, the input / output interface 1030, the communication interface 1040, and the bus 1050, in the specific implementation process, the device can also include other components necessary for normal operation. In addition, those skilled in the art can understand that the above device can also only contain the components necessary for the implementation of the embodiments of the present specification, and does not have to contain all the components shown in the figure.

[0150] The electronic device of the above embodiment is used to realize the torque control method of automatic parking corresponding to any of the above embodiments, and has the beneficial effects of the corresponding method embodiments, which are not described here.

[0151] Based on the same inventive concept, the present application also provides a non-transitory computer readable storage medium, which stores computer instructions for causing the computer to execute the torque control method of automatic parking according to any of the above embodiments.

[0152] The computer readable medium of the present embodiment includes permanent and non-permanent, removable and non-removable media, which can be realized by any method or technology to store information. The information can be computer readable instructions, data structures, program modules or other data. Examples of computer storage media include, but are not limited to, phase change memory (PRAM), static random access memory (SRAM), dynamic random access memory (DRAM), other types of random access memory (RAM), read-only memory (ROM), electrically erasable programmable read-only memory (EEPROM), flash memory or other memory technology, compact disc read-only memory (CD-ROM), digital versatile disc (DVD) or other optical storage, magnetic cassette, magnetic tape disk storage or other magnetic storage device, or any other non-transmission medium that can be used to store information accessible by a computing device.

[0153] The storage medium of the above-mentioned embodiments stores computer instructions for causing the computer to execute the torque control method for automatic parking as described in any of the above embodiments, and has the beneficial effects of the corresponding method embodiments, which are not described here again.

[0154] Based on the same inventive concept, the present application also provides a vehicle comprising the electronic device or the torque control device for automatic parking of the above-mentioned embodiments, and executing the torque control method for automatic parking as described in any of the above embodiments by the electronic device or the torque control device for automatic parking of the above-mentioned embodiments, and has the beneficial effects of the corresponding method embodiments, which are not described here again.

[0155] It can be understood that before using the technical solutions of various embodiments in the present disclosure, the user will be informed of the type, use range, use scenario, etc. of the personal information involved in a proper manner, and the authorization of the user will be obtained.

[0156] For example, in response to receiving the active request of the user, the user is sent prompt information to explicitly prompt the user that the operation requested to be performed will require the acquisition and use of personal information of the user. Thus, the user can voluntarily choose whether to provide personal information to the software or hardware such as electronic device, application program, server or storage medium that performs the technical solutions of the present disclosure according to the prompt information.

[0157] As an optional but not limited implementation manner, in response to accepting the active request of the user, the manner of sending prompt information to the user may, for example, be a pop-up window manner, and the prompt information may be presented in the form of text in the pop-up window. In addition, the pop-up window may also carry selection controls for the user to select "agree" or "disagree" to provide personal information to the electronic device.

[0158] It can be understood that the above notification and user authorization process is only illustrative, and does not limit the implementation of the present disclosure, and other ways that meet the relevant laws and regulations can also be applied to the implementation of the present disclosure.

[0159] Those skilled in the art will understand that the discussion of any of the above embodiments is only exemplary and is not intended to imply that the scope of the present application is limited to these examples; under the idea of the present application, the above embodiments or technical features in different embodiments can also be combined, the steps can be implemented in any order, and there are many other changes of different aspects of the embodiments of the present application as described above. In order to be brief, they are not provided in details.

[0160] Additionally, to simplify the description and discussion, and so as not to obscure the embodiments of the application being presented, the well-known functions or constructions of integrated circuit (IC) chips and other components can or can not be shown in the figures and will be omitted as not to unnecessarily obscure the embodiments of the application being presented. Moreover, the devices can be shown in block diagram form in order to avoid obscuring the embodiments of the application, and this also acknowledges the fact that the details in regard to the implementation of the block diagram devices are highly dependent on the platform within which the embodiments of the application are to be implemented (i.e., these details should be well within the purview of one of ordinary skill in the art). Where specific details are set forth in order to describe an illustrative embodiment of the application, it will be apparent to one of ordinary skill in the art that the embodiments of the application can be practiced without, or with variation of, these specific details. Thus, the description is to be considered as illustrative and not restrictive, and the scope of the application should be determined not with reference to the above description, but should be given to the appended claims.

[0161] While the application has been described in connection with specific embodiments thereof, many alternatives, modifications and variations will be apparent to those skilled in the art in light of the foregoing description. For example, other memory architectures (e.g., dynamic RAM (DRAM)) can use the embodiments discussed.

[0162] Embodiments of the application are intended to cover all such alternatives, modifications and variations as falling within the scope of the broadest possible interpretation of the application as set forth in the appended claims. Accordingly, any and all such modifications, variations or equivalents that fall within the spirit and scope of the underlying principles should be intended to be embraced by the claims.

Claims

1. A torque control method for automatic parking, wherein, The method comprises: monitoring a parking control signal corresponding to an automatic parking control system and a request control signal corresponding to a chassis brake system; performing safety verification on the request control signal and the parking control signal according to current operation signals to obtain a verification result; determining whether there is a parking safety risk according to the verification result, and performing torque reduction control when the parking safety risk exists.

2. The automatic parking torque control method according to claim 1, wherein The parking control signal includes an automatic parking activation state, a longitudinal acceleration activation state, a longitudinal acceleration request value, and a target parking gear.

3. The automatic parking torque control method according to claim 1, wherein The request control signal includes a request driving torque state, a request driving torque, a request gear activation state, and a target request gear.

4. The automatic parking torque control method according to claim 1, wherein The safety verification includes state safety verification, motion safety verification, and consistency safety verification. The safety verification on the request control signal and the parking control signal according to the current operation signals comprises: performing the state safety verification on the request control signal and the parking control signal according to a parking function state and a current vehicle speed in the current operation signals; performing the motion safety verification on the request control signal and the parking control signal according to a master cylinder pressure value in the current operation signals; performing the consistency safety verification by comparing the request control signal and the parking control signal.

5. The automatic parking torque control method according to claim 4, wherein The state safety verification includes torque safety verification and gear safety verification; the state safety verification on the request control signal and the parking control signal according to the parking function state and the current vehicle speed in the current operation signals comprises: determining the automatic parking activation state in the parking control signal and the request driving torque state in the request control signal in response to a torque function state in the parking function state being in a set state; determining that the torque safety verification is passed in response to the automatic parking activation state and the request driving torque state both being in the set state and the current vehicle speed being less than or equal to a preset vehicle speed threshold; determining the automatic parking activation state in the parking control signal and the request gear activation state in the request control signal in response to a gear function state in the parking function state being in the set state; determining that the gear safety verification is passed in response to the automatic parking activation state and the request gear activation state both being in the set state and the current vehicle speed being less than or equal to the preset vehicle speed threshold; determining that the state safety verification is passed in response to the gear safety verification being passed and the torque safety verification being passed.

6. The automatic parking torque control method according to claim 4, wherein The motion safety verification includes same direction driving verification and same direction operation verification; the motion safety verification on the request control signal and the parking control signal according to the master cylinder pressure value in the current operation signals comprises: determining the request driving torque state in the request control signal in response to the master cylinder pressure value being greater than or equal to a preset pressure threshold; determining that the same direction driving verification is passed in response to the request driving torque state being in an unset state; determining that there is a reverse driving risk in response to the request driving torque state being in the set state, and determining that the same direction driving verification is not passed. determining that the longitudinal acceleration request value is negative, determining that there is a risk of reverse operation, and determining that the same direction operation check is failed; determining that the longitudinal acceleration request value is positive, and determining that the same direction operation check is passed. The consistency safety check includes gear consistency check and steering consistency check.

7. The automatic parking torque control method according to claim 4, wherein The consistency safety check includes gear consistency check and steering consistency check. The consistency safety check includes gear consistency check and steering consistency check. determining a target parking gear, a parking steering direction, and a parking steering angle according to the parking control signal; determining a target request gear, a request steering direction, and a request steering angle according to the request control signal; determining that the target parking gear is inconsistent with the target request gear, and determining that the gear consistency check is failed; determining that the target parking gear is consistent with the target request gear, and determining that the gear consistency check is passed; determining that the parking steering direction is inconsistent with the request steering direction, and determining that the steering consistency check is failed; determining an angle difference value by determining an absolute value of a difference between the parking steering angle and the request steering angle, in response to the parking steering direction being consistent with the request steering direction; determining that the angle difference value is greater than or equal to a preset angle threshold, and determining that the steering consistency check is failed; determining that the angle difference value is less than the preset angle threshold, and determining that the steering consistency check is passed.

8. The automatic parking torque control method according to claim 1, wherein The consistency safety check includes gear consistency check and steering consistency check. The consistency safety check includes gear consistency check and steering consistency check. determining a target parking gear, a parking steering direction, and a parking steering angle according to the parking control signal; 9. The automatic parking torque control method according to claim 1, wherein determining a target request gear, a request steering direction, and a request steering angle according to the request control signal; determining that the target parking gear is inconsistent with the target request gear, and determining that the gear consistency check is failed; determining that the target parking gear is consistent with the target request gear, and determining that the gear consistency check is passed; 10. The automatic parking torque control method according to claim 1, wherein determining that the parking steering direction is inconsistent with the request steering direction, and determining that the steering consistency check is failed; determining an angle difference value by determining an absolute value of a difference between the parking steering angle and the request steering angle, in response to the parking steering direction being consistent with the request steering direction; determining that the angle difference value is greater than or equal to a preset angle threshold, and determining that the steering consistency check is failed; 11. The automatic parking torque control method according to claim 10, wherein determining that the angle difference value is less than the preset angle threshold, and determining that the steering consistency check is passed. The consistency safety check includes gear consistency check and steering consistency check. The consistency safety check includes gear consistency check and steering consistency check.

12. The automatic parking torque control method according to claim 10, wherein determining a target parking gear, a parking steering direction, and a parking steering angle according to the parking control signal; determining a target request gear, a request steering direction, and a request steering angle according to the request control signal; determining that the target parking gear is inconsistent with the target request gear, and determining that the gear consistency check is failed; determining that the target parking gear is consistent with the target request gear, and determining that the gear consistency check is passed; determining that the parking steering direction is inconsistent with the request steering direction, and determining that the steering consistency check is failed; determining an angle difference value by determining an absolute value of a difference between the parking steering angle and the request steering angle, in response to the parking steering direction being consistent with the request steering direction; determining that the angle difference value is greater than or equal to a preset angle threshold, and determining that the steering consistency check is failed; determining that the angle difference value is less than the preset angle threshold, and determining that the steering consistency check is passed. The consistency safety check includes gear consistency check and steering consistency check. The consistency safety check includes gear consistency check and steering consistency check. determining a target parking gear, a parking steering direction, and a parking steering angle according to the parking control signal; determining a target request gear, a request steering direction, and a request steering angle according to the request control signal; determining that the target parking gear is inconsistent with the target request gear, and determining that the gear consistency check is failed; determining that the target parking gear is consistent with the target request gear, and determining that the gear consistency check is passed; determining that the parking steering direction is inconsistent with the request steering direction, and determining that the steering consistency check is failed; determining an angle difference value by determining an absolute value of a difference between the parking steering angle and the request steering angle, in response to the parking steering direction being consistent with the request steering direction; determining that the angle difference value is greater than or equal to a preset angle threshold, and determining that the steering consistency check is failed; determining that the angle difference value is less than the preset angle threshold, and determining that the steering consistency check is passed. determining a number of items of the target check item, and determining the number of items as the risk level.

13. The automatic parking torque control method according to claim 11, wherein The total risk score is determined according to the target check item, comprising: if there is a motion safety check in the target check item, determining a preset first score as a motion item score; if there is no motion safety check in the target check item, determining zero as the motion item score; if there is a state safety check in the target check item, determining a preset second score as a state item score; if there is no state safety check in the target check item, determining zero as the state item score; if there is a consistency safety check in the target check item, determining a preset third score as a consistency score; if there is no consistency safety check in the target check item, determining zero as the consistency score; determining a sum of the motion item score, the state item score and the consistency score as the total risk score.

14. An electronic device comprising a memory, a processor, and a computer program stored on the memory and running on the processor, wherein, The processor implements the method of any one of claims 1 to 13 when executing the program.

15. A vehicle, wherein, The electronic device of claim 14 is included. The electronic device of claim 14 is included.

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