Design for exchanging key information

Through distributed ledger technology and distributed database, secure key exchange between IoT devices and center points is realized, solving the security and authenticity of key exchange between multiple devices, and improving the transparency and anti-interference of the system ability.

CN113676328BActive Publication Date: 2024-12-06VOLKSWAGEN AG
View PDF 0 Cites 0 Cited by

Patent Information

Application Number
CN202110516196.X
Authority / Receiving Office
CN · China
Patent Type
Patents(China)
Current Assignee / Owner
Priority Date
2020-05-13
Filing Date
2021-05-12
Publication Date
2024-12-06
Estimated Expiration
2041-05-12

AI Technical Summary

Technical Problem

In key exchange between IoT devices, it is difficult for the prior art to quickly and securely perform key exchange between multiple devices and center points, especially in cases where the number of devices is large, independently operated and not controlled by the manufacturer. Under, ensure the security and authenticity of the key.

Method used

Through distributed ledger technology, the public key of the center point and the private key signature and encoding secret of the device are used, combined with the redundancy of the distributed database and the random node selection, the secure key exchange between the device and the center point is realized to ensure the key authenticity and immutability.

Benefits of technology

It improves the security and transparency of key exchange, reduces the manipulation of intermediaries, ensures the authenticity of keys and device authentication, and is suitable for multi-device scenarios.

✦ Generated by Eureka AI based on patent content.

Smart Images

  • Figure CN113676328B_ABST
    Figure CN113676328B_ABST
Patent Text Reader

Abstract

The invention relates to a computer-implemented method, apparatus and computer program for exchanging key information. The computer-implemented method for exchanging key information between a device (100) and a central point (200) comprises obtaining a cryptographic secret (110), wherein the cryptographic secret is known to the central point. Furthermore, the method comprises obtaining a public key of the central point (120). Furthermore, the method comprises generating a key pair for the device with a device private key and a device public key (130). Furthermore, the method comprises signing the cryptographic secret with the device private key (140). Furthermore, the method comprises encoding the cryptographic secret signed with the device private key with the public key of the central point (150). Furthermore, the method comprises providing the encoded and signed cryptographic secret, the email address of the device and the device public key for the central point via the email of the central point (160).
Need to check novelty before this filing date? Find Prior Art

Description

Technical Field

[0001] The present invention relates to a computer implemented method, apparatus and computer program for exchanging key information. Background Art

[0002] The most popular method of operation in encryption for encoding data to be sent to a recipient without previously agreeing on a secret key to be exchanged in a listening and operationally secure path between the two communication partners is asymmetric encryption. In this case, each participant generates a key pair consisting of a private key and a public key.

[0003] As can already be seen from the name, a public key does not remain secret but can be distributed publicly (for this purpose there are, for example, public key servers via which people can make their own public keys available to the public).

[0004] If the sender now wants to pass information to the recipient in an encoded form, the sender asks the person for his public key (or on one of the public key servers described above), which can be used to encode messages to him (or more precisely only to him).

[0005] Asymmetric encryption is characterized in that only the associated private key can decrypt the message encoded with the public key. Therefore, the private key of such a key pair should be kept strictly confidential.

[0006] In contrast, in symmetric encryption, the encoding and decoding of messages are performed with the same key, so that in this form of coded communication such a key must be exchanged beforehand over a secure channel (e.g. a personal meeting), which at the same time represents the advantage of asymmetric encryption, since such a secure exchange is not necessary here due to the disclosure of the public key. If two people wish to communicate with each other in an encrypted manner, both only need to know the public key of the other person, which is generally not a problem.

[0007] Another function of asymmetric encryption is the signing of messages. If the sender of a message wants to digitally sign the message in order to prove that the message actually came from him, he can sign the message with his private key. The recipient can then verify the signature of the message using the sender's public key, i.e. ensure its authenticity. Because the private key is confidential, the recipient can be relatively sure that the message actually came from the expected person.

[0008] In the future, more and more devices connected to networks (e.g. the Internet) (so-called "IoT-Devices", Internet of Things in English) will provide data, for example in process networks (e.g. in the case of supply chains in English "Supply Chains"). The challenge here can be to ensure that the acquired data actually comes from the desired device and not from a sender who is merely pretending to look like the device from which the data came.

[0009] This is possible in some systems with applications with verified signatures. However, if the IoT device should be able to act as independently / autonomously as possible on the one hand and on the other hand, in particular, it should be possible to construct and operate a communication relationship that can no longer be destroyed (or compromised, i.e., kompromittiert) and read together by the manufacturer of the device (or by the organization that equips the device with key material), a secure key exchange must be set up. If only a few devices are involved in such a scenario, the key exchange between the two participants can be carried out on a conventional direct path: the two communication parties exchange their keys on a direct and forgery-proof and eavesdropping-proof path (such as a personal and private meeting). However, if many devices (or also "process instances") operate as data providers in the relevant usage scenario and they are no longer even known or accessible in detail, this operating method is quickly no longer available. In particular, for scenarios in which the number of recipients of such information or general communication partners is high, a communication network with many 1:1 communication paths and, if necessary, also communication groups are quickly obtained, so that a key exchange between all participants quickly on a direct and secure path is no longer available.

[0010] One application of such key exchanges is in communication between vehicles and other traffic participants or between vehicles and vehicle manufacturers. If the data of networked vehicles or other traffic participants (e.g. traffic infrastructure) are to be brought to unrestricted trust in the future, there should be a possibility to exchange key material securely between traffic participants, which not only protects the transmission path via common mechanisms but also ensures that the sender is actually the device or person who sent the key material. This makes it possible for the data user to securely verify its origin. Summary of the invention

[0011] There is a need to provide an improved concept for exchanging keys between different parties, in particular between traffic participants.

[0012] This requirement is taken into consideration by the embodiments of the present disclosure.

[0013] Embodiments of the present disclosure are based on the knowledge that a key exchange can be protected in that a shared (or published, distributed, i.e., geteiltes) secret signed by a central point is stored on the device to be reinitialized. The shared secret can be verified by means of a signature, and then signed by the device and encoded with the public key of the central point and delivered to the central point. Thus, it can be verified relative to the central point that it is the "correct" device. With the signed and encoded shared secret, the device email address can be transmitted on the one hand and the device public key of the central point can be transmitted on the other hand. It can now sign the device public key and provide it for retrieval. In addition, the email address can be made available to other communication partners. Thus, a device that reinitializes (Internet of Things, Internet of Things) in all relevant aspects of a protected key exchange is created (or implemented, i.e., geschaffen).

[0014] For such scenarios, solutions based on distributed networks, such as distributed ledger technology (DLT, literally distributed ledger), are particularly suitable in the development of the invention, because they reduce the manipulability (to the point of making it practically impossible) due to the distributed data situation, increase transparency for all participants and are therefore sufficient in the absence of trusted intermediaries (so-called Trust Authorities), which is advantageous because such trust institutions must not only be trusted in their integrity, but also in that they protect their own information technology systems so well that third parties cannot misbehave. The development of the invention thus draws on the advantages of using distributed ledger technology, but the basic concept can also bring security benefits in the case of not using such a network.

[0015] Embodiments of the present disclosure create a (first) computer-implemented method for exchanging key information between a device and a central point. The method is implemented by a device. The method includes obtaining a cryptographic secret. The cryptographic secret is known to the central point. The method includes obtaining a public key of the central point, such as from an email address of the central point. The method includes generating a key pair for the device with a device private key and a device public key. In addition, the method includes signing the cryptographic secret with the device private key. The method includes encoding the cryptographic secret signed with the device private key with the public key of the central point. The method includes providing the encoded and signed cryptographic secret, the email address of the device, and the device public key for the central point via the email address of the central point. Thus, the device can be made known to the central point in a secure manner.

[0016] For example, obtaining the public key of the central point may include obtaining the email address of the central point and retrieving the public key of the central point from the email address of the central point, thereby obtaining the corresponding currently valid public key of the central point.

[0017] For example, the email address of the central point and the email address of the device can be obtained via a distributed database. A distributed database can provide greater security because single points of failure (single failure point) can be avoided through redundancy, which can be used to prevent key exchange. In addition, the operation is traceable if necessary.

[0018] For example, the distributed database may be based on distributed ledger technology. Accordingly, the addresses of the central point's email address and the device's email address may be addresses on the distributed ledger. Distributed ledger technology combines the redundancy of a distributed database with protection against manipulation of a single node.

[0019] For example, a distributed database may be based on multiple nodes. The provision and / or acquisition of data about an e-mail box via a distributed database may be based on a random selection of one or more of the multiple nodes used for the provision and / or acquisition of information. By random selection, it is possible to prevent the disruption of data exchange due to the operation of fewer preselected nodes. By utilizing multiple nodes, redundancy can be increased, and thus the reliability of data transmission can also be increased.

[0020] In some embodiments, the encrypted secret is signed by the private key of the central point. In addition, the method may include verification of the signature of the encrypted secret based on the public key of the central point. Therefore, the authenticity of the signature and thus also the encrypted secret can be verified.

[0021] Here, the verification of the signature and / or the generation of the key pair can be performed at least partially in a trusted execution environment (also in English “Trusted Execution Environment”) of the device. Thus, the verification of the signature and / or the generation and / or storage of the key pair of the device are additionally protected.

[0022] For example, the verification of the signature of the cryptographic secret may include the verification of the signature of the cryptographic secret by a certification authority (CA). The inclusion of a CA may further make the operation of key exchange difficult.

[0023] In some embodiments, the method further comprises generating an email address of the device based on another cryptographic secret. In other words, the email address of the device can be derived from the cryptographic secret.

[0024] Furthermore, the method may include obtaining from the central point a version of the device public key signed by the central point. By means of the central point's signature, the authenticity of the device public key can be proven to a third party.

[0025] For example, the method may further include providing a signed version of the device public key via the device's email. Alternatively, the central point itself may store the signed version of the device public key in the device's email. From the device's email, the device's signed public key can be retrieved by a third party.

[0026] In at least some embodiments, the method may further include providing the email address of the device to one or more further email addresses of one or more communication partners of the device. The email address of the device may thereby be made known to the communication partners.

[0027] For example, the method may further include obtaining one or more messages for the device via the device's electronic mailbox and decoding one or more messages with the device's private key. In other words, the method may include coded communication based on the device's key pair.

[0028] In addition, embodiments of the present disclosure create a (second) computer-implemented method for exchanging key information between a device and a central point. The method is implemented by a central point. The method includes the provision of a cryptographic secret for the device. In addition, the method includes the provision of a public key of the central point for the device, for example via an email address of the central point. In addition, the method includes obtaining a version of the cryptographic secret encoded with the public key of the central point and signed with the device private key, the email address of the device, and the device public key from the device. In addition, the method includes verification of the obtained version of the cryptographic secret based on the private key of the central point and based on the cryptographic secret. In addition, the method includes encoded communication with the device based on the device public key via the device's email address. The identity of the device is verified relative to the central point by the transmission of the signed and encoded version of the cryptographic secret.

[0029] In some embodiments, the method may further include signing the device public key with the private key of the central point and providing the signed public key for the device. Thus, the device public key is confirmed by the central point.

[0030] Furthermore, embodiments of the present disclosure create a program with a program code for executing at least one of the methods, when the program code is implemented on a computer, a processor, a control module or a programmable hardware component.

[0031] In addition, embodiments of the present disclosure create a computer-implemented apparatus for exchanging key information between a device and a central point. The apparatus is suitable for exchanging key information from the device side. The apparatus includes an interface for communicating with the central point. In addition, the method includes one or more processors configured to implement the first method. In addition, embodiments create a device with the apparatus.

[0032] In addition, embodiments of the present disclosure create a computer-implemented apparatus for exchanging key information between a device and a central point. The apparatus is suitable for exchanging key information from the central point side. The apparatus includes an interface for communicating with the device. In addition, the apparatus includes one or more processors configured to implement the second method. In addition, embodiments create a central point with the apparatus. BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS

[0033] Further advantageous embodiments are described in more detail below with reference to the exemplary embodiments shown in the drawings (but generally not limited to these exemplary embodiments in general).

[0034] Figure 1a A flow chart showing an embodiment of a method for exchanging key information between a device and a central point from the device side;

[0035] Figure 1b A flow chart showing an embodiment of an apparatus for exchanging key information between a device and a central point from the device side;

[0036] Figure 2a A flow chart showing an embodiment of a method for exchanging key information between a device and a central point from the central point side;

[0037] Figure 2b A block diagram showing an embodiment of an apparatus for exchanging key information between a device and a central point from the central point side;

[0038] Figure 3a A flow chart showing an embodiment of a method for providing encoded data of a data source for multiple devices;

[0039] Figure 3b A block diagram of an embodiment of an apparatus for providing encoded data of a data source for a plurality of devices is shown;

[0040] Figure 4 shows a schematic overview of keys and email addresses in a distributed ledger;

[0041] Figure 5 A schematic diagram showing a vehicle equipped with encrypted confidentiality is shown;

[0042] Figure 6 A schematic diagram showing verification of a signature of a cryptographic secret is shown;

[0043] Figure 7 A schematic diagram showing the generation of an email address;

[0044] Figure 8 A schematic diagram showing the generation of a key pair through a vehicle;

[0045] Fig. 9 a schematic diagram showing the exchange of information between the vehicle and the central point; and

[0046] Fig.10 A schematic diagram showing vehicle information corroborated by a center point is shown. DETAILED DESCRIPTION

[0047] Different embodiments are now described in more detail with reference to the accompanying drawings, in which some embodiments are shown.

[0048] In the case of the following description of the accompanying drawings showing only some exemplary embodiments, the same reference numerals may represent the same or similar components. In addition, general reference numerals may be used for components and objects that appear multiple times in one embodiment or in one drawing but are described together in view of one or more features.

[0049] Unless otherwise defined, all concepts (including technical and scientific concepts) used in this document have the same meaning as those given by ordinary professionals in the field to which the embodiments belong. In addition, it is clarified that such expressions defined in common dictionaries, for example, should be interpreted as having a meaning consistent with their meaning in the context of the relevant technology, and not interpreted in an idealized or overly formal sense, unless this is explicitly defined in this document.

[0050] Figure 1a A flow chart of an embodiment of a (computer-implemented) method for exchanging key information between a device 100 and a central point 200 from the device side is shown. In other words, the method is implemented by the device, for example by a processor of the device. The method includes obtaining 110 a cryptographic secret, wherein the cryptographic secret is known to the central point. The method includes obtaining 120 a public key of the central point. The method includes generating 130 a key pair for the device with a device private key and a device public key. The method includes signing 140 the cryptographic secret with the device private key. The method includes encoding 150 the cryptographic secret signed with the device private key with the public key of the central point. In addition, the method includes providing 160 the encoded and signed cryptographic secret, the email address of the device and the device public key for the central point via the email address of the central point.

[0051] Figure 1b A block diagram of an embodiment of an apparatus 10 for exchanging key information between a device and a central point from the device side is shown. The apparatus comprises an interface 12 for communicating with the central point (e.g. via a distributed database). In addition, the apparatus comprises one or more processors 14 connected to the interface. Typically, the functionality of the apparatus is provided by the one or more processors, e.g. by means of the interface. For example, the one or more processors may be configured to perform internal calculations of the apparatus and coordinate communications with the central point or another communication partner. The interface may be used to perform communications. The one or more processors are configured to, for example, cooperate with the interface to implement Figure 1a Therefore, the device and in particular one or more processors of the device are improved by the features of the method. In addition, Figure 1b A device 100 with an apparatus 10 is shown.

[0052] Some embodiments of the present disclosure relate to a computer-implemented method, a computer-implemented apparatus and / or a computer program for exchanging key information between a device 100 and a central point 200 from the device 100 side. In principle, the device may be, for example, an Internet of Things device, also referred to in English as an IoT-Device or IoT device. It generally includes a device that communicates (automatically) with other devices, which means that an IoT device can be characterized as a device that is networked, i.e., is configured to communicate with one or more other devices. In the following, the device is described in particular as a vehicle, which means that the device 100 may be a vehicle, such as a motor vehicle. The same concept can, however, also be applied to components of the vehicle, such as a controller. In other words, the device may be, for example, a controller for a vehicle. The device is in communication with a central point. Here, the central point may be, for example, a central server, i.e., a server configured to communicate with multiple devices. For example, the central point may be a server of a manufacturer or user / user of the device, such as a vehicle manufacturer or a fleet user.

[0053] In principle, the method is used to enable secure, coded communication between a device and a paired node, for example between the device and another device (which can serve as a data source for the device) or between the device and a central point. Here, the device can also be regarded as a data source for other devices, and other devices can serve as data sources for the device. Therefore, the data source used as a reference in the present disclosure can also be the device and be implemented accordingly. Figure 1a Here, an encoded signed cryptographic secret is transmitted to a central point to prove to the central point that the device has the cryptographic secret. In addition, the device public key is transmitted to the central point so that the device public key a) can be signed by the central point and b) so that the central point can use the public key to encode a message at the device.

[0054] In principle, key exchange is based on two components (the device's key pair and the cryptographic secret).

[0055] Therefore, the method includes obtaining 110 the cryptographic secret. The cryptographic secret is known to the central point. Therefore, the cryptographic secret is obtained by the central point, or at least by an intermediary that also provides the cryptographic secret to the central point. Typically, the cryptographic secret can be read out from a memory of the device, for example from a protected memory of the device. For example, the cryptographic secret can be contained in a so-called firmware (hardware program) of the device. Obtaining the cryptographic secret can include reading out the cryptographic secret from the (protected) memory / firmware. For example, the cryptographic secret can be stored in a protected implementation environment (also called "Trusted Execution Environment" in English) of the device / apparatus and read out therefrom.

[0056] Furthermore, the method comprises obtaining 120 the central point's public key, for example by retrieving it from an email box of the central point, or likewise by reading out the central point's public key from a (protected) memory / firmware of the device. For example, obtaining 120 the central point's public key may comprise obtaining an email address of the central point and retrieving the central point's public key from an email box of the central point. For example, the email address may be stored in a (protected) memory / firmware of the device, for example in a protected implementation environment. In another embodiment, obtaining the central point's public key may comprise retrieving the central point's public key from a public key server.

[0057] The public key of the central point can be used to encode messages for the central point for subsequent operations and to verify the authenticity of the encrypted secret. For example, the encrypted secret can be signed by the private key of the central point. In other words, the encrypted secret can be signed by the central point. The signature of the central point can be checked via the public key of the central point. For example, the method may further include a verification 125 of the signature of the encrypted secret based on the public key of the central point. Additionally or alternatively, the signature of the encrypted secret can be checked with the help of a certification authority (also known as Certificate Authority, CA in English). To this end, the (protected) memory / firmware of the device may include a data structure with an address of a trustworthy CA that can be contacted to facilitate the verification of the signature of the encrypted secret. The verification of the signature of the encrypted secret may include the verification of the signature of the encrypted secret via a certification authority, for example, by transmitting the signature to the certification authority and receiving the verification result from the certification authority. Here, communication with the certification authority is also implemented via interface 12.

[0058] Furthermore, the method includes the generation of a cryptographic secret for the device 130. In this case, the key pair includes a device private key and a device public key. The key pair is, for example, a key pair for use in asymmetric encryption. In this case, the private key is preferably known only to the device (e.g. stored in a trusted implementation environment), while the public key can be used by other devices / central points to encode messages for the device and / or to check the signature of the device. In this case, the device public key can be provided (in a version signed by the central point) via the device's email address.

[0059] If the key pair of the device is generated and the signature of the central point of the encrypted secret is optionally verified, the encrypted secret can be transmitted to the central point. In order to indicate later that the public key of the device that is also transmitted is also authentic relative to the central point, the encrypted secret is also signed by the device with the device private key. From the central point side, the signature can be verified by the device public key, so that the authenticity of the device public key can be proved at the same time. Therefore, the method includes the signature 140 of the encrypted secret with the device private key. In asymmetric encryption, the private key is used to sign the message and to decode the encoded message based on the public key. The public key is used to check the signature and encode the message for the corresponding device. Usually, the signature is based on the data to be signed on the one hand and on the other hand on the value of the private key. Here, the signature is the result of an encryption calculation operation via the data to be signed (or via a hash value (disassembly value) of the data to be signed), wherein the encryption calculation operation is based on the private key. Here, the signature can be checked on the one hand with the help of the public key (via another encryption calculation operation based on the public key). At the same time, the integrity of the signed message can be checked because the signature must match the signed data. The data to be signed usually remain untouched by the signature; the signature is usually merely appended.

[0060] Furthermore, the method includes encrypting 150 the encrypted secret signed with the device private key with the public key of the central point, for example to prevent the encrypted secret signed with the device private key from being intercepted or manipulated by an intermediary. By encoding, the data to be encoded, here the encrypted secret signed with the device private key, is converted into a format based on the public key of the recipient by a cryptographic calculation operation, so that the encoded data can only be converted back with the corresponding private key.

[0061] Furthermore, the method includes providing (e.g. transmitting) 160 the encoded and signed cryptographic secret, the email address of the device and the device public key for the central point via the email of the central point. In other words, the above data is transmitted to the central point email of the central point. Here, parts of the data can be provided via reference. For example, the device public key can be stored in the email of the device, and the address of the device email can be transmitted to the email of the central point as a reference without transmitting the actual public key to the email of the central point.

[0062] In order to be able to transmit the electronic address of the device to a mailbox at the central point, the method may further include the generation of the electronic address of the device based on another cryptographic secret 135. Alternatively, the electronic address may be generated by another device, for example by the central point (whereby the transmission of the address also becomes ineffective) or by the management entity of the decentralized database.

[0063] In at least some embodiments, the method further comprises obtaining 170 a version of the device public key signed by the central point from the central point. Here, the signature is based, for example, on the private key of the central point. In addition, the method may include providing 175 a signed version of the device public key via an e-mail box of the device, for example to make the public key available to other devices for checking the signature and / or for signed communications with the device. To this end, the version of the device public key signed by the central point may be transmitted, for example, to an e-mail box of the device. Immediately thereafter (or beforehand / simultaneously), the e-mail address may be published so that other devices can send encoded data / messages to the device. In addition, the method may include providing (e.g. transmitting) 180 the e-mail address of the device to one or more additional e-mail boxes of one or more communication partners of the device and / or to a central register of e-mail addresses.

[0064] Based on the public key, the central point and / or one or more other devices can now send an encoded message to the device. In addition, the method may include obtaining (e.g., receiving / retrieving) 190 one or more messages for the device (encrypted with the device public key) via the device's email box. In addition, the method may include decoding 195 one or more messages with the device's private key. In order to communicate with the central point, the device can encode the corresponding data / message with the public key of the corresponding device / central point. Similarly, the key for cluster communication can be used for encoded communication. This is similar to Figure 3a and / or 3b are further described in connection therewith, but are completely applicable to Figure 1a and / or the method / apparatus of 1b.

[0065] Below, the communication is described exemplarily for the reception of data by a data source. For example, the method may include the acquisition of a message by a data source via an e-mail box (which is available via a decentralized database). The message may include data that is each encoded by the data source for the device. For example, the message may be obtained via an e-mail box of the data source or via an e-cluster mailbox. In this case, the method may further include the acquisition of a notification about the message via an e-mail box of the device. Alternatively, the message may be obtained directly via an e-mail box of the device. In addition, the method may include the decoding of the data based on a device key. Here, as with Figure 3aDifferent types of keys may be considered as described in connection with 3b and / or 3c. For example, data may be encoded based on a device-specific public key of a device. In this case, the data may be decoded based on a device-specific private key of the device. Alternatively or additionally, data may be encoded based on a key for a cluster. In this case, the data may be decoded based on a symmetric key for a cluster or based on a private key for a cluster.

[0066] As already mentioned before, the communication between the device and the central point and / or other communication partners (e.g. other devices) is based on so-called e-mail boxes. Here, the e-mail boxes can be reserved outside the corresponding device / central point, for example, through a distributed (dispersed) database or through a centralized database. In principle, the mailbox is publicly available (or accessible, i.e., zugänglich) here, so that, for example, each device with a path to the distributed database can write to the corresponding mailbox and / or the corresponding mailbox can be read out. In other words, the e-mail boxes of the central point and the e-mail boxes of the device can be obtained via a distributed database or alternatively via a centralized database. Here, the distributed database is characterized in that it is not under the control of a single entity, but is provided in a distributed manner through multiple (computing) nodes. In other words, the distributed database can be based on multiple nodes. The data of the distributed database is copied between the computing nodes of multiple nodes. Here, the data of the distributed database can be attached through the node and then copied to other nodes. A possible implementation of such a distributed database is based on distributed ledger technology. In other words, the distributed database can be based on distributed ledger technology. For this purpose, different distributed ledger technologies are possible, such as a blockchain or a directed acyclic graph. The email address of the central point and the email address of the device can thus be addresses on the distributed ledger.

[0067] Here, the mentioned e-mail box can be, for example, a data storage device, which is provided by a distributed database or a centralized database. These data storage devices can be addressed (or responded to, i.e., angesprochen) by the participating process partners, i.e., for example, devices and central points and other devices with access to the distributed or centralized database, for example, with the possibility of reading data from the data storage device and storing the data in the data storage device. In order to send a message / data to another entity, these messages / data can be stored in a data storage device corresponding to the e-mail box of the other entity, or the message / data can be stored in a data storage device corresponding to the e-mail box of the sending entity, and additional notifications can be stored in a data storage device corresponding to the e-mail box of the other entity. Here, the e-mail box is arranged outside the corresponding device, in a distributed or centralized database. In the context of distributed ledger technology, the e-mail box is a data storage device, which is available (or accessible, i.e., zugänglich) via an address on the distributed ledger, and data can be stored on it via the distributed ledger.

[0068] Therefore, the data exchanged via the mailbox is stored in the distributed ledger. Here, two methods can be selected to improve reliability. On the one hand, the corresponding data can be attached to the distributed database on multiple nodes accordingly. On the other hand, the node can be selected based on a random method. In other words, the provision and / or acquisition of data about the email mailbox via the distributed database can be based on the random selection of one or more nodes in the multiple nodes for providing and / or obtaining information. In other words, the device for providing / transmitting data via the mailbox can transmit the corresponding data to multiple nodes (a randomly selected node) / multiple nodes of the distributed database. The device can receive / receive the corresponding data by multiple nodes (a random node) of the distributed database for the retrieval / reception of data by the mailbox, and then compare the data of different nodes to obtain data that has not been manipulated.

[0069] Typically, operations that require particular security may be implemented in a trusted implementation environment of the device. For example, verification of a signature of a cryptographic secret and / or generation of a key pair may be performed at least in part in a trusted implementation environment of the device. For example, the trusted implementation environment may be provided by a processor or system-on-chip (SoC) of the device, such as processor / SoC 14 of device 10. Other cryptographic operations may also be implemented in a trusted implementation environment, such as signing and / or encoding of cryptographic secrets.

[0070] The interface 12 may correspond, for example, to one or more inputs and / or one or more outputs for receiving and / or transmitting information, for example in the form of digital bit values, based on a code, within a module, between modules, or between modules of different entities. For example, the interface 12 may be configured to communicate via a distributed database. Here, for example, the distributed database may be accessible via a computer network, for example, via a public computer network (e.g., the Internet) or via an undisclosed computer network. Accordingly, the interface 12 may be configured to access the distributed database via a computer network. Access to the distributed database may be performed by the transmission and reception of digital data packets, for example, via the provided interface via the use of a computing node by which the distributed database is provided.

[0071] In these embodiments, the one or more processors may be compatible with any controller or processor or programmable hardware component. For example, the functionality of the one or more processors may also be implemented as software programmed for the corresponding hardware components. In this regard, the one or more processors may be implemented as programmable hardware with correspondingly matched software. Any processor may be used here, such as a digital signal processor (DSPs). The embodiments are not limited to a certain type of processor. Any processor or a plurality of processors for implementing the one or more processors 14 are possible.

[0072] Figure 1a and / or 1b methods and apparatuses with further details and aspects as previously or hereafter (e.g. Figures 2a to 10 ) are mentioned in connection with the concepts or examples described. Figure 1a The method and apparatus of and / or 1b may include one or more additional optional features consistent with one or more aspects of the proposed concept or described examples, as previously or hereinafter described.

[0073] Figure 2a A flow chart of one embodiment of a method for exchanging key information between device 100 and central point 200 by central point 200 side is shown. In other words, Figure 2a The method is performed by a central point. The method includes provision of a cryptographic secret for a device 210. The method includes provision of a public key of the central point for a device 220. The method includes obtaining 230 a version of the cryptographic secret encoded with the public key of the central point and signed with a private key of the device, an email address of the device and the public key of the device by the device. The method includes verification 240 of the obtained version of the cryptographic secret based on the private key of the central point and based on the cryptographic secret. The method includes 250 an encoded communication with the device based on the public key of the device via the email address of the device.

[0074] Figure 2bA block diagram of an embodiment of a corresponding (computer-implemented) device 20 for exchanging key information between a device and a central point from the central point side is shown. In other words, the device 20 is suitable for exchanging key information from the central point side. The device comprises an interface 22 for communicating with the device and / or with one or more further devices, for example via a distributed database. In addition, the device comprises one or more processors 24 connected to the interface. Usually, the functionality of the device is provided by one or more processors, for example by means of the interface. For example, one or more processors can be configured to perform internal calculations of the device and coordinate communications with the device or with further communication partners. The interface can be used to perform communications. One or more processors are configured to implement Figure 2a Thus, the device and in particular one or more processors of the device are improved by the features of the method.

[0075] and Figures 1a to 1b Association describes the exchange of key information from the perspective of the device, and at this time Figures 2a to 2b The association takes the perspective of a central point. Here, the central point and the device interact in a time-shifted manner (by providing data stored in the device firmware) or in a time-linked communication, for example to provide a signed version of the device public key.

[0076] As already explained above, the central point can be, for example, a device, such as a computer, a computer instance, a server, a server instance or a data processing device, which is designed to communicate with a plurality of devices. In other words, the central point can, for example, be responsible for a plurality of devices and / or be connected to a plurality of devices via data communication. For example, the central point can be a server of a manufacturer or user / user of the device, such as a vehicle manufacturer or a user of a fleet. In an embodiment, this can be done, for example, via a distributed database. In this case, the central point can be designed, for example, to access the distributed database via a computer network, such as the Internet or a private computer network.

[0077] The method includes providing 210 a cryptographic secret for the device. For example, the providing of the cryptographic secret may include the generation of the cryptographic secret, for example based on a cryptographic random function. In addition, the providing of the cryptographic secret may include the signing 205 of the cryptographic secret based on a private key of the central point. Thus, the central point may have a key pair with a private key and a public key, as the device does. The cryptographic secret may be provided, for example, in the case of device manufacturing. For example, the cryptographic secret may be included in the firmware of the device, or may be passed to the memory of the device via an initial data upload. To this end, the central point may integrate the (signed) cryptographic secret into the firmware or into the data for the initial data upload.

[0078] In addition, the method includes providing 220 a public key of a central point for the device. Here, the public key of the central point can also be integrated into the firmware or the data for the initial data upload. Alternatively, the public key of the central point can be provided via an email address of the central point. For example, for the device, the address of the email address of the central point can also be provided, for example, via the firmware or the data for the initial data upload.

[0079] Furthermore, the method includes obtaining (e.g. receiving) 230 a version of the encrypted secret encoded with the public key of the central point and signed with the private key of the device, the e-mail address of the device and the public key of the device from the device. The three components mentioned above serve different purposes. The data mentioned by the central point can be obtained, for example, via the e-mail of the central point. A part of the data can be provided via a reference. For example, the public key of the device can be stored in the e-mail of the device, and the e-mail address of the device can be transmitted to the e-mail of the central point as a reference without transmitting the actual public key to the e-mail of the central point.

[0080] The cryptographic secret is initially obtained so that it can be verified that the device providing the mentioned data can also be the device. The method therefore includes a verification 240 of the cryptographic secret based on the private key of the central point and based on the cryptographic secret. In this case, the cryptographic secret is known to the central point and can therefore be compared with the encrypted value provided to the central point by the device.

[0081] The public key is in turn used to send coded messages to the device and to verify the authenticity of the signed messages sent by the device. Accordingly, the method includes coded communication 250 with the device via the device's email address based on the device's public key. Here, the device's email address can in turn be addressed based on the device's email address. Figure 1a and 1b As described in association, the email mailbox of the central point and the email mailbox of the device can be obtained via a distributed database or alternatively via a centralized database. In addition, the central point can transmit the corresponding data to multiple nodes (randomly selected one) / multiple nodes of the distributed database for the provision / transmission of data via the mailbox.

[0082] In order to make other devices also trust the device, the public key of the device can be signed by the central point. In other words, the method can include the signature of the public key of the device with the private key of the central point 260. In addition, the method can include the provision of the signed public key for the device, for example via the device email 265.

[0083] The interface 22 may correspond, for example, to one or more inputs and / or one or more outputs for receiving and / or transmitting information, for example in the form of digital binary values, based on a code, within a module, between modules or between modules of different entities. For example, the interface 22 may be configured for communicating via a distributed database. Here, the distributed database may be accessed, for example, via a computer network, for example via a public computer network such as the Internet or via a private computer network. Accordingly, the interface 22 may be configured for accessing the distributed database via a computer network. Access to the distributed database may be performed by the transmission and reception of digital data packets, for example, by the use of a computing node through a provided interface, by which the distributed database is provided.

[0084] In these embodiments, one or more processors 24 may be consistent with any controller or processor or programmable hardware component. For example, the functionality of one or more processors may also be implemented as software programmed for the corresponding hardware components. In this regard, one or more processors may be implemented as programmable hardware with corresponding matched software. Any processor, such as a digital signal processor (DSPs), may be used here. The embodiments are not limited to a certain type of processor. Any processor or multiple processors for implementing one or more processors 24 are possible.

[0085] Figure 2a and / or 2b methods and apparatuses with further details and aspects as previously or hereafter (e.g. Figures 1a to 1b , the concepts or examples described in 3a to 10) are mentioned in connection with each other. Figure 2a The methods and apparatus of and / or 2b may include one or more additional optional features consistent with one or more aspects of the proposed concept or described examples, as described before or afterward.

[0086] Figure 3a A flow chart of one embodiment of a computer-implemented method of encoded provision of data for a data source for a plurality of devices is shown. The method includes obtaining 310 one or more addresses of one or more email boxes for the plurality of devices. The method includes obtaining 320 keys for the plurality of devices. The method includes generating 330 one or more messages for the plurality of devices based on the data. For the devices in the plurality of devices, the encoded messages are each generated based on the keys. The method includes providing 340 one or more encoded messages based on one or more addresses of the one or more email boxes for the plurality of devices via at least one email box.

[0087] Figure 3bA flow chart of one embodiment of a computer-implemented apparatus 30 for encoding and providing data from a data source 300 for a plurality of devices 100 is shown. The apparatus includes an interface 32 for communicating with the plurality of devices. In addition, the method includes one or more processors 34, which are coupled to the interface. Typically, the functionality of the apparatus is provided by one or more processors, for example, via the interface. For example, the one or more processors may be configured to perform internal computations of the apparatus and coordinate communications with the plurality of devices. The interface may be used to perform communications. The one or more processors may be configured to implement Figure 3a Thus, the device and in particular one or more processors of the device are improved by the features of the method. In addition, Figure 3b A data source 300 with a device 30 is shown.

[0088] Different embodiments of the present invention relate to a computer-implemented method, a computer-implemented device, and a computer program for providing data of a data source for multiple devices from the perspective of the data source. In principle, not only the data source but also one or more devices may be, for example, devices of the Internet of Things, also referred to as IoT-Device or IoT devices in English. It generally includes devices that (automatically) communicate with other devices, that is, IoT devices can be characterized as "networked", that is, devices constructed for communicating with one or more other devices. The following is particularly referred to as a vehicle. Therefore, the data source may be, for example, a vehicle, or one or more of the multiple devices may be a vehicle. In particular, the data source may also be a component of a vehicle, and multiple devices may also be (other) vehicle components, such as a controller of a vehicle. The data source and multiple devices are in communication with each other, for example via a distributed database. Here, the distributed database may be available, for example, via a computer network.

[0089] The method includes obtaining 310 one or more addresses of one or more email boxes of multiple devices. In principle, multiple devices can be addressed via two different types of email boxes. On the one hand, each device can have its own email box, i.e., each device is assigned a device-specific email box. On the other hand, multiple devices can also communicate via a so-called electronic cluster mailbox, i.e., a mailbox used by multiple devices to receive messages. The corresponding device can monitor the cluster mailbox in order to obtain newly received messages, or the device can obtain notifications about receiving messages in the electronic cluster mailbox via its device-specific email box. Another feasible solution is that the message is stored in the email box of the data source, and the corresponding device obtains notifications about the message in its device-specific email box. Therefore, one or more addresses of one or more email boxes may include the address of the device-specific email box of the device and / or the address of one or more electronic cluster mailboxes utilized by multiple devices.

[0090] In addition, the method includes obtaining 320 the keys of multiple devices. Similar to mailboxes, two types of keys are distinguished here. For example, these keys may include one or more device-specific public keys of multiple devices. This may, for example, be the corresponding public key of an asymmetric key pair of a device. For example, the key for each device of the multiple devices may include a device-specific key. For example, obtaining the keys of multiple devices may include the retrieval of the (device-specific) public key of the corresponding device from the device's email mailbox. Alternatively or additionally, the keys may include one or more keys for a group of devices, such as an encrypted cluster key. Here, the encrypted cluster key may, for example, be a public cluster key of an asymmetric key pair for the corresponding cluster, or the encrypted cluster key may be a symmetric cluster key, which is exchanged in an encoded manner between the data source and the multiple devices (e.g. based on an asymmetric encoding of the public keys via the device and the data source).

[0091] Typically, the address and / or key of a device can be obtained in a variety of ways. For example, one or more addresses and / or keys can be read from a memory of a data source, such as from the firmware of the data source or from a trusted execution environment (also known as Trusted Execution Environment) of the data source. Alternatively or additionally, one or more addresses and / or keys can be retrieved from a trusted central point. Alternatively or additionally, one or more addresses and / or keys can be published by the corresponding device, such as through a notification of the data source on an email address of the data source.

[0092] In addition, the method includes data-based generation 330 of one or more messages for a plurality of devices. For a device in the plurality of devices, a respective encoded message is generated based on a key (and based on data). Here, the data may be, for example, data generated by a data source. For example, the data source may be a sensor or include a sensor, such as a sensor of a vehicle, and the data may be sensor data of the sensor. Alternatively, the data source may be a controller of the vehicle, and the data may be state information of the controller. The data is encoded for each of the plurality of devices.

[0093] Here, "individual encoding" does not necessarily mean that the data is individually encoded for each device in some embodiments. For example, the data can be provided via one or more messages in such a way that the availability of the data is controlled via the encoding of the message in the corresponding encoded message for multiple devices. In some embodiments, the data for a cluster of vehicles (i.e., for example, the actual partial amount of multiple vehicles) is encoded with a cluster key, and the data for other vehicles can be encoded with a corresponding device-specific public key. However, in some embodiments, the data is individually (e.g., independently) encoded for each device of the multiple devices. In addition, multiple feasibility schemes are also obtained in the case of generating one or more messages. In a variant, a message of its own can be generated for each vehicle in the multiple vehicles (which can be encoded, for example, based on the device-specific public key of the vehicle). Here, the content of the message can be completely encoded based on the (unique) key. Such behavior can also be called "encoding at the data set level", because the entire data set (content) of the message is encoded with the same key. Here, a message encoded individually can be generated for each device in the multiple devices. The message encoded individually can include such data that should be available for the corresponding device. Alternatively, a (unique) message may include a plurality of components, wherein different components may be encoded differently. In other words, a (unique) message may be generated for a plurality of devices. Data may be encoded within the message for each of the plurality of devices. In other words, components of the message may be determined for different devices of the plurality of devices and accordingly also encoded differently.

[0094] In some embodiments, one or more messages of the data source are further signed by the data source with a private key of the data source. By the device to which the message is provided, the authenticity of the message can then be checked based on the public key of the data source. Accordingly, the method may include signing 335 of one or more messages.

[0095] In addition, the method includes providing 340 one or more encoded messages via at least one email based on one or more addresses of one or more emails of multiple devices. As previously introduced, multiple implementations are possible here. For example, one or more messages may be provided via the email of the data source or via an email cluster mailbox. In these cases, the method may further include providing 350 a notification of the provision of one or more messages for the device via the email of the device (based on the email address of the device). In other words, the data source can make data in a generally available mailbox (data source or cluster) available and inform each device about this. The corresponding device can then take the message out of the generally available mailbox. Alternatively, one or more messages can be delivered (directly) via the email of the device.

[0096] As already mentioned before, the communication between the data source and the plurality of devices is based on so-called email mailboxes. In this case, the email mailboxes can, for example, be reserved outside the data source / the corresponding device, for example via a distributed (decentralized) database or via a centralized database. In principle, the email mailboxes can be publicly available here, so that, for example, each device has access to the distributed database, can write to the corresponding mailbox and / or can read from the corresponding mailbox. In other words, the email mailbox of the data source and one or more email mailboxes of the plurality of devices are available via the distributed database or, alternatively, via the centralized database. Here, the concepts of email mailbox and distributed database can be traced back to Figures 1a to 2b Introduced in association.

[0097] The interface 32 may correspond, for example, to one or more inputs and / or one or more outputs for receiving and / or transmitting information, for example in the form of digital bit values, based on a code, within a module, between modules, or between modules of different entities. For example, the interface 32 may be configured to communicate via a distributed database. Here, access to the distributed database may be, for example, via a computer network, for example, via a public computer network (e.g., the Internet) or via a non-public computer network. Accordingly, the interface 32 may be configured to access the distributed database via a computer network. Access to the distributed database may be performed by transmitting and receiving digital data packets, for example, by utilizing a computing node (which provides the distributed database) through a provided interface.

[0098] In an embodiment, one or more processors 34 may correspond to any controller or processor or programmable hardware component. For example, the functionality of one or more processors may also be implemented as software programmed for the corresponding hardware components. In this regard, one or more processors may be implemented as programmable hardware with correspondingly matched software. Any processor, such as a digital signal processor (DSPs), may be used here. The embodiment is not limited to a certain type of processor here. Any processor or also multiple processors for implementing one or more processors 34 are possible.

[0099] Figure 3a and / or 3b methods and apparatuses with further details and aspects as previously or hereafter (e.g. Figures 1a to 2b ,4 to 10) are mentioned in connection with the concepts or examples. Figure 3a The method and apparatus of and / or 3b may include one or more additional optional features consistent with one or more aspects of the proposed concept or described examples, as previously or hereinafter described.

[0100] Embodiments of the present invention relate to secure key exchange for communication encoding and authenticity verification with IoT devices, for example via a distributed ledger network.

[0101] The working principle of the invention is described with the help of an example from the "supply chain" background, but it is meaningful and applicable to any scenario with the above characteristics. Specifically, this example involves the outbound logistics process, that is, the dispatch of finished vehicles. A large number of partners (such as logistics, shipping companies, service providers, banks, insurance, etc.) and naturally the vehicles newly rolled on the conveyor belt as process instances participate in the process.

[0102] Participants within the process network expect that it is safe to receive data from the relevant vehicle itself and that it is actually the vehicle of the process partner (i.e., the OEM, Original Equipment Manufacturer). In exactly the same way, the manufacturer / OEM may also want to expect that it is safe to receive data from "its own" vehicle (acting automatically in terms of data provision) and that an attacker has not usurped its identity. Last but not least, the vehicle itself also expects that it is safe to be equipped with key material by the correct mechanism (i.e., the OEM) and not to be manipulated by an attacker, for example, in such a way that it sends data under the false identity (i.e., a vehicle of the first manufacturer is sent as a vehicle of the second manufacturer). In summary, people (manufacturers, other participants, and any attackers) cannot send messages on behalf of the data supplier (here: vehicle). The requirements mentioned above are met by at least some embodiments of the present disclosure, the implementation of which is described step by step as an example below. Here, the vehicle can, for example, be connected to the data provider. Figure 1a and / or 1b device 100, Figure 2a and / or the vehicle manufacturer of the central point 200 of 2b (eg, a server of the vehicle manufacturer) and Figure 3a and / or 3b correspond to the participants of the process network of the data source 300 .

[0103] Section 1.1: As mentioned previously, some embodiments of the present invention exploit the decentralized properties of distributed ledger networks. Figure 4 A schematic overview of keys and email addresses in a distributed ledger 400 is shown. Each participant 41; 42; 4n of such a network (i.e., a participant of the supply chain process network in this example) can generate a pair of a private key and an associated public key (hereinafter referred to as "KP", standing for "KeyPair") KP for trustworthy authentication on the one hand and for encoding information sent to it on the other hand. T1 , KP T2 , KP TnIn addition to this key pair, it uses another private key S T1 , S T2 , S Tn (e.g. another encrypted secret), which shows its identity in the network (also called "Seed", hereinafter referred to as "S"). Based on the key "S", its address in the network is derived (which is technically a public key). One of these addresses is selected as an email address, and messages directed to it can be sent to it. Below, the address is "LA" (standing for "Ledger-Address", an address in the ledger network). The own public key "KPPubKey" (public key of the key pair) used to encode the message is stored in the mailbox 410, 420, 4n0, so that other participants can send encoded messages to the owner of the mailbox. The attached private key "KPPrivKey" remains hidden from the network. In some embodiments, not only the key pair "KP" but also the email address "LA" can only be generated once for participating in the network and cannot be generated for each process instance.

[0104] Section 1.2: Figure 5 A schematic diagram of a vehicle 100 equipped with encryption secrets is shown. When an IoT device (i.e., a vehicle, for example) 100 is manufactured, the manufacturer (e.g., the manufacturer's central node 200) is equipped with a private key and an associated public key (hereinafter referred to as "KP Hersteller-Device " (Manufacturer Device Key Pair), with the included "KPPubKey Hersteller-Device "(the manufacturer's public key of the device key pair) and "KPPrivKey Hersteller-Device ” (the private key of the manufacturer's device key pair)). This key pair can be, for example, Figures 1a to 2b These keys (i.e. the cryptographic secrets) are provided, for example, by the manufacturer's own certification point ("Certificate Authority", or "CA" for short). In addition, the manufacturer transmits its own email address LA to the device / vehicle Hersteller At this address, the IoT device finds the manufacturer’s public key (“KPPubKey Hersteller ”), which is used to verify the manufacturer's signature and to send the encoded message to it.

[0105] Section 1.3: Figure 6 A schematic diagram of the verification of a cryptographically confidential signature is shown. The device / vehicle 100 uses the signature and the knowledge of known trustworthy CAs to verify whether the installed key actually comes from the manufacturer 200 (i.e. whether the signature of the key matches and is authentic). In this case, the vehicle 100 can, for example, verify the key with a signature related to an email address (LA Hersteller)610 retrieves the manufacturer’s public key (KP) from the distributed ledger 400 PubKeyHersteller ), and the encryption secret (KP Hersteller-Device ) can be checked via CA 600 which can confirm or deny whether the signature is authentic. This logic is in turn, for example, reliably protected against manipulation so that an attacker cannot close or change the check (for example by embedding in a so-called "Trusted Execution Environment").

[0106] Section 1.4: Figure 7 A schematic diagram of the generation of an address for an electronic mailbox 700 is shown. Figure 8 A schematic diagram of the generation of a key pair by a vehicle 100 is shown. In order to participate in a distributed ledger network, the device / vehicle 100 generates:

[0107] a) Your own network key (Seed, see above) Fhzg ”,

[0108] b) The email address derived from the key (“LA IoT-Device ", IoT-Device stands for IoT device, in this case, the vehicle) and

[0109] c) Generate a key pair (with "KPPubKey IoT- Device ” and “KPPrivKey IoT-Device "KP IoT-Device ”). Since the device / vehicle itself generates the new key material and is not obtained by the manufacturer, only the vehicle has knowledge of the private key.

[0110] Section 1.5: Fig. 9 A schematic diagram showing the information exchanged between the vehicle and the central point is shown. The device / vehicle 100 uses its regenerated KPPrivKey IoT-Device (Private key of device / vehicle 100) Signed by KPPrivKey obtained by the manufacturer Hersteller-Device , with the manufacturer's public key (KPPubKey Hersteller , the central point's public key) and encode it with your own email address (LA IoT-Device , the email address of the device / vehicle 100) and its own self-generated public key KPPubKey IoT-Device (the public key of the device / vehicle 100) is sent to the manufacturer's email address 610 (LA Hersteller , the email address of the central point).

[0111] Section 1.6: Fig.10A schematic diagram showing the validation of the information of the vehicle 100 through the central point 200 is shown. The manufacturer loads the data transmitted by the IoT device / vehicle from its mailbox 610 (a), which it accesses with its KPPrivKey Hersteller Decode and verify (b) whether it is a confidential KPPrivKey Hersteller-Device is contained in the message. It is thus possible to verify the sender of the message, since only the real sender knows the secret. As a result of this successful verification, the manufacturer 200 (the manufacturer's central point) in turn signs (c) the public key (KPPubKey) of the device / vehicle 100, which is also transmitted in the message. IoT-Device ) and sends it to the device / vehicle (LA IoT-Device )700. With the help of this signature, other participants can also verify the authenticity of the data provider (ie the device / vehicle). At this point, if necessary, KP Hersteller-Device , that is, the initial key pair produced by the manufacturer and transmitted to the IoT device can be revoked ("revoked") because it is no longer needed.

[0112] Section 1.7: The manufacturer as the initiator of the process generally defines the other process participants and their roles (if necessary, further new participants are also defined in the continuation of the process by the other participants in the process). In all cases, the email address of the new participant can then be propagated (or pushed, i.e. propagated) to the mailboxes (email boxes) of all other participants (e.g. communication partners), so that the new participant can be successfully connected to the process and is known to all process participants, because only in this way can all other participants address and inform him (and therefore also the device / vehicle as the main data provider). If the participant to be added knows the address of the participant already involved, he can even automatically perform such an onboarding (English for "joining").

[0113] Section 1.8: The device / vehicle can now securely send identifiable data to the customer or other process participants in an encrypted manner. This data is in the form of KP PrivKeyIoT-Device To sign. Customers of these data can use KP PubKeyIoT-Device (It is marked by the manufacturer as KP PrivKeyHersteller Come sign) and KP PubKeyHersteller Check the signature. The device uses the recipient's corresponding public key (KPPubKey X ) encodes the data to be disseminated and sends it to the participant's mailbox (LA X ) or (storing the data to be disseminated in one's own mailbox and notifying the participants via their mailboxes).

[0114] Below, a possible implementation scheme of data provision is introduced by another process participant. In such a network, the following may happen, that is, data is not only shared by the main data supplier (i.e., IoT device 100), but other participants also participate in contributing data (e.g., supplementation, such as state change, etc.). In such a case, the following can be done:

[0115] Section 2.1: Data provider (hereinafter referred to as "BD") with own mailbox LA BD ,For example Figure 3a and / or 3b) is generated in a distributed ledger (i.e., another mailbox, hereinafter referred to as “LA AdditionalDate ”). This can happen once for each data to be allocated or for each process instance for multiple data (in principle this can also happen only once for each process participant, since generally there are different process participants for each process entity, so the data are mixed there). As described later, this step is optional.

[0116] Section 2.2: BD from its own mailbox LA BD Read out all other process participants (e.g. Figure 3a and / or multiple devices 3b) of the email addresses (LAX) (see above sections 1.1+1.7) and from each mailbox determine the public key of the corresponding process participant and thus naturally also the public key of the IoT device (or in this example the vehicle).

[0117] Part 2.3: BD generates a message for each process participant (device from the plurality of devices) which contains the information to be distributed and encodes the messages with the public key of the respective participant. These messages are sent, for example, to the address LA AdditionalDate Place.

[0118] Section 2.4: BD will be kept in LA regarding new AdditionalDate A notification of the information (including addresses) in the process is sent to the mailboxes of all process participants (e.g., email mailboxes of multiple devices).

[0119] Section 2.5: The IoT device can also publish this information to its own message channel if necessary (for documentation or to reach other recipients that may be unknown to the BD). This approach also makes it possible for other process participants to contribute data. Via the address LA AdditionalDate The bypass (see sections 2.1 and 2.4) is provided for documentation purposes only. Instead of storing the message in the LA in a transmitted form via new data AdditionalDateAlternatively, it is of course also possible to transmit the new information directly to the mailboxes of the process participants.

[0120] Note: Section 1.7 describes how the process initiator identifies the process participants. This gives the process participant a certain control possibility as a "man-in-the-middle". In order to reduce this risk, communication partners who regularly participate in such a process network can exchange their public keys and email addresses in a direct way.

[0121] In addition, some embodiments create controls for visibility at the "dataset" and "attribute" levels. Security in a distributed ledger network is achieved by having a large number of decentralized stored copies of the same data, so that an attacker must compromise the network or a large portion of the copies in order to manipulate the network's data. Public DLT networks tend to have a large number of copies. Even when transparency is the underlying idea of ​​such a network, people nevertheless desire or can and if necessary allow their data to be distributed without coding.

[0122] By means of the method of operation described in the present disclosure, the visibility of data can be controlled not only at the data set level (i.e. for a single data input with generally multiple associated attributes) but also at the attribute level. If an IoT device then sends certain status information, for example, it can be the case that, due to professional or safety requirements, not everyone can see the entire status message, but it can only be decoded for individual participants of the process network (control of visibility at the data set level) or that, although the message itself is visible to all participants of the network, individual attributes of such a message (e.g. GPS position (position according to the global positioning system) or the like) are only visible to selected participants (control of visibility at the attribute level). In exactly the same way, mixed forms are naturally possible. Since the data are encoded with the corresponding public key of each participant, only the corresponding participant can decode these data (with his private key). In this way, the data generator / distributor controls which attributes should be visible to which participant / role based on roles, visibility clusters or individual permissions using adapted public keys, because the data packets are distributed accordingly and encoded separately.

[0123] If there is a large amount of overlap here, that is, different process participants have the same visibility authorization for the same data sets or attributes, it makes sense to provide such authorizations with a common key pair in order to thus reduce data redundancy in the exchange medium (i.e., for example, a distributed ledger).

[0124] This is done, for example, as follows:

[0125] Section 3.1: The data provider (hereinafter referred to as "BD") generates a symmetric key (SGX) and a cluster mailbox (LA-GX) for each role / authority cluster and sends the key and the address of the LA-GX to these cluster participants encoded with the public key of the corresponding participant.

[0126] Section 3.2: BD clusters data and / or attributes based on roles / authorities. It encodes data visible to multiple participants with the cluster key SGX. The remaining further participants are encoded with the public key of the corresponding participant.

[0127] Section 3.3: BD sends data encoded with the cluster key to the cluster mailbox LA-GX and sends data encoded with the participant's public key to the participant's mailbox.

[0128] Section 3.4: Each participant checks not only his private mailbox but also the mailbox of the group for new messages. He decodes the messages of the group mailbox with the obtained group key, and the messages in his private mailbox are also decoded with his private key. He then recombines the data obtained via different channels if necessary.

[0129] In addition, some embodiments of the present disclosure create a reduced vulnerability due to random distribution. DLT networks are further characterized by the fact that there are a large number of decentralized entry points into the network (so-called "points" or "nodes"). Each node (at least a so-called "full point", a complete node) stores the entire transaction history (or operation history, i.e., Transaktionshistorie) of the network and thus protects the network from manipulation. If a participant wants to use such a network for data storage at this time, he selects a node and transmits to it the data to be stored.

[0130] Here, a node cannot change data (when it did not generate the data itself) (because it is generally signed with the sender's private key and so manipulation will be quickly apparent), but it can discard individual transactions transferred to it before insertion into the ledger.

[0131] Furthermore, if the same nodes are selected as entry points into the DLT network for all transactions issued by IoT devices, an external attacker could potentially identify these points and disable them by attacking them and thus prevent the distribution of data of the relevant IoT devices. In order to minimize the risk of manipulation due to such attacks, the transactions issued are in some embodiments deposited by the IoT devices to the corresponding randomly selected nodes (that is to say to a random selection of one or more nodes of a plurality of nodes) for inclusion in the ledger, so that the communication between the device and the network is unpredictable.

[0132] At least some embodiments other than distributed ledger networks can be utilized. As already described above, the utilization of the embodiments of the present disclosure is not necessarily associated with distributed ledger networks. Likewise, in an environment where data exchange is performed via a centralized architecture, the authenticity of the message and its sender can be ensured with the described operating method for secure key exchange. Security may be reduced here because the central component as a "man in the middle" has a wider range of intervention possibilities than a decentralized network structure. Compared to central "Trust Authorities", embodiments, especially embodiments based on decentralized databases, bring significantly improved immunity to external and malicious influences. Embodiments can be utilized, for example, in V2X communication (communication between a vehicle (Vehicle in English) and other communication partners, where X represents different forms of communication partners). In addition, embodiments can be used in situations where data is exchanged with partners / (sub) suppliers (in a supply chain), for example, in a process network.

[0133] Another embodiment is a computer program for performing at least one of the above methods, when the computer program is run on a computer, a processor or a programmable hardware component. Another embodiment is also a digital storage medium, which can be read by a machine or a computer and has electronically readable control signals, which can cooperate with the programmable hardware component in such a way that one of the above methods is carried out.

[0134] The features disclosed in the above description, the following claims and the drawings may be essential and implementable both individually and in any combination for the realization of the exemplary embodiments in their various configurations.

[0135] Although some aspects associated with the device are described, it is obvious that these aspects are also descriptions of the corresponding methods, so that the blocks or structural elements of the device are also understood as corresponding method steps or features of the method steps. Similarly, the aspects described in association with one or as a method step are also descriptions of the corresponding blocks or details or features of the corresponding device.

[0136] According to the specific implementation requirements, the embodiments of the present invention can be implemented in hardware or in software. The embodiment can be implemented using a digital storage medium, such as a floppy disk, DVD, Blu-ray disc, CD, ROM, PROM, EPROM, EEPROM or FLASH memory, hard disk or other magnetic or optical memory, on which electronically readable control signals are stored, which can cooperate or cooperate with programmable hardware components in this way, that is, the corresponding method is executed.

[0137] Programmable hardware components can be formed by a processor, a computer processor (CPU = Central Processing Unit), a graphics processor (GPU = Graphics Processing Unit), a computer, a computer system, an application-specific integrated circuit (ASIC = Application-Specific Integrated Circuit), an integrated circuit (IC = Integrated Circuit), a system on a chip (SOC = System on Chip), a programmable logic element, or a field programmable gate array (FPGA = Field Programmable Gate Array) with a microprocessor.

[0138] The digital storage medium can thus be mechanically or computer-readable. Some exemplary embodiments thus comprise a data carrier having electronically readable control signals which interact with a programmable computer system or a programmable hardware component in such a way that one of the methods described herein is performed. One exemplary embodiment is therefore a data carrier (or a digital storage medium or a computer-readable medium) on which a program for performing the methods described herein is recorded.

[0139] Typically, embodiments of the present invention can be implemented as a program, firmware, computer program or computer program product with program code or as data, wherein the program code or data acts in such a way that one of the methods is executed when the program is run on a processor or a programmable hardware component. The program code or data can, for example, also be stored on a machine-readable carrier or data carrier. The program code or data can also exist as source code, machine code or byte code and as other intermediate codes.

[0140] Furthermore, another embodiment is a data stream, a signal sequence or a sequence of signals, which is a program for executing one of the methods described herein. The data stream, signal sequence or signal sequence can be configured, for example, so as to be transmitted via a data communication connection, for example via the Internet or another network. An embodiment is therefore also a signal sequence representing data, which is suitable for transmission via a network or a data communication connection, wherein the data is a program.

[0141] A program according to an embodiment can implement one of the methods during its execution, for example, by reading one or more data from or writing one or more data into the storage location, whereby switching processes or other processes are optionally initiated in transistor structures, in amplifier structures or in other electrical, optical, magnetic or components operating according to another functional principle. Accordingly, data, values, sensor values ​​or other information can be detected, determined or measured by the program by reading out the storage location. Thus, the program can identify, determine or measure parameters, values, measurement variables and other information by reading out one or more storage locations, and can initiate, cause or execute actions and control other devices, machines and components by writing into one or more storage locations.

[0142] The embodiments described above are merely illustrative of the principles of the invention. It should be understood that modifications and variations of the devices and details described herein will become clear to other professionals. It is therefore intended that the present invention is limited only by the scope of protection of the following patent claims and not by the specific details introduced herein by means of the description and illustration of the embodiments.

[0143] Reference numerals list

[0144] 10 Devices for use with equipment

[0145] 12 Interface

[0146] 14 One or more processors

[0147] 20 Device for center point

[0148] 22 Interface

[0149] 24 One or more processors

[0150] 30 Device for data source

[0151] 32 Interfaces

[0152] 34 One or more processors

[0153] 41, 42, 4n Participants in process networks

[0154] 100 devices

[0155] 110 Obtaining Cryptographic Secrets

[0156] 120 Obtaining the Public Key of the Central Point

[0157] 125 Cryptographically confidential signature verification

[0158] 130 Key Pair Generation

[0159] 135 Generation of device email addresses

[0160] 140 Encrypted confidential signature

[0161] 150 Encoding of the signed encrypted secret

[0162] 160 Provision of the encoded signed cryptographic secret, device email address, and device public key

[0163] 170 Obtaining a signed version of the device public key

[0164] 175 Provision of a signed version of the device public key

[0165] 180 Provision of device email address

[0166] 190 One or more messages are obtained

[0167] 195 Decoding of one or more messages

[0168] 200 Center Point

[0169] 205 Encrypted Secret Signature

[0170] 210 Provision of cryptographic secrets for device

[0171] 220 Provision of the public key of the central point for the device

[0172] 230 A signed and encoded version of the cryptographic secret, the device's email address, and the device's public key are obtained by the device

[0173] 240 Verification of the signed and encoded version of the cryptographic secret

[0174] 250 Coded communication with device

[0175] 260 Signature of the device public key

[0176] 300 Data Sources

[0177] 310 Obtaining the email address of the device

[0178] 320 Obtaining the Device Key

[0179] 330 Generation of one or more messages for a device

[0180] 335 Signature of one or more messages

[0181] 340 One or more messages provided via email

[0182] 350 Provision of Notice

[0183] 400 Distributed Ledger

[0184] 410, 420, 4n0 Letters from participants on the distributed ledger

[0185] 600 Trusted Certification Bodies

[0186] 610 Manufacturer's Email

[0187] 700 Vehicle Email.

Claims

1. A computer-implemented method for exchanging key information between a device (100) and a central point (200), wherein: The method is implemented by the device, and the method comprises: obtaining (110) a cryptographic secret, wherein the cryptographic secret is known to the central point, wherein the device obtains the cryptographic secret from the central point; Obtaining the public key of the central point (120); Generation of a key pair for the device having a private key of the device and a public key of the device (130); The encrypted secret is signed with a private key of the device (140); An encoding (150) of the public key of the central point and an encrypted secret signed with the private key of the device; The encoded and signed cryptographic secret, the email address of the device and the device public key for the central point are provided via the email address of the central point (160), wherein the encoded and signed cryptographic secret is transmitted to the central point to prove to the central point that the device has the cryptographic secret.

2. The method according to claim 1, wherein: The obtaining (120) of the central point's public key includes obtaining the central point's email address and retrieving the central point's public key from the central point's email address.

3. The method according to claim 1 or 2, wherein: The email address of the central point and the email address of the device are available via a distributed database.

4. The method according to claim 3, wherein: The distributed database is based on distributed ledger technology, wherein the email addresses of the central point and the email addresses of the devices are addresses on the distributed ledger.

5. The method according to claim 3, wherein: The distributed database is based on a plurality of nodes, wherein the provision and / or acquisition of data about an electronic mailbox via the distributed database is based on a random selection of one or more nodes of the plurality of nodes for the provision and / or acquisition of the information.

6. The method according to claim 1 or 2, wherein: The encrypted secret is signed by a private key of the central point, wherein the method further comprises a verification (125) of the signature of the encrypted secret based on the public key of the central point.

7. The method according to claim 6, wherein: The verification of the signature and / or the generation of the key pair is / are performed at least in part in a trusted implementation environment of the device.

8. The method of claim 1 or 2, comprising the generation (135) of the email address of the device based on another cryptographic secret.

9. The method according to claim 1 or 2, comprising obtaining (170) by the central point a version of the public key of the device signed by the central point.

10. The method of claim 9, comprising providing (175) a signed version of the device's public key via an electronic mailbox of the device.

11. A computer-implemented method for exchanging key information between a device and a central point, wherein: The method is implemented by the central point, and comprises: providing (210) an encryption secret for the device; provision of a public key of a central point for said device (220); obtaining from the device a version of the cryptographic secret encoded with the central point's public key and signed with the device's private key, the device's email address, and the device's public key (230), wherein the encoded and signed cryptographic secret is transmitted to the central point in order to prove to the central point that the device possesses the cryptographic secret; The obtained version of the encrypted secret is based on the private key of the central point and on verification of the encrypted secret (240); An encoded communication (250) is performed with the device via the device's email address based on the device's public key.

12. The method according to claim 11, comprising signing (260) the public key of the device with the private key of the central point and providing (265) the signed public key for the device.

13. A computer program product with a program code for carrying out at least one of the methods according to any of the preceding claims when the program code is executed on a computer, a processor, a control module or a programmable hardware component.

14. A computer-implemented apparatus (10) for exchanging key information between a device and a central point, wherein: The device is suitable for exchanging key information on the device side, and the device includes: an interface (12) for communicating with said central point; and One or more processors (14) designed to carry out the method according to any one of claims 1 to 10.

15. A computer-implemented apparatus (20) for exchanging key information between a device and a central point, wherein: The device is suitable for exchanging key information on the central point side, and the device comprises: an interface (22) for communicating with the device; and One or more processors (24) designed to carry out the method according to claim 11 or 12.