Method and device for protecting data security in GPRS network
By detecting the encryption method of the GPRS network and re-selecting a secure network connection, the attack risk caused by the use of the unrecommended encryption method in the GPRS network is solved, the security of terminal devices is improved, and the security of data transmission is ensured.
Patent Information
- Application Number
- CN202111081568.7
- Authority / Receiving Office
- CN · China
- Patent Type
- Patents(China)
- Current Assignee / Owner
- Filing Date
- 2021-09-15
- Publication Date
- 2024-11-15
- Estimated Expiration
- 2041-09-15
AI Technical Summary
There are unrecommended encryption algorithms or non-encryption methods in GPRS networks, which leads to the risk of attack on terminal devices and lacks effective security measures to improve data transmission security.
By detecting the encryption method used by the GPRS network connected to the terminal, if it is found that it is an unrecommended target encryption method or non-encryption method, the control terminal reselects the network connection and starts a secure transmission scheme, such as TLS or HTTPS transmission DNS protocol, if it fails, , send a risk warning message to warn the user.
It effectively avoids the risk of attack by using unsafe encryption methods, improves the security of data transmission, and ensures the protection of user data.
Smart Images

Figure CN113852954B_ABST
Abstract
Description
Technical Field
[0001] The embodiments of the present specification relate to the field of computer technology, and more particularly to a method and device for protecting data security in a GPRS network. Background Art
[0002] GPRS (General packet radio service) is a transitional product from 2G to 3G. It is a wireless packet switching technology based on GSM (Global System for Mobile Communications). At present, most of the communication devices on the market support GPRS, and its application scenarios are wide. To ensure the security of communication, encryption algorithms are usually used to encrypt data during GPRS network communication, for example, when sending emails and visiting websites. Since there are many kinds of encryption algorithms used in GPRS networks, the security strengths vary, and some encryption algorithms even have loopholes. Therefore, it is hoped that there will be an improved solution to improve the security of data in GPRS networks. Summary of the invention
[0003] The embodiments of this specification describe a method and device for protecting data security in a GPRS network. After determining that the connected network is GPRS, the method further determines whether the encryption method used by the GPRS network is a target encryption method or a non-encryption method not recommended by the GPRS technical standard. If the GPRS network uses a target encryption method or a non-encryption method not recommended by the GPRS technical standard, it is determined that the terminal is in an abnormal state and is at risk of being attacked. At this time, the terminal is controlled to reselect a network for connection, thereby preventing the terminal from continuing to be at risk of being attacked, thereby improving the security of the terminal.
[0004] According to a first aspect, a method for protecting data security in a GPRS network is provided, which is applied to a terminal and includes: in response to determining that the network type of the connected network is GPRS, determining the encryption method used for accessing the GPRS network; judging whether the above encryption method is a target encryption method or a non-encryption method, wherein the above target encryption method is an encryption method not recommended for use by the GPRS technical standard; in response to determining that the above encryption method is the target encryption method or the non-encryption method, determining that the above terminal is in an abnormal state; and controlling the above terminal to reselect a network for connection.
[0005] In one embodiment, the target encryption method includes GPRS encryption algorithm GEA-1 and GPRS encryption algorithm GEA-2.
[0006] In one embodiment, the method further includes: sending an alarm message, wherein the alarm message is used to remind the user that the terminal is at risk of being attacked.
[0007] In one embodiment, the method further includes: in response to determining that the terminal fails to reselect a network connection, controlling the terminal to initiate a secure transmission scheme for user data, wherein the secure transmission scheme includes using the transport layer security protocol TLS to transmit the domain name system DNS protocol or using the hypertext transfer security protocol HTTPS to transmit the domain name system DNS protocol.
[0008] In one embodiment, the method further includes: in response to determining that the terminal fails to reselect the network connection and determining that the encryption method is a non-encryption method, sending risk warning information, wherein the risk warning information is used to remind the user that there is a risk in data transmitted in plain text.
[0009] In one embodiment, the above-mentioned determination of the encryption method used for accessing the GPRS network includes: determining the encryption method used for accessing the GPRS network according to the target bits of the target signaling during the communication process.
[0010] In one embodiment, the above-mentioned determination of the encryption method used for accessing the GPRS network includes: determining the encryption method used for accessing the GPRS network according to an algorithm called when encrypting or decrypting a data packet.
[0011] In one embodiment, the above method is executed by an operating system in the above terminal.
[0012] According to the second aspect, a device for protecting data security in a GPRS network is provided, which is arranged in a terminal and includes: an encryption method determination unit, configured to determine the encryption method used for accessing the GPRS network in response to determining that the network type of the connected network is GPRS; a judgment unit, configured to judge whether the above encryption method is a target encryption method or a non-encryption method, wherein the above target encryption method is an encryption method not recommended for use by the GPRS technical standard; an abnormal state determination unit, configured to determine that the above terminal is in an abnormal state in response to determining that the above encryption method is the target encryption method or the non-encryption method; and a control unit, configured to control the above terminal to reselect a network for connection.
[0013] According to a third aspect, a computer-readable storage medium is provided, on which a computer program is stored. When the computer program is executed in a computer, the computer is caused to execute the method described in any implementation manner in the first aspect.
[0014] According to a fourth aspect, a terminal device is provided, comprising a memory and a processor, wherein executable code is stored in the memory, and when the processor executes the executable code, the method described in any implementation manner in the first aspect is implemented.
[0015] According to the method and device for protecting data security in a GPRS network provided in the embodiments of this specification, it is first determined whether the network type of the network to which the terminal is connected is GPRS. After determining that the connected network is GPRS, it is further determined whether the encryption method used by the GPRS network is an encryption method or a non-encryption method not recommended by the GPRS technical standard. If the GPRS network uses an encryption method or a non-encryption method not recommended by the GPRS technical standard, it is determined that the terminal is in an abnormal state and is at risk of being attacked. At this time, the terminal is controlled to reselect a network for connection, thereby preventing the terminal from continuing to be at risk of being attacked, thereby improving the security of the terminal. BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS
[0016] Figure 1 A schematic diagram showing an application scenario in which the embodiments of this specification can be applied;
[0017] Figure 2 A schematic flow chart of a method for protecting data security in a GPRS network according to an embodiment is shown;
[0018] Figure 3 A schematic diagram showing an example of a process of negotiating an encryption algorithm of a GPRS network between a terminal and a network end through signaling in an attachment process;
[0019] Figure 4 A schematic diagram showing an example of an encryption algorithm for negotiating a GPRS network in an attachment process in the presence of a man-in-the-middle attack;
[0020] Figure 5 A schematic block diagram of an apparatus for protecting data security in a GPRS network according to an embodiment is shown. DETAILED DESCRIPTION
[0021] The technical solution provided in this specification is further described in detail below through the accompanying drawings and embodiments. It is understood that the specific embodiments described herein are only used to explain the relevant inventions, rather than to limit the inventions. It should also be noted that, for ease of description, only the parts related to the relevant inventions are shown in the accompanying drawings. It should be noted that, in the absence of conflict, the embodiments of this specification and the features in the embodiments can be combined with each other.
[0022] As mentioned above, there are many encryption algorithms used in GPRS networks, such as GEA-1 (GPRS Encryptional algorithm 1), GEA-2, GEA-3, GEA-4, GEA-5, etc. According to researchers, the GPRS encryption algorithms used in the early days have defects and are therefore easily cracked by attackers. For example, the early GEA-1 and GEA-2 are vulnerable to attacks. Therefore, most GPRS network operators currently prefer encryption algorithms GEA-3 and above. In 2013, ETSI (European Telecommunications Standards Institute) banned the implementation of GEA-1 in mobile communications. However, since some terminal equipment manufacturers consider the compatibility of equipment when producing equipment, the hardware of the terminal equipment produced may still support the GPRS encryption algorithms used in the early days. In this case, if a 2G middleman performs a downgrade attack on the terminal device and downgrades the terminal device's GPRS encryption algorithm from a strong encryption algorithm (for example, GEA-3 and above) to a weak encryption algorithm (for example, GEA-1 or GEA-2), the terminal device will be at risk of information leakage.
[0023] In view of this, the embodiments of the present specification provide a method for protecting data security in a GPRS network. After determining that the connected network is GPRS, it is further determined whether the encryption method adopted by the GPRS network is a target encryption method or a non-encryption method not recommended by the GPRS technical standard. If the GPRS network adopts a target encryption method or a non-encryption method not recommended by the GPRS technical standard, it is determined that the terminal is in an abnormal state and is at risk of being attacked. At this time, the terminal is controlled to reselect a network for connection, thereby preventing the terminal from continuing to be at risk of being attacked, thereby improving the security of the terminal. Figure 1 A schematic diagram of an application scenario in which the embodiments of the specification can be applied is shown. As an example, the method for protecting data security in a GPRS network of the present embodiment can be implemented by software, thereby reducing data privacy leakage caused by attacks in the GPRS network from the software level. The software can be installed in a terminal device. In practice, the installation of the software can be completed by updating the system, which is fast and has low implementation costs. Optionally, the method for protecting data security in a GPRS network of the present embodiment can be executed by an operating system in a terminal.
[0024] exist Figure 1The application scenario shown includes a terminal device 101, a network 102, and a website server 103. It can be understood that the terminal device 101 can be various electronic devices that can be connected to the GPRS network, including but not limited to mobile phones, tablet computers, laptops, etc. In this example, a user using the terminal device 101 can access the website of the website server 103 through the network 102. At this time, it can be determined whether the network type of the network 102 to which the terminal device 101 is connected is GPRS. If so, the encryption method used for accessing the GPRS network is further determined. Afterwards, it can be determined whether the encryption method used by the GPRS network is an encryption method (for example, GEA-1 or GEA-2) or a non-encryption method GEA-0 that is not recommended by the GPRS technical standard. If so, it is determined that the terminal device 101 is in an abnormal state. In practice, in order to ensure the security of data transmission, the GPRS network usually does not use an encryption method that is not recommended by the GPRS technical standard or a non-encryption method for plain text transmission. Therefore, when it is detected that the encryption method used by the GPRS network is an encryption method or a non-encryption method that is not recommended by the GPRS technical standard, it can be inferred that the current state is an abnormal state. For example, there may be a middleman who performs a downgrade attack on the terminal device 101, causing the GPRS encryption algorithm to be downgraded from a strong encryption algorithm recommended by the technical standard to a weak encryption algorithm not recommended by the technical standard, resulting in an abnormal state. After determining that an abnormal state has occurred, the terminal device 101 can be controlled to reselect a network for connection, for example, 3G, 4G, 5G and other networks can be selected for connection, thereby preventing the terminal device 101 from continuing to be at risk of being attacked.
[0025] Continue to see Figure 2 , Figure 2 FIG. 1 is a flow chart of a method for protecting data security in a GPRS network according to an embodiment. It can be understood that the method can be applied to a terminal, which can be any electronic device with a GPRS network connection function. Figure 2 As shown, the method for protecting data security in the GPRS network may include the following steps:
[0026] Step 201, in response to determining that the network type of the connected network is GPRS, determining an encryption method used for accessing the GPRS network.
[0027] In this embodiment, it is first possible to detect whether the network type of the network currently connected to the terminal is GPRS. If it is GPRS, the encryption method used to access the GPRS network is further determined; if it is not GPRS, no processing is performed and the detection is continued until the network type to be accessed is detected to be GPRS. In practice, the network types that the terminal can access may include 2G, GPRS, 3G, 4G, 5G, etc., and the network type of the currently connected network can be obtained based on the interface information of the interface used by the terminal to connect to the Internet.
[0028] In one implementation, the encryption method used for accessing the GPRS network may be determined according to the target bits of the target signaling during the communication process.
[0029] Various signals are transmitted in the network, some of which are directly needed by users (such as voice calls, data packets for Internet access, etc.), while the other part is not directly needed by users and is used to control circuits. This type of signal is called signaling. Signaling is different from user information. User information is directly transmitted from the sender to the receiver through the communication network, while signaling usually needs to be transmitted between different links of the communication network (such as base stations, mobile stations and mobile control switching centers, etc.). Each link performs analysis and processing and forms a series of operations and controls through interaction, which is to ensure the effective and reliable transmission of user information.
[0030] In practice, many specific bits of signaling contain information related to encryption algorithms, which indicate the encryption algorithm used in the data transmission process. Therefore, the encryption method used to access the GPRS network can be determined based on the target bits of the target signaling containing information related to the encryption algorithm. For example, the terminal and the network end providing the GPRS network can negotiate the encryption algorithm of the GPRS network through signaling, and the signaling used in the negotiation process will contain information related to the encryption algorithm. For example, Figure 3 As shown, Figure 3The flowchart of an example of the encryption algorithm of the GPRS network negotiated between the terminal 301 and the network end 302 through signaling in the attachment process under the normal state is shown. In the conventional attachment process, the terminal 301 initiates an attachment request (Attach Request) to the network end 302, and the attachment request may include a list of GPRS encryption algorithms supported by the terminal 301. The network end 302 can determine an encryption algorithm supported by both the terminal 301 and the network end 302 as the encryption algorithm to be used in the communication process according to the list, and inform the terminal 301 of the determined encryption algorithm and the encryption parameters (for example, encryption / decryption keys, etc.) used by the encryption algorithm. After the terminal 301 replies to the response message, it enters the encryption state, thereby realizing the negotiation of the GPRS network encryption algorithm. In such a scenario, the signaling sent by the network end 302 to the terminal 301 contains information related to the encryption algorithm, and the encryption method used to access the GPRS network can be determined according to the signal. For another example, in a conventional route update process, the terminal initiates a route update request to the network, and the route update request may include a list of GPRS encryption algorithms supported by the terminal. The network can determine the encryption algorithm to be used in the communication process and the encryption parameters used by the encryption algorithm (for example, encryption / decryption keys, etc.) based on the list, and inform the terminal. After the terminal replies to the response message, it enters the encryption state, thereby realizing the renegotiation of the GPRS network encryption algorithm. Therefore, some signaling in the route update process also contains information related to the encryption algorithm. It can be understood that the above description of the attachment process and the route update process is only a schematic and brief introduction, and the actual attachment process and route update process may be more complicated, which will not be repeated here.
[0031] Figure 3 The figure shows the process of negotiating the encryption algorithm of the GPRS network between the terminal and the network through signaling in the attachment process without the presence of a man-in-the-middle attack. Figure 4 As shown, Figure 4The flowchart of an example of negotiating the encryption algorithm of the GPRS network in the attachment process in the case of a man-in-the-middle 403 attack is shown. When the man-in-the-middle 403 exists between the terminal 401 and the network 402, the terminal 401 and the network 402 cannot communicate directly. The attachment request sent by the terminal 401 will be hijacked by the man-in-the-middle 403. The man-in-the-middle 403 can modify the list of GPRS encryption algorithms supported by the terminal 401 in the attachment request. For example, the list can be modified to only support weak encryption algorithms (for example, GEA-1 or GEA-2) or only support plain text transmission. After modifying the list, the man-in-the-middle 403 will send the modified list to the network 402. The network 402 can determine an encryption algorithm included in the list and supported by itself as the encryption algorithm to be used in the communication process based on the received list, and send the determined encryption algorithm and the encryption parameters used by the encryption algorithm (for example, encryption / decryption keys, etc.). The information sent by the network 402 will be hijacked by the man-in-the-middle 403 and then modified and forwarded to the terminal 401. The response message of the terminal 401 to the information reply will also be hijacked by the middleman 403 and modified and forwarded to the network end 402, thereby realizing a downgrade attack from a strong encryption algorithm to a weak encryption algorithm. Similarly, the routing update process may also be attacked by the middleman 403, which will not be described in detail here. It can be understood that the description of the downgrade attack is only a schematic and brief introduction, and the actual downgrade attack process may be more complicated, which will not be described in detail here.
[0032] In this implementation, the signaling containing the encryption algorithm related information can be determined as the target signaling, and the bit indicating the encryption algorithm used in the communication in the target signaling can be determined as the target bit. In this way, the encryption method used for accessing the GPRS network can be determined according to the target bit of the target signaling during the communication process, thereby realizing the determination of the encryption method.
[0033] In another implementation, the encryption method used for accessing the GPRS network may be determined according to the algorithm called when encrypting or decrypting a data packet.
[0034] In this implementation, when sending a data packet, the terminal can call the encryption method pre-negotiated with the network to encrypt the data packet. When the terminal receives a data packet, it can call the decryption algorithm corresponding to the encryption algorithm used when the data packet was encrypted to decrypt the data packet. It can be understood that when the encryption method negotiated between the terminal and the network is not encrypted, the terminal may not encrypt or decrypt the data packet, that is, the encryption and decryption algorithms are not called. Because different encryption methods require the calling of different algorithm programs, for example, the GEA-1 encryption method requires the calling of the algorithm program corresponding to GEA-1, and the GEA-2 encryption method requires the calling of the algorithm program corresponding to GEA-2. Therefore, the encryption method used to access the GPRS network can be determined based on the algorithm called when encrypting or decrypting the data packet.
[0035] Step 202, determining whether the encryption method is the target encryption method or the non-encryption method.
[0036] In this embodiment, it can be determined whether the encryption method determined in step 201 is a target encryption method or a non-encryption method (i.e., plain text transmission). Here, the target encryption method can be an encryption method not recommended by the GPRS technical standard. In practice, in order to ensure the feasibility and security of data transmission, the telecommunications standardization organization will formulate some technical standards for communications, which can specify in the standards which encryption algorithms are recommended for use, which encryption algorithms are not recommended for use, which encryption algorithms are prohibited for use, etc.
[0037] In one implementation, the target encryption method may include GPRS encryption algorithm GEA-1 and GPRS encryption algorithm GEA-2. The above two encryption algorithms are encryption algorithms used in the early days of GPRS and are easily cracked. For example, researchers found that GEA-1 claims to use a 64-bit encryption algorithm, but in fact it only has 40 bits, which is easy to be cracked to obtain the key. The researchers found in practice that GEA-2 is also vulnerable to attacks.
[0038] Step 203: In response to determining that the encryption mode is the target encryption mode or the non-encryption mode, it is determined that the terminal is in an abnormal state.
[0039] In this embodiment, if it is determined that the encryption method used by the terminal to access the GPRS network is the target encryption method or the non-encryption method, it can be determined that the terminal is in an abnormal state. Usually, for the security of data transmission, the encryption method used in the communication process is a strong encryption algorithm recommended by the technical standards. Therefore, when it is monitored that the encryption method is an encryption algorithm that is not recommended or prohibited by the technical standards, it means that the current communication may have suffered a downgrade attack and the terminal is in an abnormal state. Plain text transmission is only supported in emergency special environments. For example, when extreme situations such as earthquakes and floods cause communication interruptions, and a communication network with a complete encryption algorithm cannot be established in a short time, plain text transmission will be temporarily used. Therefore, if the state of plain text transmission is monitored in a non-special environment, it can also be considered that the terminal is in an abnormal state.
[0040] Step 204: Control the terminal to reselect a network for connection.
[0041] In this embodiment, if it is determined that the terminal is in an abnormal state, the terminal can be controlled to reselect a network for connection. For example, an interface for selecting a network can be called to reselect another network (for example, 3G, 4G, 5G, etc.) for connection, thereby avoiding continued connection to a network that may be at risk of being attacked, and providing security for data transmission.
[0042] In one implementation, the above method for protecting data security in a GPRS network may further include the following steps: sending an alarm message.
[0043] In this implementation, if it is determined that the terminal is in an abnormal state, an alarm message can be sent through the terminal, and the alarm message can be used to remind the user that the terminal is at risk of being attacked. For example, the alarm message can be sent in the form of a pop-up prompt box, playing a voice message, displaying a picture, etc. Through this implementation, when it is determined that the terminal is in an abnormal state, the user can be reminded that the terminal is at risk of being attacked.
[0044] In one implementation, the method for protecting data security in a GPRS network may further include the following steps: in response to determining that the terminal fails to reselect a network connection, controlling the terminal to initiate a secure transmission scheme for user data.
[0045] In this implementation, if the terminal fails to reselect the network connection, the terminal can be controlled to start a secure transmission scheme for user data. Here, the secure transmission scheme may include the DoT (full name: DNS over TLS) scheme. DoT uses TLS (Transport Layer Security) to transmit the DNS (Domain Name System) protocol. The TLS protocol is one of the commonly used security encryption protocols on the Internet. Alternatively, the secure transmission scheme may include DoH (full name: DNS over HTTPs). DoH uses HTTPs (Hyper Text Transfer Protocol over Secure Socket Layer) to transmit the DNS protocol. Through this implementation, when the terminal fails to reselect the network, a secure transmission scheme for user data can be started to prevent users from being hijacked by DNS.
[0046] In one implementation, the method for protecting data security in a GPRS network may further include the following steps: in response to determining that the terminal fails to reselect a network connection and determining that the encryption method is a non-encryption method, sending risk warning information.
[0047] In this implementation, if it is determined that the terminal fails to reselect the network, and the encryption method used to access the GPRS network is non-encrypted, that is, plain text transmission, a risk warning message is sent, which can be used to remind the user that the data transmitted in plain text is risky. For example, the risk warning message can be sent in the form of a pop-up prompt box, playing a voice message, displaying a picture, etc. Through this implementation, when the network fails to be reselected and plain text transmission is used, the user can be reminded that the data transmitted in plain text is risky.
[0048] The above-mentioned embodiments of the present specification provide a method for protecting data security in a GPRS network. First, it is determined whether the network type of the network to which the terminal is connected is GPRS. After determining that the connected network is GPRS, it is further determined whether the encryption method adopted by the GPRS network is an encryption method or a non-encryption method not recommended by the GPRS technical standard. If the GPRS network adopts an encryption method or a non-encryption method not recommended by the GPRS technical standard, it is determined that the terminal is in an abnormal state and is at risk of being attacked. At this time, the terminal is controlled to reselect a network for connection, thereby preventing the terminal from continuing to be at risk of being attacked, thereby improving the security of the terminal.
[0049] Figure 5 FIG. 1 is a schematic block diagram of a device for protecting data security in a GPRS network according to an embodiment. Figure 5As shown, the device 500 for protecting data security in the GPRS network is arranged in the terminal, and includes: an encryption method determination unit 501, configured to determine the encryption method used for accessing the GPRS network in response to determining that the network type of the connected network is GPRS; a judgment unit 502, configured to judge whether the above encryption method is a target encryption method or a non-encryption method, wherein the above target encryption method is an encryption method not recommended for use by the GPRS technical standard; an abnormal state determination unit 503, configured to determine that the above terminal is in an abnormal state in response to determining that the above encryption method is the target encryption method or the non-encryption method; a control unit 504, configured to control the above terminal to reselect a network for connection.
[0050] In some optional implementations of this embodiment, the target encryption method includes GPRS encryption algorithm GEA-1 and GPRS encryption algorithm GEA-2.
[0051] In some optional implementations of this embodiment, the above-mentioned device 500 also includes: a first sending unit (not shown in the figure), configured to send alarm information, wherein the above-mentioned alarm information is used to prompt the user that the above-mentioned terminal is at risk of being attacked.
[0052] In some optional implementations of this embodiment, the above-mentioned device 500 also includes: a secure transmission scheme starting unit (not shown in the figure), which is configured to control the above-mentioned terminal to start a secure transmission scheme for user data in response to determining that the above-mentioned terminal fails to reselect a network connection, wherein the above-mentioned secure transmission scheme includes using the transport layer security protocol TLS to transmit the domain name system DNS protocol or using the hypertext transfer security protocol HTTPS to transmit the domain name system DNS protocol.
[0053] In some optional implementations of this embodiment, the above-mentioned device 500 also includes: a second sending unit (not shown in the figure), configured to send risk warning information in response to determining that the above-mentioned terminal has failed to reselect the network connection and determining that the above-mentioned encryption method is a non-encryption method, wherein the above-mentioned risk warning information is used to remind the user that there is a risk in the data transmitted in plain text.
[0054] In some optional implementations of this embodiment, the encryption mode determining unit 501 is further configured to determine the encryption mode used for accessing the GPRS network according to the target bit of the target signaling during the communication process.
[0055] In some optional implementations of this embodiment, the encryption mode determining unit 501 is further configured to: determine the encryption mode used for accessing the GPRS network according to the algorithm called when encrypting or decrypting the data packet.
[0056] Those of ordinary skill in the art should further appreciate that the units and algorithm steps of each example described in conjunction with the embodiments disclosed herein can be implemented in electronic hardware, computer software, or a combination of the two. In order to clearly illustrate the interchangeability of hardware and software, the composition and steps of each example have been generally described in terms of function in the above description. Whether these functions are implemented in hardware or software depends on the specific application and design constraints of the technical solution. Those of ordinary skill in the art may use different methods to implement the described functions for each specific application, but such implementation should not be considered to be beyond the scope of this application.
[0057] The steps of the method or algorithm described in conjunction with the embodiments disclosed herein may be implemented by hardware, a software module executed by a processor, or a combination of the two. The software module may be placed in a random access memory (RAM), a memory, a read-only memory (ROM), an electrically programmable ROM, an electrically erasable programmable ROM, a register, a hard disk, a removable disk, a CD-ROM, or any other form of storage medium known in the art.
[0058] The specific implementation methods described above further illustrate the objectives, technical solutions and beneficial effects of the present invention in detail. It should be understood that the above description is only a specific implementation method of the present invention and is not intended to limit the scope of protection of the present invention. Any modifications, equivalent substitutions, improvements, etc. made within the spirit and principles of the present invention should be included in the scope of protection of the present invention.
Claims
1. A method for protecting data security in a GPRS network, applied to a terminal, comprising: In response to determining that the network type of the connected network is GPRS, determining an encryption method used for accessing the GPRS network; Determining whether the encryption mode is a target encryption mode or a non-encryption mode, wherein the target encryption mode is an encryption mode not recommended by the GPRS technical standard; In response to determining that the encryption mode is a target encryption mode or a non-encryption mode, determining that the terminal is in an abnormal state; The terminal is controlled to reselect a network for connection.
2. The method according to claim 1, wherein: The target encryption methods include GPRS encryption algorithm GEA-1 and GPRS encryption algorithm GEA-2.
3. The method according to claim 1, wherein: The method further comprises: Sending an alarm message, wherein the alarm message is used to remind the user that the terminal is at risk of being attacked.
4. The method according to claim 1, wherein: The method further comprises: In response to determining that the terminal fails to reselect a network connection, the terminal is controlled to start a secure transmission scheme for user data, wherein the secure transmission scheme includes using the Transport Layer Security protocol TLS to transmit the Domain Name System DNS protocol or using the Hypertext Transfer Security protocol HTTPS to transmit the Domain Name System DNS protocol.
5. The method according to claim 1, wherein: The method further comprises: In response to determining that the terminal fails to reselect a network connection and determining that the encryption method is a non-encryption method, risk warning information is sent, wherein the risk warning information is used to remind the user that there is a risk in data transmitted in plain text.
6. The method according to claim 1, wherein: The encryption method used for determining access to the GPRS network comprises: The encryption method used for accessing the GPRS network is determined according to the target bits of the target signaling during the communication process.
7. The method according to claim 1, wherein: The encryption method used for determining access to the GPRS network comprises: The encryption method used to access the GPRS network is determined based on the algorithm called when encrypting or decrypting the data packet.
8. The method according to claim 1, wherein: The method is executed by an operating system in the terminal.
9. A device for protecting data security in a GPRS network, arranged in a terminal, comprising: an encryption mode determining unit, configured to determine an encryption mode used for accessing the GPRS network in response to determining that the network type of the connected network is GPRS; A judging unit configured to judge whether the encryption mode is a target encryption mode or a non-encryption mode, wherein the target encryption mode is an encryption mode not recommended by the GPRS technical standard; an abnormal state determination unit, configured to determine that the terminal is in an abnormal state in response to determining that the encryption mode is a target encryption mode or a non-encryption mode; The control unit is configured to control the terminal to reselect a network for connection.
10. A computer-readable storage medium having a computer program stored thereon, which, when executed in a computer, causes the computer to execute the method according to any one of claims 1 to 8.
11. A terminal device, comprising a memory and a processor, characterized in that: The memory stores executable codes, and when the processor executes the executable codes, the method according to any one of claims 1 to 8 is implemented.
