Failure processing method and device for fire information of nuclear power plant and computer device

Abstract

The application relates to a nuclear power plant fire information failure processing method, device and computer equipment. The method comprises the following steps: acquiring key information of each fireproofing subarea in a nuclear power plant when a fire occurs; identifying potential information failure common mode points of each fireproofing subarea in the nuclear power plant according to the key information; determining a target common mode point in the potential information failure common mode points; and eliminating the target common mode point according to a preset common mode point elimination strategy. The method can identify and process potential risks in a fire situation, thereby ensuring that the safety function of the nuclear power plant is not lost.

Description

TECHNICAL FIELD

[0001] The present application relates to the technical field of nuclear power, and in particular to a nuclear power plant fire information failure processing method and device, computer equipment, a storage medium and a computer program product. BACKGROUND

[0002] Fire is one of the external disasters that must be considered by a nuclear power plant. The fireproof design of a nuclear power plant not only considers reducing the possibility of fire occurrence, but also mitigates the consequences caused by fire occurrence, and the ultimate goal is to ensure that a fire occurring in any area of the nuclear power plant cannot result in the loss of safety functions of the nuclear power plant. A nuclear power plant generally divides fire zones to separate and arrange redundant devices performing the same safety function, and is assisted by fire-fighting facilities such as fire doors and smoke exhaust valves to limit the consequences of a fire occurring in a certain area and prevent the fire from affecting the adjacent fire zones. Under the fire condition, there are many risks, which can all result in the complete loss of safety functions of the nuclear power plant. In the traditional way, whether the equipment or cable is failed or damaged under the fire condition is identified, and appropriate fireproof measures are taken to ensure that the safety functions of the nuclear power plant are not lost.

[0003] However, there can be potential risks under the fire condition. The traditional way cannot identify and handle the potential risks, resulting in the risk of complete loss of safety functions of the nuclear power plant. Therefore, how to identify and handle the potential risks under the fire condition to ensure that the safety functions of the nuclear power plant are not lost has become a technical problem to be solved at present. SUMMARY

[0004] Therefore, it is necessary to provide a nuclear power plant fire information failure processing method, device, computer equipment, computer readable storage medium and computer program product capable of ensuring that the safety functions of the nuclear power plant are not lost, in view of the above technical problems.

[0005] In a first aspect, the present application provides a nuclear power plant fire information failure processing method. The method comprises:

[0006] obtaining key information of each fire zone in the nuclear power plant when a fire occurs;

[0007] identifying a potential information failure common mode point of each fire zone in the nuclear power plant according to the key information;

[0008] determining a target common mode point in the potential information failure common mode point;

[0009] eliminating the target common mode point according to a preset common mode point elimination strategy.

[0010] In one of the embodiments, the identifying a potential information failure common mode point of each fire zone in the nuclear power plant according to the key information comprises:

[0011] identify whether the fire in each fire compartment will cause the key information to have a risk of information invalidation;

[0012] If yes, the key information that has the risk of information invalidation is determined as a potential information invalidation common mode point of the corresponding fire compartment.

[0013] In one embodiment, the identifying whether the fire in each fire compartment will cause the key information to have a risk of information invalidation includes:

[0014] identifying whether the fire in each fire compartment will cause diagnostic-oriented information in the key information to be lost, whether the fire in each fire compartment will cause design extension working condition characteristic information in the key information to be triggered, whether the fire in each fire compartment will cause accident working condition entry information in the key information to be triggered, and whether the fire in each fire compartment will cause all safety functions of the fire compartment to be lost.

[0015] In one embodiment, the identifying whether the fire in each fire compartment will cause all safety functions of the fire compartment to be lost includes:

[0016] identifying whether the fire in each fire compartment will cause one safety function of the fire compartment to be lost, and trigger loss-of-support function monitoring information of a corresponding redundant column of the fire compartment, whether the fire in each fire compartment will cause one safety function of the fire compartment to be lost, and loss-of-support function monitoring information of the redundant column to be invalid, and whether the loss-of-support function monitoring information of one safety function of the fire compartment is triggered or the safety function monitoring information is invalid, and the loss-of-support function monitoring information of the redundant column is triggered or the safety function monitoring information is invalid.

[0017] In one embodiment, the identifying whether the fire in each fire compartment will cause the key information to have a risk of information invalidation includes:

[0018] identifying whether the fire in each fire compartment will cause diagnostic-oriented information in the key information to be lost;

[0019] If the diagnostic-oriented information is not caused to be lost, identifying whether the fire in each fire compartment will cause design extension working condition characteristic information in the key information to be triggered;

[0020] If the design extension working condition characteristic information is not caused to be triggered, identifying whether the fire in each fire compartment will cause accident working condition entry information in the key information to be triggered;

[0021] If the accident working condition entry information is not triggered, it is identified whether a safety function of the fire compartment is lost and the loss of support function monitoring information of the corresponding redundant column of the fire compartment is triggered when a fire occurs in each fire compartment;

[0022] If the safety function of the fire compartment is not lost and the loss of support function monitoring information of the corresponding redundant column of the fire compartment is triggered, it is identified whether a safety function of the fire compartment is lost and the safety function monitoring information of the redundant column is invalid when a fire occurs in each fire compartment;

[0023] If the safety function of the fire compartment is not lost and the safety function monitoring information of the redundant column is invalid, it is identified whether the loss of support function monitoring information of the safety function of the fire compartment is triggered or the safety function monitoring information is invalid and the loss of support function monitoring information of the redundant column is triggered or the safety function monitoring information is invalid when a fire occurs in each fire compartment.

[0024] In one of the embodiments, the determining a target common mode point in the potential information failure common mode point comprises:

[0025] characteristic analysis is performed on the potential information failure common mode point to obtain a characteristic analysis result;

[0026] The target common mode point is determined according to the characteristic analysis result.

[0027] In one of the embodiments, the characteristic analysis performed on the potential information failure common mode point to obtain a characteristic analysis result comprises:

[0028] It is identified whether there is a replacement strategy for the potential information failure common mode point to obtain a first identification result;

[0029] It is identified whether a replacement value of the potential information failure common mode point can achieve correct judgment or guidance to obtain a second identification result;

[0030] It is identified whether a result of misjudgment or misguidance caused by the potential information failure common mode point is acceptable to obtain a third identification result;

[0031] It is identified whether a consequence of information failure of the potential information failure common mode point is acceptable to obtain a fourth identification result;

[0032] The characteristic analysis result is obtained according to the first identification result, the second identification result, the third identification result and the fourth identification result.

[0033] In one of the embodiments, the preset common mode point elimination strategy comprises modifying an accident operation procedure or a fire protection strategy.

[0034] In one of the embodiments, the obtaining the key information of each fire compartment in the nuclear power plant in case of fire includes:

[0035] screening the important information of the accident operation affected by the fire in the nuclear power plant in the accident operation procedure;

[0036] constructing an important information database according to the important information of the accident operation;

[0037] determining the key information of each fire compartment in the nuclear power plant in case of fire according to the important information database.

[0038] In one of the embodiments, the screening the important information of the accident operation affected by the fire in the nuclear power plant in the accident operation procedure includes:

[0039] extracting the diagnosis-oriented information and the accident condition entry information affected by the fire in the nuclear power plant in the initial diagnosis stage and the re-diagnosis stage of the unit state in the accident operation procedure;

[0040] extracting the design extended condition characteristic information in the accident handling sequence of the accident operation procedure;

[0041] extracting the loss of support function detection information in the loss of support function monitoring part of the accident operation procedure;

[0042] extracting the safety function monitoring information in the supply system function monitoring part of the accident operation procedure;

[0043] obtaining the important information of the accident operation affected by the fire in the nuclear power plant according to the diagnosis-oriented information, the accident condition entry information, the design extended condition characteristic information, the loss of support function detection information and the safety function monitoring information.

[0044] In one of the embodiments, the method further includes:

[0045] identifying the potential information failure common mode point of the current fire compartment in the nuclear power plant according to the key information;

[0046] when the potential information failure common mode point of the current fire compartment is multiple, sequentially identifying whether the potential information failure common mode point of the current fire compartment is the target common mode point to obtain the target common mode point of the current fire compartment;

[0047] after the target common mode point of the current fire compartment is eliminated according to the preset common mode point elimination strategy, returning to the step of identifying the potential information failure common mode point of the current fire compartment in the nuclear power plant according to the key information, updating the current fire compartment to the next fire compartment, eliminating the target common mode point until the target common mode points of all the fire compartments in the nuclear power plant are eliminated.

[0048] In a second aspect, the present application provides a device for failure handling of fire information of a nuclear power plant. The device comprises:

[0049] an obtaining module configured to obtain key information of each fire compartment of the nuclear power plant in a fire;

[0050] an identifying module configured to identify potential information failure common mode points of each fire compartment of the nuclear power plant according to the key information;

[0051] a determining module configured to determine a target common mode point from the potential information failure common mode points;

[0052] an eliminating module configured to eliminate the target common mode point according to a preset common mode point elimination strategy.

[0053] In a third aspect, the present application provides a computer device. The computer device comprises a memory and a processor. The memory stores a computer program. The processor implements the following steps when executing the computer program:

[0054] obtaining key information of each fire compartment of the nuclear power plant in a fire;

[0055] identifying potential information failure common mode points of each fire compartment of the nuclear power plant according to the key information;

[0056] determining a target common mode point from the potential information failure common mode points;

[0057] eliminating the target common mode point according to a preset common mode point elimination strategy.

[0058] In a fourth aspect, the present application provides a computer readable storage medium. The computer readable storage medium stores a computer program. The computer program is executed by a processor to implement the following steps:

[0059] obtaining key information of each fire compartment of the nuclear power plant in a fire;

[0060] identifying potential information failure common mode points of each fire compartment of the nuclear power plant according to the key information;

[0061] determining a target common mode point from the potential information failure common mode points;

[0062] eliminating the target common mode point according to a preset common mode point elimination strategy.

[0063] In a fifth aspect, the present application provides a computer program product. The computer program product comprises a computer program. The computer program is executed by a processor to implement the following steps:

[0064] Acquire key information of each fire compartment in a nuclear power plant when a fire occurs;

[0065] Identify potential information failure common mode points of each fire compartment in the nuclear power plant according to the key information;

[0066] Determine a target common mode point in the potential information failure common mode points;

[0067] Eliminate the target common mode point according to a preset common mode elimination strategy.

[0068] The nuclear power plant fire information failure processing method, device, computer equipment, storage medium and computer program product, by acquiring the key information of each fire compartment in the nuclear power plant when a fire occurs, then according to the key information to identify the potential information failure common mode points of each fire compartment in the nuclear power plant, determine the target common mode point in the potential information failure common mode points, and then eliminate the target common mode point according to the preset common mode elimination strategy, so as to eliminate the potential risk caused by the fire, that is, the information failure risk, ensure that the safety function of the nuclear power plant is not lost and the correct guidance and execution of the accident operation procedure under the fire condition, so as to ensure the safety of the unit under the fire condition. At the same time, the above method can also be used as a supplement to the existing fire weak link analysis method of the nuclear power plant, and further improves the fire safety level of the nuclear power plant. BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF DRAWINGS

[0069] Figure 1 It is an application environment diagram of the nuclear power plant fire information failure processing method in one embodiment;

[0070] Figure 2 It is a flowchart of the nuclear power plant fire information failure processing method in one embodiment;

[0071] Figure 3 It is a structure diagram of a typical accident operation procedure in one embodiment;

[0072] Figure 4 It is an information "collection-processing-display" path chain in one embodiment;

[0073] Figure 5 It is a flowchart of the step of identifying the potential information failure common mode points of each fire compartment in the nuclear power plant according to the key information in one embodiment;

[0074] Figure 6 It is a flowchart of the step of identifying whether the key information will cause an information failure risk when a fire occurs in each fire compartment in one embodiment;

[0075] Figure 7 It is a flowchart of the step of performing feature analysis on the potential information failure common mode points to obtain a feature analysis result in one embodiment;

[0076] Figure 8 A flowchart of a failure processing method of nuclear power plant fire information in another embodiment;

[0077] Figure 9 A schematic diagram of a principle of identifying a potential information failure common mode point of a fire compartment in an embodiment;

[0078] Figure 10 A structural block diagram of a failure processing device of nuclear power plant fire information in an embodiment;

[0079] Figure 11 An internal structure diagram of a computer device in an embodiment;

[0080] Figure 12 An internal structure diagram of a computer device in another embodiment. DETAILED DESCRIPTION

[0081] In order to make the objects, technical solutions and advantages of the present application clearer, the present application will be further described in detail below with reference to the accompanying drawings and embodiments. It should be understood that the specific embodiments described herein are only used to explain the present application and not used to limit the present application.

[0082] The failure processing method of nuclear power plant fire information provided by the embodiments of the present application can be applied to, for example Figure 1The application environment is shown. Among them, the monitoring device 102 communicates with the nuclear power plant management device 104 through the network. The monitoring device can include a measuring instrument, a sensor and other data monitoring devices. The monitoring device 102 is used to monitor the data of the unit running in each fire compartment of the nuclear power plant, such as reactor state information (reactor nuclear power, core heat power, electric power, etc.), alarm data (loss of all emergency AC power alarm information, loss of all heat sink alarm information, reactor coolant loop flow low alarm, steam generator leakage rate high alarm, steam generator gamma radioactivity high alarm, containment dose rate high alarm, etc.), parameter data (stabilizer liquid level, core coolant outlet temperature, high-pressure safety injection system flow, steam generator secondary side pressure, etc.), and equipment operation state feedback information (pump operation state feedback information, valve opening and closing position state feedback information, etc.). The monitoring device 102 can transmit the monitored monitoring data to the nuclear power plant management device 104 through the network. The nuclear power plant management device 104 obtains the key information of each fire compartment in the nuclear power plant when a fire occurs in the monitoring data, identifies the potential information failure common mode point of each fire compartment in the nuclear power plant according to the key information, and determines the target common mode point in the potential information failure common mode point. Among them, the nuclear power plant management device 104 can be, but is not limited to, various personal computers, notebook computers, smart phones, tablet computers, Internet of Things devices and portable wearable devices. The nuclear power plant management device 102 can also be a server, which can be implemented by an independent server or a server cluster composed of multiple servers.

[0083] In one embodiment, as shown in Figure 2 , a nuclear power plant fire information failure processing method is provided. This method is applied to the nuclear power plant management device in Figure 1 for illustration, including the following steps:

[0084] Step 202, obtaining the key information of each fire compartment in the nuclear power plant when a fire occurs.

[0085] The fire compartment refers to a local area divided by fire separation measures, which can prevent fire from spreading to the remaining part of the same building within a certain time. The key information of each fire compartment when a fire occurs refers to the information required for the accident operation that needs to be focused on when a fire occurs in the fire compartment, that is, the information that may exist common mode risk.

[0086] Specifically, the nuclear power plant management device obtains data of each fire compartment of the nuclear power plant during unit operation monitored by the monitoring device in real time, which can be referred to as monitoring data. The monitoring device can include data monitoring devices such as measuring instruments and sensors. For example, the monitoring data can include reactor state information (reactor nuclear power, reactor core heat power, electric power, etc.), alarm data (loss of all emergency AC power alarm information, loss of all heat sink alarm information, reactor coolant loop flow low alarm, steam generator leakage rate high alarm, steam generator gamma radioactivity high alarm, containment dose rate high alarm, etc.), parameter data (stabilizer liquid level, reactor coolant outlet temperature, high-pressure safety injection system flow, steam generator secondary side pressure, etc.), and device operation state feedback information (pump operation state feedback information, valve opening and closing position state feedback information, etc.).

[0087] The nuclear power plant management device can determine the key information of each fire compartment of the nuclear power plant when a fire occurs in the monitoring data based on the accident operating procedure. The accident operating procedure is a procedure for guiding operators to take subsequent actions to mitigate accidents and limit the consequences of accidents after the unit occurs abnormal operating conditions or accidents, the reactor protection system triggers an emergency shutdown, or the special safety facility starts. The key information of each fire compartment when a fire occurs can include diagnostic guidance information, design extension condition characteristic information, accident condition entry information, loss of support function detection information, and safety function monitoring information. The diagnostic guidance information refers to diagnostic guidance information during the accident operation process, such as pressure vessel water level, reactor core outlet subcooling degree, steam generator water level, etc. The design extension condition (Design Extension Condition Category A, DEC-A for short) characteristic information refers to an indication or alarm information used to represent the design extension condition, such as loss of all emergency AC power alarm information, loss of all heat sink alarm information, etc. The accident condition (Accident Conditions, AC condition for short) entry information refers to the entry condition of the accident condition. For example, steam generator radioactivity high alarm, steam generator leakage rate high alarm, containment dose rate high alarm, etc. The loss of support function detection information refers to the entry criterion of the loss of support system procedure, such as power loss alarm, switchboard voltage indication, etc. The safety function monitoring information refers to possible equipment failures discovered in time by monitoring the operation of the NSSS (Nuclear Steam Supply System) function, such as safety injection system flow low, etc.

[0088] Further, obtaining the key information of each fire compartment of the nuclear power plant when a fire occurs includes: screening accident operation important information affected by the nuclear power plant fire in the accident operating procedure; constructing an important information library according to the accident operation important information; and determining the key information of each fire compartment of the nuclear power plant when a fire occurs according to the important information library.

[0089] The accident operation important information affected by the nuclear power plant fire refers to important information that needs to be considered when the fire occurs, i.e., important information indicators. The important information library can be a list of important information composed of the accident operation important information.

[0090] The important information library is actually a list of important information that needs to be considered in the fire. The nuclear power plant has hundreds of thousands of instrument parameter information, and if all of them are analyzed without discrimination, the cost is too high, and after screening, only nearly 200 pieces of information are obtained. For each fire compartment, only these screened information needs to be concerned when analyzing the fire consequences, and thus the nuclear power plant management equipment can determine the key information of each fire compartment when the fire occurs in the monitoring data according to the important information indicators in the constructed important information library.

[0091] As an example, Table 1 and Table 2 are used to represent the important information library of the nuclear power plant with two columns of safety configurations, and for convenience, Table 1 lists the parameter information, and Table 2 lists the safety function.

[0092] Table 1 diagnostic oriented information, DEC-A characteristic information and AC working condition entry information

[0093]

[0094]

[0095] Table 2 loss of support function monitoring information, safety function monitoring information

[0096]

[0097] Wherein, A represents the column of the fire compartment, and B represents the redundant column corresponding to the column A.

[0098] Further, the screening of the accident operation important information affected by the nuclear power plant fire in the accident operation procedure includes: extracting the diagnostic oriented information and the accident working condition entry information affected by the nuclear power plant fire in the initial diagnosis stage and the re-diagnosis stage of the unit state of the accident operation procedure; extracting the design extended working condition characteristic information in the accident handling sequence of the accident operation procedure; extracting the loss of support function detection information in the loss of support function monitoring part of the accident operation procedure; extracting the safety function monitoring information in the supply system function monitoring part of the accident operation procedure; and obtaining the accident operation important information affected by the nuclear power plant fire according to the diagnostic oriented information, the accident working condition entry information, the design extended working condition characteristic information, the loss of support function detection information and the safety function monitoring information.

[0099] Nuclear power plant management equipment can screen accident operating important information affected by nuclear power plant fire through multiple parts of the accident operating procedure. The information screened by each part is different. The structure diagram of a typical accident operating procedure is shown in Figure 3 , wherein, after the initial diagnosis of the unit state, if the unit state parameter is not degraded, it is included in the fault condition (IC condition) for processing, which will be guided to the appropriate IC condition accident handling sequence; if the unit state parameter is degraded, it is included in the AC condition for processing, which will be guided to the appropriate AC condition accident handling sequence. Before the end of each accident handling sequence, loss of support system monitoring and NSSS function monitoring are performed to discover possible support system failure or NSSS function failure. Then, re-diagnosis of the unit state is performed, and it is guided to the appropriate accident handling sequence.

[0100] Specifically, in the initial diagnosis of the unit state and the re-diagnosis of the unit state stage, diagnostic guidance information and AC condition entry information are extracted. This is because: a single fire originating from a nuclear power plant will only cause some equipment failure, but will not directly cause an accident condition such as a primary loop break, which is generally included in the IC condition management, therefore, in the case of an originating fire, it is necessary to ensure that the fire should not trigger the AC condition entry information, such as the steam generator high radiation alarm, and be guided to the AC condition. For the same reason, the fire should not cause the diagnostic guidance information to be completely lost to ensure correct diagnosis of the unit state under the fire condition.

[0101] DEC-A characteristic information is extracted in the accident handling sequence. DEC-A characteristic information refers to the indication or alarm information used to represent the design extended condition. Typical DEC-A conditions include loss of all emergency AC power, loss of all heat sinks, and other rare accidents, and the corresponding DEC-A characteristic information is loss of all emergency AC power alarm and loss of all heat sink alarm. The accident operating procedure generally has a special accident handling sequence to deal with these extreme conditions, and the fire should be avoided from directly triggering the DEC-A characteristic information and being wrongly guided to these accident handling sequences.

[0102] Loss of support function monitoring information is extracted in the loss of support function monitoring part. The loss of some support functions may cause the loss of safety functions, such as the loss of a column of emergency AC power, which will cause the loss of safety functions such as the safety injection system, the residual heat removal system, and the emergency water supply system of the column. For the support functions that may cause the loss of safety functions, the extracted loss of support function monitoring information is mainly the entry criteria of the loss of support system procedure, such as the loss of power alarm and the switchboard voltage indication. In the case of fire, if the entry criteria of the loss of support system procedure is triggered by mistake, it may cause the safety function to be inappropriately shut down by the operator due to the mistake of executing the loss of support system procedure, resulting in an operation common mode.

[0103] The safety function monitoring information is extracted in the NSSS function monitoring part. The purpose of the NSSS function monitoring is to monitor the operation of the NSSS function and to find possible equipment failures in time. In the embodiment, the NSSS function monitoring is only safety function monitoring, such as the safety injection system, the residual heat removal system, etc. In the case of a fire, if false safety function monitoring information is given due to the fire, such as low safety injection system flow, the further deterioration of the unit state can be caused due to the operator's false shutdown of the safety function.

[0104] The corresponding accident operation important information affected by the fire of the nuclear power plant is screened out more quickly by extracting the corresponding accident operation important information through different parts of the accident operation procedure.

[0105] In step 204, the potential information failure common mode points of each fire compartment in the nuclear power plant are identified according to the key information.

[0106] For each fire compartment, the nuclear power plant management equipment can perform fire consequence analysis on the fire compartment according to the key information, that is, identify the influence of each fire compartment on the key information when a fire occurs. Thus, the potential information failure common mode points of each fire compartment in the nuclear power plant are identified according to the fire consequence analysis result. Specifically, when the fire consequence analysis result is that a fire in the fire compartment will cause a risk of information failure of the key information, the key information that has the risk of information failure is determined as the potential information failure common mode point of the corresponding fire compartment. The risk of information failure is a potential risk of the accident operation procedure in actual execution.

[0107] When the fire consequence analysis result is that a fire in the fire compartment will not cause a risk of information failure of the key information, the fire compartment does not have a potential information failure common mode point. The risk of information failure refers to a common mode situation in which information failure, such as false triggering of an alarm or false indication of an instrument, causes misdiagnosis or misguidance of the operator during execution of the accident operation procedure, or causes the operator to falsely perform some operation according to the accident operation procedure, resulting in complete loss of safety functions.

[0108] The fire consequence analysis not only analyzes the direct consequences caused by the fire, but also analyzes the indirect consequences, which can be specifically represented as identifying all possible failure modes on the "collection-processing-display" path chain of the information. The nuclear power plant management equipment can determine the potential information common mode points according to all possible failure modes.

[0109] Taking the loss-of-power alarm as an example, the "collection-processing-display" path chain of the information is as shown in Figure 4 On the path chain, a plurality of fire compartments can be sequentially passed through. The Figure 4A typical direct consequence and indirect consequence of fire are described. The direct consequence of fire can include: fire directly destroys the pressure measuring instrument itself, the power supply cable of the instrument or the signal acquisition cable of the instrument, etc. The indirect consequence of fire can include: fire directly destroys the DCS (Distributed Control System) signal acquisition cabinet or its power supply cable, fire directly destroys the DCS signal processing cabinet or its power supply cable, fire destroys the internal optical cable of the DCS, fire destroys the signal transmission cable or the signal transmission optical cable, etc., all of which will indirectly cause the pressure measuring instrument information to be unable to be collected and processed and lost.

[0110] Step 206, determining a target common mode point in the potential information loss common mode point.

[0111] After the nuclear power plant management device identifies the potential information loss common mode point of the fire compartment, when there are multiple potential information loss common mode points, it can identify whether the information loss risk of each potential information loss common mode point is acceptable. If not, the potential information common mode point is confirmed, and the potential information common mode point is determined as the target common mode point and needs to be eliminated. If it is acceptable, it indicates that the potential information common mode point cannot be confirmed, and the potential information common mode point is not the target common mode point.

[0112] Step 208, eliminating the target common mode point according to the preset common mode point elimination strategy.

[0113] For each target common mode point, the nuclear power plant management device needs to take corresponding strategies to eliminate the target common mode point. Specifically, the nuclear power plant management device pre-stores preset common mode point elimination strategies. The preset common mode point elimination strategies can include modifying the accident operation procedure or the fire protection strategy, and can also include other strategies capable of eliminating the target common mode point. The preset common mode point elimination strategies can have priorities, for example, the priorities are in turn: modifying the accident operation procedure > the fire protection strategy > other strategies capable of eliminating the target common mode point.

[0114] Exemplarily, the nuclear power plant management device can eliminate the target common mode point by modifying the accident operation procedure. For the target common mode point, the analysis selects other alarm signals or parameter information as alternative information to replace the failure information (key information with information failure risk). If there is alternative information that meets the requirements, the target common mode point can be eliminated by modifying the accident operation procedure. By modifying the accident operation procedure to eliminate the common mode point, unnecessary fire protection strategies can be avoided, and costs can be reduced. Taking the emergency bus power failure alarm as an example, the upstream incoming line switch state of the emergency bus and the operating state of the equipment on the emergency bus can be considered as alternatives. The emergency bus power failure alarm signal is used to indicate whether the emergency bus is powered off. If the signal fails due to fire, the accident operation procedure can be modified by determining whether the "upstream bus voltage is normal + emergency bus incoming line switch is closed" or "emergency diesel engine starts + emergency diesel engine switch is closed" to determine whether the emergency bus voltage is normal. If it can ensure correct guidance and ensure smooth progress of accident handling, it indicates that there is alternative information that meets the requirements, and the determination method of the emergency bus voltage normal in the accident operation procedure is modified to "upstream bus voltage normal + emergency bus incoming line switch closed" or "emergency diesel engine starts + emergency diesel engine switch closed".

[0115] If the target common mode point cannot be eliminated by modifying the accident operation procedure, it can be analyzed whether the target common mode point can be eliminated by fire protection strategies. The actual arrangement of the equipment and the actual path of the cable can be analyzed. For nuclear power plants, cables are generally wrapped by cable bridges for fire protection, and equipment is generally protected by fire screens, fire covers, etc. The purpose of taking fire protection strategies is to protect sensors, cables, etc. on the information path chain from fire to avoid triggering of program entry criteria. The actual conditions on site need to be determined to determine what fire protection measures to take.

[0116] If the target common mode point cannot be eliminated by the above means, other solutions are sought, including modifying the design, redefining the fire compartment, etc. For example, by modifying the alarm trigger logic implemented in the digital instrument control system cabinet, the sensor failure can be avoided to trigger the alarm in the AC working condition under the fire condition.

[0117] In the failure processing method for the fire information of the nuclear power plant, the key information of each fire compartment in the nuclear power plant when a fire occurs is obtained, and then potential information failure common mode points of each fire compartment in the nuclear power plant are identified according to the key information, a target common mode point is determined in the potential information failure common mode points, and then the target common mode point is eliminated according to a preset common mode point elimination strategy, so as to eliminate the potential risk, i.e. information failure risk, caused by the fire, ensure that the safety function of the nuclear power plant is not lost and the accident operation procedure is correctly guided and executed under the fire condition, and thus the safety of the unit under the fire condition is ensured. Meanwhile, the method can also be used as a supplement to the existing weak link analysis method for the fire of the nuclear power plant, and further improves the fire safety level of the nuclear power plant.

[0118] In an alternative manner of the embodiment, as shown in Figure 5 Step 204 includes:

[0119] Step 502, whether the key information will cause the information failure risk when a fire occurs in each fire compartment is identified. If yes, step 504 is executed; if no, step 506 is executed.

[0120] Step 504, the nuclear power equipment or cable corresponding to the key information causing the information failure risk is determined as the potential information failure common mode point of the corresponding fire compartment.

[0121] Step 506, the fire compartment does not have the potential information failure common mode point.

[0122] For each fire compartment, the nuclear power plant management device can analyze the fire consequences of the fire compartment according to the key information, and obtain a fire consequence analysis result. Specifically, the nuclear power plant management device identifies whether the key information will cause the information failure risk when a fire occurs in each fire compartment, and obtains the fire consequence analysis result. The information failure risk can include loss of diagnostic guidance information in the key information, triggering of design extension condition characteristic information in the accident operation information, triggering of accident condition entry information in the accident operation information, and complete loss of safety function of the fire compartment. As long as any one of the risks of the key information is identified, the fire consequence analysis result is yes, and if all the risks of the key information are identified, the fire consequence analysis result is no.

[0123] If the fire consequence analysis result is yes, the nuclear power equipment or cable corresponding to the key information causing the information failure risk is determined as the potential information failure common mode point of the corresponding fire compartment. If the fire consequence analysis result is no, the fire compartment does not have the potential information failure common mode point, and the next fire compartment is turned to for the failure processing of the fire information.

[0124] Further, the step 502 comprises: identifying whether the fire in each fire zone will cause the loss of the diagnostic guide information in the key information, whether the fire in each fire zone will cause the triggering of the design extension condition characteristic information in the key information, whether the fire in each fire zone will cause the triggering of the accident condition entry information in the key information, and whether the fire in each fire zone will cause the loss of the safety function of the fire zone.

[0125] If the fire in the fire zone will cause the loss of the diagnostic guide information, the diagnostic guide information is considered as a potential information failure common mode point. For example, the loss of the pressure vessel water level RPVL in the diagnostic guide information shown in Table 1 (the loss of two columns at the same time) will cause the difficulty in the accident operation diagnosis, and thus the pressure vessel water level is considered as a potential information failure common mode point.

[0126] If the fire in the fire zone will cause the triggering of the design extension condition characteristic information (DEC-A characteristic information), the DEC-A characteristic information is considered as a potential information failure common mode point. For example, the triggering of the loss of the final heat sink alarm shown in Table 1 (the appearance of the final heat sink loss alarm of column A and column B at the same time) will mislead to the corresponding DEC-A accident handling sequence, and thus the triggering of the loss of the final heat sink alarm is considered as a potential information failure common mode point.

[0127] If the fire in the fire zone will cause the triggering of the accident condition entry information (AC condition entry information), the AC condition entry information is considered as a potential information failure common mode point. For example, the appearance of the high radioactivity alarm of the steam generator of column A or column B shown in Table 1 will trigger the AC condition entry condition, and will mislead to the AC condition steam generator heat pipe rupture accident handling sequence, and thus the high radioactivity alarm of the steam generator is considered as a potential information failure common mode point.

[0128] If the fire in the fire zone will cause the loss of the safety function of the column, the loss of the support function monitoring information causing the loss of the safety function, and / or the safety function monitoring information is considered as a potential information failure common mode point.

[0129] It should be noted that as long as one of the above multiple information failure risks exists, the nuclear power equipment or cable corresponding to the key information of the information failure risk will be determined as the potential information failure common mode point of the corresponding fire compartment. The multiple information failure risks can be identified simultaneously or in a preset identification order. For example, the preset identification order can be to identify whether the diagnostic guidance information in the key information will be lost when a fire occurs in each fire compartment, and then identify whether the design extension operating condition characteristic information in the key information will be triggered, whether the accident operating condition entry information in the key information will be triggered, and whether the safety functions of the fire compartment will all be lost. Alternatively, the preset identification order can be to identify whether the design extension operating condition characteristic information in the key information will be triggered when a fire occurs in each fire compartment, and then identify whether the diagnostic guidance information in the key information will be lost, whether the accident operating condition entry information in the key information will be triggered, and whether the safety functions of the fire compartment will all be lost.

[0130] Further, identifying whether the safety functions of the fire compartment will all be lost when a fire occurs in each fire compartment includes: identifying whether one safety function of the fire compartment will be lost, and whether the loss of support function monitoring information of the corresponding redundant column will be triggered, whether one safety function of the fire compartment will be lost, and whether the safety function monitoring information of the redundant column will be lost, and whether the loss of support function monitoring information of one safety function of the fire compartment will be triggered or the safety function monitoring information will be lost, and whether the loss of support function monitoring information of the redundant column will be triggered or the safety function monitoring information will be lost.

[0131] If the fire of the fire compartment directly causes a certain safety function of the column to be lost, and the corresponding loss of support system monitoring information of the redundant column is triggered, it is considered that the loss of support system monitoring information is a potential information failure common mode point. For example, as shown in Table 2, the fire of an A column fire compartment directly damages the containment spray pump of the column to cause the A column containment spray system to be lost, and the fire causes the B column emergency busbar power loss alarm to be triggered. The operator may misjudge the B column emergency busbar power loss and manually trip the B column containment spray pump, resulting in the loss of the containment spray functions of the two columns. Therefore, the B column emergency busbar power loss alarm trigger is considered as a potential information failure common mode point.

[0132] If a fire in a fire compartment directly causes the loss of a certain safety function in this column, and at the same time the safety function monitoring information of redundant columns fails, then the safety function monitoring information is considered a potential information failure common point. For example, as shown in Table 2, a fire in a fire compartment of column A directly damages the waste heat discharge pump in that column, causing the waste heat discharge function of column A to fail. At the same time, the fire causes the waste heat discharge flow rate indicator of column B to fail. In this case, the operator may misjudge the abnormal operation of the waste heat discharge in column B and manually stop the waste heat discharge pump in column B, resulting in the failure of the waste heat discharge function of both columns. Therefore, the failure of the waste heat discharge flow rate indicator of column B is considered a potential information failure common point.

[0133] If a fire causes the loss of support system monitoring information for a certain safety function in a column, triggering or malfunctioning the safety function monitoring information, and simultaneously causes the loss of support system monitoring information or malfunctioning of safety function monitoring information in redundant columns, then the loss of support system monitoring information and the malfunctioning of safety function monitoring information are considered potential common-mode points of information failure. For example, as shown in Table 2, a fire in a fire compartment of column A causes the emergency busbar power failure alarm in column A to be triggered, and simultaneously causes the waste heat discharge flow indicator in column B to be lost. The operator might mistakenly shut down the waste heat discharge systems in both columns, resulting in the loss of waste heat discharge function. Therefore, the emergency busbar power failure alarm in column A and the waste heat discharge flow indicator in column B are considered potential common-mode points of information failure.

[0134] In this optional method, such as Figure 6 The diagram illustrates the process of sequentially identifying various information failure risks according to a preset identification order. Therefore, identifying whether a fire in any fire compartment would lead to the loss of critical information includes:

[0135] Step 602: Identify whether the fire will result in the loss of diagnostic guidance information.

[0136] Identify whether a fire in any fire compartment would result in the loss of diagnostic guidance information in the critical information. If yes, proceed to step 604; otherwise, proceed to step 606.

[0137] Step 604: Identify potential information failure common mode points.

[0138] Key information that poses a risk of information failure is identified as potential common points of information failure in the corresponding fire compartment.

[0139] Step 606: Identify whether a fire will trigger the design extended operating condition characteristic information.

[0140] Identify whether a fire in any fire compartment would trigger the design extended operating condition characteristic information in the critical information. If yes, proceed to step 604; otherwise, proceed to step 608.

[0141] Step 608: Identify whether a fire will trigger the accident condition entry information.

[0142] If yes, step 604 is executed; if no, step 610 is executed.

[0143] Step 610, identify whether the fire will cause a safety function of the column to be lost and the loss of support function monitoring information of the redundant column to be triggered.

[0144] If yes, step 604 is executed; if no, step 612 is executed.

[0145] Step 612, identify whether the fire will cause a safety function of the column to be lost and the safety function monitoring information of the redundant column to be invalid.

[0146] If yes, step 604 is executed; if no, step 614 is executed.

[0147] Step 614, identify whether the fire will cause the loss of support function monitoring information of a safety function of the column to be triggered or the safety function monitoring information to be invalid and the loss of support function monitoring information of the redundant column to be triggered or the safety function monitoring information to be invalid.

[0148] If yes, step 604 is executed; if no, step 616 is executed.

[0149] Step 616, determine that there is no potential information invalidation common mode point in each fire compartment.

[0150] In this optional mode, by identifying whether the fire in each fire compartment will cause the loss of diagnostic guidance information, whether the design expansion condition characteristic information will be triggered, whether the accident condition entry information will be triggered, and whether the safety function of the fire compartment will be completely lost, multiple information invalidation risks can not only identify and process potential information invalidation risks, but also accurately eliminate information invalidation risks, thereby effectively avoiding the risk of complete loss of safety function of the nuclear power plant and greatly improving the safety of the nuclear power plant.

[0151] In an optional mode of the embodiment, determining the target common mode point in the potential information failure common mode point comprises: performing feature analysis on the potential information failure common mode point to obtain a feature analysis result; and determining the target common mode point according to the feature analysis result.

[0152] When the potential information failure common mode point identified by the nuclear power plant management device is multiple, whether the information failure risk of each potential information failure common mode point is acceptable can be identified. Specifically, whether the information failure risk of each potential information failure common mode point is acceptable comprises: performing feature analysis on the potential information failure common mode point to obtain a feature analysis result. If the information failure risk of the potential information failure common mode point is identified as unacceptable according to the feature analysis result, the potential information common mode point is confirmed, the potential information common mode point is determined as the target common mode point, and elimination is required. If the information failure risk of the potential information failure common mode point is identified as acceptable according to the feature analysis result, it is indicated that the potential information common mode point cannot be confirmed, and the potential information common mode point is not the target common mode point.

[0153] In the optional mode, the target common mode point is determined by performing feature analysis on the potential information failure common mode point, which can further determine the accurate information failure common mode point, thereby facilitating the accurate elimination of the information failure risk.

[0154] Further, as shown in Figure 7 the feature analysis on the potential information failure common mode point comprises:

[0155] Step 702, whether a potential information failure common mode point exists a substitute strategy is identified, and a first identification result is obtained.

[0156] Step 704, whether the substitute value of the potential information failure common mode point can realize correct judgment or guidance is identified, and a second identification result is obtained.

[0157] Step 706, whether the result of misjudgment or misguidance caused by the potential information failure common mode point is acceptable is identified, and a third identification result is obtained.

[0158] Step 708, whether the information failure consequence of the potential information failure common mode point is acceptable is identified, and a fourth identification result is obtained.

[0159] Step 710, the feature analysis result is obtained according to the first identification result, the second identification result, the third identification result and the fourth identification result.

[0160] The feature analysis can include identifying whether a substitute strategy exists for the potential information failure common mode point, identifying whether a substitute value for the potential information failure common mode point can achieve correct judgment or guidance, identifying whether the result of the misjudgment or misguidance caused by the potential information failure common mode point is acceptable, and identifying whether the information failure consequence of the potential information failure common mode point is acceptable. The feature analysis result can include the identification results of the above four aspects.

[0161] Specifically, the nuclear power plant management device identifies whether a substitute strategy exists for the potential information failure common mode point. Whether a substitute strategy exists can be confirmed from the operation experience, operator skills, or the robustness of the accident operation procedure. If the first identification result is that a reasonable substitute strategy exists, the potential information failure common mode point is not confirmed. If the first identification result is that a reasonable substitute strategy does not exist, the potential information failure common mode point is confirmed. For example, in addition to being able to judge the operation state of the residual heat removal system through the residual discharge flow during the accident operation, the operation state of the residual heat removal pump + whether the outlet isolation valve is open can also be used to judge. For another example, in addition to considering the on-off state, the rotation speed, current, flow, etc. of the pump can also be used to confirm whether a pump is in operation.

[0162] The feature analysis can include identifying whether a substitute strategy exists for the potential information failure common mode point, identifying whether a substitute value for the potential information failure common mode point can achieve correct judgment or guidance, identifying whether the result of the misjudgment or misguidance caused by the potential information failure common mode point is acceptable, and identifying whether the information failure consequence of the potential information failure common mode point is acceptable. The feature analysis result can include the identification results of the above four aspects.

[0163] The feature analysis can include identifying whether a substitute strategy exists for the potential information failure common mode point, identifying whether a substitute value for the potential information failure common mode point can achieve correct judgment or guidance, identifying whether the result of the misjudgment or misguidance caused by the potential information failure common mode point is acceptable, and identifying whether the information failure consequence of the potential information failure common mode point is acceptable. The feature analysis result can include the identification results of the above four aspects.

[0164] It is determined whether the information failure consequence of the potential information failure common mode point is acceptable. Specifically, the nuclear power plant management device can determine whether the information failure consequence is acceptable based on engineering experience. The engineering experience determination can be based on comprehensive consideration of operating experience feedback of similar units, acceptable degree of consequence, probabilistic risk evaluation, and the like. If the fourth identification result is that the information failure consequence is acceptable, the potential information failure common mode point is not confirmed. If the fourth identification result is that the information failure consequence is not acceptable, the potential information failure common mode point is confirmed. For example, important parameter instruments such as outlet temperature of the reactor core and water level of the pressure vessel are sent out through the instrument pipe above the top cover of the pressure vessel. If a fire occurs at the instrument pipe, all of the instrument information will be lost. However, operating experience feedback of similar units shows that there is basically no ignition source at this position, and no excessive fire load is introduced at this position during daily operation and maintenance, and thus the potential information failure common mode point is not confirmed. For another example, redundant pressure regulator water level and pressure regulator safety valve position measurement instruments are arranged in the fire compartment of the pressure regulator. Fire risk analysis of the fire compartment shows that although the instruments are arranged in the same fire compartment, any possible ignition point in the fire compartment can cause one or more instruments to lose, but will not cause all of the instruments to lose. Thus, the potential information failure common mode point is not confirmed.

[0165] In the embodiment, the potential information failure common mode points are confirmed in multiple ways to obtain the target common mode point, so that the target common mode point can be accurately identified, and the accuracy of the fire information failure processing is further improved.

[0166] In another embodiment, as shown in Figure 8 a nuclear power plant fire information failure processing method is provided. The method includes:

[0167] Step 802: screening accident operation important information affected by a fire in the nuclear power plant in an accident operation procedure.

[0168] Step 804: constructing an important information library according to the accident operation important information.

[0169] Step 806: determining key information of each fire compartment in the nuclear power plant when a fire occurs according to the important information library.

[0170] Step 808: identifying a potential information failure common mode point of a current fire compartment in the nuclear power plant according to the key information.

[0171] Step 810: when the potential information failure common mode point of the current fire compartment is multiple, it is determined in sequence whether the potential information failure common mode point of the current fire compartment is a target common mode point, and the target common mode point of the current fire compartment is obtained.

[0172] Step 812: Eliminate the target common points of the current fire compartment sequentially according to the preset common point elimination strategy.

[0173] Step 814: After the target common points of the current fire compartment have been eliminated, return to the step of identifying potential information failure common points of the current fire compartment in the nuclear power plant based on key information, update the current fire compartment to the next fire compartment, and eliminate the target common points until the target common points of all fire compartments in the nuclear power plant have been eliminated.

[0174] In this embodiment, the nuclear power plant management equipment sequentially performs information failure processing on the fire protection zones to identify all types of failures along the information path chain.

[0175] The following example, using a fire compartment in column A, illustrates the failure handling method for the aforementioned nuclear power plant fire information. Figure 9 The diagram illustrates the identification of potential information failure common points in a fire compartment of column A. A fire in this fire compartment would directly damage the containment sprinkler pump EAS001PO in column A, and simultaneously damage the cable for the steam generator radioactivity alarm signal KRT066KA generated by the steam generator radioactivity monitoring instrument KRT002MA, the cable for the LHA power failure alarm signal LHA002KA on the emergency busbar in column A, the cable for the LHB power failure alarm signal LHB002KA on the emergency busbar in column B, and the cable for the containment sprinkler system flow information EAS002MD on the column B.

[0176] A fire in the fire compartment of column A could potentially trigger the radioactive alarm signal KRT066KA from the steam generator, directly leading to the handling sequence for a steam generator heat transfer tube rupture accident under AC operating conditions. Therefore, this is a potential common-mode point of information failure. During accident operation, in order to quickly handle the steam generator heat transfer tube rupture accident and reduce leakage between the primary and secondary loops, the alarm triggering immediately requires the execution of the corresponding accident handling strategy, thus confirming this potential common-mode point of information failure. The recommended measure to eliminate this potential common-mode point of information failure is to modify the alarm triggering logic within the instrumentation and control system so that the alarm is not triggered when KRT002MA fails.

[0177] The fire in the A-row fire compartment can cause the loss of the B-row emergency bus LHB and the alarm signal LHB002KA to be triggered. Considering that the fire in the fire compartment has directly caused the loss of the A-row emergency bus, the simultaneous existence of the loss of the two-row emergency bus alarm signals means that the DEC-A feature information (loss of field alarm) appears, and thus is a potential information failure common mode point. From the perspective of accident operation, the false execution of the loss of field accident handling sequence in the case where the A-row emergency bus is actually not lost will lead to the development of the unit in the direction of deterioration, which is not desirable, and thus the potential information failure common mode point is confirmed. The recommended measure to eliminate the common mode point is to take fireproof wrapping and other protection measures on the cable of the alarm signal LHB002KA, so that the A-row fire compartment can still function when a fire occurs in the A-row fire compartment.

[0178] The fire in the A-row fire compartment can cause the loss of the B-row containment spray system flow indication EAS002MD. Considering that the fire in the fire compartment has directly caused the loss of the A-row containment spray, if the B-row containment spray system flow is falsely indicated as low by EAS002MD, the operator can mistakenly manually trip the B-row containment spray, and thus is a potential information failure common mode point. The trip of the two-row containment spray systems can cause the heat in the containment to be unable to be discharged in time, which seriously threatens the integrity of the containment, and thus the potential information failure common mode point is confirmed. The recommended measure to eliminate the potential information failure common mode point is to modify the criterion for monitoring the containment spray in the accident operation procedure, so that the running state of the B-row containment spray is no longer determined only by the flow reading of EAS002MD, but also by whether EAS002PO is running and the state of the corresponding valve, so that the running state of the B-row containment spray system can still be correctly monitored when a fire occurs in the A-row fire compartment.

[0179] It should be understood that, although each step in the flowchart involved in each of the above embodiments is shown in sequence according to the direction of the arrow, these steps are not necessarily executed in sequence according to the direction of the arrow. Unless explicitly stated herein, there is no strict sequence limitation on the execution of these steps, and these steps can be executed in other sequences. Moreover, at least part of the steps in the flowchart involved in each of the above embodiments can include multiple steps or stages, which are not necessarily executed at the same time, but can be executed at different times, and the execution sequence of these steps or stages is not necessarily sequential, but can be executed in rotation or alternation with at least part of other steps or steps or stages in other steps.

[0180] Based on the same inventive concept, the application further provides a nuclear power plant fire information failure processing device for implementing the above-mentioned nuclear power plant fire information failure processing method. The device provides a solution similar to the implementation scheme described in the above-mentioned method, so the specific limitations in one or more nuclear power plant fire information failure processing device embodiments provided below can refer to the limitations of the nuclear power plant fire information failure processing method described above, and will not be repeated here.

[0181] In one embodiment, as shown in Figure 10 a nuclear power plant fire information failure processing device is provided, comprising: an acquisition module 1002, an identification module 1004, a determination module 1006, and an elimination module 1008, wherein:

[0182] The acquisition module 1002 is configured to acquire key information of each fire compartment in the nuclear power plant when a fire occurs.

[0183] The identification module 1004 is configured to identify a potential information failure common mode point of each fire compartment in the nuclear power plant according to the key information.

[0184] The determination module 1006 is configured to determine a target common mode point in the potential information failure common mode point.

[0185] The elimination module 1008 is configured to eliminate the target common mode point according to a preset common mode point elimination strategy.

[0186] In one embodiment, the common mode point identification module 1004 is further configured to identify whether the key information will cause an information failure risk when a fire occurs in each fire compartment; if so, the key information that causes the information failure risk is determined as the potential information failure common mode point of the corresponding fire compartment.

[0187] In one embodiment, the common mode point identification module 1004 is further configured to identify whether the key information will cause diagnostic guidance information to be lost, whether the key information will cause design extension operating condition characteristic information to be triggered, whether the key information will cause accident operating condition entry information to be triggered, and whether the safety function of the fire compartment will be completely lost when a fire occurs in each fire compartment.

[0188] In one embodiment, the common mode point identifying module 1004 is further configured to identify whether a fire in each fire compartment will cause a loss of a safety function of the fire compartment, and trigger a loss of support function monitoring information of a redundant column corresponding to the fire compartment; whether a fire in each fire compartment will cause a loss of a safety function of the fire compartment, and a safety function monitoring information of the redundant column is invalid; and whether a fire in each fire compartment will cause a loss of a safety function of the fire compartment, and the loss of support function monitoring information of the redundant column is triggered or the safety function monitoring information is invalid.

[0189] In one embodiment, the common mode point identifying module 1004 is further configured to identify whether a fire in each fire compartment will cause a loss of diagnostic-oriented information in the key information; if the diagnostic-oriented information is not lost, identify whether a fire in each fire compartment will cause a triggering of design extension working condition characteristic information in the key information; if the design extension working condition characteristic information is not triggered, identify whether a fire in each fire compartment will cause a triggering of accident working condition entry information in the key information; if the accident working condition entry information is not triggered, identify whether a fire in each fire compartment will cause a loss of a safety function of the fire compartment, and trigger a loss of support function monitoring information of a redundant column corresponding to the fire compartment; if the safety function of the fire compartment is not lost, and the loss of support function monitoring information of the redundant column is triggered, identify whether a fire in each fire compartment will cause a loss of a safety function of the fire compartment, and a safety function monitoring information of the redundant column is invalid; if the safety function of the fire compartment is not lost, and the safety function monitoring information of the redundant column is invalid, identify whether a fire in each fire compartment will cause a loss of a safety function of the fire compartment, and the loss of support function monitoring information of the redundant column is triggered or the safety function monitoring information is invalid.

[0190] In one embodiment, the common mode point determining module 1006 is further configured to perform feature analysis on the potential information invalidity common mode point to obtain a feature analysis result, and determine the target common mode point according to the feature analysis result.

[0191] In one embodiment, the common mode point determination module 1006 is further configured to identify whether the potential information failure common mode point has an alternative strategy, to obtain a first identification result; identify whether an alternative value of the potential information failure common mode point can achieve correct judgment or guidance, to obtain a second identification result; identify whether a result of misjudgment or misguidance caused by the potential information failure common mode point is acceptable, to obtain a third identification result; identify whether a consequence of information failure of the potential information failure common mode point is acceptable, to obtain a fourth identification result; and obtain a feature analysis result according to the first identification result, the second identification result, the third identification result, and the fourth identification result.

[0192] In one embodiment, the preset common mode point elimination strategy includes modifying an accident operation procedure or a fire protection strategy.

[0193] In one embodiment, the information acquisition module 1002 is further configured to screen accident operation important information affected by the fire in the nuclear power plant from the accident operation procedure; construct an important information library according to the accident operation important information; and determine key information of each fire compartment in the nuclear power plant when a fire occurs, according to the important information library.

[0194] In one embodiment, the information acquisition module 1002 is further configured to extract diagnosis guidance information and accident condition entry information affected by the fire in the nuclear power plant in an initial diagnosis stage and a re-diagnosis stage of a unit state of the accident operation procedure; extract design extended condition characteristic information in an accident handling sequence extraction of the accident operation procedure; extract loss of support function detection information in a loss of support function monitoring part of the accident operation procedure; extract safety function monitoring information in a supply system function monitoring part of the accident operation procedure; and obtain the accident operation important information affected by the fire in the nuclear power plant, according to the diagnosis guidance information, the accident condition entry information, the design extended condition characteristic information, the loss of support function detection information, and the safety function monitoring information.

[0195] In one embodiment, the apparatus further includes:

[0196] A common mode point identification module configured to identify a potential information failure common mode point of a current fire compartment in the nuclear power plant according to the key information;

[0197] A common mode point confirmation module configured to, when the potential information failure common mode point of the current fire compartment is multiple, sequentially identify whether the potential information failure common mode point of the current fire compartment is a target common mode point, to obtain the target common mode point of the current fire compartment;

[0198] The common mode point elimination module is configured to return to a step of identifying a potential information invalid common mode point in the nuclear power plant according to the key information after eliminating the target common mode point of the current fire compartment according to the preset common mode point elimination strategy, update the current fire compartment to a next fire compartment, eliminate the target common mode point, and repeat the above steps until the target common mode points of all fire compartments in the nuclear power plant are eliminated.

[0199] The modules in the nuclear power plant fire information invalid processing device can be implemented by software, hardware, or a combination thereof. The modules can be embedded in or independent of the processor in the computer device in hardware form, or stored in the memory in the computer device in software form, so as to be called and executed by the processor.

[0200] In one embodiment, a computer device is provided, which can be a terminal. The internal structure diagram of the computer device can be as shown in Figure 11 The computer device includes a processor, a memory, an input / output interface, a communication interface, a display unit, and an input device. The processor, the memory, and the input / output interface are connected through a system bus. The communication interface, the display unit, and the input device are connected to the system bus through the input / output interface. The processor of the computer device is configured to provide computing and control capabilities. The memory of the computer device includes a non-volatile storage medium and an internal memory. The non-volatile storage medium stores an operating system and a computer program. The internal memory provides an environment for the operating system and the computer program in the non-volatile storage medium. The input / output interface of the computer device is configured to exchange information between the processor and external devices. The communication interface of the computer device is configured to perform wired or wireless communication with external terminals. The wireless communication can be achieved by WIFI, mobile cellular network, NFC (near field communication), or other technologies. The computer program is executed by the processor to implement a nuclear power plant fire information invalid processing method.

[0201] In one embodiment, a computer device is provided, which can be a server. The internal structure diagram of the computer device can be as shown in Figure 12The computer device shown in the figure includes a processor, a memory, an input / output interface (I / O for short), and a communication interface. The processor, the memory, and the input / output interface are connected through a system bus, and the communication interface is connected to the system bus through the input / output interface. The processor of the computer device is configured to provide computing and control capabilities. The memory of the computer device includes a non-volatile storage medium and an internal memory. The non-volatile storage medium stores an operating system, a computer program, and a database. The internal memory provides an environment for running the operating system and the computer program in the non-volatile storage medium. The database of the computer device is configured to store an accident operating procedure, key information of each fire compartment in a nuclear power plant when a fire occurs, and the like. The input / output interface of the computer device is configured to exchange information between the processor and an external device. The communication interface of the computer device is configured to communicate with a terminal outside through a network connection. The computer program is executed by the processor to implement a nuclear power plant fire information failure processing method.

[0202] Those skilled in the art can understand that, Figure 11 and Figure 12 The structure shown in the figure is only a block diagram of part of the structure related to the scheme of the present application, and does not constitute a limitation on the computer device to which the scheme of the present application is applied. A specific computer device can include more or fewer components than those shown in the figure, or combine certain components, or have a different arrangement of components.

[0203] In one embodiment, a computer device is provided, including a memory and a processor, the memory storing a computer program, and the processor executing the computer program to implement the steps in the above method embodiments.

[0204] In one embodiment, a computer readable storage medium is provided, storing a computer program, and the computer program is executed by a processor to implement the steps in the above method embodiments.

[0205] In one embodiment, a computer program product is provided, including a computer program, and the computer program is executed by a processor to implement the steps in the above method embodiments.

[0206] It should be noted that the user information (including but not limited to user device information, user personal information, etc.) and data (including but not limited to data for analysis, stored data, displayed data, etc.) involved in the present application are all information and data authorized by the user or authorized by all parties, and the collection, use, and processing of related data need to comply with relevant laws, regulations, and standards of relevant countries and regions.

[0207] Those skilled in the art can understand that all or part of the processes in the above-mentioned embodiment methods can be completed by instructing the relevant hardware through a computer program. The computer program can be stored in a non-volatile computer readable storage medium, and when the computer program is executed, the processes of the above-mentioned embodiments of the methods can be included. Any reference to memory, database or other medium used in the embodiments provided in the present application can include at least one of non-volatile and volatile memory. Non-volatile memory can include read-only memory (Read-Only Memory, ROM), magnetic tape, floppy disk, flash memory, optical storage, high-density embedded non-volatile memory, resistive memory (ReRAM), magnetoresistive random access memory (Magnetoresistive Random Access Memory, MRAM), ferroelectric memory (Ferroelectric Random Access Memory, FRAM), phase change memory (Phase Change Memory, PCM), graphene memory, etc. Volatile memory can include random access memory (Random Access Memory, RAM) or external cache memory, etc. As an illustration but not limitation, RAM can be in various forms, such as static random access memory (Static Random Access Memory, SRAM) or dynamic random access memory (Dynamic Random Access Memory, DRAM), etc. The database involved in the embodiments provided in the present application can include at least one of a relational database and a non-relational database. The non-relational database can include a distributed database based on a block chain, etc., without being limited thereto. The processor involved in the embodiments provided in the present application can be a general-purpose processor, a central processing unit, a graphics processing unit, a digital signal processor, a programmable logic device, a data processing logic device based on quantum computing, etc., without being limited thereto.

[0208] Any combination of the technical features of the above embodiments can be made. In order to make the description simple, all possible combinations of the technical features in the above embodiments are not described, however, as long as the combination of the technical features does not exist contradictory, it should be considered as the scope of the present application.

[0209] The above embodiments only express several implementation manners of the present application, and the description is more specific and detailed, but it should not be understood as a limitation on the scope of the patent of the present application. It should be pointed out that for ordinary skilled in the art, without departing from the concept of the present application, a number of modifications and improvements can be made, which are within the scope of protection of the present application. Therefore, the protection scope of the present application should be subject to the appended claims.

Claims

1. A method for failure handling of fire information in a nuclear power plant, characterized by, The method comprises: acquiring key information of each fire compartment in a nuclear power plant when a fire occurs; the key information comprises diagnosis guide information, design extended working condition characteristic information, accident working condition entry information, loss of support function detection information, and safety function monitoring information; identifying a potential information failure common mode point of each fire compartment in the nuclear power plant according to the key information; identifying whether an alternative strategy exists for the potential information failure common mode point, obtaining a first identification result; identifying whether an alternative value of the potential information failure common mode point can achieve correct judgment or guidance, obtaining a second identification result; identifying whether a result of misjudgment or misguidance caused by the potential information failure common mode point is acceptable, obtaining a third identification result; identifying whether a consequence of information failure of the potential information failure common mode point is acceptable, obtaining a fourth identification result; obtaining a characteristic analysis result according to the first identification result, the second identification result, the third identification result, and the fourth identification result, and determining a target common mode point according to the characteristic analysis result; eliminating the target common mode point according to a preset common mode point elimination strategy.

2. The method of claim 1, wherein, The identification of the potential information failure common mode point of each fire compartment in the nuclear power plant according to the key information comprises: identifying whether the key information will be at risk of information failure when a fire occurs in each fire compartment; if yes, determining the key information at risk of information failure as the potential information failure common mode point of the corresponding fire compartment.

3. The method of claim 2, wherein, The identification of whether the key information will be at risk of information failure when a fire occurs in each fire compartment comprises: identifying whether diagnosis guide information in the key information will be lost, whether design extended working condition characteristic information in the key information will be triggered, whether accident working condition entry information in the key information will be triggered, and whether safety functions of the fire compartment will all be lost when a fire occurs in each fire compartment.

4. The method of claim 3, wherein, The identification of whether safety functions of the fire compartment will all be lost when a fire occurs in each fire compartment comprises: identifying whether one safety function of the fire compartment will be lost, and whether loss of support function monitoring information of a redundant column corresponding to the fire compartment will be triggered, whether one safety function of the fire compartment will be lost, and whether safety function monitoring information of the redundant column will be lost, and whether loss of support function monitoring information of one safety function of the fire compartment will be triggered or safety function monitoring information will be lost, and whether loss of support function monitoring information of the redundant column will be triggered or safety function monitoring information will be lost.

5. The method of claim 4, wherein, The identification of whether the key information will be at risk of information failure when a fire occurs in each fire compartment comprises: identifying whether diagnosis guide information in the key information will be lost when a fire occurs in each fire compartment; if diagnosis guide information in the key information will not be lost when a fire occurs in each fire compartment, identifying whether design extended working condition characteristic information in the key information will be triggered when a fire occurs in each fire compartment; If the design extension condition feature information is not triggered, it is identified whether the accident condition entry information in the key information is triggered when a fire occurs in each fire compartment; If the accident condition entry information is not triggered, it is identified whether a safety function of the fire compartment column will be lost and the loss of support function monitoring information of the corresponding redundant column of the fire compartment column is triggered when a fire occurs in each fire compartment; If the safety function of the fire compartment column is not lost and the loss of support function monitoring information of the corresponding redundant column of the fire compartment column is triggered, it is identified whether the safety function of the fire compartment column is lost and the safety function monitoring information of the redundant column is invalid when a fire occurs in each fire compartment; If the safety function of the fire compartment column is not lost and the safety function monitoring information of the redundant column is invalid, it is identified whether the loss of support function monitoring information of the safety function of the fire compartment column is triggered or the safety function monitoring information is invalid, and the loss of support function monitoring information of the redundant column is triggered or the safety function monitoring information is invalid when a fire occurs in each fire compartment.

6. The method of claim 4, wherein, Further comprising: For each fire compartment, when the fire compartment directly causes a safety function of the column to be lost and triggers the loss of support function monitoring information of the corresponding redundant column of the fire compartment column, the loss of support function monitoring information is determined to be a potential information invalid common mode point; When the fire compartment directly causes a safety function of the column to be lost and the safety function monitoring information of the redundant column is invalid, the safety function monitoring information is determined to be a potential information invalid common mode point; When the fire compartment causes the loss of support function monitoring information of the safety function of the column to be triggered or the safety function monitoring information to be invalid, and causes the loss of support function monitoring information of the redundant column to be triggered or the safety function monitoring information to be invalid, the loss of support function monitoring information and the safety function monitoring information are determined to be potential information invalid common mode points.

7. The method of claim 1, wherein, The preset common mode point elimination strategy includes modifying the accident operation procedure or the fire protection strategy.

8. The method of claim 7, wherein, The priority of the modified accident operation procedure is higher than the priority of the fire protection strategy.

9. The method of claim 1, wherein, The key information of each fire compartment in the nuclear power plant when a fire occurs includes: Screening accident operation important information affected by the fire of the nuclear power plant in the accident operation procedure; Building an important information library according to the accident operation important information; According to the important information library, the key information of each fire compartment in the nuclear power plant when a fire occurs is determined.

10. The method of claim 9, wherein, The screening of the accident operation important information affected by the fire of the nuclear power plant in the accident operation procedure includes: In the initial diagnosis stage and the re-diagnosis stage of the unit state of the accident operation procedure, the diagnosis-oriented information and the accident condition entry information affected by the fire of the nuclear power plant are extracted; Design extension condition feature information is extracted in the accident handling sequence of the accident operation procedure; The loss of support function detection information is extracted in the loss of support function monitoring part of the accident operation procedure; The safety function monitoring information is extracted from a safety function monitoring part of the accident operating procedure supply system function monitoring part; The accident operating important information affected by the fire in the nuclear power plant is obtained according to the diagnostic guidance information, the accident condition entry information, the design extended condition characteristic information, the loss of support function detection information and the safety function monitoring information.

11. The method according to any one of claims 1 to 10, characterized in that, The method further comprises: The potential information failure common mode point of the current fire prevention partition in the nuclear power plant is identified according to the key information; When the potential information failure common mode point of the current fire prevention partition is multiple, whether the potential information failure common mode point of the current fire prevention partition is a target common mode point is identified in sequence to obtain the target common mode point of the current fire prevention partition; After the target common mode point of the current fire prevention partition is eliminated according to the preset common mode point elimination strategy, the step of identifying the potential information failure common mode point of the current fire prevention partition in the nuclear power plant according to the key information is returned, the current fire prevention partition is updated to a next fire prevention partition, and the elimination of the target common mode point is performed until the target common mode points of all fire prevention partitions in the nuclear power plant are eliminated.

12. A nuclear power plant fire information failure handling device characterized by comprising: The device comprises: An acquisition module is configured to acquire key information of each fire prevention partition in a nuclear power plant when a fire occurs; the key information comprises diagnostic guidance information, design extended condition characteristic information, accident condition entry information, loss of support function detection information and safety function monitoring information; An identification module is configured to identify potential information failure common mode points of each fire prevention partition in the nuclear power plant according to the key information; A determination module is configured to identify whether an alternative strategy exists for the potential information failure common mode point to obtain a first identification result, identify whether an alternative value of the potential information failure common mode point can achieve correct judgment or guidance to obtain a second identification result, identify whether a result of misjudgment or misguidance caused by the potential information failure common mode point is acceptable to obtain a third identification result, identify whether a consequence of information failure of the potential information failure common mode point is acceptable to obtain a fourth identification result, obtain a characteristic analysis result according to the first identification result, the second identification result, the third identification result and the fourth identification result, and determine a target common mode point according to the characteristic analysis result; An elimination module is configured to eliminate the target common mode point according to a preset common mode point elimination strategy.

13. A computer device comprising a memory and a processor, the memory storing a computer program, characterized in that, The processor executes the computer program to implement the steps of the method in any one of claims 1 to 11.

14. A computer-readable storage medium having stored thereon a computer program, characterized in that, The computer program is executed by the processor to implement the steps of the method in any one of claims 1 to 11.

15. A computer program product comprising a computer program, characterized in that, The computer program is executed by the processor to implement the steps of the method in any one of claims 1 to 11.

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