A lattice-based aggregate signature method based on revocable identity

By adopting a grid-based aggregation signature method based on revocable identities in a quantum computer environment, combining binary tree structure and trapped gate generation and original image sampling methods, the problems of large overhead of identity revocation and low data transmission efficiency are solved, and signature size compression and Quantum security, dynamic revocability and efficient signature verification.

CN115225261BActive Publication Date: 2024-11-22QUFU NORMAL UNIV
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Patent Information

Application Number
CN202210554152.0
Authority / Receiving Office
CN · China
Patent Type
Patents(China)
Current Assignee / Owner
Filing Date
2022-05-19
Publication Date
2024-11-22
Estimated Expiration
2042-05-19

AI Technical Summary

Technical Problem

In the quantum computer environment, there are problems in the identity-based digital signature method that has high overhead for identity revocation and low data transmission efficiency under resource constraints.

Method used

Using a grid-based aggregation signature method based on revocable identities, combined with a user revocation method with a binary tree structure, the compression of signature size and quantum security of aggregation signatures through collaboration between the key generation center, signature user, aggregation server and verifier. , dynamically revokes the identity of the signature user and ensures security through trap gate generation and original image sampling methods.

Benefits of technology

The compression of signature size is realized, the computing, storage and communication overhead is reduced, the computing, storage and communication overhead is dynamic revocable and quantum security, and it can withstand quantum attacks, proving the difficulty of the method's security through security regulations to the RSIS difficulty problem on the grid.

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Abstract

The present invention belongs to the field of digital signature in public key cryptography, and involves technologies such as aggregate signature, one-way hash function, trapdoor generation method and pre-image sampling method. Aiming at the problem of high identity revocation overhead in resource-based identity digital signature method in quantum computer environment, and low data transmission efficiency in resource-constrained situation, a lattice-based aggregate signature method based on revocable identity is proposed. Through our method, the size of aggregate signature is compressed, the user of aggregate signature can be dynamically revoked, and the quantum security of aggregate signature is achieved.
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Description

Technical Field

[0001] The present invention belongs to the field of digital signature in public key cryptography, and involves technologies such as aggregate signature, one-way hash function, trapdoor generation method and pre-image sampling method. Aiming at the problem of high identity revocation overhead in resource-based identity digital signature method in quantum computer environment, and low data transmission efficiency in resource-constrained situation, a lattice-based aggregate signature method based on revocable identity is proposed. Our method realizes the compression of signature size, dynamic revocability of aggregate signature users and quantum security of aggregate signature.

[0002] In the practical application of identity-based signature methods, problems such as user key loss and user identity failure often occur. This requires identity-based signature methods to implement the revocation of signing users. The existing revocation method requires the reconstruction of the system master key, which is extremely expensive. We improved the identity-based signature method by combining the user revocation method based on the binary tree structure to achieve dynamic revocation of users. At the same time, in order to cope with the threat posed by the development of quantum computers to traditional cryptographic systems, a lattice-based aggregate signature method based on revocable identities is proposed. The security of our proposed method has been proved by the method of security reduction. At the same time, since the security of our method can be reduced to the difficulty of the RSIS problem on the lattice, our method has the ability to resist quantum attacks. Background Art

[0003] Aggregate Signature

[0004] Aggregate signature is a signature method that can compress the signatures of multiple different users on multiple different messages into a single signature. The verification of the aggregated signature replaces the confirmation of the signed messages of all signatories in sequence. Aggregate signature achieves compression in the number of signatures and the number of signature verifications. Therefore, aggregate signature is a signature method that can effectively reduce computational costs and communication overheads.

[0005] Hash functions

[0006] The model of the hash function is: H(M) = h. Where M is the plaintext of any length to be processed; H() is the hash function, and h is the generated message digest, which has a fixed length and is independent of the length of M. The hash function should satisfy the following properties:

[0007] (1) Unidirectionality: given M, it is easy to calculate h; given h, it is computationally infeasible to calculate M;

[0008] (2) Abstractness: A hash function needs to map a long message of variable length into a shorter message of fixed length.

[0009] (3) Anti-collision: It is impossible for an adversary on any PPT to find a collision (i.e., to find a pair of messages with the same hash value H(M) = H(M′) and different messages M≠M′).

[0010] Trapdoor Generation Method

[0011] Using the trapdoor generation method, we can generate a pair of messages (A, T A ), where A is the trapdoor problem matrix, T A is the trapdoor information. If we only have A and u but no trapdoor information, it is computationally infeasible to obtain an e that satisfies the condition A·e=u. A In the case of , it is easy to calculate an e that satisfies the condition A·e=u. The following is a formal definition of the trapdoor generation method:

[0012] Let n be a positive integer, q≥2, m>5nlogq, there exists a polynomial time trapdoor generation method TrapGen(q,n), which outputs as well as A satisfies statistical uniformity in the value range, T A Yes The trapdoor basis of , and satisfies ||T a ||≤O(nlogq).

[0013] Pre-image sampling method

[0014] The above trapdoor generation method briefly introduces the idea of ​​solving the one-way trap problem with trapdoor information. The pre-image sampling method is a specific use of trapdoor information. The following is a formal definition of the pre-image sampling method:

[0015] Let n be a positive integer, q≥2, m>5nlogq, And T A Yes The trapdoor basis of Gaussian parameters for have:

[0016] (1) (Negligible probability).

[0017] (2) There exists a polynomial time preimage sampling method Sample(A,T A ,u,s), outputs a value that is statistically close to The grid vector Summary of the invention

[0018] A lattice-based aggregate signature method based on revocable identity, characterized by comprising the following steps:

[0019] (1) This method includes four entities: PKG (Private Key Generator), signing user, aggregation server, and verification signer;

[0020] (2) The method includes eight steps, namely, system initialization, private key generation, key update, signature key generation, single signature, single signature verification, aggregate signature, and aggregate signature verification.

[0021] The steps are as follows:

[0022] (2.1) The system initialization phase is run by PKG, which implements the distribution of public parameters and the system master key

[0023] The generation of pairs;

[0024] (2.2) The private key generation phase is run by PKG. After receiving the private key request from the user, PKG will

[0025] The user generates a private key corresponding to the identity and transmits it to the user through a secure channel;

[0026] (2.3) The key update phase is run by PKG. After each user is revoked, PKG issues a new key update.

[0027] New, thus achieving dynamic revocation of users;

[0028] (2.4) The signature key generation phase is run by the signing user. Based on the fixed user private key and the dynamic key update user, the signing key can be generated. The user uses the key to sign the message;

[0029] (2.5) The single signature phase is run by the signing user, who uses the signing private key to generate a corresponding signature for the message. This phase generates a single signature that needs to be aggregated;

[0030] (2.6) The single signature verification phase is run by the verifier, who verifies the signature based on the user's identity.

[0031] Verification: This stage verifies a single signature.

[0032] (2.7) The aggregation signature phase is run by the aggregation server, and all users can act as aggregation servers.

[0033] A message aggregator aggregates multiple messages to generate an aggregate signature;

[0034] This method achieves security in a quantum computer environment while having low computational, storage, and communication overheads, achieving the following results:

[0035] (1) The user can use this method to sign a message. The signature can serve as a message authentication statement to achieve non-repudiation of the message. In addition, it can also protect the integrity of the message.

[0036] (2) The signatures of different users on different messages can be aggregated through this method, which can compress the signature size and reduce the storage and communication overhead.

[0037] (3) When the verifier wants to verify the validity of multiple messages, he does not need to verify the signatures of multiple messages multiple times. He only needs to verify the aggregated signature once to complete the validity check of all signatures. BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS

[0038] Figure 1 Flowchart of revoking user’s pre-aggregate signature

[0039] Figure 2 Flowchart of aggregate signature after user revocation

[0040] Figure 3 Security model diagram of this article Specific implementation methods

[0041] According to claim 1, a lattice-based aggregate signature method based on revocable identity comprises the following parameters and symbols: n, m are positive integers, q is a prime number, is a polynomial quotient ring of n dimensions with modulus q, α is a positive real number and is the parameter of the Gaussian distribution, is a hash function (acting as a random oracle in the security proof), L id is the user identity list, T is the time, and the specific algorithm implementation steps are as follows:

[0042] (1) Initialization phase

[0043] Setup(1 λ )→(mpk,msk):PKG runs TrapGen(1 λ )(Trapdoor generation function) outputs trapdoor And the corresponding matrix Set the master private key msk=T A ,Master public key mpk=A, PKG broadcast system public parameters and master public key;

[0044] (2) Private key generation phase

[0045] KeyGen(msk,mpk,id)→(sk id ): After receiving the user's private key request, PKG inputs the user identity id∈L id

[0046] And the system master key pair, calculate uid =H(id), run SamplePre original image sampling function to output e id =SamplePre(A,T A ,u id ,α) Output the private key corresponding to the user identity Finally, the private key is transmitted to the user through a secure channel, and the user ID serves as the user's public key;

[0047] (3) Key update phase

[0048] KeyUpdate(msk,mpk,rl T )→(ku T ): When an existing user needs to be revoked, PKG first calls the KUNode algorithm to obtain KU T =KUNode(L id ,rl T ,T),rl T A list of users to be revoked, KU T is the identity information of all legal users, PKG is the identity information of all legal users θ j ∈KU T Generate a key update and run the SamplePre pre-image sampling function to output: Final output key update PKG will update the key ku T Sent to all signed users;

[0049] (4) Signature key generation phase

[0050] SignKeyGen(sk id ,ku T )→(sik or⊥): After the signing user receives the key update issued by PKG, j

[0051] fromku T Found Calculate the signing key If the user's identity has been revoked during this phase, the corresponding identity cannot be found in the key update. id,T , exit this stage directly;

[0052] (5) Single Signature Phase

[0053] Sign(mpk,sik,m)→σ: The signature algorithm is executed by the signing user and is run when the user needs to sign the message m.

[0054] The algorithm generates a signature σ:

[0055] (5.1) Random selection

[0056] (5.2) Calculate r←Ay,c←H c (m,r,T cu );

[0057] (5.3) Calculate z←sik T c+y;

[0058] (5.4) The probability output signature σ=(z,r,c);

[0059] (6) Single signature verification phase

[0060] Verify(σ,mpk,id)→(0or1), the verification algorithm is executed by the verifying user, and outputs 1 when the signature verification passes, otherwise outputs 0; the verifying user determines whether the signature is legal according to the following two steps:

[0061] (6.1) Verification If not satisfied, output 0;

[0062] (6.2) Verify whether c is equal to H c (A·z-id·c,m,T) are equal, if not, output 0, otherwise output 1;

[0063] (7) Aggregation Signature Phase

[0064] AggSign(σ j ,m j )→Σ: The aggregation server runs the aggregation signature algorithm. The user sends the signature and message to be aggregated to the aggregation server. The aggregation server generates the aggregation signature Σ according to the following steps:

[0065] (7.1) Calculation

[0066] (7.2) Calculate ∑ = (Z, m i ,r i );

[0067] (8) Aggregate signature verification

[0068] AggVerify(∑,mpk,L id )→(0or1), the verifier verifies the aggregate signature and message.

[0069] The combined signature only needs to be verified once to confirm the correctness of all messages:

[0070] (8.1) Calculation The value range of j is 0≤j≤|Lid |;

[0071] (8.2) Verify whether the equation holds true If not, output 0, otherwise output 1.

[0072] The effectiveness of this method is verified

[0073] The validity verification of this method is analyzed through two parts. First, we will analyze the correctness of the method, and secondly, we will analyze the security of the method in the form of security regulations.

[0074] The last term on the left side of the equation and the last term on the right side of the equation in the equation transformation in the following equation can be obtained by the verifier from the signature and public information. The following equation proves the correctness of our method:

[0075]

[0076] We prove the security (unforgeability) of our method in the form of a security specification. We reduce the unforgeability of the method to the difficulty of the RSIS hard problem on the lattice. The logic in the proof is one. Figure 3 The security game model in the security proof of this method is presented in , and we construct a simulator to play a security game with the attacker. Assuming that there is an attacker who has the ability to break our method with a non-negligible advantage in polynomial time, in the subsequent proof, the simulator uses the attacker's ability to solve the RSIS problem instance with a non-negligible advantage in polynomial time; but we know that there is an algorithm that can effectively solve the RSIS problem in polynomial time, which shows that our results are inconsistent with the facts; that is, our assumption is false, and there is no attacker who has the ability to break our method with a non-negligible advantage in polynomial time; the security of our method is proved.

[0077] The following is the specific content of the security proof of a lattice-based aggregate signature method based on revocable identity:

[0078] If there is a polynomial-time adversary The method in this paper can be broken (the adversary can perform at most q H Random oracle query, q KG Secondary key generation query, q ku Secondary key update query q AS If there is a polynomial time algorithm B that can solve the R-SIS problem.

[0079] (1) Initialization phase: simulator Use RSIS problem instance A as the system master public key, and send the parameters and the system master public key to the adversary

[0080] (2) Inquiry stage:

[0081] (2.1) In the random oracle query phase, the simulator Maintain two tables: H list as well as To respond to the enemy When the adversary Ask for all messages (including challenge identity id * ), the simulator Randomly select a sk and return u = A sk as the random oracle result to the adversary. If the random oracle result of the challenge identity is not queried, the game is terminated. c ,Simulator The query result is truly returned to the adversary and recorded.

[0082] (2.2) In the key generation query phase, the simulator Maintain a sk list To respond to the enemy Key generation query for the simulator According to H list The results are stored in sk list and returns a confirmation message to the adversary.

[0083] (2.3) During the key update query phase, the simulator Maintain a To respond to the enemy Key update query. All results simulator According to H list The information stored in is returned to the adversary.

[0084] (2.4) In the signature query phase, the simulator Maintain a To respond to the enemy The signature query. All the results of the simulator According to H list The simulation is returned to the adversary.

[0085] (3) Forgery stage: Assume that after the above inquiry, the adversary Successfully forged a file containing id * The signature Σ′ of the simulator The adversary's ability can be used to solve the RSIS problem instance A. The analysis is as follows: After obtaining the simulator The returned forged signature Σ′ is simulated You can use the private key sk of the challenge identity id* and other user keys to construct a legal aggregate signature Σ. If Σ=Σ′, exit the game, otherwise continue. Because the random oracle results c contained in all signatures are recorded in Middle, opponent It is impossible to forge the random oracle result. So according to us we can get the following equation

[0086]

[0087] Since all c i Both are random oracle H c As a result, c i =c′ i , the above equation can be transformed into

[0088] A·Σ′=A·Σ

[0089] A·(Σ′-Σ)=0

[0090] Through the enemy The simulator found a solution to the RSIS problem: ∑′-∑. However, there is no existing algorithm that can solve the RSIS problem in polynomial time. Therefore, the assumption of our proof is false, that is, there is no adversary that can break our method in polynomial time. The safety of the method was proven.

Claims

1. A lattice-based aggregate signature method based on revocable identity, including the following parameters and symbols: n, m are positive integers, q is a prime number, is a polynomial quotient ring of n dimensions with modulus q, α is a positive real number and is the parameter of the Gaussian distribution, is the hash function, L id is a list of user identities, T is time, and its characteristics are: (1) Initialization phase Setup(1 λ )→(mpk,msk):PKG runs TrapGen(1 λ )(Trapdoor generation function) outputs trapdoor And the corresponding matrix Set the master private key msk=T A ,Master public key mpk=A, PKG broadcast system public parameters and master public key; (2) Private key generation phase KeyGen(msk,mpk,id)→(sk id ): After receiving the user's private key request, PKG inputs the user identity id∈L id And the system master key pair, calculate u id =H(id), run SamplePre original image sampling function to output e id =SamplePre(A,T A ,u id ,α), output the private key corresponding to the user identity Finally, the private key is transmitted to the user through a secure channel, and the user ID serves as the user's public key; (3) Key update phase KeyUpdate(msk,mpk,rl T )→(ku T ): When an existing user needs to be revoked, PKG first calls the KUNode algorithm to obtain KU T =KUNode(L id ,rl T ,T),rl T A list of users to be revoked, KU T is the identity information of all legal users, PKG is the identity information of all legal users θ j ∈KU T Generate a key update and run the SamplePre pre-image sampling function to output: Final output key update PKG will update the key ku T Sent to all signed users; (4) Signature key generation phase SignKeyGen(sk id ,ku T )→(sikor⊥): After the signing user receives the key update issued by PKG, j fromku T Found Calculate the signing key If the user's identity has been revoked during this phase, the corresponding identity cannot be found in the key update. id,T , exit this stage directly; (5) Single Signature Phase Sign(mpk,sik,m)→σ: The signature algorithm is executed by the signing user. When the user needs to sign the message m, the algorithm is run to generate the signature σ: (5.1) Random selection (5.2) Calculate r←Ay,c←H c (m,r,T cu ); (5.3) Calculate z←sik T c+y; (5.4) The probability output signature σ=(z,r,c); (6) Single signature verification phase Verify(σ,mpk,id)→(0or1), the verification algorithm is executed by the verifying user, and outputs 1 when the signature verification passes, otherwise outputs 0; the verifying user determines whether the signature is legal according to the following two steps: (6.1) Verification If not satisfied, output 0; (6.2) Verify whether c is equal to H c (A·z-id·c,m,T) are equal, if not, output 0, otherwise output 1; (7) Aggregation Signature Phase AggSign(σ j ,m j )→Σ: The aggregation server runs the aggregation signature algorithm. The user sends the signature and message to be aggregated to the aggregation server. The aggregation server generates the aggregation signature Σ according to the following steps: (7.1) Calculation (7.2) Calculate ∑ = (Z, m i ,r i ); (8) Aggregate signature verification AggVerify(∑,mpk,L id )→(0or1), the verifier verifies the aggregate signature and the message. The aggregate signature only needs one verification to confirm the correctness of all messages: (8.1) Calculation The value range of j is 0≤j≤|L id |; (8.2) Verify whether the equation holds true If not, output 0, otherwise output 1.