A cross-domain trust management platform
Through the multi-trust domain CA mutual trust module, centralized certificate storage module, dynamic security evaluation module and certificate maintenance module of the cross-domain trust management platform, the problem of establishing a mutual trust relationship between multi-trust domains is solved, and the problem of establishing a cross-domain trust management solution in the multi-trust domain is realized. Fast and precise cross-domain authentication and security management improves system flexibility and security.
Patent Information
- Application Number
- CN202311469533.X
- Authority / Receiving Office
- CN · China
- Patent Type
- Patents(China)
- Current Assignee / Owner
- Filing Date
- 2023-11-07
- Publication Date
- 2024-11-22
- Estimated Expiration
- 2043-11-07
AI Technical Summary
The existing cross-domain trust management solution has the problem of fast and precise cross-domain authentication when establishing mutual trust relationships between multiple trust domains. The traditional method requires manual management and cumbersome security assessment, which limits its in complex network environments. application.
A cross-domain trust management platform has been designed, including multi-trust domain CA mutual trust module, centralized certificate storage module, dynamic security assessment module and certificate maintenance module. Through these modules, cross-domain certificate authentication, update, revocation and proxy authentication are realized. Simplifies the cross-domain mutual trust process and provides dynamic trust evaluation and centralized certificate storage.
It realizes efficient and secure management of cross-domain trust relationships, simplifies the traditional cross-domain mutual trust process, enhances the flexibility and security of the system, and adapts to a variety of certificate encryption algorithms and coding standards in complex network environments.
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Figure CN117675217B_ABST
Abstract
Description
Technical Field
[0001] The present invention relates to the field of information security technology, and in particular to a centralized management platform for cross-domain trust. Background Art
[0002] In the prior art, invention CN116647415 A discloses a terminal two-way authentication method, device and cross-network and cross-domain data exchange system. The two-way authentication method realizes authentication when the device accesses the system through a two-way authentication scheme based on the device feature code and the RSA asymmetric encryption algorithm, which can effectively avoid the access of illegal devices, thereby ensuring the security of the system. Correspondingly, the present invention also provides a two-way authentication device for the client and the server, respectively, and a two-way authentication system including the two-way authentication device. At the same time, the cross-network and cross-domain data exchange system provided by the present invention uses a front-end machine, a network gate and a back-end machine to build a data transmission channel between two different network systems. Between any two interconnected devices accessing the system, in addition to the need for two-way authentication during the initial connection, periodic two-way authentication is also required, further ensuring the security of the data exchange system itself.
[0003] However, the terminal two-way authentication method patent is mainly limited to the situation of establishing trust between a single trust domain client and a server, and does not take into account the situation where the client and the server are in different trust domains. In addition, the proposed cross-network and cross-domain data exchange system is not based on cross-domain authentication behavior. The cross-domain trust management platform proposed in the present invention solves this problem and can provide cross-domain authentication services for users in different trust domains.
[0004] Invention CN116668190A discloses a cross-domain single sign-on method and system based on browser fingerprint, which belongs to the field of network security and user authentication, wherein the cross-domain single sign-on method includes: generating and encrypting the browser fingerprint on the client; the user inputs the credentials; sending the fingerprint and the credentials to the authentication server; the authentication server verifies the user credentials; risk monitoring; the authentication status management server queries the user login status according to the encrypted fingerprint, etc. The cross-domain single sign-on method includes a client, an authentication server, an authentication status management server, a two-factor authentication module and a risk monitoring module. Through the present invention, the problem of frequent logins between multiple cross-domain subsystems of the same application is solved, the user experience is greatly improved, and the security of the login process is ensured.
[0005] However, the patent for the cross-domain single sign-on method based on browser fingerprint mainly focuses on solving the login problem between multiple cross-domain subsystems in a single application, lacks support for multiple trust domains and multiple encryption methods similar to those included in the present invention, and its method introduces security issues, which may greatly limit its application in a wider range of application scenarios and complex trust environments.
[0006] Invention CN116566730A discloses a cross-domain user authentication method, including obtaining the user's cross-domain information in the login domain; searching the user's home domain through the top-level domain and the user's cross-domain information; authenticating the user in the home domain to grant the user application permissions for the target business domain. The method disclosed in this disclosure can enable users to perform cross-domain access in a strongly isolated business environment, has high adaptability, and constructs a hierarchical relationship between domains, and cooperates with user tokens to ensure the attribution and authority of user information.
[0007] However, this method involves multiple steps, including obtaining user cross-domain information, searching for the home domain, and authenticating in the home domain, which increases the complexity of the implementation process. And because multiple queries and authentications need to be performed between different domains, this may affect the overall execution efficiency and user experience. The present invention uses a third-party platform for bridging operations, which not only greatly simplifies the authentication steps, but also provides better security and professional protection.
[0008] Since it was first introduced in the 1990s, Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) has become a core component in the field of network security. By providing a comprehensive management framework including digital certificates, public key encryption and digital signatures, among which the Certificate Authority (CA) plays a vital role in the PKI architecture, it plays a vital role in ensuring the reliability, integrity and security of data transmission. The technology mainly relies on asymmetric encryption algorithms such as RSA, DSA and ECC for key management and identity authentication. CA plays a key role in many security applications, including Secure Sockets Layer (SSL) and Transport Layer Security (TLS) protocols in web browsing, S / MIME for email protection, IPsec for building secure virtual private networks (VPN) and Secure Shell (SSH) for remote login and file transfer.
[0009] The widespread security application of CA has prompted enterprises and organizations to establish their own CAs, thereby strengthening enterprise security management, achieving fine-grained control of internal data, improving system robustness, and enhancing confidentiality of confidential information. Against the backdrop of the deepening development of globalization and business diversification, cross-industry and cross-regional cooperation between organizations is becoming more frequent, and accordingly, the demand for mutual trust across trust domains is also increasing. The traditional mutual trust establishment process mainly relies on predefined trust anchors or complex manual trust chain establishment, which not only requires lengthy contract negotiations and reviews, but also involves cumbersome technical configuration and manual management, thereby reducing the flexibility and scalability of the system.
[0010] Compared with these traditional methods, this study proposes an efficient solution to build and maintain cross-domain trust relationships through a third-party centralized management platform. This solution overcomes the limitations of traditional methods, gives full play to the characteristics of third-party institutions that are more focused on standardization and security than enterprises, and reduces the complexity and cost of establishing and maintaining CA and achieving cross-domain mutual trust. Through a series of module and mechanism integration, efficient and secure management of cross-trust domain digital certificates is achieved without affecting the local CA. Summary of the invention
[0011] Technical problem: The present invention aims to solve the problems existing in existing cross-domain trust management solutions when establishing mutual trust relationships between multiple trust domains, especially how to achieve fast and accurate cross-domain authentication in complex network environments. Current solutions can often only operate in a single or limited trust domain, or require cumbersome manual cross-domain certificate management and security assessment, which limits their usability in a wider range of application scenarios. At the same time, current cross-domain authentication solutions require the unification of certificate encoding standards and certificate encryption algorithms, which limits the number of trust domains that can be mutually trusted.
[0012] Technical solution: In order to solve the above technical problems, the present invention provides a cross-domain trust management platform, which includes the following modules:
[0013] Multi-trust domain CA mutual trust module: used to build mutual trust relationships between root CAs or sub-CAs in two or more different trust domains, so that certificates in different trust domains can be authenticated;
[0014] Centralized certificate storage module: used to store different types of certificates and their certificate status under the mutually trusted CA, and process certificate upload and download requests;
[0015] Dynamic security assessment module: used to evaluate the security index of mutually trusted nodes in real time, issue warnings to CAs that do not comply with the rules and their mutually trusted CAs, and terminate the two-way trust relationship with the node when the security index drops to the threshold;
[0016] Certificate maintenance module: On the basis of implementing the basic operations of cross-domain certificate update, signing, and revocation, establish an online certificate status protocol server monitor to perform direct or proxy authentication operations on cross-domain certificate authentication requests.
[0017] Furthermore, the functions of the multi-trust domain CA mutual trust module are as follows:
[0018] (1) The CA preparing mutual trust initiates a mutual trust request 1 to the trust domain CA mutual trust module. The mutual trust request 1 includes a request type identifier, a certificate of the CA initiating the request, an IP address, basic CA information, a password, and an address of a requesting mutual trust node, which is encrypted using a private key of the requesting node. The CA basic information includes: CA name, CA device location information, and user information.
[0019] (2) After receiving the mutual trust request initiated by the CA, the multi-trust domain CA mutual trust module uses the public key of the requesting node to decrypt it and query the device information initiating the request, including whether the certificate, CA basic information, and password provided in the request match. If it is determined that the request meets the requirements, the multi-trust domain CA mutual trust module sets a validity period for the request and stores it in the request library;
[0020] (3) If a legitimate request corresponding to all CAs is received within the validity period, the multi-trust domain CA mutual trust module sends a mutual trust request 2 to all mutual trust nodes. The mutual trust request 2 includes a True indicator and the IP addresses of all mutual trust nodes, and is encrypted using the private key of the requesting node. After receiving the mutual trust request 2 with the indicator being True, the CA uses the public key of the requesting node to decrypt it, exchanges certificate requests with the multi-trust domain CA mutual trust module and signs them, establishes a two-way mutual trust relationship, and sends the generated certificate to all mutual trust nodes to achieve mutual trust between CAs;
[0021] (4) If the CA mutual trust module does not receive a legitimate request from all CAs within the validity period, the multi-trust domain CA mutual trust module sends a mutual trust request 3 to all CAs. The mutual trust request 3 includes a False indicator, and the mutual trust request becomes invalid.
[0022] Furthermore, the functions of the centralized certificate storage module are as follows:
[0023] (1) CA forms storage request 1, which includes the request type, the certificate to be centrally stored, and is encrypted by the requesting node private key;
[0024] (2) The CA sends the storage request 1 to the centralized certificate storage module, which uses the public key of the requesting node to decrypt the request, and sends the certificate to the centralized certificate storage module through the internal port to identify and generate a certificate tag, and stores the certificate, certificate tag, certificate fingerprint, and certificate serial number into the certificate library accordingly; the certificate tag includes: the certificate encryption algorithm, the certificate encoding standard; the certificate fingerprint includes: the fingerprint generated by performing SHA-1 operation on the certificate, and the fingerprint generated by performing SHA-256 operation on the certificate; the certificate serial number includes: the local serial number of the certificate generated by the CA;
[0025] (3) CA forms storage request 2; storage request 2 includes request type, certificate fingerprint to be queried, and certificate serial number to be queried, and is encrypted by the requesting node private key;
[0026] (4) The CA sends the storage request 2 to the centralized certificate storage module. The centralized certificate storage module uses the public key of the requesting node to decrypt, searches for a matching certificate according to the certificate fingerprint and certificate serial number to be queried, and sends the certificate to the CA that initiated the request.
[0027] Furthermore, the functions of the dynamic security assessment module are as follows:
[0028] (1) After the CA mutual trust module of multiple trust domains establishes CA mutual trust, the dynamic security assessment module maintains the security assessment coefficients for all CAs and starts to monitor and record the node behavior;
[0029] (2) If the CA does not comply with the rules, the dynamic security assessment module will reduce its security assessment coefficient. If the CA does not comply with the rules for a period of time after not complying with the rules, the dynamic security module will restore part of the security assessment coefficient.
[0030] Furthermore, the certificate maintenance module functions as follows:
[0031] (1) When the CA has established trust through the multi-trust domain CA mutual trust module and has uploaded the certificate in the trust domain through the centralized certificate storage module and has been monitored by the dynamic security assessment module, the CA sends a certificate operation request to the certificate maintenance module to perform a certificate operation on the corresponding certificate in the centralized certificate storage module;
[0032] (2) When the CA or user attempts to authenticate the identity of an established trusted node, the CA or user can initiate two authentication requests to the certificate maintenance module: if the CA or user supports the encryption algorithm and certificate encoding standard of the node certificate to be authenticated, then when initiating the authentication request, no proxy authentication is requested. The certificate maintenance module uses a cross-domain certificate authentication method for authentication and returns the trust chain and all certificates on the trust chain. The CA or user needs to continue to complete step (3) to obtain the authentication result; if the CA or user cannot identify or does not support the encryption algorithm and certificate encoding standard of the node certificate to be authenticated, then when initiating the authentication request, proxy authentication is requested. The certificate maintenance module uses a proxy certificate authentication method for authentication and directly returns the trust chain and authentication result;
[0033] (3) If the certificate maintenance module applies the cross-domain certificate authentication method in step (2) for authentication, after receiving the trust chain and all certificates on the trust chain, the CA or user initiates OCSP requests to the certificate maintenance module step by step according to the trust chain. After receiving the request, the certificate maintenance module automatically responds and starts the corresponding OCSP server through the OCSP dynamic response method. The CA or user performs OCSP online authentication step by step according to the trust chain and finally obtains the authentication result.
[0034] Furthermore, the certificate operations include: certificate signing, certificate revocation, and certificate renewal;
[0035] The certificate signing includes the node initiating a signature request to the target CA, the CA verifies the node status through the certificate maintenance module, signs and uploads the generated certificate to the centralized certificate storage module;
[0036] The certificate revocation includes the CA determining that an abnormality has occurred in the certificate it issued, the CA setting the certificate status to revoked, and uploading the updated certificate status to the centralized certificate storage module;
[0037] The certificate update includes the CA reissuing or updating the expired certificate and uploading the updated certificate status to the centralized certificate storage module.
[0038] Furthermore, the cross-domain certificate authentication method is as follows:
[0039] (1) Assuming that the trust anchor of the requesting node is the root CA or a sub-CA in its trust domain, when the requesting node needs to authenticate the identity of any other node, it sends an authentication request 1 to the certificate maintenance module; the authentication request 1 includes: request type, requesting node certificate, fingerprint of the node certificate to be authenticated, serial number of the node certificate to be authenticated, fingerprint of the trust anchor node certificate, serial number of the trust anchor node certificate, and is encrypted by the requesting node private key;
[0040] (2) The certificate maintenance module receives the authentication request 1 and uses the public key of the requesting node to decrypt it to confirm whether the requesting node certificate is in the mutual trust domain and whether the certificate status is valid;
[0041] (3) If the verification in step (2) is passed, the certificate maintenance module starts from the node to be authenticated, searches for the certificate signer level by level until it reaches the trust anchor node, forms a trust chain with the certificate signers at each level found, and returns the trust chain and the certificates of all nodes on the trust chain to the requesting node. The requesting node sends an OCSP request to the certificate maintenance module level by level according to the trust chain. The certificate maintenance module starts the corresponding OCSP server through the OCSP dynamic response method. After the requesting node performs authentication within the time limit, it obtains the authentication result;
[0042] (4) If the verification in step (2) fails, a notification that the request is invalid is returned to the requesting node.
[0043] Furthermore, the proxy authentication method is as follows:
[0044] (1) Assuming that the trust anchor of the requesting node is the root CA or a sub-CA in its trust domain, when the requesting node needs to authenticate the identity of any other node, but the requesting node does not support the encryption algorithm and encoding standard of the node certificate to be authenticated, it sends an authentication request 2 to the certificate maintenance module to entrust the certificate maintenance module to perform the proxy authentication operation; the authentication request 2 includes: request type, requesting node certificate, fingerprint of the node certificate to be authenticated, serial number of the node certificate to be authenticated, fingerprint of the trust anchor node certificate, serial number of the trust anchor node certificate, and is encrypted by the private key of the requesting node;
[0045] (2) The certificate maintenance module receives the authentication request 2 and uses the public key of the requesting node to decrypt it to confirm whether the requesting node certificate is in the mutual trust domain and whether the certificate status is valid;
[0046] (3) If the verification in step (2) is passed, the certificate maintenance module starts from the node to be authenticated, searches for the certificate signer level by level until the trust anchor node is reached, forms a trust chain with the certificate signers at each level found, and directly starts multiple OCSP servers corresponding to the trust chain on the local port, performs OCSP online authentication operations level by level, and returns the authentication results and the trust chain to the requesting node;
[0047] (4) If the verification in step (2) fails, a notification that the request is invalid is returned to the requesting node.
[0048] Furthermore, the OCSP dynamic response method is as follows:
[0049] (1) Assuming that a node needs to verify whether two nodes have a direct trust relationship, the node initiates an OCSP request to the certificate maintenance module. The OCSP request includes: the requested certificate, the node certificate to be verified, and the CA certificate fingerprint, which is encrypted using the requesting node private key. The node sends the OCSP request to the certificate maintenance module;
[0050] (2) The certificate maintenance module receives the OCSP request and uses the public key of the requesting node to decrypt it to confirm whether the requesting node certificate is in the mutual trust domain and whether the certificate status is valid;
[0051] (3) If the verification in step (2) is passed, the certificate maintenance module opens a new port, starts the OCSP server listening, and returns the port number to the requesting node;
[0052] (4) If the verification in step (2) fails, a notification that the OCSP server is not started is returned to the requesting node.
[0053] (5) If the OCSP server monitoring has been started in step (3), if the OCSP server monitoring has not received any valid message after a specified period of time, the monitoring is closed and the port is reused.
[0054] Beneficial effects: Compared with the prior art, the technical solution of the present invention has the following beneficial technical effects:
[0055] This specification provides a cross-domain trust management platform, which is based on a professional third-party management entity and is independent of the traditional CA. Through this platform, the complex traditional cross-domain mutual trust process can be greatly simplified, and the mutual trust process can be automated, and the original CA can maintain independence in the mutual trust process. The platform also has a dynamic trust evaluation and centralized certificate storage module, which enhances security and flexibility, and can adapt to the need to establish long-term trust and contains a variety of certificate encryption algorithms and certificate encoding standards. Complex network environments. The platform also simplifies the cross-domain authentication process and provides a proxy authentication method to apply to a variety of CA institutions. BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS
[0056] Figure 1 This is a schematic diagram of an exemplary cross-domain trust management platform structure;
[0057] Figure 2 This is an exemplary schematic diagram of the workflow of a multi-trust domain CA mutual trust module;
[0058] Figure 3 is a schematic diagram of an exemplary centralized certificate storage module workflow;
[0059] Figure 4 is a schematic diagram of an exemplary dynamic security assessment module workflow;
[0060] Figure 5 This is an exemplary workflow diagram of a certificate maintenance module. DETAILED DESCRIPTION
[0061] In order to enable those skilled in the art to better understand the technical solutions in this specification, the technical solutions in the embodiments of this specification will be clearly and completely described below in conjunction with the drawings in the embodiments of this specification. Obviously, the described embodiments are only part of the embodiments of this specification, not all of the embodiments. Based on the embodiments in this specification, all other embodiments obtained by ordinary technicians in this field without creative work should fall within the scope of protection of this specification.
[0062] It should be noted that: in other embodiments, the steps of the corresponding method are not necessarily performed in the order shown and described in this specification. In some other embodiments, the steps included in the method may be more or less than those described in this specification. In addition, a single step described in this specification may be decomposed into multiple steps for description in other embodiments; and multiple steps described in this specification may be combined into a single step for description in other embodiments.
[0063] Figure 1 The overall architecture of the cross-domain trust management platform is shown. The platform is deployed and maintained by a professional third-party organization. The third-party organization needs to be able to support multiple certificate encoding formats and encryption algorithms, and also needs to have the function of real-time data update and maintenance to ensure service quality. The four modules in the platform are four independent modules when deployed, but the highly integrated and standardized interface design ensures that the modules can work seamlessly to form a comprehensive, secure and efficient management system. This design not only enhances the scalability and flexibility of the platform, but also maintains the independence and integrity of the original CA, avoiding the cumbersome process of reissuing or modifying certificates due to participation in cross-domain mutual trust. The OCSP dynamic response method and the cross-domain certificate authentication method are two methods to implement the certificate maintenance module, realizing a simple and easy-to-operate cross-domain authentication process after cross-domain mutual trust. The OCSP dynamic response method and the cross-domain certificate authentication method are two implementation methods in the certificate maintenance module, ensuring that a simple and easy-to-operate cross-domain authentication process is provided after establishing cross-domain mutual trust.
[0064] Figure 2 The specific operation process of the multi-trust domain CA mutual trust module is shown; assuming that two companies each have independent CAs and are in different trust domains, their corresponding CA organizations are CA1 and CA2. When companies cooperate or communicate with each other, their CAs need to establish mutual trust to use the other company's database, internal email and other confidential services. At this time, the complete process of using the multi-trust domain CA mutual trust module to achieve cross-domain mutual trust mainly includes:
[0065] (1) Before establishing mutual trust, the corresponding entities of CA1 and CA2 shall discuss and confirm the mutual trust strategy, security strategy, certificate strategy, etc. through offline or online meetings or emails. The content of the mutual trust strategy includes but is not limited to the length of the mutual trust period, that is, the mutual trust certificate life cycle; the mutual trust update cycle. The content of the security strategy includes but is not limited to the types of non-compliance behaviors that can be tolerated; the tolerable security level, that is, the initial security assessment value; the degree of reduction in the security factor corresponding to the non-compliance behavior; and the security factor recovery mechanism. The content of the certificate strategy includes but is not limited to certificate update permissions; whether cross-domain certificate operations are allowed; certificate read and write permissions;
[0066] (2) After CA1 and CA2 have agreed on various policies, they submit the policies to the multi-trust domain CA mutual trust module. Then, according to the agreed time, they each initiate a mutual trust request to the multi-trust domain CA mutual trust module at a relatively close time;
[0067] (3) The multi-trust domain CA mutual trust module will temporarily store the legitimate request after receiving it. After receiving all requests that require mutual trust nodes, it will officially start the mutual trust operation. The multi-trust domain CA mutual trust module first signs the CA's certificate request, that is, the .csr file, and then issues the signed certificate to each CA. It also initiates a certificate request to each CA and waits for each CA to sign the request. At this point, the multi-trust domain CA mutual trust module, that is, the third-party CA, has established a two-way trust relationship with each mutual trust CA;
[0068] (4) After the mutual trust relationship is initially established, the multi-trust domain CA mutual trust module will initiate a request to the centralized certificate storage module through the internal interface, and centrally store the certificate generated in step (3) in the centralized certificate storage module.
[0069] Figure 3 The specific operation process of the centralized certificate storage module is demonstrated; the centralized certificate storage module mainly includes an adaptive interface to automatically identify the certificate encryption algorithm and certificate encoding format, and generate a label for the information, which is stored in the non-volatile memory together with the certificate. The centralized certificate storage module can only be triggered through the internal port, and the requests that can trigger the module only include the following. Requests from other methods or sources are considered illegal requests to prevent illegal tampering, reading, etc.
[0070] (1) After CA1 and CA2 complete cross-domain mutual trust, upload all certificates in the CA1 and CA2 domains, as well as the two-way certificates generated by mutual trust, to the centralized certificate storage module. This request is limited to the triggering of the multi-trust domain CA mutual trust module of the internal port. It should be noted that when the mutual trust certificate or mutual trust period in the agreed policy expires, the centralized certificate storage module also needs to update the certificate once to ensure that it does not retain expired certificates;
[0071] (2) If there is a CA3 with which mutual trust has been established and CA3 has operated on the certificate, CA3 must promptly submit a certificate update request to the certificate maintenance module to ensure the timeliness of the certificates managed by the centralized certificate storage module. This request is limited to requests initiated by the certificate maintenance module through the internal port;
[0072] (3) If the dynamic security assessment module determines that the security index of a CA has dropped to the untrustworthy value specified by the security policy, the centralized certificate storage module is required to delete all certificates under the CA domain. This request is limited to requests initiated by the dynamic security assessment module through the internal port.
[0073] Figure 4The specific operation process of the dynamic security assessment module is demonstrated; the dynamic security assessment module mainly includes monitoring of each CA and multiple dynamic counters. According to the agreed security policy, the dynamic security assessment module creates a corresponding initial security factor for each mutually trusted CA and monitors its various requests for non-compliance behavior;
[0074] (1) After mutual trust is established, each node obtains an initial security factor, which is determined by the policy and can be dynamically set according to the characteristics of the CA organization;
[0075] (2) The dynamic security assessment module monitors all CAs to see if they have any non-compliance behavior, where the definition of non-compliance behavior is determined by the policy; if non-compliance behavior occurs, the policy determines how much value to subtract from the initial security factor. When the real-time security factor is lower than the threshold, a warning is issued to all CAs participating in the mutual trust; when the real-time security factor returns to zero, the mutual trust is automatically terminated, and the risk node will no longer have any trust relationship with the cross-domain mutual trust platform. This implementation method can avoid the complicated operations on certificates that traditional mutual trusts perform when terminating mutual trust.
[0076] Figure 5 The specific operation process of the certificate maintenance module, as well as the complete process of the OCSP dynamic response method and the cross-domain certificate authentication method are demonstrated. This module not only provides a certificate update interface, but also implements cross-domain certificate authentication operations through the above two methods. Among them, basic certificate operations include certificate signing, revocation, and update lifecycle operations. After these operations are completed on the local CA, the corresponding update operations are performed on the certificate maintenance module by filing a certificate update request;
[0077] For cross-domain certificate authentication, the complete authentication process is as follows;
[0078] (1) Assuming that CA1 and CA2 have completed mutual trust operations, user USER1 in the CA1 domain wants to initiate secure communication with user USER2 in the CA2 domain. Then USER1 needs to verify whether USER2 is a trusted node. However, USER1's trust anchor can only trust CA1 but not CA2. At this time, USER1 initiates CA1's authentication request to USER2. The authentication request includes two methods: cross-domain certificate authentication method (steps 2 to 3 below) and proxy authentication method (steps 4 to 5 below);
[0079] (2) For the cross-domain certificate authentication method, after receiving the cross-domain authentication request, the certificate maintenance module encounters a self-signed certificate, namely the root certificate CA2, while searching for the trust chain from USER2 to CA1. At this time, the trust chain is relayed by the cross-domain trust management platform certificate and finally reaches CA1. The certificate maintenance module returns this trust chain to USER1;
[0080] (3) USER1 checks the trust chain. If USER1 confirms that the trust chain is legitimate and can proceed to the next step of authentication, as shown in the figure, starting from the bottom of the trust chain, it initiates an OCSP server request at the previous level and performs OCSP online authentication. This process will continue until the last level of the trust chain, and USER1 will receive the authentication results of each level. After receiving the OCSP server request, the certificate maintenance module opens a new port and deploys the OCSP server. After receiving no request for a certain period of time, it closes the OCSP server and the port.
[0081] (4) For the proxy certificate authentication method, after receiving the cross-domain authentication request, the certificate maintenance module encounters a self-signed certificate, namely the root certificate CA2, while searching for the trust chain from USER2 to CA1. At this time, the trust chain is relayed by the cross-domain trust management platform certificate and finally reaches CA1. However, since it is difficult for USER1 to perform independent authentication, the certificate maintenance module will perform the authentication operation on behalf of USER1;
[0082] (5) Continue with the proxy certificate authentication method in step (4). At this time, the certificate maintenance module does not open the external port. Compared with the cross-domain certificate authentication method in steps (2) to (3), it will use the trust chain corresponding to the local port to open the OCSP server and use the stored certificate to perform OCSP authentication of the local port. The authentication process is the same as step (3), from the bottom layer of the trust chain to the top layer, and finally returns the authentication results of each level, and returns the result and the trust chain to USER1 to implement the proxy authentication method.
[0083] The user information (including but not limited to user device information, user personal information, etc.) and data (including but not limited to data used for analysis, stored data, displayed data, etc.) involved in this application are all information and data authorized by the user or fully authorized by all parties, and the collection, use and processing of relevant data must comply with the relevant laws, regulations and standards of relevant countries and regions, and provide corresponding operation entrances for users to choose to authorize or refuse.
[0084] It should also be noted that the terms "include", "comprises" or any other variations thereof are intended to cover non-exclusive inclusion, so that a process, method, commodity or device including a series of elements includes not only those elements, but also other elements not explicitly listed, or also includes elements inherent to such process, method, commodity or device. In the absence of more restrictions, the elements defined by the sentence "comprises a ..." do not exclude the existence of other identical elements in the process, method, commodity or device including the elements.
[0085] The above is a description of a specific embodiment of the specification. Other embodiments are within the scope of the appended claims. In some cases, the actions or steps recorded in the claims can be performed in an order different from that in the embodiments and still achieve the desired results. In addition, the processes depicted in the drawings do not necessarily require the specific order or continuous order shown to achieve the desired results. In some embodiments, multitasking and parallel processing are also possible or may be advantageous.
[0086] The terms used in one or more embodiments of this specification are only for the purpose of describing specific embodiments, and are not intended to limit one or more embodiments of this specification. The singular forms of "one", "said" and "the" used in one or more embodiments of this specification and the appended claims are also intended to include plural forms, unless the context clearly indicates other meanings. It should also be understood that the term "and / or" used herein refers to and includes any or all possible combinations of one or more associated listed items.
[0087] It should be understood that although the terms first, second, third, etc. may be used to describe various information in one or more embodiments of this specification, these information should not be limited to these terms. These terms are only used to distinguish the same type of information from each other. For example, without departing from the scope of one or more embodiments of this specification, the first information may also be referred to as the second information, and similarly, the second information may also be referred to as the first information. Depending on the context, the word "if" as used herein may be interpreted as "at the time of" or "when" or "in response to determining".
[0088] The above description is merely a preferred embodiment of one or more embodiments of the present specification and is not intended to limit one or more embodiments of the present specification. Any modifications, equivalent substitutions, improvements, etc. made within the spirit and principles of one or more embodiments of the present specification shall be included in the scope of protection of one or more embodiments of the present specification.
Claims
1. A cross-domain trust management platform, characterized in that: The platform includes the following modules: Multi-trust domain CA mutual trust module: used to build mutual trust relationships between root CAs or sub-CAs in two or more different trust domains, so that certificates in different trust domains can be authenticated; Centralized certificate storage module: used to store different types of certificates and their certificate status under the mutually trusted CA, and process certificate upload and download requests; Dynamic security assessment module: used to evaluate the security index of mutually trusted nodes in real time, issue warnings to CAs that do not comply with the rules and their mutually trusted CAs, and terminate the two-way trust relationship with the node when the security index drops to the threshold; Certificate maintenance module: On the basis of implementing cross-domain certificate update, signature, and revocation operations, establish online certificate status protocol server monitoring, and perform direct or proxy authentication operations on cross-domain certificate authentication requests; The certificate maintenance module functions as follows: (1) When the CA has established trust through the multi-trust domain CA mutual trust module and has uploaded the certificate in the trust domain through the centralized certificate storage module and has been monitored by the dynamic security assessment module, the CA sends a certificate operation request to the certificate maintenance module to perform a certificate operation on the corresponding certificate in the centralized certificate storage module; (2) When the CA or user attempts to authenticate the identity of an established trusted node, the CA or user can initiate two authentication requests to the certificate maintenance module: If the CA or user supports the encryption algorithm and certificate encoding standard of the node certificate to be authenticated, then no proxy authentication is requested when initiating the authentication request. The certificate maintenance module uses the cross-domain certificate authentication method for authentication and returns the trust chain and all certificates on the trust chain. The CA or user needs to continue to complete step (3) to obtain the authentication result; If the CA or user cannot identify or does not support the encryption algorithm or certificate encoding standard of the node certificate to be authenticated, then an application for proxy authentication is made when initiating an authentication request. The certificate maintenance module uses the proxy certificate authentication method for authentication and directly returns the trust chain and authentication results. (3) If the certificate maintenance module applies the cross-domain certificate authentication method in step (2) for authentication, after receiving the trust chain and all certificates on the trust chain, the CA or user initiates OCSP requests to the certificate maintenance module step by step according to the trust chain. After receiving the request, the certificate maintenance module automatically responds and starts the corresponding OCSP server through the OCSP dynamic response method. The CA or user performs OCSP online authentication step by step according to the trust chain and finally obtains the authentication result.
2. A cross-domain trust management platform according to claim 1, characterized in that: The functions of the multi-trust domain CA mutual trust module are as follows: (1) The CA preparing mutual trust initiates a mutual trust request 1 to the multi-trust domain CA mutual trust module. The mutual trust request 1 includes a request type identifier, a certificate of the CA initiating the request, an IP address, basic CA information, a password, and an address of a requesting mutual trust node, and is encrypted using a private key of the requesting node; The CA basic information includes: CA name, CA equipment location information, and user information; (2) After receiving the mutual trust request initiated by the CA, the multi-trust domain CA mutual trust module uses the public key of the requesting node to decrypt it and query the device information initiating the request, including whether the certificate, CA basic information, and password provided in the request match. If it is determined that the request meets the requirements, the multi-trust domain CA mutual trust module sets a validity period for the request and stores it in the request library; (3) If a legitimate request corresponding to all CAs is received within the validity period, the multi-trust domain CA mutual trust module sends a mutual trust request 2 to all mutual trust nodes. The mutual trust request 2 includes a True indicator and the IP addresses of all mutual trust nodes, and is encrypted using the private key of the requesting node. After receiving the mutual trust request 2 with the indicator being True, the CA uses the public key of the requesting node to decrypt it, exchanges certificate requests with the multi-trust domain CA mutual trust module and signs them, establishes a two-way mutual trust relationship, and sends the generated certificate to all mutual trust nodes to achieve mutual trust between CAs; (4) If the CA mutual trust module does not receive a legitimate request from all CAs within the validity period, the multi-trust domain CA mutual trust module sends a mutual trust request 3 to all CAs. The mutual trust request 3 includes a False indicator, and the mutual trust request becomes invalid.
3. A cross-domain trust management platform according to claim 1, characterized in that: The functions of the centralized certificate storage module are as follows: (1) CA forms storage request 1, which includes the request type, the certificate to be centrally stored, and is encrypted by the requesting node private key; (2) The CA sends the storage request 1 to the centralized certificate storage module, which uses the public key of the requesting node to decrypt the certificate and sends the certificate to the centralized certificate storage module through the internal port for identification, generates a certificate label, and stores the certificate, certificate label, certificate fingerprint, and certificate serial number into the certificate library accordingly; the certificate label includes the certificate encryption algorithm and the certificate encoding standard; the certificate fingerprint includes the fingerprint generated by performing SHA-1 operation on the certificate and the fingerprint generated by performing SHA-256 operation on the certificate; The certificate serial number includes the local serial number of the certificate generated by the CA; (3) CA forms storage request 2; storage request 2 includes request type, certificate fingerprint to be queried, and certificate serial number to be queried, and is encrypted by the requesting node private key; (4) The CA sends the storage request 2 to the centralized certificate storage module. The centralized certificate storage module uses the public key of the requesting node to decrypt, searches for a matching certificate according to the certificate fingerprint and certificate serial number to be queried, and sends the certificate to the CA that initiated the request.
4. A cross-domain trust management platform according to claim 1, characterized in that: The functions of the dynamic security assessment module are as follows: (1) After the CA mutual trust module of multiple trust domains establishes CA mutual trust, the dynamic security assessment module maintains the security assessment coefficients for all CAs and starts to monitor and record the node behavior; (2) If the CA does not comply with the rules, the dynamic security assessment module will reduce its security assessment coefficient. If the CA does not comply with the rules for a period of time after not complying with the rules, the dynamic security module will restore part of the security assessment coefficient.
5. A cross-domain trust management platform according to claim 1, characterized in that: The certificate operations include: certificate signing, certificate revocation, and certificate update; The certificate signing includes the node initiating a signature request to the target CA, the CA verifies the node status through the certificate maintenance module, signs and uploads the generated certificate to the centralized certificate storage module; The certificate revocation includes the CA determining that an abnormality has occurred in the certificate it issued, the CA setting the certificate status to revoked, and uploading the updated certificate status to the centralized certificate storage module; The certificate update includes the CA reissuing or updating the expired certificate and uploading the updated certificate status to the centralized certificate storage module.
6. A cross-domain trust management platform according to claim 1, characterized in that: The cross-domain certificate authentication method is as follows: (1) Assuming that the trust anchor of the requesting node is the root CA or a sub-CA in its trust domain, when the requesting node needs to authenticate the identity of any other node, it sends an authentication request 1 to the certificate maintenance module; Authentication request 1 includes: request type, requesting node certificate, node certificate fingerprint to be authenticated, node certificate serial number to be authenticated, trust anchor node certificate fingerprint, trust anchor node certificate serial number, and is encrypted by the requesting node private key; (2) The certificate maintenance module receives the authentication request 1 and uses the public key of the requesting node to decrypt it to confirm whether the requesting node certificate is in the mutual trust domain and whether the certificate status is valid; (3) If the verification in step (2) is passed, the certificate maintenance module starts from the node to be authenticated, searches for the certificate signer level by level until it reaches the trust anchor node, forms a trust chain with the certificate signers at each level found, and returns the trust chain and the certificates of all nodes on the trust chain to the requesting node. The requesting node sends an OCSP request to the certificate maintenance module level by level according to the trust chain. The certificate maintenance module starts the corresponding OCSP server through the OCSP dynamic response method. After the requesting node performs authentication within the time limit, it obtains the authentication result; (4) If the verification in step (2) fails, a notification that the request is invalid is returned to the requesting node.
7. A cross-domain trust management platform according to claim 1, characterized in that: The proxy authentication method is as follows: (1) Assuming that the trust anchor of the requesting node is the root CA or a sub-CA in its trust domain, when the requesting node needs to authenticate the identity of any other node, but the requesting node does not support the encryption algorithm and encoding standard of the node certificate to be authenticated, it sends an authentication request 2 to the certificate maintenance module to entrust the certificate maintenance module to perform the proxy authentication operation; Authentication request 2 includes: request type, requesting node certificate, node certificate fingerprint to be authenticated, node certificate serial number to be authenticated, trust anchor node certificate fingerprint, trust anchor node certificate serial number, and is encrypted by the requesting node private key; (2) The certificate maintenance module receives the authentication request 2 and uses the public key of the requesting node to decrypt it to confirm whether the requesting node certificate is in the mutual trust domain and whether the certificate status is valid; (3) If the verification in step (2) is passed, the certificate maintenance module starts from the node to be authenticated, searches for the certificate signer level by level until the trust anchor node is reached, forms a trust chain with the certificate signers at each level found, and directly starts multiple OCSP servers corresponding to the trust chain on the local port, performs OCSP online authentication operations level by level, and returns the authentication results and the trust chain to the requesting node; (4) If the verification in step (2) fails, a notification that the request is invalid is returned to the requesting node.
8. A cross-domain trust management platform according to claim 6 or 7, characterized in that: The OCSP dynamic response method is as follows: (1) Assuming that a node needs to verify whether two nodes have a direct trust relationship, the node initiates an OCSP request to the certificate maintenance module. The OCSP request includes: the requested certificate, the node certificate to be verified, and the CA certificate fingerprint, which is encrypted using the requesting node private key. The node sends the OCSP request to the certificate maintenance module; (2) The certificate maintenance module receives the OCSP request and uses the public key of the requesting node to decrypt it to confirm whether the requesting node certificate is in the mutual trust domain and whether the certificate status is valid; (3) If the verification in step (2) is passed, the certificate maintenance module opens a new port, starts the OCSP server listening, and returns the port number to the requesting node; (4) If the verification in step (2) fails, a notification that the OCSP server is not started is returned to the requesting node; (5) If the OCSP server monitoring has been started in step (3), if the OCSP server monitoring has not received any valid message after a specified period of time, the monitoring is closed and the port is reused.
