A dual model-based access control authority execution verification method and device

Through the dual-model access control permission execution method, blockchain technology and finite state automata are used to solve the problem of access control policy verification in cross-domain data flow, the secure data flow and policy consistency are achieved, and the security flow of data and policy consistency are improved. Verify efficiency and credibility.

CN118214596BActive Publication Date: 2024-11-26HUAZHONG UNIV OF SCI & TECH
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Patent Information

Application Number
CN202410310262.1
Authority / Receiving Office
CN · China
Patent Type
Patents(China)
Current Assignee / Owner
Filing Date
2024-03-19
Publication Date
2024-11-26
Estimated Expiration
2044-03-19

AI Technical Summary

Technical Problem

In the case of cross-domain data flow, it is difficult for the existing technology to effectively verify the execution of access control permissions, resulting in data leakage and tampering problems, and lack of consistency and compliance of cross-domain access control policies.

Method used

Using the access control permission based on the dual model to perform verification methods, by generating intra-domain and inter-domain access control policies, uploading data and descriptions to data containers, obtaining index information and sending it to a security authorization server, and then storing it in the blockchain network after processing. Static analysis, combined with dynamic analysis operation records, determine whether the specification model and implementation model are isomorphic to verify permission execution.

Benefits of technology

It realizes the secure flow of data between different domains, ensures the consistency and compliance of access control policies, improves the credibility of modeling results, reduces the manual verification process in traditional methods, and saves time and resources.

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Abstract

The present invention relates to the field of network data security technology, and in particular to a method and device for executing access control authority verification based on a dual model. By using blockchain technology to break through the barriers between different domains and systems, data can be safely transferred between different domains, which can prevent data from being tampered with or forged, and improve the credibility of modeling results. The specific implementation of the static target network system in the implementation model is replaced with the dynamic behavior of the terminal user, which can more realistically reflect the state of the system during runtime and avoid the influence of idealized assumptions on the verification results. Static and dynamic analysis of access control policies and corresponding behaviors can quickly obtain specification models and implementation models, and convert model comparison problems into graph isomorphism problems, which can effectively verify the correctness and consistency of access control policies, reduce the cumbersome manual verification process in traditional methods, and save time and resources.
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Description

Technical Field

[0001] The present invention relates to the technical field of network data security, and in particular to a method and device for executing and verifying access control authority based on a dual model. Background Art

[0002] In recent years, with the development of information technology, in order to promote the value of data, improve the efficiency of data utilization and support the development of the digital economy, the interaction and sharing of data between different systems and organizations has become more and more common. In the process of cross-domain data flow, in order to ensure the security and controllability of data, access control strategies are widely adopted and become the basis of network system protection solutions to ensure that data can only be accessed by legal and compliant entities in an appropriate manner. However, due to design defects in access control strategies, improper implementation by personnel, and expansion of system scale, users will violate access control strategies and perform unauthorized actions, resulting in data leakage and data tampering, which will damage the interests of data owners and users. Therefore, how to effectively verify the execution of access control permissions in the cross-domain data flow scenario and support the timely detection and repair of errors during policy implementation is the main technical challenge currently faced.

[0003] In view of this, overcoming the defects of the prior art is an urgent problem to be solved in the field of this technology. Summary of the invention

[0004] The technical problem to be solved by the present invention is how to provide a method for effectively verifying the execution of access control permissions in a cross-domain data flow scenario.

[0005] The present invention adopts the following technical solution:

[0006] In a first aspect, a dual model-based access control authority execution verification method is provided, comprising:

[0007] Generate data and set intra-domain access control policy and inter-domain access control policy for each data;

[0008] Upload the data and the data description to the data container to obtain the data index and the data container index;

[0009] Obtaining intra-domain binding information and inter-domain binding information according to the data index, the data container index, the data description, the intra-domain access control policy, and the inter-domain access control policy, and sending the intra-domain binding information and the inter-domain binding information to a security authorization server respectively, processing the intra-domain binding information and the inter-domain binding information respectively by the security authorization server, and sending the processed information to the blockchain network;

[0010] Obtain all the intra-domain binding information and the inter-domain binding information from the blockchain network and perform static analysis to obtain a specification model; obtain all operation records of data users from the blockchain network and perform dynamic analysis to obtain an implementation model;

[0011] It is determined whether the specification model is isomorphic to the implementation model. If the specification model is isomorphic to the implementation model, the permission execution verification is passed; if the specification model is not isomorphic to the implementation model, the permission execution verification is failed.

[0012] Preferably, uploading the data and the data description to the data container to obtain the data index and the data container index comprises:

[0013] The data and data description are uploaded to the data container, and the data container returns the corresponding data index and data container index to the data owner.

[0014] Preferably, the security authorization server includes an intra-domain security authorization server and an inter-domain security authorization server;

[0015] The step of obtaining intra-domain binding information and inter-domain binding information according to the data index, the data container index, the data description, the intra-domain access control policy, and the inter-domain access control policy, and sending the intra-domain binding information and the inter-domain binding information to a security authorization server respectively, specifically includes:

[0016] Binding the data index, the data container index, the data description and the intra-domain access control policy to obtain the intra-domain binding information, and sending the intra-domain binding information to the intra-domain security authorization server;

[0017] The data index, the data container index, the data description and the inter-domain access control policy are bound to obtain the inter-domain binding information, and the inter-domain binding information is sent to the inter-domain security authorization server.

[0018] Preferably, the processing of the intra-domain binding information and the inter-domain binding information by the security authorization server respectively and sending the processed information to the blockchain network comprises:

[0019] The intra-domain security authorization server formats, verifies and encrypts the intra-domain binding information to obtain intra-domain ciphertext binding data; the intra-domain security authorization server encapsulates the intra-domain ciphertext binding data into a first blockchain transaction, and sends the first blockchain transaction to the blockchain network through a secure network protocol;

[0020] The inter-domain security authorization server formats, verifies and encrypts the inter-domain binding information to obtain inter-domain ciphertext binding data; the inter-domain security authorization server encapsulates the inter-domain ciphertext binding data into a second blockchain transaction, and sends the second blockchain transaction to the blockchain network through a secure network protocol.

[0021] Preferably, obtaining all of the intra-domain binding information and the inter-domain binding information from the blockchain network and performing static analysis to obtain a specification model includes:

[0022] Obtaining, by means of a verification server, a first key of the intra-domain access control policy from the intra-domain security authorization server, downloading a first ciphertext access control policy from the first blockchain transaction in the blockchain network according to the first key, and decrypting the first ciphertext access control policy to obtain a first plaintext access control policy;

[0023] Obtaining a second key of the inter-domain access control policy from the inter-domain security authorization server through a verification server, downloading a second ciphertext access control policy from the second blockchain transaction in the blockchain network according to the second key, and decrypting the second ciphertext access control policy to obtain a second plaintext access control policy;

[0024] The first plaintext access control policy and the second plaintext access control policy are modeled and analyzed using a finite state automaton to obtain a standard model.

[0025] Preferably, the using of a finite state automaton to model and analyze the first plaintext access control policy and the second plaintext access control policy to obtain a standard model includes:

[0026] Defining states of the finite state automaton, defining a state for each role and its possible data operation combination, to form a first state set;

[0027] Identifying an event or operation that triggers a change in the state of the finite state automaton, and defining transitions between states according to the first plaintext access control policy and the second plaintext access control policy to form a first transition condition set;

[0028] Define a starting state and an ending state; use the first state set as nodes of a graph, use the first transition condition set as edges of the graph, point each transition condition from one state to another, and mark the initial state and the ending state, return a first directed graph of the finite state automaton, and use the first directed graph as the specification model.

[0029] Preferably, obtaining all operation records of data users from the blockchain network and performing dynamic analysis to obtain an implementation model includes:

[0030] Obtaining the operation record key from the data container through the verification server, downloading the ciphertext operation record from the blockchain network, and decrypting the ciphertext operation record to obtain the plaintext operation record;

[0031] The plaintext operation record is modeled and analyzed using a finite state automaton to obtain an implementation model.

[0032] Preferably, the using of a finite state automaton to model and analyze the plaintext operation record to obtain an implementation model includes:

[0033] Combining each role in the operation record with its actual data operation defines a state to form a second state set;

[0034] Identifying an event or operation that triggers a change in the state of the finite state automaton, defining transitions between states according to roles in the operation record, and forming a second transition condition set;

[0035] Define the starting state and the ending state; use the second state set as the nodes of the graph, use the second transition condition set as the edges of the graph, point each transition condition from one state to another, and mark the initial state and the ending state, return the second directed graph of the finite state automaton, and use the second directed graph as the implementation model.

[0036] Preferably, the implementation model and the specification model are both directed graphs, and the determining whether the specification model is isomorphic to the implementation model includes:

[0037] Comparing the nodes in the specification model and the implementation model, ensuring that each node of the finite state automaton corresponding to the operation record appears in the finite state automaton corresponding to the access control policy, otherwise the specification model and the implementation model are not structurally identical;

[0038] Comparing the edges of the specification model and the implementation model to ensure that each edge in the finite state automaton corresponding to the operation record has a corresponding edge in the finite state automaton corresponding to the access control policy, otherwise the specification model is not structurally identical to the implementation model;

[0039] Initialize an empty mapping M and select an unmatched node n1 in the specification model;

[0040] Traversing each unmatched node n2 in the implementation model, and checking whether n1 and n2 are compatible;

[0041] If they are compatible, add n1 and n2 to the mapping M, and execute a recursive algorithm based on the current mapping M to find other node matches;

[0042] If a complete match is found in any recursive step, then the specification model is isomorphic to the implementation model;

[0043] If they are incompatible or a complete match cannot be constructed based on the mapping of n1 and n2, remove n1 and n2 from the mapping M and backtrack to the previous step;

[0044] If each node in the specification model finds a matching node in the implementation model in the mapping M, then the specification model is isomorphic to the implementation model; if no such match can be found, then the specification model is not isomorphic to the implementation model.

[0045] In a second aspect, a dual-model-based access control authority execution verification device is provided, the device comprising: a processor and a memory for storing processor executable instructions;

[0046] Wherein, the processor is configured to execute the access control authority execution verification method based on the dual model.

[0047] Compared with the prior art, the present invention has the following beneficial effects:

[0048] On the one hand, the present invention breaks through the barriers between different domains and systems by means of blockchain technology, so that data can be safely transferred between different domains, while ensuring the consistency and compliance of access control policies. By storing information such as data indexes and access control policies in the blockchain network, data can be prevented from being tampered with or forged, thereby improving the credibility of the modeling results. On the other hand, the specific implementation of the static target network system in the implementation model is replaced with the dynamic behavior of the terminal user, which can more realistically reflect the state of the system during operation and avoid the influence of idealized assumptions on the verification results. At the same time, static and dynamic analysis of the access control policy and the corresponding behavior can quickly obtain the specification model and the implementation model, and convert the model comparison problem into a graph isomorphism problem. This method can effectively verify the correctness and consistency of the access control policy, reduce the cumbersome manual verification process in the traditional method, and save time and resources. BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS

[0049] In order to more clearly illustrate the embodiments of the present invention or the technical solutions in the prior art, the drawings required for use in the embodiments or the description of the prior art will be briefly introduced below. Obviously, the drawings described below are only some embodiments of the present invention. For ordinary technicians in this field, other drawings can be obtained based on these drawings without paying creative work.

[0050] Figure 1It is a flowchart of a method for executing and verifying access control authority based on a dual model provided by an embodiment of the present invention;

[0051] Figure 2 It is a flow chart of a generation specification model of a dual-model-based access control authority execution verification method provided by an embodiment of the present invention;

[0052] Figure 3 It is a specific flow chart of a generation specification model of a dual-model-based access control authority execution verification method provided by an embodiment of the present invention;

[0053] Figure 4 It is a flow chart of a generation and implementation model of an access control authority execution verification method based on a dual model provided by an embodiment of the present invention;

[0054] Figure 5 It is a specific flow chart of a generation and implementation model of a dual-model-based access control authority execution verification method provided by an embodiment of the present invention;

[0055] Figure 6 It is a flowchart of judging whether a specification model and an implementation model are isomorphic in a dual-model-based access control authority execution verification method provided by an embodiment of the present invention;

[0056] Figure 7 It is a schematic diagram of the overall flow of a method for executing and verifying access control authority based on a dual model provided by an embodiment of the present invention;

[0057] Figure 8 It is a schematic diagram of a binding information chaining process of an access control authority execution verification method based on a dual model provided by an embodiment of the present invention;

[0058] Fig. 9 It is a schematic diagram of a policy execution flow of an access control authority execution verification method based on a dual model provided by an embodiment of the present invention;

[0059] Fig.10 It is a schematic diagram of a canonical model analysis flow of a dual-model-based access control authority execution verification method provided by an embodiment of the present invention;

[0060] Fig.11 It is a schematic diagram of a dual model comparison process of an access control authority execution verification method based on a dual model provided by an embodiment of the present invention;

[0061] Fig.12 It is a structural diagram of an access control authority execution verification device based on a dual model provided by an embodiment of the present invention. DETAILED DESCRIPTION

[0062] In order to make the purpose, technical solution and advantages of the present invention more clearly understood, the present invention is further described in detail below in conjunction with the accompanying drawings and embodiments. It should be understood that the specific embodiments described herein are only used to explain the present invention and are not intended to limit the present invention.

[0063] The terms "first", "second", etc. in the present invention are used for descriptive purposes only and should not be understood as indicating or implying relative importance or implicitly indicating the number of the indicated technical features. Thus, a feature defined as "first", "second", etc. may explicitly or implicitly include one or more of the features. In the description of the present invention, unless otherwise specified, "plurality" means two or more.

[0064] In addition, the technical features involved in the various embodiments of the present invention described below can be combined with each other as long as they do not conflict with each other.

[0065] Embodiment 1:

[0066] The existing access control permission execution verification scheme is mainly implemented through two measures: dynamic analysis and static analysis. Among them, dynamic analysis is mainly carried out when the system is running. It effectively identifies and responds to ongoing security threats or abnormal behaviors by real-time monitoring and analysis of user behaviors and requests. The advantages of this method are its real-time and flexibility. Static analysis is carried out before the system is running, mainly for detailed review and verification of system configuration, user permission settings, etc. This method emphasizes prevention and systematicness by pre-identifying and repairing known security vulnerabilities and configuration errors.

[0067] The limitations of existing access control permission execution verifiable solutions are mainly manifested in:

[0068] (1) Data cross-domain restrictions: Existing solutions lack effective support for verifying cross-domain data access control permissions. Cross-domain data interaction involves multiple systems and organizations, and requires coordination of access policies, identity authentication, and authorization methods across different domains. However, existing solutions fail to provide a complete solution to verify the consistency and compliance of cross-domain access control policies.

[0069] (2) Potential system risks: Existing solutions often assume that the access control policy has been correctly configured in the system, but ignore the security vulnerabilities and configuration errors that may exist in the actual system, and cannot reflect the actual status of the access control policy being executed in the system. These problems may cause the access control policy to fail or be bypassed in actual operation, thus creating potential security risks.

[0070] (3) Modeling trustworthiness issue: Existing solutions model access control policies and system implementations, but lack a trustworthy evaluation process for data and information sources during the modeling process. If unreliable data or information sources are used during the modeling process, even if the model itself is correct, it will lead to deviations in the verification results.

[0071] In order to solve the problems existing in the prior art, a dual-model-based access control permission execution verification method is proposed in this embodiment, including: generating data, and setting an intra-domain access control policy and an inter-domain access control policy for each data; uploading the data and the data description to the data container to obtain the data index and the data container index; obtaining the intra-domain binding information and the inter-domain binding information according to the data index, the data container index, the data description, the intra-domain access control policy and the inter-domain access control policy, and sending the intra-domain binding information and the inter-domain binding information to the security authorization server respectively, and the security authorization server processes the intra-domain binding information and the inter-domain binding information respectively and then sends them to the blockchain network; obtaining all the intra-domain binding information and the inter-domain binding information from the blockchain network and performing static analysis to obtain a specification model; obtaining all the operation records of the data user from the blockchain network and performing dynamic analysis to obtain an implementation model; judging whether the specification model is isomorphic to the implementation model, if the specification model is isomorphic to the implementation model, the permission execution verification is passed; if the specification model is not isomorphic to the implementation model, the permission execution verification fails.

[0072] On the one hand, this embodiment breaks down the barriers between different domains and systems by using blockchain technology, so that data can be securely transferred between different domains while ensuring the consistency and compliance of access control policies. By storing information such as data indexes and access control policies in the blockchain network, data can be prevented from being tampered with or forged, thereby improving the credibility of the modeling results. On the other hand, the specific implementation of the static target network system in the implementation model is replaced with the dynamic behavior of the terminal user, which can more realistically reflect the state of the system during runtime and avoid the impact of idealized assumptions on the verification results. At the same time, static and dynamic analysis of the access control policy and the corresponding behavior can quickly obtain the specification model and the implementation model, and convert the model comparison problem into a graph isomorphism problem. This method can effectively verify the correctness and consistency of the access control policy, reduce the cumbersome manual verification process in the traditional method, and save time and resources.

[0073] Preferably, the method proposed in this embodiment divides the access control policy of the data into fine-grained divisions, including intra-domain access control policy and inter-domain access control policy, and binds the data index, data container index and corresponding access control policy to the chain, breaking down the barriers between different domains and different systems, and ensuring the credibility of the modeling data and information sources in the cross-domain data flow scenario, thereby supporting the trusted verification of the execution of access control permissions. This method replaces the specific implementation of the static target network system in the implementation model with the dynamic behavior of the terminal user, reflecting the real state of the system during operation. Finite state automata are used to perform static and dynamic analysis on the policies and behaviors respectively to obtain the specification model and implementation model, and the model comparison problem is converted into a graph isomorphism problem to realize the verification of the execution of access control permissions.

[0074] It is worth noting that the solution provided in this embodiment is applicable to data owners, data containers and data users who need to verify access control permissions during cross-domain data transfer, and can be deployed on terminals and servers involved in cross-domain data transfer. Terminals are divided into data owners and data users, and servers are divided into data containers, blockchain networks, security authorization servers and verification servers.

[0075] The steps of the method will be described in detail below. In a preferred embodiment, Figure 1 As shown:

[0076] Step 101: Generate data, and set an intra-domain access control policy and an inter-domain access control policy for each data.

[0077] The data owner generates data and sets intra-domain access control policy and inter-domain access control policy for each data. The "intra-domain access control policy" and "inter-domain access control policy" here are two different security measures used to jointly ensure the correct use and protection of data.

[0078] The intra-domain access control policy refers to the access control measures implemented within the same security domain or organization. This policy determines who can access which data and what operations they can perform, such as reading, editing, deleting, etc. Its main purpose is to protect data from unauthorized access or abuse, while ensuring that legitimate users can access the data they need. It can be implemented through methods such as role-based access control, autonomous access control, or mandatory access control. Specifically, it will not be explained in detail in this embodiment. The inter-domain access control policy handles data access between different security domains. This policy defines how data is transferred from one domain to another and under what conditions such transfer is allowed. Its main purpose is to ensure that data is securely transmitted between different domains to prevent data leakage or access by unauthorized third parties. It can be implemented through methods such as network security policies, encryption technology, and cross-domain solutions.

[0079] Step 102: Upload the data and data description to the data container to obtain a data index and a data container index.

[0080] The data owner uploads the data and the data description to the data container, and the data container returns the corresponding data index and data container index to the data owner.

[0081] Data container is an abstract concept, which refers to a system or service that can store data and provide data management functions. For example, in a healthcare data sharing system, the data container can be a hospital server. The data owner first uploads the data and its description information to the data container. The description information usually includes the metadata of the data, such as data type, creation date, owner information, access permission settings, etc., which helps to classify, manage and retrieve the data. After receiving the data and description information, the data container will store it in an appropriate location. Data encryption, compression or other forms of processing may be involved to ensure the security and efficient storage of the data.

[0082] The data container generates a unique data index for each data item uploaded. This index allows for quick retrieval of specific data items stored in the container. The data index may include keywords, identifiers, or other information that can uniquely identify and locate data. In addition to generating indexes for the data items themselves, the data container can also provide a data container index to the data owner. The data container index is used to identify the container or data storage location that holds a specific data collection, helping the data owner and other authorized users to quickly locate and access the data collection.

[0083] Data owners and other authorized users can quickly and efficiently retrieve data stored in data containers through data indexes and data container indexes. Indexes also help organize and manage data, including data updates, deletions, and permission management. They enable data containers to efficiently handle complex data operations and queries. By controlling access to data indexes and data container indexes, data containers can implement fine-grained access control to data and enhance data security and privacy protection.

[0084] Step 103: Obtain intra-domain binding information and inter-domain binding information according to the data index, the data container index, the data description, the intra-domain access control policy, and the inter-domain access control policy, and send the intra-domain binding information and the inter-domain binding information to a security authorization server respectively. The security authorization server processes the intra-domain binding information and the inter-domain binding information respectively, and sends the processed information to the blockchain network.

[0085] The security authorization server includes an intra-domain security authorization server and an inter-domain security authorization server. Specifically, the data owner binds the data index, the data container index, the data description and the intra-domain access control policy to obtain the intra-domain binding information, and sends the intra-domain binding information to the intra-domain security authorization server; the data owner binds the data index, the data container index, the data description and the inter-domain access control policy to obtain the inter-domain binding information, and sends the inter-domain binding information to the inter-domain security authorization server.

[0086] The intra-domain access control policy is a rule or policy used to control the access rights of users within the domain to data, including mechanisms such as identity authentication and authorization.

[0087] The domain binding information is the information obtained by binding the data index, data container index, data description and domain access control policy, which is used to explain the management and control method of data in the domain. The domain security authorization server is responsible for processing the access request of the users in the domain to the data, and authorizing and verifying the server according to the domain access control policy.

[0088] Inter-domain binding information is information obtained by binding data index, data container index, data description and inter-domain access control policy, which is used to describe the sharing and access methods of data between different domains. The inter-domain security authorization server is responsible for processing data sharing and access requests between different domains, and is a server that performs verification and authorization according to the inter-domain access control policy.

[0089] The data owner first binds the data index, data container index, data description and intra-domain access control policy to form intra-domain binding information, and then sends it to the intra-domain security authorization server. Next, the data index, data container index, data description and inter-domain access control policy are bound to form inter-domain binding information and sent to the inter-domain security authorization server. The purpose of this is to ensure that data access within and between domains is strictly controlled and managed, and to ensure data security and privacy.

[0090] The intra-domain security authorization server formats, verifies and encrypts the intra-domain binding information to obtain intra-domain ciphertext binding data; the intra-domain security authorization server encapsulates the intra-domain ciphertext binding data into a first blockchain transaction, and sends the first blockchain transaction to the blockchain network through a secure network protocol. The inter-domain security authorization server formats, verifies and encrypts the inter-domain binding information to obtain inter-domain ciphertext binding data; the inter-domain security authorization server encapsulates the inter-domain ciphertext binding data into a second blockchain transaction, and sends the second blockchain transaction to the blockchain network through a secure network protocol.

[0091] Specifically, the intra-domain security authorization server first formats, verifies and encrypts the intra-domain binding information to ensure the integrity and security of the information, and generates intra-domain ciphertext binding data. This process may include structuring the data, verifying the legitimacy of the data, and encrypting the data using an encryption algorithm to protect the privacy and security of the data. After the corresponding processing is completed, the intra-domain security authorization server encapsulates the intra-domain ciphertext binding data into the first blockchain transaction and sends the first blockchain transaction to the blockchain network through a secure network protocol. In this process, steps such as transaction packaging, broadcasting and verification are involved to ensure that the transaction is correctly added to the blockchain network and confirmed.

[0092] Similarly, the inter-domain security authorization server formats, verifies and encrypts the inter-domain binding information to generate inter-domain ciphertext binding data. This process is similar to the intra-domain processing, but may involve security protocols and identity authentication mechanisms between different domains. After the corresponding processing is completed, the inter-domain security authorization server encapsulates the inter-domain ciphertext binding data into a second blockchain transaction and sends the second blockchain transaction to the blockchain network through a secure network protocol. Similarly, this transaction also needs to be verified and confirmed by the network to ensure the secure transmission and storage of data. Such a process ensures the secure management and transmission of data within and between domains, realizes the traceability and immutability of data through blockchain technology, and ensures the security and privacy of data.

[0093] Data users query the data container index in the blockchain network according to the data description and data index, and request data from the data container. The data container sends the data request to the security authorization server, which queries the access control policy in the blockchain network according to the data index in the request. If the requester is from within the domain, the intra-domain access control policy is executed, otherwise the inter-domain access control policy is executed. The data container encrypts the requester's successful operation record into a transaction and sends it to the blockchain network. The blockchain network reaches consensus, verifies and confirms the transaction.

[0094] Step 104: Obtain all the intra-domain binding information and the inter-domain binding information from the blockchain network, and perform static analysis to obtain a specification model; obtain all operation records of data users from the blockchain network and perform dynamic analysis to obtain an implementation model.

[0095] The construction process of the specification model is as follows: Figure 2 As shown, including:

[0096] Step 1041: Obtain a first key of the intra-domain access control policy from the intra-domain security authorization server through a verification server, download a first encrypted access control policy from the first blockchain transaction in the blockchain network according to the first key, and decrypt the first encrypted access control policy to obtain a first plaintext access control policy.

[0097] Through the verification server, the user obtains the first key of the domain access control policy from the domain security authorization server. The first key is used to decrypt the corresponding ciphertext of the domain access control policy. The user downloads the first ciphertext of the domain access control policy from the blockchain network. Involving the data storage and retrieval mechanism of the blockchain, it is necessary to ensure that the user obtains the correct ciphertext. The first ciphertext access control policy is decrypted to obtain the first plaintext access control policy. The decryption process includes decoding using the key to restore the original access control policy.

[0098] Step 1042: Obtain a second key of the inter-domain access control policy from the inter-domain security authorization server through the verification server, download a second encrypted access control policy from the second blockchain transaction in the blockchain network according to the second key, and decrypt the second encrypted access control policy to obtain a second plaintext access control policy.

[0099] Through the verification server, the user obtains the second key of the inter-domain access control policy from the inter-domain security authorization server, similar to step 1041. Using the second key, the user downloads the second ciphertext of the inter-domain access control policy from the blockchain network. The second ciphertext access control policy is then decrypted to obtain the second plaintext access control policy.

[0100] This design ensures the secure transmission and storage of access control policies. The key is obtained through the verification server to ensure security. Using the blockchain network to store ciphertext can provide decentralized and tamper-proof features, while the decryption step ensures the confidentiality of the access control policy during transmission.

[0101] Step 1043: Use a finite state automaton to model and analyze the first plaintext access control policy and the second plaintext access control policy to obtain a standard model.

[0102] In the context of designing a finite state automaton to handle data operations and access control, a specific method is followed to define states, state transitions, and how to form a standard model by graphically representing these elements. The first plaintext access control policy is the intra-domain access control policy, and the second plaintext access control policy is the inter-domain access control policy. Figure 3 As shown, the step 1043 specifically includes:

[0103] Step 10431: define the states of the finite state automaton, define a state for each role and its possible data operation combination, and form a first state set.

[0104] In a finite state automaton, each state represents a possible configuration of the system. For data operations and access control, a state is defined for each role and its possible data operation combination. For example, a role may have operation permissions such as "read data", "edit data", "delete data", and each permission combination corresponds to a unique state. The first state set includes the states of all possible role and data operation combinations. For example, if there are two roles, one role can perform read and edit operations, and the other role can only perform read operations, then there are at least two different states to represent these permission combinations.

[0105] Step 10432: Identify an event or operation that triggers a change in the state of the finite state automaton, define transitions between states according to the first plaintext access control policy and the second plaintext access control policy, and form a first transition condition set.

[0106] State transitions are triggered by specific events or actions. These events or actions can be user requests for data operations, time changes, or other events inside or outside the system. Transitions between states are defined based on a first plaintext access control policy (such as role-based access control) and a second plaintext access control policy (which may be more fine-grained attribute-based control). Each transition condition represents a specific rule from one state to another, which is based on the requirements of the access control policy.

[0107] Step 10433: define the starting state and the ending state; use the first state set as the nodes of the graph, use the first transition condition set as the edges of the graph, point each transition condition from one state to another, and mark the initial state and the ending state, return the first directed graph of the finite state automaton, and use the first directed graph as the specification model.

[0108] The starting state usually represents the initial security state of the system, for example, all data is encrypted and not accessed. The ending state may represent one or more states that represent the end or target state of the system, such as the state where data operations are completed.

[0109] The steps to construct the first directed graph are as follows:

[0110] 1. Take each state in the first state set as a node of the graph.

[0111] 2. Use the transition conditions defined in the first transition condition set as the edges of the graph, which represent the transition paths between states.

[0112] 3. Mark the initial and final states. Clearly mark the initial and final states in the diagram to make it easier to identify the beginning and end of the automaton.

[0113] Through the above steps, a directed graph can be constructed, which vividly represents the structure of the finite state automaton. This graph contains all states (nodes), transition conditions (edges) between states, and start and end states. This directed graph, as a specification model, can be used to describe and analyze the logic of data operations and access control in detail to ensure that the system design meets the predetermined security and functional requirements.

[0114] The above introduces the construction process of the specification model, such as Figure 4 As shown, the construction process of the implementation model includes:

[0115] Step 1044: Obtain the operation record key from the data container through the verification server, download the ciphertext operation record from the blockchain network, and decrypt the ciphertext operation record to obtain the plaintext operation record.

[0116] First, the verification server obtains the operation record key from the data container. The operation record key is the key for decrypting the ciphertext operation record stored in the blockchain network. Subsequently, the ciphertext operation record is downloaded from the blockchain network. The blockchain network is often used to store key operation records and transaction logs due to its tamper-proof and decentralized characteristics. The downloaded ciphertext operation record is decrypted using the obtained key to obtain the plaintext operation record. Only by converting the encrypted operation record into plaintext can subsequent analysis and modeling be performed.

[0117] Step 1045: Use a finite state automaton to model and analyze the plain text operation record to obtain an implementation model.

[0118] like Figure 5 As shown, the step 1045 specifically includes:

[0119] Step 10451: Combine each role in the operation record with its actual data operation to define a state, forming a second state set.

[0120] In this step, a state is defined for each role and the data operation combination actually performed in the operation record based on the content in the operation record. This is similar to the first state set defined previously, but the second state set is defined based on actual operation records rather than theoretical or preset behaviors.

[0121] Step 10452: Identify the event or operation that triggers the state change of the finite state machine, define the transition between states according to the roles in the operation record, and form a second transition condition set.

[0122] Analyze the operation records to identify specific events or actions that trigger state changes. This may include data access, modification, deletion, etc. Define transitions between states based on the actual behavior of the roles in the operation records. These transition conditions are based on actual observed behavior patterns and reflect actual system usage.

[0123] Step 10453: define the starting state and the ending state; use the second state set as the nodes of the graph, use the second transition condition set as the edges of the graph, point each transition condition from one state to another, and mark the initial state and the ending state, return the second directed graph of the finite state automaton, and use the second directed graph as the implementation model.

[0124] Based on the actual operation records, define the starting state (e.g., the initial safety state of the system) and the ending state (e.g., the state where the operation is completed or a specific goal is achieved). The states in the second state set are used as nodes of the graph, and the transition conditions in the second transition condition set are used as edges of the graph. Each transition condition represents a path from one state to another. Clearly mark the starting state and the ending state in the directed graph to facilitate identification and understanding of the operation flow of the finite state automaton.

[0125] Through the above modeling and analysis process, a finite state automaton model that reflects the actual behavior of the system can be constructed based on the actual operation records, that is, the implementation model. This model can be used to analyze the security, efficiency, user behavior patterns, etc. of the system, providing an empirical basis for system optimization and improvement.

[0126] Step 105: Determine whether the specification model is isomorphic to the implementation model. If the specification model is isomorphic to the implementation model, the permission execution verification is passed; if the specification model is not isomorphic to the implementation model, the permission execution verification is failed.

[0127] The purpose of step 105 is to verify whether the implementation model is consistent with the specification model, and both the implementation model and the specification model are directed graphs. This ensures that the actual operation follows the established access control policy. In a preferred embodiment, Figure 6 As shown, step 105 includes:

[0128] Step 1051: Compare the nodes in the specification model and the implementation model to ensure that each node of the finite state automaton corresponding to the operation record appears in the finite state automaton corresponding to the access control policy, otherwise the specification model is not structurally identical to the implementation model.

[0129] Compare the nodes in the first directed graph (the specification model) and the second directed graph (the implementation model). The purpose of this comparison is to ensure that each node in the implementation model (i.e., each combination of roles and their data operations) has a corresponding node in the specification model. This step ensures that all states that appear in actual operations are covered by the access control policy without omissions.

[0130] If nodes are found that exist in the implementation model but not in the specification model, this indicates that a state that was not foreseen by the access control policy has occurred in actual operation, which may be an indication of a security risk or policy gap.

[0131] Step 1052: Compare the edges of the specification model and the implementation model to ensure that each edge in the finite state automaton corresponding to the operation record has a corresponding edge in the finite state automaton corresponding to the access control policy, otherwise the specification model is not isomorphic with the implementation model.

[0132] Compare the edges in the two directed graphs, i.e., the state transition conditions. The purpose of this step is to ensure that each edge in the implementation model (i.e., each state transition) has a corresponding edge in the specification model. This ensures that all state transitions in actual operations comply with the established access control policy.

[0133] If some transformations in the implementation model have no counterparts in the specification model, this may indicate that there are operations in the actual system that do not follow the access control policy, which may also indicate a security vulnerability or improper policy enforcement.

[0134] If a mismatch is found in the comparison of nodes or edges, that is, the specification model is not the same as the implementation model, this means that there are differences between the operation and state transition of the actual system and the original access control policy. This difference may lead to security risks or indicate that the access control policy needs to be updated to reflect changes in actual operations.

[0135] Initialize an empty mapping M, select an unmatched node n1 in the specification model; traverse each unmatched node n2 in the implementation model to check whether n1 and n2 are compatible; if compatible, add n1 and n2 to the mapping M, and execute a recursive algorithm based on the current mapping M to find other node matches; if a complete match is found in any recursive step, the specification model is isomorphic to the implementation model; if incompatible or a complete match cannot be constructed based on the mapping of n1 and n2, remove n1 and n2 from the mapping M and backtrack to the previous step; if each node in the specification model finds a matching node in the implementation model in the mapping M, the specification model is isomorphic to the implementation model; if such a match cannot be found, the specification model is not isomorphic to the implementation model.

[0136] Through this comparative analysis, organizations can evaluate the effectiveness of their access control policies and the consistency of actual operations, timely discover and correct deviations, and ensure the security and compliance of the system. This not only helps prevent potential security threats, but also promotes continuous improvement and optimization of system management.

[0137] Embodiment 2:

[0138] In Example 1, a dual-model-based access control authority execution verification method is proposed. A feasible use scenario of this method is a medical health data sharing system. The system includes patients, medical staff, medical institutions, hospital servers, security authorization servers and blockchain networks. Its workflow is as follows: Figure 7 shown.

[0139] The specific steps are as follows:

[0140] Step 11: Data and policy generation: The subject uploads the object to the data container and sets the intra-domain access control policy and inter-domain access control policy. The patient generates data and identity authentication information, encrypts it and sends it to the hospital server, and sets the intra-domain access control policy and inter-domain access control policy for each data.

[0141] Step 111: Data collection and identity information generation. Hospital g1 distributes various intelligent terminal devices d1, d2, ..., d n Used to collect and sense the patient's blood pressure s1.11, body temperature s1.12, ... heart rate s1.1 in real time n The patient's mobile phone acts as an edge computing node device s2 to receive data collected by various smart terminal devices s1.l1, s1.l2, ..., s1.l n To ensure the security and integrity of the patient's information, the patient's mobile phone s2 uses the patient's identity information s2.l1 and the received data to call the digest algorithm to calculate the digest value s2.l2 = H (s2.l1||s1.l1||s1.l2||...||s1.l n The patient's mobile phone uses the key key=s2.l3 negotiated with the hospital's g1 server s3, calls the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) algorithm to encrypt the patient's related information to obtain the ciphertext of the patient's related information, and sends it to the hospital's g1 server s3. s2.out1=s2.l4=AES(key, s2.l2||s2.l1||s1.l1||s1.l2||…||s1.l n ).

[0142] Step 112: Generate inter-domain and intra-domain access control policies. Patients can access the collected data s1.11, s1.12, ..., s1.1 according to their own wishes and the role-based access control policy (RBAC). n Set the domain access control policy policy1 for the medical institution g1 and other medical institutions g2, ..., g n The inter-domain access control policy policy2, ..., policy n .

[0143] Step 12, index and policy binding, the data container returns the object index and data container index, the subject sends the object index, data container index and corresponding access control policy to the intra-domain and inter-domain security authorization servers. The patient uploads the data to the hospital server to obtain the data index and data container index, the patient binds it with the intra-domain access control policy to obtain the intra-domain binding information, sends it to the intra-domain security authorization server, binds the data index, data container index and the inter-domain access control policy to obtain the inter-domain binding information, and sends it to the inter-domain security authorization server.

[0144] Step 121, index acquisition. The patient's mobile phone s2 uploads the data s2.out1 to the hospital's g1 server s3. After s3 receives the patient's ciphertext information s2.out1=s3.in1, it first uses the key key=s2.l3=s3.l1 to call the AES algorithm to decrypt the patient's ciphertext information and obtain the patient's plaintext information s3.l3, s3.l3=AES(s3.l1, s2.out1). At the same time, it calls the digest algorithm to calculate the patient's information digest value s3.l2=H(s2.l1||s1.l1||s1.l2||…||s1.l n ), compare s3.l2 and s2.l2 for integrity verification, extract identity information s2.l1 for identity verification. After successful verification, server s3 sends the patient's identity information s2.l1 and plaintext information s3.l4 = s1.l1||s1.l2||…||s1.l n Store in the local data container and return the data index da, data container index dc and data description dsec to the patient.

[0145] Step 122, policy binding. After receiving the data index da, data container index dc and data description dsec, the patient's mobile phone s2 binds it with the intra-domain access control policy policy1 to obtain binding information bind1, and sends it to the intra-domain security authorization server s4, and binds it with the inter-domain access control policies policy2, ..., policy n After binding, the binding information bind2 is obtained and sent to the inter-domain security authorization server s5.

[0146] Step 13: Binding information is uploaded to the chain. The intra-domain and inter-domain security authorization servers upload the data index, data container index and corresponding access control policy to the chain. Figure 8 As shown, the intra-domain security authorization server and the inter-domain security authorization server encrypt and encapsulate the intra-domain binding information and the inter-domain binding information into blockchain transactions respectively. The hospital server encapsulates the data index, data container index and data description into blockchain transactions. The nodes of the blockchain network perform consensus verification and return the on-chain address after the transaction is confirmed.

[0147] Step 131, binding information processing. The intra-domain and inter-domain security authorization servers s4 and s5 respectively format, verify and encrypt the binding information bind1 and the binding information bind2 to obtain intra-domain ciphertext binding data Ebind1 and inter-domain ciphertext binding data Ebind1.

[0148] Step 132: Transaction generation. The intra-domain and inter-domain security authorization servers s4 and s5 encapsulate the intra-domain ciphertext binding data Ebind1 and the inter-domain ciphertext binding data Ebind1 into blockchain transactions T1 and T2, and the hospital server s3 encapsulates the data index da, the data container index dc and the data description dsec into blockchain transaction T3, and sends it to the blockchain network s6 through the secure network protocol.

[0149] Step 133, blockchain network processing and confirmation. The nodes of blockchain network s6 verify the validity of transactions T1, T2, and T3 through a consensus protocol. Once the verification is passed, the transaction is added to the blockchain.

[0150] Step 134, transaction confirmation and recording. The intra-domain and inter-domain security authorization servers s4, s5 and hospital server s3 receive the confirmation response and on-chain addresses A1, A2, A3 from the blockchain network s6, indicating that the intra-domain ciphertext binding data Ebind1, the inter-domain ciphertext binding data Ebind1, the data index da, the data container index dc and the data description dsec have been successfully recorded.

[0151] Step 14: Data query and request: The subject queries the data container index based on the object index in the blockchain network and requests the object from the data container. The medical data user queries the data container index based on the data index in the blockchain network and requests data from the data container.

[0152] Step 141, data query. A medical institution s7 is conducting a research and needs relevant information of patients. The blockchain network s6 will publicly disclose the data index da, the data container index dc and the data description dsec. The medical institution s7 can query the data index da and the data container index dc according to the data description dsec and its own needs.

[0153] Step 142, data request. The medical institution s7 sends a data request to the data container dc to operate the data da. The data request q1 includes the IP address s7.IP, the role s7.role and other information of the medical institution s7.

[0154] Step 15: Policy execution: The data container queries and executes the access control policy based on the object index in the blockchain network, and records the subject operation to the blockchain network. Fig. 9 As shown, the data container sends the medical institution request to the security authorization server. The security authorization server queries the access control policy in the blockchain network according to the data index in the request. If the medical institution is from within the domain, the intra-domain access control policy is executed, otherwise the inter-domain access control policy is executed. The data container records the successful operation of the medical institution to the blockchain.

[0155] Step 151, domain judgment. The data container dc judges whether the medical institution is within or outside the domain according to the IP address s7.IP in the data request q1 of the medical institution. If it is from within the domain, q1 is sent to the intra-domain security authorization server s4, otherwise it is sent to the inter-domain security authorization server s5.

[0156] Step 152: Access control policy execution. The intra-domain security authorization server s4 receives the data request q1 and executes the intra-domain access control policy policy1 according to the role of the medical institution. The inter-domain security authorization server s5 receives the data request q1 and executes the inter-domain access control policy policy2 according to the role of the medical institution, ..., policy n If the medical institution has the authority to operate the data, the security authorization server returns permission to the data container, otherwise it returns rejection.

[0157] Step 153, upload the operation record to the blockchain. If the medical institution s7 successfully operates the data, the data container dc records the operation record, formats, verifies and encrypts it, and encapsulates it into a transaction and uploads it to the blockchain. The blockchain operation part is the same as step 133 and step 134, and the address A4 on the chain is obtained. The operation record includes the operation type, operator information, operation object, domain information, etc.

[0158] Step 16: Generate the canonical model. The verifier obtains all access control policies from the blockchain network and generates the corresponding finite state automaton, which is called the canonical model. Fig.10 As shown, the verification server obtains the access control policy key from the security authorization server, downloads the ciphertext access control policy from the blockchain network, decrypts it to obtain the plaintext access control policy, and uses a finite state automaton (FSA) to model and analyze the access control policy to obtain a standard model.

[0159] Step 161, analyzing the access control policy. The verification server s8 identifies all user roles, such as patients, doctors, administrators, etc., medical institutions, etc. Determine which data types need to be controlled for access, such as collection information, medical records, diagnostic reports, etc. Determine data-related operations, such as generate, read, write, modify, etc.

[0160] Step 162, define the state of FSA. Define a state for each role and its possible data operation combination to form a state set States. For example, "patient-generate-collect information", "doctor-read-collect information", "doctor-modify-diagnosis report", "medical institution-read-diagnosis report", etc.

[0161] Step 163, define transitions. Identify events or operations that trigger state changes, such as domain login, logout, and data request outside the domain, and define transitions between states according to the access control policy to form a set of transition conditions. For example, when a "patient" performs a "read medical record" operation, the state is transitioned from the "no access state" to the "patient-read-medical record" state.

[0162] Step 164, define the start and end states. The start state is the state when the user starts to interact with the system. In a medical data sharing system, this is usually the state when the user is unauthenticated or not logged in. The end state is the state when the user ends interacting with the system. This may be the state after the user completes his task, or the end state caused by a specific condition (such as insufficient permissions, violation of security rules, etc.).

[0163] Step 165, create a state transition graph. Use the state set States as the nodes of the graph. Use the transition condition set Transitions as the edges of the graph, and point each transition condition from one state to another state. Mark the initial state and the terminal state, and return the directed graph G1 of the finite state automaton.

[0164] Step 17: Implementation model generation: The verifier obtains all operation records from the blockchain network and generates a corresponding finite state automaton, which is called the implementation model. The verification server obtains the operation record key from the data container, downloads the ciphertext operation record from the blockchain network, decrypts it to obtain the plaintext operation record, and uses the finite state automaton (FSA) to model and analyze the operation record to obtain the implementation model.

[0165] Step 171, analyzing operation records. The verification server s8 identifies all user roles, such as patients, doctors, administrators, etc., medical institutions, etc. Identifies all data types, such as collected information, medical records, diagnostic reports, etc. Identifies data-related operations, such as generating, reading, writing, modifying, etc.

[0166] Step 172, define the state of FSA. Each role in the operation record is combined with its actual data operation to define a state, forming a state set States. For example, "patient-generate-collect information", "doctor-read-collect information", "doctor-modify-diagnosis report", "medical institution-read-diagnosis report", etc.

[0167] Step 173, define transitions. Identify events or operations that trigger state changes, such as domain login, logout, and external data request, and define transitions between states based on roles in the operation record to form a set of transition conditions. For example, when a "patient" performs a "read medical record" operation, the state transitions from "no access" to "patient-read-medical record" state.

[0168] Step 174, define the start and end states. The start state is the state when the user starts to interact with the system. In a medical data sharing system, this is usually the state when the user is unauthenticated or not logged in. The end state is the state when the user ends interacting with the system. This may be the state after the user completes his task, or the end state caused by a specific condition (such as insufficient permissions, violation of security rules, etc.).

[0169] Step 175, create a state transition graph. Use the state set States as the nodes of the graph. Use the transition condition set Transitions as the edges of the graph, and point each transition condition from one state to another state. Mark the initial state and the terminal state, and return the directed graph G2 of the finite state automaton.

[0170] Step 18: Compare the two models. The verifier determines whether the specification model and the implementation model are isomorphic to confirm whether the permission execution verification has passed. Fig.11 As shown, the verification server obtains the specification model and the implementation model, compares the nodes and edges of the two models, and performs graph isomorphism judgment to verify the access control policy.

[0171] Step 181, node comparison. Compare the nodes in the two graphs. Ensure that each node (state) of the operation record FSA appears in the access control policy FSA, otherwise the verification fails.

[0172] Step 182: edge comparison. Compare the edges in the two graphs. Ensure that each edge (state transition) in the operation record FSA has a corresponding edge in the access control policy FSA, otherwise the verification fails.

[0173] Step 183, graph isomorphism judgment. The two graphs are G1 and G2, and an empty mapping M is initialized (for storing the currently found node matches). Select an unmatched node n1 in G1. Traverse each unmatched node n2 in G2 and check whether n1 and n2 are compatible (that is, whether they can become a valid matching pair). If compatible, add n1 and n2 to the mapping M. Based on the current mapping M, execute a recursive algorithm to find other node matches. If a complete match is found in any recursive step, the graphs are isomorphic. If it is incompatible or a complete match cannot be constructed based on the mapping of n1 and n2, remove n1 and n2 from the mapping M and backtrack to the previous step. If each node in G1 finds a match with a node in G2 in the mapping M, the two graphs are isomorphic. If such a match cannot be found, the two graphs are not isomorphic.

[0174] Step 184: Analyze and verify. Analyze the relationship between the two models. If the graphs of the operation record model and the access control policy model are isomorphic, they are structurally consistent, which indicates that each operation in the operation record model complies with the access control policy and the access control authority execution verification is passed.

[0175] Specifically, the specific process of the access control authority execution verification method based on the dual model is shown in Example 1, which will not be repeated in this embodiment.

[0176] Embodiment 3:

[0177] In Example 1, a dual-model-based access control permission execution verification method is provided. In this embodiment, a dual-model-based access control permission execution verification device is proposed. The dual-model-based access control permission execution verification device includes: a processor and a memory for storing processor executable instructions; wherein the processor is configured to execute the dual-model-based access control permission execution verification method described in Example 1.

[0178] like Fig.12 As shown, a processor 21 and a memory 22, wherein the processor 21 and the memory 22 may be connected via a bus or other means.

[0179] The processor 21 may be a central processing unit (CPU). The processor 21 may also be other general-purpose processors, digital signal processors (DSP), application-specific integrated circuits (ASIC), field-programmable gate arrays (FPGA), or other programmable logic devices, discrete gate or transistor logic devices, discrete hardware components, or a combination of the above chips.

[0180] The memory 22, as a non-transitory computer-readable storage medium, can be used to store non-transitory software programs, non-transitory computer executable programs and modules, such as program instructions / modules corresponding to the dual-model-based access control authority execution verification method in Embodiment 1 of the present invention. The processor executes various functional applications and training processes of the processor by running the non-transitory software programs, instructions and modules stored in the memory.

[0181] The memory 22 may include a program storage area and a training storage area, wherein the program storage area may store an operating system, an application required for at least one function; the training storage area may store training created by the processor, etc. In addition, the memory may include a high-speed random access memory, and may also include a non-volatile memory, such as at least one disk storage device, a flash memory device, or other non-volatile solid-state storage device. In some embodiments, the memory 22 may optionally include a memory remotely disposed relative to the processor, and these remote memories may be connected to the processor via a network. Examples of the above-mentioned network include, but are not limited to, the Internet, an intranet, a local area network, a mobile communication network, and combinations thereof.

[0182] The one or more modules are stored in the memory 22, and when executed by the processor 21, the following is performed: Figure 1 The access control authority execution verification method based on the dual model in the embodiment 1 is shown.

[0183] For details of the above dual model-based access control permission execution verification method, please refer to Figure 1 , Figure 2 and Figure 3 The corresponding descriptions and effects in the embodiments shown in the figure can be understood and will not be repeated here.

[0184] This embodiment also provides a computer storage medium, which stores a computer program. The computer program can be executed by a processor to complete the access control authority execution verification method based on the dual model described in Example 1.

[0185] The computer storage medium stores computer executable instructions, which can execute the access control authority execution verification method based on the dual model in any of the above method embodiments. The storage medium can be a disk, an optical disk, a read-only memory (ROM), a random access memory (RAM), a flash memory, a hard disk (HDD), or a solid-state drive (SSD); the storage medium can also include a combination of the above types of memory.

[0186] The above description is only a preferred embodiment of the present invention and is not intended to limit the present invention. Any modifications, equivalent substitutions and improvements made within the spirit and principles of the present invention should be included in the protection scope of the present invention.

[0187] The specific process of the access control authority execution verification method based on the dual model is shown in Example 1, which will not be repeated in this embodiment.

[0188] The above description is only a preferred embodiment of the present invention and is not intended to limit the present invention. Any modifications, equivalent substitutions and improvements made within the spirit and principles of the present invention should be included in the protection scope of the present invention.

Claims

1. A dual model-based access control authority execution verification method, characterized in that: include: Generate data and set intra-domain access control policy and inter-domain access control policy for each data; Upload the data and the data description to the data container to obtain the data index and the data container index; Obtaining intra-domain binding information and inter-domain binding information according to the data index, the data container index, the data description, the intra-domain access control policy, and the inter-domain access control policy, and sending the intra-domain binding information and the inter-domain binding information to a security authorization server respectively, processing the intra-domain binding information and the inter-domain binding information respectively by the security authorization server, and sending the processed information to the blockchain network; Obtain all the intra-domain binding information and the inter-domain binding information from the blockchain network and perform static analysis to obtain a specification model; obtain all operation records of data users from the blockchain network and perform dynamic analysis to obtain an implementation model; It is determined whether the specification model is isomorphic to the implementation model. If the specification model is isomorphic to the implementation model, the permission execution verification is passed; if the specification model is not isomorphic to the implementation model, the permission execution verification is failed.

2. The access control authority execution verification method based on the dual model according to claim 1 is characterized in that: The uploading of the data and the data description to the data container to obtain the data index and the data container index includes: The data and data description are uploaded to the data container, and the data container returns the corresponding data index and data container index to the data owner.

3. The access control authority execution verification method based on the dual model according to claim 1 is characterized in that: The security authorization server includes an intra-domain security authorization server and an inter-domain security authorization server; The step of obtaining intra-domain binding information and inter-domain binding information according to the data index, the data container index, the data description, the intra-domain access control policy, and the inter-domain access control policy, and sending the intra-domain binding information and the inter-domain binding information to a security authorization server respectively, specifically includes: Binding the data index, the data container index, the data description and the intra-domain access control policy to obtain the intra-domain binding information, and sending the intra-domain binding information to the intra-domain security authorization server; The data index, the data container index, the data description and the inter-domain access control policy are bound to obtain the inter-domain binding information, and the inter-domain binding information is sent to the inter-domain security authorization server.

4. The access control authority execution verification method based on the dual model according to claim 3 is characterized in that: The processing of the intra-domain binding information and the inter-domain binding information by the security authorization server respectively and sending the processed information to the blockchain network comprises: The intra-domain security authorization server formats, verifies and encrypts the intra-domain binding information to obtain intra-domain ciphertext binding data; the intra-domain security authorization server encapsulates the intra-domain ciphertext binding data into a first blockchain transaction, and sends the first blockchain transaction to the blockchain network through a secure network protocol; The inter-domain security authorization server formats, verifies and encrypts the inter-domain binding information to obtain inter-domain ciphertext binding data; the inter-domain security authorization server encapsulates the inter-domain ciphertext binding data into a second blockchain transaction, and sends the second blockchain transaction to the blockchain network through a secure network protocol.

5. The access control authority execution verification method based on the dual model according to claim 4 is characterized in that: The obtaining of all the intra-domain binding information and the inter-domain binding information from the blockchain network and performing static analysis to obtain a specification model includes: Obtaining, by means of a verification server, a first key of the intra-domain access control policy from the intra-domain security authorization server, downloading a first ciphertext access control policy from the first blockchain transaction in the blockchain network according to the first key, and decrypting the first ciphertext access control policy to obtain a first plaintext access control policy; Obtaining a second key of the inter-domain access control policy from the inter-domain security authorization server through a verification server, downloading a second ciphertext access control policy from the second blockchain transaction in the blockchain network according to the second key, and decrypting the second ciphertext access control policy to obtain a second plaintext access control policy; The first plaintext access control policy and the second plaintext access control policy are modeled and analyzed using a finite state automaton to obtain a standard model.

6. The access control authority execution verification method based on the dual model according to claim 5 is characterized in that: The using of a finite state automaton to model and analyze the first plaintext access control policy and the second plaintext access control policy to obtain a standard model includes: Defining states of the finite state automaton, defining a state for each role and its possible data operation combination, to form a first state set; Identifying an event or operation that triggers a change in the state of the finite state automaton, and defining transitions between states according to the first plaintext access control policy and the second plaintext access control policy to form a first transition condition set; Define a starting state and an ending state; use the first state set as nodes of a graph, use the first transition condition set as edges of the graph, point each transition condition from one state to another, and mark the initial state and the ending state, return a first directed graph of the finite state automaton, and use the first directed graph as the specification model.

7. The access control authority execution verification method based on the dual model according to claim 1 is characterized in that: The obtaining of all operation records of data users from the blockchain network and performing dynamic analysis to obtain an implementation model includes: Obtaining the operation record key from the data container through the verification server, downloading the ciphertext operation record from the blockchain network, and decrypting the ciphertext operation record to obtain the plaintext operation record; The plaintext operation record is modeled and analyzed using a finite state automaton to obtain an implementation model.

8. The access control authority execution verification method based on the dual model according to claim 7 is characterized in that: The method of using a finite state automaton to model and analyze the plaintext operation record to obtain an implementation model includes: Combining each role in the operation record with its actual data operation defines a state to form a second state set; Identifying an event or operation that triggers a change in the state of the finite state automaton, defining transitions between states according to roles in the operation record, and forming a second transition condition set; Define the starting state and the ending state; use the second state set as the nodes of the graph, use the second transition condition set as the edges of the graph, point each transition condition from one state to another, and mark the initial state and the ending state, return the second directed graph of the finite state automaton, and use the second directed graph as the implementation model.

9. The access control authority execution verification method based on the dual model according to claim 1 is characterized in that: The implementation model and the specification model are both directed graphs, and the determining whether the specification model is isomorphic to the implementation model includes: Compare the nodes in the specification model and the implementation model to ensure that each node of the finite state automaton corresponding to the operation record appears in the finite state automaton corresponding to the access control policy, otherwise the specification model and the implementation model are not structurally identical; compare the edges of the specification model and the implementation model to ensure that each edge in the finite state automaton corresponding to the operation record has a corresponding edge in the finite state automaton corresponding to the access control policy, otherwise the specification model and the implementation model are not structurally identical; Initialize an empty mapping M and select an unmatched node n1 in the specification model; Traversing each unmatched node n2 in the implementation model, and checking whether n1 and n2 are compatible; If they are compatible, add n1 and n2 to the mapping M, and execute a recursive algorithm based on the current mapping M to find other node matches; If a complete match is found in any recursive step, then the specification model is isomorphic to the implementation model; If they are incompatible or a complete match cannot be constructed based on the mapping of n1 and n2, remove n1 and n2 from the mapping M and backtrack to the previous step; If each node in the specification model finds a matching node in the implementation model in the mapping M, then the specification model is isomorphic to the implementation model; if no such match can be found, then the specification model is not isomorphic to the implementation model.

10. A dual model-based access control authority execution verification device, characterized in that: The apparatus comprises: a processor and a memory for storing processor-executable instructions; Wherein, the processor is configured to execute the access control authority execution verification method based on the dual model as described in any one of claims 1-9.