A quantum encryption authentication method for smart grid

By adopting a dual-channel quantum encryption authentication method in the smart grid, using Bell-state dual-quantum communication and traditional channels to achieve efficient identity authentication, solving the problems of vulnerability and high cost of traditional methods under high-level attacks. Improves the safety and economics of the power grid system.

CN118555064BActive Publication Date: 2024-11-19STATE GRID ZHEJIANG ELECTRIC POWER CO LTD JINHUA POWER SUPPLY CO +1
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Patent Information

Application Number
CN202410778154.7
Authority / Receiving Office
CN · China
Patent Type
Patents(China)
Current Assignee / Owner
Filing Date
2024-06-17
Publication Date
2024-11-19
Estimated Expiration
2044-06-17

AI Technical Summary

Technical Problem

Traditional encryption authentication methods are fragile when facing high-level malicious attacks, and Bell state quantum communication relies on additional quantum channels in implementation methods to cumbersome security monitoring, which increases the cost of confidential communication.

Method used

The dual-channel method is adopted, where the optical quantum channel is used for key transmission, and the data encryption is used for Bell state dual-quantum method. The traditional channel is used for information transmission. Identity authentication is realized through the shared key matrix and one-way hash function, and only point-to-point communication is required. , avoid third-party authentication.

Benefits of technology

Identity authentication based on quantum information is realized, the security and reliability of the power grid system are improved, the bandwidth requirements of quantum channels are reduced, and the economy is improved.

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Abstract

The present invention provides a smart grid quantum encryption authentication method. Two channels are used, one for a light quantum channel for key transmission and the other for a traditional channel for information transmission. The light quantum channel key transmission uses a Bell state double quantum method for data encryption. The method of the present invention can improve the security and stability of power grid system communication.
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Description

Technical Field

[0001] The present invention relates to the field of information security technology for power distribution networks, and in particular to a quantum encryption authentication method for smart grids. Background Art

[0002] With the popularization and development of energy Internet, the role of smart grid in energy transmission and distribution is becoming increasingly important. However, the resulting network security issues are also becoming increasingly serious. Traditional encryption and authentication methods show certain vulnerabilities when facing high-level malicious attacks. Therefore, developing a secure and efficient encryption and authentication method is of great significance to ensure the stable operation of smart grids.

[0003] At present, the use of Bell state quantum communication can achieve identity authentication without relying on a third party, which has become a current development hotspot. For example, Zhang Shun et al. proposed a method based on a quantum two-way identity authentication protocol in the paper "Quantum two-way identity authentication protocol based on Bell states". However, in terms of implementation, this method also needs to rely on additional quantum for channel security monitoring, which is relatively cumbersome. In addition, the degree of integration with traditional channel encryption communication methods is not high, which increases the cost of confidential communication. Summary of the invention

[0004] The purpose of the present invention is to solve the above-mentioned problems existing in the prior art and provide a smart grid quantum encryption authentication method to improve the security and stability of power grid system communications.

[0005] In order to achieve the above object, the present invention provides a smart grid quantum encryption authentication method, which comprises the following steps:

[0006] The smart grid quantum encryption authentication method uses two channels;

[0007] The two channels are respectively used for an optical quantum channel for key transmission and a traditional channel for information transmission;

[0008] The optical quantum channel key transmission adopts Bell state double quantum method to encrypt data.

[0009] Preferably, the communicating parties share a bit string matrix K in advance AB As the authentication key,

[0010]

[0011] At the same time, they share a one-way hash function H:{0,1} * →{0,1} d , output the hash value of the data string with a length of d, and agree on a data encryption method Me.

[0012] Preferably, step S1: communication node A applies to a quantum key management server for M Bell state double quantum bits

[0013]

[0014] In the formula is the number of two entangled particles in Bell state, M = N / 2, described as

[0015]

[0016] Divide each Bell state into two entangled quanta into two groups, and then decompose the double quantum bit Q into two sequences Q A and Q B ,

[0017]

[0018] The node A retains Q A , Q B Sent to nodes that require authentication.

[0019] Preferably, step S2: transmit the sequence Q B Send to node B, and at the same time, randomly generate a set of data bit strings T = (T1, T2, ..., T L ), L>>N, and sent to the node B using a traditional channel.

[0020] 11. The method according to claim 4, characterized in that the method further comprises:

[0021] Step S3: After receiving the data bit string T, the node B calculates the hash value of the data bit string T after encrypting it with the secret key and adopting the agreed data encryption method Me; the secret key is obtained from the secret key matrix K AB Random selection is done as follows:

[0022] Step S3.1: From Q B The sequence randomly selects X non-repeating Bell state particles, 2 X ≥M, then the position sequence of X quanta is SX={ind1,ind2,…,ind X}, where ind j ∈{1,2,…,M}, j=1,2,…,X;

[0023] Step S3.2: Take measurements if If is an odd number, use B Z The basis for measurement, If it is an even number, use B X The base is measured;

[0024] Step S3.3: Calculate the selected secret key in the secret key matrix K according to the value Va of the measurement result sequence (Va is the value represented by X binary bits, such as 1001, then Va = 9). AB Position ind *

[0025]

[0026] According to the secret key position ind * , determine the secret key ind * ∈{1,2,…,V}, round() function is a four-in-five-into-round function;

[0027] Step S3.4: According to the above secret key and a shared one-way hash function H:{0,1} * →{0,1} d , calculated based on the secret key The hash value of the encryption result of the data bit string T;

[0028] Step S3.5: After the calculation is completed, the obtained hash value and the position sequence of the selected X quanta SX = {ind1, ind2, ..., ind X}Sent to the node A through the traditional channel.

[0029] Preferably, step S4: the node A receives the hash value sent by the node B and the positions of the selected X quanta SX = {ind1, ind2, ..., ind X}, according to the method in step S3, A The X Bell state particles at the corresponding positions in the sequence are measured, and the node A infers the corresponding measurement value Va of the node B based on the measurement result, and selects the corresponding secret key according to the measurement value Va of the node B. The method is the same as step S3, and the hash value of the data bit string T is calculated according to the selected secret key and hash function. If the result is the same as that sent by the node B, it means that the channel of communication between the two parties is secure.

[0030] Preferably, step S5: the node A and the node B select a secret key according to the selected secret key. The quanta of the selected measurement basis and its own sequence are measured, wherein the quanta used for channel security detection in step S3 and step S4 are no longer measured, and the measurement sequence length is MX;

[0031] The node A measures Q′ A , the node B measures Q′ B ;

[0032]

[0033] Preferably, for the Bell state quantum sequence Q′ A and the Q′ B The measurement method is as follows:

[0034] In the selected key If the key sequence Then choose B X The basis is measured; if the secret key sequence Then choose B Z Base measurement.

[0035] Preferably, after measurement, the node A and the node B send the hash value of the measurement result to each other through a traditional channel. If the node A finds that the hash value sent by the node B is the same as the hash value of the measurement result of the node B calculated from the value measured by itself, then the node A considers that the identity authentication of the node B is successful, and the node B operates in the same way. If the hash value of the calculated value is inconsistent with the result sent by the other party, it means that the identity authentication has failed.

[0036] Another aspect of the present invention provides a smart grid quantum encryption authentication system for executing the above method.

[0037] Compared with the prior art, the present invention has the following beneficial effects:

[0038] 1) The present invention utilizes the security of Bell state quantum communication to realize identity authentication based on quantum information, fundamentally solving the problems of key information being monitored and tampered with, and greatly improving the security and reliability of identity authentication in the power grid system.

[0039] 2) In the implementation process of this method, only point-to-point communication is required between the two parties, and no third party authentication is required, which avoids the unreliability of third-party authentication and can realize mutual confirmation of identity authentication between the two parties, thus meeting the identity authentication requirements of key nodes in smart grids;

[0040] 3) Using a combination of quantum channels and traditional channels for confidential communication only requires one quantum channel transmission, and other data are transmitted through traditional channels. This can not only achieve confidential transmission, but also reduce the bandwidth requirements for quantum channels and improve economic efficiency. Therefore, this method is very practical. BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS

[0041] Figure 1 This is a schematic diagram of a smart grid quantum encryption authentication method according to Embodiment 1 of the present invention. DETAILED DESCRIPTION

[0042] The present invention is further described in detail below in conjunction with the accompanying drawings:

[0043] In order to better understand the present invention, the embodiments of the present invention are explained in detail below with reference to the accompanying drawings.

[0044] Embodiment 1 of the present invention provides a smart grid quantum encryption authentication method, as shown in the attached Figure 1 shown.

[0045] The smart grid quantum encryption authentication method in the method of the present invention adopts two channels, an optical quantum channel for key transmission and a traditional channel for information transmission.

[0046] Since the current bandwidth of optical quantum channels is limited and the cost of optical quantum preparation and transmission is high, it is necessary to design methods for optical quantum channel key transmission and bidirectional identity tasks.

[0047] Assume that smart grid node A and node B communicate and need to authenticate the identities of both parties. The method adopted in the present invention is used to better implement the authentication process of the identities of both parties.

[0048] Using quantum encryption authentication, the two communicating parties share a bit string matrix K in advance. AB As an authentication key:

[0049]

[0050] At the same time, they share a one-way hash function H:{0,1} * →{0,1} d , the data string can be output as a hash value with a length of d, and a data encryption method Me is agreed upon.

[0051] The authentication steps are as follows:

[0052] Step S1:

[0053] Communication node A applies to the quantum key control server for M Bell state double quantum bits

[0054]

[0055] In the formula is the number of two entangled particles in Bell state, M = N / 2, which can be described as

[0056]

[0057] Divide each Bell state into two entangled quanta into two groups, and then decompose the double quantum bit Q into two sequences Q A and Q B ,

[0058]

[0059] Communication node A reserves Q A , QB Sent to nodes that require authentication.

[0060] Step S2:

[0061] Through the quantum channel, the sequence Q B Send to node B, and at the same time, randomly generate a set of data bit strings T = (T1, T2, ..., T L ), L>>N, and is sent to node B using a traditional channel. In order to ensure that the bit string has a high complexity, the length L is set to be much larger than N.

[0062] Step S3:

[0063] After receiving the data bit string T, node B calculates the hash value of the data bit string T after encryption using the secret key (using the agreed data encryption method Me). The secret key is obtained from the secret key matrix K AB Random selection is done as follows:

[0064] Step S3.1: From Q B The sequence randomly selects X non-repeating Bell state particles, 2 X ≥M, then the position sequence of X quanta is SX={ind1,ind2,…,ind X}, where ind j ∈{1,2,…,M}, j=1,2,…,X.

[0065] Step S3.2 Take measurements if If is an odd number, use B Z The basis for measurement, If it is an even number, use B X Base measurement.

[0066] Step S3.3 calculates the selected secret key in the secret key matrix K according to the value Va of the measurement result sequence (Va is the value represented by X binary bits, such as the binary bit is 1001, then Va = 9). AB Position ind *

[0067]

[0068] According to the secret key position ind * , determine the secret key ind * ∈{1,2,…,V}. The round() function is a four-into-five-into integer function.

[0069] Step S3.4: According to the above key and a shared one-way hash function H:{0,1} * →{0,1}d , calculated based on the secret key The hash value of the data bit string T encrypted (after encryption method Me).

[0070] After step S3.5 is calculated, the obtained hash value and the position sequence of the selected X quanta SX = {ind1, ind2, ..., ind X} is sent to A through the traditional channel.

[0071] Step S4:

[0072] Node A receives the hash value sent by B and the position of the selected X quanta SX = {ind1, ind2, ..., ind X}, follow the method in step 3 to A The X Bell state particles at the corresponding positions in the sequence are measured, and node A infers the corresponding measurement value Va of node B based on the measurement results. Then, the corresponding secret key is selected based on B's measurement value Va. The method is the same as step three. Then, the hash value of the data bit string T is calculated based on the selected secret key and hash function. If the result is the same as that sent by node B, it means that the communication channel between the two parties is secure.

[0073] Step S5:

[0074] Node A and Node B select the secret key The quanta of the selected measurement basis are measured, and the quanta used for channel security detection in steps 3 and 4 are no longer measured. The length of the measurement sequence is MX. Node A measures Q′ A , Node B measures Q′ B .

[0075]

[0076] For the Bell state quantum sequence Q′ A and Q′ B The measurement method is as follows:

[0077] In the selected key If the key sequence Then choose B X The basis is measured; if the secret key sequence Then choose B Z Base measurement.

[0078] Here, to select different measurement bases, it is only necessary to select nodes A and B according to the same rule. The above method is only a feasible solution and can be extended to various forms.

[0079] After the measurement, nodes A and B send the hash value of the measurement result to each other through the traditional channel. If node A finds that the hash value sent by node B is the same as the hash value of the measurement result of node B calculated by its own measurement, node A believes that the identity authentication of node B has passed, and node B operates in the same way. If the hash value of the calculated value is inconsistent with the result sent by the other party, it means that the identity authentication has failed.

[0080] In the description of the present invention, it should be noted that, unless otherwise clearly specified and limited, the terms "connected" and "connection" should be understood in a broad sense, for example, it can be a fixed connection, a detachable connection, or an integral connection; it can be a mechanical connection or an electrical connection; it can be a direct connection or an indirect connection through an intermediate medium. For ordinary technicians in this field, the specific meanings of the above terms in the present invention can be understood according to specific circumstances.

[0081] In the description of the present invention, unless otherwise specified, the terms "upper", "lower", "left", "right", "inside", "outside", etc. indicate directions or positional relationships based on the directions or positional relationships shown in the accompanying drawings. They are only for the convenience of describing the present invention and simplifying the description, and do not indicate or imply that the device or element referred to must have a specific direction, be constructed and operated in a specific direction. Therefore, they cannot be understood as limitations on the present invention.

[0082] Finally, it should be explained that the above technical solution is only one implementation method of the present invention. For those skilled in the art, it is easy to make various types of improvements or modifications based on the application methods and principles disclosed in the present invention, and it is not limited to the method described in the above specific implementation method of the present invention. Therefore, the method described above is only preferred and does not have a restrictive meaning.

Claims

1. A smart grid quantum encryption authentication method, characterized in that: The smart grid quantum encryption authentication method uses two channels; The two channels are respectively used for an optical quantum channel for key transmission and a traditional channel for information transmission; The optical quantum channel key transmission adopts Bell state double quantum method to encrypt data; The smart grid quantum encryption authentication method specifically includes the following steps: the communicating parties share a bit string matrix K in advance. AB As the authentication key, At the same time, they share a one-way hash function H:{0,1} * →{0,1} d , output the hash value of the data string with a length of d, and agree on a data encryption method M; Step S1: Communication node A applies to the quantum key management server for M Bell state double quantum bits In the formula is the number of two entangled particles in Bell state, M = N / 2, described as Divide each Bell state into two entangled quanta into two groups, and then decompose the double quantum bit Q into two sequences Q A and Q B , Node A retains Q A , Q B Sent to nodes that require authentication; Step S2: Transmit the sequence Q through the quantum channel B Send to node B, and at the same time, randomly generate a set of data bit strings T = (T1, T2, ..., T L ), L>>N, using a traditional channel, and sending to the node B; Step S3: After receiving the data bit string T, the node B calculates the hash value of the data bit string T after encrypting it with the secret key and adopting the agreed data encryption method Me; the secret key is obtained from the secret key matrix K AB Random selection is done as follows: Step S3.1: From Q B The sequence randomly selects X non-repeating Bell state particles, 2 X ≥M, then the position sequence of X quanta is SX={ind1,ind2,…,ind X }, where ind j ∈{1,2,…,M}, j=1,2,…,X; Step S3.2: Take measurements if If is an odd number, use B Z The basis for measurement, If it is an even number, use B X The base is measured; Step S3.3: Calculate the selected secret key in the secret key matrix K according to the value Va of the measurement result sequence AB Position ind * According to the secret key position ind * , determine the secret key is The round() function is a four-in-five integer function; Step S3.4: According to the above secret key and a shared one-way hash function H:{0,1} * →{0,1} d , calculated based on the secret key The hash value of the encryption result of the data bit string T; Step S3.5: After the calculation is completed, the obtained hash value and the position sequence of the selected X quanta SX = {ind1, ind2, ..., ind X }Sent to the node A via a traditional channel; Step S4: Node A receives the hash value sent by node B and the positions of the selected X quanta SX = {ind1, ind2, ..., ind X }, according to the method in step S3, Q A X Bell state particles at corresponding positions in the sequence are measured, and the node A infers the corresponding measurement value Va of the node B according to the measurement result, and selects the corresponding secret key according to the measurement value Va of the node B, in the same way as step S3, and calculates the hash value of the data bit string T according to the selected secret key and hash function. If the result obtained is the same as that sent by the node B, it means that the communication channel between the two parties is secure; Step S5: The node A and the node B select the secret key The quanta of the selected measurement basis and its own sequence are measured, wherein the quanta used for channel security detection in step S3 and step S4 are no longer measured, and the measurement sequence length is MX; The node A measures Q′ A , the node B measures Q′ B ; For the Bell state quantum sequence Q′ A and the Q′ B The measurement method is as follows: In the selected key If the key sequence Then choose B X The basis is measured; if the secret key sequence Then choose B Z The base is measured; After the measurement, the node A and the node B send the hash value of the measurement result to each other through the traditional channel. If the node A finds that the hash value sent by the node B is the same as the hash value of the measurement result of the node B calculated from the value measured by itself, then the node A believes that the identity authentication of the node B has passed, and the node B operates in the same way; if the hash value of the calculated value is inconsistent with the result sent by the other party, it means that the identity authentication has failed.

2. A smart grid quantum encryption authentication system, characterized in that Used to perform the method according to claim 1.