A secure communication verification method and system for the Internet of Things
Through the combination of decentralized distributed trust map and dynamic token pool, the problems of equipment quantity diversity and dynamic threat response in the Internet of Things environment are solved, efficient communication security checksum protection is achieved, adapting to complex network environments, and ensuring that Continuity of communication security.
Patent Information
- Application Number
- CN202411019386.0
- Authority / Receiving Office
- CN · China
- Patent Type
- Patents(China)
- Current Assignee / Owner
- Filing Date
- 2024-07-26
- Publication Date
- 2024-11-26
- Estimated Expiration
- 2044-07-26
AI Technical Summary
The prior art is difficult to cope with the flexibility and expansion requirements of large-scale devices and diverse device types in the Internet of Things environment, lacks the ability to respond instantly to dynamic security threats, and the static configuration cannot adapt to complex network environments.
By configuring a decentralized distributed trust map, built-in interactive verification strategy and trust evaluation model, combining dynamic token pools and encryption algorithms, the secure communication verification between devices and servers is realized, and token attributes are adjusted in real time through the exception monitoring model to deal with it. abnormal.
It significantly improves the communication security between IoT devices and servers, enhances the scalability of the system and adaptability to complex network environments, realizes immediate response and dynamic protection, and ensures the sustainability of communication security.
Smart Images

Figure CN118748619B_ABST
Abstract
Description
Technical Field
[0001] The present invention belongs to the field of communication security technology, and in particular relates to a security communication verification method and system for the Internet of Things. Background Art
[0002] With the rapid development of Internet of Things technology, the connection between devices is becoming increasingly close, information exchange is frequent, and communication security has become a crucial link in the Internet of Things system. Although the existing security communication verification methods have made certain progress, for example, CN111262686A discloses a security communication verification method based on RSSP-I, which generates pseudo-random values through primitive polynomials and Galois linear feedback shift algorithm to strengthen security verification, and CN104038490A proposes a set of two-way authentication mechanisms between clients and servers, using Token for identity authentication. These technologies have improved the security of communication to a certain extent. However, in practical applications, these solutions still face several challenges and shortcomings, especially the challenges of communication security in the Internet of Things environment. The limitations of device scale, resource constraints, dynamic threat response and static configuration, and the complexity and diversity of network environment all put forward higher requirements for secure communication.
[0003] The above existing technologies have the following problems: 1) Although the Token verification mechanism realizes two-way authentication, in the IoT scenario, the number of devices is huge and the types are diverse. A single Token verification mechanism may be difficult to cope with the flexibility and expansion requirements under large-scale deployment; 2) Most of the existing technologies focus on static security configuration and one-time verification, and lack the ability to respond immediately to dynamic security threats during the communication process; In order to solve the above problems, the present invention provides a secure communication verification method and system for the IoT. Summary of the invention
[0004] In view of the shortcomings of the prior art, the present invention proposes a method and system for secure communication verification for the Internet of Things. The method realizes secure communication verification between devices and servers by configuring a decentralized distributed trust graph, building in an interactive verification strategy and a trust assessment model, and combining a dynamic token pool and a secure channel. When a device initiates a verification request, interactive verification and trust assessment are performed through the trust graph to generate a corresponding dynamic token, and communication security is confirmed through a dual authentication strategy. At the same time, the verification interaction process is monitored in real time through a configured anomaly monitoring model. Once an anomaly is found, the token attributes are immediately adjusted through an encryption algorithm to ensure communication security. The present invention effectively improves the communication security between IoT devices and servers.
[0005] To achieve the above object, the present invention provides the following technical solutions:
[0006] A secure communication verification method for the Internet of Things, comprising the steps of:
[0007] S1. Configure a decentralized distributed trust graph in the server, embed interactive verification strategies and trust assessment models in the trust graph, configure a dynamic token pool, and embed encryption algorithms and secure channels in the dynamic token pool;
[0008] S2. When the device initiates a first verification request, the server uses the interactive verification strategy and trust evaluation model in the distributed trust graph to interactively verify the first verification request information and the node information in the graph according to the obtained first verification request information, and performs trust evaluation on the first verification request information to obtain a trust evaluation score;
[0009] S3, input the obtained trust assessment score into the dynamic token pool, generate a first token corresponding to the first verification request through an encryption algorithm, and feed back the first token to the device corresponding to the verification request through the established secure channel;
[0010] S4. The device confirms the communication security between the device requesting verification and the server through a dual authentication strategy based on the first token and device attributes fed back;
[0011] S5. Configuring an abnormality monitoring model in the server to monitor the verification interaction process between the device and the server in real time. When an abnormality occurs in the verification, the abnormal result is fed back to the dynamic token pool, and the first token attribute is adjusted in real time through an encryption algorithm.
[0012] The decentralized distributed trust graph includes super nodes, verification nodes and basic nodes; the super nodes are used to coordinate the communication transmission between each verification node and the basic nodes through the P2P network protocol; the verification nodes are used to verify the authenticity of the newly added basic nodes according to the basic node identity ID and attribute information, and calculate the trust score between the basic nodes through the trust evaluation model; the basic nodes are used to build the trust graph and save the identity ID and attribute information of each basic node; the basic nodes include devices and servers;
[0013] The specific steps for building a decentralized distributed trust graph include:
[0014] S101. Use super nodes, verification nodes and basic nodes to build a decentralized distributed trust graph architecture through graph database algorithms;
[0015] S102, obtaining trust scores between the basic nodes through the verification node according to the collected historical interaction record data between the basic nodes, and setting corresponding trust relationships using the obtained trust scores;
[0016] S103, using the obtained trust relationship and the interaction mode between each basic node as the edge attribute between each basic node in the distributed trust graph, to obtain a decentralized distributed trust graph; the interaction mode includes direct interaction and indirect interaction between basic nodes; the trust relationship includes high trust, medium trust and low trust;
[0017] S104. Capture the interaction data between each basic node regularly or in real time, and update the distributed trust graph through the built-in verification node and update mechanism;
[0018] The specific steps of obtaining the trust score and the corresponding trust relationship in S102 include:
[0019] S1021. Obtain historical interaction data between each entity node from the decentralized distributed trust graph, and preprocess the acquired historical interaction data; the historical interaction data includes: communication time, interaction frequency, data transmission volume, operation type, response time, and number of operation successes or failures;
[0020] S1022. Analyze the historical interaction data by a principal component analysis algorithm to obtain historical interaction data whose cumulative contribution rate to the trust score exceeds 0.8; the historical interaction data variables include interaction frequency, success rate ratio, and response time;
[0021] S1023. Construct a trust assessment model through a graph theory algorithm, train the trust assessment model using the acquired historical interaction data with a cumulative contribution rate exceeding 0.8, and deploy the trained trust assessment model to the verification node;
[0022] S1024, real-time acquisition of interaction data between each basic node and the newly added basic node in the distributed trust graph, and the trust score f between each two basic nodes through the verification node ij , where f ij represents the trust score between basic node i and basic node j;
[0023] S1024, setting trust classification thresholds θ1 and θ2, when f ij ≤θ1 is a low trust relationship. When θ1<f ij ≤θ2 is a medium trust relationship. ij When >θ2, it is a high trust relationship.
[0024] Specifically, the specific steps of S3 include:
[0025] S301, combining the acquired trust score, trust relationship and first verification request into a message data string, and using the message data string and a secret key generated by the server to calculate a hash message authentication code corresponding to the message data string through an HMAC-SHA256 algorithm;
[0026] S302: Encapsulate the obtained hash message authentication code, expiration timestamp, and trust score into a token, and place a feedback condition in the generated token according to the trust score. ij ≤θ2 or f ij >θ2 feedback condition, sending the first token to the device corresponding to the first verification request through the established secure channel;
[0027] S303, when f is satisfied ij ≤θ1 feedback condition, a request error message is sent to the device corresponding to the first verification request.
[0028] Specifically, the specific implementation steps of the two-factor authentication strategy in S4 include:
[0029] S401. When the condition in S302 is met and the device receives the first token fed back, the device decodes the first token using the shared key stored in the attribute information of the basic node, and verifies the expiration timestamp contained in the decoded first token, so that the timestamp in the token is contained in the time tolerance interval set by the basic node; the time tolerance interval is specifically: [T c , T c +T w ], where T c Indicates the current time point obtained by the device, T w Indicates the length of the tolerance time radius;
[0030] S401. When the S401 verification process is met, a secondary verification is performed. The specific process includes:
[0031] S4011. By sending the unique identification information of the first verification request device, a unique standard hash value is generated through a hash function, and the obtained unique standard hash value is matched with the corresponding hash value in the decoded token. If the match is successful, the secondary verification is passed. If the match fails, the device refuses to execute the request and triggers an alarm or a re-verification process.
[0032] Specifically, the specific steps of adjusting the first token attribute in real time in S5 include:
[0033] S501. Collect historical normal interaction verification and network behavior data, and use the collected data to train the abnormal monitoring model constructed by the random forest algorithm, obtain the trained abnormal monitoring model, and establish normal communication and interaction verification as a baseline;
[0034] S502, collecting the interaction data between the device and the server in real time, monitoring the network traffic and protocol behavior data at the same time, inputting the acquired interaction data and traffic and behavior data into the anomaly monitoring model for anomaly analysis, and when the analysis result deviates from the baseline, feeding back the analysis result to the dynamic token pool;
[0035] S503. The dynamic token pool adjusts the expiration timestamp in the corresponding generated token through an encryption algorithm so that the adjusted timestamp is not included in the time tolerance interval in S401, and at the same time, feedbacks and warns of abnormal results.
[0036] A secure communication verification system for the Internet of Things, comprising: a trust graph module, a token pool management module, and a dual authentication module; the trust graph module comprises a trust graph construction unit and a trust graph update unit; the trust graph construction unit is used to construct a distributed trust graph architecture using a graph database, a super node, a verification node, and a basic node, and obtain edge attributes of the trust graph through interactive verification data between the verification node and the basic node to obtain a decentralized distributed trust graph.
[0037] Specifically, the token pool management module includes a token generation unit, a token transmission unit and a token adjustment unit; the token generation unit is used to generate a first token containing an expiration timestamp and feedback conditions based on the trust assessment score in combination with encryption algorithms such as HMAC-SHA256; the token transmission unit is used to transmit the generated first token to the corresponding device through an established secure channel; the token adjustment unit is used to receive feedback from the anomaly monitoring model and dynamically adjust the validity period or authority of the token.
[0038] Compared with the prior art, the present invention has the following beneficial effects:
[0039] 1. Aiming at the deficiencies of the prior art, the present invention constructs a decentralized distributed trust graph, which can flexibly adapt to the huge number and type diversity of devices in the IoT environment. Each node in the graph adaptively adjusts the trust relationship according to its dynamic interaction history and trust evaluation model. This dynamicity significantly enhances the scalability of the system and its adaptability to complex network environments. In addition, by deeply mining the interaction history data between nodes and using the trust evaluation model constructed by principal component analysis and graph theory algorithms, accurate quantification and dynamic adjustment of trust relationships are achieved, which not only improves the accuracy of trust evaluation, but also ensures that the trust graph can timely reflect changes in network status and improves the system's response speed to newly added nodes and changes in the behavior of existing nodes.
[0040] 2. Aiming at the deficiencies of the prior art, the present invention realizes the dynamic generation and attribute adjustment of tokens through a dynamic token pool and encryption algorithm, which not only enhances the security of the authentication process, but also enables the system to respond quickly according to real-time interaction data and abnormal monitoring results, dynamically adjust the validity and security strategy of the token, and improve the protection capability in a complex threat environment;
[0041] 3. In view of the deficiencies of the prior art, the present invention combines the anomaly monitoring model of the random forest algorithm, which can not only monitor network interaction and behavior data in real time, but also immediately adjust the token attributes through the dynamic token pool when an anomaly is found, effectively blocking potential attacks or fraudulent behaviors. This instant response mechanism greatly improves the active defense capability of the system and ensures the continuity of communication security. BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS
[0042] Figure 1 This is a flow chart of a secure communication verification method for the Internet of Things according to Embodiment 1 of the present invention;
[0043] Figure 2 This is a logical structure diagram of a secure communication verification method for the Internet of Things in accordance with Embodiment 1 of the present invention;
[0044] Figure 3 This is a module structure diagram of a secure communication verification system for the Internet of Things according to Example 2 of the present invention. DETAILED DESCRIPTION
[0045] Example 1
[0046] See also Figure 1 , an embodiment provided by the present invention: a secure communication verification method for the Internet of Things, specifically comprising:
[0047] S1. Configure a decentralized distributed trust graph in the server, embed interactive verification strategies and trust assessment models in the trust graph, configure a dynamic token pool, and embed encryption algorithms and secure channels in the dynamic token pool;
[0048] Furthermore, in this embodiment, the decentralized distributed trust graph includes super nodes, verification nodes and basic nodes; the super nodes are used to coordinate the communication transmission between the verification nodes and the basic nodes through the P2P network protocol; further, the specific workflow of the super nodes in this embodiment is:
[0049] 1) The super node first initializes the P2P network to ensure that all participating nodes can discover and connect with each other, and tracks online verification nodes and basic nodes through the dynamic node list built by the P2P network;
[0050] 2) When there are new verification requests, trust assessment results or abnormal monitoring alarms that need to be disseminated, the super node broadcasts the corresponding information to the corresponding verification nodes and basic nodes through the dynamic node list and Kademlia routing algorithm;
[0051] The verification node is used to verify the authenticity of the newly added basic node based on the basic node identity ID and attribute information, and calculate the trust score between the basic nodes through the trust evaluation model; further, in this embodiment, when a new basic node attempts to join the graph, the verification node receives the identity ID and attribute information of the node, and verifies its authenticity through a pre-set public key infrastructure PKI verification;
[0052] Basic nodes are used to build the trust graph and store the identity ID and attribute information of each basic node; basic nodes include devices and servers.
[0053] Furthermore, the specific steps of constructing a decentralized distributed trust graph in this embodiment include:
[0054] S101. Use super nodes, verification nodes and basic nodes to build a decentralized distributed trust graph architecture through graph database algorithms;
[0055] S102: Obtain the trust scores between the basic nodes through the verification node according to the collected historical interaction record data between the basic nodes, and set the corresponding trust relationship using the obtained trust score; further, the specific steps of obtaining the trust score and the corresponding trust relationship in this embodiment include:
[0056] S1021. Obtain historical interaction data between each entity node from the decentralized distributed trust graph, and preprocess the acquired historical interaction data; the historical interaction data includes: communication time, interaction frequency, data transmission volume, operation type, response time, and number of successful or failed operations;
[0057] S1022. Analyze the historical interaction data by a principal component analysis algorithm to obtain historical interaction data whose cumulative contribution rate to the trust score exceeds 0.8; the historical interaction data variables include interaction frequency, success rate ratio, and response time;
[0058] S1023. Construct a trust assessment model through a graph theory algorithm, train the trust assessment model using the acquired historical interaction data with a cumulative contribution rate exceeding 0.8, and deploy the trained trust assessment model to the verification node;
[0059] S1024, real-time acquisition of interaction data between each basic node and the newly added basic node in the distributed trust graph, and the trust score f between each two basic nodes through the verification node ij , where fij represents the trust score between basic node i and basic node j;
[0060] S1024, setting trust classification thresholds θ1 and θ2, when f ij ≤θ1 is a low trust relationship. When θ1<f ij ≤θ2 is a medium trust relationship. ij >θ2 is a high trust relationship. In this embodiment, the trust classification threshold is set by those skilled in the art according to actual security requirements;
[0061] S103, using the obtained trust relationship and the interaction mode between each basic node as the edge attribute between each basic node in the distributed trust graph, to obtain a decentralized distributed trust graph; the interaction mode includes direct interaction and indirect interaction between basic nodes; the trust relationship includes high trust, medium trust and low trust; further, in this embodiment, the trust relationship is set to be a high trust relationship between two basic nodes for direct interaction, and the trust relationship is set to be a low trust relationship or a medium trust relationship between two basic nodes for indirect interaction;
[0062] S104, periodically or in real time, capture the interaction data between each basic node, and update the distributed trust graph through the built-in verification node and update mechanism. The update mechanism in this embodiment is that when a new basic node joins the distributed trust graph or each basic node in the distributed trust graph has a verification interaction, the edge attribute relationship between each basic node is updated.
[0063] This process realizes the dynamic quantification and management of trust relationships through the collaborative work of super nodes, verification nodes and basic nodes, combined with graph database algorithms. Preprocessing and principal component analysis refine key historical interaction indicators to ensure the accuracy and robustness of trust scores. The trust assessment model constructed through graph theory algorithms can not only evaluate and classify the trust levels between basic nodes in real time, but also optimize the utilization of network resources and the security of information transmission through flexible interaction strategy configuration (direct and indirect interaction). The introduction of the update mechanism enables the graph to adapt to changes in network topology, promptly reflect the addition of new nodes or changes in the trust status of existing nodes, and maintain the timeliness and reliability of the graph.
[0064] S2. When the device initiates a first verification request, the server uses the interactive verification strategy and trust evaluation model in the distributed trust graph to interactively verify the first verification request information and the node information in the graph according to the obtained first verification request information, and performs trust evaluation on the first verification request information to obtain a trust evaluation score;
[0065] S3, input the obtained trust assessment score into the dynamic token pool, generate a first token corresponding to the first verification request through an encryption algorithm, and feed back the first token to the device corresponding to the verification request through the established secure channel; further, in this embodiment, the specific steps of S3 include:
[0066] S301, combining the acquired trust score, trust relationship and first verification request into a message data string, and using the message data string and the secret key generated by the server to calculate the hash message authentication code corresponding to the message data string through the HMAC-SHA256 algorithm; the first verification request includes a request ID, a user identifier and a device shared key;
[0067] S302: Encapsulate the obtained hash message authentication code, expiration timestamp, and trust score into a token, and place a feedback condition in the generated token according to the trust score. ij ≤θ2 or f ij >θ2 feedback condition, the first token is sent to the device corresponding to the first verification request through the established secure channel; in this embodiment, the secure channel is implemented by a TLS / SSL encrypted connection;
[0068] S303, when f is satisfied ij ≤θ1 feedback condition, a request error message is sent to the device corresponding to the first verification request.
[0069] The generation of a dynamic token in this step ensures that only authorized devices can decrypt and verify the token, thereby enhancing communication security, and the token includes a trust assessment score, so that the receiving end can understand the trustworthiness of the sending end. In addition, the token also includes an expiration timestamp to ensure that the token is only valid for a limited time to prevent replay attacks. Furthermore, this embodiment sets feedback conditions through trust scores in the constructed token, so that the system can make specific feedback judgments based on the feedback conditions in the token and the trust scores obtained by real-time evaluation, and send request error messages based on the judgment results to notify problems in a timely manner, which enables the entire security system to maintain a high degree of security while also having certain intelligent decision-making capabilities.
[0070] S4. The device confirms the communication security between the device requesting verification and the server through the dual authentication strategy according to the first token and device attributes fed back. Furthermore, the specific implementation steps of the dual authentication strategy in this embodiment include:
[0071] S401. When the condition of S302 is met and the device receives the first token fed back, the device decodes the first token using the shared key stored in the attribute information of the basic node, and verifies the expiration timestamp contained in the decoded first token, so that the timestamp in the token is contained in the time tolerance interval set by the basic node; the time tolerance interval is specifically: [T c , T c +T w ], where T c Indicates the current time point obtained by the device, T w Indicates the length of the tolerance time radius;
[0072] S402: When the verification process of S401 is met, a secondary verification is performed. The specific process includes:
[0073] S4021. By sending the unique identification information of the first verification request device, a unique standard hash value is generated through a hash function, and the obtained unique standard hash value is matched with the corresponding hash value in the decoded token. If the match is successful, the secondary verification is passed. If the match fails, the device refuses to execute the request and triggers an alarm or a re-verification process.
[0074] This process uses the device's unique identification information combined with a shared key for dual authentication, ensuring that only legitimate devices can pass authentication, greatly reducing the risk of identity impersonation. Secondly, the introduction of time tolerance interval verification ensures the timeliness of the token and prevents replay attacks. Even if an attacker intercepts the token, the attacker cannot use the token at any time in the future because the token has an expiration time. In addition, if any mismatch or abnormality is found during the verification process, the device will immediately refuse to execute the request and trigger an alarm or re-verification process. This immediate response helps to quickly identify and deal with potential security threats.
[0075] S5. Configure an abnormality monitoring model in the server to monitor the verification interaction process between the device and the server in real time. When an abnormality occurs in the verification, the abnormal result is fed back to the dynamic token pool, and the first token attribute is adjusted in real time through the encryption algorithm. Furthermore, the specific steps of adjusting the first token attribute in real time in this embodiment include:
[0076] S501. Collect historical normal interaction verification and network behavior data, and use the collected data to train the abnormal monitoring model constructed by the random forest algorithm, obtain the trained abnormal monitoring model, and establish normal communication and interaction verification as the baseline; in this embodiment, the normal interaction verification data includes but is not limited to request frequency, response time, data packet integrity, and specific behavior patterns; network behavior data includes repeated requests and non-standard protocol operations in a short period of time; the baseline includes normal communication mode, interaction verification characteristics, network traffic characteristics, and user behavior patterns;
[0077] S502, collecting the interaction data between the device and the server in real time, monitoring the network traffic and protocol behavior data at the same time, inputting the acquired interaction data and traffic and behavior data into the anomaly monitoring model for anomaly analysis, and when the analysis result deviates from the baseline, feeding the analysis result back to the dynamic token pool;
[0078] S503. The dynamic token pool adjusts the expiration timestamp in the corresponding generated token through an encryption algorithm so that the adjusted timestamp is not included in the time tolerance interval in S401, and at the same time, feedbacks and warns of abnormal results.
[0079] Example 2
[0080] Please refer to the figure, another embodiment provided by the present invention: a secure communication verification system for the Internet of Things, comprising: a trust graph module, a token pool management module, a dual authentication module and an abnormality monitoring module;
[0081] A trust graph module is used for building and updating the trust graph; the trust graph module includes a trust graph building unit and a trust graph updating unit; the trust graph building unit is used to build a distributed trust graph architecture using a graph database, super nodes, verification nodes, and basic nodes, and obtain edge attributes of the trust graph through interactive verification data between verification nodes and basic nodes to obtain a decentralized distributed trust graph; further, the edge attributes in this embodiment include trust relationships and interaction methods; the trust graph updating unit is used to update the trust graph regularly or in real time, including the addition of new nodes and the adjustment of edge attributes;
[0082] The token pool management module is used to generate a corresponding first token according to the trust relationship and trust score obtained by the trust graph module, and adjust the first token in real time; the token pool management module includes a token generation unit, a token transmission unit and a token adjustment unit; the token generation unit is used to generate a first token containing an expiration timestamp and a feedback condition according to the trust evaluation score in combination with encryption algorithms such as HMAC-SHA256; the token transmission unit is used to transmit the generated first token to the corresponding device through the established secure channel; the token adjustment unit is used to receive feedback from the anomaly monitoring model and dynamically adjust the validity period or authority of the token to respond to security threats;
[0083] A dual authentication module is used to perform dual authentication on the device side according to the first token obtained to ensure communication security; the dual authentication module includes a time tolerance interval checking unit and an identity authentication unit; the time tolerance interval checking unit is used to verify whether the valid timestamp of the token is within the time tolerance interval allowed by the device, and if so, the first layer of verification is passed; if not, the execution request is directly rejected to enhance time sensitivity; the identity authentication unit is used to match the hash value in the token with the hash value generated by the device, and determine whether the hash values match and are equal, if they are equal, the secondary verification is passed, if not, the device refuses to execute the request and triggers an alarm or a re-verification process;
[0084] The anomaly monitoring module is used to monitor the verification interaction process between the device and the server in real time, detect anomalies and adjust token attributes; the anomaly monitoring module includes an interaction monitoring unit and a monitoring feedback unit; the interaction monitoring unit is used to collect interaction and network behavior data in real time; the monitoring feedback unit is used to use the trained anomaly monitoring model to compare real-time data with the baseline, identify abnormal behavior, and feed back the identified abnormal behavior to the token adjustment unit, while issuing early warnings for the acquired anomalies.
[0085] The embodiments of the present invention are described above in conjunction with the accompanying drawings, but the present invention is not limited to the above-mentioned specific implementation modes, which are merely illustrative rather than restrictive. Under the guidance of the present invention, ordinary technicians in the field may also change, modify, replace and modify the above-mentioned embodiments without departing from the scope of protection of the purpose of the present invention and the claims, and all of these are within the protection of the present invention.
Claims
1. A secure communication verification method for the Internet of Things, characterized in that the steps include: S1. Configure a decentralized distributed trust graph in the server, embed interactive verification strategies and trust assessment models in the trust graph, configure a dynamic token pool, and embed encryption algorithms and secure channels in the dynamic token pool; S2. When the device initiates a first verification request, the server uses the interactive verification strategy and trust evaluation model in the distributed trust graph to interactively verify the first verification request information and the node information in the graph according to the obtained first verification request information, and performs trust evaluation on the first verification request information to obtain a trust evaluation score; S3, input the obtained trust assessment score into the dynamic token pool, generate a first token corresponding to the first verification request through an encryption algorithm, and feed back the first token to the device corresponding to the verification request through the established secure channel; S4. The device confirms the communication security between the device requesting verification and the server through a dual authentication strategy according to the fed-back first token and device attributes; S5. Configuring an abnormality monitoring model in the server to monitor the verification interaction process between the device and the server in real time. When an abnormality occurs in the verification, the abnormal result is fed back to the dynamic token pool, and the first token attribute is adjusted in real time through an encryption algorithm. The decentralized distributed trust graph includes super nodes, verification nodes and basic nodes; the super nodes are used to coordinate the communication transmission between the verification nodes and the basic nodes through the P2P network protocol; the verification nodes are used to verify the authenticity of the newly added basic nodes according to the basic node identity ID and attribute information, and calculate the trust scores between the basic nodes through the trust evaluation model; The basic nodes are used to build a trust graph and store the identity ID and attribute information of each basic node; The basic nodes include devices and servers; The specific steps of constructing the decentralized distributed trust graph include: S101. Use super nodes, verification nodes and basic nodes to build a decentralized distributed trust graph architecture through graph database algorithms; S102, obtaining trust scores between the basic nodes through the verification node according to the collected historical interaction record data between the basic nodes, and setting corresponding trust relationships using the obtained trust scores; S103, using the obtained trust relationship and the interaction mode between each basic node as the edge attribute between each basic node in the distributed trust graph, to obtain a decentralized distributed trust graph; the interaction mode includes direct interaction and indirect interaction between basic nodes; the trust relationship includes high trust, medium trust and low trust; S104. Capture the interaction data between each basic node regularly or in real time, and update the distributed trust graph through the built-in verification node and update mechanism; The specific steps of obtaining the trust score and the corresponding trust relationship in S102 include: S1021. Obtain historical interaction data between each entity node from the decentralized distributed trust graph, and preprocess the acquired historical interaction data; the historical interaction data includes: communication time, interaction frequency, data transmission volume, operation type, response time, and number of operation successes or failures; S1022. Analyze the historical interaction data by a principal component analysis algorithm to obtain historical interaction data whose cumulative contribution rate to the trust score exceeds 0.8; the historical interaction data variables include interaction frequency, success rate ratio, and response time; S1023. Construct a trust assessment model through a graph theory algorithm, train the trust assessment model using the acquired historical interaction data with a cumulative contribution rate exceeding 0.8, and deploy the trained trust assessment model to the verification node; S1024, real-time acquisition of interaction data between each basic node and the newly added basic node in the distributed trust graph, and the trust score f between each two basic nodes through the verification node ij , where f ij represents the trust score between basic node i and basic node j; S1024, setting trust classification thresholds θ1 and θ2, when f ij ≤θ1 is a low trust relationship. When θ1<f ij ≤θ2 is a medium trust relationship. ij When >θ2, it is a high trust relationship.
2. A secure communication verification method for the Internet of Things as claimed in claim 1, characterized in that: The specific steps of S3 include: S301, combining the acquired trust score, trust relationship and first verification request into a message data string, and using the message data string and a secret key generated by the server to calculate a hash message authentication code corresponding to the message data string through an HMAC-SHA256 algorithm; S302: Encapsulate the obtained hash message authentication code, expiration timestamp, and trust score into a token, and place a feedback condition in the generated token according to the trust score. ij ≤θ2 or f ij >θ2 feedback condition, sending the first token to the device corresponding to the first verification request through the established secure channel; S303, when f is satisfied ij ≤θ1 feedback condition, a request error message is sent to the device corresponding to the first verification request.
3. A secure communication verification method for the Internet of Things as claimed in claim 2, characterized in that: The specific implementation steps of the dual authentication strategy in S4 include: S401. When the condition in S302 is met and the device receives the first token fed back, the device decodes the first token using the shared key stored in the attribute information of the basic node, and verifies the expiration timestamp contained in the decoded first token, so that the timestamp in the token is contained in the time tolerance interval set by the basic node; the time tolerance interval is specifically: [T c , T c +T w ], where T c Indicates the current time point obtained by the device, T w Indicates the length of the tolerance time radius; S401. When the S401 verification process is met, a secondary verification is performed. The specific process includes: S4011. By sending the unique identification information of the first verification request device, a unique standard hash value is generated through a hash function, and the obtained unique standard hash value is matched with the corresponding hash value in the decoded token. If the match is successful, the secondary verification is passed. If the match fails, the device refuses to execute the request and triggers an alarm or a re-verification process.
4. A secure communication verification method for the Internet of Things as claimed in claim 3, characterized in that: The specific steps of adjusting the first token attribute in real time in S5 include: S501. Collect historical normal interaction verification and network behavior data, and use the collected data to train the abnormal monitoring model constructed by the random forest algorithm, obtain the trained abnormal monitoring model, and establish normal communication and interaction verification as a baseline; S502, collecting the interaction data between the device and the server in real time, monitoring the network traffic and protocol behavior data at the same time, inputting the acquired interaction data and traffic and behavior data into the anomaly monitoring model for anomaly analysis, and when the analysis result deviates from the baseline, feeding back the analysis result to the dynamic token pool; S503. The dynamic token pool adjusts the expiration timestamp in the corresponding generated token through an encryption algorithm so that the adjusted timestamp is not included in the time tolerance interval in S401, and at the same time, feedbacks and warns of abnormal results.
5. A secure communication verification system for the Internet of Things, which is implemented based on a secure communication verification method for the Internet of Things according to any one of claims 1 to 4, characterized in that: include: Trust graph module, token pool management module, dual authentication module; The trust graph module includes a trust graph construction unit and a trust graph update unit; The trust graph construction unit is used to construct a distributed trust graph architecture using a graph database, super nodes, verification nodes and basic nodes, and obtain edge attributes of the trust graph through interactive verification data between the verification nodes and the basic nodes to obtain a decentralized distributed trust graph.
6. A secure communication verification system for the Internet of Things as claimed in claim 5, characterized in that: The token pool management module includes a token generation unit, a token transmission unit and a token adjustment unit; the token generation unit is used to generate a first token containing an expiration timestamp and a feedback condition according to the trust evaluation score in combination with an encryption algorithm such as HMAC-SHA256; The token transmission unit is used to transmit the generated first token to the corresponding device through the established secure channel; The token adjustment unit is used to receive feedback from the abnormal monitoring model and dynamically adjust the validity period or authority of the token; The dual authentication module includes a time tolerance interval checking unit and an identity authentication unit; the time tolerance interval checking unit is used to verify whether the valid timestamp of the token is within the time tolerance interval allowed by the device. If so, the first layer of verification is passed; if not, the execution request is directly rejected; the identity authentication unit is used to match the hash value in the token with the hash value generated by the device, and determine whether the hash values match and are equal. If they are equal, the secondary verification is passed; if they are not equal, the device rejects the execution request and triggers an alarm or a re-verification process.
7. A computer-readable storage medium, characterized in that: Computer instructions are stored thereon, and when the computer instructions are executed, a secure communication verification method for the Internet of Things as described in any one of claims 1 to 4 is executed.
