Dynamic credibility evaluation method for systematic confrontation simulation system
By comprehensively measuring uncertainty and building hypernetwork structures on the nodes of the system-adversarial simulation system, dynamic credibility is solved, and the problem that the existing technology cannot dynamically evaluate the credibility of the system-adversarial simulation system is realized, and trustworthiness is achieved dynamic measurement and analytical improvements in degree.
Patent Information
- Application Number
- CN202411090795.X
- Authority / Receiving Office
- CN · China
- Patent Type
- Applications(China)
- Current Assignee / Owner
- Filing Date
- 2024-08-09
- Publication Date
- 2024-11-12
AI Technical Summary
The existing credibility evaluation method for system-versus-simulation systems cannot dynamically evaluate the credibility of the system during the simulation process, resulting in the inability to effectively analyze and improve.
By comprehensively measuring uncertainty for each node of the current time system against simulation system, building a hypernetwork structure, calculating the importance and credibility of each node, and using a specific formula to calculate the dynamic credibility of the simulation system against simulation system .
An objective and comprehensive assessment of the dynamic credibility of the system against simulation system is achieved, which is convenient for system analysis and improvement.
Smart Images

Figure CN118940538A_ABST
Abstract
Description
Technical Field
[0001] The present invention relates to the technical field of system simulation, and in particular to a dynamic credibility evaluation method for a system confrontation simulation system. Background Art
[0002] During the evolution process, the network of the system confrontation simulation system needs to continuously observe and collect data, make orientations to environmental changes, and add or delete nodes, so the system network is constantly changing. The existing credibility assessment of the system confrontation simulation system is usually based on a comprehensive assessment of the simulation data and the final simulation results to obtain a final credibility assessment, but the system confrontation simulation system is constantly changing during the simulation process. The existing evaluation method cannot reflect the dynamic credibility of the system during the simulation process, which is not conducive to the analysis and improvement of the system confrontation simulation system. Summary of the invention
[0003] In view of the above analysis, an embodiment of the present invention aims to provide a dynamic credibility assessment method for a system of systems adversarial simulation system, so as to solve the problem that the existing method cannot dynamically assess the credibility of the system of systems simulation system.
[0004] On the one hand, an embodiment of the present invention provides a method for dynamic credibility assessment of a system confrontation simulation system, comprising the following steps:
[0005] Perform comprehensive uncertainty measurement on each node of the system confrontation simulation system at the current moment to obtain the credibility of each node in the system confrontation simulation system at the current moment;
[0006] Constructing a hypernetwork structure of the current system confrontation simulation system, and calculating the importance of each node in the current system confrontation simulation system based on the hypernetwork structure;
[0007] The credibility of the system confrontation simulation system at the current moment is calculated based on the importance and credibility of each node in the system confrontation simulation system at the current moment.
[0008] Based on the further improvement of the above method, the following formula is used to calculate the credibility of the system adversarial simulation system at the current moment based on the importance and credibility of each node in the simulation system at the current moment:
[0009]
[0010] Among them, Y represents the credibility of the system against the simulation system at the current moment, ω j represents the importance of the jth node in the system at the current moment, y j represents the credibility of the jth node in the system at the current moment, and M is the number of nodes in the system at the current moment.
[0011] Based on the further improvement of the above method, a comprehensive uncertainty measurement is performed on each node of the system confrontation simulation system at the current moment to obtain the credibility of each node in the system confrontation simulation system at the current moment, including:
[0012] For each node, the comprehensive uncertainty vector of the node is determined according to the simulation data of its simulation variables;
[0013] Calculate the weight of each element in the comprehensive uncertainty vector based on the correlation coefficient of any two simulation variables;
[0014] The credibility of each node is obtained based on the comprehensive uncertainty vector and the weight of each element in the vector.
[0015] Based on the further improvement of the above method, for each node, the comprehensive uncertainty vector of the node is determined according to the simulation data of its simulation variables, including:
[0016] Calculating a data distribution probability envelope of each simulation variable, and determining a random uncertainty and a probability uncertainty of each simulation variable based on the data distribution probability envelope;
[0017] The random uncertainty and probabilistic uncertainty of each simulation variable are dedimensionalized to construct a comprehensive uncertainty vector.
[0018] Based on the further improvement of the above method, the random uncertainty and probabilistic uncertainty of each simulation variable are dedimensionalized by the following formula:
[0019]
[0020] The comprehensive uncertainty vector u is constructed by the following formula:
[0021]
[0022] Among them, u a represents the random uncertainty matrix, u e The epistemic uncertainty measurement matrix, r represents the number of simulation variables, g k (x) represents the data distribution probability envelope of the kth simulation variable x, For the upper bound, g k (x) is the lower bound, represents the random uncertainty, represents the probability uncertainty, P k Indicates g k The area of the rectangle enclosed by the response corresponding to the 0.5 quantile of (x) and the coordinate axis.
[0023] Based on the further improvement of the above method, the importance of each node in the system confrontation simulation system at the current moment is calculated based on the hypernetwork structure, including:
[0024] Searching for OODA loops based on the hypernetwork, and calculating the initial comprehensive confrontation capability of each OODA loop;
[0025] For each node, treat it as a failed node and update the super network based on the network cascade failure analysis; calculate the updated comprehensive confrontation capability of each OODA loop based on the updated super network;
[0026] Based on the initial comprehensive confrontation capability and the updated comprehensive confrontation capability of each OODA loop, the importance of the failed node is obtained.
[0027] Based on the further improvement of the above method, based on the initial comprehensive confrontation capability and updated comprehensive confrontation capability of each OODA loop, the importance of the failed node is calculated using the following formula:
[0028]
[0029] in, Indicates that the i-th target node T i The initial comprehensive confrontation capability of the target j-th OODA loop, Indicates that the i-th target node T i The updated comprehensive confrontation capability of the target j-th OODA loop, Indicates that the i-th target node T i is the weight of the jth OODA loop of the target, Value(v) represents the importance of the failed node v, N T Represents the number of target nodes in the system confrontation simulation system, Indicates the number of OODA loops where the i-th target node is located.
[0030] Based on the further improvement of the above method, the initial comprehensive confrontation capability of each OODA loop is calculated in the following way:
[0031]
[0032] Among them, P op represents the target damage probability of the OODA loop, Q op represents the stability of the topological structure of the OODA loop, w1 and w2 represent the weights of the target damage probability and topological structure stability of the OODA loop respectively.
[0033] Based on the further improvement of the above method, the following formula is used to calculate the target damage probability of the OODA loop:
[0034]
[0035] Among them, P Ai represents the comprehensive damage probability of the i-th action node in the OODA loop to the target node in the OODA loop, and k represents the number of action nodes in the OODA loop;
[0036] The following formula is used to calculate the comprehensive damage probability of the action node to the target node in the OODA loop:
[0037] P A =P S→D ×P D→A ×P h ×P d
[0038] Among them, P S→D Indicates the quality of target intelligence information received by the action node, P D→A Indicates the correctness of the accusation information received by the action node, P h represents the probability of the action node hitting the target node in the OODA loop, P d represents the conditional damage probability of the action node to the target node, P A Represents the comprehensive damage probability of the action node to the target node in the OODA loop.
[0039] Based on the further improvement of the above method, the following formula is used to calculate the quality of the target intelligence information received by the action node:
[0040]
[0041] Among them, the i-th sensor node is the last sensor node in the OODA loop that sends target intelligence information to the accusation node. represents the information utilization rate of the i-th sensor node, R(S i ) represents the serial number set of sensor nodes that share intelligence with the i-th sensor node, represents the probability of the i-th sensor node detecting and identifying the target node, P T ' →Si It represents the probability that the i-th sensor node detects and identifies the target node after the intelligence sharing process; λ1 represents the attenuation coefficient of the timeliness of intelligence information.
[0042] Compared with the prior art, the present invention obtains the credibility of each node by performing comprehensive uncertainty measurement on each node. Since the contribution of each node to the credibility of the system is different at each simulation moment, a system adversarial super network is constructed at the current simulation moment, and the importance of each node in the system adversarial simulation system at the current moment is calculated. Based on the importance and credibility of each node at the current moment, the dynamic credibility of the simulation system at the current moment is obtained. When implemented, the dynamic credibility of the system at each moment can be measured, so that the credibility of the system can be evaluated more objectively and comprehensively, and it is convenient to analyze and improve the system.
[0043] In the present invention, the above-mentioned technical solutions can also be combined with each other to achieve more preferred combination solutions. Other features and advantages of the present invention will be described in the subsequent description, and some advantages can become obvious from the description, or can be understood by practicing the present invention. The purpose and other advantages of the present invention can be realized and obtained through the contents particularly pointed out in the description and the drawings. BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS
[0044] The accompanying drawings are only used for the purpose of illustrating specific embodiments and are not to be considered as limiting the present invention. In the entire drawings, the same reference symbols represent the same components;
[0045] Figure 1 The present invention is a flowchart of a method for dynamic credibility assessment of a system confrontation simulation system according to an embodiment of the present invention. DETAILED DESCRIPTION
[0046] The preferred embodiments of the present invention are described in detail below in conjunction with the accompanying drawings, wherein the accompanying drawings constitute a part of this application and are used together with the embodiments of the present invention to illustrate the principles of the present invention, but are not used to limit the scope of the present invention.
[0047] A specific embodiment of the present invention discloses a dynamic credibility evaluation method for a system confrontation simulation system, such as Figure 1 As shown, the following steps are included:
[0048] S1. Perform comprehensive uncertainty measurement on each node of the system confrontation simulation system at the current moment to obtain the credibility of each node in the system confrontation simulation system at the current moment;
[0049] S2, constructing a hypernetwork structure of the system confrontation simulation system at the current moment, and calculating the importance of each node in the system confrontation simulation system at the current moment based on the hypernetwork structure;
[0050] S3. Calculate the credibility of the system confrontation simulation system at the current moment based on the importance and credibility of each node in the system confrontation simulation system at the current moment.
[0051] Compared with the prior art, the dynamic credibility assessment method of the system confrontation simulation system provided in this embodiment obtains the credibility of each node by performing a comprehensive uncertainty measurement on the node. Since the contribution of each node to the credibility of the system is different at each simulation moment, a system confrontation super network is constructed at the current simulation moment, and the importance of each node in the system confrontation simulation system at the current moment is calculated. Based on the importance and credibility of each node at the current moment, the dynamic credibility of the simulation system at the current moment is obtained. When implemented, the dynamic credibility of the system at each moment can be measured, so that the credibility of the system can be evaluated more objectively and comprehensively, and it is convenient to analyze and improve the system.
[0052] The nodes of the system confrontation simulation system include four types: sensor nodes S, which are used to collect original situation information, process situation information to generate intelligence information, such as radars and reconnaissance satellites; command and control nodes D, which make decisions based on intelligence information, specify confrontation plans, and command and control confrontation activities. The command and control center is the command and control node; action nodes, which receive command and control information and intelligence information, execute decisions, and influence targets; target nodes, which are the confrontation targets in the system simulation system.
[0053] For each simulation moment, a comprehensive uncertainty measurement is performed on each node of the system confrontation simulation system at the current moment to obtain the credibility of each node in the system confrontation simulation system at the current moment. Specifically, it includes:
[0054] S11, for each node, determining a comprehensive uncertainty vector of the node according to simulation data of its simulation variables;
[0055] S12, calculating the weight of each element in the comprehensive uncertainty vector based on the correlation coefficient of any two simulation variables;
[0056] S13. Obtain the credibility of each node based on the comprehensive uncertainty vector and the weight of each element in the vector.
[0057] During implementation, simulation data of simulation variables of each node in the system are obtained. For example, simulation variables of sensor node radar include detection distance, detection angle, detection energy, etc.; simulation variables of the command and control center include target list, planning instructions, etc.; simulation variables of action nodes include confrontation speed.
[0058] The comprehensive uncertainty vector of the node is determined based on the simulation data of its simulation variables, including:
[0059] S111, calculating the data distribution probability envelope of each simulation variable, and determining the random uncertainty and probability uncertainty of each simulation variable based on the data distribution probability envelope;
[0060] S112. De-dimensionalize the random uncertainty and probabilistic uncertainty of each simulation variable and construct a comprehensive uncertainty vector.
[0061] During implementation, the simulation data of each simulation variable x is sorted and partitioned into intervals to obtain an interval set B:
[0062] M is the number of simulation data of simulation variable x, a (1) is the minimum value in the simulation data, a (M) is the maximum value in the simulation data.
[0063] The trust probability m(B) of each interval is calculated according to the following formula: j ):
[0064]
[0065] ξ j =1-θ j (2)
[0066]
[0067] in, represents the mean of the simulation data, Indicates that each interval B j The Euclidean distance from (j=1,2,…,M-1) to the mean a.
[0068] For the intervals in the interval set B and the corresponding trust probability m(B j ) is used to perform data fitting, such as using the least squares method to perform data fitting, to obtain the data distribution probability envelope g(x) of the simulation variables.
[0069] Based on the data distribution probability envelope, the following formula is used to determine the random uncertainty and probability uncertainty of the simulation variables:
[0070]
[0071] in, represents the random uncertainty, represents the probability uncertainty, represents the upper bound of the probability envelope of the data distribution, g k (x) represents the lower bound of the probability envelope of the data distribution.
[0072] After calculating the random uncertainty and probabilistic uncertainty of each simulation variable, the random uncertainty and probabilistic uncertainty are dedimensionalized to construct a comprehensive uncertainty vector. The random uncertainty and probabilistic uncertainty of each simulation variable are dedimensionalized using the following formula:
[0073]
[0074] The comprehensive uncertainty vector u is constructed by the following formula:
[0075]
[0076] Among them, u a represents the random uncertainty matrix, u e Epistemic uncertainty measurement matrix, r represents the number of simulation variables, P k Indicates g k The area of the rectangle enclosed by the response corresponding to the 0.5 quantile of (x) and the coordinate axis.
[0077] For r simulation variables, in order to obtain a unified measurement index, it is necessary to perform a weighted average on the r uncertainty measurement values. The weight of the contribution of different simulation variables to the system uncertainty is determined by the correlation coefficient. If all simulation variables are completely uncorrelated, the weights are the same, and the uncertainty measurement values of the r response quantities can be directly averaged; otherwise, the more correlated the response quantity, the lower the weight assigned.
[0078] Therefore, during implementation, the Pearson correlation coefficient between two simulation variables can be calculated based on the simulation data.
[0079] The weight of each element in the uncertainty vector is calculated using the following formula:
[0080]
[0081] Among them, ρ j,i Represents the correlation coefficient between the j-th simulation variable and the i-th simulation variable.
[0082] Then according to the formula Calculate the credibility of each node, where u i Represents the i-th element of the comprehensive uncertainty vector u.
[0083] As the simulation system continues to change, the importance of each node will change, and its contribution to the credibility of the entire system will also change. Therefore, it is necessary to calculate the importance of each node in the system adversarial simulation system at the current moment.
[0084] During implementation, a hypernetwork structure of the system confrontation simulation system at the current moment is constructed at each simulation moment. As a complex network organizational structure, the hypernetwork can connect and interact multiple sub-networks to form a larger and more complex network system. This form of network organization can provide more powerful, flexible and collaborative functions, and is suitable for application scenarios that require scale expansion and functional integration. Modeling the system confrontation simulation system based on the hypernetwork theory can overcome the limitations of general complex network models in modeling and characterizing the network structure and functional characteristics of the simulation system. During implementation, the hypernetwork modeling idea is used to construct the hypernetwork of the system confrontation simulation system in accordance with the principle of "units are condensed into points, relationships are abstracted into edges, and systems are transformed into networks."
[0085] During implementation, each simulation entity in the system confrontation simulation system is a node in the super network. The relationship between entities is abstracted as an edge in the network. The entities in the system confrontation simulation system are of different types, and the same type of nodes are divided into a network, and the networks are coupled to form a super network.
[0086] In a system confrontation simulation system, a simulation entity may have multiple node types. For example, an airborne early warning aircraft can not only conduct reconnaissance and surveillance activities in the confrontation environment, but also serve as a command and control center to command and control related confrontation activities. This type of node is called a composite node. The multiple functions of a node may lead to multiple associations between the same node pair, which is not conducive to a clear description of the specific functions of the node in the simulation process. In view of this situation, based on the idea of super network, the composite node is abstracted into multiple network nodes according to its function for description during implementation. For example, the airborne early warning aircraft can be abstracted into a sensor node S and a command and control node D to describe its reconnaissance and surveillance capabilities and command and control capabilities respectively.
[0087] During implementation, the interaction edges in the system confrontation simulation system include: the reconnaissance and surveillance link T→S for the sensor node to monitor the target node and collect target intelligence, the target intelligence sharing link S→S between the sensor nodes, the intelligence support link S→D for the sensor node to send the target intelligence information to the command node, the intelligence support link S→A for the sensor node to send the target intelligence information to the action node, the collaborative decision-making link D→D for sharing intelligence and decision-making collaboration between the same-layer command nodes, the command and control link D→D for the upper-level command node to send the command information to its lower-level command node, the command and control link D→A for the command and control node to send the command information to the action node, and the damage link A→T for the action node to carry out physical strikes or electronic interference on the target node.
[0088] Nodes in different networks are connected through these links to form a super network. The node set V in the constructed super network is expressed as: V = {S, D, A, T}.
[0089] in, represents the set of sensor nodes in the simulation system, N s Indicates the number of sensor nodes; Represents the collection of accusation nodes, N D Indicates the number of accusation nodes; Represents the set of action nodes, N A Indicates the number of action nodes; Represents the target class node set in the simulation system, N T Indicates the number of target class nodes.
[0090] According to the connection relationship between each node, the edges in the hypernetwork are constructed to obtain the adjacency matrix X of the hypernetwork.
[0091] After the hypernetwork is built, search for the OODA loop in the hypernetwork. OODA refers to a cyclic model consisting of observation (Obeserve) - judgment (Orient) - decision (Decide) - action (Act), which is used to describe the entire process of the entire system's confrontation action.
[0092] According to the OODA loop concept diagram, the process of completing a confrontation mission can be regarded as a cycle, and the process can be briefly described as follows: the reconnaissance and surveillance simulation entity S obtains information about the enemy target, and transmits this information to our command center D through the communication relationship between entities. The command center D processes and analyzes the information obtained, and makes a decision by comprehensively considering the current confrontation situation and the strength of both sides, and issues an action order to the strike entity A. After receiving the order, A immediately takes corresponding countermeasures against the enemy target T. In order to complete a specific confrontation mission, it is necessary to build one or more closed loops formed by the reconnaissance and surveillance entity S, command and control entity D, strike entity A, and enemy target entity T in our system, and ensure that these loops can complete their respective confrontation tasks with the highest possible stability.
[0093] The OODA loop in the present invention is an OODA loop in which the starting node and the ending node are the same node and the node type is also a target node. Taking the typical OODA loop in the confrontation process: T→S→D→A→T as an example, the OODA loop indicates that the red party target node is discovered by the blue party reconnaissance node, and the blue party reconnaissance node transmits effective information to the accusation node through information transmission. The accusation node processes and analyzes the information and issues an attack command to the action node. Finally, the action node implements the confrontation process against the red party target node. Table 1 shows the OODA loop in the present invention.
[0094] Table 1 OODA loop and its meaning
[0095]
[0096]
[0097] The rapid and effective extraction of OODA loops in the simulation system hypernetwork is the basis for evaluating the importance of nodes based on OODA loops. From the perspective of graph theory, the OODA loop search problem can be described as a subgraph isomorphism problem. In implementation, the VF3 algorithm can be used to search for OODA loops in the hypernetwork.
[0098] On the basis of successful extraction of OODA loop, a reasonable and effective evaluation of its confrontation capability is the premise of evaluating the importance of hypernetwork nodes based on OODA loop. The confrontation capability of OODA loop is mainly reflected in two aspects: 1) the ability of OODA loop to damage enemy targets; 2) the ability of OODA loop to maintain its confrontation capability, that is, the stability of OODA loop topology.
[0099] Under uncertainty, the damage capability of an OODA loop can be expressed as its probability of damage to the enemy target P op The comprehensive probability of damage to the target node by an action node in the OODA loop depends on four factors: 1) The quality of the target intelligence information received by the action node P S→D ; 2) The accuracy of the superior's accusation information D→A ; 3) Under the condition that the target information is completely determined and the superior accusation information is completely correct, the probability P of the action node hitting the target node h ; 4) Under the condition of hitting the target node, the probability P of the action node destroying the target node d .
[0100] Therefore, for a certain action node in a certain OODA loop, the comprehensive probability of damaging the target node in the OODA loop is:
[0101] P A =P S→D ×P D→A ×P h ×P d (12)
[0102] Where k represents the number of action nodes in the OODA loop, P S→D Indicates the quality of target intelligence information received by the action node, P D→A Indicates the correctness of the accusation information received by the action node, P h represents the probability of the action node hitting the target node in the OODA loop, P d It represents the conditional damage probability of the action node to the target node, that is, the probability that the target node will be damaged when the action node hits the target node in the OODA loop.
[0103] Among them, the hit probability P of the action node to the target node hIncluding the probability P of the action node hitting the target node by physical attack h ′ and the probability P of the action node hitting the target node through electronic interference h ″. The conditional damage probability P of the action node to the target node h It consists of two parts: the conditional damage probability P of the action node destroying the target through physical strike d ′ and the conditional damage probability P of the action node destroying the target by electronic interference d "And there are
[0104] P h =1-(1-P h′ )(1-P h″ ) (13)
[0105] P d =1-(1-P d′ )(1-P d″ ) (14)
[0106] Among them, P h′ P represents the probability of the action node hitting the target node by physical attack, that is, under the condition that the target information is completely determined and the superior accusation information is completely correct, h″ It represents the probability that the action node hits the target node through electronic interference, that is, under the condition that the target information is completely determined and the superior command information is completely correct. d′ P represents the conditional damage probability of the action node to the target node through physical attack, that is, the probability of the action node damaging the target under the condition that the action node hits the target based on physical attack, d″ The conditional probability of an action node damaging a target node through electronic interference is the probability of the action node damaging the target under the condition that the action node hits the target based on electronic interference.
[0107] The higher the strike accuracy of the action node, the smaller the circular probability deviation, and the smaller the area of the strike concentration area. If the strike area of the target node is larger, the greater the hit probability; the lower the strike accuracy of the action node, the greater the circular probability deviation and the larger the area of the strike concentration area. If the strike area of the target node is smaller, it is more difficult for the action node to hit the target node, that is, the lower the hit probability. When the area of the strike concentration area is smaller than the target strike area, it means that the action node will definitely hit the target, that is, the hit probability is 1; when the area of the strike concentration area is larger than the target bullet area, the probability of the action node hitting the target depends on the ratio of the target strike area to the area of the strike concentration area. In summary, the relationship between the hit probability of the action node on the target node and its strike accuracy and the strike area of the target node can be described as follows in the following mathematical form:
[0108]
[0109] Among them, τ' is the state quantity describing whether the target node is out of the physical strike range of the action node after the early warning maneuver, Indicates the strike accuracy of the action node, namely the circular error probability (CEP); Indicates the area of the action node's strike concentration zone. The smaller the area, the higher the strike accuracy. Indicates the hit area of the target node. AT represents the initial distance between the action node A and the target node T, which can be calculated using the traditional distance calculation formula between two points; and respectively Indicates the maneuvering speed and warning time of the target node; Indicates the effective range of the action node.
[0110] Under the condition of hitting the target, the probability of an action node damaging the target is the probability that its opponent falls into the vulnerable area of the target. Therefore, the conditional damage probability of an action node can be expressed as:
[0111]
[0112] in, Indicates the power of the action node against the unit, with a value range of [0,1]; It represents the sequence of vulnerable areas of target nodes when facing attacks of different power countermeasures; Indicates that the target node faces a force of The relative vulnerable area when confronting the part.
[0113] The probability P of an action node hitting the target under electronic jamming h ″ is expressed as
[0114]
[0115] Among them, τ” is the state quantity that describes whether the target node is out of the electronic interference range of the action node after the early warning maneuver.
[0116] Indicates the interference frequency band range of the action node, Refers to the target's operating frequency band, Indicates the overlap between the target working frequency band and the action node interference frequency band; Indicates the interference radius of the action node.
[0117] Under the condition of hitting the target, since the present invention mainly considers active suppression interference, its essence is the confrontation between the power of the enemy and the friend. Therefore, the conditional damage probability of the action node to the target node is mainly related to the interference power of the action node and the transmission power of the target node. The ratio of the interference power of the action node to the maximum transmission power of the target node is called the suppression coefficient of the action node to the target node, denoted as ρ, then
[0118]
[0119] in, represents the interference power of the action node; Represents the maximum transmission power of the target node. The suppression coefficient determines the effect of suppressive electronic interference to a certain extent. Therefore, for the convenience of research, the conditional damage probability P of the action node to the target node under the electronic interference mode can be d "Description is as follows
[0120]
[0121] Among them, ρ represents the suppression coefficient of the action node on the target node; ρ min Represents the minimum suppression coefficient that can interfere with the target node; ρ max It represents the minimum suppression coefficient that makes the target node lose its ability to resist 100%. min When ρ>ρ, the action node cannot effectively interfere with the target, and the conditional damage probability is 0; max When ρ , the action node completely suppresses the target node, causing the target node to lose its confrontation ability. At this time, the conditional damage probability is 1. nim ≤ρ≤ρ xma When the suppression coefficient increases, the action node can produce effective electronic interference to the target node, and the probability that the target node loses its confrontation capability increases with the increase of the suppression coefficient.
[0122] Therefore, it is necessary to reasonably evaluate the quality of the target intelligence information received by each action node in the OODA loop. S→D , and the correctness of the accusation information issued by each accusation node P D→A , is the key to describing the OODA loop’s adversarial capabilities.
[0123] The target intelligence information received by the action node is actually the target intelligence information obtained by the sensor node that provides intelligence information support for the action node. The target intelligence information obtained by the sensor node comes from its reconnaissance and monitoring process of the target node on the one hand, and from the intelligence sharing process between sensor nodes on the other hand. Before the sensor nodes share the target intelligence information, the probability of each sensor node detecting and identifying the target node can be obtained. The calculation of the sensor node identification probability can be obtained by referring to the relevant industry standards of the corresponding equipment of each sensor node. This represents the quality of the target intelligence information obtained by each sensor node.
[0124] Through intelligence sharing, each sensor node can obtain the target intelligence information of other sensor nodes. By fusing the target intelligence information from multiple sensor nodes, more accurate, reliable and complete estimation and judgment of target attributes such as target location, state estimation and identity description can be obtained. However, on the other hand, as the number of intelligence sharing increases, the intelligence sharing time continues to grow, and the timeliness of information will gradually decrease, resulting in a decrease in the quality of the final target intelligence information. It can be seen that in the process of intelligence sharing, the information fusion capability of the sensor node and the total duration of the intelligence sharing process jointly determine the quality of the target intelligence information finally obtained by each sensor node. Among them, the information fusion capability mainly represents the ability of the sensor node to mine useful information from the target intelligence information of other nodes. The information fusion capability is only represented by the utilization rate of the sensor node to the intelligence information of other sensor nodes. The information utilization rate is usually obtained by the ratio of the utilized information to the total amount of information obtained, and the value range is 0-1; on the other hand, since the intelligence sharing link represents the intelligence sharing process between two sensor nodes, the number of intelligence sharing links in the OODA loop can represent the total duration of the intelligence sharing process. Based on the above analysis, the intelligence sharing process between two sensor nodes can be described as follows.
[0125] Assume that the sensor node S i and S j There is a monitoring relationship between the two sensor nodes and the target node T, and the target intelligence information is shared between the two sensor nodes. Assume that before sharing, the probability of each sensor node detecting and identifying the target node is P T→Si and P T→Sj , after sharing the target intelligence information, the probability of each sensor node detecting and identifying the target node is as follows:
[0126]
[0127] in, and After sharing intelligence, the sensor nodes S i and S j The probability of detecting and identifying the target node T; and They represent the sensor nodes S i and S j information fusion capability, that is, information utilization rate.
[0128] On this basis, the impact of intelligence sharing duration on the quality of intelligence information must also be considered.
[0129] It should be noted that the quality of the target intelligence information received by the action node is P S→D It is the quality of the target intelligence information obtained by the last sensor node in the current OODA loop.
[0130] Based on this, the quality P of the target intelligence information obtained by the sensor nodes in the OODA loop after intelligence sharing can be calculated. S→D :
[0131]
[0132] Among them, the i-th sensor node is the last sensor node in the OODA loop that sends target intelligence information to the accusation node. represents the information utilization rate of the i-th sensor node, R(S i ) represents the serial number set of sensor nodes that share intelligence with the i-th sensor node, represents the probability of the i-th sensor node detecting and identifying the target node, It represents the probability that the i-th sensor node detects and identifies the target node after the intelligence sharing process; λ1 represents the attenuation coefficient of the timeliness of intelligence information. The smaller λ1 is, the faster the attenuation speed of the timeliness of information is; It represents the number of intelligence sharing links in the OODA loop, which to a certain extent represents the duration of the intelligence sharing process.
[0133] For example, if the OODA loop is T→S→S→D→S→D→A→T, then the third sensor node is the last sensor node in the loop to send target intelligence information to the command node.
[0134] In the individual decision-making process, the correctness of the accusation information output by the accusation node is P D It can be expressed as:
[0135]
[0136] in, Indicates the superior accusation node D of the control node D up The correctness of the output accusation information, when the accusation node is the top accusation node in the OODA loop, That is, when l D =1, P D =P S→D ×η D ;PS→D Indicates the quality of target intelligence information received by the action node; η D It represents the information utilization capability of the command node D in the current state. The value range is 0-1. The information utilization capability can be approximately calculated according to the task difficulty coefficient. The collaborative decision-making process between the command nodes at the same level is similar to the intelligence sharing process between the sensor nodes. The only difference is that what is shared between the command nodes is the decision opinions of each command node on the same confrontation task, which is essentially the sharing of knowledge. Therefore, the collaborative decision-making process between the command nodes at the same level can be described by analogy with the modeling idea of the intelligence sharing process. Similar to the intelligence sharing process between sensor nodes, the information utilization capability in the collaborative decision-making process is an important factor in determining the correctness of the command information output by each command node. In addition, since the confrontation situation changes rapidly, if the decision-making time is too long, the decision made at the previous moment may not be applicable to the confrontation situation at the current moment, thus missing the opportunity for confrontation. Therefore, the impact of the duration of the collaborative decision-making process on the correctness of the command information must be considered. Since the collaborative decision-making link represents the collaborative decision-making relationship between the command nodes, the number of collaborative decision-making links between the command nodes at the same command level can be used to represent the duration of the collaborative decision-making process between the command nodes at this level.
[0137] Assume that the two command nodes D1 and D2 in the OODA loop can make collaborative decisions, and the information utilization capabilities of the two command nodes in the current state are and After individual decision-making, the correctness of the results output by each command node is and Then after collaborative decision-making, the correctness of the accusation information output by each accusation node is:
[0138]
[0139]
[0140] in, and They respectively represent the correctness of the accusation information output by the accusation nodes D1 and D2 after collaborative decision-making.
[0141] On this basis, considering the impact of the duration of the collaborative decision-making process on the correctness of the accusation information, the final correctness of the accusation information output by each accusation node can be obtained.
[0142] It should be noted that the correctness of the accusation information received by the action node is the correctness of the accusation information output by the last accusation node to send the accusation information, which is specifically expressed as follows:
[0143]
[0144] Among them, P Di Indicates the correctness of the initial output charge information of the i-th charge node, Indicates the charge node D i (D i ∈D op ) After the collaborative decision-making process, the final correctness of the output accusation information, represents the correctness of the initial output accusation information of the jth accusation node, λ2 represents the attenuation coefficient of the timeliness of the accusation information, the smaller λ2 is, the faster the timeliness of the information decays; represents the number of collaborative decision-making links in the corresponding command level in the OODA loop, represents the information utilization capability of the ith accusation node, R(D i ) represents the serial number set of the accusation nodes that make collaborative decisions with the ith accusation node. i It is the last charging node to send charging information to the action node.
[0145] For example, if the OODA loop is T→S→S→D→S→D→A→T, then the second sensor node is the last sensor node in the loop to send target intelligence information to the command node.
[0146] The target damage probability P of any OODA loop op It can be calculated using the following formula:
[0147]
[0148] Among them, P Ai represents the comprehensive damage probability of the i-th action node in the OODA loop to the target node in the OODA loop, and k is the number of action nodes in the OODA loop.
[0149] The adversarial capability of the OODA loop is closely related to the properties of all nodes and edges in the loop. Therefore, maintaining the stability of the topological structure of the OODA loop is the basic condition for maintaining its adversarial capability. The OODA loop consists of four types of nodes, namely target nodes, sensor nodes, command nodes and action nodes, as well as many edges between nodes. The stability of its topological structure is inseparable from the stability of every node and every edge in the loop.
[0150] Since the target node is the object of the OODA loop, its stability is regarded as 1. Therefore, the stability of the sensor node, the command node and the action node in the OODA loop is mainly analyzed. There are two main factors affecting node stability: internal factors and external factors. Among them, internal factors mainly refer to the impact of internal fault factors of the node on the stability of the node; while external factors refer to the impact of the correlation between nodes on the stability of the node, and the latter is mainly considered here. When the node remains stable internally, whether the material resource demand of the node is adequately guaranteed is the main factor affecting its stability. Therefore, the present invention measures the stability of the node by the material guarantee strength of the simulation system for each node. According to the material guarantee needs of the node and the guarantee capabilities of the material guarantee department, the stability of each node can be described as follows:
[0151]
[0152] Among them, Q i represents the stability of the i-th node in the OODA loop, Indicates the strength of the jth material of the i-th node in the OODA loop. In a special ideal situation, the material guarantee of the i-th node is sufficient, indicating that the i-th node does not need any material resource guarantee, that is, its stability Q i =1.
[0153] The communication link is used to characterize the static connection relationship between nodes. Therefore, when the nodes at both ends are not failed, the stability of the communication link is considered to be 1. The OODA loop mainly involves 7 types of links, namely, reconnaissance and surveillance links, intelligence sharing links, intelligence support links, command and control links, collaborative decision-making links, status reporting links, and damage links. Once the OODA loop is formed, the reconnaissance and surveillance relationship and damage relationship of other nodes in the loop to the target node are established and unchanged. Therefore, the stability of the reconnaissance and surveillance link and the damage link is considered to be 1. In addition, the intelligence sharing link, intelligence support link, command and control link, collaborative decision-making link, and status reporting link all characterize the information interaction relationship between nodes, which is essentially the information transmission process between nodes. Therefore, the stability of the above 5 types of links mainly depends on the information transmission capacity between the nodes at both ends. The number of effective communication paths between nodes is an effective indicator to characterize the stability of information interaction between nodes. Therefore, the stability calculation method of the information interaction link is as follows.
[0154]
[0155] Among them, Q ij represents the stability of the link between the i-th node and the j-th node, α represents the coefficient of the influence of the number of effective communication paths between nodes in the OODA loop on the stability of the link, and CL ijRepresents the number of valid communication paths between the i-th node and the j-th node of the OODA loop.
[0156] For an OODA loop, its topological stability Q op It is expressed as:
[0157]
[0158] Among them, Q i Indicates the stability of the i-th node in the OODA loop, with a value range of [0,1]; N op Indicates the number of nodes in the OODA loop; Q ij represents the link l between the i-th node and the j-th node ij The stability of the value range is [0,1], and when l ij = 0, Q i =1.
[0159] The importance of the target node can be evaluated from the perspectives of its spatial concealment probability, spectral concealment probability, floating intensity concealment probability, false survival probability, warning time, maneuvering speed, operating frequency bandwidth, transmission power, and the maximum power it can withstand.
[0160] Then, the initial comprehensive confrontation capability of each OODA loop is calculated in the following way:
[0161]
[0162] Among them, P op represents the target damage probability of the OODA loop, Q op represents the stability of the topological structure of the OODA loop, w1 and w2 represent the weights of the target damage probability and topological structure stability of the OODA loop respectively.
[0163] After obtaining the comprehensive importance of the OODA loop, to evaluate the importance of a certain node in it, we can refer to the idea of node deletion and describe it by the changes in the comprehensive confrontation capability of the OODA loop of the entire network before and after deleting the node.
[0164] Considering the characteristics of the simulation system, we cannot only delete the nodes to be evaluated and the edges directly connected to the nodes to be evaluated, which is likely to lead to a low final evaluation result, because the failure of some nodes may cause cascading failures of other nodes and edges. Therefore, in order to achieve a comprehensive and effective evaluation of node value, it is necessary to perform cascading failure analysis on the hypernetwork of the simulation system.
[0165] After deleting the node to be evaluated, the relevant failed nodes are analyzed through cascading failure analysis, and then these nodes and directly connected edges are deleted from the super network to update the super network. The updated comprehensive confrontation capability of each OODA loop is calculated based on the updated super network, and the calculation formula refers to formula (13). It should be noted that if there is a failed node in an OODA loop, the comprehensive confrontation capability of the OODA loop is regarded as 0. Otherwise, its comprehensive confrontation capability is re-evaluated according to the above process to obtain the updated comprehensive confrontation capability.
[0166] According to the comprehensive confrontation capabilities of each OODA loop before and after the node v to be evaluated is deleted, the support degree of the node to be evaluated for each OODA loop can be calculated, which is expressed as follows:
[0167]
[0168] in, Indicates the node v to be evaluated with the i-th target node T i is the support of the jth OODA loop of the target, Indicates that the i-th target node T i The initial comprehensive confrontation capability of the target j-th OODA loop, Indicates that the i-th target node T i The updated comprehensive confrontation capability of the target j-th OODA loop.
[0169] Comprehensively consider the support of the node v to be evaluated for each OODA loop to obtain the importance evaluation result of the node to be evaluated
[0170]
[0171] in, Indicates the node v to be evaluated with the i-th target node T i is the support of the jth OODA loop of the target, Indicates that the i-th target node T i is the weight of the jth OODA loop of the target, Value(v) represents the importance evaluation result of node v, Indicates that the i-th target node T i is the number of the jth OODA loop of the target, N T Indicates the number of target nodes.
[0172] Take the i-th target node T i The weight of the j-th OODA loop for the target is:
[0173]
[0174] in, Represents the target node Ti The weight of Indicates that the i-th target node T i The jth OODA loop for the target Initial comprehensive confrontation capability. It can be evaluated by existing methods such as expert scoring.
[0175] If you want to evaluate the importance of multiple nodes, you can delete each node in turn, and evaluate the importance of the node based on the changes in the comprehensive confrontation capability of the OODA loop in the network before and after deleting the node.
[0176] As the system confrontation simulation system continues to change, the importance of each node will change, and its contribution to the credibility of the entire system will also change. The following formula is used to calculate the credibility of the system confrontation simulation system at the current moment based on the importance and credibility of each node in the simulation system at the current moment:
[0177]
[0178] Among them, Y represents the credibility of the system against the simulation system at the current moment, ω j represents the importance of the jth node in the system at the current moment, y j represents the credibility of the jth node in the system at the current moment, and M is the number of nodes in the system at the current moment.
[0179] By measuring the credibility of each node in the system and the importance of the node at each moment, the dynamic credibility of the system at each moment can be measured, which can evaluate the credibility of the system more objectively and comprehensively, and facilitate the analysis and improvement of the system.
[0180] Those skilled in the art will appreciate that all or part of the processes of the above-mentioned embodiments can be implemented by instructing related hardware through a computer program, and the program can be stored in a computer-readable storage medium, wherein the computer-readable storage medium is a disk, an optical disk, a read-only storage memory, or a random access memory, etc.
[0181] The above description is only a preferred specific implementation manner of the present invention, but the protection scope of the present invention is not limited thereto. Any changes or substitutions that can be easily conceived by any technician familiar with the technical field within the technical scope disclosed by the present invention should be covered within the protection scope of the present invention.
Claims
1. A dynamic credibility evaluation method for a system confrontation simulation system, characterized in that: The following steps are involved: Perform comprehensive uncertainty measurement on each node of the system confrontation simulation system at the current moment to obtain the credibility of each node in the system confrontation simulation system at the current moment; Constructing a hypernetwork structure of the current system confrontation simulation system, and calculating the importance of each node in the current system confrontation simulation system based on the hypernetwork structure; The credibility of the system confrontation simulation system at the current moment is calculated based on the importance and credibility of each node in the system confrontation simulation system at the current moment.
2. The dynamic credibility evaluation method of the system confrontation simulation system according to claim 1 is characterized in that: The following formula is used to calculate the credibility of the system adversarial simulation system at the current moment based on the importance and credibility of each node in the simulation system at the current moment: Among them, Y represents the credibility of the system against the simulation system at the current moment, ω j represents the importance of the jth node in the system at the current moment, y j represents the credibility of the jth node in the system at the current moment, and M is the number of nodes in the system at the current moment.
3. The dynamic credibility evaluation method of the system confrontation simulation system according to claim 1 is characterized in that: The credibility of each node in the system confrontation simulation system at the current moment is obtained by comprehensively measuring the uncertainty of each node in the system confrontation simulation system at the current moment, including: For each node, the comprehensive uncertainty vector of the node is determined according to the simulation data of its simulation variables; Calculate the weight of each element in the comprehensive uncertainty vector based on the correlation coefficient of any two simulation variables; The credibility of each node is obtained based on the comprehensive uncertainty vector and the weight of each element in the vector.
4. The dynamic credibility evaluation method of the system confrontation simulation system according to claim 3 is characterized in that: For each node, the comprehensive uncertainty vector of the node is determined based on the simulation data of its simulation variables, including: Calculating a data distribution probability envelope of each simulation variable, and determining a random uncertainty and a probability uncertainty of each simulation variable based on the data distribution probability envelope; The random uncertainty and probabilistic uncertainty of each simulation variable are dedimensionalized to construct a comprehensive uncertainty vector.
5. The dynamic credibility evaluation method of the system confrontation simulation system according to claim 4 is characterized in that: The random uncertainty and probabilistic uncertainty of each simulation variable are dedimensionalized by the following formula: The comprehensive uncertainty vector u is constructed by the following formula: Among them, u a represents the random uncertainty matrix, u e The epistemic uncertainty measurement matrix, r represents the number of simulation variables, g k (x) represents the data distribution probability envelope of the kth simulation variable x, For the upper bound, g k (x) is the lower bound, represents the random uncertainty, represents the probability uncertainty, P k Indicates g k The area of the rectangle enclosed by the response corresponding to the 0.5 quantile of (x) and the coordinate axis.
6. The dynamic credibility evaluation method of the system confrontation simulation system according to claim 1 is characterized in that: The importance of each node in the system confrontation simulation system at the current moment is calculated based on the hypernetwork structure, including: Searching for OODA loops based on the hypernetwork, and calculating the initial comprehensive confrontation capability of each OODA loop; For each node, treat it as a failed node and update the super network based on the network cascade failure analysis; calculate the updated comprehensive confrontation capability of each OODA loop based on the updated super network; Based on the initial comprehensive confrontation capability and the updated comprehensive confrontation capability of each OODA loop, the importance of the failed node is obtained.
7. The dynamic credibility evaluation method of the system confrontation simulation system according to claim 6 is characterized in that: Based on the initial comprehensive confrontation capability and updated comprehensive confrontation capability of each OODA loop, the importance of the failed node is calculated using the following formula: in, Indicates that the i-th target node T i The initial comprehensive confrontation capability of the target j-th OODA loop, Indicates that the i-th target node T i The updated comprehensive confrontation capability of the target j-th OODA loop, Indicates that the i-th target node T i is the weight of the jth OODA loop of the target, Value(v) represents the importance of the failed node v, N T Represents the number of target nodes in the system confrontation simulation system, Indicates the number of OODA loops where the i-th target node is located.
8. The dynamic credibility evaluation method of the system confrontation simulation system according to claim 7 is characterized in that: The initial comprehensive confrontation capability of each OODA loop is calculated in the following way: Among them, P op represents the target damage probability of the OODA loop, Q op represents the stability of the topological structure of the OODA loop, w1 and w2 represent the weights of the target damage probability and topological structure stability of the OODA loop respectively.
9. The dynamic credibility evaluation method of the system confrontation simulation system according to claim 8 is characterized in that: The target destruction probability of the OODA loop is calculated using the following formula: Among them, P Ai represents the comprehensive damage probability of the i-th action node in the OODA loop to the target node in the OODA loop, and k represents the number of action nodes in the OODA loop; The following formula is used to calculate the comprehensive damage probability of the action node to the target node in the OODA loop: P A =P S→D ×P D→A ×P h ×P d Among them, P S→D Indicates the quality of target intelligence information received by the action node, P D→A Indicates the correctness of the accusation information received by the action node, P h represents the probability of the action node hitting the target node in the OODA loop, P d represents the conditional damage probability of the action node to the target node, P A Represents the comprehensive damage probability of the action node to the target node in the OODA loop.
10. The dynamic credibility evaluation method of the system confrontation simulation system according to claim 9 is characterized in that: The quality of target intelligence information received by the action node is calculated using the following formula: Among them, the i-th sensor node is the last sensor node in the OODA loop that sends target intelligence information to the accusation node. represents the information utilization rate of the i-th sensor node, R(S i ) represents the serial number set of sensor nodes that share intelligence with the i-th sensor node, represents the probability of the i-th sensor node detecting and identifying the target node, It represents the probability that the i-th sensor node detects and identifies the target node after the intelligence sharing process; λ1 represents the attenuation coefficient of the timeliness of intelligence information.
