Safe two-party real number comparison method and device based on nonlinear mapping

Through nonlinear mapping protocol and symbol conversion processing, the problems of high computational complexity and unfair output in the safe numerical comparison of two parties are solved, and efficient and secure privacy numerical calculations are realized, which reduces the risk of privacy leakage and avoids the issue of the numerical comparison. Reliance on three-party cloud services.

CN118944860AActive Publication Date: 2024-11-12BEIHANG UNIV
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Patent Information

Application Number
CN202411354419.7
Authority / Receiving Office
CN · China
Patent Type
Applications(China)
Current Assignee / Owner
Filing Date
2024-09-26
Publication Date
2024-11-12
Estimated Expiration
2044-09-26

AI Technical Summary

Technical Problem

The existing two-party numerical comparison methods have problems such as high computational complexity, unfair output, dependence on one party's credibility and third-party cloud service reliability, resulting in low efficiency and risk of privacy leakage.

Method used

Using a secure two-party real number comparison method based on nonlinear mapping, through a secure two-party nonlinear mapping protocol and symbol conversion processing, a vector space mapping transformation and a secure two-party scalar product protocol are used to realize the real number comparison between the two-party, reduce the calculation cost and ensure the Fairness and privacy protection of output.

Benefits of technology

It realizes efficient, secure and reliable nonlinear numerical calculations of privacy, reduces computational complexity and communication overhead, avoids the risk of privacy leakage, and does not need to rely on third-party cloud services.

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Abstract

The invention discloses a secure two-party real number comparison method and device based on non-linear mapping, and relates to the field of wireless communication, and the method comprises the steps: matching a corresponding secure two-party real number comparison protocol based on a real number comparison request, and then obtaining a secure two-party real number comparison protocol based on a first secure party node and a second secure party node; executing a secure two-party real number comparison protocol on the first secure party real number and the second secure party real number to obtain a first secure party calculation result and a second secure party calculation result, and further determining a real number comparison result of the first secure party real number and the second secure party real number; wherein the secure two-party real number comparison protocol is determined based on a secure two-party nonlinear mapping protocol and symbol conversion processing; the secure two-party nonlinear mapping protocol is determined based on vector space mapping transformation and a secure two-party scalar product protocol; the secure two-party scalar product protocol is determined based on a random vector, a random number, an auxiliary computing node and a secure data obfuscation technology. According to the method, efficient, safe and reliable privacy nonlinear numerical calculation is realized.
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Description

Technical Field

[0001] The present application relates to the field of wireless communications, and in particular to a method and device for securely comparing two real numbers based on nonlinear mapping. Background Art

[0002] With the continuous innovation and application of artificial intelligence and big data technologies, data has become an important strategic resource. Regarding privacy data modeling in large model scenarios, privacy comparison is usually required for data alignment during data preprocessing and cleaning. The maximum pooling layer in the model training phase also involves numerical comparison issues. In addition, in some scenarios that require multi-party data sorting, such as decision tree models and KNN (K-NearestNeighbor) models, their prediction processes are all closely related to privacy comparison operations. However, at present, when it comes to comparing values ​​between two secure parties, the following problems exist:

[0003] (1) Existing solutions to the problem of secure two-party numerical comparison mostly use computing frameworks developed based on traditional basic cryptographic primitives such as homomorphic encryption, secret sharing, and obfuscated circuits. These methods rely on ciphertext space calculations with extremely high time and space complexity, which leads to low practicality and efficiency. (2) The output of existing protocols for secure two-party numerical comparison is neither fair nor consistent. The calculation result is usually obtained by one party first, and then the other party is notified of the comparison result. This model has the problem that the output is too dependent on whether one party is trustworthy. Once the party that obtains the comparison result first exits the protocol early or broadcasts an error, it will be rejected. If an incorrect result is obtained, the final correct comparison result cannot be obtained; (3) The existing solutions to the problem of secure two-party numerical comparison aim to verify whether the difference between the two numbers to be compared is greater than zero, and to protect the difference by introducing a random confusion value. Therefore, there is a problem of over-protecting the difference result and introducing additional computing overhead and memory overhead; (4) The application scenarios of existing solutions involving secure two-party numerical comparison mostly rely on outsourced cloud service systems. The reliability of the third-party cloud service computing platform is not high or it may be attacked by malicious nodes, which may cause the leakage of intermediate calculation results or key key information, further causing the security risk of privacy leakage of the original data party. Summary of the invention

[0004] The purpose of this application is to provide a secure two-party real number comparison method and device based on nonlinear mapping, which can realize efficient, secure and reliable privacy nonlinear numerical calculation.

[0005] To achieve the above objectives, this application provides the following solutions:

[0006] In a first aspect, the present application provides a secure two-party real number comparison method based on nonlinear mapping, comprising:

[0007] Obtaining secure two-party real number comparison request information; the secure two-party real number comparison request information includes a real number comparison request, a first secure party node and a corresponding first secure party real number, a second secure party node and a corresponding second secure party real number;

[0008] Matching a corresponding secure two-party real number comparison protocol based on the real number comparison request, and then executing the secure two-party real number comparison protocol on the first security party real number and the second security party real number based on the first security party node and the second security party node to obtain a first security party calculation result and a second security party calculation result;

[0009] Determine a real number comparison result between the first security side real number and the second security side real number according to the first security side calculation result and the second security side calculation result;

[0010] Among them, the secure two-party real number comparison protocol is determined based on the secure two-party nonlinear mapping protocol and symbol conversion processing; the secure two-party nonlinear mapping protocol is determined based on the vector space mapping transformation and the secure two-party scalar product protocol; the secure two-party scalar product protocol is determined based on random vectors, random numbers, auxiliary computing nodes and secure data obfuscation technology.

[0011] In a second aspect, the present application provides a secure two-party real number comparison device based on nonlinear mapping, comprising:

[0012] The task acquisition module is used to: parse and acquire the secure two-party real number comparison request information issued by the computing requester; the secure two-party real number comparison request information includes a real number comparison request, a first secure party node and a corresponding first secure party real number, a second secure party node and a corresponding second secure party real number;

[0013] A secure computing module, configured to: match a corresponding secure two-party real number comparison protocol based on the real number comparison request;

[0014] A comparison calculation module, configured to: based on the first security party node and the second security party node, execute the secure two-party real number comparison protocol on the first security party real number and the second security party real number to obtain a first security party calculation result and a second security party calculation result;

[0015] a data sending module, configured to: return the first security party calculation result and the second security party calculation result to the calculation requester, and determine at the calculation requester a real number comparison result of the first security party real number and the second security party real number according to the first security party calculation result and the second security party calculation result;

[0016] Among them, the secure two-party real number comparison protocol is determined based on the secure two-party nonlinear mapping protocol and symbol conversion processing; the secure two-party nonlinear mapping protocol is determined based on the vector space mapping transformation and the secure two-party scalar product protocol; the secure two-party scalar product protocol is determined based on random vectors, random numbers, auxiliary computing nodes and secure data obfuscation technology.

[0017] According to the specific embodiments provided by the present application, the present application discloses the following technical effects: the present application provides a secure two-party real number comparison method and device based on nonlinear mapping, based on real number comparison request matching corresponding secure two-party real number comparison protocol, and then based on the first security party node and the second security party node, the secure two-party real number comparison protocol is executed on the first security party real number and the second security party real number to obtain the first security party calculation result and the second security party calculation result, and then obtain the real number comparison result. It should be noted that the secure two-party real number comparison protocol plays an important role in this process, and the secure two-party real number comparison protocol is determined based on the secure two-party nonlinear mapping protocol and symbol conversion processing. By calling the secure two-party nonlinear mapping protocol and symbol conversion, the privacy protection and fair output of the two-party comparison results are achieved at the lowest computing cost. The secure two-party nonlinear mapping protocol is determined based on the vector space mapping transformation and the secure two-party scalar product protocol. By calling the secure two-party scalar product protocol to calculate the nonlinear mapping values ​​corresponding to each input, the existing problems of high ciphertext calculation complexity, high communication overhead and low availability based on homomorphic encryption, secret sharing and obfuscated circuit schemes are solved, and an efficient and secure two-party numerical comparison scheme without relying on a third-party cloud service platform is realized. The secure two-party scalar product protocol is determined based on random vectors, random numbers, auxiliary computing nodes and secure data obfuscation technology, and the setting of the secure two-party scalar product protocol is designed based on the secure data obfuscation technology idea. The secure two-party scalar product protocol does not need to introduce any secret key and due to its own characteristics of obfuscating encrypted data based on the real number field, it ensures the security of "one-time one-key" while also taking into account the lower computing cost requirements. BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS

[0018] In order to more clearly illustrate the embodiments of the present application or the technical solutions in the prior art, the drawings required for use in the embodiments will be briefly introduced below. Obviously, the drawings described below are only some embodiments of the present application. For ordinary technicians in this field, other drawings can be obtained based on these drawings without paying creative work.

[0019] Figure 1 This is a flow chart of a method for safely comparing two real numbers based on nonlinear mapping in one embodiment of the present application;

[0020] Figure 2This is a schematic diagram of the security data obfuscation technology in one embodiment of the present application;

[0021] Figure 3 This is a schematic diagram of a secure two-party scalar product problem in an embodiment of the present application;

[0022] Figure 4 This is a flow chart of a secure two-party scalar product calculation protocol in one embodiment of the present application;

[0023] Figure 5 This is a schematic diagram of a secure two-party nonlinear mapping problem in an embodiment of the present application;

[0024] Figure 6 This is a flow chart of a secure two-party nonlinear mapping protocol in an embodiment of the present application;

[0025] Figure 7 This is a flow chart of a secure two-party numerical comparison protocol in one embodiment of the present application;

[0026] Figure 8 This is a schematic diagram of a problem of comparing two secure values ​​in one embodiment of the present application;

[0027] Fig. 9 Schematic diagram of a secure two-party real number comparison device based on nonlinear mapping in one embodiment of the present application. DETAILED DESCRIPTION

[0028] The following will be combined with the drawings in the embodiments of the present application to clearly and completely describe the technical solutions in the embodiments of the present application. Obviously, the described embodiments are only part of the embodiments of the present application, not all of the embodiments. Based on the embodiments in the present application, all other embodiments obtained by ordinary technicians in this field without creative work are within the scope of protection of this application.

[0029] The following is an explanation of some terms appearing in this application:

[0030] The semi-honest model (Semi-Honest Adversaries Security) is a specific protocol that assumes that all participants in the calculation will honestly participate in the privacy calculation and strictly follow each step of the process. However, there is a risk that some corrupted participants will try to infer the privacy of other participants through the intermediate or final results of the protocol execution process.

[0031] The Secure 2-Party DotProduct Protocol (S2PDP) assumes that there are two mutually untrusting parties, P1 and P2, each of which holds a secret input vector x and y, and jointly executes a two-party scalar product protocol f(x, y) = Output(v 1, v 2 ) = x ⊙ y, and finally each participant obtains the corresponding output v 1 , v 2 , and the output satisfies v 1 + v 2 = x ⊙ y. During the entire calculation process, each participant node only knows the input and output data involved in its own calculation process and cannot obtain any intermediate calculation results of other participants.

[0032] The Secure Two-Party Comparison Protocol (S2PC) assumes that there are two distrustful participants, P1 and P2. Each participant holds a secret real number x and y as inputs respectively, and they jointly execute a two-party comparison protocol and U a = U b = Sign(δ) = Output{-1, 0, 1}. Finally, each participant knows the size relationship between each other, where "-1" represents x < y, "0" represents x = y, and "1" represents x > y. During the entire calculation process, each participant node only knows the input and output data involved in its own calculation process and cannot obtain any intermediate calculation results of other participants.

[0033] Non-Linear Mapping specifically refers to a family of unary monotonic functions jointly coupled by an n + 1-dimensional parameter vector θ = {(θ 0 , θ 1 , θ 2 , …, θ n )|(θ i ∈ R + , i = 1 ~ n)} defined in the positive real number field and a set of odd power functions in the random element functions. The function can be formalized as where is a power function randomly selected from the set , and the function vector F(x) = (1, f 1 (x), f 2 (x), …, f n (x)).

[0034] Secure Data Disguising Technology (SDDT) is a data protection method used to protect the intermediate results of multi-party secure computing. By rationally constructing a computing protocol, the computing results are randomly split so that the outputs of multiple parties together constitute the true target computing results in a linear combination, ultimately achieving a one-time, one-key data privacy protection effect.

[0035] Privacy-Preserving Computing Technology refers specifically to a series of information security technologies that break down data silos, coordinate multi-party computing, and ultimately achieve complex computing and modeling analysis on multi-source data without exposing the privacy of private data of all parties, thereby ensuring that data elements are "available but invisible" during the circulation and integration process.

[0036] In order to make the purpose, features and advantages of the present application more obvious and easy to understand, the present application is further described in detail below in conjunction with the accompanying drawings and specific implementation methods.

[0037] In an exemplary embodiment, Figure 1 As shown, a secure two-party real number comparison method based on nonlinear mapping is provided, which is executed by a computer device, and can be specifically executed by a computer device such as a terminal or a server alone, or can be executed by a terminal and a server together. In an embodiment of the present application, the following steps 101 to 103 are included.

[0038] Step 101, obtaining secure two-party real number comparison request information; the secure two-party real number comparison request information includes a real number comparison request, a first secure party node and a corresponding first secure party real number, a second secure party node and a corresponding second secure party real number.

[0039] Step 102, matching the corresponding secure two-party real number comparison protocol based on the real number comparison request, and then executing the secure two-party real number comparison protocol on the first security party real number and the second security party real number based on the first security party node and the second security party node to obtain the first security party calculation result and the second security party calculation result.

[0040] Step 103, determining a real number comparison result of the first security party real number and the second security party real number according to the first security party calculation result and the second security party calculation result;

[0041] Among them, the secure two-party real number comparison protocol is determined based on the secure two-party nonlinear mapping protocol and symbol conversion processing; the secure two-party nonlinear mapping protocol is determined based on the vector space mapping transformation and the secure two-party scalar product protocol; the secure two-party scalar product protocol is determined based on random vectors, random numbers, auxiliary computing nodes and secure data obfuscation technology.

[0042] In order to more intuitively demonstrate the algorithm flow of the secure two-party real number comparison protocol, the following content will be derived and expressed in the order of secure data obfuscation technology, secure two-party scalar product protocol, secure two-party nonlinear mapping protocol, and secure two-party real number comparison protocol. In addition, in the following, the first security party node can be represented by node Alice, and the second security party node can be represented by node Bob.

[0043] (1) Security data obfuscation technology

[0044] For most multi-party computations, the process of implementing secure computation usually involves multiple steps of interaction. In the process of interaction, one problem is inevitable: how to ensure the security of the intermediate results. For example, when the product of two matrices A×B is used as the intermediate result of the computation, no matter whether the participating node Alice or the node Bob obtains the result of the final matrix A×B, any of the nodes may be able to infer the data information of the other node. Therefore, in the privacy computing process, it is necessary not only to ensure the security of the initial input data, but also to ensure the security of the intermediate results of the computation.

[0045] To solve this problem, the present application applies secure data obfuscation encryption technology, that is, by decomposing any multi-objective operation into a new multi-objective addition to obfuscate the result of calculating the intermediate value. Taking the two-party operation type as an example, the principle is as follows: Figure 2 Assume S k =F k (A i ,B i ), F k is the target calculation function of the kth step, A i is the private input data of node Alice at step k, B i is the private input data of node Bob in step k. When executing step k of the multi-party secure computation protocol, the intermediate result S k The following constraints will be strictly followed: Alice only knows her own calculation result A k and Bob only knows the result B k , and A k +B k =S k . Formula [A i :B i ]→[A k :Bk |A k +B k =F k (A i ,B i )] represents the process of transferring the intermediate value. During the whole process, nodes Alice and Bob are not allowed to exchange each other’s data information, including the calculation of the intermediate result after splitting A k and B k ; Similarly, for the k+1th step, the input and The output A of node Alice and node Bob in step k k and B k The transmission structure, and and Its output A k+1 and B k+1 satisfy Node Alice only knows her own calculation result A k+1 and node Bob only knows the result B k+1 Therefore, as long as the intermediate value is split into two random data items and stored separately in the two computing participants at each step of the calculation, it can be guaranteed that no party can reverse the original data item from the obfuscated encrypted data, making the entire privacy computing process more secure.

[0046] Based on this, this application further provides a secure two-party scalar product protocol.

[0047] (II) Secure Two-Party Scalar Product Protocol.

[0048] Before determining the process of the secure two-party scalar product protocol, we first need to define the problem: It is known that there are two computing parties or computing nodes Alice and Bob, who are independent and do not trust each other. Node Alice holds an n-dimensional private vector α = (α 1 ,α 2 ,…,α n ) T , node Bob holds an n-dimensional private vector β = (β 1 ,β 2 ,…,β n ) T The two nodes hope to achieve f by jointly executing a secure two-way scalar product protocol. S2PDP (α,β)=α⊙β=W a +W b , and finally each computing node gets its corresponding output W a , W b, and send it to the calculation requester to aggregate and obtain the desired scalar product result of the two parties. During the calculation process, each participating node can only understand its own input and output information, and cannot obtain the intermediate calculation results and held data information of other participants. The problem defined above can be Figure 3 shown.

[0049] Corresponding to the above problems, such as Figure 4 As shown, the process of the secure two-party scalar product protocol in this application includes:

[0050] (21) Obtain a first private vector generated at the first security party node and a second private vector generated at the second security party node; wherein, when the first private vector is the first security party private parameter vector, the corresponding second private vector is the second security party private input vector; when the first private vector is the first security party private input vector, the corresponding second private vector is the second security party private parameter vector.

[0051] It should be noted that this step is only required when executing the secure two-party nonlinear mapping protocol. If only the secure two-party scalar product protocol is called in the actual application, this step can be skipped directly to directly obtain the corresponding private vector as input.

[0052] (22) Calling an auxiliary computing node (CommodityServer, CS), and randomly generating a first random vector and a corresponding first random number, a second random vector and a corresponding second random number at the auxiliary computing node; wherein the sum of the first random number and the second random number is equal to the scalar product of the first random vector and the second random vector.

[0053] Specifically, the auxiliary computing node generates a first random vector R with a dimension of n a , the second random vector R of dimension n b and the first random number r a , the second random number r b These random variables strictly satisfy the following constraints r a +r b =R a ⊙R b .

[0054] (23) The first random vector R is converted by the auxiliary computing node CS a and the first random number r a Send to the first security node Alice; use the auxiliary computing node CS to convert the second random vector R b and the second random number r b Send to the second security party node Bob.

[0055] (24) At the first security node Alice, according to the first random vector R a , the first private vector α determines the first encryption vector The specific calculation formula is: Then the first encryption vector Sent to the second security node Bob, where the second private output W is randomly generated b ∈R, and according to the second random number r b , the second private output W b , the first encryption vector And the second private vector β calculates the intermediate result t, and the specific calculation formula is: The intermediate result t is then sent to the first secure party node Alice.

[0056] (25) At the second security node Bob, according to the second random vector R b , the second private vector β determines the second encryption vector The specific calculation formula is: Then the second encryption vector Send to the first security party node Alice.

[0057] (26) At the first security party node Alice, according to the intermediate result t, the second encryption vector The first random number r a and the first random vector R a Calculate the first private output W a , the specific calculation formula is:

[0058] (27) Marking the second private output as the second scalar product sub-result or the fourth scalar product sub-result, and marking the first private output as the first scalar product sub-result or the third scalar product sub-result; wherein the sum of the first scalar product sub-result and the second scalar product is equal to the scalar product of the first private vector α and the second private vector β, that is, α⊙β=W a +W b .

[0059] In practical applications, if only the secure two-party scalar product protocol is executed, the final obfuscated split result W a , W b Sent to the computation requester, who aggregates the final product and can verify it within the computation requester:

[0060] (III) Secure two-party nonlinear mapping protocol.

[0061] Before determining the process of the secure two-party nonlinear mapping protocol, we first need to define the problem: It is known that there are two computing participants, Alice and Bob, who are independent of each other and do not trust each other. Alice holds private data a∈R and private parameter vector θ stored only in her own computing node. a =(θ a0 ,θ a1 ,θ a2 ,…,θ an )∈R + , Bob holds private data b∈R and private parameter vector θ stored only in his own computing node b =(θ b0 ,θ b1 ,θ b2 ,…,θ bn )∈R + The two computing participants, Alice and Bob, collaborate to compute a nonlinear mapping Get the function value corresponding to each private data when x=a or b The nonlinear mapping The parameters θ in the equation are determined by the private parameter vector θ of both parties. a and θ b Together they satisfy the relationship θ=θ a +θ b , and both parties keep their parameter vectors θ secret from each other a and θ b Therefore, this problem is equivalent to: both parties need to know the function vector F(x) = (1,f 1 (x),f 2 (x),…,f n (x)) but with unknown distribution of parameter θ, we construct a two-party nonlinear mapping protocol ψ(a, b, θ a ,θ b )=θ⊙F(x)=(U a ,U b ), and obtain the corresponding mapping output results through collaborative calculation During the calculation process, each participant node can only understand its own input and output information, and cannot obtain any intermediate calculation results and final output of other participants. The problem defined above can be explained as follows: Figure 5 shown.

[0062] Based on the above defined problems, this application studies the following design principles:

[0063] First, for nonlinear mapping For collection An arbitrary power function extracted from , which can also be replaced by a set of more general monotonically increasing functions, so the set It can be expressed as a monotonically increasing function over the real number field Differentiable, and f'(x)≥0}. Since the first-order derivative of the nonlinear mapping function family By the positive domain parameter θ i and the even power function f' in the non-negative domain i =x 2k , k=1,2,…n, so it is easy to know is always a monotonically increasing function. In practical applications, the parameter θ can be defined on the negative domain, and the power function set It can be expressed as a family of monotonically decreasing functions over the real number field so that the mapping still maintains its monotonically increasing property.

[0064] To unite two mutually distrusting parties to collaboratively calculate the real number domain The nonlinear mapping of Alice and Bob is not exposing their private data {a,θ a} and {b,θ b}, both parties obtain the corresponding mapping output value and In order to simplify the analysis, in this application, f i (x) = x 2i-1 , then the nonlinear mapping can be expressed as Furthermore, the nonlinear mapping is transformed into tensor space and represented as vector inner product calculation Where X is the n+1-dimensional vector X=(1,x,x 3 ,…,x 2n-1 ).

[0065] According to the above problem definition, participants Alice and Bob each hold private parameters θ of the nonlinear mapping a =(θ a0 ,θ a1 ,θ a2 ,…,θ an )∈R n+1 and θ b =(θ b0 ,θ b1 ,θ b2 ,…,θ bn )∈R n+1 , and the private parameters satisfy θ=θ a +θ b , so the problem can be further transformed into Obviously, when the input variable x belongs to the node Alice, the calculation process of the mapping function value of the corresponding node Alice can be expressed as At this time, you only need to call the S2PDP protocol once to get f S2PDP (X a ,θ b )=V a1 +V b1 , then the output V b =V b1 Send it to the node Alice, who will summarize the intermediate calculation results of the two parties (V a ,V b ) to get the corresponding x a The mapping value of Similarly, when the input variable x comes from node Bob, there is a similar derivation: At this time, only one call to the S2PDP protocol f S2PDP (θ a ,X b )=V a2 +V b2 , then the output V a '=V a2 It is also sent to the node Bob, who summarizes the intermediate calculation results of the two parties (V a ',V b ') Get the corresponding mapping value

[0066] Corresponding to the above problems, such as Figure 6 As shown, the process of the secure two-party nonlinear mapping protocol in this application includes:

[0067] (31) Obtain the first security party node Alice and the corresponding first security party real number a, the second security party node Bob and the corresponding second security party real number b.

[0068] (32) Generate a first security party private parameter vector at the first security party node Alice, and perform a vector space mapping transformation based on the first security party real number to generate a first security party private input vector; generate a second security party private parameter vector at the second security party node, and perform a vector space mapping transformation based on the second security party real number to generate a second security party private input vector. So far, the process is completed. Figure 6 Processing within the preprocessing module.

[0069] Taking the steps performed at the first security party node Alice as an example, the steps of determining the first security party private parameter vector and the first security party private input vector include:

[0070] 321) Obtain a random parameter n determined by the first security party node Alice and the second security party node Bob through negotiation; in an application example, n is a positive integer, n≥2.

[0071] 322) At the first security party node Alice, a set of |n|+1-dimensional parameter vectors θ is generated based on the random parameters a =(θ a0 ,θ a1 ,θ a2 ,…,θ an )∈R + , and marked as the first security party private parameter vector.

[0072] 323) At the first security party node Alice, a mapping transformation from a unary real number to an |n|+1 dimensional vector space is performed based on the first security party real number a To obtain the first security party private input vector X a =(1,a,a 3 ,…,a 2n-1 ).

[0073] The steps performed at the second security party node Bob can be obtained in the same way, which will not be repeated here. The corresponding second security party private parameter vector is θ b =(θ b0 ,θ b1 ,θ b2 ,…,θ bn )∈R + , the second security party private input vector is X b =(1,b,b 3 ,…,b 2n-1 ).

[0074] (33) Input the private vector X to the first security party a ∈R n+1 , the second security party private parameter vector θ b ∈R n+1 Execute the secure two-party scalar product protocol S2PDP by computing f S2PDP (X a ,θ b )=θ b ⊙X a To get the first scalar product result V a1 ∈R, the second scalar product result V b1∈R, and send it to the first security node Alice and the second security node Bob respectively. It should be noted that at this time, the formula is satisfied: f S2PDP (X a ,θ b )=V a1 +V b1 =θ b ⊙X a .

[0075] (34) The second scalar product sub-result V is transmitted to the second security party node Bob. b1 ∈R is sent to the first security party node Alice; at the first security party node Alice, the first security party private parameter vector θ a With the first security party private input vector X a Perform scalar product calculation to obtain the first vector scalar product result. The specific calculation formula is: T a =θ a ⊙X a ; Then, at the first secure party node Alice, according to the first vector scalar product result T a , the first scalar product result V a1 and the second scalar product result V b1 , determine the first security party mapping result U a , the specific calculation formula is: U a =(T a +V a1 )+V b1 .

[0076] (35) Input the second security party private vector X b ∈R n+1 , the first security party private parameter vector θ a ∈R n+1 Execute the secure two-party scalar product protocol by computing f S2PDP (X b ,θ a )=θ a ⊙X b To get the third scalar product result V a2 ∈R, the fourth scalar product result V b2 ∈R, and send it to the first security node Alice and the second security node Bob respectively. It should be noted that at this time, the formula is satisfied: f S2PDP (X b ,θ a )=V a2 +V b2 =θ a ⊙X b .

[0077] (36) The third scalar product sub-result V is transmitted to the first secure party node Alice. a2 ∈R is sent to the second security party node Bob; at the second security party node Bob, the second security party private parameter vector θ b With the second security party private input vector X b Perform a scalar product calculation to obtain the second vector scalar product result T b , the specific calculation formula is: T b =θ b ⊙X b ; Then at the second security node, according to the second vector scalar product result T b , the third scalar product result V a2 and the fourth scalar product result V a2 , determine the second security party mapping result U b , the specific calculation formula is: U b =(T b +V b2 )+V a2 .

[0078] In practical applications, if only the secure two-party scalar product protocol is executed, the final private mapping function value U a , U b Sent to the computing requester, who will summarize and verify: For the participant node Alice: Similarly, for the participant node Bob, there is

[0079] (iv) Secure two-party real number comparison protocol.

[0080] The problem of secure two-party real number comparison usually occurs in application scenarios such as privacy intersection of distributed databases, privacy ranking of online decision trees, and privacy-preserving deep neural networks, and has extensive research value. Therefore, in order to maintain generality, let the initial input of Alice's calculation of the participating nodes in the protocol be a real number a∈R, and the initial input of Bob's calculation of the participating nodes be a real number b∈R. On this basis, Figure 7 As shown, the process of the secure two-party real number comparison protocol in this application includes:

[0081] (41) Obtain the first security party node Alice and the corresponding first security party real number a, the second security party node Bob and the corresponding second security party real number b.

[0082] (42) Based on the first security party node Alice and the second security party node Bob, perform a secure two-party nonlinear mapping protocol S2PNLM on the first security party real number a and the second security party real number b to obtain a first security party mapping result And the second security party mapping result Due to the mapping process within the protocol and They are independent and unrelated to each other, so they can be executed in parallel to improve computing efficiency.

[0083] (43) The first security party mapping result is mapped to the first security party node Alice. Send it to the second security party node Bob, and then combine it with the second security party mapping result at the second security party node Bob Perform a sign conversion to obtain the second security calculation result V b .

[0084] In a specific practical application, the second security party calculates the result V b The determination process includes:

[0085] 431) Obtain the symbol conversion function Sign(x) at the second security party node as:

[0086]

[0087] x is the difference between the first security party mapping result and the second security party mapping result. Figure 7 In the embodiment, the symbol conversion module includes the symbol conversion function.

[0088] 432) using the difference between the first security side mapping result and the second security side mapping result as the input of the symbol conversion function to obtain the second security side calculation result V b ; The specific formula is: V b =Sign(σ)=δ∈{-1,0,1};σ=U a -U b As input to the sign function Sign(x).

[0089] Since the nonlinear mapping function is a monotonically increasing function in the real number domain, the calculation requester can easily infer the relative size relationship between Alice's private data a and Bob's private data b based on the positive or negative value of the final comparison function output result δ.

[0090] (44) The second security party mapping result is mapped to Send to the first security party node Alice, and then combine the first security party mapping result at the first security party node Alice Perform a sign conversion to obtain the first security calculation result V a .

[0091] In another specific practical application, step 103 includes:

[0092] (51) Obtain the calculation requester corresponding to the real number comparison request.

[0093] (52) The first security calculation result V a And the second security party calculation result V b are all sent to the computing requester.

[0094] (53) The calculation requesting party calculates the received first security party calculation result V a And the second security party calculation result V b Perform consistency comparison (this consistency comparison here can ensure the reliability of the comparison result, because when the first security node Alice and the second security node Bob calculate accurately and do not lie, V a =V b Always holds true, if V a ≠V b Then one party must have made a mistake in calculation); after consistency comparison, according to the calculation result V of the first security party a Or the second security party calculates the result V b Determine a real number comparison result; the real number comparison result is used to characterize the relative size relationship between the first safety side real number and the second safety side real number.

[0095] Specifically, under the premise of reliable results, the result V is calculated according to the first security method. a Or the second security party calculates the result V b The positive or negative value of can quickly infer the relative size relationship between the private data a of node Alice and the private data b of node Bob. a =V b = -1, a <b,V a =V b =0, a=b, V a =V b When =1, a>b.

[0096] In addition, from the overall perspective of the solution, this application solves the problem of safe comparison of two real numbers, which can be solved as follows Figure 8As shown: It is known that two computing participants, Alice and Bob, are independent and do not trust each other. Alice holds a private data a∈R stored only in her own computing node, and Bob holds a private data b∈R stored only in his own computing node. The two participants jointly execute a secure two-party real number comparison protocol π(a,b)=sign(ab)=V a =V b , and finally each computing participant node gets its corresponding output indicator V a 、V b ∈{1,0,-1}, and sent to the calculation requester to obtain the expected result of the comparison of the two numerical values. During the calculation process, each participating node can only obtain its own input and output information during the calculation process, and cannot obtain the intermediate settlement results and private data information held by other participants.

[0097] For the above-mentioned problem of secure two-party real number comparison, this application provides a secure two-way scalar product protocol S2PDP based on secure data obfuscation technology. This protocol has the characteristics of lightweight, low overhead, and high computational efficiency. It solves the problems of large communication overhead, high computational complexity, and low availability caused by the mixed calls of technologies such as homomorphic encryption, secret sharing, oblivious transmission, and obfuscated circuits in existing cryptographic schemes. This application also proposes for the first time a privacy protection solution for the problem of two-party collaborative computing of nonlinear mappings. Its key technical point is the introduction of a family of monotonically increasing functions based on the joint construction of the two parties, and its order-preserving property is the key to ensuring the correctness and security of the final comparison result. This application ensures the reliability and fairness of the final output result by performing symbol conversion on the intermediate results of the dual mapping protocol, solving the problem of result reliability and fairness caused by one party knowing the result first in the traditional scheme.

[0098] In practical applications, in order to improve computing efficiency, the secure two-party real number comparison method based on nonlinear mapping in the present application also includes: the computing operations required to be performed by the first security party node and the computing operations required to be performed by the second security party node are executed asynchronously and in parallel.

[0099] Based on the same inventive concept, the embodiment of the present application also provides a secure two-party real number comparison device for implementing the secure two-party real number comparison method based on nonlinear mapping involved above. The implementation scheme for solving the problem provided by the device is similar to the implementation scheme recorded in the above method, so the specific limitations in one or more embodiments of the secure two-party real number comparison device based on nonlinear mapping provided below can refer to the limitations of the secure two-party real number comparison method based on nonlinear mapping above, and will not be repeated here.

[0100] In an exemplary embodiment, Fig. 9As shown, a secure two-party real number comparison device based on nonlinear mapping is provided, including a task acquisition module, a security calculation module, a rule generation module, a consensus calculation module, and a data sending module.

[0101] The task acquisition module is used to: parse and obtain the secure two-party real number comparison request information issued by the calculation requester (such as a client); the secure two-party real number comparison request information includes a real number comparison request, a first security party node and the corresponding first security party real number, a second security party node and the corresponding second security party real number.

[0102] The secure computing module is used to match the corresponding secure two-party real number comparison protocol based on the real number comparison request.

[0103] A comparison calculation module is used to: based on the first security party node and the second security party node, execute the secure two-party real number comparison protocol on the first security party real number and the second security party real number to obtain the first security party calculation result and the second security party calculation result. In a specific application example, the comparison calculation module includes a rule generation module and a consensus calculation module that communicate with each other.

[0104] The rule generation module is used to: determine the computing operations that need to be performed by the first security party node and the computing operations that need to be performed by the second security party node based on the secure two-party real number comparison protocol (that is, to achieve the splitting of computing tasks so that different computing nodes perform collaborative computing according to their respective corresponding self-rules), and construct an asynchronous parallel execution process; determine the computing operation instructions of the two nodes based on the asynchronous parallel execution process, and send them to the first security party node and the second security party node respectively, until the first security party calculation result and the second security party calculation result are obtained at the end of the asynchronous parallel execution process.

[0105] The consensus computing module is used to monitor the computing operations in the first security party node and the computing operations in the second security party node, and match them with the asynchronous parallel execution process to ensure the order of real number comparison between the two security parties, thereby ensuring the synchronization of calculations between different nodes and the consistency of results.

[0106] The data sending module is used to: return the first security party calculation result and the second security party calculation result to the calculation requester, and determine the real number comparison result of the first security party real number and the second security party real number at the calculation requester based on the first security party calculation result and the second security party calculation result.

[0107] Among them, the secure two-party real number comparison protocol is determined based on the secure two-party nonlinear mapping protocol and symbol conversion processing; the secure two-party nonlinear mapping protocol is determined based on the vector space mapping transformation and the secure two-party scalar product protocol; the secure two-party scalar product protocol is determined based on random vectors, random numbers, auxiliary computing nodes and secure data obfuscation technology.

[0108] In a specific practical application, a computing framework is deployed based on the secure two-party real number comparison device based on nonlinear mapping of the present application, and then the calculation of the two-party secure numerical comparison task is participated in. The process is as follows: a client outside the framework sends a request for two-party numerical comparison to a network end deployed with a distributed computing service through HTTP or GRPC communication protocol; when the task acquisition module of the node on the group network receives the request for numerical comparison, it parses it and starts the secure computing service process of the corresponding computing participant nodes Alice and Bob; when the task acquisition module parses the corresponding computing requirement, it passes it to the secure computing module, performs a joint query through its internal interface, and matches the corresponding secure computing protocol (which can be a secure two-party scalar product protocol, a secure The two-party nonlinear mapping protocol and the secure two-party real number comparison protocol are synchronized to the rule generation modules in the two participating nodes; the rule generation module will formulate different asynchronous parallel execution processes according to the different subtasks undertaken by the two different participating nodes, and maintain communication with the consensus calculation module at each step of the execution; while the two participating nodes execute each step of the calculation instructions, the consensus calculation module broadcasts and maintains the consistency of the results of the distributed computing nodes on the chain and the stability of the control execution process; after the calculation protocol is executed, the two participating nodes Alice and Bob obtain the results of each other's calculations, and then send the result sub-matrices after the confusion and splitting of the two parties to the calculation requester, that is, the client, through the data sending module, so as to obtain the correct calculation results.

[0109] In actual specific application scenarios, according to the different actual scenarios in which the client issues the calculation request, it can be divided into two cases: the first case is that the calculation request is an intermediate calculation requirement, and the real number comparison result obtained at this time can be used as the input for the next round of calculation, such as the maximum pooling layer in the deep neural network model training phase, the multi-level decision process in the decision tree model, etc.; the second case is that the calculation request is a separate calculation request, and the real number comparison result obtained at this time can be directly returned to the calculation requester, such as the simpler size comparison required in the calculation program.

[0110] In summary, compared with the prior art, this application has the following advantages:

[0111] (1) Based on the secure data obfuscation technology, this application proposes a secure two-way scalar product protocol S2PDP in a semi-honest scenario. Compared with the existing homomorphic encryption, secret sharing, and obfuscated circuit schemes, this protocol reduces the computational complexity to the O(n) level. At the same time, the number of interactions in the constant round and the intermediate transmission data are real numbers, ensuring that the communication overhead cost is controlled in a relatively low range, taking into account the balance of the three impossible triangle requirements of security, lightness, and efficiency.

[0112] (2) The present application proposes a numerical comparison method based on the secure two-party nonlinear mapping protocol S2PNLM. The two parties jointly hold a part of the parameters to ensure the computational security, introduce a power function set to construct a nonlinear mapping function family, and use its monotonic characteristic to ensure the relative size consistency of the output and input. The original input is converted into disguised data in the nonlinear function space for comparison, and the parallel call of S2PDP directly improves the computational timeliness of the dual numerical mapping. The above advantages directly avoid the problem of low efficiency caused by the additional computational overhead of the traditional method of using numerical difference for comparison.

[0113] (3) The present application does not directly output the output result of the S2PNLM protocol, but converts the intermediate calculation result that may carry the characteristics of the original data into a symbol element Sig(x)={-1,0,1} that only represents the relative size relationship of the two parties' data through a symbol conversion module. This method not only ensures that the final calculation requester cannot obtain any privacy related to the input through the output, but also ensures the reliability of the output through the consistency of the two. In particular, when the calculation requesters are Alice and Bob, both parties can obtain the final comparison results at the same time, solving the output unfairness problem existing in the traditional method.

[0114] (4) This application is a study of key technologies for integrated blockchain performance model and multi-level continuous collaborative optimization.

[0115] In another exemplary embodiment, a computer device is provided, including a memory and a processor, wherein a computer program is stored in the memory, and the processor implements the steps in the above-mentioned method embodiments when executing the computer program.

[0116] In another exemplary embodiment, a computer-readable storage medium is provided, storing a computer program, which implements the steps in the above method embodiments when executed by a processor.

[0117] In an exemplary embodiment, a computer program product is provided, including a computer program, and when the computer program is executed by a processor, the steps in the above method embodiments are implemented.

[0118] It should be noted that the user information (including but not limited to user device information, user personal information, etc.) and data (including but not limited to data used for analysis, stored data, displayed data, etc.) involved in this application are all information and data authorized by the user or fully authorized by all parties, and the collection, use and processing of relevant data must comply with relevant regulations.

[0119] Those of ordinary skill in the art can understand that all or part of the processes in the above-mentioned embodiment methods can be completed by instructing the relevant hardware through a computer program, and the computer program can be stored in a non-volatile computer-readable storage medium. When the computer program is executed, it can include the processes of the embodiments of the above-mentioned methods. Among them, any reference to the memory, database or other medium used in the embodiments provided in the present application can include at least one of non-volatile and volatile memory. Non-volatile memory can include read-only memory (ROM), magnetic tape, floppy disk, flash memory, optical memory, high-density embedded non-volatile memory, resistive random access memory (ReRAM), magnetic random access memory (MRAM), ferroelectric random access memory (FRAM), phase change memory (PCM), graphene memory, etc. Volatile memory can include random access memory (RAM) or external cache memory, etc. By way of illustration and not limitation, RAM may be in various forms, such as static random access memory (SRAM) or dynamic random access memory (DRAM).

[0120] The database involved in each embodiment provided in this application may include at least one of a relational database and a non-relational database. The non-relational database may include a distributed database based on blockchain, etc., but is not limited thereto. The processor involved in each embodiment provided in this application may be a general-purpose processor, a central processing unit, a graphics processor, a digital signal processor, a programmable logic device, a data processing logic device based on quantum computing, etc., but is not limited thereto.

[0121] The technical features of the above embodiments may be arbitrarily combined. To make the description concise, not all possible combinations of the technical features in the above embodiments are described. However, as long as there is no contradiction in the combination of these technical features, they should be considered to be within the scope of this specification.

[0122] This article uses specific examples to illustrate the principles and implementation methods of this application. The description of the above embodiments is only used to help understand the method and core ideas of this application. At the same time, for those skilled in the art, according to the ideas of this application, there will be changes in the specific implementation methods and application scope. In summary, the content of this specification should not be understood as limiting this application.

Claims

1. A secure two-way real number comparison method based on nonlinear mapping, characterized in that: The secure two-party real number comparison method based on nonlinear mapping includes: Obtaining secure two-party real number comparison request information; the secure two-party real number comparison request information includes a real number comparison request, a first secure party node and a corresponding first secure party real number, a second secure party node and a corresponding second secure party real number; Matching a corresponding secure two-party real number comparison protocol based on the real number comparison request, and then executing the secure two-party real number comparison protocol on the first security party real number and the second security party real number based on the first security party node and the second security party node to obtain a first security party calculation result and a second security party calculation result; Determine a real number comparison result between the first security side real number and the second security side real number according to the first security side calculation result and the second security side calculation result; Among them, the secure two-party real number comparison protocol is determined based on a secure two-party nonlinear mapping protocol and symbol conversion processing; the secure two-party nonlinear mapping protocol is determined based on a vector space mapping transformation and a secure two-party scalar product protocol; the secure two-party scalar product protocol is determined based on random vectors, random numbers, auxiliary computing nodes and secure data obfuscation technology.

2. The secure two-way real number comparison method based on nonlinear mapping according to claim 1, characterized in that: The process of the secure two-party real number comparison protocol includes: Obtain the first security party node and the corresponding first security party real number, the second security party node and the corresponding second security party real number; Based on the first security party node and the second security party node, perform a secure two-party nonlinear mapping protocol on the first security party real number and the second security party real number to obtain a first security party mapping result and a second security party mapping result; Sending the first security party mapping result to the second security party node through the first security party node, and then performing symbol conversion at the second security party node in combination with the second security party mapping result to obtain a second security party calculation result; The second security party mapping result is sent to the first security party node through the second security party node, and then the symbol conversion is performed at the first security party node in combination with the first security party mapping result to obtain the first security party calculation result.

3. The secure two-way real number comparison method based on nonlinear mapping according to claim 2, characterized in that: Performing symbol conversion at the second security party node in combination with the second security party mapping result to obtain a second security party calculation result, including: obtaining a symbol conversion function at the second security party node; using the difference between the first security party mapping result and the second security party mapping result as an input of the symbol conversion function to obtain the second security party calculation result; Wherein, the sign conversion function Sign(x) is: x is the difference between the first security party mapping result and the second security party mapping result.

4. The secure two-way real number comparison method based on nonlinear mapping according to claim 1, characterized in that: Determining a comparison result of the first security side real number and the second security side real number according to the first security side calculation result and the second security side calculation result, including: Obtaining a calculation requester corresponding to the real number comparison request; Sending the calculation result of the first security party and the calculation result of the second security party to the calculation requesting party; The calculation requesting party performs a consistency comparison on the received calculation results of the first security party and the calculation results of the second security party, and after the consistency comparison, determines the real number comparison result according to the calculation result of the first security party or the calculation result of the second security party; the real number comparison result is used to characterize the relative size relationship between the real number of the first security party and the real number of the second security party.

5. The secure two-way real number comparison method based on nonlinear mapping according to claim 1, characterized in that: The process of the secure two-party nonlinear mapping protocol includes: Obtain the first security party node and the corresponding first security party real number, the second security party node and the corresponding second security party real number; Generate a first security party private parameter vector at the first security party node, and perform a vector space mapping transformation based on the first security party real number to generate a first security party private input vector; generate a second security party private parameter vector at the second security party node, and perform a vector space mapping transformation based on the second security party real number to generate a second security party private input vector; Performing a secure two-party scalar product protocol on the first secure party private input vector and the second secure party private parameter vector to obtain a first scalar product sub-result and a second scalar product sub-result, and sending them to the first secure party node and the second secure party node respectively; The second scalar product sub-result is sent to the first security party node through the second security party node; a scalar product is calculated on the first security party private parameter vector and the first security party private input vector at the first security party node to obtain a first vector scalar product result; and then a first security party mapping result is determined at the first security party node according to the first vector scalar product result, the first scalar product sub-result and the second scalar product sub-result; Perform a secure two-party scalar product protocol on the second secure party private input vector and the first secure party private parameter vector to obtain a third scalar product sub-result and a fourth scalar product sub-result, and send them to the first secure party node and the second secure party node respectively; The third scalar product sub-result is sent to the second security party node through the first security party node; a scalar product is calculated on the second security party private parameter vector and the second security party private input vector at the second security party node to obtain a second vector scalar product result; and then a second security party mapping result is determined at the second security party node based on the second vector scalar product result, the third scalar product sub-result and the fourth scalar product sub-result.

6. The secure two-way real number comparison method based on nonlinear mapping according to claim 5, characterized in that: Generating a first security party private parameter vector at the first security party node, and performing a vector space mapping transformation based on the first security party real number to generate a first security party private input vector, including: Obtaining a random parameter n determined by negotiation between the first security party node and the second security party node; At the first security party node, a set of |n|+1-dimensional parameter vectors is generated based on the random parameters and marked as first security party private parameter vectors; At the first security party node, a mapping transformation from a unary real number to an |n|+1-dimensional vector space is performed based on the first security party real number to obtain a first security party private input vector.

7. The secure two-way real number comparison method based on nonlinear mapping according to claim 5, characterized in that: The process of the secure two-party scalar product protocol includes: Obtain a first private vector generated at the first security party node and a second private vector generated at the second security party node; wherein, when the first private vector is the first security party private parameter vector, the corresponding second private vector is the second security party private input vector; when the first private vector is the first security party private input vector, the corresponding second private vector is the second security party private parameter vector; Calling an auxiliary computing node, and randomly generating a first random vector and a corresponding first random number, a second random vector and a corresponding second random number at the auxiliary computing node; wherein the value of the sum of the first random number and the second random number is equal to the value of the scalar product of the first random vector and the second random vector; Sending the first random vector and the first random number to the first security node through the auxiliary computing node; sending the second random vector and the second random number to the second security node through the auxiliary computing node; Determine a first encryption vector at the first security party node according to the first random vector and the first private vector, then send the first encryption vector to the second security party node, randomly generate a second private output at the second security party node, calculate an intermediate result according to the second random number, the second private output, the first encryption vector and the second private vector, and then send the intermediate result to the first security party node; determining, at the second security party node, a second encryption vector according to the second random vector and the second private vector, and then sending the second encryption vector to the first security party node; At the first secure party node, calculating a first private output based on the intermediate result, the second encryption vector, the first random number, and the first random vector; The second private output is marked as a second scalar product subresult or a fourth scalar product subresult, and the first private output is marked as a first scalar product subresult or a third scalar product subresult; wherein the value of the sum of the first scalar product subresult and the second scalar product is equal to the value of the scalar product of the first private vector and the second private vector.

8. The secure two-way real number comparison method based on nonlinear mapping according to claim 1, 2, 4 or 5, characterized in that: The secure two-party real number comparison method based on nonlinear mapping also includes: the calculation operation required to be executed by the first security party node and the calculation operation required to be executed by the second security party node are executed asynchronously and in parallel.

9. A secure two-way real number comparison device based on nonlinear mapping, characterized in that: The secure two-party real number comparison device based on nonlinear mapping comprises: The task acquisition module is used to: parse and acquire the secure two-party real number comparison request information issued by the computing requester; the secure two-party real number comparison request information includes a real number comparison request, a first secure party node and a corresponding first secure party real number, a second secure party node and a corresponding second secure party real number; A secure computing module, configured to: match a corresponding secure two-party real number comparison protocol based on the real number comparison request; A comparison calculation module, configured to: based on the first security party node and the second security party node, execute the secure two-party real number comparison protocol on the first security party real number and the second security party real number to obtain a first security party calculation result and a second security party calculation result; a data sending module, configured to: return the first security party calculation result and the second security party calculation result to the calculation requester, and determine at the calculation requester a real number comparison result of the first security party real number and the second security party real number according to the first security party calculation result and the second security party calculation result; Among them, the secure two-party real number comparison protocol is determined based on the secure two-party nonlinear mapping protocol and symbol conversion processing; the secure two-party nonlinear mapping protocol is determined based on the vector space mapping transformation and the secure two-party scalar product protocol; the secure two-party scalar product protocol is determined based on random vectors, random numbers, auxiliary computing nodes and secure data obfuscation technology.

10. The secure two-way real number comparison device based on nonlinear mapping according to claim 9, characterized in that: The comparison calculation module includes a rule generation module and a consensus calculation module that communicate with each other; The rule generation module is used to: determine the computing operations required to be performed by the first security party node and the computing operations required to be performed by the second security party node based on the secure two-party real number comparison protocol, and construct an asynchronous parallel execution process; Determine two-node computing operation instructions based on the asynchronous parallel execution process, and send them to the first safety party node and the second safety party node respectively, until the first safety party computing result and the second safety party computing result are obtained at the end of the asynchronous parallel execution process; The consensus calculation module is used to monitor the calculation operations in the first security party node and the calculation operations in the second security party node, and match them with the asynchronous parallel execution process to ensure the real number comparison order between the two security parties.

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