Attribute-based ciphertext search method, medium and system for evidence release
Through the attribute-based ciphertext search method and system released by evidence, bilinear mapping and Witness Encryption technology are used to solve the problem of data visitors losing search capabilities and low access efficiency in cloud service environments, and achieve fine-grained access control and high efficiency ciphertext search and decryption process.
Patent Information
- Application Number
- CN202410913723.4
- Authority / Receiving Office
- CN · China
- Patent Type
- Applications(China)
- Current Assignee / Owner
- Filing Date
- 2024-07-09
- Publication Date
- 2024-11-12
AI Technical Summary
In a cloud service environment, data visitors lose the ability to search original files when uploading files by encrypting them, and existing searchable encryption technologies lack fine-grained access control and efficient access structure support.
A method and system for searching attribute-based ciphertext for evidence release is designed, using bilinear mapping technology and Witness Encryption (WE) technology to map access policies to multi-output circuit SAT problems, so as to realize the data owner's access structure and support it. Data visitors retrieve and download ciphertext data based on attributes and decrypt it offline.
It realizes that data owners formulate access policies, and data visitors can search and download ciphertext data and decrypt and obtain plaintext, which improves access efficiency and security, supports multi-party models, and reduces the number of encryption and decryption times.
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Figure CN118944864A_ABST
Abstract
Description
Technical Field
[0001] The present invention belongs to the fields of information processing technology and information security, and more specifically, to the fields of witness encryption (WE) technology and searchable encryption (SE) technology. In order to realize in a cloud service environment that when a data visitor encrypts and uploads files, the data visitor does not lose the ability to search for original files, and on the other hand, it is also necessary to realize that only when the attributes of the data visitor satisfy the access structure, the matching files can be retrieved and the plain text of the files is hidden from the cloud server, an attribute-based ciphertext search method, medium and system for evidence release are designed. Background Art
[0002] At present, the cloud-based outsourcing service model is becoming increasingly popular in the context of big data, resulting in more and more data being collected in cloud servers. However, cloud servers are not always completely trustworthy. An effective measure to solve this problem is to encrypt the data before the data owner outsources it to the cloud server. However, traditional symmetric encryption and asymmetric encryption cannot search for ciphertext on cloud servers. To solve this problem, searchable encryption is proposed, which supports searching encrypted data while protecting the data. However, most of the existing works give data accessors unlimited search capabilities without considering the search permissions of data accessors. In the practical application of searchable encryption, granting data accessors search permissions is a very important measure to strengthen data access control. Therefore, people proposed a technology of secondary encryption using attribute-based encryption and searchable encryption. In such a system, the data owner can control the keyword search permissions of data users in the form of mNP access policy by using attribute-based encryption primitives. However, these schemes do not have fine-grained access control capabilities and only support mNP access policies, that is, the access structure only allows AND gates and OR gates between attributes. In addition, the performance of secondary encryption is not high.
[0003] Therefore, in order to enable data owners to formulate access structures, encrypt and upload data, and data accessors whose attributes satisfy the access structure to search and download ciphertext data and decrypt offline to obtain plaintext data, we design an attribute-based ciphertext search method, medium and system for evidence release based on WE. We first present the bilinear mapping technology and symbolic definition used in this patent (as shown in Table 1), and then introduce the WE technology we use.
[0004] There exist two multiplicative cyclic groups G1 and G2 of prime order p, and the bilinear mapping relation e: G1×G1→G2 exists, which must satisfy the following three conditions at the same time:
[0005] Bilinear: For any chosen generator g1, g2∈G1 and Must satisfy e(g1,g2)∈G2.
[0006] Computability: For any g1, g2∈G1, e(g1, g2) can be computed in finite polynomial time.
[0007] Non-degeneracy: There exist g1, g2∈G1 such that e(g1, g2)≠1.
[0008] Table 1 Symbol definition table
[0009]
[0010] Witness Encryption (WE) technology: In 2013, Garg et al. proposed the concept of witness encryption. Unlike the traditional public key encryption method, which can only encrypt information with a public key and decrypt information when the corresponding private key is possessed, WE encrypts messages through specific problem instances. Problem instances come in many forms, such as crossword puzzles in newspapers, Goldbach's conjecture, or any NP search problem. When decrypting a message, when the receiver has the solution to the puzzle, a concise proof of the Goldbach conjecture, or the answer to the NP search problem, the message is decrypted. This article will use the WE construction based on the variant circuit SAT problem, because the access structure of ABSE can be intuitively converted into an instance of a variant circuit SAT problem. A variant circuit SAT problem is described as: For circuit C: L = {L i} i∈[1,l] =f(x1, x2, ..., x n ) and a set of expected Boolean output values y = {y i} i∈[1,l] , input W and get y′={y′ i} i∈[1,l] =f(W), satisfying If a variant circuit SAT problem belongs to NP language, that is, W exists, then the plaintext can be decrypted, and the data accessor who can restore W in the ABSE system can retrieve the ciphertext and decrypt it offline. If W does not exist, the plaintext is hidden, and the ciphertext cannot be retrieved or decrypted in the ABSE system. The WE algorithm is as follows:
[0011] WE.Enc(1 λ , X, M = {m i} i∈[1,l] ):
[0012] (1) Input security parameter 1λ, plaintext set ( As plaintext space ), select two multiplicative cyclic groups G1 and G2 of order p, the generator of G1 is g, the bilinear map is defined as e: G1×G1→G2, and the NP instance X of the variant SAT problem is: For circuit C: L = {L i} i∈[1,l] =f(x1, x2, ..., x n ) and a set of expected Boolean output values y = {y i} i∈[1,l] , input and get y′={y′ i} i∈[1,l] =f(W), satisfying
[0013] (2) Random selection exist In (will As ), and get the garbled circuit C ★ =(S = {S n , S n} n-1 , PD), the Boolean circuit encoding of this process is as follows:
[0014] If G = (w1, w2, OR, w). Assume w 1 =a, set up: and Assume that w 0 =a, Setting: A randomly selected element b in and .
[0015] If G = (w1, w2, AND, w). Assume w 1 =a, Setting: A randomly selected element b in and Assume that w 0 =a, set up: and
[0016] If G = (w1, NOT, w). Assume w b =a, b∈{0,1}, set up:
[0017] If G = (w, FO, w1, ..., w j ). b∈{0,1}, assuming Setting: The common parameters are defined as
[0018] also WE.Dec(X, CT, W):
[0019] (1) Input ciphertext CT, instance X and evidence If X∈L, then by decoding we get e(g, g) V (L i , b i ), b i ∈{0,1},i=1,2,...,l. The decoding rules are as follows:
[0020] If G = (w1, w2, OR, w). Assume V (w1, 1) = e (g, g) a Or V(w2,1)=e(g,g) a . Set: V(w,1)=e(g,g) a Assume V(w1,0) = e(g,g) b Or V(w2,0)=e(g,g) c . Set: V(w,0) = e(g,g) b+c .
[0021] If G = (w1, w2, AND, w). Assume V (w1, 0) = e (g, g) a Or V(w2,0)=e(g,g) a . Set: V(w,0) = e(g,g) a Assume V(w1,1)=e(g,g) b Or V(w2,1)=e(g,g) c . Set: V(w,1)=e(g,g) b+c .
[0022] If G = (w′, NOT, w). Assume V(w1, 1-b) = e(g, g) a . Set: V(w,b)=e(g,g) a .
[0023] If G = (w, FO, w1, ..., w j ).set up:
[0024] (2) Calculate and output Or ⊥, i=1,2,...,l. Summary of the invention
[0025] In a cloud service environment, when data accessors encrypt and upload files, they lose the ability to search for original files. On the other hand, during data access, executing NP access control can greatly improve access efficiency. The attribute-based ciphertext search method, medium and system based on evidence release disclosed in the present invention enable data owners to formulate access structures, encrypt and upload data, and data accessors whose attributes meet the access structure can search and download ciphertext data and decrypt offline to obtain plaintext data.
[0026] The technical solution adopted by the solution of the present invention is: an attribute-based ciphertext search method, medium and system for evidence release.
[0027] An attribute-based ciphertext search method, medium and system for evidence release, characterized by comprising the following steps:
[0028] Step 1: System initial configuration; the algorithm is initialized by AA running the algorithm;
[0029] Step 2: Key distribution phase; in this phase, the AA accepts the data accessor's request, calls the key generation algorithm, generates a key DK owned only by the data accessor through the master private key MSK, and issues a certificate;
[0030] Step 3: Registration phase; the data owner applies to AA for registration, and AA runs the algorithm and inputs the keyword master key to generate a keyword key for the data owner that only he owns;
[0031] Step 4: Keyword encryption stage; the data owner runs the keyword encryption algorithm, generates keyword ciphertext and makes it public;
[0032] Step 5: File encryption and storage stage; the data owner runs the shared file encryption algorithm, generates the shared file ciphertext and stores it in CS;
[0033] Step 6: Retrieval request phase; after the data accessor obtains the keyword ciphertext, he runs the trapdoor generation algorithm and sends the access trapdoor and access information as a retrieval request to the CS;
[0034] Step 7: Ciphertext retrieval phase: After receiving the retrieval request, CS runs the ciphertext retrieval algorithm to find a set of shared file ciphertexts, verify the access information, and respond to the request;
[0035] Step 8: Decryption phase: After receiving the CS response, the data accessor calls the shared file ciphertext to run the decryption algorithm and obtain the plaintext;
[0036] Furthermore, step 1 includes the following specific steps:
[0037] Step 1.1: AA calls the Setup algorithm, inputs the system security parameters, outputs the system master private key MSK and master public key MPK, and also generates the corresponding keyword master key {K i} i∈[1,l] , the Setup algorithm we proposed is as follows:
[0038] (1) Input security parameter 1 λ , select two multiplicative cyclic groups G1 and G2 of order p, the generator of G1 is g, and the bilinear map is defined as e: G1×G1→G2. Then randomly select Where 1≤i≤n, n represents the number of attributes;
[0039] (2) Obtain the master private key: MSK = <α, (t0i, t 1i , 1≤i≤n)};
[0040] (3) Set the master public key: 4 is the keyword set KW = {kw1, ..., kw l Each element in} is randomly Take the value from the table and generate the corresponding keyword master key K i ;
[0041] (4) Output MSK, MPK, {K i} i∈[1,l] ;
[0042] Step 1.2: Public master public key MPK:
[0043] Furthermore, step 2 includes the following specific steps:
[0044] Step 2.1: AA receives the data accessor attribute key application request;
[0045] Step 2.2: AA evaluates the data accessor and distributes the attribute label U DU And issue the certificate ca i The process includes: generating a signature Sig = Enc_by_priavate_CA[Hash(INFO i )].INFO i Includes the user name provided by the data accessor, and the corresponding attribute label U DU The signature is combined with the certificate version information, the certificate serial number (each certificate has a unique certificate serial number), the signature algorithm used by the certificate, the name of the certificate issuing agency, and the name of the certificate owner to form a digital certificate issuance; AA calls the key generation algorithm KeyGen, inputs the master private key MSK and the attribute label U of the data accessor DU, to generate the key DK, the KeyGen algorithm we proposed is as follows:
[0046] (1) Input the master key MSK and attribute tag U DU ;
[0047] (2) Calculate and output
[0048] Step 2.3: Install the certificate CA i The key DK is sent to the user through a trusted secret channel;
[0049] Furthermore, step 3 includes the following specific steps:
[0050] Step 3.1: AA receives the key application request from the data owner;
[0051] Step 3.2: Call the key generation algorithm Reg and input the keyword master key {K i} i∈[1,l] , to generate keyword key k, we propose the Reg algorithm as follows:
[0052] (1) Input the keyword master key set {K i} i∈[1,l] ;
[0053] (2) Select a random value for the data owner who runs the algorithm
[0054] (3) Generate and output its keyword key set k = {k i =H(K i , ID DO )} i∈[1,l] ;
[0055] Step 3.3: Send the keyword key k to the data owner;
[0056] Furthermore, step 4 includes the following specific steps:
[0057] Step 4.1: The data owner runs the keyword encryption algorithm EncKW, inputs security parameters, access policy, keyword key k, master public key MPK, and generates keyword ciphertext CT. The EncKW algorithm we proposed is as follows:
[0058] (1) Input security parameter 1 λ , access policy f, keyword key k, master public key MPK;
[0059] (2) Generate NP instance X: So that circuit C: KW = {kw i} i∈[1,l] =f(u1,u2,...,un ) and a set of expected values of KW for the circuit output: y = {y i =1} i ∈{1, l}, satisfying y = C(W);
[0060] (3) Select a random element β and run WE.Enc(1 λ , X, k) in e(g, g) αβ The result is recorded as C′: (S={(S 0i =V(u i ,0),S 1i =V(u i ,1)} i∈[1,n] , PP);
[0061] (4) Use MPK to further calculate and obtain the intermediate ciphertext:
[0062] (5) After that, the final ciphertext is further generated and output:
[0063] Step 4.2: Public keyword ciphertext CT;
[0064] Furthermore, step 5 includes the following specific steps:
[0065] Step 5.1: The data owner runs the shared file encryption algorithm EncDA, inputs security parameters, access policies, and the shared file plaintext m DA , master public key MPK, generate shared file ciphertext ct DA , the EncDA algorithm we proposed is as follows:
[0066] (1) Input security parameter 1 λ , access policy f, shared file plaintext m DA , master public key MPK;
[0067] (2) Select the keyword key set of the data owner calculate
[0068] (3) Calculate and output ct D A=m DA g -ck ;
[0069] Step 5.2: Encrypt the shared file DA Store to CS;
[0070] Furthermore, step 6 includes the following specific steps:
[0071] Step 6.1: The data visitor runs the trapdoor generation algorithm Trapdoor, inputs the keyword ciphertext CT, the decryption key DK, the retrieval strategy p, and outputs the trapdoor query Tr(p). The Trapdoor algorithm we proposed is as follows:
[0072] Input keyword ciphertext CT, decryption key DK, and retrieval strategy p;
[0073] (1) From i∈[1,n]
[0074] (2) Call WE.Dec(X, {ct i} i∈[1,l] , W) to obtain the generated intermediate value
[0075] (3) Calculation Get k D U,
[0076] (4) According to the retrieval strategy p, a file index i required by the data accessor is selected and its keyword key set is obtained. calculate Get another file index and repeat this step until all available file indexes are traversed;
[0077] (5) Random generation h is the total number of files required in p;
[0078] (6) Then calculate and output
[0079] Step 6.2: Send the trapdoor query Tr(p) and the certificate ca as a retrieval request to CS;
[0080] Furthermore, step 7 includes the following specific steps:
[0081] Step 7.1: After receiving the retrieval request from the data accessor, AA verifies the certificate CA;
[0082] Step 7.2: If the verification is successful, AA will call the Search algorithm and input the trapdoor query Tr(p) and the shared file ciphertext set Generate the intermediate ciphertext set ct of the shared file DU , the Search algorithm we proposed is as follows:
[0083] (1) Input the trapdoor query Tr(p) and the shared file ciphertext set
[0084] (2) Calculate and output
[0085] Step 7.3: Set the intermediate ciphertext of the shared file to ct DU The response is returned to the corresponding data accessor of ca; further, step 8 includes the following specific steps:
[0086] Step 8.1: After receiving the CS response, the data accessor calls the shared file ciphertext to run the decryption algorithm Dec and inputs the intermediate ciphertext set ct DU and trapdoor key to obtain the shared file plaintext collection The Dec algorithm we proposed is as follows:
[0087] (1) Input the intermediate ciphertext set ct DU and the trapdoor key {T i} i∈[1,h] ;
[0088] (2) From i∈[1,h], calculate and output
[0089] Some advantages of the present invention are:
[0090] The scheme maps the access strategy to a multi-output circuit SAT problem as an instance of evidence encryption X. X is encoded by the WE algorithm, and each attribute obtains two encoding values recorded as '0 encoding' and '1 encoding', corresponding to the two cases of "having" or "not having" the attribute. The corresponding key of each keyword is encrypted to an output wire of the multi-output circuit SAT problem. The above changes make the scheme have:
[0091] First, short keys, multi-party interaction, and low consumption;
[0092] Second, in terms of access control, it can support the access structure of NP and improve access efficiency;
[0093] Third, based on evidence encryption, evidence release is achieved, and the number of encryption and decryption operations is less than that of intersecting secondary encryption.
[0094] Fourth, the solution can be applied to the model of multiple data owners corresponding to multiple data accessors in terms of security. BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS
[0095] Figure 1 It is a system flow chart of the present invention. DETAILED DESCRIPTION
[0096] In order to facilitate a better understanding of the purpose, structure and function of the present invention, the attribute-based ciphertext search method, medium and system for evidence release of the present invention are further described in detail below in conjunction with the accompanying drawings and implementation examples. It should be understood that the implementation examples described herein are only used to illustrate and explain the present invention, and are not used to limit the present invention.
[0097] Example 1
[0098] Please see Figure 1 The present invention provides an attribute-based ciphertext search method, medium and system for evidence release. The entities involved in the system include any data owners, any data accessors, a group of cloud servers (CS) and a management center (AA).
[0099] Assume that a specific implementation example includes two data owners, a data accessor, a group of cloud servers (CS), and an administration center (AA). The data accessor needs some of the shared files of the data owner.
[0100] An example of an attribute-based ciphertext search system based on evidence release includes the following steps:
[0101] Step 1: System initial configuration; the algorithm is initialized by AA running the algorithm;
[0102] Step 1 of the present invention is further described in detail as follows:
[0103] Step 1.1: AA calls the Setup algorithm, inputs the system security parameters, outputs the system master private key MSK and master public key MPK, and also generates the corresponding keyword master key {K i} i∈[1,l] , the Setup algorithm we proposed is as follows:
[0104] (1) Input security parameter 1 λ , select two multiplicative cyclic groups G1 and G2 of order p, the generator of G1 is g, and the bilinear map is defined as e: G1×G1→G2. Then randomly select Where 1≤i≤n, n represents the number of attributes;
[0105] (2) Obtain the master private key: MSK = <α, (t0i, t 1i , 1≤i≤n)>;
[0106] (3) Set the master public key: 4 is the keyword set KW = {kw1, ..., kw l Each element in} is randomly Take the value from the table and generate the corresponding keyword master key K i ;
[0107] (4) Output MSK, MPK, {K i} ie[1,l] ;
[0108] Step 1.2: Public master public key MPK;
[0109] Step 2: Key distribution phase; in this phase, the AA accepts the data accessor's request, calls the key generation algorithm, generates a key DK owned only by the data accessor through the master private key MSK, and issues a certificate.
[0110] Step 2 of the present invention is further described in detail as follows:
[0111] Step 2.1: AA receives the data accessor attribute key application request;
[0112] Step 2.2: AA evaluates the data accessor and distributes the attribute label U DU And issue the certificate ca i The process includes: generating a signature Sig = Enc_by_priavate_CA[Hash(INFO i )].INFO i Includes the user name provided by the data accessor, and the corresponding attribute label U DU The signature is combined with the certificate version information, the certificate serial number (each certificate has a unique certificate serial number), the signature algorithm used by the certificate, the name of the certificate issuing agency, and the name of the certificate owner to form a digital certificate issuance; AA calls the key generation algorithm KeyGen, inputs the master private key MSK and the attribute label U of the data accessor DU , to generate the key DK, the KeyGen algorithm we proposed is as follows:
[0113] (1) Input the master key MSK and attribute tag U DU ;
[0114] (2) Calculate and output
[0115] Step 2.3: Install the certificate CA i The key DK is sent to the user through a trusted secret channel;
[0116] Step 3: Registration phase; the data owner applies to AA for registration, and AA runs the algorithm and inputs the keyword master key to generate a keyword key for the data owner that only he owns;
[0117] Step 3 of the present invention is further described in detail as follows:
[0118] Step 3.1: AA receives the key application request from the data owner;
[0119] Step 3.2: Call the key generation algorithm Reg and input the keyword master key {K i} i∈[1,l] , to generate keyword key k, we propose the Reg algorithm as follows:
[0120] (1) Input the keyword master key set {K i} i∈[1,l] ;
[0121] (2) Select a random value for the data owner who runs the algorithm
[0122] (3) Generate and output its keyword key set k = {k i =H(K i , ID DO )} i∈[1,l] ;
[0123] Step 3.3: Send the keyword key k to the data owner;
[0124] Step 4: Keyword encryption stage; the data owner runs the keyword encryption algorithm, generates keyword ciphertext and makes it public;
[0125] Step 4 of the present invention is further described in detail as follows:
[0126] Step 4.1: The data owner runs the keyword encryption algorithm EncKW, inputs security parameters, access policy, keyword key k, master public key MPK, and generates keyword ciphertext CT. The EncKW algorithm we proposed is as follows:
[0127] (1) Input security parameter 1 λ , access policy f, keyword key k, master public key MPK;
[0128] (2) Generate NP instance X: So that circuit C: KW = {kw i} i∈[1,l] =f(u1,u2,...,u n ) and a set of expected values of KW for the circuit output: y = {y i =1} i ∈{1, l}, satisfying y = C(W);
[0129] (3) Select a random element β and run WE.Enc(1 λ , X, k) in e(g, g) αβ The result is recorded as C′: (S={(S 0i =V(u i ,0),S1i =V(u i ,1)} i∈[1,n] , PP);
[0130] (4) Use MPK to further calculate and obtain the intermediate ciphertext:
[0131] (5) After that, the final ciphertext is further generated and output:
[0132] Step 4.2: Public keyword ciphertext CT;
[0133] Step 5: File encryption and storage stage; the data owner runs the shared file encryption algorithm, generates the shared file ciphertext and stores it in CS;
[0134] Step 5 of the present invention is further described in detail as follows:
[0135] Step 5.1: The data owner runs the shared file encryption algorithm EncDA, inputs security parameters, access policies, and the shared file plaintext m DA , master public key MPK, generate shared file ciphertext ct DA , the EncDA algorithm we proposed is as follows:
[0136] (1) Input security parameter 1 λ , access policy f, shared file plaintext m DA , master public key MPK;
[0137] (2) Select the keyword key set of the data owner calculate
[0138] (3) Calculate and output ct D A=m DA g -ck ;
[0139] Step 5.2: Encrypt the shared file DA Store to CS;
[0140] Step 6: Retrieval request phase; after the data accessor obtains the keyword ciphertext, he runs the trapdoor generation algorithm and sends the access trapdoor and access information as a retrieval request to the CS.
[0141] Step 6 of the present invention is further described in detail as follows:
[0142] Step 6.1: The data visitor runs the trapdoor generation algorithm Trapdoor, inputs the keyword ciphertext CT, the decryption key DK, the retrieval strategy p, and outputs the trapdoor query Tr(p). The Trapdoor algorithm we proposed is as follows: input the keyword ciphertext CT, the decryption key DK, and the retrieval strategy p;
[0143] (1) From i∈[1,n]
[0144] (2) Call WE.Dec(X, {ct i} i∈[1,l] , W) to obtain the generated intermediate value
[0145] (3) Calculation Get k D U,
[0146] (4) According to the retrieval strategy p, a file index i required by the data accessor is selected and its keyword key set is obtained. calculate Get another file index and repeat this step until all available file indexes are traversed;
[0147] (5) Random generation h is the total number of files required in p;
[0148] (6) Then calculate and output
[0149] Step 6.2: Send the trapdoor query Tr(p) and the certificate ca as a retrieval request to CS;
[0150] Step 7: Ciphertext retrieval phase; after receiving the retrieval request, CS runs the ciphertext retrieval algorithm to find a set of shared file ciphertexts, verify the access information, and respond to the request.
[0151] Step 7 of the present invention is further described in detail as follows:
[0152] Step 7.1: After receiving the retrieval request from the data accessor, AA verifies the certificate CA;
[0153] Step 7.2: If the verification is successful, AA will call the Search algorithm and input the trapdoor query Tr(p) and the shared file ciphertext set Generate the intermediate ciphertext set ct of the shared file DU , the Search algorithm we proposed is as follows:
[0154] (1) Input the trapdoor query Tr(p) and the shared file ciphertext set
[0155] (2) Calculate and output
[0156] Step 7.3: Set the intermediate ciphertext of the shared file to ct DU Response, returned to the corresponding data accessor of ca;
[0157] Step 8: Decryption phase; after receiving the CS response, the data accessor calls the shared file ciphertext to run the decryption algorithm and obtain the plaintext.
[0158] Step 8 of the present invention is further described in detail as follows:
[0159] Step 8.1: After receiving the CS response, the data accessor calls the shared file ciphertext to run the decryption algorithm Dec and inputs the intermediate ciphertext set ct DU and trapdoor key to obtain the shared file plaintext collection The Dec algorithm we proposed is as follows:
[0160] (1) Input the intermediate ciphertext set ct DU and the trapdoor key {T i} i∈[1,h] ;
[0161] (2) From i∈[1,h], calculate and output
[0162] In this example, since CS, as a third party, does not know ck i and {T i} i∈[1,h] Therefore, CS obtains the plaintext of the shared file, which is equivalent to solving the discrete logarithm problem within the PPT time. Therefore, for CS, the shared file is confidential within the PPT time.
[0163] In this example, for the keyword set KW in the system, AA will generate corresponding keyword key sets k1 and k2 for the two data owners DO1 and DO2, respectively. This ensures that in the example, when the access structure f of one of the data owners (assuming it is DO1) gives part of the keyword key to the data accessor that meets f, the DO2 access structure f′ gives part of the keyword key to the data accessor, but the data accessor does not meet f′.
[0164] The present invention belongs to the fields of information processing technology and information security, and more specifically, to the fields of evidence encryption (WE) technology and searchable encryption (SE) technology. In order to solve the problem that in a cloud service environment, when a data accessor encrypts and uploads files, he loses the ability to search for original files, and in the process of data access, there is a low access efficiency caused by no access control or weak access control. An attribute-based ciphertext search method, medium and system for evidence release are designed.
[0165] It should be understood that parts not elaborated in detail in this specification belong to the prior art.
[0166] It should be understood that the present invention is described by some embodiments, and those skilled in the art will appreciate that various changes or equivalent substitutions may be made to these features and embodiments without departing from the spirit and scope of the present invention. In addition, under the teachings of the present invention, these features and embodiments may be modified to adapt to specific circumstances and materials without departing from the spirit and scope of the present invention. Therefore, the present invention is not limited by the specific embodiments disclosed herein, and all fall within the scope of the claims of the present application.
Claims
1. An attribute-based ciphertext search method, medium and system for evidence release, characterized in that: The following steps are involved: Step 1: System initial configuration; the algorithm is initialized by AA running the algorithm; Step 2: Key distribution phase; In this stage, the AA accepts the data accessor's request and calls the key generation algorithm. It uses the master private key MSK to generate a key DK that only the data accessor owns and issues a certificate. Step 3: Registration phase; the data owner applies to AA for registration, and AA runs the algorithm and inputs the keyword master key to generate a keyword key for the data owner that only he owns; Step 4: Keyword encryption stage; The data owner runs the keyword encryption algorithm to generate keyword ciphertext and make it public; Step 5: File encryption and storage stage; The data owner runs the shared file encryption algorithm to generate the shared file ciphertext and stores it in CS; Step 6: Retrieval request phase; After obtaining the keyword ciphertext, the data accessor runs the trapdoor generation algorithm and sends the access trapdoor and access information as a retrieval request to the CS; Step 7: Ciphertext retrieval phase: After receiving the retrieval request, CS runs the ciphertext retrieval algorithm to find a set of shared file ciphertexts, verify the access information, and respond to the request; Step 8: Decryption phase; after receiving the CS response, the data accessor calls the shared file ciphertext to run the decryption algorithm and obtain the plaintext.
2. The attribute-based ciphertext search method, medium and system for evidence release according to claim 1, characterized in that: Step 1 includes the following specific steps: Step 1.1: AA calls the Setup algorithm, inputs the system security parameters, outputs the system master private key MSK and master public key MPK, and also generates the corresponding keyword master key {K i } i∈[1,l] ; Step 1.2: Public master public key MPK.
3. The attribute-based ciphertext search method, medium and system for evidence release according to claim 2, characterized in that: Step 2 includes the following specific steps: Step 2.1: AA receives the data accessor attribute key application request; Step 2.2: AA evaluates the data accessor and distributes the attribute label U DU And issue the certificate ca i The process includes: generating a signature Sig = Enc_by_priavate_CA[Hash(INFO i )].INFO i Includes the user name provided by the data accessor, and the corresponding attribute label U DU The signature is combined with the certificate version information, the certificate serial number (each certificate has a unique certificate serial number), the signature algorithm used by the certificate, the name of the certificate issuing agency, and the name of the certificate owner to form a digital certificate issuance; AA calls the key generation algorithm KeyGen, inputs the master private key MSK and the attribute label U of the data accessor DU , generate key DK; Step 2.3: The certificate ca i and key DK are sent to the user.
4. The attribute-based ciphertext search method, medium and system for evidence release according to claim 3, characterized in that: Step 3 includes the following specific steps: Step 3.1: AA receives the key application request from the data owner; Step 3.2: Call the key generation algorithm Reg and input the keyword master key {K i } i∈[1,l] , generate keyword key k; Step 3.3: Send the keyword key k to the data owner.
5. The attribute-based ciphertext search method, medium and system for evidence release according to claim 4, characterized in that: Step 4 includes the following specific steps: Step 4.1: The data owner runs the keyword encryption algorithm EncKW, inputs security parameters, access policy, keyword key k, master public key MPK, and generates the keyword ciphertext CT; Step 4.2: Public keyword ciphertext CT.
6. The attribute-based ciphertext search method, medium and system for evidence release according to claim 5, characterized in that: Step 5 includes the following specific steps: Step 5.1: The data owner runs the shared file encryption algorithm EncDA, enters security parameters, access policy, and shared file plaintext m DA , master public key MPK, generate shared file ciphertext ct DA ; Step 5.2: Encrypt the shared file DA Store to CS.
7. The attribute-based ciphertext search method, medium and system for evidence release according to claim 6, characterized in that: Step 6 includes the following specific steps: Step 6.1: The data accessor runs the trapdoor generation algorithm Trapdoor, inputs the keyword ciphertext CT, the decryption key DK, the retrieval strategy p, and outputs the trapdoor query Tr(p); Step 6.2: Send the trapdoor query Tr(p) and the certificate ca as a retrieval request to CS.
8. The attribute-based ciphertext search method, medium and system for evidence release according to claim 7, characterized in that: Step 7 includes the following specific steps: Step 7.1: After receiving the retrieval request from the data accessor, AA verifies the certificate CA; Step 7.2: If the verification is successful, AA will call the Search algorithm and input the trapdoor query Tr(p) and the shared file ciphertext set Generate the intermediate ciphertext set ct of the shared file DU ; Step 7.3: Set the intermediate ciphertext of the shared file to ct DU The response is returned to the corresponding data accessor of ca.
9. The attribute-based ciphertext search method, medium and system for evidence release according to claim 8, characterized in that: Step 8 includes the following specific steps: Step 8.1: After receiving the CS response, the data accessor calls the shared file ciphertext to run the decryption algorithm Dec and inputs the intermediate ciphertext set ct DU and trapdoor key to obtain the shared file plaintext collection
