Secure remote payment transaction processing

By using secure element-based mobile payment applications and remote key managers on mobile devices, combined with dynamic authentication data and payment processing networks, the security and operation complexity of the remote payment transaction system are solved, and more secure and Convenient payment experience.

CN118982352APending Publication Date: 2024-11-19VISA INTERNATIONAL SERVICE ASSOCIATION
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Patent Information

Application Number
CN202411021364.8
Authority / Receiving Office
CN · China
Patent Type
Applications(China)
Current Assignee / Owner
Priority Date
2013-09-19
Filing Date
2014-07-15
Publication Date
2024-11-19

AI Technical Summary

Technical Problem

The existing remote payment transaction system is inadequate in security and is susceptible to malicious applications and spoofing threats, and consumers need to manually enter sensitive information, which increases security risks and operational complexity.

Method used

By using secure element-based mobile payment applications on mobile devices, generating and managing dynamic authentication data, combining remote key managers and payment processing networks, secure transmission and decryption of encrypted payment information is achieved, ensuring that payment information is in the process of transmission. Security.

Benefits of technology

It improves the security of remote payment transactions, prevents the harm of distrust applications, reduces fraudulent transactions, enhances the robustness of the payment system, and simplifies consumer operations, providing a safer and more convenient payment experience.

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Abstract

The invention relates to secure remote payment transaction processing. Embodiments of the present invention are directed to methods, apparatuses, computer-readable media, and systems for securely processing remote transactions. One embodiment of the invention is directed to a method of processing a remote transaction initiated by a mobile device, including a server computer that receives a payment request including encrypted payment information. The encrypted payment information is generated by a mobile payment application of the mobile device and encrypted using a third party key. The method further includes decrypting encrypted payment information using the third party key, determining a transaction processor public key associated with the payment information, and re-encrypting the payment information using the transaction processor public key. The method further includes sending a payment response containing the re-encrypted payment information to the transaction processor. The transaction processor decrypts the re-encrypted payment information using the transaction processor private key and initiates a payment transaction.
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Description

This application is a divisional application filed again for the divisional application 202010997309.8. The divisional application 202010997309.8 is a divisional application filed for the PCT international application number PCT / US2014 / 046764, the international application date is July 15, 2014, the application number entering the Chinese national phase is 201480050582.2, and the application titled "Secure Remote Payment Transaction Processing". CROSS-REFERENCE TO RELATED APPLICATIONS

[0001] This application claims the benefit of priority to U.S. Provisional Application No. 61 / 957,948 filed on July 15, 2013, U.S. Provisional Application No. 61 / 863,869 filed on August 8, 2013, U.S. Provisional Application No. 61 / 871,814 filed on August 29, 2013, and U.S. Provisional Application No. 61 / 880,154 filed on September 19, 2013. Background Art

[0002] More and more consumers are using devices that are configured to use near field communication (NFC) and other short-range communication protocols for payment transactions. For example, a consumer's mobile device may include NFC hardware and a secure element or other secure storage medium for storing sensitive account information. To conduct a payment transaction, a consumer may place the mobile device in proximity to a sales terminal, access device, or other short-range or contactless communication reader. The secure payment information stored on the secure storage medium may then be used to process the transaction without requiring the user to provide a physical credit card or manually enter a credit card number.

[0003] Consumers may also use mobile devices to conduct online payment transactions. For example, a consumer may download a merchant application and select some items to purchase. Then, to conduct the payment transaction, the consumer may enter payment information using a physical or on-screen keyboard. However, manual entry of payment information into a merchant application is often cumbersome because the consumer may already have the payment information stored on a secure storage medium. Furthermore, manual entry of physical information may introduce security risks, such as vulnerability to eavesdropping.

[0004] Therefore, there is a need to allow consumers to initiate and process remote transactions using secure payment credentials stored on mobile devices. However, payment credentials stored on mobile devices are sensitive and merchant applications on mobile devices are subject to intrusion, spoofing and other security threats. Thus, there is a need to ensure that payment credentials securely stored on mobile devices are protected during payment transaction processing to prevent potential malicious applications and threats on the mobile device.

[0005] Furthermore, conventional remote transactions have limited security features and a higher risk of fraud because the consumer is not present at the merchant or service provider to verify that the payment credentials have not been stolen or intercepted and used by a malicious third party.Therefore, there is a need to increase the security of remote transactions initiated by mobile devices.

[0006] Various embodiments of the invention address these and other problems, individually and collectively. Brief Overview

[0007] Embodiments of the present invention are directed to methods, apparatus, computer-readable media, and systems for securely processing remote transactions. For example, embodiments of the present invention allow consumers to use mobile devices containing secure and sensitive payment credentials during remote payment transactions initiated via a merchant website or merchant application. The merchant website or merchant application can utilize a secure element-based mobile payment application to obtain payment credentials (e.g., account number and expiration date), instead of having the consumer use a keyboard to provide the account number and expiration date or obtain the information from an unsecured memory. Embodiments provide a secure process for transmitting sensitive payment information while protecting the sensitive information from untrusted, unsecure, and / or potentially malicious mobile applications (e.g., merchant applications).

[0008] In addition, the embodiments incorporate chip-based generation of dynamic authentication data (e.g., dynamic passwords or other values) for remote transactions initiated via mobile payment applications and provide additional security to typical remote payment transactions. Thus, the embodiments provide a more secure and robust remote payment transaction system. Thus, the embodiments enhance the security level of card-not-present transactions by providing a unique dynamic and verifiable password in transactions that typically do not have the ability to include such security features.

[0009] One embodiment of the present invention is directed to a method for processing a remote transaction initiated by a mobile device. The method includes: a server computer receives a payment request including encrypted payment information. The encrypted payment information is generated by a mobile payment application of the mobile device and the encrypted payment information is encrypted using a third-party key. The method further includes: decrypting the encrypted payment information using the third-party key, determining a transaction processor public key associated with the payment information, and re-encrypting the payment information using the transaction processor public key. The method further includes sending a payment response including the re-encrypted payment information to the transaction processor. The transaction processor decrypts the re-encrypted payment information using the transaction processor private key and initiates a payment transaction using the decrypted payment information.

[0010] Another embodiment of the present invention is directed to a server computer, which includes: a processor and a computer-readable medium coupled to the processor. The computer-readable medium includes code executable by the processor for performing a method for processing a remote transaction. The method includes: the server computer receives a payment request including encrypted payment information. The encrypted payment information is generated by a mobile payment application of a mobile device and the encrypted payment information is encrypted using a third-party key. The method further includes: decrypting the encrypted payment information using the third-party key, determining a transaction processor public key associated with the payment information, and re-encrypting the payment information using the transaction processor public key. The method further includes sending a payment response including the re-encrypted payment information to the transaction processor. The transaction processor decrypts the re-encrypted payment information using the transaction processor private key and initiates a payment transaction using the decrypted payment information.

[0011] These and other embodiments of the invention are described in further detail below. BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS

[0012] Figure 1 A block diagram is shown of an exemplary system for performing remote transactions using a remote key manager and a merchant application of a mobile device according to some embodiments of the present invention.

[0013] Figure 2 A block diagram is shown of an exemplary mobile device that may be used with some embodiments of the present invention.

[0014] Figure 3 A block diagram of an exemplary remote key manager according to some embodiments of the present invention is shown.

[0015] Figure 4 A flow chart illustrating an exemplary method of using a certificate authority to provision a merchant public / private key pair and a merchant application certificate according to some embodiments of the invention.

[0016] Figure 5 A flow chart illustrating an exemplary method of processing a remote transaction using a remote key manager and a merchant application of a mobile device according to some embodiments of the present invention.

[0017] Figure 6 Additional exemplary methods of conducting remote transactions using a remote key manager and a merchant application of a mobile device are shown according to some embodiments of the present invention.

[0018] Figure 7 A block diagram illustrating an exemplary system for performing remote transactions using a mobile gateway associated with a payment processing network and a merchant application of a mobile device according to some embodiments of the present invention.

[0019] Figure 8A block diagram illustrating an exemplary payment processing network configured to manage transaction processing encryption keys for remote transactions and to process secure remote transactions according to some embodiments of the present invention.

[0020] Fig. 9 A flow chart illustrating an exemplary method of processing a remote transaction using a mobile gateway associated with a payment processing network and a merchant application of a mobile device according to some embodiments of the present invention.

[0021] Fig.10 A block diagram is shown of an exemplary system for performing remote transactions using a third-party service provider (eg, a mobile wallet provider) and a merchant application of a mobile device in accordance with some embodiments of the present invention.

[0022] Fig.11 A flow chart illustrating an exemplary method of processing a remote transaction using a third-party service provider (eg, a mobile wallet provider) and a merchant application of a mobile device according to some embodiments of the present invention.

[0023] Fig.12 A flow chart illustrating an exemplary method of encrypting and decrypting information using elliptic curve cryptography according to some embodiments of the present invention.

[0024] Fig.13 A flow chart illustrating another exemplary method of encrypting and decrypting information using elliptic curve cryptography according to some embodiments of the present invention.

[0025] Fig.14 A block diagram of an exemplary computer device is shown. DETAILED DESCRIPTION

[0026] Embodiments of the present invention are directed to systems and methods for securely processing remote transactions initiated by untrusted merchant applications on mobile devices. Embodiments include several different configurations to provide a security system that protects sensitive payment information stored in a secure memory of a mobile device and allows sensitive payment information to be transmitted in a secure manner to perform remote payment transactions.

[0027] When performing remote electronic commerce transactions (i.e., e-commerce) on a mobile device, a consumer may need to provide payment credentials and other sensitive information to a merchant website so that the merchant can identify and initiate payment for the transaction. Typically, the consumer can key in or otherwise enter a primary account number (PAN), expiration date, and card verification value (e.g., CVV2) into a mobile device, which sends the information to a merchant server. However, this method is unsafe and can result in fraudulent transactions. For example, the merchant has no way of knowing whether the consumer is who they present themselves to be or whether the consumer possesses the underlying payment device or merely intercepted or maliciously obtained the PAN, expiration date, and card verification value from the device and used it without proper authorization.

[0028] According to various embodiments of the present invention, a merchant network server computer or a merchant application can securely obtain account information from a mobile payment application of a mobile device that securely stores account information. In addition, because remote transactions are initiated via a mobile payment application on a mobile device, some embodiments can provide additional authentication data to further ensure that the account information on the mobile device is authentic and provided or installed in an authorized manner. Therefore, various embodiments provide a more secure remote payment transaction processing system.

[0029] In some embodiments, the mobile payment application may obtain account information from a secure element or secure memory of the mobile device. Therefore, because the transaction is processed using a mobile payment application, the mobile payment application may be configured to provide chip data (e.g., dynamic value, password, etc.) during close range or contactless communication, so the remote transaction may include dynamic chip data (e.g., dynamic value or password) for the remote transaction. Therefore, during e-commerce transactions where merchants are typically unable to receive highly secure chip data due to consumer key entry of account information and / or lack of access to chip data, embodiments of the present invention provide dynamic authentication information and other chip data for verification during transaction processing.

[0030] Embodiments allow a merchant computer to securely receive account credentials and chip data from a mobile payment application during a remote payment transaction. Thus, a remote merchant server computer may receive sufficient data to establish a standard "card present" chip transaction authorization request message, which provides a higher level of security than typical remote transactions.

[0031] Embodiments of the present invention have several advantages. For example, embodiments improve the security of payment transactions using untrusted or unknown merchant applications on mobile devices. In some embodiments, a remote key manager, mobile gateway, payment processing network, mobile wallet provider, or any other third-party system can be used to verify merchant keys with the public key of a trusted merchant, decrypt payment information, and re-encrypt payment information. This prevents unscrupulous applications or devices from gaining access to sensitive data because payment information is unreadable without a trusted transaction processor encryption key (e.g., merchant private key, merchant application private key, acquirer private key, etc.).

[0032] In addition, embodiments provide a more secure payment system by allowing highly secure and difficult to reproduce information to be used during transactions. For example, a dynamic password or dynamic value provided during a transaction enables merchants to have a higher level of confidence that the consumer is in fact authorized to perform transactions using the account. As a result, payment processing networks, issuers, and merchants will deal with fewer fraudulent transactions and payment rejections.

[0033] In addition, embodiments are more convenient for consumers and users because the system allows consumers to use payment information (e.g., account information) that already exists on the mobile device to initiate and process transactions. Previous remote transactions required consumers to manually enter payment information or use information that was not stored in secure memory. Therefore, embodiments provide consumers with a more secure and convenient method to initiate transactions from a mobile device.

[0034] Furthermore, because multiple key exchanges are included in the remote transaction process, sensitive information can be protected while being transmitted or delivered to the destination entity. Thus, embodiments provide a secure communication process for transmitting sensitive information related to remote transactions to achieve protection of sensitive information, which can be static and can be reused in future transactions (e.g., static account identifiers, expiration dates, etc.).

[0035] Before discussing the embodiments of the present invention, a description of some terms may help to understand the embodiments of the present invention.

[0036] "Remote transactions" may include any transaction in which one party to the transaction is separated from the other party by a certain distance and / or by a device. For example, remote transactions may include "card-not-present transactions", e-commerce or other online transactions performed via communication between two or more devices. For example, remote transactions may include devices that are not in the same location or multiple devices where both parties (e.g., merchants and consumers) do not use the same device to complete the transaction. In addition, remote transactions may include in-store transactions that are not completed using merchant point-of-sale devices (e.g., access devices) but are completed by consumers using their mobile devices to communicate with remote (or local) merchant server computers configured to process remote transactions. Traditionally, remote transactions have a higher potential for fraud because remote transactions do not allow the payee an opportunity to identify the payee or otherwise ensure that the payment they receive is legitimate, as the two parties are not in the same location during the transaction (such as "card-present transactions" or in-store transactions). Local, card-present, face-to-face or in-store transactions may include a transaction in which two or more parties are in the same location, using the same transaction device or by indicating a person or entity present to authenticate the identity of the payee and / or payee.

[0037] A "payment request" may include a message containing a request to process or initiate a payment. For example, a payment request may be sent from a mobile device associated with a consumer, the payment request being related to a purchase transaction associated with goods or services provided by a merchant. A payment request may include information related to the transaction, including payment information (e.g., account identifier, personal information, etc.), transaction information (e.g., merchant information, items purchased, etc.), device information (e.g., mobile device phone number, secure element identifier, etc.), routing information (e.g., Internet Protocol (IP) address of a destination computer, an identifier for the destination computer, a bank identification number (BIN), etc.), and any other information related to the payment transaction. For example, a payment request may include encrypted payment information for a transaction and may be sent to a third-party computer configured to authenticate the payment request, verify a public key certificate, decrypt the encrypted payment information, and send the re-encrypted payment information to a transaction processor to initiate the payment transaction. Thus, a payment request may include any information related to the secure processing of transmitting sensitive data to a merchant server for processing a remote transaction.

[0038] As used herein, "payment information" may include relevant information used to perform a payment. For example, payment information may include any sensitive account information and / or personal information that can be used to identify and / or authenticate a consumer account at an acquirer. In addition, in some embodiments, payment information may also include merchant information, consumer information, mobile device information, routing information, or any other relevant information that can be used to control, manage, and deliver payment transactions. In this way, payment information may include sensitive and non-sensitive information. In addition, payment information may include only a portion of account information, personal information, etc. that can be used to perform a transaction. For example, payment information may include sensitive information associated with a transaction or account and may be sent together with other non-sensitive information, which may be considered not to be payment information (e.g., transaction amount, etc.).

[0039] As used herein, "payment credentials" may include any information that allows a processor to identify, verify, and / or process a payment transaction using a consumer account. For example, a payment credential may include an account identifier (e.g., a primary account number (PAN)), a token (e.g., an account identification substitute), an expiration date, a card verification value (e.g., CVV, CVV2, dCVV, etc.), a dynamic password or dynamic value (e.g., dynamic authentication data), personal information associated with an account (e.g., an address, etc.), an account alias, or any other relevant information.

[0040] In some embodiments, the payment credentials may be stored in a secure memory of a mobile device. The secure memory of the mobile device may be configured so that the data stored in the secure memory can be directly accessed by an external application and the mobile payment application associated with the secure memory can be accessed to obtain the payment credentials stored on the secure memory. Therefore, the merchant application can interact with the mobile payment application or with the remote transaction application or other remote transaction application to interact with the mobile payment application to obtain access to the payment credentials stored on the secure memory. In some embodiments, a software development kit (SDK), an application program interface (API) or other third-party program code or module may be accessed to request payment credentials from the mobile payment application. In addition, the secure memory may be configured so that the payment credentials can be provided in an encrypted form using a session derivation key (SDK) based on a shared master derivation key (MDK), which is associated with the issuer of the payment credentials stored on the secure memory of the mobile device. In addition, a valid digital certificate may be present so that the SDK or API accesses the secure memory (e.g., a secure element).

[0041] As used herein, "transaction information" may include any data associated with a transaction. For example, transaction information may include transaction amount, transaction time, transaction date, seller information (e.g., registered merchant identifier, address, merchant computer IP address, etc.), product information (e.g., serial number, product name or other identifier, etc.). Transaction information may be provided to a mobile device by a merchant server computer before or after a consumer initiates a payment transaction via a merchant application. In some embodiments, transaction information may be used to identify a specific merchant associated with a transaction using merchant information contained in the transaction information.

[0042] As used herein, "merchant information" may include any information associated with a merchant, payee, service provider, manufacturer, or other trusted party in a transaction. For example, merchant information may include a merchant identifier that is determined during registration with a remote payment service, remote key manager, payment processing network, or other transaction processing entity associated with a remote transaction processing system. In some embodiments, the merchant identifier may be used to determine a registered merchant computer public key, merchant application public key, and / or acquirer public key associated with a transaction.

[0043] As used herein, "encrypted payment information" may include any payment information that is made unintelligible to a party to prevent unauthorized access to the payment information. For example, encrypted payment information may not be readable by a recipient who does not have access to a shared secret or who does not have access to a specified encryption key. In this way, encrypted payment information may be rendered unintelligible via a reversible and repeatable process such that two entities may share information using a shared secret or encryption key, and unauthorized entities may not be able to understand or obtain sensitive payment information or sensitive payment credentials within the payment information (unless they obtain access to the shared secret or encryption key).

[0044] Additionally, in some embodiments, the encrypted payment information may include any combination of encrypted sensitive information and unencrypted less sensitive or non-sensitive information. For example, in some embodiments, the encrypted payment information may include encrypted payment credentials (e.g., sensitive account identifiers and expiration dates) and unencrypted transaction information (e.g., transaction amounts, product identifiers, etc.). In other embodiments, the encrypted payment information may include all encrypted relevant transaction information. For example, in some embodiments, the encrypted payment information may include both encrypted payment credentials and encrypted transaction information.

[0045] In some embodiments, encrypted payment information may be generated by a mobile payment application of a mobile device, so that the mobile payment application may have an encryption key (e.g., a third-party public key) that is used to encrypt stored or received payment credentials and / or other payment information for transactions. For example, a mobile payment application may store a third-party public encryption key. The third-party public encryption key may be paired with a third-party private encryption key, which may be securely stored in a remote key manager, a mobile gateway, a payment processing network, a mobile wallet provider, or any other third party configured to process remote payment transactions. The third-party private key may be used to decrypt the encrypted payment information and allow the third party to further encrypt the secure payment information using the public key of a designated transaction processor. Therefore, the encrypted payment information may be used to implement secure remote transaction processing. Therefore, the third-party encryption key may include a symmetric encryption key and this key is not limited to a public / private key pair.

[0046] As used herein, "decrypted payment information" may include payment information that has been transformed from an unintelligible state to an intelligible state. For example, the decrypted payment information may include the result of applying an appropriate encryption key to the encrypted payment information to obtain the original payment information. For example, a third-party private key may be applied to payment information encrypted using a third-party public key to decrypt the encrypted payment information and obtain the underlying payment information. In addition, in the case where the encrypted payment information includes encrypted information and unencrypted information, the decrypted payment information may be obtained by decrypting the encrypted portion without decrypting the unencrypted portion.

[0047] As used herein, "re-encrypted payment information" may include any payment information that is rendered unintelligible after being decrypted at least once to prevent unauthorized access to the payment information. For example, the re-encrypted payment information may be encrypted or otherwise rendered unintelligible to unauthorized entities using a different encryption key or encryption algorithm than the payment information that was originally encrypted. For example, payment information that was encrypted and decrypted using third-party public and private keys (or third-party symmetric encryption keys), respectively, may be re-encrypted using a transaction processor public key (e.g., a merchant public key, a merchant application public key, an acquirer public key, etc.) and sent to a transaction processor. In this way, the same information (e.g., payment information) may be encrypted using two different keys, allowing different entities to securely obtain the underlying information while protecting this information from any other entity.

[0048] A "payment request" may include a message containing a response to a request to process or initiate a payment. For example, a payment response may be sent from a server computer in response to a purchase request associated with a remote transaction request associated with a good or service provided by a merchant. The payment response may include information related to the transaction, including payment information (e.g., account identifier, personal information, etc.), transaction information (e.g., items purchased, merchant information, etc.), device information (e.g., mobile device phone number, secure element identifier, etc.), routing information (e.g., Internet Protocol (IP) address of the destination computer, bank identification number (BIN), etc.), and any other relevant information. For example, the payment response may include re-encrypted payment information encrypted using a transaction processor public key and may be sent to a transaction processor for further processing. For example, the transaction processor may decrypt the re-encrypted payment information using a transaction processor private key and initiate a payment transaction using the decrypted payment information. In addition, in some embodiments, the payment response may include authentication response information that identifies whether the transaction, account, consumer, and / or other entity for the transaction has been authenticated.

[0049] A "mobile gateway" may be a server computer or a series of server computers configured to communicate with a mobile device. The mobile gateway may communicate with the mobile device using "over-the-air" (OAT) messages or using any other communication network and protocol. For example, the mobile gateway may be configured to provide a secure communication channel (e.g., a secure channel) to communicate with the mobile device, over which information may be securely transferred to and from the mobile device using a mobile communication network, the Internet, and / or any other relevant communication network.

[0050] A "transaction processor" may include any entity associated with processing a transaction. For example, a merchant, a mobile device, a merchant application or other mobile application on a mobile device (e.g., an acquirer application or a payment service provider application), an acquirer computer, a payment processing network, and other entities in a transaction processing ecosystem may be a transaction processor. In some embodiments, a transaction processor may be associated with a particular public key (e.g., a merchant public key, a merchant application public key, an acquirer public key, etc.) and a private key (e.g., a merchant private key, a merchant application private key, an acquirer private key, etc.) that may be used to encrypt and decrypt payment information during the processing of a remote payment transaction.

[0051] Thus, in some embodiments, the transaction processor may be an entity configured to decrypt the encrypted (or re-encrypted) payment information and initiate the payment transaction. The payment transaction may be initiated via an appropriate means (including passing the decrypted payment information to another party) or by generating and / or mapping the decrypted payment information to an authorization request message. For example, in some embodiments, the transaction processor may initiate the payment transaction by mapping the decrypted payment information to an authorization request message that is configured to be processed by the payment processing network.

[0052] A "dynamic value" may include any data that changes. For example, a dynamic value may change over time (e.g., periodically), using (e.g., each transaction), and / or based on received information (e.g., input information to an algorithm). For example, a dynamic value may include an authentication value (or authentication request value) that may change each time a transaction is initiated and may be generated using a shared secret algorithm or other shared information between two entities, so that one entity can verify whether the other entity has access to the shared key and is therefore credible. This may also be referred to as authentication data. In some embodiments, a dynamic value may include a password generated using a shared secret algorithm between two entities. For example, a password may be generated at each transaction based on a derivation algorithm that is specific to each consumer device and / or issuer account, and the password may be verified at the payment processor or issuer of the account for each transaction. Such a dynamic value may be referred to as a dynamic card verification value (e.g., dCVV, dCVV2), a unique authentication verification value (UAVV), a token authentication verification value (TAVV), etc., and may be distinguished based on input data and an algorithm used to generate a verifiable dynamic value. For example, a token authentication verification value may use a token as input to a verification algorithm, while a dynamic card verification value may use a primary account number as input to generate a dCVV.

[0053] In other embodiments, the dynamic value may include a cryptogram generated using a secret algorithm that is known only to a single entity. For example, in some embodiments, before initiating a payment or generating an authorization request message, the payment processing network may generate an authentication response value using a secret algorithm for the transaction. When the transaction is initiated and an authorization request message is generated, the authentication response message may be included in the authorization request message and the payment processing network may verify the authentication response value using the same secret algorithm and input data to ensure that the transaction data has not changed and the transaction information matches. Thus, a dynamic value may include a cryptogram generated using a shared key (e.g., a dynamic verification value, token authentication data, etc.) or a private key (e.g., an authentication response value).

[0054] In some embodiments, the payment processing network may authenticate the transaction value before receiving the authorization request message, and the payment processing network may return an authentication response including an authentication response value, which indicates the verification of the dynamic value if the dynamic value is authenticated and / or verified. Thus, a third-party remote transaction processor (e.g., a payment processing network computer) may replace the dynamic value with the authentication response value in the payment information before re-encrypting the payment information and sending it to the transaction processor to initiate the payment transaction. Thereafter, the authentication response value may be returned to the payment processing network to notify the transaction entity that the payment transaction was previously authenticated. Such a system increases the security of the payment processing system and minimizes the possibility that the transaction is fraudulent because multiple authentication processes occur at different times during transaction processing. In addition, authentication information may be provided to the merchant.

[0055] An "authentication response value" may include any data that informs an entity that data or a process has been authenticated. For example, an authentication response value may be generated similarly to the dynamic value described above, and a different shared secret or algorithm may be used to generate the authentication response value, such that another entity within the transaction processing ecosystem that has access to the shared secret may determine that a message, account number, or other information contained in the message has been authenticated by an entity. For example, certain static data elements associated with a transaction (e.g., account identifier, expiration date, transaction time, date, etc.) may be used to generate an authentication response value during the authentication phase, and this calculation may be repeated (using the same data elements) during the payment phase after receiving the authorization request message to verify the authentication response value.

[0056] A "mobile payment application" may include any application configured to facilitate payment transactions from a mobile device or other electronic device. For example, a mobile payment application may store sensitive payment information and / or payment credentials of a consumer account in a secure manner so that payment information, account information, payment credentials, personal information, or any other information may be protected from unauthorized access. The mobile payment application may be configured to provide sensitive information to an authorized software application or module on a mobile device, a contactless element, or any other software or hardware configured and authorized to communicate with the mobile payment application. For example, the mobile payment application may be configured to interact with other mobile applications or merchant applications on a mobile device to provide payment information for a transaction. For example, the mobile payment application may provide a software development kit (SDK) or application programming interface (API) that merchant applications and / or other mobile applications can use to interact with the mobile payment application. The mobile payment application may be configured to provide sensitive information in encrypted form using a storage key on a secure memory.

[0057] Furthermore, in some embodiments, the mobile payment application may include any API, service, application, applet, or other executable code adapted to retrieve payment information from a secure element, generate payment information for a transaction (e.g., using a dynamic value of an unpredictable number, etc.), and communicate with a remote transaction application, a merchant application, a mobile gateway, and / or other application to securely communicate with a server computer (e.g., a remote key manager, a mobile gateway, a payment processing network, a third-party service provider, etc.). The mobile payment application may include or be configured to obtain stored information including a payment processing network public key, payment credentials, a third-party key, a mobile gateway credential, and be able to communicate with the mobile gateway to obtain issuer updates. For example, the mobile payment application may include a certificate associated with the mobile gateway that may be used to encrypt payment information using a public key associated with the mobile gateway.

[0058] A "merchant application" may include any application associated with a party to a transaction. For example, a merchant application may be associated with a particular merchant or may be associated with several different merchants and may be able to identify a particular merchant (or multiple merchants) as a party to a transaction. For example, a merchant application may store information identifying a particular merchant server computer that is configured to provide a sales environment in which the merchant server computer is capable of processing remote transactions initiated by the merchant application. In addition, a merchant application may also include a general browser or other software designated to interact with multiple merchant server computers, as long as the browser is configured to identify the merchant server computer and process remote transactions. The merchant application may be installed on the general storage of the mobile device and may be susceptible to malicious attacks, intrusions, etc. Therefore, the merchant application may be treated as an untrusted or unknown application by the security system within the mobile device and the remote payment transaction processing system.

[0059] In some embodiments, the merchant application can initiate a payment transaction by sending the decrypted payment information to the merchant server computer, which can then generate an authorization request message for the payment transaction using the decrypted payment information. In other embodiments, the merchant application can be configured to generate an authorization request message and send the authorization request message to the merchant server for processing.

[0060] Additionally, in some embodiments, the merchant application may be operated by or associated with an acquirer, a payment service provider, or a back-end processor that is operating on behalf of one or more merchants and / or is processing remote transactions for one or more merchants. For example, the merchant application may include a payment service provider configured to process remote transactions on behalf of a merchant computer. Additionally, an acquirer may process transactions on behalf of a merchant computer and may provide an acquirer application that performs similar functions to the merchant application by allowing a consumer to initiate a remote payment via the acquirer application.

[0061] A "public / private key pair" may include a pair of linked keys generated by an entity. The public key may be used for public functions, such as encrypting a message to send to an entity or for verifying a digital signature that is supposed to be made by the entity. On the other hand, the private key may be used for private functions, such as decrypting a received message or applying a digital signature. The public key will typically be authorized by a subject known as a certification authority (i.e., a certificate authority), which stores the public key in a database and distributes it to any other entity that requests it. The private key will typically be kept in a secure storage medium and will typically only be known to the entity. However, the cryptographic system described herein may function as a key retrieval mechanism to retrieve lost keys and avoid data loss.

[0062] A "public key" may include an encryption key that may be openly and publicly shared. A public key may be designated as being shared and may be configured so that any information encrypted using the public key can only be decrypted using a private key associated with the public key (i.e., a public / private key pair).

[0063] A "private key" may include an encryption key that may be protected and secure. For example, a private key may be securely stored at an entity that generates a public / private key pair and may be used to decrypt information that has been encrypted using the associated public key of the public / private key pair.

[0064] A "digital signature" may involve the result of applying an algorithm, which allows the signing party to demonstrate and the verifier to verify the authenticity and integrity of a document. For example, for a public / private key pair, the signing party may act with the private key, while the verifier may act with the public key. This process may prove the authenticity of the sender and the integrity of the signed document, without allowing denial of having signed due to the so-called principle of non-repudiation. A certificate or other data containing the signing party's digital signature is said to be "signed" by the signing party.

[0065] A "certificate" may include an electronic file or data document that establishes the identity and / or authenticity of an entity. For example, a certificate may use a digital signature to combine a public key with data associated with the identity. A certificate may include one or more data fields, such as the legal name of the identity, the serial number of the certificate, the "valid from" and "valid to" dates of the certificate, permissions associated with the certificate, or any other relevant information to identify and / or authenticate the entity or the certificate itself. For example, a certificate may include a "valid from" date indicating the initial date that the certificate is valid; and a "valid to" date indicating the last date that the certificate is valid. In addition, a certificate may also include a hash of the data in the certificate including the data fields. In addition, each certificate may be signed by a certificate authority.

[0066] A "certificate authority" may include an entity configured to issue certificates. A certificate authority may prove its identity using a certificate authority certificate that contains the certificate authority's public key. A certificate authority certificate may be signed by the private key of another certificate authority or may be signed by the certificate authority's private key. The latter is known as a self-signed certificate. A certificate authority also typically maintains a database of all certificates issued by the certificate authority.

[0067] In a typical certificate issuance process, a certificate authority receives an unsigned certificate from an entity whose identity is known. The unsigned certificate includes a public key, one or more data fields, and a hash of the data in the certificate. The certificate authority may sign the certificate using a private key that corresponds to the public key included in the certificate authority's certificate. The certificate authority may then store the signed certificate in a database and send the signed certificate to the entity. The entity may then use the certificate as a way to demonstrate the entity's authenticity and identity.

[0068] In some embodiments, the certificate authority may include any entity from the transaction processing ecosystem. For example, a payment processing network, a remote key manager, an issuer, an acquirer, or other entities within the transaction system may also be responsible for issuing and verifying certificates. For example, a merchant, a merchant application, or an acquirer computer configured to process a remote transaction may register with a remote key manager, a payment processing network, a mobile wallet provider, or any other third party to obtain a public key certificate signed by the corresponding entity, which allows the entity to verify the certificate and ensure that the certificate is valid for any given transaction. In some embodiments, an entity within the remote payment transaction processing system may contact the certificate authority to determine whether the status of the certificate has been updated, whether it is in good standing, whether it has been revoked, etc. Therefore, the certificate authority may be configured to provide status information about the issued certificate.

[0069] A "token" may include any appropriate data. For example, a token may include a replacement for an account identifier at an issuer, a payment processing network, a merchant, or any other transaction entity. A token may identify a payment account or a non-payment account, wherein the relationship between an account and a token is managed by a token registry 1061 or database.

[0070] A "server computer" may include a powerful computer or group of computers. For example, a server computer may be a mainframe, a cluster of minicomputers, or a group of servers acting as a unit. In one example, a server computer may be a database server coupled to a Web server. The server computer may be coupled to a database and may include any hardware, software, other logic, or combination of the foregoing for servicing requests from one or more client computers. The server computer may include one or more computing devices and may use any of a variety of computing structures, layouts, and compilations for servicing requests from one or more client computers.

[0071] The embodiments of the present invention described herein include a plurality of different embodiments, which may be combined in any appropriate manner, as one of ordinary skill in the art will recognize. For example, in the various embodiments described below, a plurality of different parties, merchant applications, mobile payment applications, and transaction processors are described and specific flow charts are provided as examples. These examples are provided for illustration of the concepts of the present invention and are meant to be non-limiting. Thus, features from the various embodiments may be combined in any appropriate manner, including using registered public keys and public key certificates in different configurations than are explicitly provided in each of the illustrative systems described herein. For example, the public key certificate process (e.g., regarding Figure 1 and Figure 5-6 described) may be used with third-party service providers (such as Fig.10 ) together with the registered key process (as shown in Fig.10 described) can be used with a remote key manager (such as Figure 1 and Figure 5-6 Therefore, this is only one example of the various combinations that can be provided according to certain embodiments of the present invention that will be described in more detail below. I. Systems and methods for processing remote mobile payment transactions using a remote key manager

[0072] Figure 1 A block diagram of an exemplary system 100 for performing remote transactions using a remote key manager 140 and a merchant application 121 of a mobile device 120 according to some embodiments of the present invention is shown. System 100 includes a user (e.g., consumer 110); a mobile device 120 including a merchant application 121, a secure element 122, and a mobile payment application 123; a remote key manager 140; a certificate authority 180; a merchant computer 130; an acquirer computer 150; a payment processing network 160; and an issuer computer 170. The various entities may be configured to communicate with each other over any suitable wireless or wired communication network and using any suitable communication protocol, including public or proprietary communication protocols.

[0073] As used herein, an "issuer" may generally refer to a business entity (e.g., a bank) that maintains a user's financial account and often issues portable consumer devices such as credit or debit cards to the user. An issuer may also issue or provide account information to a mobile device 120 to allow mobile payments initiated by the mobile device. A "merchant" is generally an entity that engages in transactions and can sell goods or services. An "acquirer" is generally a business entity (e.g., a commercial bank) that has a business relationship with a particular merchant or other entity. Some entities may perform both the functions of an issuer and an acquirer. Certain embodiments may encompass such a single-entity issuer-acquirer. Each of these entities may include one or more computer devices (e.g., a merchant computer 130, an acquirer computer 150, a payment processing network 160, and an issuer computer 170) that enable communications or perform one or more of the functions described herein.

[0074] Payment processing network 160 may include data processing subsystems, networks, and operations for supporting and delivering certificate authority services, authorization services, exception file services, transaction scoring services, and clearing and settlement services. An exemplary payment processing network 160 may include VisaNet TM . Such as VisaNet TM Payment processing networks such as Visa and Visa International can process credit card transactions, debit card transactions, and other types of commercial transactions. TM It includes the VIP system (Visa integrated payment system) that processes authorization requests and the Base II system that performs clearing and settlement services.

[0075] The payment processing network 160 may include one or more server computers. A server computer is typically a powerful computer or group of computers. For example, a server computer may be a mainframe, a cluster of minicomputers, or a group of servers acting as a unit. In one example, the server computer may be a database server coupled to a web server. The payment processing network 160 may use any suitable wired or wireless network, including the Internet.

[0076] In some card present or in-store payment transactions, a user purchases goods or services at a merchant using a mobile device 120. For example, the user's mobile device 120 may interact with an access device (not shown) at a merchant that is associated with a merchant computer 130. For example, the user may tap the mobile device 120 against a near field communication (NFC) reader in the access device. Alternatively, in a remote or "card not present" transaction, the user may electronically indicate payment details to the merchant computer 130, such as in an online transaction.

[0077] The authorization request message may be generated by the mobile device 120 or the merchant computer 130 and then forwarded to the acquirer computer 150. After receiving the authorization request message, the authorization request message is then sent to the payment processing network 160. The payment processing network 160 then forwards the authorization request message to a corresponding issuer computer 170 associated with the issuer associated with the user.

[0078] An "authorization request message" may be an electronic message sent to the payment processing network 160 and / or the issuer of a payment card to request authorization of a transaction. The authorization request message according to certain embodiments may comply with ISO 8583, which is a standard for systems for exchanging electronic transaction information associated with a payment made by a user using a payment device or payment account. The authorization request message may include an issuer account identifier that may be associated with the payment device or payment account. The authorization request message may also include additional data elements corresponding to "identification information", including, by way of example only: service code, CVV (card verification value), dCVV (dynamic card verification value), expiration date, etc. The authorization request message may also include "transaction information", such as any information associated with the current transaction, such as the transaction amount, merchant identifier, merchant location, etc., and any other information that may be used in determining whether to identify and / or authorize a transaction. The authorization request message may also include other information, such as information identifying the access device that generated the authorization request message, information about the location of the access device, etc.

[0079] After the issuer computer 170 receives the authorization request message, the issuer computer 170 sends an authorization response message back to the payment processing network 160 to indicate whether the current transaction is authorized (or not authorized). The payment processing network 160 then forwards the authorization response message back to the acquirer computer 150. In some embodiments, depending on the value of the fraud risk score, for example, the payment processing network 160 may deny the transaction even though the issuer computer 170 has authorized the transaction. The acquirer computer 150 then sends a response message back to the merchant computer 130.

[0080] An "authorization response message" may be an electronic message reply to an authorization request message generated by the issuer computer 170 or the payment processing network 160. By way of example only, the authorization response message may include one or more of the following status indicators: "Approved" - the transaction is approved; "Denied" - the transaction is not approved; or "Call Center" - the response is pending for more information and the merchant must call a toll-free authorization phone number. The authorization response message may also include an authorization code, which may be a code returned in an electronic message by the credit card issuing bank to the merchant computer 130 (directly or through the payment processing network 160) in response to the authorization request message indicating approval of the transaction. The code may serve as proof of authorization. As noted above, in some embodiments, the payment processing network 160 may generate or forward the authorization response message to the merchant.

[0081] After the merchant computer 130 receives the authorization response message, the merchant computer 130 may then provide the authorization response message to the user. The response message may be displayed by the mobile device 120 or may be printed on a physical receipt. Alternatively, if the transaction is an online transaction, the merchant may provide a web page or other indication of the authorization response message as a virtual receipt. The receipt may include transaction data for the transaction.

[0082] At the end of the day, payment processing network 160 may conduct normal clearing and settlement processes. The clearing process is the exchange of financial details between acquirers and issuers to facilitate postings to the consumer's payment account and reconciliation of the user's settlement position.

[0083] exist Figure 1 In the remote transaction processing system of the present invention, the mobile device 120 is configured to initiate and process remote transactions using a merchant computer 130 even when an unknown merchant application 121 or other mobile application installed on the mobile device 120 is used. The merchant computer 130 uses a remote key manager 140 to provide a secure remote payment transaction environment.

[0084] A user (e.g., consumer 110) may operate mobile device 120 to perform any number of functions that mobile device 120 is configured to perform. For example, consumer 110 may use mobile device 120 to conduct a remote payment transaction by communicating with remote key manager 140 and merchant computer 130. Merchant computer 130 may deliver available products and services to merchant application 121, which consumer 110 may use to initiate a remote transaction, whether at the merchant's location or remote from the merchant.

[0085] Mobile device 120 may be configured to communicate with remote key manager 140, which is configured to facilitate and / or process remote transactions. Remote key manager 140 is configured to perform several functions related to remote transactions including receiving encrypted payment information, verifying a public key certificate associated with the remote transaction, decrypting the encrypted payment information using a remote key manager key, and re-encrypting the payment information using a public key associated with a transaction processor (e.g., a merchant, a merchant processor, an acquirer, etc.) for the transaction. Figure 3 The various modules of the remote key manager 140 are described in further detail in .

[0086] A "mobile device" may include any electronic computing device. For example, mobile device 120 may include a mobile phone, a tablet, a netbook, a portable computer, or any other suitable mobile computing device. Mobile device 120 may include merchant application 121 and mobile payment application 123. Mobile payment application 123 may be stored in a secure memory (e.g., secure element 122).

[0087] The merchant application 121 may include any mobile program, software, or other suitable executable code suitable for conducting payment transactions. In some embodiments, the merchant application 121 may be a merchant-specific application. In other embodiments, the merchant application 121 may be a general-purpose application, such as a web browser. In addition, the merchant application may be associated with parties that are not merchants and process payments on behalf of merchants or other service providers (e.g., payment service providers, acquirers, etc.).

[0088] The security element 122 may be any hardware or software component operable to securely store any information and / or security applications. For example, the security element 122 may be operable to store payment information. In addition, a mobile payment application 123 may be provided and stored on the security element 122 to securely access personal sensitive information (e.g., payment credentials, tokens, account identifiers, etc.) associated with a consumer's financial account. For example, in some embodiments, the security element 122 may include a secure cryptographic processor or a contactless integrated circuit to protect the information stored on the security element 122. The security element 122 may have a separate processor, and the information stored thereon may be encrypted using a key that is held only by a trusted service manager or other designated entity, and the security element 122 may include any hardware so that the security element 122 may be a secure area that can store important information (e.g., payment credentials, encryption keys, and any other sensitive information). In addition, only a special key may be used to access the security data elements of the security element 122, and only certain trusted service managers may access the special key.

[0089] The mobile payment application 123 may include any application programming interface (API), service, application, applet, or other executable code suitable for retrieving payment information from the secure storage module or secure element 122 and communicating with the merchant application 121. In some embodiments, the mobile payment application 123 may be protected. For example, the mobile payment application 123 may run on a secure element 122 (e.g., Figure 2 as shown) or other trusted environment, as a core service, or running at a higher permission level than the merchant application 121.

[0090] The mobile payment application 123 may include a certificate associated with the remote key manager 140 that can be used to encrypt payment information and other communications using a public key associated with the remote key manager 140. In some embodiments, the mobile payment application 123 is operable to generate a cryptogram associated with the payment information. For example, the mobile payment application 123 is operable to generate a dynamic card verification value (dCVV2) associated with the payment account. In other embodiments, the mobile payment application is capable of generating a special dynamic authentication request or other dynamic value that can be verified by a payment processing network that shares a secret with the personal mobile payment application.

[0091] Figure 2 A block diagram of an exemplary mobile device 120 according to some embodiments of the present invention is shown. The mobile device 120 may include circuits for implementing certain device functions, such as a phone. The functional elements responsible for implementing these functions may include a processor 120 (A), which is programmed to execute instructions for implementing the functions and operations of the device. The processor 120 (A) may access a data memory 120 (E) (or another appropriate memory area or element) to retrieve instructions or data for executing instructions, such as a merchant application, a remote transaction application, or other mobile application. A data input / output element 120 (C), such as a keyboard or a touch screen, may be used to enable a user to operate the mobile device 120 and input data (e.g., user authentication data). The data input / output element may also be configured to output data (e.g., via a speaker). A display 120 (B) may also be used to output data to a user. A communication element 120 (D) may be used to implement data transmission between the mobile device 120 and a wired or wireless network (e.g., via an antenna 120 (H)) to assist connectivity with the Internet or other communication networks and implement data transmission functions.

[0092] The mobile device 120 may also include a contactless element interface or a secure memory interface 120 (F) to enable data transmission between the contactless element 120 (G) and other elements of the mobile device, wherein the contactless element 120 (G) may include a secure memory (e.g., a secure element 122) and a near field communication data transmission element (or other forms of short-range or contactless communication technology). As described above, a cellular phone or similar device is an example of a mobile device 120 that can be used according to an embodiment of the present invention. However, other forms or types of devices may be used without departing from the underlying concept of the present invention. In addition, the device may not need to use a cellular network to communicate in order to be suitable for use with an embodiment of the present invention.

[0093] Figure 3 A block diagram of an exemplary remote key manager 140 according to some embodiments of the present invention is shown. The remote key manager 140 may include a server computer 141, a certificate authority root public key database 141 (F), and a private key database 141 (E). The server computer 141 may include a certificate verification module 141 (A), a public key extraction module 141 (B), a transaction processing module 141 (C), and a mobile device interface 141 (D). The server computer 141 may further include a processor (not shown) and a computer-readable medium (not shown) coupled to the processor, the computer-readable medium including code executable by the processor for performing methods as described in the embodiments herein.

[0094] The certificate verification module 141(A) may be configured to verify that a merchant certificate (or other transaction processor certificate) associated with a particular merchant is authentic and valid. The certificate verification module 141(A) may perform any number of steps to accomplish this functionality. For example, the certificate verification module 141(A) may communicate with the certificate authority 180 to ensure that the public certificate is currently valid and in good standing (e.g., has not been disclosed, such as compromised or revoked, via a certificate revocation list (CRL) or online certificate status protocol responder (CSPR), etc.). Additionally, the certificate verification module 141(A) may use the certificate authority root public key stored in the root key database 141(F) to verify that the public key certificate is legitimate and signed by the proper certificate authority 180.

[0095] Back to Figure 1 , the certificate authority 180 can be associated with the merchant server computer and can issue a public key certificate to the merchant computer 130, which can be used during remote payment transaction processing to establish trust between the third-party server computer (e.g., remote key manager 140) and the merchant server computer that the merchant computer 130 is authentic and authorized to obtain sensitive payment credentials in the encrypted payment information. The certificate authority 180 can issue a merchant certificate through this process, in the following Figure 4 This process is described in more detail in . Some non-limiting examples of certificate issuance methods can be found in ANSI X9.24 Part 2 Retail Financial Services Symmetric Key Management Part 2: Using Asymmetric Techniques for the Distribution of Symmetric Keys and ISO 11568 Part 4 Banking—Key management (retail)—Part 4: Asymmetric cryptosystems—Key management and life cycle.

[0096] The public key extraction module 141(B) may be configured to extract a public key from a retrieved or stored public key certificate for use in processing a remote transaction. Any suitable process may be used to extract the public key. In some embodiments, the public key may be extracted before or after confirmation and / or verification of the public key certificate.

[0097] The transaction processing module 141(C) may be configured to process the payment request and provide a payment response in reply to the payment request, assuming that the received or stored public key certificate is valid and active for the transaction. For example, the transaction processing module 141(C) may decrypt the received encrypted message using the remote key manager private key stored in the private key database 141(E) and re-encrypt the decrypted message or information from this message using the transaction processor public key extracted from the transaction processor certificate (e.g., merchant certificate) for secure delivery to the transaction processor. The transaction processing module 141(C) may further pass the re-encrypted message (e.g., payment response) to the mobile device interface 141(D) for delivery to the appropriate transaction processor.

[0098] The mobile device interface 141(D) may be configured to communicate with the mobile device 120. For example, the mobile device 120 may incorporate any suitable communication protocol or network interface to communicate with the mobile device 120. The mobile device interface 141(D) may retrieve a message (e.g., a payment request) from the mobile device 120 and may be configured to parse the message to determine relevant information contained in the message.

[0099] The private key database 141(E) may include private keys for the remote key manager 140 (also referred to as remote key manager private keys). The private keys may be generated via any appropriate means and may be securely stored so that unauthorized entities are not provided access to the private keys. In some embodiments, the private keys may be stored in a local memory or in a remote secure database. In some embodiments, the private key may be one of a private / public key pair associated with the remote key manager 140 and the public key may be provided to the merchant application 121, the mobile payment application 123, the mobile device 120, the remote transaction application (not shown), and any other transaction entity that is configured to encrypt payment information for processing by the remote key manager 140. Additionally, in some embodiments, the private key database 141(E) may include symmetric encryption keys that may be used when encrypting data using symmetric encryption keys instead of public / private encryption key pairs.

[0100] Root public key database 141(F) may include root public keys for certificate authorities associated with public key certificates. In some embodiments, a single certificate authority root public key may be stored at a remote key manager associated with a single certificate authority (and may be stored locally at the remote key manager computer), while in other embodiments, multiple certificate authority root keys may be stored in the database or locally at the remote key manager computer. The certificate authority root public key may be used in the signature verification process to ensure that the public key certificate and the issuing certificate authority are valid and active. A. Merchant Certificate Issuance / Provision Method

[0101] Figure 4 A flow chart illustrating an exemplary method 400 for providing a merchant public / private key pair and a merchant application certificate using a certificate authority 180 according to some embodiments of the present invention. In some embodiments, the method 400 may be performed to provide a certificate indicating the trustworthiness or reliability of the merchant to a merchant computer 130. The received merchant certificate may then be included in a merchant application installed or provided to a mobile device.

[0102] At step 401, the merchant computer 130 generates a merchant public-private key pair. The merchant public-private key pair may be generated in any suitable format, such as RSA or elliptic curve cryptography (ECC). In some embodiments, the merchant private key may be securely stored on the merchant computer 130.

[0103] At step 402, the merchant computer 130 sends the merchant public key of the public-private key pair to the certificate authority 180. The certificate authority 180 may include any suitable entity configured to issue and verify certificates. For example, in some embodiments, the certificate authority 180 may include the payment processing network 160, the remote key manager 140, the mobile wallet provider, an entity not included in a typical payment transaction processing system, and any other entity.

[0104] At step 403, the certificate authority 180 verifies the authenticity of the merchant using any suitable means. For example, the merchant computer 130 may provide the certificate authority 180 with information that provides the identity of the merchant computer 130 being operated by the merchant. In one example, the merchant computer 130 may provide a document signed by an authorized signatory of the merchant (e.g., the president of the merchant organization).

[0105] At step 404, the certificate authority 180 generates a signed merchant certificate using the received merchant certificate signing request including the merchant public key. Typically, the merchant certificate may be signed by a certificate authority root private key. The certificate authority signature allows an entity to verify the authenticity of the merchant certificate using the certificate authority root public key.

[0106] At step 405 , certificate authority 180 sends the signed merchant certificate to merchant computer 130 .

[0107] At step 406, the merchant computer 130 generates a signed merchant application certificate using the merchant private key. Thus, a chain of trust can be established from the merchant application certificate to the merchant certificate to the certificate authority root certificate. In some embodiments, the signed merchant application certificate can be associated with an instance or version of the merchant application 121. For example, the merchant application certificate can be used to verify that the merchant application 121 is from the merchant.

[0108] At step 407, the merchant computer 130 stores the merchant application certificate and the merchant application private key associated with the merchant application certificate in the merchant application 121. Thus, when the merchant application 121 is loaded onto the mobile device 120, the authenticity of the merchant application 121 can be verified.

[0109] It should be understood that Figure 4 For example, in some embodiments of the invention, a merchant public-private key pair may be generated by certificate authority 180, and the merchant private key may be securely provided to merchant computer 130, such as using a Public Key Cryptography Standard (PKCS) #12 message. B. Exemplary Merchant Application Remote Payment Method Using Remote Key Manager and Public Key Certificates

[0110] Figure 5A flow chart illustrating an exemplary method 500 for processing a remote transaction using a remote key manager 140 and a merchant application 121 of a mobile device 120 according to some embodiments of the present invention. In some embodiments, the method 500 may be performed after a merchant application certificate has been provided to (e.g., according to method 400) and stored in the merchant application 121 with or without a merchant application private key. Figure 5 Then, you can execute Figure 5 method to conduct remote payment transactions for goods or services.

[0111] At step 501, the merchant application 121 sends payee information to the mobile payment application 123 for use in performing a remote payment transaction. The payee information may include information suitable for identifying the user's payment method (e.g., payment credentials associated with the mobile payment application 123), the merchant associated with the mobile payment application 123 (and the remote payment transaction), the type of transaction (e.g., a remote transaction), and any other information that may be relevant to the mobile payment application 123 for processing the remote payment transaction. For example, the payee information may include the user's name, the payment processing network identifier associated with the payment method (e.g., Visa ID), and the like. TM 、MasterCard TM etc.) and the last four digits of the account number for the mobile payment application 123 to identify the payment credentials or account information used for the remote payment transaction.

[0112] Additionally, the payee information may include a merchant identifier that may be provided to the merchant application 121 (or a merchant server associated with the merchant application 121) during an enrollment phase with the remote transaction processing service or remote key manager 140. In some embodiments, the payee information may be used to identify a merchant certificate that is provided to the remote key manager 140 (e.g., for embodiments where the mobile payment application 123 passes the merchant certificate to the remote key manager 140).

[0113] Additionally, the payee information may include a transaction identifier type that informs the mobile payment application 123 to request association with the remote payment transaction. Accordingly, the mobile payment application 123 may select an appropriate public encryption key (e.g., a remote key manager public key) to encrypt the payment information, an appropriate destination or routing address for the remote key manager 140, and an appropriate communication protocol or message format for communicating with the remote key manager 140.

[0114] At step 502, the mobile payment application 123 uses the received payee information to retrieve and / or generate payment information from the secure element 122 of the mobile device 120. "Payment information" may include payment card data (e.g., payment account number (PAN) and expiration date), a cryptogram (such as a dynamic card verification value (dCVV or dCVV2) or other dynamically generated data), or other information suitable for conducting a remote payment transaction.

[0115] At step 503, the mobile payment application 123 encrypts the payment information using a remote key manager key. The remote key manager key may be symmetric or a public key associated with a remote key manager public / private key pair. In some embodiments, the mobile payment application 123 may determine the remote key manager public key using a remote key manager certificate stored on the mobile device 120, may request a certificate from the mobile key manager, or may obtain the remote key manager public key on the secure element 122 or general memory of the mobile device 120. In the case where the remote key manager key is a symmetric key, the symmetric key may be securely stored by the mobile payment application 123.

[0116] At step 504, the mobile payment application 123 sends the encrypted payment information to the merchant application 121. It should be noted that because the merchant application 121 does not know the remote key manager private key, the merchant application 121 cannot decrypt the encrypted payment information.

[0117] At step 505, the merchant application 121 receives the encrypted payment information and generates a payment request that includes the encrypted payment information, the received encrypted payment information, any other transaction data associated with the payment transaction that is not included in the encrypted payment information (e.g., transaction amount, merchant identifier, product identifier, etc.), a merchant certificate associated with the merchant computer 130, and a signature generated using the merchant computer private key. The merchant application 121 can then transmit the payment request to the remote key manager 140. In some embodiments, the payment request can be encrypted using a session key established between the remote key manager 140 and the mobile device 120. This session key can be established and transmitted by any suitable means.

[0118] At step 506, the remote key manager 140 receives the payment request, can decrypt the payment request using the session key, and parse the encrypted payment information, unencrypted transaction data, merchant certificate, and signature from the payment request. The remote key manager 140 can verify the signature. Typically, the signature can be verified using a public key contained in the merchant certificate. Alternatively, in some embodiments, the public key can be registered and stored at the remote key manager associated with the merchant certificate. If the signature is not verified, the remote key manager 140 indicates to the merchant application 121 that the signature is invalid and the method stops. Otherwise, the method proceeds to step 507. Note that verifying the signature is optional (just as signing is optional) and can occur on a periodic basis, so the signature may not be transmitted from the merchant computer 130.

[0119] At step 507, the remote key manager 140 decrypts the encrypted payment information using a remote key manager key stored at the remote key manager 140. The remote key manager key may include a symmetric key or a private key of a public / private key pair. In embodiments using a remote key manager private key, the private key is configured to decrypt information that has been encrypted with a corresponding remote key manager public key and the public key is intended to be securely stored on the remote key manager 140 so that only the remote key manager 140 can decrypt information encrypted with the remote key manager public key. Similarly, a symmetric key may be stored at the remote key manager 140 and used to decrypt the encrypted payment information.

[0120] At step 508, the remote key manager 140 re-encrypts the payment information using the determined merchant public key. As explained above, the merchant public key may be contained in the merchant application certificate and may be extracted at any point during the remote transaction processing. The remote key manager 140 may determine the merchant public key in any suitable manner, including extracting the public key from the merchant certificate, using a stored merchant public key of a merchant registered with the remote key manager 140, etc.

[0121] At step 509, the remote key manager 140 generates and sends a transaction response containing the re-encrypted payment information to the merchant application 121 of the mobile device 120. In some embodiments, the re-encrypted payment information may be further encrypted using a previously established session key for secure communication between the remote key manager 140 and the mobile device 120.

[0122] At step 510, the merchant application 121 sends the re-encrypted payment information to the merchant computer 130. The merchant application 121 may determine the appropriate merchant computer 130 to send the re-encrypted payment information to by any appropriate method. For example, routing information may be included in the payment response, and the merchant application 121 may have a destination merchant computer 130 associated with the remote payment transaction when initiating the payment, or the merchant application 121 may have a designated merchant computer 130 to send the payment request to.

[0123] At step 511, the merchant computer 130 receives the re-encrypted payment information and decrypts the re-encrypted payment information using the merchant private key stored at the merchant computer 130. Thus, for the first time in remote transaction processing, the merchant computer 130 can gain access to the payment information (e.g., payment credentials and / or other security information) that the mobile payment application 123 retrieved and encrypted from the secure memory of the mobile communication device. For example, the merchant server can retrieve an account identifier (e.g., a primary account number (PAN)) and a transaction-specific password with an expiration date and a dynamic value associated with the payment account. The password provides additional authentication and verification opportunities for the payment processor and / or issuer and enables minimized fraud risk in such remote transactions.

[0124] At step 512, the merchant computer 130 may use the decrypted payment information to initiate and / or conduct a payment transaction. For example, the merchant computer 130 may generate an authorization request message that includes information typically present in a card present transaction (e.g., payment credentials, chip data, etc.). Thus, the merchant computer 130 may map the decrypted payment information (and other transaction information included in the payment response) into a format that is associated with the authorization request message for the merchant computer 130, the acquirer computer 150, the payment processing network 160, and the issuer computer 170.

[0125] It should be understood that Figure 5 It is intended to be illustrative rather than limiting. For example, as will be referred to below Figure 6 As shown, any number of different entities may be used to decrypt the re-encrypted payment information. For example, Figure 6 Three different options for decrypting and delivering the payment information are shown. Other transaction entities may also be configured to decrypt the re-encrypted payment information and initiate a payment transaction.

[0126] Figure 6 Additional exemplary methods for conducting remote transactions using the remote key manager 140 and the merchant application 121 of the mobile device 120 according to some embodiments of the present invention are shown. Figure 6As shown, after the remote key manager 140 decrypts the encrypted payment information, the remote key manager 140 may re-encrypt the payment information using public keys associated with any number of different transaction processing entities. For example, instead of using the merchant application public key to encrypt the payment information, the merchant public key (associated with a private key stored at the merchant server computer) or the acquirer public key (associated with a private key stored at the acquirer computer 150) may be used to encrypt the payment information and the re-encrypted payment information may be passed to each corresponding entity (e.g., the merchant server computer or the acquirer computer 150) for decryption and authorization request message generation.

[0127] Steps 601-608 ( Figure 6 Only some of them are shown) are similar to the above reference Figure 5 For example, at step 601, the merchant application 121 sends the payee information to the mobile payment application 123 of the mobile device 120 to identify the appropriate payment information for the transaction. In addition, at steps 602-604, the mobile payment application 123 encrypts the payment information using the remote key manager public key and sends the encrypted payment information to the remote key manager 140.

[0128] However, at step 605, depending on the configuration of the remote transaction processing system, any number of public key certificates (e.g., merchant application public key certificate, merchant public key certificate, acquirer public key certificate, etc.) may be passed to the remote key manager 140. Once the re-encrypted payment information is returned from the remote key manager 140, the merchant application 121 may determine which public key certificate and routing information should be provided for the encrypted payment information.

[0129] Steps 606-608 are similar to those in the above reference Figure 5 1, the identity of the transaction processor certificate may include any of the merchant application 121, the merchant computer 130, or the acquirer computer 150. Thus, the remote key manager 140 may verify the received public key certificate, decrypt the encrypted payment information (e.g., account identifier and password) using the public key extracted from the received public key certificate, and re-encrypt the decrypted payment information (e.g., card data and password). As explained above, the public key certificate may be associated with any transaction processor (e.g., including the merchant computer 130, the merchant application 121, or the acquirer computer 150).

[0130] At steps 609A-609C, remote key manager 140 may send the re-encrypted payment information to the transaction processing entity (e.g., merchant application 121, merchant computer 130, acquirer computer 150, etc.) associated with the received public key certificate (and subsequently encrypt the payment information using the public key).

[0131] For example, for option A, the public key certificate sent at step 605 includes the merchant application public key certificate, so that the remote key manager 140 verifies the certificate and extracts or otherwise obtains the merchant application public key. Therefore, the merchant application public key is used to re-encrypt the decrypted payment information, and at step 609A, the remote key manager 140 sends the re-encrypted payment information to the merchant application 121.

[0132] At step 610A, the merchant application 121 may receive the re-encrypted payment information, determine the merchant application private key associated with the re-encrypted payment information, and decrypt the re-encrypted payment information using the merchant application private key. Thus, the merchant application 121 may have sensitive information stored on the secure element 122 and secure information generated using the security algorithm of the mobile payment application 123 for payment transactions. For example, the merchant application 121 may have the consumer's payment credentials (e.g., account identifier, expiration date, card verification value (CVV), personal information, etc.) and a password or other dynamic value that can be used to authenticate that the mobile payment application 123 used to generate the transaction data is authentic.

[0133] The merchant application 121 may then initiate a payment transaction using the decrypted payment information. The merchant application 121 may initiate the payment transaction using any suitable method. For example, the merchant application 121 may generate an authorization request message configured to be sent via the payment processing network 160. Figure 6 , the merchant application 121 can re-encrypt the decrypted payment information using the merchant server key and can send the payment information to the merchant computer 130 for decryption and initiation of the payment transaction. In this way, the decrypted payment information can be passed to the merchant computer 130 for generation of an authorization request message or other initiation of a payment transaction.

[0134] At step 612A, the merchant computer 130 may send an authorization request message to an acquirer computer 150 associated with the merchant for processing of the transaction. The authorization request message may be sent along a secure communication channel using an encrypted link encryption key or encryption process. Thus, in some embodiments, the payment information included in the authorization request message may be encrypted once more and sent to the acquirer computer 150 for processing. Any other secure process may be used to send the authorization request message to the acquirer via a secure process. Although in Figure 6Not shown, the acquirer computer 150 may then forward the authorization request message to the payment processing network 160, which is configured to process the payment transaction as if it were a card or other local transaction.

[0135] In some embodiments, the payment processing network 160 may not be aware that the payment transaction is a remote payment transaction because the authorization request message may have the same security data fields as other chip-based card-present transactions. Therefore, the remote payment transaction may have the same security features and associated risks as a card-present transaction, which may result in fewer fraudulent transactions.

[0136] In some embodiments, the payment processing network 160 may determine that the authorization request message is associated with a remote payment transaction based on the type of password or dynamic data generated by the mobile payment application 123 or by a security level indicator set in the payment information or authorization request message. For example, the mobile payment application 123, the merchant application 121, or the merchant computer 130 may provide a security level indicator that informs the payment network and the issuer that the transaction originated remotely but was processed by the secure remote payment transaction processor method described herein. In such embodiments, there may be different security level indicators for traditional key entry transactions or unsecured card-not-present transactions. Therefore, the security level indicator may inform different entities about who is responsible for fraud in a payment transaction (e.g., merchant versus issuer) and the risks associated with this type of transaction.

[0137] The remote payment transaction may be further routed to the issuer associated with the payment credential, where an authentication decision may be made and the transaction may be authorized or denied, as described above with reference to Figure 1 An authorization response message may be generated and returned to the merchant server computer, merchant application 121, mobile payment application 123 via the transaction processing system to update any account or transaction history information associated with the mobile payment application 123 or security element 122, and provided to the consumer 110. Thus, the transaction may be processed.

[0138] Alternatively, for Option B, the public key certificate sent at step 605 includes a merchant public key certificate, so that the remote key manager 140 verifies the certificate and extracts or otherwise obtains the merchant public key. Thus, the merchant public key is used to re-encrypt the payment information, and at step 609B, the remote key manager 140 sends the re-encrypted payment information to the merchant computer 130.

[0139] Any number of different methods may be used to send the re-encrypted payment information to the merchant computer 130. For example, the payment response message may include unencrypted routing information associated with the merchant computer 130 so that the merchant application 121 may automatically route the re-encrypted payment information to the merchant computer 130. Alternatively or in conjunction, the merchant application 121 may have the routing information associated with the merchant computer 130 (e.g., a server computer address) programmed into the merchant application 121, and when the transaction is initiated, the merchant application 121 may know that any corresponding payment response message may be routed to the merchant computer 130. In addition, a flag or other data element in the received message containing the re-encrypted payment information may indicate to the merchant application 121 where and within which entity the re-encrypted payment information is to be sent.

[0140] Additionally, in some embodiments, remote key manager 140 may be configured to send a payment response directly to merchant computer 130. Thus, remote key manager 140 may use address information contained in a merchant certificate, in merchant information provided during a session with a remote payment processing service, or in merchant information provided in a purchase request to determine the appropriate merchant server computer to which to send the purchase request.

[0141] At steps 610B-611B, the merchant computer 130 may decrypt the re-encrypted payment information, initiate the payment transaction, and send an authorization request message to the acquirer, as described above in steps 611A-612A.

[0142] Thus, for Option C, the public key certificate sent at step 605 includes the acquirer public key certificate, so that the remote key manager 140 verifies this certificate and extracts or otherwise obtains the acquirer public key. Accordingly, the acquirer public key is used to re-encrypt the payment information, and at step 609C, the remote key manager 140 sends the re-encrypted payment information to the acquirer computer 150. A process similar to that described above with respect to sending the merchant public key encrypted payment information may be used to send the encrypted payment information to the acquirer computer 150, including routing this information through the merchant application 121 and the merchant computer 130 or sending the encrypted payment information directly to the acquirer computer 150.

[0143] At step 610C, the acquirer computer 150 may decrypt the re-encrypted payment information, initiate the payment transaction, and send an authorization request message to the acquirer, as described above in steps 611A-612A and 610B-611B.

[0144] Therefore, there are many options for securely processing remote payment transactions to pass sensitive information from the mobile payment application 123 of the mobile device 120 to the remote merchant server computer without allowing the sensitive information to be intercepted by a malicious third party, while providing the security benefits of a card or local transaction to complete the remote payment transaction. II. Systems and methods for processing remote mobile payment transactions using a mobile gateway associated with a payment processing network

[0145] Another embodiment of the present invention includes a system for performing remote transactions using a gateway 190 associated with a payment processing network server computer 161. Interacting with the payment processing network 160 can achieve several advantages, including additional authentication capabilities, including verifying an authentication value before submitting a transaction to the payment processing network 160 via the payment network using an authorization request message. Thus, the payment processing network 160 can perform additional authentication processes (e.g., risk management, velocity detection, etc.) on the payment request (and associated consumer account) before initiating payment, which can allow the payment processing network 160 to notify the merchant system whether the transaction is authentic before initiating the payment transaction via the authorization request message. The merchant can then change the risk decision, authentication process, and any other transaction process based on the authentication results provided by the payment processing network.

[0146] Additionally, by interacting with the payment processing network 160 , the payment processing network 160 may implement an additional layer of transaction authentication by generating an authorization response value, which may be verified by the payment processing network 160 prior to authorizing the transaction.

[0147] Figure 7 A block diagram of an exemplary system 700 for performing remote transactions using a mobile gateway 190 associated with a payment processing network 160 and a merchant application 121 of a mobile device 120 according to some embodiments of the present invention is shown. Figure 7 As can be seen in FIG. 1 , the remote transaction processing system 700 is similar to Figure 1 As shown in FIG. 1 , however, instead of a separate remote key manager 140, the system 700 includes a mobile gateway 190 that allows the mobile device 120 to transmit encrypted payment information of a payment request directly to a payment processing network 160 that is configured to process remote payment transactions. The payment processing network 160 can provide several additional features and capabilities for a secure remote payment transaction processor method, as described in more detail below.

[0148] For reference Figure 1 Found above Figure 7 Therefore, a detailed explanation is not provided here. Figure 7The mobile device 120 is configured to communicate with a mobile gateway 190, which is configured to communicate with a payment processing network 160, which may be associated with or responsible for processing remote payment transactions.

[0149] The mobile gateway 190 may include a mobile gateway encryption key that can be shared with the mobile payment application 123 stored on the secure element 122 of the mobile device 120. The mobile gateway encryption key can be a symmetric or public / private secret key pair. The mobile gateway encryption key can be provided to the mobile payment application 123 and can allow the mobile payment application 123 to initiate a secure channel using the mobile gateway 190, which can allow the mobile payment application 123 to provide "end-to-end" encryption for communication between the mobile payment application 123 and the payment processing network server computer 161. Alternatively or in combination, the mobile payment application 123 can use the mobile gateway public key to securely encrypt and transmit information in and out of the mobile gateway 190. Therefore, the mobile gateway 190 can be configured to decrypt encrypted payment information that is encrypted using a public key or other secure encryption key stored on the secure element 122 of the mobile device 120. Therefore, sensitive data can be securely shared between the mobile device 120 and the mobile gateway server computer.

[0150] The mobile gateway 190 may include a secure channel generation module configured to configure a secure communication link between the mobile gateway 190, the mobile device 120, and the payment processing network server computer 161. The secure channel generation module may exchange any relevant information so that the mobile payment application 123 and the mobile gateway 190 generate matching or complementary session keys to securely transmit sensitive information. Any other suitable method of generating a secure channel may be implemented.

[0151] Further information regarding the capabilities of mobile gateway 190 may be found in U.S. Patent No. 13 / 662,843, filed on October 29, 2012, entitled “Over The Air Update of Payment Transaction Data Stored in Secure Memory,” U.S. Patent Application No. 12 / 563,410, filed on September 21, 2009, entitled “Apparatus and Method for Preventing Unauthorized Access to Payment Application Installed in Contactless Payment Device,” and U.S. Patent Application No. 13 / 563,421, filed on September 21, 2009, entitled “Over The Air Update of Payment Transaction Data Stored in Secure Memory,” which are incorporated herein by reference in their entirety for all purposes.

[0152] In addition to reference Figure 1 In addition to the modules described above, Figure 7 The payment processing network 160 may have several other modules associated with the remote payment transaction processing capabilities described above. In addition, the payment processing network 160 may further include a private key of a public / private encryption key pair (e.g., a payment processing network encryption key pair) and this payment processing network public encryption key pair may be shared with the merchant computer 130, which is registered to the payment processing network 160 that provides remote transaction processing. Note that the mobile gateway 190 and modules described herein for the payment processing network 160 may be found integrated into a single entity or may also be separated into additional entities. For example, the mobile gateway 190 may be integrated into the payment processing network server computer 161 or the encryption and decryption functions of the payment processing network 160 may be integrated into the mobile gateway 190.

[0153] Figure 8A block diagram of an exemplary payment processing network 160 according to some embodiments of the present invention is shown. The payment processing network 160 may include a payment processing network server computer 161, a registered key database 161 (F), and a private key database 161 (G). The payment processing network server computer 161 may include a key registration module 161 (A), a password verification module 161 (B), a transaction processing module 161 (C), a merchant verification module 161 (D), and a mobile gateway interface 161 (E). The payment processing network server computer 161 may further include a processor (not shown) and a computer-readable medium (not shown) coupled to the processor, the computer-readable medium including code executable by the processor for performing methods as described in the embodiments herein.

[0154] The key registration module 161(A) may include any software module configured to register encryption keys, shared secrets, and / or any other transaction processor (e.g., merchant application 121, merchant computer 130, acquirer computer 150, etc.) information with the payment processing network server computer 161 to enable processing of remote payment transactions.

[0155] The registered key database 161(F) may include registered public keys from public / private key pairs associated with a variety of merchants, merchant applications, acquirers, and / or any other transaction processors that have registered for remote transaction processing. The registered key database 161(F) may include any appropriate information for obtaining the appropriate public key for a given transaction, including a public key stored with a corresponding public key certificate and / or associated with a particular merchant identifier provided during registration. The merchant identifier may be included in a payment request, which may allow the transaction processing module 161(C) of the payment processing network 160 to identify the appropriate transaction processor public key associated with the transaction.

[0156] The private key database 161(G) may include a database or local memory of the payment processing network server computer 161 that contains the payment processing network private key associated with the payment processing network public key from the public / private key pair. The private key database 161(G) may be secure and may keep the private keys secure and accessible only by the payment processing network server computer 161. In some embodiments, there may be multiple private keys associated with the payment processing network 160.

[0157] The merchant verification module 161(D) may include any component module configured to verify the registration of a merchant (or other transaction processor) associated with a remote payment transaction. For example, the merchant verification module 161(D) may determine whether the merchant has registered with the payment processing network server computer 161 to ensure that the payment processing network 160 has access to a public key associated with the merchant computer 130 or the merchant application 121. Similar to reference Figure 3 As described above, the merchant verification module 161 (D) can verify the merchant public key certificate (if provided) to ensure that the merchant certificate is currently valid and active. If the merchant (or other transaction processor) cannot be verified, then the remote payment transaction processing can be stopped.

[0158] The password verification module 161(B) may include any software module configured to verify a password or other dynamic verification value associated with a payment request. The password verification module 161(B) may use a shared secret or a shared algorithm to verify the password, using repeated input data to recalculate and compare the dynamic password used for the transaction. For example, the password or other dynamic value may be generated by the mobile payment application 123 using an account identifier, an expiration date, a transaction time, a transaction amount, or any other appropriate transaction information available to the mobile payment application 123 and the payment processing network 160 (or an issuer computer or other processing entity). The shared algorithm may be shared between the mobile payment application and the payment processing network (or issuer or other processing entity).

[0159] In addition, the password verification module 161(B) may be configured to generate an authentication response value using a secret algorithm stored at the payment processing network 160 and the secret algorithm is not shared with any other entity in the remote transaction processing system. Therefore, the password verification module 161(B) may verify the dynamic password generated by the mobile payment application 123 and may return another dynamic password (e.g., an authentication response value), which may be returned to the mobile device 120 and submitted with any authorization request message generated for the transaction. Therefore, the payment processing network 160 may obtain the authentication response value during the transaction processing of the authorization request message and may verify whether the authentication response value matches the authentication response message generated, which was originally generated by the payment processing network 160 during the initial processing of the remote payment transaction. Therefore, the payment processing network 160 can be confident that the transaction has not been modified and that the transaction data is the same as the transaction originally authenticated by the payment processing network server computer 161.

[0160] The transaction processing module 161(C) may include any software module configured to receive a payment request including encrypted payment information, decrypt the encrypted payment information, determine a transaction processor public key, re-encrypt the decrypted payment information using the public key, and provide a payment request including the re-encrypted payment information to the transaction processor.

[0161] The mobile gateway interface 161 (E) may allow the payment processing network 160 to interact with the mobile gateway 190 and obtain communications from the mobile gateway 190 that the payment processing network 160 is able to decrypt or may have already been decrypted.

[0162] Fig. 9 A flow chart is shown of an exemplary method 900 for performing a remote transaction using a mobile gateway 190 associated with a payment processing network 160 and a merchant application 121 of a mobile device 120 according to some embodiments of the present invention.

[0163] At step 901 , consumer 110 initiates a remote payment transaction using merchant application 121 , which sends a message to a merchant server computer indicating that consumer 110 wants to initiate a remote transaction.

[0164] At step 902, the merchant computer 130 generates, encrypts, and sends transaction information encrypted with a payment processing network public key for the remote payment transaction to the merchant application 121 of the mobile device 120. The payment processing network public key may include a registration key provided by the payment processing network server computer 161 during the merchant's registration with the remote payment transaction process. The transaction information may include, for example, a merchant identifier, a transaction amount, a type of authentication used for the transaction, a transaction identifier, and any other relevant information for processing the remote transaction. The transaction information may be encrypted using the payment processing network public key, which is provided to the merchant server computer during the registration of the remote payment transaction processing function.

[0165] At step 903, the merchant application 121 forwards the encrypted transaction data to the mobile payment application 123 of the mobile device 120. In this embodiment, the merchant application 121 may not modify or change the transaction data and may merely act as an intermediary between the merchant computer 130 and the mobile payment application 123.

[0166] At steps 904-907, a secure channel is established and communications are sent between the mobile payment application 123, the mobile gateway 190 associated with the payment processing network 160, and the payment processing network server computer 161 to initialize and prepare the secure channel. The secure channel enables communications between the mobile device 120 and the payment processing network 160 to be encrypted and protected from interception.

[0167] The secure channel may be established in any suitable manner. For example, the secure channel may be established using a mobile gateway encryption key provided to the mobile payment application 123 during personalization of the mobile payment application 123. Thus, the encryption key used to establish the secure channel may include a session key that changes for each session or remote payment transaction. Aabye et al. describe a similar process in U.S. Patent Application No. 13 / 075,592 filed on March 30, 2011, which is incorporated herein by reference in its entirety.

[0168] In addition, the encryption key can be a unique derived key (UDK) derived from a master key, which is provided by the mobile payment application 123 issuer, a trusted service manager (TSM) associated with the secure element 122, or a secure element issuer. In addition, any other suitable encryption method can be implemented, as one skilled in the art will recognize. In this way, a secure connection can be implemented using a data encryption standard, such as, for example, RSA with a key indicating 1024 bits, triple data encryption standard (DES), 128-bit advanced encryption standard (AES), RC4 stream encryption algorithm using a minimum 128-bit key length, etc.

[0169] At step 908, after establishing a secure channel, the mobile payment application 123 can use the payment credentials stored in the security element 122 and the mobile gateway encryption key derived or stored using the information stored in the security element 122 (e.g., a shared encryption key or method for generating a unique derived key for each session) to generate and send a payment request containing encrypted payment information. The payment request may include encrypted transaction data received from the merchant computer 130 and the merchant application 121 without further modification or obtaining access to the encrypted transaction information. The encrypted payment information may include payment credentials, transaction passwords or other dynamic values ​​and any other information requested by the mobile gateway 190 and / or the payment processing network 160 to process remote transaction payments. Note that in this embodiment, the encrypted payment information can be encrypted with a session key that includes an encryption key different from the network public / private key pair.

[0170] Thus, the mobile gateway 190 can decrypt the encrypted payment information provided by the mobile payment application 123 without affecting the encrypted transaction information transmitted from the merchant server and encrypted using the payment processing network public key. Thus, the mobile gateway 190 can use one encryption key for communicating on a secure channel, and the payment processing network 160 can use a different encryption key for decrypting the encrypted transaction information provided by the merchant computer 130. Thus, the mobile payment application 123 can use a first key to generate and securely transmit payment credentials and consumer information stored in the secure element 122 of the mobile device 120, and the payment processing network 160 can use a second key (e.g., a payment processing network private key) to decrypt the transaction information transmitted from the merchant server computer.

[0171] At step 909, the password verification module 161 (B) of the payment processing network server computer 161 verifies the password in the received payment request, which is generated by the authentic mobile payment application 132. The verification password can be generated by the payment processing network 160 using the transaction information and / or payment information, which is shared between the payment processing network 160 and the mobile payment application 123 via the secure channel provided by the mobile gateway 190. If the received password matches the generated verification password, then the payment processing network 160 can determine that the payment information is generated by a valid and authentic mobile payment application 123.

[0172] At step 910, the transaction processing module 161(C) of the payment processing network server computer 161 may decrypt the transaction data using a private key associated with the payment processing network 160. The decrypted transaction information may include a merchant identifier or any other merchant information, so that the payment processing network 160 may determine the identity and associated public key to use them to process the remote payment transaction. Additionally, the merchant verification module 161(D) of the payment processing network 160 may verify with the remote payment transaction processing system that the merchant associated with the decrypted transaction information is registered, valid, active, and in good standing.

[0173] At step 911, any number of internal or external authentication processes may be used to authenticate the decrypted payment information. For example, a risk-based, stored credential, challenge-response, or any other type of consumer authentication process may be completed. In some embodiments, the mobile gateway 190 may request authentication information from the consumer 110 via an authentication request, a challenge, a request for a password, or via any other appropriate method. Alternatively or in conjunction, the payment processing network server computer 161 may determine whether the merchant application 121 or the mobile payment application 123 has previously authenticated the consumer 110 and may use this information to determine whether to perform a consumer authentication process and which authentication process to perform. For example, information associated with a cardholder verification method performed by the merchant application 121 prior to initiating a transaction may be passed to the payment processing network server computer 161.

[0174] At step 912, if the authentication process is successful and the password is verified, the password verification module 161(B) may generate an authentication response value for the transaction using a private key associated with the mobile gateway 190 or the payment processing network 160. The authentication response value may be verified by the payment processing network 160 during the authentication process to provide an additional level of authentication for the transaction by indicating that the transaction processor network computer previously analyzed and authenticated the transaction and did not modify the transaction.

[0175] At step 913 , the transaction processing module 161 (C) encrypts the payment information using the identified merchant public encryption key registered and stored at the payment processing network 160 .

[0176] At step 914, the mobile gateway interface 161(E) of the payment processing network server computer 161 uses the second channel to send a payment response including the encrypted payment information to the mobile payment application 123 of the mobile device 120. The mobile payment application 123 may not access the encrypted payment information because the mobile payment application 123 does not have access to the merchant private key.

[0177] At step 915, the mobile payment application 123 closes the secure channel connection to the mobile gateway 190. In this embodiment, the mobile gateway 190 may close the secure channel after sending the payment response including the encrypted payment information.

[0178] At step 916, the mobile payment application 123 returns a payment response containing the encrypted payment information to the merchant application 121. The payment response may include any information to identify this transaction and tell the mobile payment application 123 which merchant application 121 to send the encrypted payment information to.

[0179] At step 917, the merchant application 121 receives the payment response containing the encrypted payment information and forwards this encrypted payment information to the merchant server computer.

[0180] At step 918, the merchant server computer receives the payment response containing the encrypted payment information and decrypts the encrypted payment information using the merchant private key securely stored at the merchant server. Thus, the merchant server computer now has the secure payment credentials, authentication response value, security level, liability indicator, transaction data, and any other relevant information to initiate the payment transaction.

[0181] At step 919, the merchant server computer initiates the payment transaction by generating an authorization request message using the decrypted payment information. The authorization request message may have the decrypted payment information mapped to predetermined fields within the authorization request message to allow transaction entities within the transaction ecosystem to identify accounts, authenticate levels, and process transactions.

[0182] At step 920, the authorization request message may be sent to the acquirer computer 150 associated with the merchant computer 130, and the acquirer computer 150 may route the authorization request message to the payment processing network associated with the issuer identifier (e.g., BIN) or account identifier (e.g., primary account identifier).

[0183] At step 921, the payment processing network 160 may verify the authentication response value in the authorization request message. The payment processing network 160 may parse the authorization request message to determine the authentication response value and may obtain the mobile gateway private key or another payment processing network private key used to generate the authentication response value to generate the verification authentication value. If the verification authentication value and the authentication response value match, then the payment processing network 160 may know that this transaction was previously authenticated and determine that the transaction is fraudulent with a low likelihood. Therefore, this transaction may be authorized immediately or additional authentication information may be provided to the issuer to inform them that this transaction is likely authentic and should be authorized.

[0184] At step 922, the payment processing network 160 forwards the authorization request message to the issuer computer 170 associated with the consumer account.

[0185] At step 923, the issuer computer 170 may perform a risk assessment and authorization decision process, wherein the issuer computer 170 may parse relevant information from the authorization response message (including the authentication response value), any verification information from the payment processing network 160 associated with this transaction (e.g., risk score, results of other authentication processes, etc.), and may make a decision as to whether to authorize this transaction. Fig. 9 As shown in , issuer computer 170 may then generate an authorization response message containing an indication as to whether the transaction is authorized and pass it back through the payment network and ultimately to merchant computer 130 and consumer 110 (via mobile device 120) as to whether the transaction is authorized and successfully completed. III. Systems and methods for processing remote mobile payment transactions using a third-party service provider (e.g., a mobile wallet provider)

[0186] Additionally, some embodiments of the present invention may include a third-party service provider (e.g., a mobile wallet provider, a mobile network provider, a device manufacturer, etc.) having a relationship with the consumer 1010 to provide information about Figure 1 The third-party service provider can provide a secure remote transaction application 1025 on the secure element 1022 and use the remote transaction application 1025 to obtain payment credentials from the mobile payment application 1023, decrypt the payment information received from the mobile payment application 1023, and encrypt the payment information for delivery to the third-party server computer.

[0187] Fig.10 A block diagram of an exemplary system for processing remote transactions using a third-party service provider (e.g., a mobile wallet provider) and a merchant application 1021 of a mobile device 1020 according to some embodiments of the present invention is shown. Figure 1 and Figure 7 systems and their main differences.

[0188] Fig.10 The embodiment shown in includes additional configuration options for the remote transaction processing system, including the use of a token to identify the account of the consumer 1010 and the use of a registered merchant key, where the third party service provider 1040 is a mobile wallet provider. Fig.10 The configuration is illustrative only and multiple parties and tokens may be used in any of the systems described above.

[0189] like Fig.10 As shown, the payment processing network 1060 may also be communicatively coupled or incorporated with a token registry 1061. The token registry 1061 may include any database or other storage in which tokens may be issued to the mobile device 1020 and associated with an issuer account so that transactions may be processed using the token in place of a primary account number / identifier (PAN).

[0190] The mobile device 1020 may include a merchant application 1021, a remote transaction SDK 1024, an API, or other third-party service layer that can be incorporated into the merchant application 1021 to allow the merchant application 1021 to interact with a remote transaction application 1025 stored in the secure element 1022, a remote transaction application 1025 installed on the secure element 1022 of the mobile device 1020, and a mobile payment application 1023 stored in the secure element 1022 of the mobile device 1020.

[0191] The remote transaction SDK 1024 or third-party service layer may include an API, application, applet, or other executable code suitable for interacting with a secure application and / or a third-party server system (e.g., a mobile wallet provider, a remote key manager, etc.). For example, the remote transaction SDK 1024 may be embedded in the merchant application 1021 and may be used by the merchant application 1021 to retrieve payment information from the secure remote transaction application 1025 on the secure element 1022 to interact with the mobile payment application 1023 provided on the secure element 1022, communicate with the merchant application 1021, and communicate with a third-party system. In some embodiments, the remote transaction SDK 1024 or third-party service layer may be protected and embedded in the secure element 1022. In addition, although the remote transaction SDK 1024 is shown as part of the merchant application 1021, the remote transaction SDK 1024 may also be a standalone application or may be embedded in the operating system of the mobile device 1020.

[0192] The remote transaction application 1025 includes a security application in the security element 1022 provided to the mobile device 1020. The remote transaction application 1025 provides a secure area for the storage of public key certificates and / or public keys for a third-party service provider system (e.g., a mobile wallet provider). In addition, the remote transaction application 1025 can provide mobile payment application 1023 access control verification (e.g., providing security functions for mobile payment application 1023) by allowing access to mobile payment application 1023 only when the consumer provides security credentials or is otherwise authenticated. For example, if the signature cannot be verified or if the certificate does not match the certificate authority 180, the remote transaction application 1025 can reject the remote transaction request from the merchant application 1021, and the transaction processing can end (the consumer 1010 can be prompted to try a different payment method or try again). Optionally, if the certificate is valid, the remote transaction application 1025 can pass the request for payment information to the mobile payment application 1023.

[0193] The third-party service provider system (e.g., mobile wallet provider 1040) may include any entity that is related to or interested in the consumer 1010, mobile device 1020, merchant, payment processing network 1060, or any other payment transaction processing method or system. For example, the third-party service provider may include a mobile wallet provider, a mobile device manufacturer, a mobile network operator, or any other entity that may interact with merchants and consumer devices. Thus, embodiments of the present invention may allow a third-party service provider system to register merchants and manage the authentication process for merchant remote transactions to provide multiple security processes for remote transactions.

[0194] The registration key of the mobile wallet provider may include any public encryption key used to encrypt payment information when processing remote transactions. For example, when a merchant logs on-board or registers with the remote payment transaction service provided by the mobile wallet provider, the merchant may send a public key and / or public key certificate to the mobile wallet provider, which the mobile wallet provider may use to encrypt the payment information before sending it to the merchant server computer so that the merchant computer 1030 can decrypt the payment information. Although not in Figure 10-11 As shown in FIG. 1 , a mobile wallet provider (or other third party) may also use some embodiments, wherein by reference to Figure 1-6 Describes the use of public key certificates to identify keys.

[0195] Fig.11 A flow chart is shown of an exemplary method 1100 for processing a remote transaction using a third-party service provider (eg, a mobile wallet provider) and a merchant application 1021 of a mobile device 1020 according to some embodiments of the invention.

[0196] At step 1101, the consumer 1010 completes their shopping experience through a merchant application 1021 that communicates with a merchant online or e-commerce store. When the consumer 1010 is ready to review their shopping experience and complete the purchase, the consumer 1010 can log into a third-party applet or remote transaction application 1025 or service layer using a third-party (e.g., mobile wallet provider) credential. The consumer 1010 can then initiate a checkout via the merchant application 1021. The merchant application 1021 can provide an option to select a payment card or account for payment through the remote transaction application 1025. The consumer 1010 can select an account to initiate payment.

[0197] At step 1102, the merchant application 1021 sends the payee information to the remote transaction application 1025 using a remote transaction software development kit (SDK) or other third-party service layer or application located on the mobile device 1020. In one embodiment, the remote transaction SDK 1024 or the remote transaction application 1025 may include a service layer configured to form an interface between the merchant application 1021 and a remote transaction applet stored on the secure element 1022 of the mobile device 1020. Optionally, the remote transaction application 1025 may also be stored in the general memory of the mobile device 1020 and may be configured to communicate with a third-party server platform (e.g., mobile wallet provider 1040). In either case, the remote transaction application 1025 may be configured to communicate with a mobile payment application 1023 (e.g., Visa) stored on the secure element 1022 of the mobile device 1020. TM Paywave TM Application) communication.

[0198] At step 1103, the remote transaction SDK 1024 or remote transaction application 1025 exchanges the payee information with the remote transaction application 1025 present in the secure element 1022. The remote transaction application 1025 can then use an API or other command to request the mobile payment application 1023 (e.g., Visa TM Paywave TM The application) provides specified payment credentials (e.g., payment token, primary account number (PAN), pseudo PAN, virtual PAN, validity period, etc.), which are stored in a protected manner on the secure element 1022.

[0199] At step 1104, the mobile payment application 1023 may use the received payee information to retrieve and generate payment information using the security element 1022. For example, the mobile payment application 1023 may obtain token information from the security element 1022 and use the payment information, the token, and information associated with the token (e.g., token validity period) to generate a payment request payload (payload) (including token data elements) and dynamic values ​​(e.g., authentication values). For example, the payment information may include a token (or PAN, pseudo-PAN, PAN substitute, etc.), a token validity period, a unique transaction identifier (e.g., a nonce), token authentication data (e.g., a dynamic value or password-such as CAVV, dCVV, etc.), and an authentication and / or security registration indicator (e.g., an ECI5 value). The payment information may further include any transaction information (e.g., amount, merchant identifier, etc.) that may be useful in processing the transaction.

[0200] The token may include any payment credentials issued or known at a token registry 1061, which is coupled to a payment processing network 1060 or other payment entity. The token may be a PAN substitute, so that the token may have the same format as a typical primary account number (PAN) and may be processed by an existing payment processing infrastructure. Alternatively, the token may be in any other possible format so that it is associated with a PAN or other account identifier at a token registry 1061. Embodiments of the present invention may enable tokens that may be stored in a secure element 1022 and used in transactions initiated using a mobile payment application 1023 to be used for remote payment transactions.

[0201] The authentication data may include any cryptographic value generated by a security algorithm, key, or other security and protection method in a mobile payment application stored on a secure element. Thus, the authentication data (in this case, "token authentication data") may be similar to a CAVV, dCVV, or any other dynamic value used for authentication that is generated and sent during a card-present, chip-based, or in-person payment transaction. The authentication data assures the payment processing network that the payment request was generated by a secure user and allows the payment processing network to determine that the transaction has a higher level of security. Thus, the token authentication data may be generated using separate algorithms or encryption keys located on the secure element and the payment processing network, respectively.

[0202] When the payment processing network receives the authorization request message generated during the transaction, the payment processing network can generate another authentication data cryptographically and compare the independently generated authentication data with the received authentication data. If they match, then the transaction can be authenticated, such as generated by a reliable mobile payment application. However, if the token authentication data does not match, then the transaction can be rejected, the security level can be downgraded to a typical e-commerce transaction, or the payment processing network can take any other appropriate steps to inform the multiple parties in the transaction processing environment that this transaction may be fraudulent or that an error may have occurred.

[0203] The authentication and / or security level indicator may include an indicator that allows some or all parties in the transaction processing environment to understand the risk level and authentication level of the current transaction. For example, the authentication and / or security level indicator may inform all parties that a new accountability rule or scheme is being implemented based on the presence of generated authentication data (e.g., a dynamic value or password) because this transaction has a high level of assurance.

[0204] In addition, at step 1104, mobile payment application 1023 may use third-party public encryption key to encrypt remote transaction request payload including token, token authentication data and other transaction data. In some embodiments, mobile payment application 1023 may use third-party certificates stored on mobile device 1020 to determine third-party public keys or may obtain third-party public keys through certificate authority 180 or other databases. Public keys may be provided to mobile payment application security element 1022 and mobile payment application 1023 may obtain third-party public keys. Alternatively or in combination, mobile payment application 1023 may have an encryption key (symmetric or public / private key pair) associated with remote transaction application 1025 provided to security element 1022 and use the key pair payment information provided to encrypt. Alternatively, because mobile payment application 1023 and remote transaction application 1025 run together with security element 1022, mobile payment application 1023 may transmit payment information in unencrypted format so that encryption key is not necessary.

[0205] At step 1105 , the mobile payment application 1023 sends the payment information (encrypted or unencrypted) to the remote transaction application 1025 .

[0206] At step 1106, the remote transaction application 1025 can determine whether the payment information is encrypted, and if so, an encryption key can be obtained to decrypt the encrypted payment information. The remote transaction application encryption key may include any appropriate encryption key based on the key provided or used by the mobile payment application 1023 to encrypt the payment information. The key may be a symmetric or private key associated with a public key, used to encrypt the payment information from the mobile payment application 1023. In either case, the remote transaction application 1025 decrypts the encrypted payment information (if it is encrypted) and obtains the payment information containing the payment voucher. In addition, the remote transaction application 1025 can re-encrypt the decrypted payment information using a third-party server computer public encryption key (e.g., a mobile wallet provider computer encryption key) so that sensitive payment information can be securely sent to the mobile wallet provider. The remote transaction application 1025 may have a third-party encryption public key provided to the security element 1022 or may use a public key certificate or other information to obtain the correct encryption key. Thus, the payment information may be encrypted using a third-party server computer public key (e.g., a mobile wallet provider public key) and the encrypted payment information may be sent to a third-party service provider server computer (e.g., a mobile wallet provider) for further remote transaction processing.

[0207] At step 1107, the encrypted payment information may then be sent to the remote transaction SDK 1024 or other remote transaction application 1025 on the mobile device 1020, which can transmit the encrypted payment information to the third-party server platform. The remote transaction SDK 1024 may then send the encrypted payment information to the third-party server platform. It should be noted that because the remote transaction SDK 1024, the merchant application 1021, the remote transaction application 1025, the mobile payment application 1023, or any other application or program located on the mobile device 1020 does not know the third-party private key, the encrypted payment information cannot be decrypted by any program on the mobile device 1020.

[0208] At step 1108, the third-party server platform may receive the encrypted payment information and may decrypt the payment information using the stored third-party private key. Only the third-party server system may have access to the third-party private key. In addition, the third-party server system may verify the received payment information by checking to ensure that the correct third-party public key was used for the encrypted payment information, to ensure that various aspects of the payment information are correct (e.g., the merchant identifier is associated with a registered merchant), and any other appropriate verification that the encrypted payment information was sent by a legitimate payment application, mobile device 1020, etc.

[0209] The third-party server system can then determine the appropriate merchant associated with the merchant identifier. The merchant identifier can be unique to the third-party server system and can include any information identifying the merchant associated with the merchant application 1021 that originally generated the payee information. The merchant can register with the third-party server system or otherwise complete a merchant "login" process to be included in the highly authenticated e-commerce payment processor method. Therefore, a login or registration process can be performed between the merchant and the third-party server system before any transaction is performed, and the merchant can provide the merchant-facing public key and other registration information (e.g., merchant address, etc.) to the third-party system at this time. Therefore, when the third-party server system decrypts the payment information and determines that it contains a merchant identifier associated with a specific merchant, the third-party server system can determine the merchant public key associated with the identified merchant.

[0210] At step 1110, the mobile wallet provider computer 1040 may use the determined merchant public key to re-encrypt the payment information using the merchant public key, which is stored on the mobile wallet provider computer 1040 during login or, in some embodiments, may be included in the payment information received from the remote transaction SDK 1024 or third party remote transaction application 1025, where the public key is included in the merchant certificate.

[0211] At step 1111, the mobile wallet provider computer 1040 may then send the re-encrypted payment information encrypted using the merchant public key to the merchant system. The merchant key encrypted payment information may be sent to the merchant by any suitable means. For example, the mobile wallet provider computer 1040 may send the re-encrypted payment information to the remote transaction SDK 1024 or a third-party server layer application (step 1111), which then forwards the re-encrypted payment information to the merchant application 1021 (step 1112), which then forwards the re-encrypted payment information to the merchant system (step 1113). Alternatively, the mobile wallet provider computer 1040 may send the re-encrypted payment information directly to the merchant system (not shown) or may send the re-encrypted payment information via another third party before transmitting to the merchant system (not shown).

[0212] At step 1114, the merchant system receives the re-encrypted payment information from the merchant application 1021 and decrypts the encrypted merchant public key using the stored merchant private key known only to the merchant system. Thus, the merchant system now has the payment information including the token, token authentication data, transaction data, and any other relevant information.

[0213] The merchant system may now provide the decrypted payment information including the transaction data element (e.g., the token data element) into an authorization request message and submit the authorization request message to the acquirer computer 1050. The authorization request message may appear to be a typical authorization request message initiated by a merchant system during a card present transaction that includes a chip-based PIN or other dynamic value for authentication (e.g., a token authentication value).

[0214] At step 1115 , the acquirer computer 1050 determines the appropriate payment processing network 1060 and forwards the authorization request message to the payment processing network 1060 .

[0215] In step 1116, the payment processing network 1060 may determine that the token should be exchanged for a PAN or other account identifier in the token registry 1061 and that the token should be used to generate token authentication data to ensure that the data matches, thereby verifying that the data originated from the legitimately provided mobile payment application 1023 stored on the secure element 1022. The payment processing network 1060 may use appropriate methods to determine that the payment credential includes the token. For example, a dynamic value may flag the transaction to the payment processing network 1060 that the token is included. Any other suitable information may be included to inform the payment processing network 1060 that the payment credential includes token information.

[0216] At step 1117 , the token registry 1061 determines the account identifier and other account information associated with the token in the authorization request message and sends an updated authorization request message including the account identifier to the payment processing network 1060 .

[0217] At step 1118, the payment processing network 1060 forwards the updated authorization request message to the issuer for risk and authorization decision. As described above with respect to step 922, if the issuer authorizes this transaction, the issuer may generate an authorization response message, which may be transmitted back to the merchant and / or mobile device 1020 to complete the transaction. In addition, the token registry 1061 may replace the account identifier with the token in the authorization response message.

[0218] It should be understood that Fig.11 It is intended to be illustrative and not limiting. Therefore, additional steps may be performed and some steps may be skipped, and additional entities may be included in Fig.11 description and flow chart or removed therefrom. A. Exemplary Elliptic Curve Cryptography Methods

[0219] In some embodiments of the present invention, elliptic curve cryptography (ECC) may be used to perform one or more of the encryption or decryption operations performed in the various transaction flow diagrams of the methods described herein. Fig.12 In the context of the flowchart of , elliptic curve cryptography can be used to encrypt and decrypt the payment information transmitted between the mobile wallet provider and the mobile payment application 1023.

[0220] For example, as described above with reference to steps 1104-1108, the mobile payment application 1023 may obtain payment credentials from the security element 1022, may encrypt the payment credentials, and may send the encrypted payment information to the mobile wallet provider computer. The mobile wallet provider computer may then decrypt the encrypted payment information using a private key. In some embodiments, the mobile payment application 1023 and the mobile wallet provider computer may use elliptic curve cryptography (ECC) to encrypt and decrypt the payment information, respectively. In order to use elliptic curve cryptography, the mobile payment application 1023 and the server computer may have a shared message authentication function and a shared key derivation function.

[0221] A "key derivation function" may include any function or operation that can be used to determine one or more keys, such as a symmetric key or message authentication code (MAC) or other means known in the art. An example of a KDF may include ANSI-X9.63-KDF with a SHA-1 option.

[0222] At step 1201, the mobile payment application 1023 retrieves a server public key associated with a third-party computer system. The third-party computer public key may be retrieved in any suitable manner. For example, the server public key may be contained on a certificate stored on the mobile device 1020, or may exist in an application memory or secure memory associated with the mobile payment application 1023. The third-party server system may store a server private key corresponding to the server public key.

[0223] At step 1202, the mobile payment application 1023 retrieves a key derivation function (KDF) for use in the encryption process. In some embodiments of the present invention, the KDF may be predetermined so that the third-party server system and the mobile payment application 1023 are configured to use the same KDF. In other embodiments, the KDF used may be shared between the third-party server system and the mobile payment application 1023.

[0224] At step 1203, the mobile payment application 1023 retrieves the elliptic curve and generator function (eg, P256) for use in the encryption process. The third-party server system also knows the elliptic curve and generator function.

[0225] At step 1204, the mobile payment application 1023 generates a random ephemeral elliptic curve (EC) key pair associated with the payment transaction. This key pair contains a transaction private key and a transaction public key.

[0226] At step 1205, the mobile payment application 1023 generates an encrypted ciphertext containing a payment token. In some embodiments, the ciphertext may be generated using a server public key, a transaction private key, a key derivation function, an elliptic curve, a generator function, and a payment token. The ciphertext contains the payment token, but is unreadable without the server private key.

[0227] At step 1206 , the mobile payment application 1023 sends the encrypted token and transaction public key to the third-party server system.

[0228] At step 1207, the third-party server system decrypts the encrypted payment token. In some embodiments, the payment token may be decrypted using the transaction public key, the server private key, the key derivation function, the elliptic curve, the generator function, and the received encrypted payment token. The decrypted payment token may then be processed by the third-party server system.

[0229] Fig.13 Another method is shown for encrypting a payment token using ECC at the mobile payment application 1023 and then decrypting the token at the third-party server system. Steps 1301-1303 are similar to those described in Fig.13Steps 1201-1204 are the same as described above and include the mobile payment application 1023 retrieving a third-party server computer public key associated with the mobile wallet provider computer 1040, a key derivation function (KDF), an elliptic curve (e.g., P256), and a generator function for use in the encryption process.

[0230] At step 1304, the mobile payment application 1023 generates a random temporary elliptic curve (EC) key pair associated with the payment transaction. This key pair contains a transaction private key and a transaction public key. Fig.13 In an embodiment of the invention, a key pair may be generated such that a transaction public key is equal to a transaction private key multiplied by a generator function.

[0231] At step 1305, the mobile payment application 1023 generates a shared secret using the product of the server public key and the transaction private key. It should be noted that the shared secret is also equal to the product of the server private key, the generator function, and the private transaction key. Similarly, the shared secret is also equal to the product of the server private key and the transaction public key.

[0232] At step 1306, the mobile payment application 1023 generates a symmetric key and a message authentication code (MAC) using the shared secret determined at step 1305 and the KDF determined at step 1303. The symmetric key may be, for example, an AES encryption key. The MAC may be, for example, a key used to generate a hash-based message authentication code (HMAC).

[0233] At step 1307, the mobile payment application 1023 generates an encrypted ciphertext containing the payment token. In some embodiments, the ciphertext may be generated using the symmetric key determined in step 1306. The ciphertext contains the encrypted payment token, but is unreadable without the symmetric key.

[0234] At step 1308, the mobile payment application 1023 calculates a message authentication code (MAC) for the encrypted token. The MAC may be generated using the MAC key determined in step 1306 and any suitable function, such as HMAC-SHA-256. The MAC may be generated to confirm that the encrypted token has not been modified during transmission.

[0235] At step 1309 , the mobile payment application 1023 sends the encrypted token, the transaction public key, and the MAC of the encrypted token to the third-party server system.

[0236] At step 1310, the third-party server system determines a shared secret using the product of the server private key and the transaction public key received in step 13. It should be noted that although the shared secret is calculated using a different key, it is the same as the shared secret calculated by the mobile payment application 1023 in step 1305.

[0237] At step 1311, the third-party server system generates a symmetric key and message authentication code (MAC) using the shared secret determined at step 1305 and the KDF determined at step 1303. It should be noted that since the shared secret and KDF are the same as those used by the mobile payment application 1023, the symmetric key and MAC key are the same as those received by the third-party server system at step 1309 to generate the encrypted token and MAC.

[0238] At step 1312, the third party server system calculates a MAC for the received encrypted token using the MAC key determined at step 1306. If the calculated MAC does not match the MAC received at step 1309, then corruption of the encrypted token is confirmed and the method results in an error. For example, this may cause the third party server system to request a retransmission of the encrypted token. If the calculated MAC matches the received MAC, then the method proceeds to step 1313.

[0239] At step 1313, the third party server system decrypts the encrypted token using the symmetric key determined at step 1311. The decrypted payment token may then be processed by the third party server system. IV. Exemplary Computer Devices

[0240] Fig.14 is a high-level block diagram of a computer system that can be used to implement any of the entities or components described above. Fig.14 The subsystems shown in the figure are interconnected via a system bus 1475. Additional subsystems include a printer 1403, a keyboard 1406, a fixed disk 1407, and a monitor 1409, which is coupled to a display adapter 1404. Peripheral devices and input / output (I / O) devices coupled to the I / O controller 1400 can be connected to the computer system via any number of devices known in the art such as serial ports. For example, a serial port 1405 or an external interface 1408 can be used to connect a computer device to a wide area network such as the Internet, a mouse input device, or a scanner. Interconnection via the system bus 1475 allows the central processor 1402 to communicate with each subsystem, and allows control of the execution of instructions from the system memory 1401 or the fixed disk 1407 and the exchange of information between the subsystems. The system memory 1401 and / or the fixed disk can contain computer-readable media.

[0241] Storage media and computer-readable media for containing code or portions of code may include any suitable media known or used in the art, including storage media and communication media, such as but not limited to volatile and non-volatile, removable and non-removable media for storage and / or transmission of information such as computer-readable instructions, data structures, program modules or other data implemented in any method or technology, including RAM, ROM, EEPROM, flash memory or other memory technology, CD-ROM, digital versatile disk (DVD) or other optical storage devices, magnetic cassettes, magnetic tape, magnetic disk storage devices or other magnetic storage devices, data signals, data transmission, or any other medium that can be used to store or transmit the desired information and can be accessed by a computer. Based on the disclosure and teachings provided herein, a person of ordinary skill in the art will understand other ways and / or methods of implementing the various embodiments.

[0242] The above description is illustrative only, and not restrictive. After those skilled in the art have read this disclosure, many variations of the present invention will become apparent to them. Therefore, the scope of the present invention may be determined without reference to the above description, but may be determined with reference to the claims to be examined and their full scope or equivalents.

[0243] It is understood that the present invention described above can be implemented in a modular or integrated manner, using computer software, in the form of control logic. Based on the disclosure and teachings provided herein, those of ordinary skill in the art can know and understand other ways and / or methods of implementing the present invention using hardware and a combination of hardware and software.

[0244] Any of the software components or functions described in this application can be implemented as software code that is executed by a processor using, for example, conventional or object-oriented techniques and using any suitable computer language (such as, for example, Java, C++, or Perl). The software code can be stored as a series of instructions or commands on a computer-readable medium, such as a random access memory (RAM), a read-only memory (ROM), a magnetic medium such as a hard drive or floppy disk, or an optical medium such as a CD-ROM. Any such computer-readable medium can reside on or within a single computing device and can exist on or within different computing devices within a system or network.

[0245] One or more features from any embodiment may be combined with one or more features of any other embodiment without departing from the scope of the invention.

[0246] References to "a," "an," or "the" are intended to mean "one or more" unless specifically indicated to the contrary.

Claims

1. A method for conducting a transaction, the method comprising: Initiating a message by a merchant application on the mobile device to a merchant computer to initiate a transaction; receiving, by the merchant application, encrypted transaction information from the mobile device, the encrypted transaction information including a merchant identifier and a transaction amount; forwarding, by the merchant application, the encrypted transaction information to a mobile payment application on the mobile device; generating, by the mobile payment application, a payment request including the encrypted payment information and the encrypted transaction information; as well as The mobile payment application transmits the payment request to a remote server computer, wherein the remote server computer decrypts the encrypted payment information using a first key and decrypts the encrypted transaction information using a second key, wherein the remote server computer processes the transaction using the payment information and the transaction information.

2. The method of claim 1, wherein the mobile payment application encrypts the payment information with a third key, and the first key and the third key are symmetric keys.

3. The method of claim 2, wherein the encrypted transaction information received from the merchant computer is encrypted by a fourth key, the fourth key being a transaction processing network public key, and the second key being a transaction processing network private key.

4. The method according to claim 2, further comprising: Prior to transmitting the payment request to the remote server computer, a secure channel is established by the mobile payment application and the remote server computer.

5. The method of claim 1 , wherein the remote server computer verifies the decrypted payment information and the decrypted transaction information and generates an authentication response value that is forwarded to the merchant computer so that the merchant computer can include the authentication response value in an authorization request message. The method according to claim 1 , wherein the encrypted payment information includes a payment credential and a transaction password.

7. The method of claim 6, wherein the server computer verifies the password after decrypting the encrypted payment information.

8. The method according to claim 1, further comprising: A payment response is received by the mobile payment application from the remote server computer, the payment response including the payment information encrypted with a merchant's public key.

9. The method according to claim 8, further comprising: The payment response is provided by the mobile payment application to the merchant application.

10. A mobile device, comprising: processor; as well as A computer readable medium coupled to the processor, the computer readable medium comprising code executable by the processor to perform a method comprising: initiating a message by a merchant application on the mobile device to a merchant computer to initiate a transaction; receiving, by the merchant application, encrypted transaction information from the mobile device, the encrypted transaction information including a merchant identifier and a transaction amount; forwarding, by the merchant application, the encrypted transaction information to a mobile payment application on the mobile device; generating, by the mobile payment application, a payment request including the encrypted payment information and the encrypted transaction information; and The mobile payment application transmits the payment request to a remote server computer, wherein the remote server computer decrypts the encrypted payment information using a first key and decrypts the encrypted transaction information using a second key, wherein the remote server computer processes a transaction using the payment information and the transaction information.

11. The mobile device of claim 10, wherein the mobile payment application encrypts the payment information with a third key, the first key and the third key being symmetric keys.

12. The mobile device of claim 11, wherein the encrypted transaction information received from the merchant computer is encrypted by a fourth key, the fourth key is a transaction processing network public key, and the second key is a transaction processing network private key.

13. The mobile device of claim 11, wherein the method further comprises: Prior to transmitting the payment request to the remote server computer, a secure channel is established by the mobile payment application and the remote server computer.

14. The mobile device of claim 10, wherein the remote server computer verifies the decrypted payment information and the decrypted transaction information and generates an authentication response value that is forwarded to the merchant computer so that the merchant computer can include the authentication response value in an authorization request message.

15. The mobile device of claim 10, wherein the method further comprises: The payment response is provided by the merchant application to the merchant computer, wherein the merchant computer decrypts the encrypted payment information using the merchant's private key corresponding to the merchant's public key. The mobile device of claim 10 , wherein the encrypted payment information comprises a payment credential and a transaction password.

17. The mobile device of claim 16, wherein in the method, after decrypting the encrypted payment information, the server computer verifies the password.

18. The mobile device of claim 16, wherein the method further comprises: A payment response is received by the mobile payment application from the remote server computer, the payment response including the payment information encrypted with a merchant's public key.

19. The mobile device of claim 18, wherein the method further comprises: The payment response is provided by the mobile payment application to the merchant application.

20. The mobile device of claim 19, wherein the method further comprises: The payment response is provided by the merchant application to the merchant computer, wherein the merchant computer decrypts the encrypted payment information using the merchant's private key corresponding to the merchant's public key.

21. A method comprising: generating, by the mobile payment application on the mobile device, a shared secret using a product of the server public key and the transaction private key; generating, by the mobile payment application, a symmetric key using the shared secret and a key derivation function; generating a ciphertext by the mobile payment application encrypting the payment token using the symmetric key; as well as The transaction public key and the ciphertext are transmitted by the mobile payment application to a server computer, wherein the server computer determines the shared secret using the product of a server private key and the transaction public key, generates the symmetric key using the shared secret and the key derivation function, then decrypts the ciphertext using the symmetric key to obtain the payment token, and then performs the transaction using the payment token.

22. The method according to claim 21, wherein the method further comprises: Use said shared secret and generate a MAC using the MAC key; as well as The MAC is transmitted to the server computer, wherein the server computer verifies the MAC before executing the transaction.

23. The method of claim 21, wherein the method further comprises: Prior to generating the shared secret, the server public key is retrieved from the server computer.

24. A mobile device, comprising: processor; and a computer-readable medium comprising code executable by the processor to perform a method comprising: generating, by the mobile payment application on the mobile device, a shared secret using a product of a server public key and a transaction private key; generating, by the mobile payment application, a symmetric key using the shared secret and a key derivation function; generating, by the mobile payment application, a ciphertext by encrypting the payment token using the symmetric key; and The transaction public key and the ciphertext are transmitted by the mobile payment application to a server computer, wherein the server computer determines the shared secret using the product of a server private key and the transaction public key, generates the symmetric key using the shared secret and the key derivation function, then decrypts the ciphertext using the symmetric key to obtain the payment token, and then performs the transaction using the payment token.

25. The mobile device of claim 24, wherein the method further comprises: Use said shared secret and generate a MAC using the MAC key; as well as The MAC is transmitted to the server computer, wherein the server computer verifies the MAC before executing the transaction.

26. The method of claim 24, wherein the method further comprises: Prior to generating the shared secret, the server public key is retrieved from the server computer.