Method for cutting off safety communication channel of vehicle-mounted equipment, electronic equipment and medium

By using the multi-level interaction and inspection mechanism of CPU module and FPGA module in rail transit vehicle equipment, the problem of not being able to quickly cut off the safe communication channel when the equipment fails, achieving faster and more complete safe cutoff, reducing the fault causes danger.

CN119026190APending Publication Date: 2024-11-26CASCO SIGNAL LTD
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Patent Information

Application Number
CN202411105968.0
Authority / Receiving Office
CN · China
Patent Type
Applications(China)
Current Assignee / Owner
Filing Date
2024-08-13
Publication Date
2024-11-26

AI Technical Summary

Technical Problem

The existing rail transit vehicle-mounted equipment cannot quickly and fully cut off the safe communication channel in the event of a failure, resulting in unsafe operations that may be performed. The cutoff is single, and the working status of all relevant modules is not comprehensively considered.

Method used

By interacting between the CPU module and the FPGA module of the on-board security platform, multi-level checks and interactions are carried out, including periodic checks of the number of restarts, verification words, health code words and dynamic system verification words. If any step If the timeout or fails, enter safe mode and send illegal dynamic system verification words to the FPGA to cut off the secure communication channel.

Benefits of technology

It improves the response speed of safe cutoff and the adequacy and diversity of the cutoff basis, ensures that the safe communication channels between the equipment and other boards in the system are cut off in a timely manner in the event of a fault, and reduces the probability of danger.

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Abstract

The invention relates to a method for cutting off a safety communication channel of vehicle-mounted equipment, electronic equipment and a medium, the method is realized based on a rail transit vehicle-mounted safety platform, and a logic board of the safety platform comprises a dual-channel CPU module and a dual-channel FPGA module. The method comprises the following steps that: in a system initialization stage, a CPU module checks the number of rebootable times, check words and the number of recovered rebootable times; in the normal operation stage, the CPU module periodically reads FPGA health code words, checks dual-channel dynamic system check words and checks dual-channel FPGA health code words; and if any one of the above check is not passed, the CPU module enters a security mode and sends illegal dynamic system check words to the FPGA, and the FPGA cuts off a security communication channel with other board cards in the system. Compared with the prior art, the method has the advantages of enriching sufficiency and diversity of cut-off judgment basis, improving response speed of safe cut-off and the like.
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Description

Technical Field

[0001] The present invention relates to the field of rail transit signal control, and in particular to a method for cutting off a safety communication channel of an on-board device, an electronic device and a medium. Background Art

[0002] In scenarios with particularly high safety requirements, such as rail transit, if a device fails, it needs to be directed to the safe side and the safe communication channel between the device and other external devices needs to be cut off. The faster the response speed of the guidance to the safe side and the cut-off operation, the lower the probability of danger caused by the failure and the smaller the impact.

[0003] The existing safety cutoff of rail transit on-board equipment faces the following problems:

[0004] 1) Safety cut-off speed issue: If a device has failed but its connection with other devices in the system has not been cut off, the device may still send safety-related data generated during the failure to other devices, causing other devices to perform unsafe operations after receiving the data.

[0005] 2) The problem of the singleness of the cut-off basis: The judgment basis for safe cut-off only considers certain single aspects, and does not comprehensively consider information such as the working status of all relevant modules. The cut-off basis is not sufficient.

[0006] How to quickly and fully cut off the safety communication channel of rail transit on-board equipment has become a technical problem that needs to be solved. Summary of the invention

[0007] The purpose of the present invention is to overcome the defects of the above-mentioned prior art and provide a method for cutting off the secure communication channel of a vehicle-mounted device, an electronic device and a medium.

[0008] The purpose of the present invention can be achieved by the following technical solutions:

[0009] According to one aspect of the present invention, a method for cutting off a safety communication channel of an on-board device is provided. The method is implemented based on a rail transit on-board safety platform. The logic board of the safety platform includes a dual-channel CPU module and an FPGA module. The method includes:

[0010] During the system initialization phase, the CPU module checks the number of possible restarts, the checksum, and the number of possible restarts.

[0011] During the normal operation phase, the CPU module periodically reads the FPGA health code word, checks the dual-channel dynamic system check word, and checks the dual-channel FPGA health code word;

[0012] If any of the above checks fails, the CPU module enters the safe mode, sends an illegal dynamic system check word to the FPGA, and the FPGA cuts off the secure communication channel with other boards in the system.

[0013] Preferably, the checking of the restartable times and the check word during the system initialization phase includes:

[0014] Step S101, the CPU module checks the restartable times and the check word, if the check passes, then executes step S102; otherwise, enters the safe mode;

[0015] Step S102, after the CPU module performs the restartable number subtracting 1 operation, it checks the updated restartable number and the check word. If the check passes, it executes the check process for restoring the restartable number; otherwise, it enters the safe mode.

[0016] More preferably, the process of step S101 includes the following steps:

[0017] Step S1011, the CPU module reads the first restartable number and the first check word from the non-volatile storage medium. If the check word calculated from the first restartable number is inconsistent with the read first check word, the first check word is illegal and the safe mode is entered; otherwise, the first check word is legal and step S1012 is executed;

[0018] Step S1012, the CPU module exchanges the restartable number and the check word with the channel CPU module. If the restartable number and the check word of the channel CPU module are not received after the first set time, or the restartable number and the check word of the channel CPU module are received but judged to be illegal, the safe mode is entered; otherwise, the restartable number and the check word of the dual-channel CPU module are determined to be legal, and step S102 is executed.

[0019] More preferably, the step S102 is specifically as follows: the CPU module subtracts 1 from the read first restartable number, calculates a check word according to the updated first restartable number, generates a second restartable number and a second check word, and updates them to the non-volatile storage medium; then the second restartable number and its second check word are read back from the non-volatile storage medium and checked. If the check word calculated from the second restartable number is inconsistent with the read second check word, the second check word is judged to be illegal and the safe mode is entered; otherwise, the second check word is judged to be legal and a check to restore the restartable number is performed.

[0020] Preferably, the process of checking the number of restartable times during the system initialization phase includes:

[0021] Step S103, the CPU module judges the read FPGA health code word. If it is judged to be illegal, the CPU module continues to read the FPGA health code word until the FPGA health code word is judged to be a legal value, and then executes step S104;

[0022] Step S104, the CPU module restores the second restartable number of times to n times, and checks whether the second restartable number of times is restored successfully. If the check passes, the normal operation phase is entered; otherwise, the safe mode is entered.

[0023] More preferably, the step S104 includes: the CPU module sets the second restartable number of times to n times, generates a third check word, and updates it to the non-volatile storage medium; then reads back the second restartable number of times and the third check word from the non-volatile storage medium and checks, if the check word calculated by the second restartable number of times is inconsistent with the read third check word, then the third check word is illegal, and the safe mode is entered; otherwise, the second restartable number of times and the third check word are judged to be legal, the CPU module calculates a dynamic system check word once and sends it to the FPGA, and enters the normal operation stage.

[0024] More preferably, the process of the CPU module checking the dual-channel dynamic system check word during the normal operation stage includes:

[0025] Step S201, the CPU module checks the second restartable number and the third check word;

[0026] Step S202, the CPU module calculates the system check word according to the third check word;

[0027] Step S203, the CPU module calculates a dynamic system check word according to the calculated system check word;

[0028] Step S204, the CPU module checks the calculated dynamic system check word;

[0029] Step S205, the CPU module interacts with the channel CPU module and checks the dynamic system check words of the dual channels.

[0030] More preferably, the step S201 is specifically as follows: the CPU module reads the second restartable number and the third check word from the non-volatile storage medium and verifies them. If the check word calculated by the second restartable number is inconsistent with the read third check word, the third check word is judged to be illegal and the safe mode is entered.

[0031] More preferably, the step S203 comprises: the CPU module calculates the system check word:

[0032] System check word = check word XOR (BIT_RESULT) XOR (CPU_COMP_VALUE)

[0033] Where BIT_RESULT is the internal test result, CPU_COMP_VALUE is the CPU compensation value, and XOR is the exclusive OR operation;

[0034] CPU calculates dynamic system check word:

[0035] Dynamic system check word = system check word XOR (DYN_COMP_VALUE)

[0036] Where DYN_COMP_VALUE is the dynamic compensation value.

[0037] More preferably, the condition for the dynamic system check word calculated by the CPU module to pass the check is that the dynamic system check word of the dual-channel CPU module alternates between two values ​​of the set legal check word set.

[0038] More preferably, if the dual-channel dynamic system check word is checked and passed, the CPU sends the dynamic system check word to the FPGA, and the FPGA opens the logic board's secure communication channel to other boards in the system or maintains the channel open, and executes step S204; otherwise, enters the safe mode.

[0039] More preferably, the step S205 is specifically as follows: if the dynamic system check word for the channel is not received within the second set time, or the dynamic system check word for the channel CPU module is received but the check fails, then entering the safe mode;

[0040] If the dynamic system check word check of the dual-channel CPU module passes, then check the FPGA health code word of the dual channel.

[0041] More preferably, the passing condition for checking the dynamic system check word of the dual-channel is: in the initialization stage, the dual-channel FPGA health code word can be read as any one of the set second legal code word set, and then the value of the dual-channel FPGA health code word alternates between two values ​​in the second legal code word set, and the alternating time interval does not exceed the third set duration.

[0042] More preferably, after entering the safe mode, the following operations are performed:

[0043] Step S301, setting the CPU dynamic system check word provided to the FPGA module of this channel to an illegal value, and the FPGA module cuts off the secure communication channel between the logic board and other boards in the system;

[0044] Step S302, read the restartable number and the check word from the non-volatile storage medium, if the check word is illegal or the restartable number is 0, set the restartable number = 0; if the check word is legal and the restartable number is not 0, reduce the restartable number by 1;

[0045] Step S303, calculate the check word according to the restartable number updated in step S302, and update the restartable number and the check word in the non-volatile storage medium, and end.

[0046] According to another aspect of the present invention, an electronic device is provided, including a memory and a processor, wherein a computer program is stored in the memory, and the method described above is implemented when the processor executes the program.

[0047] According to a third aspect of the present invention, there is provided a computer-readable storage medium having a computer program stored thereon, wherein the program implements the method described above when executed by a processor.

[0048] Compared with the prior art, the present invention has the following beneficial effects:

[0049] 1) In the initialization stage and the normal operation stage, the present invention interacts with the CPU module and the FPGA module of the rail transit vehicle safety platform logic board, the dual-channel CPU module interacts, and the dual-channel FPGA module interacts. When any of the multiple steps times out or fails the check, the safe mode is entered, and the CPU module sends an illegal dynamic system check word to the FPGA module to cut off the logic board's secure communication channel with other boards in the system. This method enriches the sufficiency and diversity of the cut-off basis.

[0050] 2) The present invention designs a variety of detection mechanisms and steps in the initialization stage and the normal operation stage. In the normal operation stage, the interactions between dual-channel CPUs, between dual-channel FPGAs, and between the CPU and FPGA of the same channel are all executed periodically. If a certain interaction is not completed within the set time period, or is completed but the result verification is incorrect, the cut-off operation is immediately triggered, thereby improving the response speed of safe cut-off.

[0051] 3) The present invention sets multiple mechanism checks for the restartable times of the CPU of the same channel and the dual-channel CPU, the restartable times minus 1, and the recovery of the restartable times during the initialization phase, thereby expanding the sufficiency and diversity of the cut-off basis. If any of the checks fails, the cut-off operation is immediately triggered, thereby improving the response speed of the safety cut-off.

[0052] 4) During the normal operation phase, the present invention calculates the dynamic system check word according to the check word, the in-machine test result, the CPU compensation value, and the dynamic compensation value, and checks the dynamic system check word, which further reflects the sufficiency of the cut-off basis and ensures the timely execution of the safety switch. BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS

[0053] Figure 1 A schematic diagram of the interaction between the logic board CPU module and the FPGA module in the vehicle safety platform of the present invention;

[0054] Figure 2 It is a schematic flow chart of the method for cutting off the secure communication channel in the present invention. DETAILED DESCRIPTION

[0055] The following will be combined with the drawings in the embodiments of the present invention to clearly and completely describe the technical solutions in the embodiments of the present invention. Obviously, the described embodiments are part of the embodiments of the present invention, not all of the embodiments. Based on the embodiments of the present invention, all other embodiments obtained by ordinary technicians in this field without creative work should fall within the scope of protection of the present invention.

[0056] The prior art has the following problems: it cannot ensure that the connection with the external device is quickly cut off; the judgment basis for the cut-off is small and the basis source is single. The present invention aims to provide a method to solve the above two problems.

[0057] The present embodiment relates to a method for cutting off a secure communication channel of an on-board device. The method is implemented based on a rail transit on-board safety platform. The logic board of the rail transit on-board safety platform includes a CPU module and an FPGA module. The interaction and cutting mechanism of the CPU module and the FPGA module on the logic board are used to ensure rapid cutting off of the secure communication channel. The working states of multiple modules such as the CPU and FPGA are comprehensively considered to ensure that the secure communication channel of the device can be cut off in case of various abnormalities.

[0058] like Figure 1 As shown, the CPU module and the FPGA module are connected through the general purpose memory controller (GPMC) to exchange information, so that the CPU provides the FPGA with dynamic system check words and the FPGA provides the CPU with health code words. A CPU module and an FPGA module constitute a channel, and the CPUs and FPGAs of the two channels constitute a complete logic board. The CPUs of the two channels are connected through the serial port, and information can be exchanged between the CPUs of the two channels, and the dynamic system check words of the CPU of the current channel and the health code words of the FPGA can be provided to the opposite channel.

[0059] like Figure 2 As shown, the method for cutting off the safety communication channel of rail transit on-board equipment includes a switching mechanism in the initialization phase and a switching mechanism in the normal operation phase.

[0060] The switching mechanism in the initialization phase includes: the CPU module first checks the restartable number and the check word; then after the restartable number is reduced by 1, the updated restartable number and the check word are checked; then the FPGA health code word is read for inspection; finally, after reading the FPGA health code word of the legal value, the restartable number is restored to n times (this embodiment can be set to 10 times), and it is checked whether the recovery of the restartable number is successful. If successful, a dynamic system check word is sent to the FPGA. If any of the checks fail, the safe mode (SAFESTATE) is entered, and the secure communication channels of other boards in the logic board system are cut off to achieve safe disconnection of the device.

[0061] During the normal operation stage, the FPGA health code word is continuously read. After reading the FPGA health code word with the value of code word 2A or code word 2B, it starts to generate dynamic system check words at 50ms intervals, check the dual-channel dynamic system check words, provide dynamic system check words to the FPGA, and check the dual-channel FPGA health code words. If the check of the dual-channel dynamic system check words or the check of the dual-channel FPGA health code words fails, the SAFESTATE mode is entered and the secure communication channels of other boards in the logic board system are cut off to achieve safe disconnection of the equipment.

[0062] The CPU module of the rail transit vehicle safety platform logic board starts from the initialization stage and performs the following steps:

[0063] Step S1: The CPU module of the logic board of the rail transit vehicle safety platform reads the first restartable number and its first check word from the non-volatile storage medium. If the check word calculated by the first restartable number is inconsistent with the read first check word, the first check word is illegal, and the safe mode (SAFESTATE) is entered, and step S9 is executed; if the second check word calculated by the first restartable number is consistent with the read first check word, the first check word is legal, and step S2 is executed.

[0064] Step S2: The CPU module of the rail transit vehicle-mounted safety platform logic board interacts with the channel CPU module about the restartable number and its check word. If the restartable number and its check word of the channel CPU module are not received after 60ms, or the restartable number and its check word of the channel CPU module are received but judged to be illegal, the safe mode is entered and step S9 is executed; if the restartable number and its check word of the dual-channel CPU module are legal, step S3 is executed.

[0065] The channel CPU here refers to another CPU on this logic board, for example Figure 1 For the logic board CPU1, the logic board CPU2 is its corresponding channel CPU; for the logic board CPU2, the logic board CPU1 is its corresponding channel CPU.

[0066] Step S3: The CPU module of the logic board of the rail transit vehicle safety platform subtracts 1 from the read first restartable number, calculates the check word according to the updated first restartable number, generates the second restartable number and the second check word, and updates them to the non-volatile storage medium; then reads back the second restartable number and its second check word from the non-volatile storage medium and checks them. If the check word calculated from the second restartable number is inconsistent with the read second check word, the second check word is illegal, enters the safety mode, and executes step S9; if the check word calculated from the second restartable number is consistent with the read second check word, the second check word is legal, and executes step S4.

[0067] Step S4: After completing the first restartable number minus 1 operation, the CPU module of the rail transit vehicle safety platform logic board reads the health codeword issued by the FPGA, and its legal value is within the set first legal codeword set, and the first legal codeword includes codeword 1A and codeword 1B; if the read health codeword is neither codeword 1A nor codeword 1B, it means that the FPGA has not entered the initialization state, and continues to read the health codeword until the read result is codeword 1A or codeword 1B, and executes step S5. For example: codeword 1A and codeword 1B are 4-byte numbers in hexadecimal, 0x3C3C3C3C and 0xC3C3C3C3, respectively. Codeword 1A and codeword 1B flip every 50ms.

[0068] Step S5: After reading the healthy code of code word 1A or code word 1B, the CPU module of the logic board of the rail transit vehicle safety platform sets the second restartable number to 10 times, generates a third check word, and updates it to the non-volatile storage medium; then reads back the second restartable number and the third check word from the non-volatile storage medium and verifies them. If the check word calculated by the second restartable number is inconsistent with the read third check word, the third check word is illegal, enters the safety mode, and executes step S9; if the check word calculated by the second restartable number is consistent with the read third check word, the second restartable number and the third check word are legal, the CPU module calculates the dynamic system check word once and sends it to the FPGA, and executes step S6.

[0069] Step S6: After the CPU module of the rail transit vehicle safety platform logic board reads the FPGA health codeword whose value is any one of the second legal codeword set, the CPU calculates a dynamic system check word (CPU_DYN_SYSCHKW) according to the following steps, and then checks the calculated dynamic system check word, wherein the second legal codeword set includes codeword 2A or codeword 2B, for example: codewords 2A and 2B are 4-byte numbers in hexadecimal, 0x69696969 and 0x96969696, respectively. The process includes:

[0070] In the first step, the CPU module reads the second restartable number and the third check word from the non-volatile storage medium and checks them. If the check word calculated by the second restartable number is inconsistent with the read third check word, the third check word is judged to be illegal, the safe mode is entered, and step S9 is executed;

[0071] Step 2: The CPU module calculates the system check word (CPU_SYSCHKW):

[0072] CPU_SYSCHKW = check word XOR (BIT_RESULT) XOR (CPU_COMP_VALUE);

[0073] Step 3: The CPU module calculates the dynamic system check word (CPU_DYN_SYSCHKW):

[0074] CPU_DYN_SYSCHKW=(CPU_SYSCHKW)XOR(DYN_COMP_VALUE)

[0075] Where DYN_COMP_VALUE alternates between compensation value A and compensation value B;

[0076] Step 4: The CPU module checks the calculated dynamic system check word and checks the passing condition: the dynamic system check word should alternate between check word A and check word B.

[0077] If the check fails, the system enters the safe mode and executes step S9; if the check passes, the CPU sends the dynamic system check word to the FPGA, which opens the logic board's secure communication channel to other boards in the system or maintains the channel open, and executes step S7.

[0078] The following is a further explanation of several parameters used in step S6:

[0079] System check word: CPU_SYSCHKW

[0080] Dynamic system check word: CPU_DYN_SYSCHKW

[0081] Built-in test result: BIT_RESULT (BIT: Built-in test), built-in test is a technology that performs segmented detection of memory and CPU registers when the device is running. BIT_RESULT represents the test result of BIT, and its return value is test success (pass) or test error (fail).

[0082] CPU compensation value: CPU_COMP_VALUE (CPU compensate value) is a fixed value with a length of 4 bytes.

[0083] Dynamic compensation value: DYN_COMP_VALUE (dynamic compensate value) is a 4-byte value that alternates between the compensation value A and the compensation value B mentioned above, so it is called the dynamic compensation value. The final dynamic system check word is: check word XOR (BIT_RESULT) XOR (CPU_COMP_VALUE) XOR (DYN_COMP_VALUE), where the first three items are fixed when the calculation is correct, and the dynamic system check word is alternately flipped by DYN_COMP_VALUE. For example, when DYN_COMP_VALUE is the compensation value A, the final dynamic system check word result is 0x5A5A5A5A, and when DYN_COMP_VALUE is the compensation value B, the final dynamic system check word result is 0xA5A5A5A5).

[0084] Step S7: The CPU module of the rail transit vehicle safety platform logic board interacts with the channel CPU module and checks the dynamic system check word (CPU_DYN_SYSCHKW) of the dual channels, where the check passes under the following conditions: the CPU_DYN_SYSCHKW of the dual channel CPU module alternates between check word A and check word B.

[0085] If the dynamic system check word for the channel is not received within 60ms, or the dynamic system check word for the channel CPU is received but fails the check, the safe mode is entered and step S9 is executed;

[0086] If the dynamic system check words of the dual-channel CPU module are checked and passed, execute step S8.

[0087] Step S8: The CPU module of the rail transit vehicle safety platform logic board reads the FPGA health code of the current channel, exchanges the FPGA health code with the opposite CPU module, and checks the FPGA health code of the dual channels.

[0088] If the FPGA health code word for the channel is not received within 60ms, or the FPGA health code word for the channel is received but the check fails, the safe mode is entered and step S9 is executed;

[0089] If the FPGA health code word for the channel is received and the check passes, return to step S6 and repeat the execution.

[0090] The conditions for passing the check are: during the initialization phase, the dual-channel FPGA health code can be read as code 2A or code 2B, and then the value of the dual-channel FPGA health code alternates between code 2A and code 2B, and the alternating time interval does not exceed 60ms. Code 2A and code 2B flip every 50ms.

[0091] Step S9: The CPU module of the rail transit vehicle safety platform logic board performs the following operations in the safety mode:

[0092] a) Set the CPU dynamic system check word (CPU_DYN_SYSCHKW) provided to the FPGA module of this channel to an illegal value, and the FPGA module cuts off the logic board's secure communication channel with other boards in the system.

[0093] b) Read the restartable number and its check word from the non-volatile storage medium. When the check word is illegal or the restartable number is 0, REBOOT_NUM_UPDATE=0; when the check word is legal and the restartable number is not 0, REBOOT_NUM_UPDATE=restartable number-1.

[0094] c) Calculate the check word according to the updated restartable number REBOOT_NUM_UPDATE, update the restartable number and its check word in the non-volatile storage medium to the calculated restartable number and its check word, and end.

[0095] In summary, in this embodiment, the secure communication channel between the logic board of the rail transit vehicle safety platform and other devices is controlled by the FPGA module. In the initialization stage, the CPU module performs an operation of reducing the number of restarts by 1, a dual-channel restartable number verification operation, establishes interaction with the FPGA module, and a restartable number recovery operation. Subsequently, the CPU module and the FPGA module perform periodic health code words and dynamic system check word interactions to maintain the logic board and other boards. The secure communication channel is opened. When any step times out or the result is an error, the safe mode is entered, and the CPU module sends an illegal dynamic system check word to the FPGA module to cut off the logic board's secure communication channel with other boards in the system. This embodiment effectively improves the response speed of safe cutoff and improves the adequacy and diversity of the basis for cutoff.

[0096] In this embodiment, the interactions between dual-channel CPUs, between dual-channel FPGAs, and between the CPU and FPGA of the same channel are all executed periodically (for example, once every 50 ms) and must be completed (for example, within 60 ms). If a certain interaction is not completed within a certain time period (for example, within 60 ms), or is completed but the result verification is wrong, then the error can be immediately known within the time period (for example, within 60 ms), thereby triggering the cutting operation and improving the cutting speed.

[0097] The electronic device of the present invention includes a central processing unit (CPU), which can perform various appropriate actions and processes according to computer program instructions stored in a read-only memory (ROM) or loaded from a storage unit into a random access memory (RAM). In the RAM, various programs and data required for device operation can also be stored. The CPU, ROM and RAM are connected to each other via a bus. An input / output (I / O) interface is also connected to the bus.

[0098] Multiple components in the device are connected to the I / O interface, including: input units, such as keyboards, mice, etc.; output units, such as various types of displays, speakers, etc.; storage units, such as disks, optical disks, etc.; and communication units, such as network cards, modems, wireless communication transceivers, etc. The communication unit allows the device to exchange information / data with other devices through computer networks such as the Internet and / or various telecommunication networks.

[0099] The processing unit performs the various methods and processes described above, such as methods S1 to S9. For example, in some embodiments, methods S1 to S9 may be implemented as a computer software program, which is tangibly contained in a machine-readable medium, such as a storage unit. In some embodiments, part or all of the computer program may be loaded and / or installed on the device via a ROM and / or a communication unit. When the computer program is loaded into the RAM and executed by the CPU, one or more steps of methods S1 to S9 described above may be performed. Alternatively, in other embodiments, the CPU may be configured to execute methods S1 to S9 by any other appropriate means (e.g., by means of firmware).

[0100] The functions described above herein may be performed at least in part by one or more hardware logic components. For example, without limitation, exemplary types of hardware logic components that may be used include: field programmable gate arrays (FPGAs), application specific integrated circuits (ASICs), application specific standard products (ASSPs), systems on chips (SOCs), complex programmable logic devices (CPLDs), and the like.

[0101] The program code for implementing the method of the present invention can be written in any combination of one or more programming languages. These program codes can be provided to a processor or controller of a general-purpose computer, a special-purpose computer or other programmable data processing device, so that the program code, when executed by the processor or controller, enables the functions / operations specified in the flow chart and / or block diagram to be implemented. The program code can be executed entirely on the machine, partially on the machine, partially on the machine as a stand-alone software package and partially on a remote machine, or entirely on a remote machine or server.

[0102] In the context of the present invention, a machine-readable medium may be a tangible medium that may contain or store a program for use by or in conjunction with an instruction execution system, device, or equipment. A machine-readable medium may be a machine-readable signal medium or a machine-readable storage medium. A machine-readable medium may include, but is not limited to, electronic, magnetic, optical, electromagnetic, infrared, or semiconductor systems, devices, or equipment, or any suitable combination of the foregoing. A more specific example of a machine-readable storage medium may include an electrical connection based on one or more lines, a portable computer disk, a hard disk, a random access memory (RAM), a read-only memory (ROM), an erasable programmable read-only memory (EPROM or flash memory), an optical fiber, a portable compact disk read-only memory (CD-ROM), an optical storage device, a magnetic storage device, or any suitable combination of the foregoing.

[0103] The above is only a specific embodiment of the present invention, but the protection scope of the present invention is not limited thereto. Any technician familiar with the technical field can easily think of various equivalent modifications or replacements within the technical scope disclosed by the present invention, and these modifications or replacements should be included in the protection scope of the present invention. Therefore, the protection scope of the present invention shall be based on the protection scope of the claims.

Claims

1. A method for cutting off a vehicle-mounted device safety communication channel, the method is implemented based on a rail transit vehicle-mounted safety platform, the logic board of the safety platform includes a dual-channel CPU module and an FPGA module, characterized in that: The method comprises: During the system initialization phase, the CPU module checks the number of possible restarts, the checksum, and the number of possible restarts. During the normal operation phase, the CPU module periodically reads the FPGA health code word, checks the dual-channel dynamic system check word, and checks the dual-channel FPGA health code word; If any of the above checks fails, the CPU module enters the safe mode, sends an illegal dynamic system check word to the FPGA, and the FPGA cuts off the secure communication channel with other boards in the system.

2. A method for cutting off a secure communication channel of an in-vehicle device according to claim 1, characterized in that: The checks on the restartable times and check words during the system initialization phase include: Step S101, the CPU module checks the restartable times and the check word, if the check passes, then executes step S102; otherwise, enters the safe mode; Step S102, after the CPU module performs the restartable number subtracting 1 operation, it checks the updated restartable number and the check word. If the check passes, it executes the check process for restoring the restartable number; otherwise, it enters the safe mode.

3. A method for cutting off a secure communication channel of an in-vehicle device according to claim 2, characterized in that: The process of step S101 includes the following steps: Step S1011, the CPU module reads the first restartable number and the first check word from the non-volatile storage medium. If the check word calculated from the first restartable number is inconsistent with the read first check word, the first check word is illegal and the safe mode is entered; otherwise, the first check word is legal and step S1012 is executed; Step S1012, the CPU module exchanges the restartable number and the check word with the channel CPU module. If the restartable number and the check word of the channel CPU module are not received after the first set time, or the restartable number and the check word of the channel CPU module are received but judged to be illegal, the safe mode is entered; otherwise, the restartable number and the check word of the dual-channel CPU module are determined to be legal, and step S102 is executed.

4. A method for cutting off a secure communication channel of an in-vehicle device according to claim 2, characterized in that: The step S102 is specifically as follows: the CPU module subtracts 1 from the read first restartable number, calculates a check word according to the updated first restartable number, generates a second restartable number and a second check word, and updates them to the non-volatile storage medium; Then, the second restartable number and the second check word thereof are read back from the non-volatile storage medium and checked. If the check word calculated from the second restartable number is inconsistent with the read second check word, it is determined that the second check word is illegal, and the safe mode is entered; Otherwise, the second check word is determined to be legal, and a check is performed to recover the restartable number of times.

5. A method for cutting off a secure communication channel of an in-vehicle device according to claim 1, characterized in that: The process of checking the number of restartable times during the system initialization phase includes: Step S103, the CPU module judges the read FPGA health code word. If it is judged to be illegal, the CPU module continues to read the FPGA health code word until the FPGA health code word is judged to be a legal value, and then executes step S104; Step S104, the CPU module restores the second restartable number of times to n times, and checks whether the second restartable number of times is restored successfully. If the check passes, the normal operation phase is entered; otherwise, the safe mode is entered.

6. A method for cutting off a secure communication channel of an in-vehicle device according to claim 5, characterized in that: The step S104 includes: the CPU module sets the second restartable number of times to n times, generates a third check word, and updates it to the non-volatile storage medium; then reads back the second restartable number of times and the third check word from the non-volatile storage medium and checks, if the check word calculated by the second restartable number of times is inconsistent with the read third check word, the third check word is illegal, and the safe mode is entered; otherwise, the second restartable number of times and the third check word are judged to be legal, the CPU module calculates a dynamic system check word and sends it to the FPGA, and the normal operation stage is entered.

7. A method for cutting off a secure communication channel of an in-vehicle device according to claim 6, characterized in that: The process of the CPU module checking the dual-channel dynamic system check word during the normal operation phase includes: Step S201, the CPU module checks the second restartable number and the third check word; Step S202, the CPU module calculates the system check word according to the third check word; Step S203, the CPU module calculates a dynamic system check word according to the calculated system check word; Step S204, the CPU module checks the calculated dynamic system check word; Step S205, the CPU module interacts with the channel CPU module and checks the dynamic system check words of the dual channels.

8. A method for cutting off a secure communication channel of an in-vehicle device according to claim 7, characterized in that: The step S201 is specifically as follows: the CPU module reads the second restartable number and the third check word from the non-volatile storage medium and checks them. If the check word calculated by the second restartable number is inconsistent with the read third check word, the third check word is judged to be illegal and the safe mode is entered.

9. A method for cutting off a secure communication channel of an in-vehicle device according to claim 7, characterized in that: The step S203 includes: the CPU module calculates the system check word: System check word = check word XOR (BIT_RESULT) XOR (CPU_COMP_VALUE) Where BIT_RESULT is the internal test result, CPU_COMP_VALUE is the CPU compensation value, and XOR is the exclusive OR operation; CPU calculates dynamic system check word: Dynamic system check word = system check word XOR (DYN_COMP_VALUE) Where DYN_COMP_VALUE is the dynamic compensation value.

10. A method for cutting off a secure communication channel of an in-vehicle device according to claim 7, characterized in that: The condition for the dynamic system check word calculated by the CPU module to pass the check is that the dynamic system check word of the dual-channel CPU module alternates between two values ​​of the set legal check word set.

11. A method for cutting off a secure communication channel of an in-vehicle device according to claim 7, characterized in that: If the dual-channel dynamic system check word is checked and passed, the CPU sends the dynamic system check word to the FPGA, and the FPGA opens the logic board's secure communication channel to other boards in the system or maintains the channel open, and executes step S204; otherwise, enters the safe mode.

12. A method for cutting off a secure communication channel of an in-vehicle device according to claim 7, characterized in that: The step S205 is specifically as follows: if the dynamic system check word for the channel is not received within the second set time, or the dynamic system check word for the channel CPU module is received but the check fails, then enter the safe mode; If the dynamic system check word check of the dual-channel CPU module passes, then check the FPGA health code word of the dual channel.

13. A method for cutting off a secure communication channel of an in-vehicle device according to claim 7, characterized in that: The passing condition for checking the dynamic system check word of the dual-channel is: during the initialization stage, the dual-channel FPGA health code word can be read as any one of the set second legal code word set, and then the value of the dual-channel FPGA health code word alternates between two values ​​in the second legal code word set, and the alternating time interval does not exceed the third set duration.

14. A method for cutting off a secure communication channel of an in-vehicle device according to claim 7, characterized in that: Once in safe mode, do the following: Step S301, setting the CPU dynamic system check word provided to the FPGA module of this channel to an illegal value, and the FPGA module cuts off the secure communication channel between the logic board and other boards in the system; Step S302, reading the restartable number and the check word from the non-volatile storage medium, if the check word is illegal or the restartable number is 0, setting the restartable number = 0; If the checksum is valid and the number of possible restarts is not 0, then the number of possible restarts is reduced by 1; Step S303, calculate the check word according to the restartable number updated in step S302, and update the restartable number and the check word in the non-volatile storage medium, and end.

15. An electronic device comprising a memory and a processor, wherein a computer program is stored in the memory, wherein: When the processor executes the program, the method according to any one of claims 1 to 14 is implemented.

16. A computer-readable storage medium having a computer program stored thereon, characterized in that: When the program is executed by a processor, the method according to any one of claims 1 to 14 is implemented.