Human error prevention design method and device for nuclear power plant equipment
By identifying key equipment and risk guidance designs, combined with the analysis of PSA model, the problem of lack of anti-human design in nuclear power plant equipment design is solved, and the safety and economicality of nuclear power plant equipment is improved, dynamically identifying and preventing high risks is achieved. equipment reduces the risk of accidents.
Patent Information
- Application Number
- CN202411125164.7
- Authority / Receiving Office
- CN · China
- Patent Type
- Applications(China)
- Current Assignee / Owner
- Filing Date
- 2024-08-15
- Publication Date
- 2024-11-26
AI Technical Summary
The existing technology lacks a systematic method to prevent human error design, which leads to safety and economic problems in the design and operation of nuclear power plant equipment, and cannot effectively reduce the risk of accidents caused by human error.
By identifying key originating events, determining the key equipment to respond to, and generating anti-human error design based on risk guidance methods, combining probability safety analysis (PSA) models, calculating risk contribution and importance, screening high-risk equipment for prevention design, until Meeting probabilistic safety goals.
It realizes the anti-human design of nuclear power plant equipment, improves safety and economy, dynamically and efficiently identify and prevent high-risk equipment, and reduces the possibility of accidents.
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Figure CN119026910A_ABST
Abstract
Description
Technical Field
[0001] The present invention relates to the technical field of nuclear power plant design, and in particular to a method and device for preventing human error in design of nuclear power plant equipment. Background Art
[0002] Nuclear power plants are large industrial systems constructed by complex system equipment, and the safety of their operation has attracted much attention from the society. In the daily operation and maintenance of nuclear power plants, operators, local control personnel or maintenance personnel need to complete a large number of daily and corrective maintenance, adjustment, monitoring and detection, and correction and recovery activities under non-accident conditions. Human errors that may occur during the activities will directly or indirectly cause the system or equipment to be in a failed state when it is needed to be put into operation, reducing the availability of the system. According to the feedback reports on the operating experience of the World Association of Nuclear Operators (WANO) and my country's nuclear power plants, the incidence of unsafe incidents caused by unsafe human behavior is more than 60%. Therefore, it is crucial to improve the safety of nuclear power plants by reducing the possibility of accidents and accident development caused by human errors through reasonable anti-human error design. Nuclear power plants have complex systems and equipment. The current equipment anti-human error design is based on determinism and design and operation experience. There is a lack of a systematic anti-human error design method. On the one hand, some equipment with a high risk of core damage (CD) in nuclear power plants lacks anti-human error design, which reduces the safety of power plant operation; on the other hand, some equipment with a low risk of core damage in nuclear power plants has too many anti-human error designs, which brings unnecessary burdens to power plants. In summary, the lack of a systematic anti-human error design method is not conducive to the research and development of new nuclear power plants, nor is it conducive to systematically improving the safety and economy of nuclear power plant design from the perspective of anti-human error.
[0003] The existing patent CN110070269B discloses a risk-guided management optimization method for equipment in a post-processing facility, which includes the following steps: (1) selecting a target system, familiarizing the target system and determining the RIMO optimization target; (2) performing PSA on the target system to obtain the top event probability, minimum cut set MCS and component cut set importance FV and risk value importance RAW of the target system; (3) determining decision variables and constraints; (4) determining the objective function; (5) using a genetic algorithm to write a corresponding program code to solve the Pareto optimal set of RIMO; and (6) selecting a suitable solution according to actual conditions.
[0004] The existing patent CN110070269B discloses a risk-guided analysis method for optimizing the technical specifications of a nuclear power plant. The method includes the following steps: S1. Determine the optimization target: determine the optimization target according to the actual situation of the nuclear power plant; S2. Engineering analysis, specifically including the steps of qualitative safety analysis and quantitative safety analysis; S21. Qualitative safety analysis: evaluate and analyze the compliance of the optimization target formulated in step S1 with respect to regulatory requirements, compliance with defense in depth, and compliance with safety margin; S22. Quantitative safety analysis is a probabilistic safety evaluation: evaluate the impact of optimization on the safety of the nuclear power plant and the impact of optimization on the PSA model of the power plant, obtain quantitative evaluation results, and comprehensively judge whether the optimization of the technical specifications of the nuclear power plant is acceptable; S3. Risk-guided decision-making principle judgment; S4. Formulate a performance supervision strategy.
[0005] In summary, the above two existing patents have not proposed a systematic design method to prevent human errors, nor have they systematically improved the safety and economy of nuclear power plant design from the perspective of preventing human errors. Summary of the invention
[0006] Based on the above technical problems, the present invention proposes a method and device for preventing human error design of nuclear power plant equipment, which solves the shortcomings of the anti-human error design method in the prior art and systematically improves the safety and economy of nuclear power plant design from the perspective of preventing human error.
[0007] To achieve the above object, the present invention proposes a method for preventing human error in design of nuclear power plant equipment.
[0008] A method for preventing human error in design of nuclear power plant equipment, comprising:
[0009] Identify critical initiating events and determine key equipment to respond to critical initiating events;
[0010] Generate the first anti-human error design corresponding to the key equipment based on the key equipment anti-human error design requirement table;
[0011] For the key equipment that does not generate the corresponding first anti-human error design, screen out the key equipment that meets the preset conditions, and add the events corresponding to the remaining key equipment to the fault tree of the PSA model;
[0012] Analyze the human error events in the PSA model and calculate the risk contribution and / or importance of the human error events;
[0013] Identify high-risk equipment that may cause core damage in nuclear power plants based on risk contribution and / or importance, and conduct secondary anti-human error design for high-risk equipment;
[0014] For key equipment that does not generate the corresponding second anti-human error design, calculate the sum of the frequencies of core damage caused by it;
[0015] Determine whether the sum of the frequencies is less than the preset probability safety target value;
[0016] If the sum of the frequencies is less than the preset probabilistic safety target value, it is determined that the first anti-human error design and the second anti-human error design meet the design requirements.
[0017] Furthermore, key equipment that meets the preset conditions includes:
[0018] Equipment put into operation during normal operation, equipment that does not affect the functions required by the PSA model, and equipment that can be operated alternately.
[0019] Furthermore, the human error events in the PSA model are analyzed to calculate the risk contribution corresponding to the human error events, including:
[0020] The PSA model is used to determine the minimum cut set that causes core damage;
[0021] The risk contribution corresponding to the human error event in the minimum cut set is determined by formula 1. Formula 1: f MCS(i) is the core damage frequency of a minimum cut set containing human error event i, F MCS is the sum of the core damage frequencies of the minimum cut set MCS that causes core damage, and P(i) is the contribution of human error event i.
[0022] Furthermore, the human error events in the PSA model are analyzed and the importance of the human error events is calculated, including:
[0023] The importance of the human error event corresponding to the human error event in the minimum cut set is determined by formula 2. Formula 2: Among them, F MCS is the sum of the core damage frequencies of the minimum cut set MCS that causes core damage, F(MCS including i) is the sum of the core damage frequencies of the minimum cut set that includes human error event i, I FV i is the importance of human error event i;
[0024] Furthermore, the human error events in the PSA model are analyzed to calculate the importance of the human error events, which also includes:
[0025] The importance of the risk increase factor corresponding to the human error event in the minimum cut set is determined by formula 3. Formula 3: Among them, F MCS is the sum of core damage frequencies of the minimum cut set MCS that causes core damage, F MCS (x i =1) represents the sum of the core damage frequencies of the minimum cut set containing the human error event i when the failure probability of the human error event i is 1.
[0026] Furthermore, high-risk equipment that may cause core damage in nuclear power plants is determined based on risk contribution and / or importance, including:
[0027] The equipment involved in the human error event with a risk contribution greater than the preset risk contribution is regarded as high-risk equipment;
[0028] The equipment involved in human error events with a degree of importance greater than the preset degree of importance is regarded as high-risk equipment;
[0029] Equipment involved in human error events whose risk contribution is greater than the preset risk contribution and whose importance is greater than the preset importance is regarded as high-risk equipment.
[0030] Furthermore, for the key equipment for which the corresponding second anti-human error design is not generated, the sum of the frequencies of core damage caused by the equipment is calculated, including:
[0031] The sum of the frequencies that lead to core damage is determined by formula 4:
[0032]
[0033] Among them, F MCS is the sum of the frequencies of core damage; F i is the frequency of occurrence of the initiating event; Q is the failure probability of the top event, which is the set of equipment failure events used to mitigate various initiating events; n is the number of initiating events that occurred, X j is the failure of equipment or personnel action; r is the number of failure events in the event set that leads to the failure of equipment or personnel to mitigate a certain initiating event.
[0034] In order to achieve the same purpose as the above method, the present invention also proposes a device for preventing human error in design of nuclear power plant equipment.
[0035] A device for preventing human error design of nuclear power plant equipment, comprising:
[0036] Identification module, used to identify key initiating events and determine key equipment to respond to key initiating events;
[0037] The first design module is used to generate a first anti-human error design corresponding to the key equipment based on the key equipment anti-human error design requirement table;
[0038] A screening module is used to screen out key equipment that meets preset conditions for key equipment that does not generate the corresponding first human error prevention design, and add events corresponding to the remaining key equipment to the fault tree of the PSA model;
[0039] The first calculation module is used to analyze the human error events in the PSA model and calculate the risk contribution and / or importance corresponding to the human error events;
[0040] The second design module is used to determine the high-risk equipment that may cause damage to the nuclear power plant core according to the risk contribution and / or importance, and to perform a second anti-human error design on the high-risk equipment;
[0041] The second calculation module is used to calculate the sum of the frequencies of core damage caused by the key equipment for which the corresponding second anti-human error design is not generated;
[0042] A judgment module is used to judge whether the sum of frequencies is less than a preset probability safety target value;
[0043] The determination module is used to determine whether the first anti-human error design and the second anti-human error design meet the design requirements if the total frequency is less than a preset probabilistic safety target value.
[0044] Furthermore, key equipment that meets the preset conditions includes:
[0045] Equipment put into operation during normal operation, equipment that does not affect the functions required by the PSA model, and equipment that can be operated alternately.
[0046] Furthermore, the first computing module is used to:
[0047] The PSA model is used to determine the minimum cut set that causes core damage;
[0048] The risk contribution corresponding to the human error event in the minimum cut set is determined by formula 1. Formula 1: f MCS(i) is the core damage frequency of a minimum cut set containing human error event i, F MCS is the sum of the core damage frequencies of the minimum cut set MCS that causes core damage, and P(i) is the contribution of human error event i.
[0049] Furthermore, the first computing module is used to:
[0050] The importance of the human error event corresponding to the human error event in the minimum cut set is determined by formula 2. Formula 2: Among them, F MCS is the sum of the core damage frequencies of the minimum cut set MCS that causes core damage, F(MCS including i) is the sum of the core damage frequencies of the minimum cut set that includes human error event i, I FV i is the importance of human error event i;
[0051] Furthermore, the first computing module is further used for:
[0052] The importance of the risk increase factor corresponding to the human error event in the minimum cut set is determined by formula 3. Formula 3: Among them, F MCSis the sum of core damage frequencies of the minimum cut set MCS that causes core damage, F MCS (X i =1) represents the sum of the core damage frequencies of the minimum cut set containing the human error event i when the failure probability of the human error event i is 1.
[0053] Furthermore, the second design module is used to:
[0054] The equipment involved in the human error event with a risk contribution greater than the preset risk contribution is regarded as high-risk equipment;
[0055] The equipment involved in human error events with a degree of importance greater than the preset degree of importance is regarded as high-risk equipment;
[0056] Equipment involved in human error events whose risk contribution is greater than the preset risk contribution and whose importance is greater than the preset importance is regarded as high-risk equipment.
[0057] Furthermore, the second computing module is used to:
[0058] The sum of frequencies that lead to core damage is determined by formula 4:
[0059]
[0060] Among them, F MCS is the sum of the frequencies of core damage; F i is the frequency of occurrence of the initiating event; Q is the failure probability of the top event, which is the set of equipment failure events used to mitigate various initiating events; n is the number of initiating events that occurred; X j is the failure of equipment or personnel action; r is the number of failure events in the event set that leads to the failure of equipment or personnel to mitigate a certain initiating event.
[0061] Based on the above technical solution, the present invention has at least the following beneficial effects:
[0062] 1. According to the design characteristics of nuclear power plants at different design stages, the present invention establishes a systematic risk-guided anti-human error design method and device for nuclear power plant equipment, combines the preliminary anti-human error design of key equipment with the PSA model, and analyzes the human error events, risk contribution, and human error event I in the PSA model. FV Importance, risk increase factor I RIF Importance analysis can quantify the impact of human error events on nuclear power plants. Based on the quantification results, it is convenient to put forward targeted design requirements to prevent human errors, which can improve the safety and economy of nuclear power plant design.
[0063] 2. The present invention removes key equipment or high-risk equipment that has been proposed to prevent human error design from the PSA model, and iteratively updates the PSA model until the probabilistic safety target is met. This method and device facilitate dynamic and efficient determination of high-risk equipment in nuclear power plants, thereby preventing accidents before they occur. BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS
[0064] The accompanying drawings constituting a part of the present invention are used to provide a further understanding of the present invention. The exemplary embodiments of the present invention and their descriptions are used to explain the present invention and do not constitute an improper limitation of the present invention. In the accompanying drawings:
[0065] Figure 1 A flow chart of a method for preventing human error in designing nuclear power plant equipment according to an embodiment of the present invention;
[0066] Figure 2 A schematic diagram of a process for preventing human error design of nuclear power plant equipment in one embodiment of the present invention;
[0067] Figure 3 A schematic diagram of a device for preventing human error in design of nuclear power plant equipment according to an embodiment of the present invention; DETAILED DESCRIPTION
[0068] It should be noted that, in the absence of conflict, the embodiments of the present invention and the features in the embodiments can be combined with each other. The present invention will be described in detail below with reference to the accompanying drawings and in combination with the embodiments.
[0069] The present invention is further described in detail below in conjunction with specific embodiments. These embodiments should not be construed as limiting the scope of protection claimed by the present invention.
[0070] Example
[0071] In order to solve the shortcomings of the human error prevention design method in the prior art and systematically improve the safety and economy of nuclear power plant design from the perspective of human error prevention, the present invention proposes a human error prevention design method and device for nuclear power plant equipment. The present invention adds a risk assessment dimension based on probabilistic safety analysis to the original ideas of determinism and traditional engineering design experience, and uses a risk-guided method to quantify some fuzzy or unquantified parts in the original human error prevention design system, revealing the weak links in the human error prevention design of the equipment, and then preventing accidents before they occur.
[0072] To achieve the above object, the present invention proposes a method for preventing human error in design of nuclear power plant equipment.
[0073] like Figure 1 FIG. 4 shows a flow chart of a method for preventing human error in designing nuclear power plant equipment according to an embodiment of the present invention. Figure 1 As shown, the method comprises the following steps:
[0074] S1, identify critical initiating events and determine the key equipment to respond to critical initiating events.
[0075] Table 1 shows the process and examples of identifying key initiating events and determining corresponding key equipment in this embodiment. As can be seen from Table 1, the process of determining the key equipment corresponding to the initiating event mainly includes: (1) identifying key initiating events; (2) determining the frequency of key initiating events and classifying key initiating events according to the frequency; (3) determining the mitigation strategy for responding to accidents according to different categories of key initiating events; (4) designing and arranging the system according to the mitigation strategy; (5) determining the key equipment for responding to key initiating events according to the system design and arrangement.
[0076]
[0077]
[0078]
[0079] Table 2 shows the initiating events and the corresponding frequencies and categories in a specific embodiment of the present invention.
[0080] Table 2 Examples of initiating events and frequencies
[0081]
[0082] After determining the categories of critical initiating events, the mitigation strategies for coping with accidents are determined according to the different categories of critical initiating events. Specifically, in this embodiment, one example each of a medium frequency event, a rare accident, and an extreme accident is selected to list the functional layer and system layer of some accident mitigation strategies. Table 3 is an example of the functional layer of the accident mitigation strategy. After the functional layer requirements analysis, the safety functions required to cope with the initiating event can be determined.
[0083] Table 3 Incident Mitigation Strategy - Functional Layer Example
[0084]
[0085] Table 4 Incident Mitigation Strategy - System Level Example
[0086]
[0087]
[0088] Table 4 shows an example of system-level requirement analysis in determining the mitigation strategy for responding to accidents. Based on the functional requirement analysis in the mitigation strategy for responding to accidents determined in Table 3 above, the system that implements the mitigation function can be determined, that is, the mitigation strategy for responding to accidents can be determined.
[0089] Regarding human errors before the initiating event, according to the influence of HRA (Human Factors Analysis) elements on the analysis of different elements of PSA (Probabilistic Safety Assessment), human errors are divided into three types: Type A: Human errors before the initiating event, which refers to human actions that produce or cause the system or equipment to be unavailable during the work process according to the daily operation or maintenance and debugging plan; Type B: Human actions that cause the initiating event, whose actions themselves or in combination with equipment failure will directly lead to the occurrence of the initiating event or equipment failure; Type C: Human actions after the initiating event, which refers to the safety actions performed by personnel after the initiating event or the behaviors and actions of personnel that aggravate the course of the event. In this embodiment, the key equipment is mainly determined based on the human errors before the initiating event, and the human errors before the initiating event are also analyzed in the subsequent process.
[0090] Taking the injection box system as an example, the system includes three types of equipment: injection box, electric valve and check valve. There is no possible human error in the initiating event for the injection box and the check valve. Therefore, the key equipment determined in the system is the electric valve.
[0091] S2, generating the first anti-human error design corresponding to the key equipment based on the key equipment anti-human error design requirement table.
[0092] Based on the key equipment sensors, electric valves, manual valves and pneumatic valves determined in step S1 above, first analyze the possible failure modes due to human error according to the design and operation principles of the key equipment, analyze the possible human error scenarios in combination with the design and control characteristics of the key equipment, and formulate corresponding anti-human error measures for specific scenarios; then conduct a feasibility analysis of the preliminary anti-human error design measures for key equipment with the professionals in process, system, layout, operation, instrumentation and control, equipment, etc., and determine the anti-human error measures for key equipment. Table 5 is the anti-human error design requirements table for key equipment.
[0093] Table 5 Key equipment anti-error design requirements
[0094]
[0095]
[0096] Based on the anti-human error design requirements of the key equipment in Table 5 above, corresponding designs are performed, and for the key equipment for which no anti-human error design requirements are proposed, further analysis is performed through step S3.
[0097] S3, for the key equipment that does not generate the corresponding first anti-human error design, screen out the key equipment that meets the preset conditions, and add the events corresponding to the remaining key equipment to the fault tree of the PSA model.
[0098] For the key equipment that has not generated the corresponding first anti-human error design, according to the screening principle of human error before the initiating event in PSA modeling, the impact of possible Class A human error equipment in each system on the system operation is analyzed one by one, and a PSA model for anti-human error design of high-risk equipment for core damage is constructed.
[0099] Specifically, the key equipment that meets the preset conditions includes: equipment put into operation during normal operation, equipment that does not affect the functions required by the PSA model, and equipment that can be operated alternately. Table 6 lists the analysis process of the impact of Class A human errors on the PSA model of some equipment in the spent fuel cooling system (RFT).
[0100] Table 6 Analysis of the impact of type A human error on the PSA model of some equipment in the RFT system
[0101]
[0102] Based on the above analysis results, the human error and equipment failure before the initiating event corresponding to the manual valve RFT021VB are added to the fault tree of the PSA model. In the PSA modeling software, the fault tree is expressed graphically as a Boolean equation, and the human error and equipment failure events are converted into the expression of the minimum cut set according to the rules of Boolean algebra, that is, a set of basic event combinations that can lead to the top event (failure of the function or system that mitigates the accident), and the function or system failure is composed of a finite number of minimum cut sets.
[0103] S4, analyzing the human error events in the PSA model, and calculating the risk contribution and / or importance corresponding to the human error events.
[0104] The following will introduce the specific method of calculating the risk contribution and importance corresponding to human error events.
[0105] Among them, analyzing the human error events in the PSA model and calculating the risk contribution corresponding to the human error events include the following two steps:
[0106] Firstly, the PSA model is used to determine the minimum cut set that causes core damage.
[0107] The minimum cut set that causes core damage can be expressed as: MCS i is the minimum cut set that causes core damage; X j Failure of equipment or personnel action; m is the occurrence of a certain initiating event; n is the number of initiating events that occurred; h is the number of sets of equipment or personnel failures used to mitigate accidents under a certain initiating event; r is the number of failure events in a set of events that lead to equipment or personnel failure to mitigate a certain initiating event.
[0108] Secondly, the risk contribution corresponding to the human error event in the minimum cut set is determined by formula 1.
[0109] Formula 1: f MCS(i) is the core damage frequency of a minimum cut set containing human error event i, F MCS is the sum of the core damage frequencies of the minimum cut set MCS that causes core damage, and P(i) is the contribution of human error event i.
[0110] The f MCS(i) Calculated by the following formula, f MCS(i) =F (i) v (i) =F (i) *P(x1*x2*x i *…*x k ), where F m is the occurrence frequency of a certain initiating event; Q is the failure probability of the top event, and the failure probability of the top event is the set of equipment failure events used to mitigate various initiating events.
[0111] Furthermore, the human error events in the PSA model are analyzed to calculate the importance of the human error events. The importance includes the importance of the human error events and the importance of the risk increase factor. Specifically, after determining the minimum cut set that causes core damage, the importance of the human error events corresponding to the human error events in the minimum cut set is determined by Formula 2.
[0112] Formula 2: Among them, F MCS is the sum of the core damage frequencies of the minimum cut set MCS that causes core damage, F(MCS including i) is the sum of the core damage frequencies of the minimum cut set that includes human error event i, I FV i The importance of human error event i.
[0113] Formula 3 is used to determine the importance of the risk increase factor corresponding to the human error event in the minimum cut set.
[0114] Formula 3: Among them, F MCS is the sum of core damage frequencies of the minimum cut set MCS that causes core damage, F MCS (X i =1) represents the sum of the core damage frequencies of the minimum cut set containing the human error event i when the failure probability of the human error event i is 1.
[0115] In this embodiment, the risk contribution and importance values corresponding to the human error events in the minimum cut set are determined respectively, which are used to determine the high-risk equipment in step S5.
[0116] S5. Determine the high-risk equipment that may cause core damage in nuclear power plants based on risk contribution and / or importance, and conduct a second anti-human error design for the high-risk equipment.
[0117] It can be understood that the methods for determining the high-risk equipment include the following three: (1) Equipment in human error events with a risk contribution greater than a preset risk contribution is regarded as a high-risk equipment; (2) Equipment in human error events with an importance greater than a preset importance is regarded as a high-risk equipment. It should be understood that the present invention can use any one or a combination of the importance of human error events or the importance of risk increase factors as the determination conditions for high-risk equipment; (3) Equipment in human error events with a risk contribution greater than a preset risk contribution and an importance greater than a preset importance is regarded as a high-risk equipment. In this embodiment, equipment in human error events with a risk contribution greater than a preset risk contribution or an importance greater than a preset importance is regarded as a high-risk equipment. For example, in this embodiment, the equipment related to the human error event before the initiating event in the minimum cut set with a risk contribution P exceeding 10% is regarded as a high-risk equipment; I FV ≥0.005 or I RIF The equipment related to the human error events of ≥2 is regarded as high-risk equipment, and then the second anti-human error design is performed for the high-risk equipment determined above. Table 7 shows an example of the second anti-human error design for high-risk equipment in this embodiment.
[0118] Table 7 Example of secondary anti-error design for high-risk equipment
[0119]
[0120]
[0121] S6: For key equipment that does not generate the corresponding second anti-human error design, calculate the sum of the frequencies of core damage caused by it.
[0122] Before executing step S6, the equipment failure events and human error events corresponding to the key equipment that has undergone the second anti-human error design are removed from the PSA model, and then the sum of the frequencies that lead to core damage is calculated.
[0123] Specifically, this embodiment determines the sum of frequencies causing core damage by using Formula 4. Formula 4:
[0124]
[0125] Among them, F MCS is the sum of the frequencies of core damage; F iis the frequency of occurrence of the initiating event; Q is the failure probability of the top event, which is the set of equipment failure events used to mitigate various initiating events; n is the number of initiating events that occurred; X j is the failure of equipment or personnel action; r is the number of failure events in the event set that leads to the failure of equipment or personnel to mitigate a certain initiating event.
[0126] S7, determining whether the total frequency is less than a preset probabilistic safety target value.
[0127] S8, if the total frequency is less than the preset probability safety target value, it is determined that the first anti-human error design and the second anti-human error design meet the design requirements.
[0128] If the core damage frequency is greater than the preset probabilistic safety target value, the minimum cut set and risk contribution and / or importance that cause the core damage are further determined, the high-risk equipment is determined, a human error prevention design is proposed for it, and S6 to S7 are executed.
[0129] In general, the process of preventing human error design of nuclear power plant equipment in this embodiment is as follows: Figure 2 As shown, firstly, step S1 is used to determine whether the system equipment has human error before the initiating event ( Figure 2 =A type of human error in the middle), that is, determine the key equipment; propose anti-human error design for the key equipment from the perspective of hardware design according to step S2, screen out the key equipment for which anti-human error design has been proposed, and further screen out the key equipment for which anti-human error design has not been proposed based on the screening principle in PSA modeling, and screen out the human errors before the initiating event that do not need to be considered; for the key equipment that has not been screened out, use the PSA model to identify high-risk equipment from the perspective of quantitative analysis, and propose anti-human error design from the aspects of program design such as main control room design and administrative isolation for the high-risk equipment for core damage, so as to avoid human errors before the initiating event ( Figure 2 Class A human error); key equipment for which anti-human error design has been proposed will be screened out from the PSA model. For high-risk equipment that cannot be screened out, the probability of human error before the initiating event will be reduced through maintenance inspection, patrol inspection, process management, etc. to meet the core probabilistic safety target.
[0130] In order to achieve the same purpose as the above method, the present invention also proposes a device for preventing human error in design of nuclear power plant equipment.
[0131] like Figure 3 A schematic diagram of a device for preventing human error design of nuclear power plant equipment according to an embodiment of the present invention is shown, and the device includes: an identification module 31, a first design module 32, a screening module 33, a first calculation module 34, a second design module 35, a second calculation module 36, a judgment module 37 and a determination module 38.
[0132] The identification module 31 is used to identify key initiating events and determine key equipment for responding to key initiating events.
[0133] The first design module 32 is used to generate a first anti-human error design corresponding to the key equipment based on the key equipment anti-human error design requirement table.
[0134] The screening module 33 is used to screen out the key equipment that meets the preset conditions for the key equipment that does not generate the corresponding first anti-human error design, and add the events corresponding to the remaining key equipment to the fault tree of the PSA model.
[0135] Furthermore, key equipment that meets the preset conditions includes:
[0136] Equipment put into operation during normal operation, equipment that does not affect the functions required by the PSA model, and equipment that can be operated alternately.
[0137] The first calculation module 34 is used to analyze the human error events in the PSA model and calculate the risk contribution and / or importance corresponding to the human error events.
[0138] Furthermore, the first calculation module 34 is used to:
[0139] The PSA model is used to determine the minimum cut set that causes core damage.
[0140] The risk contribution corresponding to the human error event in the minimum cut set is determined by formula 1. Formula 1: f MCS(i) is the core damage frequency of a minimum cut set containing human error event i, F MCS is the sum of the core damage frequencies of the minimum cut set MCS that causes core damage, and P(i) is the contribution of human error event i.
[0141] Furthermore, the first calculation module 34 is used to:
[0142] The importance of the human error event corresponding to the human error event in the minimum cut set is determined by formula 2. Formula 2: Among them, F MCS is the sum of the core damage frequencies of the minimum cut set MCS that causes core damage, F(MCS including i) is the sum of the core damage frequencies of the minimum cut set that includes human error event i, I FV i The importance of human error event i.
[0143] Furthermore, the first calculation module 34 is used to:
[0144] The importance of the risk increase factor corresponding to the human error event in the minimum cut set is determined by formula 3. Formula 3: Among them, F MCSis the sum of core damage frequencies of the minimum cut set MCS that causes core damage, F MCS (X i =1) represents the sum of the core damage frequencies of the minimum cut set containing the human error event i when the failure probability of the human error event i is 1.
[0145] The second design module 35 is used to determine the high-risk equipment that may cause damage to the core of the nuclear power plant according to the risk contribution and / or importance, and perform a second anti-human error design on the high-risk equipment.
[0146] Furthermore, the second design module 35 is used to:
[0147] The equipment involved in the human error event with a risk contribution greater than the preset risk contribution is regarded as high-risk equipment;
[0148] The equipment involved in human error events with a degree of importance greater than the preset degree of importance is regarded as high-risk equipment;
[0149] Equipment involved in human error events whose risk contribution is greater than the preset risk contribution and whose importance is greater than the preset importance is regarded as high-risk equipment.
[0150] The second calculation module 36 is used to calculate the total frequency of core damage caused by key equipment for which the corresponding second anti-human error design is not generated.
[0151] Furthermore, the second calculation module 36 is used to:
[0152] The sum of frequencies that lead to core damage is determined by formula 4:
[0153]
[0154] Among them, F MCS is the sum of the frequencies of core damage; F i is the frequency of occurrence of the initiating event; Q is the failure probability of the top event, which is the set of equipment failure events used to mitigate various initiating events; n is the number of initiating events that occurred; X j is the failure of equipment or personnel action; r is the number of failure events in the event set that leads to the failure of equipment or personnel to mitigate a certain initiating event.
[0155] The judgment module 37 is used to judge whether the core damage frequency is less than a preset probabilistic safety target value.
[0156] The determination module 38 is used to determine whether the first design to prevent human error and the second design to prevent human error meet the design requirements if the core damage frequency is less than a preset probabilistic safety target value.
[0157] It should be understood that a device for preventing human error in design of nuclear power plant equipment is consistent with the description of a corresponding method for preventing human error in design of nuclear power plant equipment, so it will not be repeated in this embodiment.
[0158] In summary, it can be seen from the above description that the above embodiments of the present invention achieve the following technical effects:
[0159] 1. According to the design characteristics of nuclear power plants at different design stages, the present invention establishes a systematic risk-guided anti-human error design method and device for nuclear power plant equipment, combines the preliminary anti-human error design of key equipment with the PSA model, and analyzes the human error events, risk contribution, and human error event I in the PSA model. FV Importance, risk increase factor I RIF Importance analysis can quantify the impact of human error events on nuclear power plants. Based on the quantification results, it is convenient to put forward targeted design requirements to prevent human errors, which can improve the safety and economy of nuclear power plant design.
[0160] 2. The present invention removes key equipment or high-risk equipment that has been proposed to prevent human error design from the PSA model, and iteratively updates the PSA model until the probabilistic safety target is met. This method and device facilitate dynamic and efficient determination of high-risk equipment in nuclear power plants, thereby preventing accidents before they occur.
[0161] The above description is only a preferred embodiment of the present invention and is not intended to limit the present invention. For those skilled in the art, the present invention may have various modifications and variations. Any modification, equivalent replacement, improvement, etc. made within the spirit and principle of the present invention shall be included in the protection scope of the present invention.
[0162] It should be noted that, in this article, relational terms such as first and second, etc. are only used to distinguish one entity or operation from another entity or operation, and do not necessarily require or imply any such actual relationship or order between these entities or operations. Moreover, the terms "include", "comprise" or any other variants thereof are intended to cover non-exclusive inclusion, so that a process, method, article or device including a series of elements includes not only those elements, but also other elements not explicitly listed, or also includes elements inherent to such process, method, article or device. In the absence of further restrictions, the elements defined by the sentence "comprise a ..." do not exclude the existence of other identical elements in the process, method, article or device including the elements.
[0163] The logic and / or steps represented in the flowchart or otherwise described herein, for example, can be considered as an ordered list of executable instructions for implementing logical functions, which can be embodied in any computer-readable medium for use by an instruction execution system, apparatus or device (such as a computer-based system, a system including a processor or other system that can fetch instructions from an instruction execution system, apparatus or device and execute instructions), or used in combination with these instruction execution systems, apparatuses or devices.
[0164] It should be understood that the various parts of the present invention can be implemented by hardware, software, firmware or a combination thereof. In the above-mentioned embodiments, a plurality of steps or methods can be implemented by software or firmware stored in a memory and executed by a suitable instruction execution system. For example, if implemented by hardware, as in another embodiment, it can be implemented by any one of the following technologies known in the art or their combination: a discrete logic circuit having a logic gate circuit for implementing a logic function for a data signal, a dedicated integrated circuit having a suitable combination of logic gate circuits, a programmable gate array (PGA), a field programmable gate array (FPGA), etc.
[0165] It should be noted that, in the description of this specification, the description with reference to the terms "one embodiment", "some embodiments", "example", "specific example", or "some examples" etc. means that the specific features, structures, materials or characteristics described in conjunction with the embodiment or example are included in at least one embodiment or example of the present invention. In this specification, the schematic representations of the above terms do not necessarily refer to the same embodiment or example. Moreover, the specific features, structures, materials or characteristics described may be combined in any one or more embodiments or examples in a suitable manner. In addition, those skilled in the art may combine and combine the different embodiments or examples described in this specification and the features of the different embodiments or examples, unless they are contradictory.
Claims
1. A method for preventing human error in design of nuclear power plant equipment, characterized in that: include: Identify critical initiating events and determine the key equipment to respond to the critical initiating events; Generate a first anti-human error design corresponding to the key equipment based on the key equipment anti-human error design requirement table; For the key equipment that does not generate the corresponding first anti-human error design, screen out the key equipment that meets the preset conditions, and add the events corresponding to the remaining key equipment to the fault tree of the PSA model; Analyze the human error events in the PSA model and calculate the risk contribution and / or importance corresponding to the human error events; Determine the high-risk equipment that may cause damage to the core of the nuclear power plant according to the risk contribution and / or the importance, and perform a second anti-human error design on the high-risk equipment; For key equipment that does not generate the corresponding second anti-human error design, calculate the sum of the frequencies of core damage caused by it; Determining whether the frequency sum is less than a preset probabilistic safety target value; If the frequency sum is less than the preset probabilistic safety target value, it is determined that the first anti-human error design and the second anti-human error design meet the design requirements.
2. The method according to claim 1, characterized in that The key equipment that meets the preset conditions includes: Equipment put into operation during normal operation, equipment that does not affect the functions required by the PSA model, and equipment that can be operated alternately.
3. The method according to claim 1, characterized in that Analyze the human error events in the PSA model and calculate the risk contribution corresponding to the human error events, including: Determining the minimum cut set that causes core damage using the PSA model; The risk contribution corresponding to the human error event in the minimum cut set is determined by formula 1, wherein: f MCS(i) is the core damage frequency of a minimum cut set containing human error event i, F MCS is the sum of the core damage frequencies of the minimum cut set MCS that causes core damage, and P(i) is the contribution of human error event i.
4. The method according to claim 1, characterized in that: Analyzing the human error events in the PSA model and calculating the importance of the human error events includes: The importance of the human error event corresponding to the human error event in the minimum cut set is determined by formula 2, wherein: Among them, F MCS is the sum of core damage frequencies of the minimum cut set MCS that causes core damage, F(MCSincludingi) is the sum of core damage frequencies of the minimum cut set including human error event i, I FV i The importance of human error event i.
5. The method according to claim 1, characterized in that Analyzing the human error events in the PSA model and calculating the importance of the human error events, further comprising: The importance of the risk increase factor corresponding to the human error event in the minimum cut set is determined by formula 3, wherein: Among them, F MCS is the sum of core damage frequencies of the minimum cut set MCS that causes core damage, F MCS (X i =1) represents the sum of the core damage frequencies of the minimum cut set containing the human error event i when the failure probability of the human error event i is 1.
6. The method according to claim 1, characterized in that The high-risk equipment causing damage to the core of a nuclear power plant is determined according to the risk contribution and / or the importance, including: The equipment in the human error event where the risk contribution is greater than the preset risk contribution is regarded as a high-risk equipment; The equipment involved in the human error event whose importance is greater than the preset importance is regarded as high-risk equipment; The equipment involved in the human error event whose risk contribution is greater than the preset risk contribution and whose importance is greater than the preset importance is regarded as high-risk equipment.
7. The method according to claim 1, characterized in that For key equipment that does not have the corresponding second anti-error design, calculate the sum of the frequencies of core damage caused by it, including: The sum of frequencies leading to core damage is determined by Formula 4, where: Among them, F MCS is the sum of the frequencies of core damage; F m is the frequency of occurrence of the initiating event; Q is the failure probability of the top event, which is the set of equipment failure events used to mitigate various initiating events; n is the number of initiating events that occurred; X j is the failure of equipment or personnel action; r is the number of failure events in the event set that leads to the failure of equipment or personnel to mitigate a certain initiating event.
8. A device for preventing human error in design of nuclear power plant equipment, characterized in that: include: An identification module, used to identify key initiating events and determine key equipment for responding to the key initiating events; A first design module, used for generating a first anti-human error design corresponding to the key equipment based on the key equipment anti-human error design requirement table; A screening module is used to screen out key equipment that meets preset conditions for key equipment that does not generate the corresponding first human error prevention design, and add events corresponding to the remaining key equipment to the fault tree of the PSA model; A first calculation module is used to analyze the human error events in the PSA model and calculate the risk contribution and / or importance corresponding to the human error events; A second design module is used to determine the high-risk equipment that causes damage to the nuclear power plant core according to the risk contribution and / or the importance, and perform a second anti-human error design on the high-risk equipment; A second calculation module is used to calculate the sum of frequencies causing core damage for key equipment for which a corresponding second anti-human error design is not generated; A judgment module, used to judge whether the sum of the frequencies is less than a preset probabilistic safety target value; A determination module is used to determine whether the first anti-human error design and the second anti-human error design meet the design requirements if the total frequency is less than the preset probabilistic safety target value.
9. The device according to claim 8, characterized in that The key equipment that meets the preset conditions includes: Equipment put into operation during normal operation, equipment that does not affect the functions required by the PSA model, and equipment that can be operated alternately.
10. The device according to claim 8, characterized in that The first computing module is used for: Determining the minimum cut set that causes core damage using the PSA model; The risk contribution corresponding to the human error event in the minimum cut set is determined by formula 1, wherein: f MCS(i) is the core damage frequency of a minimum cut set containing human error event i, F MCS is the sum of the core damage frequencies of the minimum cut set MCS that causes core damage, and P(i) is the contribution of human error event i.
11. The device according to claim 8, characterized in that The first computing module is used for: The importance of the human error event corresponding to the human error event in the minimum cut set is determined by formula 2, wherein: Among them, F MCS is the sum of core damage frequencies of the minimum cut set MCS that causes core damage, F(MCSincludingi) is the sum of core damage frequencies of the minimum cut set including human error event i, I FV i The importance of human error event i.
12. The device according to claim 8, characterized in that The first computing module is further configured to: The importance of the risk increase factor corresponding to the human error event in the minimum cut set is determined by formula 3, wherein: Among them, F MCS is the sum of core damage frequencies of the minimum cut set MCS that causes core damage, F MCS (X i =1) represents the sum of the core damage frequencies of the minimum cut set containing the human error event i when the failure probability of the human error event i is 1.
13. The device according to claim 8, characterized in that The second design module is used for: The equipment in the human error event where the risk contribution is greater than the preset risk contribution is regarded as a high-risk equipment; The equipment involved in the human error event whose importance is greater than the preset importance is regarded as high-risk equipment; The equipment involved in the human error event whose risk contribution is greater than the preset risk contribution and whose importance is greater than the preset importance is regarded as high-risk equipment.
14. The device according to claim 8, characterized in that The second computing module is used for: The sum of frequencies leading to core damage is determined by Formula 4, where: Among them, F MCS is the sum of the frequencies of core damage; F i is the frequency of occurrence of the initiating event; Q is the failure probability of the top event, which is the set of equipment failure events used to mitigate various initiating events; n is the number of initiating events that occurred; X j is the failure of equipment or personnel action; r is the number of failure events in the event set that leads to the failure of equipment or personnel to mitigate a certain initiating event.
