Multi-spacecraft safety cooperative control method for resisting multipath spoofing attack
The spacecraft safety controller is established through Rodriguez parameters and adaptive fuzzy update law, which solves the problem of instability of multi-spacecraft systems under deceptive attacks, ensures the stability and safety of the spacecraft, and realizes the spacecraft's instability in the first place. Security collaborative control under spoofing attacks.
Patent Information
- Application Number
- CN202411187437.0
- Authority / Receiving Office
- CN · China
- Patent Type
- Applications(China)
- Current Assignee / Owner
- Filing Date
- 2024-08-28
- Publication Date
- 2024-12-03
- Estimated Expiration
- 2044-08-28
AI Technical Summary
The existing technology has failed to effectively deal with the system instability caused by spoofing attacks in the coordinated control of multi-spacecraft, especially under modeling errors and spoofing attacks caused by nonlinear strongly coupled mathematical models and linear modeling differences, making it difficult to ensure aerospace. The safe and stable operation of the device.
The spacecraft attitude kinematics and dynamics model is established through the Rodriguez parameters, the spacecraft consistency error variable is designed based on the damaged system state, the unknown term is estimated using the adaptive fuzzy update law, and the first virtual controller and the The second virtual controller, combined with the Nussbaum function to handle unknown problems in the control direction, establishes a spacecraft security controller to resist spoofing attacks.
It effectively deals with unknown problems in the spacecraft attitude model caused by spoofing attacks, ensures the stability and security of the system, and ensures the secure coordinated control of the spacecraft under multiple spoofing attacks.
Smart Images

Figure CN119065394A_ABST
Abstract
Description
Technical Field
[0001] The present invention belongs to the technical field of multi-spacecraft formation safety control, and in particular relates to a multi-spacecraft safety collaborative control method for resisting multi-path deception attacks. Background Art
[0002] With the rapid development of aerospace technology, the field of spacecraft control has become a hot topic of research. With the increasing complexity of space exploration missions, the traditional single-spacecraft mission execution mode can no longer meet the needs, and multi-spacecraft collaborative control technology has emerged. Multi-spacecraft systems can improve the efficiency and reliability of mission execution through division of labor and cooperation. However, when multi-spacecraft systems are performing missions, their wireless communication links are vulnerable to deception attacks, which may lead to information transmission errors, thus affecting the normal operation of spacecraft and even causing immeasurable losses. Therefore, it is particularly important to study the safe collaborative control methods of multiple spacecraft under deception attack environments;
[0003] For example, Chinese patent publication number CN111752292A proposes a distributed spacecraft tracking control method, which uses a distributed finite-time state observer to observe the navigator information, and uses a fast non-singular terminal sliding mode control algorithm to handle external interference. At the same time, an input saturation function is designed to limit the attitude control torque to achieve fast collaborative tracking of the spacecraft attitude. Although this method has made breakthroughs in control accuracy and response speed, it does not involve the system's response strategy when it is subjected to deception attacks;
[0004] Furthermore, Chinese patent announcement number CN117806164A discloses a multi-spacecraft formation consistency control method based on the dynamic event method under a denial of service attack. This method constructs a multi-spacecraft formation system model and designs a dynamic event trigger mechanism to reduce the communication frequency to cope with time series denial of service attacks and ensure that the system remains stable under the attack. However, this method uses a linear model in modeling, which is quite different from the highly nonlinear and strongly coupled mathematical model of actual spacecraft, resulting in large modeling errors. In addition, this method also fails to solve the problem of system instability caused by deception attacks;
[0005] In summary, existing technologies have made some progress in the coordinated control of multiple spacecraft, but there are still challenges in security and stability when facing deception attacks. Therefore, developing a coordinated control method that can effectively resist deception attacks and ensure the safe and stable operation of multi-spacecraft systems is an urgent problem to be solved in the current field of aerospace technology. Summary of the invention
[0006] The purpose of the present invention is to provide a multi-spacecraft safe collaborative control method for resisting multi-path deception attacks, which can effectively deal with the problem of instability when the system is attacked by a network, thereby effectively solving the problem of the system being attacked by deception and ensuring the stability of the system.
[0007] The technical solution adopted by the present invention is as follows:
[0008] A multi-spacecraft safety cooperative control method for resisting multi-path spoofing attacks comprises the following steps:
[0009] S1: Use Rodriguez parameters to establish the attitude kinematics and dynamics model of the spacecraft, establish the mathematical model of the multi-path deception attack and pre-process the attacked spacecraft model;
[0010] S2: Design the spacecraft consistency error variable based on the damaged system state and construct the correlation between the actual attitude output of the spacecraft and the damaged consistency error variable;
[0011] S3: The unknown terms in the spacecraft attitude model caused by the spoofing attack are estimated using the adaptive fuzzy update law, and the first and second virtual controllers are constructed using first-order filters;
[0012] S4: Construct a spacecraft attitude controller based on the first virtual controller and the second virtual controller, and design a Nussbaum function to handle the problem of unknown control direction caused by deception attacks.
[0013] The technical effects achieved by the present invention are:
[0014] The present invention conducts a security analysis on the injection of erroneous data into the spacecraft communication link in response to the deception attack, designs a fuzzy adaptive update law to effectively estimate the unknown function for the problem of unknown partial functions caused by the deception attack holding the spacecraft node hostage, constructs a Nussbaum function to perform direction search for the unknown control direction, effectively handles the problem of instability when the system is attacked by a network, uses Rodriguez parameters to establish a spacecraft attitude kinematic and dynamic model, uses the first virtual controller, the second virtual controller and the adaptive fuzzy update law to establish a spacecraft safety controller, and uses the safety controller to perform formation collaborative control of multiple spacecraft, effectively solves the problem of the system being attacked by deception and ensures the stability of the system. BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS
[0015] Figure 1 is a flow chart of the present invention;
[0016] Figure 2 is the communication topology diagram attacked in the present invention;
[0017] Figure 3It is a graph of the spacecraft attitude tracking change in the present invention;
[0018] Figure 4 is a graph showing changes in adaptive parameters of the spacecraft in the present invention;
[0019] Figure 5 It is a Nussbaum function parameter curve diagram of the spacecraft in the present invention. DETAILED DESCRIPTION
[0020] In order to make the purpose and advantages of the present invention more clearly understood, the present invention is specifically described below in conjunction with embodiments. It should be understood that the following text is only used to describe one or several specific embodiments of the present invention, and does not strictly limit the scope of protection of the specific claims of the present invention.
[0021] like Figure 1 As shown, a multi-spacecraft safe collaborative control method for resisting multi-path deception attacks, the present invention uses a deception attack model to construct a damaged spacecraft attitude model, designs a spacecraft consistency error variable based on the damaged system state, constructs the correlation between the actual spacecraft attitude output and the damaged consistency error variable, uses an adaptive fuzzy update law to estimate the unknown items in the spacecraft attitude model caused by the deception attack, constructs a first virtual controller and a second virtual controller according to a first-order low-pass filter, and designs a Nussbaum function to handle the problem that the control direction may be unknown due to the deception attack, effectively resists the problem of system instability caused by unknown deception attacks, and has high practical significance.
[0022] Embodiment 1:
[0023] The following steps are involved:
[0024] S1: Use Rodriguez parameters to establish the attitude kinematics and dynamics model of the spacecraft, establish the mathematical model of the multi-path deception attack and pre-process the attacked spacecraft model;
[0025] When establishing the attitude kinematics and dynamics model of the spacecraft, the modified Rodriguez parameter vector The kinematic attitude model of the i-th rigid spacecraft is:
[0026]
[0027] Among them, q i =[q xi ,q yi ,q zi ] T and ρ i are the spacecraft principal axis and principal rotation angle, ω i ∈R 3 =[ωi1 ,ω i2 ,ω i3 ] T is the spacecraft angular velocity in the body coordinate system, ε i ∈(-2π,2π);
[0028] Jacobian matrix The skew symmetric matrix
[0029] I3∈R 3×3 is the identity matrix;
[0030] The dynamic attitude of the i-th rigid spacecraft is:
[0031]
[0032] Among them, J i ∈R 3×3 is the inertia matrix, u i ∈R 3 is the control torque, a symmetric matrix satisfy
[0033]
[0034] If the leader spacecraft node is not subject to spoofing attacks, the leader spacecraft is modeled as:
[0035]
[0036] Among them, x l and y0 is the output of the leader spacecraft, f(x l ) is a known nonlinear function of the leader spacecraft;
[0037] Let P i (q i )=T i -1 (q i ), we get the Lagrangian equation as:
[0038]
[0039] in:
[0040]
[0041]
[0042] Let x i,1 =q i , The i-th follower spacecraft is rewritten as:
[0043]
[0044] The network topology of the spacecraft and the deception attack on the spacecraft nodes are modeled as follows:
[0045]
[0046] where x i,m is the m-th order state of the ith follower spacecraft, is the m-th order state of the ith follower spacecraft under spoofing attack, u i is the controller of the ith follower spacecraft, is the controller of the ith follower spacecraft under spoofing attack, y0 is the output signal of the leader spacecraft, is the output signal of the leader spacecraft that is under spoofing attack, are all time-varying functions, is an unknown bounded function;
[0047] Assumptions satisfy as well as in and is an unknown constant, then we can get as well as in as well as are all unknown constants;
[0048] Combining the spacecraft attitude model and the mathematical model of multi-path deception attack, the mathematical model of the spacecraft under deception attack is described as follows:
[0049]
[0050] S2: Design the spacecraft consistency error variable based on the damaged system state and construct the correlation between the actual attitude output of the spacecraft and the damaged consistency error variable;
[0051] The specific process is:
[0052] Use the following formula to complete S2:
[0053]
[0054] Establish the output consistency error for the i-th follower spacecraft, where a i,j represents the connection relationship between the ith follower spacecraft and the jth follower spacecraft. If the two are connected or there is data transmission between them, then a i,j > 0, otherwise, a i,j =0;
[0055] b i represents the connection relationship between the ith follower spacecraft and the leader spacecraft, and are the damaged Rodriguez parameter vectors of the ith and jth follower spacecraft, respectively, N is the number of spacecraft.
[0056] The correlation between the damaged consistency error vector of the spacecraft and the actual consistency error vector is constructed using the following formula:
[0057]
[0058] Where D = diag{d1,...,d N} is the in-degree matrix of the spacecraft topology, where The Laplace matrix L=DA.
[0059] S3: The unknown terms in the spacecraft attitude model caused by the spoofing attack are estimated using the adaptive fuzzy update law, and the first and second virtual controllers are constructed using first-order filters;
[0060] The first virtual controller is obtained using the following formula:
[0061]
[0062] Among them, k i,1 is the first virtual controller gain i=1,2,3, is the nonlinear compensation term;
[0063] The following formula is used to establish a first-order low-pass filter to avoid the derivation of the first virtual control vector. The specific formula is:
[0064]
[0065] The filter input α i,1 and output The initial value of is equal, that is
[0066] The error vector of a first-order low-pass filter is constructed using the following formula:
[0067]
[0068] The attitude dynamics error vector of the i-th spacecraft is constructed using the following formula:
[0069]
[0070] The spacecraft attitude controller obtains the original state vector of the system using the following formula:
[0071]
[0072] The relationship between the damaged system state and the original system state is used to remodel the spacecraft mathematical model (4) for controller design;
[0073] in:
[0074]
[0075] Since the function θ in the deception attack i (t) is unknown, so the function in the remodeled spacecraft attitude model is and All unknown;
[0076] By processing the unknown function, we get:
[0077]
[0078] Among them, σ i,1 (ο i )≥1 is an unknown function that satisfies is an unknown function, is the function σ i,1 (ο i ) has an unknown upper bound;
[0079] Since some functions in the spacecraft model are unknown due to deception attacks, a fuzzy logic system is introduced:
[0080]
[0081] in, is an unknown function, is the fuzzy parameter vector, is a nonlinear function vector that satisfies:
[0082]
[0083] in yes Membership function, s = 1, 2;
[0084] The adaptive fuzzy update law is:
[0085]
[0086] in, is δ i,1 =max{||θ i,1 || 2}, γ i and C i All are unknown parameters;
[0087] The second virtual controller is constructed using the following formula:
[0088]
[0089] Among them, k i,2 is the second virtual controller gain is a nonlinear function vector that satisfies:
[0090]
[0091] in, yes Membership function, s=1,2.
[0092] S4: Design a Nussbaum function to handle the problem that the control direction may be unknown due to a deception attack, construct a spacecraft attitude controller based on the first virtual controller and the second virtual controller, and design a Nussbaum function to handle the problem that the control direction may be unknown due to a deception attack.
[0093] The reconstructed spacecraft mathematical model (4) due to the spoofing attack The direction is unknown and cannot be directly determined. The following formula is used to establish the actual spacecraft controller. The specific formula is:
[0094] u i =N(χ i )α i,2
[0095] in:
[0096]
[0097] sin(a2χ i (t))
[0098]
[0099] And a1 and a2 are design parameters.
[0100] Embodiment 2:
[0101] The stability, that is, the feasibility, of the solution designed by the present invention is proved by the Lyapunov function. The Lyapunov function is designed as follows:
[0102] Choose the Lyapunov function as:
[0103]
[0104] V i,1 Regarding the time derivative, the formula is:
[0105]
[0106] Among them, B i =d i +b i . From Young's inequality, we can get:
[0107]
[0108] Substituting the above inequality into equation (20), we can obtain:
[0109]
[0110] in:
[0111]
[0112] Because of the function Contains unknown function and its derivatives Therefore, the fuzzy logic function is introduced as:
[0113]
[0114] You can get:
[0115]
[0116] Using Young's inequality again, we can get:
[0117]
[0118] Among them, δ i,1 =max{||θ i,1 || 2}. Further we can get:
[0119]
[0120] Set the first virtual controller α i,1 and adaptive update law Substituting into the above formula, we get:
[0121]
[0122] Choose the Lyapunov function as:
[0123]
[0124] V i,2Regarding the time derivative, the formula is:
[0125]
[0126] in:
[0127]
[0128] The fuzzy logic function is introduced as:
[0129]
[0130] You can get:
[0131]
[0132] in:
[0133] δ i,2 =max{||θ i,2 || 2}
[0134]
[0135] Using the second virtual controller and the adaptive fuzzy update law, we can get:
[0136]
[0137] For a multi-spacecraft model with one leader and three followers, construct the overall Lyapunov function:
[0138]
[0139] By taking the derivative of the above Lyapunov function, we can get:
[0140]
[0141] Taking the derivative of the error vector of a first-order low-pass filter, we get:
[0142]
[0143] So we can get:
[0144]
[0145] in:
[0146]
[0147] is a known function consisting of state and parameter estimates, then there exists a set:
[0148]
[0149] Satisfies the set Δ i superior is a normal number. Then we can get:
[0150]
[0151] in:
[0152]
[0153] s=1,2
[0154] Therefore, the consensus of the closed-loop system is finally bounded. By using the correlation between the damaged consistency error vector of the spacecraft in step 2 and the actual consistency error vector and selecting the appropriate values of the parameters, the attitude of the spacecraft follower tracks the attitude of the leader well, and the safe and stable tracking of the follower spacecraft can still be guaranteed in the case of multi-path spoofing attacks;
[0155] Figure 2 It is a topological link diagram of the multi-spacecraft attitude network topology of the present invention that is subjected to a deception attack. The deception attack in this embodiment is modeled as:
[0156]
[0157] i=1,2,3
[0158] By choosing the parameters as:
[0159] k i,1 =50,k i,2 =50,C i,1 =0.1,C i,2 =0.1,c i,2 =1,i=1,2,3
[0160] Spacecraft safety collaborative controller effect Figure 3-5 shown. Figure 3 is the curve of the Rodriguez parameter variation of the spacecraft; the r1, r2, and r3 curves represent the reference signal; x 111 ,x 211 ,x 311 The curve represents the output curve of the first dimension of spacecraft 1-3; x 112 ,x 212 ,x 312 The curve represents the output curve of the second dimension of spacecraft 1-3; x 113 ,x 213 ,x 313 The curves represent the output curves of spacecraft 1-3 in the third dimension.
[0161] according to Figure 3 It can be seen that the fuzzy adaptive safety control scheme proposed in the present invention can make the follower spacecraft track the leader spacecraft with very good tracking effect; Figure 4 is a graph of adaptive fuzzy parameters for multiple spacecraft, Figure 5 It is a parameter curve diagram of the Nussbaum function, and it can be seen that the Nussbaum function can well search the direction of the spacecraft. It can be seen that the fuzzy adaptive safety control scheme proposed in the present invention can make the follower spacecraft track the leader spacecraft under a deception attack.
[0162] Through the above technical scheme, the present invention provides a multi-spacecraft adaptive fuzzy security collaborative control method for resisting multi-path deception attacks, which uses Rodriguez parameters to establish a spacecraft attitude kinematic and dynamic model, uses a first virtual controller, a second virtual controller and an adaptive fuzzy update law to establish a spacecraft safety controller, and uses the safety controller to perform formation collaborative control of multiple spacecraft, which effectively solves the problem of the system being subjected to deception attacks and ensures the stability of the system.
[0163] The above is only a preferred embodiment of the present invention. It should be noted that, for those skilled in the art, several improvements and modifications can be made without departing from the principles of the present invention, and these improvements and modifications should also be considered as the protection scope of the present invention. The structures, devices and operating methods not specifically described and explained in the present invention shall be implemented according to the conventional means in the art unless otherwise specified and limited.
Claims
1. A multi-spacecraft safety cooperative control method for resisting multi-path spoofing attacks, characterized by: The following steps are involved: S1: Use Rodriguez parameters to establish the attitude kinematics and dynamics model of the spacecraft, establish the mathematical model of the multi-path deception attack and pre-process the attacked spacecraft model; S2: Design the spacecraft consistency error variable based on the damaged system state and construct the correlation between the actual attitude output of the spacecraft and the damaged consistency error variable; S3: The unknown terms in the spacecraft attitude model caused by the spoofing attack are estimated using the adaptive fuzzy update law, and the first and second virtual controllers are constructed using first-order filters; S4: Construct a spacecraft attitude controller based on the first virtual controller and the second virtual controller, and design a Nussbaum function to handle the problem of unknown control direction caused by deception attacks.
2. The multi-spacecraft safety collaborative control method according to claim 1, characterized in that: In S1, when establishing the attitude kinematics and dynamics model of the spacecraft, the modified Rodriguez parameter vector is first used. The kinematic attitude model of the i-th rigid spacecraft is: Among them, q i =[q xi ,q yi ,q zi ] T and ρ i are the spacecraft principal axis and principal rotation angle, ω i ∈R 3 =[ω i1 ,ω i2 ,ω i3 ] T is the spacecraft angular velocity in the body coordinate system, ε i ∈(-2π,2π); Jacobian matrix The skew symmetric matrix I3∈R 3×3 is the identity matrix; The dynamic attitude of the i-th rigid spacecraft is: Among them, J i ∈R 3×3 is the inertia matrix, u i ∈R 3 is the control torque, a symmetric matrix satisfy If the leader spacecraft node is not subject to spoofing attacks, the leader spacecraft is modeled as: Among them, x l and y0 is the output of the leader spacecraft, f(x l ) is a known nonlinear function of the leader spacecraft; make The Lagrangian equation is: in: Let x i,1 =q i , The i-th follower spacecraft is rewritten as:
3. The multi-spacecraft safety collaborative control method according to claim 2 is characterized in that: The network topology of the spacecraft and the deception attack on the spacecraft nodes are modeled as follows: where x i,m is the m-th order state of the ith follower spacecraft, is the m-th order state of the ith follower spacecraft under spoofing attack, u i is the controller of the ith follower spacecraft, is the controller of the ith follower spacecraft under spoofing attack, y0 is the output signal of the leader spacecraft, is the output signal of the leader spacecraft that is under spoofing attack, are all time-varying functions, is an unknown bounded function; Assumptions satisfy as well as in and is an unknown constant, then we can get as well as in θ i , as well as are all unknown constants; Combining the spacecraft attitude model and the mathematical model of multi-path deception attack, the mathematical model of the spacecraft under deception attack is described as follows:
4. The multi-spacecraft safety collaborative control method according to claim 1, characterized in that: The specific process in S2 is: Using the following formula: Establish the output consistency error for the i-th follower spacecraft, where a i,j represents the connection relationship between the ith follower spacecraft and the jth follower spacecraft. If the two are connected or there is data transmission between them, then a i,j > 0, otherwise, a i,j =0; b i represents the connection relationship between the ith follower spacecraft and the leader spacecraft, and are the damaged Rodriguez parameter vectors of the ith and jth follower spacecraft, respectively, N is the number of spacecraft.
5. The multi-spacecraft safety collaborative control method according to claim 4 is characterized in that: The correlation between the damaged consistency error vector of the spacecraft and the actual consistency error vector is constructed using the following formula: Where D = diag{d1,...,d N } is the in-degree matrix of the spacecraft topology, where The Laplace matrix L=DA.
6. The multi-spacecraft safety collaborative control method according to claim 5, characterized in that: In S3, the first virtual controller is obtained using the following formula, the specific formula is: Among them, k i,1 is the first virtual controller gain i=1,2,3; is the nonlinear compensation term; The following formula is used to establish a first-order low-pass filter to avoid the derivation of the first virtual control vector. The specific formula is: The filter input α i,1 and output The initial value of is equal, that is The error vector of a first-order low-pass filter is constructed using the following formula: The attitude dynamics error vector of the i-th spacecraft is constructed using the following formula:
7. The multi-spacecraft safety cooperative control method according to claim 6, characterized in that: The spacecraft attitude controller obtains the original state vector of the system using the following formula: The relationship between the damaged system state and the original system state is used to remodel the spacecraft mathematical model (4) for controller design; in: Since the function θ in the deception attack i (t) is unknown, so the function in the remodeled spacecraft attitude model is and All unknown; By processing the unknown function, we get: Among them, σ i,1 (ο i )≥1 is an unknown function that satisfies is an unknown function, is the function σ i,1 (ο i ) has an unknown upper bound; Since some functions in the spacecraft model are unknown due to deception attacks, a fuzzy logic system is introduced: in, is an unknown function, is the fuzzy parameter vector, is a nonlinear function vector that satisfies: in yes Membership function, s = 1, 2; The adaptive fuzzy update law is: in, is δ i,1 =max{||θ i,1 || 2 }, γ i and C i All are unknown parameters; The second virtual controller is constructed using the following formula: Among them, k i,2 is the second virtual controller gain is a nonlinear function vector that satisfies: in, yes Membership function, s=1,2.
8. The multi-spacecraft safety collaborative control method according to claim 1, characterized in that: In S4, an actual spacecraft controller is established, and its specific formula is: you i =N(x i )a i,2 in: sin(a2χ i (t)) And a1 and a2 are design parameters.
Citation Information
Patent Citations
Distributed index time varying slip mode posture cooperation tracking control method
CN103439975A
Multi-spacecraft consistent dynamic gain control method
CN110456807A
Networked spacecraft attitude control method based on hybrid forced observer
CN112363522A
Self-adaptive attitude tracking control and parameter identification method for service-oriented spacecraft
CN115629550A
Fixed-time elastic control method and device for resisting spoofing attack
CN118249704A
Cited By
Multi-spacecraft grouping consistency containment control method and device under optimized FLS
CN122343816A
Optimized multi-spacecraft formation keeping control method and device under FLS
CN122343816B
