Network access system and method based on zero-trust gateway and storage medium
By implementing dual security verification policies and storage of non-domain name resolution results in zero-trust gateway and DNS service clusters, the problem of low security in zero-trust gateway network access is solved, and effective protection of source station addresses is achieved.
Patent Information
- Application Number
- CN202411169242.3
- Authority / Receiving Office
- CN · China
- Patent Type
- Applications(China)
- Current Assignee / Owner
- Filing Date
- 2024-08-23
- Publication Date
- 2024-12-03
- Estimated Expiration
- 2044-08-23
AI Technical Summary
Network access security based on zero-trust gateways is low because attackers can use the intranet DNS service cluster to bypass the gateway and directly attack the source site, resulting in the network access security being compromised.
Using multiple zero-trust gateways and zero-trust DNS service clusters, verify user identity and permissions through the first and second security verification policies, and store non-domain name resolution results in the intranet DNS service cluster to hide the source station address to ensure attacks The user cannot obtain the real source site address.
Improve the security of zero-trust gateway network access, prevent attackers from obtaining the source station address through the intranet DNS service cluster, and enhance the protection of the source station address.
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Figure CN119071058A_ABST
Abstract
Description
Technical Field
[0001] Embodiments of the present application relate to the technical field of communications, and in particular, to a network access system, method, and storage medium based on a zero-trust gateway. Background Art
[0002] The zero-trust gateway is a key component of the zero-trust system. It is usually deployed at the network entrance or the front end of the application service to separate users and resources, enforce access control policies on all traffic, and provide a unified entrance for background applications. The zero-trust gateway integrates authentication, access control, behavior auditing and security protection functions, effectively reducing the risk of attacks and improving employee office experience and business data security. Employees can access internal applications at any time through the zero-trust gateway and no longer rely on network access or VPN (Virtual Private Network) to enter the intranet.
[0003] Since the zero-trust gateway provides a unified entrance for backend applications, the zero-trust gateway needs to assume the responsibility of maintaining the source site addresses of each backend application. It usually adopts manual maintenance or obtains the source address based on the intranet DNS (Domain Name System) service cluster.
[0004] However, manually maintaining the back-to-source address will increase the operation and maintenance pressure, which is not conducive to application access and horizontal expansion. Although the efficiency of obtaining the back-to-source address through the intranet DNS service cluster is higher, there are many source station addresses maintained on the intranet DNS service cluster. Once an attacker breaks through the network boundary, he can use the intranet DNS service cluster to bypass the zero-trust gateway and directly attack the source station, making the network access security based on the zero-trust gateway low. Summary of the invention
[0005] Embodiments of the present application provide a network access system, method, and storage medium based on a zero-trust gateway, aiming to improve the security of network access based on a zero-trust gateway.
[0006] In a first aspect, an embodiment of the present application provides a network access system based on a zero-trust gateway, the system comprising multiple zero-trust gateways, a zero-trust DNS service cluster, and an intranet DNS service cluster, wherein the zero-trust DNS service cluster stores a domain name resolution result corresponding to any target domain name request, the target domain name request is a domain name request for access based on any zero-trust gateway, and the domain name resolution result includes at least one source station address corresponding to the target domain name request;
[0007] Any zero-trust gateway is used to respond to the access operation of the current user, obtain the current target domain name request, and execute a first security verification strategy for verifying the identity information of the current user. When the first security verification strategy passes, the target source station address corresponding to the current target domain name request is obtained in the zero-trust DNS service cluster, and the target source station address corresponding to the current target domain name request is accessed, wherein the target source station address is any source station address in the domain name resolution result corresponding to the current target domain name request;
[0008] When the intranet DNS service cluster responds to any target domain name request, it returns the non-domain name resolution result corresponding to the target domain name request, and the non-domain name resolution result includes the security response policy corresponding to the target domain name request, and the security response policy is used to hide the source site address corresponding to the target domain name request.
[0009] Optionally, when any zero-trust gateway obtains the current target domain name request in response to the access operation of the current user and executes the first security verification policy for verifying the identity information of the current user, the zero-trust gateway is used to:
[0010] In response to an access operation of the current user, obtaining the current target domain name request, and detecting whether the current target domain name request carries the identity information of the current user;
[0011] When the identity information of the current user is carried, whether the identity information of the current user is correct is determined based on the allowed access list maintained by the zero-trust gateway itself and the identity information of the current user; wherein the allowed access list includes the identity information of multiple users respectively.
[0012] Optionally, the access permission list also includes access permissions of the multiple users respectively, and the access permission of any user is used to characterize all target domain name requests that the user is allowed to access. When the identity information of the current user is correct, the zero trust gateway is further used to:
[0013] According to the access permission list, it is determined whether the current user has the access authority requested by the current target domain name.
[0014] Optionally, when the first security verification policy passes, the zero-trust gateway is further used to send a current target domain name request carrying a security identifier of the zero-trust gateway to the zero-trust DNS service cluster;
[0015] The zero-trust DNS service cluster includes multiple zero-trust DNS servers, and a master server among the multiple zero-trust DNS servers is used to execute a second security verification policy for verifying the identity of the zero-trust gateway. When the second security verification policy passes, the master server sends the current target domain name request to the zero-trust DNS server closest to the zero-trust gateway;
[0016] The zero trust DNS server closest to the zero trust gateway is used to resolve the domain name resolution result corresponding to the current target domain name request, and after determining the target source station address corresponding to the current target domain name request in the domain name resolution result, the target source station address is sent to the zero trust gateway.
[0017] Optionally, when the first security verification policy passes, the zero-trust gateway is further used to send a current target domain name request carrying a security identifier of the zero-trust gateway to the zero-trust DNS service cluster;
[0018] The zero-trust DNS service cluster is used to send the current target domain name request to the zero-trust DNS server in the zero-trust DNS service cluster that is closest to the zero-trust gateway based on anycast technology;
[0019] The zero-trust DNS server closest to the zero-trust gateway is used to execute a second security verification policy for verifying the identity of the zero-trust gateway. When the second security verification policy is passed, the domain name resolution result corresponding to the current target domain name request is obtained by parsing, and after determining the target source station address corresponding to the current target domain name request in the domain name resolution result, the target source station address is sent to the zero-trust gateway.
[0020] Optionally, when the domain name resolution result corresponding to the current target domain name request includes multiple source site addresses, the zero trust DNS server closest to the zero trust gateway is used to determine the distance between the devices corresponding to the multiple source site addresses and the zero trust gateway, and uses the source site address closest to the zero trust gateway as the target source site address.
[0021] Optionally, the security response policy corresponding to any target domain name request includes returning an illegal response or returning the address of a security honeypot.
[0022] Optionally, the system also includes a configuration module, which is used to configure the domain name or address of any zero-trust gateway, configure the DNS service of the zero-trust DNS server, and configure the security response policy corresponding to any target domain name request in the intranet DNS service cluster.
[0023] Optionally, the configuration module is also used to configure a domain name or address pointing to the zero trust DNS service cluster for the newly added zero trust gateway in response to the new addition operation of the zero trust gateway.
[0024] Optionally, the configuration module is also used to respond to the addition of a zero-trust DNS server, perform access configuration for the newly added zero-trust DNS server, and store domain name resolution results corresponding to multiple target domain name requests in the newly added zero-trust DNS server.
[0025] Optionally, the configuration module is also used to respond to a new operation of a target domain name request, store the domain name resolution result corresponding to the new target domain name request in the zero-trust DNS service cluster; and change the domain name resolution result corresponding to the new target domain name request in the intranet DNS service cluster to a non-domain name resolution result.
[0026] In a second aspect, an embodiment of the present application provides a network access method based on a zero-trust gateway, which is applied to the network access system based on a zero-trust gateway described in the first aspect of the embodiment, and the method includes:
[0027] Any zero-trust gateway obtains the current target domain name request in response to the access operation of the current user, executes a first security verification policy for verifying the identity information and access rights of the current user, and sends the current target domain name request to the zero-trust DNS service cluster when the first security verification policy passes;
[0028] The zero-trust DNS service cluster resolves and obtains a domain name resolution result corresponding to the current target domain name request, determines a target source station address corresponding to the current target domain name request, and sends the address to the zero-trust gateway;
[0029] After receiving the target source station address, the zero-trust gateway accesses the target source station address.
[0030] In a third aspect, an embodiment of the present application provides a computer-readable storage medium, on which a computer program is stored. When the computer program is executed by a processor, the network access method based on the zero-trust gateway as described in the second aspect of the embodiment is implemented.
[0031] Beneficial effects:
[0032] The present embodiment provides a network access system based on a zero-trust gateway, the system comprising multiple zero-trust gateways, a zero-trust DNS service cluster and an intranet DNS service cluster, the zero-trust DNS service cluster storing a domain name resolution result corresponding to any target domain name request, the target domain name request is a domain name request for access based on any zero-trust gateway, and the domain name resolution result includes at least one source site address corresponding to the target domain name request.
[0033] When any zero-trust gateway responds to the current user's access operation, it obtains the current target domain name request and executes the first security verification policy for verifying the current user's identity information. When the first security verification policy passes, it obtains the target source station address corresponding to the current target domain name request in the zero-trust DNS service cluster, and accesses the target source station address corresponding to the current target domain name request. By verifying the identity information of the current user who initiated the current target domain name request through the zero-trust gateway, attackers can be prevented from accessing the source station address corresponding to the target domain name request through the zero-trust gateway.
[0034] The intranet DNS service cluster no longer stores the real source site address of any target domain name request, but instead stores the non-domain name resolution result of any target domain name request. The non-domain name resolution result includes the security response policy corresponding to the target domain name request. The security response policy is used to hide the source site address corresponding to the target domain name request. When the target domain name request is returned to the source through the intranet DNS service cluster, the real source site address cannot be obtained. Even if an attacker enters the intranet, he cannot obtain the source site address from the intranet DNS service cluster to attack, thereby improving the security of network access based on the zero-trust gateway. BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS
[0035] In order to more clearly illustrate the technical solutions of the embodiments of the present application, the drawings required for use in the description of the embodiments of the present application will be briefly introduced below. Obviously, the drawings described below are only some embodiments of the present application. For ordinary technicians in this field, other drawings can be obtained based on these drawings without paying creative labor.
[0036] Figure 1 This is a schematic diagram of obtaining the source address based on the existing intranet DNS service cluster;
[0037] Figure 2 It is a structural diagram of a network access system based on a zero-trust gateway proposed in an embodiment of the present application;
[0038] Figure 3 It is a flowchart of the steps of a network access method based on a zero-trust gateway provided by an embodiment of the present application;
[0039] Figure 4 It is a schematic diagram of executing a network access method based on a zero-trust gateway proposed in an embodiment of the present application;
[0040] Figure 5 It is a schematic diagram of a computer-readable storage medium proposed in an embodiment of the present application. DETAILED DESCRIPTION
[0041] The following will be combined with the drawings in the embodiments of the present application to clearly and completely describe the technical solutions in the embodiments of the present application. Obviously, the described embodiments are part of the embodiments of the present application, not all of the embodiments. Based on the embodiments in the present application, all other embodiments obtained by ordinary technicians in this field without creative work are within the scope of protection of this application.
[0042] VPN: Virtual Private Network;
[0043] DNS: Domain Name System.
[0044] Compared with traditional gateways, zero-trust gateways integrate authentication and access control security functions on the basis of traditional gateways. As an extended form of gateway, zero-trust gateways need to assume the responsibility of maintaining the source site addresses of various backend applications. Users can access internal applications at any time through the zero-trust gateway, reducing dependence on network access or VPN.
[0045] Usually, manual maintenance or obtaining the source address based on the intranet DNS service cluster is adopted. Manual maintenance of the source address will increase the operation and maintenance pressure, which is not conducive to application access and horizontal expansion. In the method of obtaining the source address based on the intranet DNS service cluster, the mapping relationship between the domain name request and the source station address is maintained in the intranet DNS service cluster.
[0046] Reference Figure 1 , showing a schematic diagram of the existing method of obtaining the source address based on the intranet DNS service cluster. When the zero-trust gateway 1 obtains the user's domain name request 1: site1.example.com, the domain name request 1 is sent to the intranet DNS service cluster. The intranet DNS service cluster maintains all domain name requests and corresponding source station addresses in the intranet. After the intranet DNS service cluster resolves the domain name request 1, it determines the source station address 10.0.0.1 corresponding to the domain name request 1, that is, the IP address (Internet Protocol Address) of the source station and returns it to the zero-trust gateway 1; when the zero-trust gateway 2 obtains the user's domain name request 2: site2.example.com, the intranet DNS service cluster resolves the domain name request 2, determines the source station address 10.0.0.3 corresponding to the domain name request 2, and returns it to the zero-trust gateway 2.
[0047] However, when obtaining the back-to-source address through the intranet DNS service cluster, once the attacker breaks through the network boundary, he can use the intranet DNS service cluster to bypass the zero-trust gateway and directly attack the source station, making the network access security based on the zero-trust gateway low.
[0048] Based on this, an embodiment of the present application provides a network access system based on a zero-trust gateway, which can improve the security of network access based on a zero-trust gateway.
[0049] Reference Figure 2 , shows a schematic diagram of the structure of a network access system based on a zero-trust gateway in an embodiment of the present application, such as Figure 2 The system includes multiple zero-trust gateways, a zero-trust DNS service cluster, and an intranet DNS service cluster.
[0050] Each zero-trust gateway is used to provide users with a network access portal for obtaining users' domain name requests and accessing the source site address corresponding to the domain name requests. Each zero-trust gateway has the functions of identity verification, security protection and application auditing, and has high security. The number of zero-trust gateways can be configured according to the needs of actual applications. This embodiment does not impose any restrictions. Any zero-trust gateway can be used to process domain name requests initiated by users in any area.
[0051] In the actual implementation process, the target domain name request corresponding to the zero-trust gateway can be determined according to business needs. The target domain name request is a domain name request that is configured to be accessible only through the zero-trust gateway. When the domain name request from the user is any target domain name request, the target domain name request will be sent to the zero-trust gateway; for example, enterprise A includes business website 1 and business website 2. The domain name request corresponding to the zero-trust gateway can be set as a domain name request for accessing business website 1. When any user wants to access business website 1, the domain name request for business website 1 will be sent to the zero-trust gateway; in actual applications, the websites that need to be accessed through the zero-trust gateway can be determined according to the needs of the actual application.
[0052] In a feasible implementation, an access permission list is pre-maintained on the zero-trust gateway, and the access permission list maintains the identity information of multiple users allowed to access. When a target domain name request is initiated by any user, the identity information of the current user is first verified.
[0053] When the user initiates a current target domain name request to the zero trust gateway on the device side through an access operation, the current target domain name request carries the identity information of the current user; when the zero trust gateway receives the current target domain name request, it executes the first security verification strategy, which is used to detect the user's identity information.
[0054] Specifically, when executing the first security verification strategy, the zero trust gateway detects whether the target domain name request carries identity information. For example, the identity information can be a cookie or token with a user ID and password. When the target domain name request does not carry identity information, the current user can be prompted to log in, such as displaying a login prompt page on the user's current web page interface.
[0055] When the target domain name request carries identity information, it is matched with the identity information of each user in the allowed access list. If the match is unsuccessful, it indicates that the identity information of the current user is incorrect, and the current user can be prompted to log in again; if the match is successful, it indicates that the identity information of the current user is correct.
[0056] In another feasible implementation, after determining that the identity information of the current user is correct, it is also possible to determine whether the current user has the access rights to the current target domain name request. For example, the access permission list may also include the respective access rights of multiple users, and the access rights of any user are used to represent all target domain name requests that the user is allowed to access.
[0057] After the zero-trust gateway determines that the current user's identity information is correct, it determines whether the current user has permission to access the current target domain name request based on the allowed access list. If the current user does not have permission to access the target domain name request, the current user can be prompted that he does not have this permission, or the current user can be prompted to apply for permission to access the target domain name request, such as displaying a prompt page indicating that he does not have permission or a prompt page for applying for access permission on the user's current web page interface.
[0058] If the current user identity information and access permission verification are passed, the zero trust gateway sends the current target domain name request to the zero trust DNS service cluster to obtain the target source station address corresponding to the current target domain name request.
[0059] After receiving the current target domain name request, the zero-trust gateway verifies the user's identity information and access rights, which can improve the security of accessing the source site address corresponding to the target domain name request. When any attacker attempts to attack the zero-trust gateway, the attacker can be prevented from accessing the source site address corresponding to the target domain name request through the zero-trust gateway due to the limitations of identity information and access rights verification.
[0060] The zero-trust DNS service cluster in this system provides DNS services for multiple zero-trust gateways. The zero-trust DNS service cluster includes multiple zero-trust DNS servers distributed in different geographical locations. Any zero-trust DNS server in the zero-trust DNS service cluster stores domain name resolution results corresponding to multiple target domain name requests. The domain name resolution results include at least one source station address corresponding to the target domain name request. In actual applications, there may be only one source station address corresponding to a target domain name request, or there may be multiple source station addresses.
[0061] In a feasible implementation, in order to further protect the source site address, a second security verification strategy can also be configured between the zero-trust DNS service cluster and multiple zero-trust gateways. The second security verification strategy is used to verify the identity of any zero-trust gateway.
[0062] When any zero-trust gateway sends the current target domain name request to the zero-trust DNS service cluster, the zero-trust DNS service cluster can verify the identity of the zero-trust gateway based on the target domain name request sent by the zero-trust gateway, and then determine whether the target domain name request is a legitimate request, thereby preventing attackers from obtaining the source site address corresponding to any target domain name request by attacking the zero-trust DNS service cluster, further improving the security when accessing the source site address.
[0063] The second security verification strategy between the zero-trust DNS service cluster and multiple zero-trust gateways can be configured according to actual needs. For example, one or more zero-trust gateways can be pre-registered on the zero-trust DNS service cluster, and a unique security identifier can be assigned to each successfully registered zero-trust gateway. When any zero-trust gateway forwards the current target domain name request to the zero-trust DNS service cluster, the forwarded target domain name request carries its own security identifier registered on the zero-trust DNS service cluster.
[0064] When executing the second security verification strategy, the zero-trust DNS service cluster detects whether the received target domain name request carries a security identifier, and then verifies whether the security identifier is the unique security identifier assigned by the zero-trust gateway during registration. If so, the verification passes and the target domain name request can be further parsed. If not, the verification fails and an error prompt can be returned.
[0065] By configuring a second security verification policy between the zero-trust DNS service cluster and multiple zero-trust gateways, attackers can be prevented from bypassing the zero-trust gateway and directly attacking the source site address maintained in the zero-trust DNS service cluster, further improving the security when accessing the source site address.
[0066] In a feasible implementation, since the zero-trust DNS service cluster includes multiple zero-trust DNS servers, and each zero-trust DNS server maintains the same mapping relationship between the target domain name request and the domain name resolution result, the IPs published externally by multiple zero-trust DNS servers are the same, that is, one zero-trust DNS service cluster has one IP.
[0067] In order to improve the efficiency of returning to the source, a selection thread can be set in the zero-trust DNS service cluster. When the zero-trust DNS service cluster receives a target domain name request sent by any zero-trust gateway, it executes the selection thread, determines the zero-trust DNS server closest to the zero-trust gateway based on the pre-maintained setting address of each zero-trust gateway and the setting address of each zero-trust DNS server, and sends the target domain name request to the zero-trust DNS server closest to the zero-trust gateway, so that the zero-trust DNS server closest to the zero-trust gateway resolves the target domain name request, determines the target source station address corresponding to the current target domain name request, and sends it to the zero-trust gateway.
[0068] In the actual implementation process, a master server can be determined among multiple zero-trust DNS servers in the zero-trust DNS service cluster, and the second security verification policy and selection thread between the zero-trust DNS service cluster and multiple zero-trust gateways can be set on the master server.
[0069] The zero-trust gateway can first send the current target domain name request to the primary server. The primary server will first perform the second security verification strategy on the current target domain name request. When the second security verification strategy passes, the primary server will send the current target domain name request to the zero-trust DNS server closest to the zero-trust gateway. The primary server can also monitor the failure status of multiple zero-trust DNS servers in the zero-trust DNS service cluster in real time to ensure that the selected zero-trust DNS server is the closest and healthy zero-trust DNS server to the zero-trust gateway.
[0070] In the actual implementation process, the zero-trust DNS service cluster can also accelerate DNS responses through technologies such as Anycast, that is, the current target domain name request is sent to the zero-trust DNS server closest to the zero-trust gateway in the zero-trust DNS service cluster, and then the zero-trust DNS server closest to the zero-trust gateway executes the second security verification policy. When the second security verification policy passes, the zero-trust DNS server closest to the zero-trust gateway resolves the target domain name request.
[0071] In this embodiment, the target domain name request is resolved by selecting a zero-trust DNS server closest to the zero-trust gateway in the zero-trust DNS service cluster, and the target source station address corresponding to the target domain name request is determined, thereby improving the efficiency of DNS back-to-source. The closest distance referred to in this embodiment refers to the minimum physical communication distance between the zero-trust DNS server and the zero-trust gateway.
[0072] For example, there is a zero-trust DNS server in Beijing and Shanghai. When the zero-trust gateway serving Beijing sends the target domain name request to the zero-trust DNS service cluster, the zero-trust DNS server in Beijing in the zero-trust DNS service cluster will be given priority to provide domain name resolution services. If the zero-trust DNS server in Beijing fails or goes offline, the zero-trust DNS server in the zero-trust DNS service cluster that is closest to the zero-trust gateway serving Beijing can be selected to provide domain name resolution services.
[0073] Furthermore, since the domain name resolution results corresponding to some target domain name requests may include multiple source station addresses, in order to further improve the efficiency of returning to the source, when the domain name resolution results corresponding to the target domain name request include multiple source station addresses, the zero-trust DNS server that resolves the target domain name request can determine the setting addresses of the devices corresponding to the multiple source station addresses, and select the source station address closest to the zero-trust gateway that received the target domain name request as the target source station address to return, that is, return to the source nearby.
[0074] If the current target domain name request is not found in the zero-trust DNS server that resolves the target domain name request, the domain name resolution result representing the target domain name request is not pre-configured in the zero-trust DNS service cluster. Therefore, the zero-trust DNS server that resolves the target domain name request can return a resolution failure response to the zero-trust gateway.
[0075] Because the domain name resolution result corresponding to the target domain name request is maintained in the zero-trust DNS service cluster, the domain name resolution result corresponding to the target domain name request previously maintained in the intranet DNS service cluster needs to be deleted or replaced to prevent the attacker from attacking the source station address of the target domain name request in the intranet DNS service cluster after attacking the intranet.
[0076] In a feasible implementation, non-domain name resolution results can be configured for target domain name requests in an intranet DNS service cluster, that is, the intranet DNS service cluster stores non-domain name resolution results corresponding to each target domain name request, and the non-domain name resolution result of any target domain name request includes a security response policy corresponding to the target domain name request, and the security response policy is used to hide the source site address corresponding to the target domain name request; when the intranet DNS service cluster responds to a target domain name request from an attacker, the security response policy can be executed, so that the attacker who breaks through the network boundary cannot obtain the source site address corresponding to the target domain name request in the intranet DNS service cluster.
[0077] This system stores the source site address corresponding to any target domain name request in a separate zero-trust DNS service cluster, and stores the non-domain name resolution result corresponding to any target domain name request in the intranet DNS service cluster. The non-domain name resolution result corresponding to any target domain name request includes a security response policy but does not include the source site address, that is, the source site addresses of multiple target domain name requests are hidden in the intranet DNS service cluster. Therefore, after any zero-trust gateway obtains the user's current target domain name request, the target source site address corresponding to the current target domain name request can be obtained in the zero-trust DNS service cluster, and the target source site address corresponding to the current target domain name request can be accessed.
[0078] The intranet DNS service cluster only stores the non-domain name resolution results corresponding to multiple target domain name requests, hiding the domain name resolution results corresponding to multiple target domain name requests that are already maintained by the zero-trust DNS service cluster. Even if an attacker enters the intranet, he or she cannot obtain the source station address corresponding to the target domain name request from the intranet DNS service cluster to attack. When the source station address of the target domain name request is obtained based on the intranet DNS service cluster, a security response strategy for hiding the source station address corresponding to the target domain name request will be executed, thereby improving the security of network access based on the zero-trust gateway.
[0079] In a feasible implementation, the system further includes a configuration module, which is used to build a system that provides zero-trust services and to modify or edit zero-trust services.
[0080] In the actual implementation process, building a network access system based on a zero-trust gateway can include the following steps:
[0081] A1: Build a group of zero-trust DNS servers in the intranet to form a zero-trust DNS service cluster.
[0082] The number of zero-trust DNS servers in a zero-trust DNS service cluster can be customized according to actual application needs.
[0083] A2: Based on the configuration module, configure the zero-trust gateway and zero-trust DNS service cluster.
[0084] The configuration module configures the DNS service of the zero-trust DNS service cluster in response to the access control configuration operation of the zero-trust DNS service cluster, including configuring a zero-trust gateway object for the zero-trust DNS service cluster to provide DNS services, and configuring domain name resolution results of multiple target domain name requests in the zero-trust DNS service cluster.
[0085] Specifically, access control of the zero-trust DNS service cluster is performed through ACL (Access Control List) and other methods. ACL is a list of instructions applied to the router interface. These instruction lists are used to configure which data packets of the zero-trust gateway can be received and which data packets need to be rejected. As for whether the data packet is received or rejected, it can be determined by specific indication conditions such as source address, destination address, port number, etc. The zero-trust gateway for which the zero-trust DNS service cluster provides DNS service can be determined through ACL. For example, the IP or domain name of the zero-trust gateway that the zero-trust DNS service cluster can receive can be configured through ACL, so that the zero-trust DNS service cluster can provide DNS service for the zero-trust gateway. In other implementation methods, other methods can also be used to configure access control of the zero-trust DNS service cluster.
[0086] Then, through the configuration module, the domain name resolution results of multiple target domain name requests can be configured in the zero-trust DNS service cluster. The domain name resolution results of multiple target domain name requests can be stored on all zero-trust DNS servers in the zero-trust DNS service cluster; the source station address included in the domain name resolution result of a target domain name request can be one or more. When accessing, you only need to select one source station address in the domain name resolution result as the target source station address.
[0087] A3: Configure multiple zero-trust gateways.
[0088] In addition to configuring the DNS service of the zero-trust DNS service cluster, it is also necessary to configure the domain name or IP of each zero-trust gateway so that each zero-trust gateway can point to the zero-trust DNS service cluster.
[0089] For example, assuming that the IP address of a zero-trust gateway should be configured as 10.100.100.100, it can be configured in the following two ways:
[0090] 1) Change the DNS of the zero-trust gateway host to 10.100.100.100;
[0091] 2) Modify the DNS of the zero-trust gateway service. Taking NGINX as an example, add the configuration item "resolver10.100.100.100valid=60s;". This configuration means that the DNS resolution result is updated every 60 seconds based on the response of 10.100.100.100.
[0092] Furthermore, the configuration module can determine target domain name requests for access through multiple zero-trust gateways in response to the access control configuration operation of the zero-trust gateway.
[0093] A4: Modify the domain name resolution results of multiple target domain name requests stored in the intranet DNS service cluster.
[0094] For target domain name requests whose domain name resolution results have been published on the zero-trust DNS service cluster, the domain name resolution results stored in the intranet DNS service cluster are deleted or modified to hide the source station address of the target domain name on the intranet DNS service cluster. For example, the domain name resolution result corresponding to the target domain name request in the intranet DNS service cluster can be changed to a non-domain name resolution result, and the non-domain name resolution result includes a security response policy corresponding to the target domain name request.
[0095] For any target domain name request, the corresponding security response policy can be set to return an illegal response, such as NX Domain, which indicates a resolution failure, or 127.0.0.1.
[0096] For any target domain name request, its corresponding security response policy can also be set to return the address of the security honeypot. The security honeypot is a network active defense technology that builds a simulated system or service to deceive attackers, induce attacks, increase the cost of attacks, and reduce security threats to the actual system or service. For example, a security honeypot can be a service, a web page, a database, or a complete operating system, or even a monitored file. During the process of the honeypot being invaded, the attacker's attack traffic, behavior, and data will be recorded and audited in real time. That is, the intranet DNS service cluster will return the address of the security honeypot for subsequent target domain name requests, thereby guiding the attacker to access the security honeypot and providing data or evidence support for security tracing.
[0097] In other implementations, the security response policy corresponding to any target domain name request may also adopt other methods according to actual application requirements, as long as the domain name resolution result corresponding to the target domain name request can be hidden.
[0098] Reference Figure 3, shows a flowchart of the steps of a network access method based on a zero-trust gateway provided by the present application, the method is applied to the network access system based on a zero-trust gateway described in this embodiment, and the method specifically includes the following steps:
[0099] S101: Any zero-trust gateway responds to the current user's access operation, obtains the current target domain name request, executes a first security verification policy for verifying the identity information of the current user, and when the first security verification policy passes, sends the current target domain name request to the zero-trust DNS service cluster.
[0100] Any target domain name request is a domain name request that is configured to be accessible only through the zero trust gateway; for example, the current target domain name request may be site1.example.com.
[0101] When the zero-trust gateway receives the current target domain name request, it executes a first security verification strategy for detecting the identity information of the current user. The first security verification strategy may also include determining whether the current user has access rights to access the current target domain name request.
[0102] Specifically, the identity information and access rights of the current user are verified according to the access permission list maintained by the zero-trust gateway itself and the identity information carried in the current target domain name request. If the current user's identity information and access rights are verified, that is, the first security verification policy is passed, the zero-trust gateway sends the target domain name request to the zero-trust DNS service cluster to obtain the source site address corresponding to the target domain name request.
[0103] Based on the user verification and security protection functions of the zero-trust gateway, when any target domain name request does not carry identity information, the current user identity information is incorrect, and the current user's access rights fail to pass the verification, the zero-trust gateway will not send the current target domain name request to the zero-trust DNS service cluster. At this time, the source station address corresponding to the target domain name request cannot be obtained through the zero-trust gateway, which can improve the security of accessing the source station address corresponding to the target domain name request, making it difficult for attackers to access the source station address through the zero-trust gateway.
[0104] S102: The zero-trust DNS service cluster resolves and obtains a domain name resolution result corresponding to the current target domain name request, determines a target source site address corresponding to the current target domain name request, and sends the address to the zero-trust gateway.
[0105] Specifically, any zero-trust DNS server in the zero-trust DNS service cluster can execute a second security verification policy after receiving the current target domain name request sent by the zero-trust gateway. When the second security verification policy passes, it parses the domain name resolution result corresponding to the current target domain name request and sends it to the zero-trust gateway.
[0106] However, in order to improve the efficiency of returning to the source, a main server can be set up in the zero-trust DNS service cluster, and the main server executes the second security verification strategy to determine whether the current target domain name request sent by the zero-trust gateway carries a security identifier and verify the security identifier.
[0107] When the main server determines that the second security verification policy passes, it executes the selection thread and sends the current target domain name request to the zero trust DNS server closest to the zero trust gateway, so that the zero trust DNS server closest to the zero trust gateway resolves the current target domain name request.
[0108] Alternatively, the zero-trust DNS service cluster can adopt Anycast technology to accelerate DNS response. That is, when the current target domain name request is routed between multiple zero-trust DNS servers in the zero-trust DNS service cluster, the current target domain name request is first sent to the zero-trust DNS server closest to the zero-trust gateway based on Anycast technology. The zero-trust DNS server executes the second security verification strategy, that is, verifies the security identifier in the current target domain name request. When the second security verification strategy passes, the zero-trust DNS server resolves the current target domain name request.
[0109] When any zero-trust DNS server resolves and obtains the domain name resolution result corresponding to the current target domain name request, if there is only one source site address in the domain name resolution result, the source site address is the target source site address corresponding to the current target domain name request.
[0110] Since the domain name resolution results corresponding to some target domain name requests include multiple source site addresses, in order to further improve the efficiency of returning to the source, when the domain name resolution results include multiple source site addresses, determine the setting addresses of the devices corresponding to the multiple source site addresses, select the source site address of the device closest to the zero trust gateway as the target source site address corresponding to the current target domain name request, and finally return the target source site address to the zero trust gateway.
[0111] If the current target domain name request is not found in the zero-trust DNS service cluster, the domain name resolution result representing the target domain name request is not pre-configured in the zero-trust DNS service cluster. Therefore, the zero-trust DNS server responsible for resolving the current target domain name request can return a resolution failure response.
[0112] S103: After receiving the target source station address, the zero-trust gateway accesses the target source station address.
[0113] When the zero-trust gateway receives the target source site address corresponding to the current target domain name request returned by the zero-trust DNS server, it can access it according to the target source site address.
[0114] In a feasible implementation manner, the method further comprises the following steps:
[0115] S104: When the intranet DNS service cluster responds to any target domain name request, it obtains a non-domain name resolution result corresponding to the target domain name request, and executes a security response policy in the non-domain name resolution result.
[0116] In the process of building the system, for the target domain name request whose domain name resolution result has been published on the zero-trust DNS service cluster, the domain name resolution result stored in the intranet DNS service cluster is deleted or modified, hiding the source station address of the target domain name on the intranet DNS service cluster; and the user's target domain name request is based on the domain name request processed by the zero-trust gateway. The zero-trust gateway will forward any target domain name request directly to the zero-trust DNS service cluster for resolution and return to the source, that is, the target domain name request is not based on the intranet DNS service cluster to achieve address return to the source; if the intranet DNS service cluster responds to any target domain name request at this time, it may be a sign that the attacker has broken through the network boundary and there is a security risk that any source station address may be attacked.
[0117] When the intranet DNS service cluster responds to any target domain name request, it obtains the non-domain name resolution result corresponding to the target domain name request, and executes the security response policy in the non-domain name resolution result. For example, when the security response policy is to return an illegal response, the intranet DNS service cluster returns NX Domain, or 127.0.0.1, etc., which indicates a resolution failure; when the security response policy is to return the address of a security honeypot, the intranet DNS service cluster returns the address of the security honeypot to guide the attacker into the security honeypot, record and audit the attacker's attack traffic, behavior and data in real time, and provide data or evidence support for security tracing.
[0118] Reference Figure 4 , shows a schematic diagram of executing the network access method based on the zero-trust gateway provided in an embodiment of the present application, Figure 4The figure shows two zero-trust gateways in the system: Zero-trust Gateway 1 and Zero-trust Gateway 2, a zero-trust DNS service cluster, and an intranet DNS service cluster. When Zero-trust Gateway 1 sends a target domain name request 1: site1.example.com to the Zero-trust DNS service cluster, the Zero-trust DNS service cluster obtains the domain name resolution result 1 corresponding to the target domain name request 1. The domain name resolution result 1 includes two source station addresses: 10.0.0.1 and 10.0.0.2. The Zero-trust DNS service cluster returns the source station address 10.0.0.1 closest to Zero-trust Gateway 1 in the domain name resolution result 1 as the target source station address to Zero-trust Gateway 1.
[0119] like Figure 4 When Zero Trust Gateway 2 sends target domain name request 2: site2.example.com to the Zero Trust DNS service cluster, the Zero Trust DNS service cluster obtains the domain name resolution result 2 corresponding to the target domain name request 2. The domain name resolution result 2 includes two source station addresses: 10.0.0.3 and 10.0.0.4. The Zero Trust DNS service cluster returns the source station address 10.0.0.3 closest to Zero Trust Gateway 2 in the domain name resolution result 2 as the target source station address to Zero Trust Gateway 2.
[0120] like Figure 4 When the intranet DNS service cluster responds to the target domain name request 1: site1.example.com, the target domain name request 1 may be initiated directly to the intranet DNS service cluster by the attacker through the attack software. At this time, the intranet DNS service cluster executes the security response policy corresponding to the target domain name request 1 and returns the response corresponding to the target domain name request 1 as 127.0.0.1.
[0121] like Figure 4 When the intranet DNS service cluster responds to the target domain name request 2, the target domain name request 2 may be initiated directly to the intranet DNS service cluster by the attacker through the attack software. At this time, the intranet DNS service cluster executes the security response policy corresponding to the target domain name request 2 and returns the response corresponding to the target domain name request 2 as NX Domain.
[0122] Zero Trust Gateway 1 and Zero Trust Gateway 2 will send the target domain name request initiated by the user to the Zero Trust DNS service cluster for back-to-source. Other non-target domain name requests can still be sent to the intranet DNS service cluster for back-to-source. Even if the attacker attacks the Zero Trust Gateway and obtains the target domain name request directly from the intranet DNS service cluster through the Zero Trust Gateway, the real source station address of the target domain name request cannot be obtained because the intranet DNS service cluster maintains the non-domain name resolution result of the target domain name request.
[0123] In a feasible implementation, during the system application process, it is also allowed to expand the zero-trust gateway, zero-trust DNS server, and modify the security response policy corresponding to any target domain name request in the intranet DNS service cluster; it can be based on the configuration module in the system, and the configuration module is used to configure the domain name of any zero-trust gateway, configure the DNS service of the zero-trust DNS server, and configure the security response policy corresponding to any target domain name request in the intranet DNS service cluster.
[0124] Specifically, the configuration module is used to respond to the new operation of the zero-trust gateway, configure the new zero-trust gateway with a domain name or address pointing to the zero-trust DNS service cluster, thereby providing DNS services for the new zero-trust gateway, which has the effect of horizontally expanding the zero-trust gateway.
[0125] The configuration module is used to respond to the addition of a zero-trust DNS server, perform access configuration for the newly added zero-trust DNS server, and store domain name resolution results corresponding to multiple target domain name requests in the newly added zero-trust DNS server, so that a new zero-trust DNS server can be added to the zero-trust DNS cluster to provide better and faster DNS services.
[0126] The configuration module is used to respond to the new operation of the target domain name request, store the domain name resolution result corresponding to the new target domain name request in the zero-trust DNS service cluster; and change the domain name resolution result corresponding to the new target domain name request in the intranet DNS service cluster to a non-domain name resolution result, so that different applications and source stations can be flexibly added.
[0127] The system provided in this embodiment realizes the return to the source of domain name requests based on a zero-trust gateway and a zero-trust DNS service cluster, and the zero-trust gateway verifies the user identity and authority of the target domain name request by executing a first security verification strategy, and the zero-trust DNS server in the zero-trust DNS service cluster verifies the identity of the zero-trust gateway based on a second security verification strategy. Through double verification, attackers are prevented from obtaining the source station address corresponding to any target domain name request by attacking the zero-trust gateway and the zero-trust DNS service cluster, thereby further improving the security of the source station address.
[0128] At the same time, the domain name resolution result of the target domain name request in the intranet DNS service cluster is modified, that is, a non-domain name resolution result is configured for the target domain name request in the intranet DNS service cluster, hiding the real source station address of the target domain name request in the intranet DNS service cluster.
[0129] This system can effectively protect the security of the real source station address in the intranet DNS service cluster in the zero-trust service, and reduce the risk of the intranet DNS service cluster being maliciously attacked by attackers; at the same time, it can also expand the zero-trust gateway and zero-trust DNS service cluster that provide zero-trust services, thereby providing better and faster DNS services back to the source; and compared to statically configuring the source station address corresponding to the domain name request in the gateway, obtaining the source station address by parsing the target domain name request can reduce the gateway operation and maintenance cost, and determining the nearest zero-trust DNS server and the nearest source station address can improve the efficiency of back to the source.
[0130] Reference Figure 5 , shows a schematic diagram of a computer-readable storage medium provided in an embodiment of the present application, wherein the computer-readable storage medium 500 stores a computer program 501, and when the computer program 501 is executed by a processor, the network access method based on the zero-trust gateway as described in the embodiment is implemented.
[0131] The various embodiments in this specification are described in a progressive manner, and each embodiment focuses on the differences from other embodiments. The same or similar parts between the various embodiments can be referenced to each other.
[0132] Those skilled in the art will appreciate that the embodiments of the present application can be provided as methods, devices, or computer program products. Therefore, the present application can adopt the form of a complete hardware embodiment, a complete software embodiment, or an embodiment in combination with software and hardware. Moreover, the present application can adopt the form of a computer program product implemented on one or more computer-usable storage media (including but not limited to disk storage, CD-ROM, optical storage, etc.) containing computer-usable program code.
[0133] The embodiments of the present application are described with reference to the flowcharts and / or block diagrams of the methods, terminal devices (systems), and computer program products according to the embodiments of the present application. It should be understood that each process and / or box in the flowchart and / or block diagram, as well as the combination of the processes and / or boxes in the flowchart and / or block diagram, can be implemented by computer program instructions. These computer program instructions can be provided to a processor of a general-purpose computer, a special-purpose computer, an embedded processor, or other programmable data processing terminal device to generate a machine, so that the instructions executed by the processor of the computer or other programmable data processing terminal device generate instructions for implementing the processes in the flowchart and / or block diagram. Figure 1 A process or multiple processes and / or boxes Figure 1 A device that provides the functions specified in a block or multiple blocks.
[0134] These computer program instructions may also be stored in a computer-readable memory capable of directing a computer or other programmable data processing terminal device to operate in a specific manner, so that the instructions stored in the computer-readable memory produce a manufactured product including an instruction device, which implements the process Figure 1 A process or multiple processes and / or boxes Figure 1 A function specified in one or more boxes.
[0135] These computer program instructions can also be loaded onto a computer or other programmable data processing terminal device so that a series of operating steps are executed on the computer or other programmable terminal device to produce a computer-implemented process, thereby providing instructions for executing on the computer or other programmable terminal device to implement the process. Figure 1 A process or multiple processes and / or boxes Figure 1 A step that specifies a function in one or more boxes.
[0136] Although the preferred embodiments of the present application have been described, those skilled in the art may make additional changes and modifications to these embodiments once they have learned the basic creative concept. Therefore, the appended claims are intended to be interpreted as including the preferred embodiments and all changes and modifications that fall within the scope of the embodiments of the present application.
[0137] Finally, it should be noted that, in this article, relational terms such as first and second, etc. are only used to distinguish one entity or operation from another entity or operation, and do not necessarily require or imply any such actual relationship or order between these entities or operations. Moreover, the terms "include", "comprise" or any other variants thereof are intended to cover non-exclusive inclusion, so that a process, method, article or terminal device including a series of elements includes not only those elements, but also other elements not explicitly listed, or also includes elements inherent to such process, method, article or terminal device. In the absence of further restrictions, the elements defined by the sentence "comprise a ..." do not exclude the existence of other identical elements in the process, method, article or terminal device including the elements.
[0138] Specific examples are used herein to illustrate the principles and implementation methods of the present application. The description of the above embodiments is only used to help understand the method of the present application and its core idea. At the same time, for those skilled in the art, according to the idea of the present application, there will be changes in the specific implementation methods and application scope. In summary, the content of this specification should not be understood as a limitation on the present application.
Claims
1. A network access system based on a zero-trust gateway, characterized in that: The system includes multiple zero-trust gateways, a zero-trust DNS service cluster, and an intranet DNS service cluster. The zero-trust DNS service cluster stores a domain name resolution result corresponding to any target domain name request, the target domain name request is a domain name request for access based on any zero-trust gateway, and the domain name resolution result includes at least one source station address corresponding to the target domain name request; Any zero-trust gateway is used to respond to the access operation of the current user, obtain the current target domain name request, and execute a first security verification strategy for verifying the identity information of the current user. When the first security verification strategy passes, the target source station address corresponding to the current target domain name request is obtained in the zero-trust DNS service cluster, and the target source station address corresponding to the current target domain name request is accessed, wherein the target source station address is any source station address in the domain name resolution result corresponding to the current target domain name request; When the intranet DNS service cluster responds to any target domain name request, it obtains the non-domain name resolution result corresponding to the target domain name request, and the non-domain name resolution result includes the security response policy corresponding to the target domain name request, and the security response policy is used to hide the source site address corresponding to the target domain name request.
2. The system according to claim 1, characterized in that When any zero-trust gateway responds to the access operation of the current user, obtains the current target domain name request, and executes the first security verification policy for verifying the identity information of the current user, the zero-trust gateway is used to: In response to an access operation of the current user, obtaining the current target domain name request, and detecting whether the current target domain name request carries the identity information of the current user; When the identity information of the current user is carried, whether the identity information of the current user is correct is determined based on the allowed access list maintained by the zero-trust gateway itself and the identity information of the current user; wherein the allowed access list includes the identity information of multiple users respectively.
3. The system according to claim 2, characterized in that The access permission list also includes the access permissions of the multiple users respectively, and the access permission of any user is used to represent all target domain name requests that the user is allowed to access; when the identity information of the current user is correct, the zero trust gateway is also used to: According to the access permission list, it is determined whether the current user has the access authority requested by the current target domain name.
4. The system according to claim 1, characterized in that When the first security verification strategy passes, the zero-trust gateway is further used to send a current target domain name request carrying a security identifier of the zero-trust gateway to the zero-trust DNS service cluster; The zero-trust DNS service cluster includes multiple zero-trust DNS servers, and a master server among the multiple zero-trust DNS servers is used to execute a second security verification policy for verifying the identity of the zero-trust gateway. When the second security verification policy passes, the master server sends the current target domain name request to the zero-trust DNS server closest to the zero-trust gateway; The zero trust DNS server closest to the zero trust gateway is used to resolve the domain name resolution result corresponding to the current target domain name request, and after determining the target source station address corresponding to the current target domain name request in the domain name resolution result, the target source station address is sent to the zero trust gateway.
5. The system according to claim 1, characterized in that When the first security verification strategy passes, the zero-trust gateway is further used to send a current target domain name request carrying a security identifier of the zero-trust gateway to the zero-trust DNS service cluster; The zero-trust DNS service cluster is used to send the current target domain name request to the zero-trust DNS server in the zero-trust DNS service cluster that is closest to the zero-trust gateway based on anycast technology; The zero-trust DNS server closest to the zero-trust gateway is used to execute a second security verification policy to verify the identity of the zero-trust gateway. When the second security verification policy passes, the domain name resolution result corresponding to the current target domain name request is obtained by parsing, and after determining the target source station address corresponding to the current target domain name request in the domain name resolution result, the target source station address is sent to the zero-trust gateway.
6. The system according to claim 4 or 5, characterized in that: When the domain name resolution result corresponding to the current target domain name request includes multiple source site addresses, the zero trust DNS server closest to the zero trust gateway is used to determine the distance between the devices corresponding to the multiple source site addresses and the zero trust gateway, and uses the source site address closest to the zero trust gateway as the target source site address.
7. The system according to claim 1, characterized in that The security response strategy corresponding to any target domain name request includes returning an illegal response or returning the address of a security honeypot.
8. The system according to claim 1, characterized in that The system also includes a configuration module, which is used to configure the domain name or address of any zero-trust gateway, configure the DNS service of the zero-trust DNS server, and configure the security response policy corresponding to any target domain name request in the intranet DNS service cluster.
9. The system according to claim 8, characterized in that The configuration module is also used to configure a domain name or address pointing to the zero trust DNS service cluster for the newly added zero trust gateway in response to the new addition operation of the zero trust gateway.
10. The system according to claim 8, characterized in that The configuration module is also used to respond to the new addition operation of the zero-trust DNS server, perform access configuration for the new zero-trust DNS server, and store domain name resolution results corresponding to multiple target domain name requests in the new zero-trust DNS server.
11. The system according to claim 8, characterized in that The configuration module is also used to respond to the new operation of the target domain name request and store the domain name resolution result corresponding to the newly added target domain name request in the zero-trust DNS service cluster; And the domain name resolution result corresponding to the newly added target domain name request in the intranet DNS service cluster is changed to a non-domain name resolution result.
12. A network access method based on a zero-trust gateway, characterized in that: The method applied to the network access system based on zero-trust gateway according to any one of claims 1 to 11 comprises: Any zero-trust gateway obtains the current target domain name request in response to the access operation of the current user, executes a first security verification strategy for verifying the identity information of the current user, and sends the current target domain name request to the zero-trust DNS service cluster when the first security verification strategy passes; The zero-trust DNS service cluster resolves and obtains a domain name resolution result corresponding to the current target domain name request, determines a target source site address corresponding to the current target domain name request, and sends the address to the zero-trust gateway; After receiving the target source station address, the zero-trust gateway accesses the target source station address.
13. A computer-readable storage medium, characterized in that: The computer-readable storage medium stores a computer program, and when the computer program is executed by the processor, it implements the network access method based on the zero-trust gateway as described in claim 12.
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