Anonymous decentration computing system and method based on group appointment
By introducing anonymity and traceability mechanism based on group combination contracts in the decentralized computing system, the problems of node identity exposure and Byzantine node attacks are solved by using group signatures and polynomial time algorithms, and anonymity and Byzantine fault tolerance are achieved. The improvement of the system enhances the credibility and security of the system.
Patent Information
- Application Number
- CN202411203594.6
- Authority / Receiving Office
- CN · China
- Patent Type
- Applications(China)
- Current Assignee / Owner
- Filing Date
- 2024-08-30
- Publication Date
- 2024-12-06
- Estimated Expiration
- 2044-08-30
AI Technical Summary
The existing decentralized computing system has credibility problems in node identity exposure and Byzantine node attacks, and cannot effectively tolerate a large number of Byzantine nodes, resulting in system failure and requires the participation of trusted institutions.
Adopt anonymous decentralized computing system based on group combination contracts, using group signatures and polynomial time algorithms to achieve anonymity and traceability, and use InitializeGroup, RegisterUser, Trace and Revoke functions to perform user registration, authentication and maliciousness on the blockchain. Node tracking ensures the system's anonymity and Byzantine fault tolerance.
It realizes ensuring node anonymity and Byzantine fault tolerance, resisting fake attacks, and enhancing the trustworthiness and security of the system without relying on trusted third parties.
Smart Images

Figure CN119089470A_ABST
Abstract
Description
Technical Field
[0001] The present invention relates to the field of distributed learning technology, and in particular to an anonymous decentralized computing system and a computing method based on a group contract. Background Art
[0002] At present, research on distributed learning focuses on two methods: federated learning (client-parameter server mode) and decentralized computing. Compared with federated learning, all nodes in decentralized computing are treated equally, and information exchange does not require the intervention of parameter servers. However, if the identity of the node is exposed, the nodes participating in decentralized computing may cause problems.
[0003] In the existing technology, identity privacy is protected by changing the virtual identity every time the user participates in a new learning process, or even in different iterations of the same process. However, this solution cannot track malicious nodes that disrupt the training process, which leads to credibility issues for the entire system. In addition, decentralized computing can only tolerate a limited number of Byzantine nodes, such as SPDL (a decentralized computing system that supports security and privacy in blockchain), which can only allow Byzantine nodes to be less than 33%. If the node registration is not properly managed, the opponent may launch a fake attack and create a large number of Byzantine nodes that exceed this limit, causing the system to fail. In addition, decentralized architecture is also an issue worth considering. At present, the solutions to the above problems require the participation of trusted institutions. Summary of the invention
[0004] In order to overcome the above problems existing in the prior art, the present invention proposes an anonymous decentralized computing system and a computing method based on a group contract.
[0005] The technical solution adopted by the present invention to solve its technical problem is: an anonymous decentralized computing system based on group contracts, including a group contract, wherein the group contract uses a group signature to protect the anonymity of individual group members while allowing traceability within the group, and uses a polynomial time algorithm to represent the group signature function, GroupSig def = (Setup, Join, Sign, Verify, Open, Revoke); the group contract specifically includes the following functions: InitializeGroup, Register User , CountVote, Trace and Revoke, where CountVote is an internal function and is only used in tracking and revocation to check and enumerate non-duplicate votes; InitializeGroup, Register User , Trace and Revoke are public functions; InitializeGroup, Register UserThe codes of , CountVote, Trace, and Revoke are protected by TEE-DS in encrypted form, and the staff interacts with it securely, obtains the encrypted code and decrypts it in TEE.
[0006] In the anonymous decentralized computing system based on group contracts, InitializeGroup is used to initialize a group and generate key parameters required for the remaining functions; it accepts security parameters λ and PubKey DS As input, where PubKey DS is the public key used by TEE-DS to encrypt data;
[0007] Specifically: InitializeGroup calls GroupSig.Setup, which takes 1 λ Generates a group public key gp as input k and a group management private key gmsk; generate the signing key (pk c ,sk c ), and use PubKeyDS to pair gmsk and sk c Encryption; InitializeGroup output gp k , pk c , Enc_gmsk and Enc_sk c .
[0008] The above-mentioned anonymous decentralized computing system based on group contracts, the Register User Function used for user registration; requires cred i and where cred i is the user's certificate, is the user's public key;
[0009] Specifically: For user X i , first verify the user's cred i , using the GroupSig.Join algorithm for X i Generate group private key gsk i and group member identity information (i, A i ); Output usage Encrypted encryption key Enc_gsk i To ensure that except for the owner X i No one else can access the key.
[0010] In the above anonymous decentralized computing system based on group contracts, the Trace function is used to track malicious users. First, the Trace function calls the CountVote function to enumerate the votes of other users. If the number of votes exceeds the predefined threshold h, GroupSig.Open is used to generate the identity parameter A of the malicious user X′*i according to the private key gmsk of the group manager and the group signature σ′*G. i ; Blockchain enables all users to gain access to i The corresponding label i;
[0011] The Revoke function is used to invalidate the malicious user with label i. After calling the CountVote function to count the votes of the remaining users, if the specified threshold h is exceeded, the Revoke function updates the Acc parameter of the dynamic accumulator with the help of the GroupSig.Revoke algorithm, indicating that user X i Expired.
[0012] An anonymous decentralized computing method based on a group contract, using the above-mentioned anonymous decentralized computing system based on a group contract, comprises the following steps:
[0013] Step 1, Initialization: Build a group GR k , with safety parameter 1 λ and TEE-DS's public encryption key PubKey DS As input, call the group contract to output the group public key gp k , contract signature public key pk c , encrypted group management private key Enc_gmsk and encrypted contract signature private key Enc_sk;
[0014] Step 2, user registration: the user obtains the member private key gsk and joins the anonymous decentralized computing system;
[0015] Step 3, distributed learning: Decentralized computing in the anonymous decentralized computing system includes: group member verification and model training. Group member verification is used to confirm the qualifications of users and the model training phase. Users who pass the group member verification perform decentralized computing.
[0016] Step 4, tracking and revocation;
[0017] The specific process of tracking users is as follows: v Logo R v Conduct a vote and collect votes After that, the user calls the tracking function of the group contract; if the number of valid votes exceeds the threshold h, the tracking function outputs the group membership parameter A i ; Users obtain A from the blockchain iThe associated label i indicates that the malicious user’s signature has been successfully traced;
[0018] The specific process of revoking a user is as follows: v Logo R v Conduct a vote and collect votes Afterwards, the user calls the revocation function of the group contract and provides the label i of the malicious user as input; if the number of valid votes exceeds the threshold h, the malicious user is revoked by updating the new dynamic accumulator parameter Acc.
[0019] In the above-mentioned anonymous decentralized computing method based on group contracts, step 2 specifically includes:
[0020] Step 2.1, User X i Call the Register of the group contract User Function, input cred i and where cred i is the user's certificate, is the user's public encryption key; Register User The function outputs the encrypted group member private key Enc_gsk i , can be obtained by the corresponding user X i Decryption; Register User The function outputs the user's group membership information (i, A i ), the information is recorded on the blockchain for subsequent tracking;
[0021] Step 2.2: User X i Decrypt Enc_gsk i , obtain its group signature private key gsk i .
[0022] In the above anonymous decentralized computing method based on group contracts, the group member verification in step 3 specifically includes: adding a public function named GiVeIdentityProof to the original group contract, which is used to verify the user's temporary identity R and issue an identity certificate P;
[0023] The specific process is: Use GroupSig.Verify to verify the group public key gpk and group signature σ G The correctness of the signature; execute the GroupSig.Open algorithm to obtain the user's membership parameter A i ; Calculate the label and membership parameters A of the decentralized computation i The hash value of
[0024] During the group member verification phase, a practical Byzantine fault-tolerant protocol is adopted as the backbone for reaching consensus.
[0025] In the above anonymous decentralized computing method based on group contracts, the model training in step 3 includes: during the model training process, each user maintains an array C[|U|] to record the number of times information is received from a specific user; each piece of information to be transmitted is packaged as <ID i ,(t,mes i )> σ , where σ represents the elliptic curve digital signature algorithm signature; for each received <ID v , (t,mas v )> σ , user X i Search and ID v The corresponding R v , if R is not found in U v , or the round is not the current round t, user X i neglect <ID v , (t,mas v )> σ ; User X i Use the corresponding public key pk v Verify the signature. If the signature is valid and the information is received, it is used for model training. In each round, the user updates his local gradient and a new block is created. Appended to the blockchain middle.
[0026] The beneficial effect of the present invention is that the group contract of the present invention fully combines private smart contracts and group signatures. The solution replaces the trusted institution required in the group signature with the entire blockchain and uses a trusted execution environment (TEE) to prevent privacy leakage.
[0027] The present invention proposes an anonymous decentralized computing method, which combines anonymity and traceability mechanisms to offset Byzantine nodes; compared with centralized methods, it does not rely on a trusted third party; while ensuring anonymity, it can also ensure strong Byzantine fault tolerance and the ability to resist imposters. BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS
[0028] The present invention is further described below in conjunction with the accompanying drawings and embodiments.
[0029] Figure 1 This is the architecture diagram of the anonymous decentralized computing system of the present invention;
[0030] Figure 2 The GiveIdentityProof function of the embodiment of the present invention;
[0031] Figure 3 This is a schematic diagram of group member verification according to an embodiment of the present invention;
[0032] Figure 4 It is the test error of the model training in the embodiment of the present invention. DETAILED DESCRIPTION
[0033] In order to enable those skilled in the art to better understand the technical solution of the present invention, the present invention is described in detail below in conjunction with the accompanying drawings and specific implementation methods.
[0034] like Figure 1 As shown, the present embodiment discloses an anonymous decentralized computing system based on a group contract, which uses group signatures to protect the anonymity of individual group members while allowing traceability within the group. Specifically, a set of polynomial time algorithms are used to represent the group signature function, expressed as GroupSig def = (Setup (for initialization), Join (for group member registration), Sign (for output signature), Verify (for verification of signature), Open (for tracing the group members to which the signed member belongs), and Revoke (for revoking group members)). In order to further ensure privacy in the group contract, TEE-DS is used to help implement the contract, which can protect the private keys of the group manager and group members. In addition, the input and output parameters in the TEE are also encrypted. However, some parameters, such as the group public key, need to be publicly accessible in the field of group signature.
[0035] The group contract contains five functions: InitializeGroup, Register User , CountVote, Trace, and Revoke. Among these five functions, CountVote is an internal function that can only be called from within the group contract, and the other four functions are public and can be called by external users. The codes of these functions are protected by TEE-DS in encrypted form, and the staff needs to interact with them securely, obtain the encrypted code, and decrypt it in TEE. Next, each function will be described in detail.
[0036] InitializeGroup: The InitializeGroup function is used to initialize a group and generate the key parameters required by the remaining functions. It accepts the security parameters λ and PubKey Ds As input, where PubKey DS is the public key used by TEE-DS to encrypt data. First, InitializeGroup calls GroupSig.Setup, which takes 1 λ Generates a group public key gp as input kand a group management private key gmsk. Then, it generates the signing key (pk c ,sk c ), and use PubKeyDS to pair gmsk and sk c Finally, InitializeGroup outputs gp k , pk c , Enc_gmsk and Enc_sk c It is worth noting that the remaining four functions are only generated when InitializeGroup is executed.
[0037] Register User :Register User This function is used to register a user. It requires cred i and Register Useri , where cred i is the user's certificate, is the user's public key. i , which first verifies the user's cred i , then use the GroupSig.Join algorithm for X i Generate group private key gsk i and group member identity information (i, A i ). Finally, the function output uses Register User Encrypted encryption key gsk i To ensure that except for the owner X i No one else can access the key. i ) is stored locally by the group manager, but in this solution, the centralized group manager is removed and stored on the blockchain for future tracing. (i, A i ) is just a symbol and has no direct connection with the signature, so it does not reveal the identity of user X. i any personally identifiable information.
[0038] CountVote: The CountVote function is an internal mechanism limited to use in the tracking and revocation functions. Its main function is to check and enumerate non-duplicate votes. To do this, the function utilizes the GroupSig.Openalgorithm to verify the identity of the signer. The anonymous nature of group signatures requires this approach to avoid duplicate counting from a single entity. Upon successful verification, the function will count the votes and return them as a count.
[0039] Trace: The main purpose of this function is to track malicious users. First, the Trace function calls the CountVote function to enumerate the votes of other users. If the number of votes exceeds the predefined threshold h, GroupSig.Open is used to generate the identity parameter A of the malicious user X′*i based on the group manager's private key gmsk and the group signature σ′*G (generated by the malicious user). i Blockchain enables all users to gain access to i The corresponding tag i indicates the successful association of the signature with the user identity. In the subsequent Revoke function, a malicious user can revoke the signature by providing tag i.
[0040] Revoke: The purpose of this process is to invalidate the malicious user with identifier i. After calling the CountVote program to count the votes of the remaining users, if the specified threshold h is exceeded, the Revoke program will use the GroupSig.Revoke algorithm to update the Acc parameter of the dynamic accumulator, indicating that user X i Expired.
[0041] Based on the technical support of group contracts, the anonymous decentralized computing method can be divided into four stages: Figure 1 As shown, it is divided into four stages: initialization, user registration, decentralized computing, and tracking and revocation.
[0042] 1) Initialization: This embodiment sets up an interaction scenario, where users X1, X2, ...X t Constructed a group GR k With safety parameter 1 λ and TEE-DS's public encryption key PubKey DS As input, the InitializeGroup function of the group contract is called. This function outputs multiple parameters for the next stage, such as the group public key gp k , contract signature public key pk c , encrypted group management private key Enc_gmsk and encrypted contract signature private key Enc sk.
[0043] 2) User registration: During the user registration process, the user obtains the member private key gsk and joins the ADL (anonymous decentralized computing) system. User registration includes the following steps:
[0044] Step 1: User X i Call the Register of the group contract User Function, input cred i and where cred i is the user's certificate, Is the user's public encryption key. Register User The function outputs the encrypted group member private key Enc_gsk i , can be obtained by the corresponding user X i Decryption. In addition, Register User The function also outputs the user's group membership information (i, A i ), this information will be recorded on the blockchain for subsequent tracking. i ) is purely a symbol and does not reveal any private information as long as it is not associated with a signature.
[0045] Step 2: User X i Decrypt Enc_-gsk i , obtain its group signature private key gsk i With this signature private key, user X i You can participate in the decentralized computing process.
[0046] 3) Decentralized computing: Decentralized computing in anonymous decentralized computing is divided into two parts: group member verification and model training. Group member verification is used to confirm the qualifications of users and the model training phase, and users who are verified by group members perform decentralized computing.
[0047] a) Group member identity verification: This embodiment adds a public function named GiveIdentityProof to the original group contract, such as Figure 2 This function is used to verify the user's temporary identity R and issue an identity certificate P.
[0048] This function first uses GroupSig.Verify to verify the group public key gpk and group signature σ G The correctness of the signature. Then execute the GroupSig.Open algorithm to obtain the user's membership parameter A i Then, the label and membership parameter A of the decentralized computation DL is calculated i This method ensures that different decentralized computations will produce different hash values, but in a specific decentralized computation, signatures from the same user will produce the same hash value. In this way, ADL (anonymous decentralized computation) can effectively resist attacks by imposters.
[0049] In the group member verification phase, the main goal is to authenticate the users participating in the training, exclude unqualified users, and prevent Sybil attacks. Eventually, the users reach a consensus and form a training user list U. The Practical Byzantine Fault Tolerance (PBFT) protocol is used as the backbone of consensus. The protocol runs independently of the digital currency system and exhibits high efficiency. The group member verification phase consists of four phases: PRE-PREPARE, PREPARE, COMMIT, and ACCOMPLISH, as shown in Figure 1. Figure 3 shown.
[0050] In the pre-preparation stage, participate in decentralized computing DL u Each user uses the Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (ECDSA) to generate a one-time and non-repetitive public and private key pair (pk i ,sk i ). Each user X i A temporary identifier is generated. Where ID i is a randomly generated number, GR k Represents the group label to which the group signature obtained in the previous user registration phase belongs. i Using R i and decentralized computing DL u The tag calls the GiveIdentityProof function of the group contract and receives the output P i , as a temporary identity certificate. i Request a temporary identity from the blockchain that is valid for this specific decentralized computation process, X i P i Broadcast to its peers.
[0051] In the preparation phase, the judgment of Sybil attack is embedded to ensure that the training user list does not contain users who impersonate multiple users by sending multiple identity information R. First, user X i Authentication from user X v Received P v (denoted as Verify(P v )). If the embedded information is duplicated or the signature is invalid, P v will be discarded. The remaining verified P v Hash(DL u , M v ) is stored in M_SET. Then, X i In SET R Storage and non-repetitive Hash (DL u , M v ) corresponding to R. In this embodiment, SETR The size of is denoted as n, where n = 3f + 1, where f represents the maximum allowed number of Byzantine users. v ∈SET R , user X i Sign it and send it to <PREPARE,R i , Rv> σ Broadcast to other users.
[0052] It should be noted that in this embodiment, group signatures are only used in the pre-preparation and preparation stages. Since the group signature is bound to the ECDSA signature, it is not required in the subsequent process. This optimization greatly reduces the signature overhead of the system. In addition, the ECDSA key in this system is temporary and will change in the next distributed learning process, so the protection of identity privacy can be ensured.
[0053] In the submission phase, for any R v , if user X i Received from at least 2f+1 different users <PREPARE,R j , R v ) σ , it will broadcast <COMMIT,R i , R v > σ .
[0054] In the completion phase, for any R v , if user X i Received from at least 2f+1 different users <COMMIT,R i , R v > σ , it will R v Add to its training user list U. Finally, user X i Set its broadcast list to the users in U. Generate a new block Record U and DL u , and appended to the blockchain middle.
[0055] b) Model training: In this system, SPDL (a decentralized computing system that supports security and privacy of blockchain) is used as the model training algorithm, but it is not limited to this. This embodiment will not discuss the detailed algorithm flow of model training in depth, because the detailed algorithm flow is a prior art, and the focus of this embodiment is information verification, which will be described in detail below. In this case, (t, mes i ) to represent user X i The information sent in round t.
[0056] During model training, each user maintains an array C[|U|] to record the number of times a message is received from a specific user, thereby preventing replay attacks. Each message to be transmitted is packaged as <ID i ,(t,mes i )> σ , where σ represents the ECDSA (Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm) signature. Group signature is not required here because the group signature is already bound to the ECDSA (Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm) signature during the group member verification process. In addition, since the ECDSA (Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm) signature is temporary and one-time and will be changed in the next decentralized computing process, it will not leak any identity privacy. It is only used to verify whether the information comes from user X i . Then, for each received <ID v ,(t,mes v )> σ , user X i Search by ID v The corresponding R v If R is not found in U v , or the round is not the current round t, user X i Ignored <ID v ,(t,mes v )> σ Then, user X i Use the corresponding public key pk v Verify the signature. If the signature is valid and the message is received, it is used for model training.
[0057] In each round, users update their local gradients, and a new block Appended to the blockchain This block records the relevant training information of the t+1th round. As mentioned in the previous paragraph, through the combination of group member verification and message verification, user X i It can ensure that it only interacts with users in the training user list U. Therefore, the adversary cannot create Byzantine users that exceed the number of users it controls to disrupt the model training process. Throughout the process, users communicate anonymously and securely without revealing their identity privacy.
[0058] 4) Tracking and revocation: In anonymous decentralized computing, users can track and revoke user X. v Logo R v Once a set of votes is collected, The user will call the tracking function of the group contract. If the number of valid votes exceeds the threshold h, the tracking function will output the group membership parameter A. i . Users can then obtain the samei The associated label i indicates that the malicious user’s signature has been successfully traced. The process of revoking a user is similar to the process of tracing a user. Afterwards, the user calls the revocation function of the group contract and provides the label i of the malicious user as input. If the number of valid votes exceeds the threshold h, the malicious user is revoked by updating the new dynamic accumulator parameter Acc.
[0059] In order to verify the Byzantine fault tolerance of the anonymous decentralized system of this embodiment, different Byzantine ratio (BR) training models are used for testing. The Byzantine ratio represents the ratio of the number of Byzantine users to the total number of users. In the experiment, the total number of users is set to 20, and the BR values are 0%, 10%, 20% and 30%, respectively. Considering f = 33% × N, this is the upper limit of the PBFT algorithm. Figure 4 shows the test error of the model training (the proportion of incorrect predictions made on the test dataset to the total number of predictions). Figure 2 In this experiment, Byzantine users try to interfere with the training process by sending very large gradients and not sending any messages after the PREPARE phase of the PBFT algorithm of the anonymous decentralized computing system. Figure 2 It can be seen that the "PURE" system is directly damaged in the presence of Byzantine users, resulting in the inability to converge the test error. In contrast, the anonymous decentralized computing system (ADL) of this application includes a Byzantine fault tolerance function, and can converge to a favorable test error value even if the number of Byzantine users is less than 30%. Therefore, it can be concluded that the anonymous decentralized computing system (ADL) of this embodiment has good Byzantine fault tolerance.
[0060] The above embodiments are only exemplary embodiments of the present invention and are not intended to limit the present invention. The protection scope of the present invention is defined by the claims. Those skilled in the art may make various modifications or equivalent substitutions to the present invention within the essence and protection scope of the present invention, and such modifications or equivalent substitutions shall also be deemed to fall within the protection scope of the present invention.
Claims
1. An anonymous decentralized computing system based on group contracts, It is characterized in that Including group contracts, the group contract uses group signatures to protect the anonymity of individual group members, while allowing traceability within the group, and uses a polynomial time algorithm to represent the group signature function, GroupSig def = (Setup, Join, Sign, Verify, Open, Revoke); the group contract specifically includes the following functions: InitializeGroup, Register User , CountVote, Trace and Revoke, where CountVote is an internal function and is only used in tracking and revocation to check and enumerate non-duplicate votes; InitializeGroup, Register User , Trace and Revoke are public functions; InitializeGroup, Register User The codes of , CountVote, Trace, and Revoke are protected by TEE-DS in encrypted form, and the staff interacts with it securely, obtains the encrypted code and decrypts it in TEE.
2. According to claim 1, an anonymous decentralized computing system based on group contracts, It is characterized in that InitializeGroup is used to initialize a group and generate key parameters required by the remaining functions; it accepts security parameters λ and PubKey Ds As input, where PubKey Ds is the public key used by TEE-DS to encrypt data; Specifically: InitializeGroup calls GroupSig.Setup, which takes 1 λ Generates a group public key gp as input k and a group management private key gmsk; generate the signing key (pk c ,sk c ), and use PubKeyDS to encrypt gmsk and skc; InitializeGroup outputs gp k , pk c , Enc_gmsk and Enc_sk c .
3. According to the anonymous decentralized computing system based on group contracts of claim 1, It is characterized in that The Register User Function is used to register a user; it requires credi and where cred i is the user's certificate, is the user's public key; Specifically: For user X i , first verify the user's cred i , using the GroupSig.Join algorithm for X i Generate group private key gsk i and group member identity information (i, A i ); Output usage Encrypted encryption key Enc_gsk i To ensure that except for the owner X i No one else can access the key.
4. According to claim 1, an anonymous decentralized computing system based on group contracts, It is characterized in that The Trace function is used to track malicious users. First, the Trace function calls the CountVote function to enumerate the votes of other users. If the number of votes exceeds the predefined threshold h, GroupSig.Open is used to generate the identity parameter A of the malicious user X′*i based on the private key gmsk of the group manager and the group signature σ′*G. i ; Blockchain enables all users to gain access to i The corresponding label i; The Revok e The function is used to invalidate the malicious user with label i; when calling CountVot e After the function counts the votes of other users, if it exceeds the specified threshold h, Revok e The function updates the dynamic accumulator Acc parameter with the help of GroupSig.Revoke algorithm, indicating that user X i Expired.
5. An anonymous decentralized computing method based on group contracts, It is characterized in that An anonymous decentralized computing system based on a group contract as described in any one of claims 1 to 4 comprises the following steps: Step 1, Initialization: Build a group GR k , with safety parameter 1 λ and TEE-DS's public encryption key PubKey DS As input, call the group contract to output the group public key gp k , contract signature public key pk c , encrypted group management private key Enc_gmsk and encrypted contract signature private key Enc_sk; Step 2, user registration: the user obtains the member private key gsk and joins the anonymous decentralized computing system; Step 3, distributed learning: Decentralized computing in the anonymous decentralized computing system includes: group member verification and model training. Group member verification is used to confirm the qualifications of users and the model training phase. Users who pass the group member verification perform decentralized computing. Step 4, tracking and revocation; The specific process of tracking users is as follows: v Logo R v Conduct a vote and collect votes After that, the user calls the tracking function of the group contract; if the number of valid votes exceeds the threshold h, the tracking function outputs the group membership parameter A i ; Users obtain A from the blockchain i The associated label i indicates that the malicious user’s signature has been successfully traced; The specific process of revoking a user is as follows: v Logo R v Conduct a vote and collect votes Afterwards, the user calls the revocation function of the group contract and provides the malicious user's label i as input; if the number of valid votes exceeds the threshold h, the new dynamic accumulator parameter Ac is updated c to revoke the malicious user.
6. According to claim 5, an anonymous decentralized computing method based on group contracts, It is characterized in that The step 2 specifically includes: Step 2.1, User X i Call the Register of the group contract User Function, input cred i and where cred i is the user's certificate, is the user's public encryption key; Register User The function outputs the encrypted group member private key Enc_gsk i , can be obtained by the corresponding user X i Decryption; Register User The function outputs the user's group membership information (i, A i ), the information is recorded on the blockchain for subsequent tracking; Step 2.2: User X i Decrypt Enc_gsk i , obtain its group signature private key gsk i .
7. According to claim 5, an anonymous decentralized computing method based on group contracts, It is characterized in that The step 3 group member verification specifically includes: adding a public function named GiVeIdentityProof to the original group contract, which is used to verify the user's temporary identity R and issue an identity certificate P; The specific process is: Use GroupSig.Verify to verify the group public key gpk and group signature σ G The correctness of the signature; execute the GroupSig.Open algorithm to obtain the user's membership parameter A i ; Calculate the label and membership parameters A of the decentralized computation i The hash value of During the group member verification phase, a practical Byzantine fault-tolerant protocol is adopted as the backbone for reaching consensus.
8. According to claim 5, an anonymous decentralized computing method based on group contracts, It is characterized in that The model training in step 3 includes: during the model training process, each user maintains an array C[|U|] to record the number of times information is received from a specific user; each piece of information to be transmitted is packaged as <ID i , (t, mmes i )> σ , where σ represents the elliptic curve digital signature algorithm signature; for each received <ID v ,(t,mes v )> σ , user X i Search and ID v The corresponding R v , if R is not found in U v , or the round is not the current round t, user X i neglect <ID v ,(t,mes v )> σ ; User X i Use the corresponding public key pk v Verify the signature. If the signature is valid and the information is received, it is used for model training. In each round, the user updates his local gradient and a new block is created. Appended to the blockchain middle.
Citation Information
Patent Citations
An Internet of Vehicles privacy protection authentication method based on group signatures
CN109831296A
Electronic group signature method with revocable anonymity, equipment and programs for implementing the method
US20040260926A1
Computer-implemented method for managing user-submitted reviews using anonymous reputation system
US20200349616A1
Cited By
Decentralized traceable ring signature authentication method and system, and storage medium
CN120128342A
