Power battery closed-loop supply decision-making method and system considering echelon utilization

Abstract

The invention relates to the technical field of batteries, and discloses a power battery closed-loop supply decision-making method and system considering echelon utilization, the method is improved on the basis of a K-S method, the number of coordination objects is expanded from 2 to 3, a profit distribution mechanism is designed, and a power battery closed-loop supply decision-making method is established according to the contribution of three supply chain members. And the increment of the total profit of the whole supply chain system under the completely concentrated decision and the completely dispersed decision is distributed, so that the supply chain coordination is effectively realized.

Description

Technical Field

[0001] The present invention relates to the field of battery technology, and in particular to a closed-loop supply decision method and system for power batteries taking into account cascade utilization. Background Art

[0002] In recent years, the installed capacity of power batteries for new energy vehicles in China has continued to grow. As the first batch of new energy vehicles expire, the power battery retirement wave is coming, but the power battery recycling industry is still in its early stages of development.

[0003] Then, how to deal with retired new energy vehicle power batteries has become an urgent problem to be solved. For environmental protection and economic considerations, standardized recycling of retired power batteries is currently the best choice. First of all, most power batteries use lithium battery technology. If traditional waste disposal methods such as landfill or incineration are used, the metals, such as cobalt, nickel, lithium, manganese, and inorganic organic compounds, will cause serious pollution to the atmosphere, water and soil. Secondly, the recycling of power batteries also has important economic value, including the reuse of energy value and material regeneration value. Although China has rich lithium mineral resources, due to the difficulty of mining and other reasons, the actual output is small, resulting in more than 90% of lithium demand relying on imports. Therefore, how to recycle new energy vehicle power batteries and solve the problem of power battery recycling has become an urgent problem to be solved. Summary of the invention

[0004] The present invention provides a power battery closed-loop supply decision method and system taking into account cascade utilization, so as to solve the problems existing in the prior art.

[0005] In order to achieve the above object, the present invention is implemented by the following technical solutions:

[0006] In a first aspect, the present invention provides a closed-loop supply decision method for power batteries considering cascade utilization, comprising:

[0007] S1: A three-level closed-loop supply chain is formed based on power battery manufacturers, new energy vehicle manufacturers and cascade users;

[0008] S2: Design a profit distribution mechanism corresponding to the three-level closed-loop supply chain;

[0009] S3: Determine the contribution of the three supply chain members in the three-level closed-loop supply chain according to the profit distribution mechanism, and distribute the increase in the total profit of the entire supply chain system under both fully centralized and decentralized decisions.

[0010] In a second aspect, the present application provides a closed-loop supply decision monitoring of a power battery taking into account cascade utilization, including a memory, a processor, and a computer program stored in the memory and executable on the processor, wherein the processor implements the steps of the method described in the first aspect when executing the computer program.

[0011] Beneficial effects:

[0012] The closed-loop supply decision method for power batteries considering cascade utilization provided by the present invention is improved on the basis of the KS method, expanding the coordination objects from 2 to 3, and designing a profit distribution mechanism. According to the contribution of the three supply chain members, the increase in the total profit of the entire supply chain system under both fully centralized and decentralized decisions is distributed, thereby effectively realizing supply chain coordination.

[0013] In further technical solutions, by setting up a profit distribution mechanism, the profits of each entity in the closed-loop supply chain of power batteries can be improved and Pareto improvement can be achieved. BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS

[0014] Figure 1 This is a flow chart of a closed-loop supply decision method for power batteries considering cascade utilization according to a preferred embodiment of the present invention;

[0015] Figure 2 A schematic diagram of a three-level closed-loop supply chain according to a preferred embodiment of the present invention;

[0016] Figure 3 The preferred embodiment of the present invention is the price p of the battery in the cascade utilization d Under the change of the recycling price p in the four decision-making modes r Schematic diagram of numerical simulation analysis;

[0017] Figure 4 The preferred embodiment of the present invention is the price p of the battery in the cascade utilization d Under the change of the transfer price p in four decision-making modes b Schematic diagram of numerical simulation analysis;

[0018] Figure 5 The preferred embodiment of the present invention is the price p of the battery in the cascade utilization d Schematic diagram of numerical simulation analysis of recycling quantity Q under four decision modes under changing conditions;

[0019] Figure 6 The preferred embodiment of the present invention is the price p of the battery in the cascade utilization d Schematic diagram of numerical simulation analysis of the recovery rate θ under four decision modes under the condition of changes;

[0020] Figure 7The preferred embodiment of the present invention is the price p of the battery in the cascade utilization d Under the changing conditions, the profit π of power battery manufacturers under four decision-making modes M Schematic diagram of numerical simulation analysis;

[0021] Figure 8 The preferred embodiment of the present invention is the price p of the battery in the cascade utilization d Under the changing conditions, the profit π of new energy vehicle manufacturers under four decision-making modes R Schematic diagram of numerical simulation analysis;

[0022] Fig. 9 The preferred embodiment of the present invention is the price p of the battery in the cascade utilization d Under the change of the four decision-making modes, the profit π of the tiered utilization business C Schematic diagram of numerical simulation analysis;

[0023] Fig.10 The preferred embodiment of the present invention is the price p of the battery in the cascade utilization d Under the changing conditions, the overall profit π of the closed-loop supply chain under the four decision-making modes M +π R +π C Schematic diagram of numerical simulation analysis;

[0024] Fig.11 The profit of the power battery manufacturer under different recycling modes in the preferred embodiment of the present invention is p d Schematic diagram of the relationship between β and β. DETAILED DESCRIPTION

[0025] The technical solution of the present invention is described clearly and completely below. Obviously, the described embodiments are only a part of the embodiments of the present invention, not all of the embodiments. Based on the embodiments of the present invention, all other embodiments obtained by ordinary technicians in this field without creative work are within the scope of protection of the present invention.

[0026] Unless otherwise defined, the technical terms or scientific terms used in the present invention shall have the usual meanings understood by persons with ordinary skills in the field to which the present invention belongs. The words "first", "second" and similar words used in the present invention do not indicate any order, quantity or importance, but are only used to distinguish different components. Similarly, words such as "one" or "one" do not indicate quantity restrictions, but indicate the existence of at least one. Words such as "connect" or "connected" are not limited to physical or mechanical connections, but may include electrical connections, whether direct or indirect. "Up", "down", "left", "right" and the like are only used to indicate relative positional relationships. When the absolute position of the object being described changes, the relative positional relationship also changes accordingly.

[0027] See also Figure 1 The present application provides a closed-loop supply decision method for power batteries considering cascade utilization, including:

[0028] S1: A three-level closed-loop supply chain is formed based on power battery manufacturers, new energy vehicle manufacturers and cascade users;

[0029] S2: Design a profit distribution mechanism corresponding to the three-level closed-loop supply chain;

[0030] S3: Determine the contribution of the three supply chain members in the three-level closed-loop supply chain according to the profit distribution mechanism, and distribute the increase in the total profit of the entire supply chain system under both fully centralized and decentralized decisions.

[0031] The above-mentioned closed-loop supply decision-making method for power batteries considering cascade utilization is improved on the basis of the KS method, expanding the coordination objects from 2 to 3, and designing a profit distribution mechanism. According to the contribution of the three supply chain members, the increase in the total profit of the entire supply chain system under the two decisions of complete centralization and decentralization is distributed, thereby effectively realizing supply chain coordination.

[0032] The following is a complete example to describe the above method steps in detail:

[0033] Build a three-level closed-loop supply chain consisting of a power battery manufacturer, a new energy vehicle manufacturer and a cascade user, such as Figure 2 shown.

[0034] In the forward supply chain, power battery manufacturers use new raw materials or recycled materials extracted from dismantled old batteries purchased from recyclers to produce new energy vehicle power battery products, which are then installed on new energy vehicles by new energy vehicle manufacturers and sold to consumers. Considering that most new energy vehicle manufacturers have their own 4S stores in reality, this application regards new energy vehicle manufacturers and 4S stores as a supply chain member. Therefore, in the reverse supply chain of this application, recyclers recover scrapped power batteries from consumers through new energy vehicle manufacturers, and classify and recycle them. Recyclers will test the remaining capacity and other data of the recycled scrapped old batteries, classify them according to the test data, and those that can be recycled will be produced as recycled products and sold to recycled consumers. For scrapped old batteries that cannot be recycled, recyclable metals, non-metals and other polymer materials in the battery carrier will be extracted and sold to power battery manufacturers for the production of new power batteries.

[0035] To simplify the model, this application assumes that:

[0036] In the closed-loop supply chain of power batteries, the number of batteries recycled Q does not exceed the number of batteries produced D, that is, Q≤D.

[0037] The purchasing cost of new raw materials is greater than the purchasing cost of recycled materials, that is, f-c0<0.

[0038] Assume that the recycling price of the cascade utilization enterprise is greater than the cost saved by the power battery manufacturer's remanufacturing, that is, c0-f<p d .

[0039] Assuming that all batteries manufactured by power battery manufacturers can be sold, the sales quantity is calculated according to the manufacturing quantity. Market demand is affected by power battery prices, D = ab*p, where a is the initial market demand for power batteries and the consumer's price sensitivity coefficient is b.

[0040] Since the main residual value of retired new energy vehicles is concentrated in the power battery, the price in the reverse supply chain of the model is the price of retired power batteries, that is, p r The price of the battery part when new energy vehicle retailers recycle retired new energy vehicles.

[0041] The recycling volume of new energy vehicle retailers will be affected by the recycling price p r Influence, the expression of Q is Q = q + m * p r . Where q is the recycling volume of retired batteries when the recycling price is 0, that is, the potential recycling volume in the market, and m is the consumer's sensitivity coefficient to the recycling price.

[0042] The basic parameter symbols and their meanings involved in this application are shown in Table 1.

[0043] Table 1 Symbols and descriptions

[0044]

[0045]

[0046] Building a decentralized decision-making model: Model D

[0047] In this model, power battery manufacturers, new energy vehicle manufacturers, and cascade users make decentralized decisions based on their profit maximization principle. Power battery manufacturers first decide the wholesale price w of new power batteries and the price f of purchasing recycled raw materials from cascade users. After that, cascade users decide the unit price p of reclaiming retired old batteries from new energy vehicle manufacturers. b Finally, the new energy vehicle manufacturer determines the new energy vehicle sales price p and the unit price p for recycling retired old batteries from consumers. r .

[0048] According to the symbolic description and basic assumptions in the previous article, the profit function π of power battery manufacturers, new energy vehicle manufacturers and cascade utilization companies can be obtained: M , π R , π C They are as follows:

[0049] π M =(wc n -c0)D+(c0-f)Q (1)

[0050] π R =(pw)D+(p b -p r )Q (2)

[0051] π C =β*Q(p d -c p -p b -p c +f)+(1-β)Q(fp b ) (3)

[0052] By the inverse solution method, we can get:

[0053]

[0054]

[0055] Building a centralized decision-making model: Model C

[0056] In this model, power battery manufacturers, new energy vehicle manufacturers and cascade users make centralized decisions based on the principle of maximizing overall profits. Power battery manufacturers, new energy vehicle manufacturers and cascade users simultaneously determine the wholesale price w of new power batteries, the price at which power battery manufacturers purchase recycled raw materials from cascade users, and the unit price p at which cascade users recycle retired old batteries from new energy vehicle manufacturers. b , the sales price of new energy vehicles p and the unit price of new energy vehicle manufacturers to recycle retired old batteries from consumers p r .

[0057] According to the symbolic description and basic assumptions in the previous article, the profit function π of the entire supply chain (power battery manufacturers, new energy vehicle manufacturers and cascade utilization companies) can be obtained: MRC as follows:

[0058] π MRC =(wc n -c0)D+(c0-f)Q+(pw)D+

[0059] (p b -p r )Q+βQ(p d -c p -p b -p c +f)+(1-β)Q(fp b )(4)

[0060] By the inverse solution method, we can get:

[0061]

[0062] Building a partially centralized model

[0063] Cooperation between power battery manufacturers and recycling companies: MC model

[0064] In the MC model, power battery manufacturers cooperate with recycling companies, and both make decisions with the goal of maximizing their total profits. New energy vehicle manufacturers make decisions independently based on their own profit maximization principle. Power battery manufacturers and recycling companies first determine the wholesale price w of new power batteries and the unit price p of retired old batteries recycled by recycling companies from new energy vehicle manufacturers. b After that, the new energy vehicle manufacturer determines the new energy vehicle sales price p and the unit price p for recycling retired old batteries from consumers r .

[0065] According to the symbolic description and basic assumptions in the previous article, the common profit function π of new energy vehicle manufacturers, power battery manufacturers and cascade utilization companies can be obtained: R , π MC as follows:

[0066] π R =(pw)D+(p b -p r )Q (5)

[0067]

[0068] By the inverse solution method, we can get:

[0069]

[0070]

[0071] Building cooperation between new energy vehicle manufacturers and recycling companies: RC model

[0072] In the RC model, new energy vehicle manufacturers cooperate with recycling companies, and both make decisions based on the goal of maximizing their total profits. Power battery manufacturers make decisions based on their own profit maximization principle. Power battery manufacturers first determine the wholesale price w of new power batteries and the price f of recycled raw materials purchased by power battery manufacturers from recycling companies. After that, new energy vehicle manufacturers and recycling companies determine the sales price p of new energy vehicles and the unit price p of retired old batteries collected from consumers. r .

[0073] According to the symbolic description and basic assumptions in the previous article, the common profit function π of power battery manufacturers, new energy vehicle manufacturers and cascade utilization companies can be obtained: M , π RC as follows:

[0074] π M =(wc n -c0)D+(c0-f)Q (7)

[0075]

[0076] By the inverse solution method, we can get:

[0077]

[0078]

[0079] Balanced result analysis

[0080] Comparison of the best results under different cooperation models

[0081] Proposition 1 By comparing the equilibrium results under four decision-making modes: decentralized, centralized, and partially centralized (MC and RC modes), we can conclude that: (1) p C* <p D* =p MC*=p RC* ; (2) (3)D D* =D MC* =D RC* <D C* ; (4) Q D* <Q MC* =Q RC* <Q C* .

[0082] prove:

[0083] because So ab(c0+c n )>0. And b>0, so So C* <p D* =p MC* =p RC* , the proof is complete.

[0084] because So c0m-qm(c p +p c -p d )β>0,

[0085]

[0086] Therefore The proof is complete.

[0087] Similarly, from (1), ab(c0+c n )>0. Therefore, again So D D* =D MC* =D RC* <D C* , the proof is complete.

[0088] Similarly, from (2), we know that c0m+qm(c p +p c -p d )β>0. Therefore,

[0089] again So Q D* <Q MC* =Q RC* <Q C* , the proof is complete.

[0090] The results of Proposition 1 show that centralized decision-making will increase the sales volume of new energy vehicles and the recycling volume of retired power batteries. The reason is that the selling price of new energy vehicles has decreased, while the recycling price of retired power batteries has increased. Therefore, from the perspective of expanding product sales and improving environmental protection, centralized decision-making is a more favorable strategy. However, compared with decentralized decision-making, partial centralized decision-making will increase the recycling price of power batteries, which will in turn lead to an increase in recycling volume, without affecting the selling price and sales volume of new energy vehicles. In addition, the selling price of new energy vehicles, the sales volume of new energy vehicles, the recycling price of retired power batteries, and the recycling volume of retired power batteries in the two partial centralized decision-making modes are all consistent. The reason for this result is that under the decentralized decision-making model, the subjects in the closed-loop supply chain of power batteries need to make multi-layer decisions, resulting in a "double marginal effect" with low operational efficiency.

[0091] Proposition 2: By comparing the profits of various supply chain entities under the decentralized (D model) decision-making model, we can obtain: (1) (2) (3) When c p +p c -p d <0 and hour, When c p +p c -p d <0 and hour,

[0092] because so Therefore The proof is complete.

[0093] Similar to (1), Therefore The proof is complete.

[0094]

[0095] When c p +p c -p d <0: is monotonically decreasing. have to or From Proposition 1, we know that:

[0096] ab(c0+c n )>0, and because c p +p c -p d <0;

[0097] therefore should be abandoned;

[0098] Therefore hour, When c p +p c -p d <0 and hour,

[0099] The results of Proposition 2 show that power battery manufacturers get more profits than other members of the supply chain. p +p c -p d When <0 and β is less than a certain threshold, New energy vehicle manufacturers have the smallest profits when c p +p c -p d When <0 and β is greater than a certain threshold, The profit of the cascade utilization is the smallest. In the actual production process, the channel leadership of the power battery manufacturer usually enables it to obtain more profits than other entities. At the same time, since the new energy vehicle manufacturers recycle the retired old batteries in the closed-loop supply chain of this application, whether the cascade utilization can obtain more profits than the new energy vehicle manufacturers depends on the proportion of retired power batteries that can be recycled. When the proportion is higher than a certain value, the profit obtained by the cascade utilization is lower than that of the new energy vehicle manufacturers.

[0100] Proposition 3: By comparing the profits of each subject under four decision-making modes: decentralized (D mode), centralized (C mode), and partially centralized (MC and RC modes), we can obtain: (1) (2) (3) (4)

[0101] Therefore

[0102] Therefore

[0103] Therefore

[0104] Therefore The proof is complete.

[0105] The results of Proposition 3 show that when a supply chain member cooperates with a reutilizer (partial centralized decision-making), the total profit of the two will be higher than the total profit when they make decentralized decisions, and the other member who does not participate in the cooperation (independent decision-making) will obtain more profits than when decentralized decisions are made. For example, when new energy vehicle manufacturers cooperate with reutilizers, the total profit of new energy vehicle manufacturers and reutilizers is higher than the total profit when decentralized decisions are made, and the profit obtained by power battery manufacturers is higher than the profit when decentralized decisions are made.

[0106] Proposition 4: By comparing the overall profits of the supply chain under four decision-making modes: decentralized (D mode), centralized (C mode), and partially centralized (MC and RC modes), we can conclude that:

[0107] because

[0108] so

[0109] Also because

[0110] and

[0111] Therefore The proof is complete.

[0112] The results in Proposition 4 show that the total profit of the power battery closed-loop supply chain system as a whole under decentralized decision-making is lower than that under partially centralized decision-making, and the total profit of the supply chain under fully centralized decision-making is the highest, that is, in the power battery closed-loop supply chain constructed in this application, centralized decision-making can effectively avoid the emergence of the "double marginal" effect. However, this centralized decision-making is only an ideal state in theory. In the actual operation of the power battery closed-loop supply chain, most companies still adopt decentralized decision-making. Therefore, it is more important to study the optimal decision-making and coordination contract issues of the power battery closed-loop supply chain.

[0113] Comparison of recovery rates under different cooperation models

[0114] The recycling rate of retired power batteries is represented by θ, which is determined by calculating the ratio of the recycled power battery to the produced power battery, that is, Among them, Q is the recycling volume of retired power batteries, and D is the sales volume of new power batteries. The power battery recycling rates under the four decision-making modes of decentralized (D mode), centralized (C mode) and partially centralized (MC and RC modes) are as follows:

[0115]

[0116] Proposition 5: By comparing the power battery recycling rates under four decision-making modes: decentralized (D mode), centralized (C mode) and partially centralized (MC and RC modes), we can obtain: θ D <θ C =θ MC =θ RC ;

[0117] prove:

[0118] because so again So θ D <θ C =θ MC =θ RC , the proof is complete.

[0119] The results of Proposition 5 show that both partially centralized decision-making and fully centralized decision-making will increase the recycling rate of power batteries, but compared with the recycling rate under partially centralized decision-making, fully centralized decision-making does not increase the recycling rate.

[0120] Building a supply chain coordination mechanism

[0121] Among them, the profit sharing mechanism (PS model)

[0122] Since profit sharing in both the forward and reverse supply chains can achieve full coordination of multi-level supply chains, this application enables power battery manufacturers to simultaneously participate in recycling revenue sharing in the reverse supply chain and sales revenue sharing in the forward supply chain. λ1 represents the recycling revenue sharing ratio of power battery manufacturers to new energy vehicle manufacturers, λ2 represents the recycling revenue sharing ratio of power battery manufacturers to cascade utilization companies, and μ1 represents the sales revenue sharing ratio of power battery manufacturers to new energy vehicle manufacturers. The profit function is as follows:

[0123] π M =(wc n -c0)D+(c0-f)Q+λ2(βp d Q+fQ)+λ1p b Q+μ1pD (9)

[0125] π R =((1-μ1)pw)D+(p b -p r )Q-λ1p b Q (10)

[0126] π C =βQ(p d -c p -p b -pc +f)+(1-β)Q(fp b )-λ2(βp d Q+f (11)

[0128] According to the reverse solution method, we can get:

[0129]

[0130]

[0131] At this point, to achieve closed-loop supply chain coordination, Simplifying, we get μ1=1, λ1=3, which is obviously not true. Therefore, constructing a profit-sharing contract in both the forward and reverse supply chains of power batteries still cannot achieve coordination of the closed-loop supply chain.

[0132] Among them, the KS method is as follows:

[0133] Since the profit-sharing contract cannot achieve the coordination of the closed-loop supply chain of power batteries, this application uses the improved KS method to coordinate the closed-loop supply chain of power batteries. It is worth explaining that the KS method is an allocation mechanism that can effectively achieve supply chain coordination. Its main core idea is to allocate the increase in the total profit of the entire supply chain system under both fully centralized and decentralized decisions according to the contribution of the supply chain members. Based on the research results of this application, the following specific allocation steps are given.

[0134] When the power battery manufacturer and the recycling company have the intention to cooperate:

[0135] Considering power battery manufacturers and cascade users as a whole, the increased profits of the entire system are distributed with new energy vehicle manufacturers. At this time, the profit contributions of new energy vehicle manufacturers, power battery manufacturers and cascade users to the power battery closed-loop supply chain are and The increase in overall supply chain profit when the decision is fully centralized (Model C) The proportional coefficient of profit distribution at this time It is easy to find that the profits of each party at this time are

[0136]

[0137] in, is the total profit of new energy vehicle manufacturers, It is the total profit of power battery manufacturers and recyclers.

[0138] The improved KS solution is used to distribute the increased profits of power battery manufacturers and cascade users as a whole. The profit obtained by power battery manufacturers and cascade users as a community of interests in the first step is subtracted from the total profit obtained by the two under the decentralized decision-making model to obtain At this time, the power battery manufacturers and cascade users contribute to their overall profits respectively. and Proportional coefficient of profit distribution It is easy to find that the profits of each party at this time are

[0139]

[0140] At this time, the improved profits of power battery manufacturers, new energy vehicle manufacturers and cascade utilization companies are

[0141] Similarly, if the new energy vehicle manufacturer and the cascade utilization company have the intention to cooperate first, then the profits of the power battery manufacturer, the new energy vehicle manufacturer and the cascade utilization company after improvement will be

[0142]

[0143] in,

[0144] In one example, the above method is numerically simulated as follows:

[0145] Taking the production, collection and utilization of BYD Tang EV600 PB as an example, numerical analysis was performed using Mathematica 12.3 software to intuitively analyze the impact of important parameters under four collection modes on the optimal decision-making and profitability of each subject in the closed-loop supply chain of power batteries. BYD is the producer of BYD Tang EV600 power batteries, and the retailers of these PBs are 4S stores. Power battery recyclers PBRs can participate in the collection of SPBs Shanghai Huadong Automobile Disassembly Co., Ltd. 6 Enterprises mainly engaged in EU business and collection capacity of SPBs Gem Co., Ltd. 7 Collecting its SPBs and fulfilling extended producer responsibility (EPR) PB products, BYD can cooperate with 4S stores, PBRs and Euros. Based on the survey results, the key initial parameters are determined as follows.

[0146] The capacity of the power battery of BYD Tang EV600 is 82.8kWh. According to the global lithium-ion battery price survey report released by Bloomberg New Energy Finance, the average price of global lithium-ion batteries will be 139$ / kWh in 2023. The exchange rate is 1$=7.077￥, c n =82.8×139×7.077=81451 yuan.

[0147] According to the above data, the value of power battery recycling products is about 80.3€ / kWh, the processing cost is 24.09€ / kWh, and the collection cost is 28.1€ / kWh. In addition, based on the actual situation and data, it is assumed that 40% of the recycled retired batteries can be used to produce recycling products, that is, β = 0.4. Assuming the exchange rate is 1€ = 7.66 yuan, p d =0.4×82.8×80.3×7.66≈20372 yuan, c p =0.4×82.8×24.09×7.66≈6112 yuan, p c =0.4×82.8×28.1×7.66≈7129 yuan.

[0148] The initial values ​​of other parameters are set as follows: m=0.3, c0=9000.

[0149] The parameter values ​​of this application are shown in Table 2.

[0150] Table 2 Parameters of numerical simulation

[0151]

[0152] The simulation of recycling price, recycling quantity and transfer price under different decision-making modes is shown below, where the decision changes of each subject under different decision-making modes are related to the price p of the second-life battery. d The relationship is as follows Figure 3-Figure 6 As shown; in the case of second-use battery price p d Under the change of the recycling price p in the four decision-making modes r , transfer price p b , recovery quantity Q and recovery rate θ are subjected to numerical simulation analysis.

[0153] In general, the recycling price, transfer price, recycling quantity and recycling rate under decentralized decision-making (model D) are always lower than those under centralized or partially centralized decision-making (models C, RC, MC). In addition, with the increase in the income of recycled materials, the recycling quantity and recycling rate of used batteries have not increased significantly, but compared with decentralized decision-making (model D), no matter what centralized decision-making method (model C, RC, MC) is adopted, the recycling rate will be greatly improved, but the recycling quantity of partially centralized models (models RC, MC) is lower than that of fully centralized models.

[0154] The simulation of profit changes of each entity in the closed-loop supply chain under different decision-making modes is shown below. Among them, the profit of the supply chain entity and the overall profit of the supply chain under different recycling modes are related to the price of the second-hand battery p d The relationship is as follows Figure 7-10 As shown. In the case of second-hand battery price pd Under the changing conditions, the profit π of power battery manufacturers under four decision-making modes M 、Profits of new energy vehicle manufacturers π R , Tiered Utilization Profit π C And the overall profit of the closed-loop supply chain π M +π R +π C For new energy vehicle manufacturers and recycling companies, their profits have been greatly improved after the KS model redistributes profits. However, for power battery manufacturers, Fig.11 , when the price of second-use batteries and the proportion of retired batteries that can be used for second-use reach a certain threshold, the profit in the KS model will be less than the profit under the cooperation model between new energy vehicle manufacturers and second-use companies (RC model). Therefore, when the price of second-use batteries and the utilization rate of retired power batteries are low, the three parties have the motivation to redistribute profits according to the distribution principle of the KS model, thereby achieving coordination of the closed-loop supply chain of power batteries.

[0155] The present application also provides a power battery closed-loop supply decision system considering cascade utilization, including a memory, a processor, and a computer program stored in the memory and executable on the processor, wherein the processor implements the steps of the above method when executing the computer program. The power battery closed-loop supply decision system considering cascade utilization can implement various embodiments of the power battery closed-loop supply decision method considering cascade utilization, and can achieve the same beneficial effects, which will not be described in detail here.

[0156] The preferred specific embodiments of the present invention are described in detail above. It should be understood that a person skilled in the art can make many modifications and changes based on the concept of the present invention without creative work. Therefore, any technical solution that can be obtained by a person skilled in the art through logical analysis, reasoning or limited experiments based on the concept of the present invention on the basis of the prior art should be within the scope of protection determined by the claims.

Claims

1. A closed-loop supply decision method for power batteries considering cascade utilization, characterized in that: include: S1: A three-level closed-loop supply chain is formed based on power battery manufacturers, new energy vehicle manufacturers and cascade users; S2: Design a profit distribution mechanism corresponding to the three-level closed-loop supply chain; S3: Determine the contribution of the three supply chain members in the three-level closed-loop supply chain according to the profit distribution mechanism, and distribute the increase in the total profit of the entire supply chain system under both fully centralized and decentralized decisions.

2. The closed-loop supply decision method for power batteries considering cascade utilization according to claim 1 is characterized in that: The three-level closed-loop supply chain includes a forward supply chain and a reverse supply chain; In the forward supply chain, the relationship between the supply chain members is as follows: Power battery manufacturers use new raw materials or recycled materials extracted from dismantled old batteries purchased from recycling companies to produce new energy vehicle power battery products, which are then installed in new energy vehicles by new energy vehicle manufacturers and sold to consumers; In the reverse supply chain, the relationship between the supply chain members is as follows: Recyclers collect scrapped power batteries from consumers through new energy vehicle manufacturers, and classify and recycle them. Recyclers will test the remaining capacity of the recycled scrapped batteries and classify them according to the test data. Those that can be recycled will be produced into recycled products and sold to recycled consumers. For scrapped batteries that cannot be recycled, reusable metals, non-metals and other polymer materials in the battery carrier will be extracted and sold to power battery manufacturers.

3. The closed-loop supply decision method for power batteries considering cascade utilization according to claim 1 is characterized in that: The profit distribution mechanism in S2 includes: If the power battery manufacturer and the recycling company have the intention to cooperate first, then: (1) Treating power battery manufacturers and recycling companies as a whole, the whole and the new energy vehicle manufacturers share the increased profits of the entire system; by calculating the increased profits and the profit contribution of each entity, the profit distribution ratio coefficient is determined, thereby obtaining the profits of the whole and the new energy vehicle manufacturers; (2) According to the steps in (1), the increased profits obtained by the power battery manufacturers and the cascade utilization companies are distributed as a whole; the profits of the power battery manufacturers, new energy vehicle manufacturers and cascade utilization companies after the coordination mechanism are obtained; (3) According to steps (1) and (2), a coordination mechanism is set up when the new energy vehicle manufacturers and the recycling companies have the intention to cooperate.

4. The closed-loop supply decision method for power batteries considering cascade utilization according to claim 1 is characterized in that: In the S3, there are four models under the two decisions of complete centralization and decentralization, namely, the D model for representing decentralization decision, the C model for representing centralization decision, the MC model for representing the cooperation between power battery manufacturers and cascade utilization companies, and the RC model for representing the cooperation between new energy vehicle manufacturers and cascade utilization companies.

5. The closed-loop supply decision method for power batteries considering cascade utilization according to claim 4 is characterized in that: In the D model, power battery manufacturers, new energy vehicle manufacturers, and recycling companies make decentralized decisions based on their profit maximization principle. Power battery manufacturers first determine the wholesale price of new power batteries and the price of purchasing recycled raw materials from recycling companies. Then, recycling companies determine the unit price of recycling retired old batteries from new energy vehicle manufacturers. Finally, new energy vehicle manufacturers determine the sales price of new energy vehicles and the unit price of recycling retired old batteries from consumers.

6. The closed-loop supply decision method for power batteries considering cascade utilization according to claim 4 is characterized in that: In the C model, power battery manufacturers, new energy vehicle manufacturers and recycling companies make centralized decisions based on the principle of maximizing overall profits. Power battery manufacturers, new energy vehicle manufacturers and recycling companies simultaneously determine the wholesale price of new power batteries, the price at which power battery manufacturers purchase recycled raw materials from recycling companies, the unit price at which recycling companies recycle retired old batteries from new energy vehicle manufacturers, the sales price of new energy vehicles and the unit price at which new energy vehicle manufacturers recycle retired old batteries from consumers.

7. The closed-loop supply decision method for power batteries considering cascade utilization according to claim 4 is characterized in that: In the MC model, power battery manufacturers cooperate with recyclers, and both make decisions with the goal of maximizing their total profits. New energy vehicle manufacturers make independent decisions based on their own profit maximization principle. Power battery manufacturers and recyclers first determine the wholesale price of new power batteries and the unit price at which recyclers recycle retired old batteries from new energy vehicle manufacturers. After that, new energy vehicle manufacturers determine the sales price of new energy vehicles and the unit price at which they recycle retired old batteries from consumers.

8. The closed-loop supply decision method for power batteries considering cascade utilization according to claim 4 is characterized in that: In the RC model, new energy vehicle manufacturers cooperate with recycling companies, and both make decisions with the goal of maximizing their total profits. Power battery manufacturers make decisions independently based on their own profit maximization principle. Power battery manufacturers first determine the wholesale price of new power batteries and the price at which power battery manufacturers purchase recycled raw materials from recycling companies. After that, new energy vehicle manufacturers and recycling companies determine the sales price of new energy vehicles and the unit price of reclaiming retired old batteries from consumers.

9. A power battery closed-loop supply decision system considering cascade utilization, comprising a memory, a processor, and a computer program stored in the memory and executable on the processor, characterized in that: When the processor executes the computer program, the steps of the method described in any one of claims 1 to 8 are implemented.

Images