Rural power supply service quality-effect improvement method and system based on evolutionary game theory

Abstract

The embodiment of the invention provides a rural power supply service quality and efficiency improvement method and system based on an evolutionary game theory, and the method comprises the steps: determining a game main body, and constructing an evolutionary game model containing finite rationality and asymmetric information based on the game main body; the game main body comprises a local government, a power supply company and a network coordinator; defining two strategies for each game subject, and determining a revenue function corresponding to each strategy; simulating the natural evolution process of each game subject strategy through a natural selection and simulation mechanism, and analyzing a dynamic balance point selected by each subject strategy in the game process; suggestions are provided for strategy adjustment of the game subjects through the dynamic balance points selected by the strategy of the subjects.

Description

Technical Field

[0001] This document relates to the technical field of power supply services, and in particular to a method and system for improving the quality and efficiency of rural power supply services based on evolutionary game theory. Background Art

[0002] With the rapid economic development in rural areas, the demand for electricity supply is growing. However, the implementation of rural power supply services involves multiple stakeholders, including local governments, power supply companies, and network associations. There is a complex game of interests between them, which brings challenges to improving the quality and efficiency of power supply services. Summary of the invention

[0003] One or more embodiments of this specification provide a method for improving the quality and efficiency of rural power supply services based on evolutionary game theory, including:

[0004] Determine the game subject, and construct an evolutionary game model containing limited rationality and asymmetric information based on the game subject; the game subject includes local governments, power supply companies and network association members;

[0005] Define two strategies for each game player and determine the payoff function corresponding to each strategy;

[0006] Through natural selection and imitation mechanisms, the natural evolution process of the strategies of each game subject is simulated, and the dynamic equilibrium point of the strategy selection of each subject in the game process is analyzed;

[0007] Through the dynamic equilibrium point of the strategy selection of each subject, suggestions are made for the strategy adjustment of each game subject.

[0008] Furthermore, the game model includes economic benefits, social benefits, work standards, resource allocation, project progress and results evaluation.

[0009] Furthermore, the two strategies defined for each gaming subject specifically include:

[0010] The strategy of the local government is defined as active support and normative guidance;

[0011] The strategy of the power supply company is defined as independent service and village-enterprise cooperation;

[0012] The strategies of the tennis assistants are defined as long-term cooperation and passive coordination.

[0013] Furthermore, the profit function includes basic profit, cost and investment return.

[0014] Furthermore, the profit function corresponding to each strategy is determined as follows:

[0015] The revenue function is divided into 8 modes according to the different strategic choices of local governments, power supply companies and network association members. These 8 modes are represented as follows:

[0016] (1) Under the strategy of active support from local governments, independent service from power supply companies, and long-term cooperation among network association members, the profit function of all parties is:

[0017] Local government: R G -C G0 -C G +R1;

[0018] Power supply company: L×rC E1 -R G -C ci -R V +C G0 ;

[0019] Tennis Associate: R V -C vi ;

[0020] (2) Under the strategy of local government active support, power supply company independent service, and network association members passive cooperation, the profit function of all parties is:

[0021] Local government: R G ;

[0022] Power supply company: -C ci ;

[0023] Tennis Associate: -C vi ;

[0024] (3) Under the strategy of active support from local governments, cooperation between power supply companies and villages and long-term cooperation between network association members, the profit function of all parties is:

[0025] Local government: R G ;

[0026] Power supply company: -C ci ;

[0027] Tennis Associate: -C vi ;

[0028] (4) Under the strategy of active support from local government, cooperation between power supply company and village-enterprise, and passive cooperation from network association members, the profit function of all parties is:

[0029] Local government: R G -C G0 -C G +R2;

[0030] Power supply company: aL×rC E2 -C ci -R G +CG0 ;

[0031] Tennis Association: (1-a) L×rC vi ;

[0032] (5) Under the policy of local government regulation and guidance, independent service of power supply companies, and long-term cooperation of network association members, the profit function of all parties is:

[0033] Local government: R G -R G0 -C G +R3;

[0034] Power supply company: L×rC E1 -R G -C ci -R V +R G0 ;

[0035] Tennis Associate: R V -C ci ;

[0036] (6) Under the strategy of local government regulation and guidance, independent service of power supply companies, and passive cooperation of network association members, the profit function of all parties is:

[0037] Local government: R G ;

[0038] Power supply company: -C ci ;

[0039] Tennis Associate: -C vi ;

[0040] (7) Under the guidance of local government regulations, cooperation between power supply companies and villages, and long-term cooperation strategies of network association members, the profit function of all parties is:

[0041] Local government: R G ;

[0042] Power supply company: -C ci ;

[0043] Tennis Associate: -C vi ;

[0044] (8) Under the strategy of local government regulation and guidance, power supply company village-enterprise cooperation, and network association members passive cooperation, the profit function of all parties is:

[0045] Local government: R G +R G0 -C G +R4;

[0046] Power supply company: aL×rC E2 -C ci -RG -R G0 ;

[0047] Tennis Association: (1-a) L×rC vi ;

[0048] Among them, R G The basic income of grassroots governments; G0 Costs of funds and policy support for grassroots governments to actively support strategies; C G The opportunity cost of developing cooperation; R i (i=1,2,3,4) is the social and ecological environmental benefits of grassroots governments; R G0 is the economic benefits obtained by the grassroots government through regulation and guidance; L is the scale of the power supply enterprise's operating area; r is the additional income or reduced service cost of the power supply enterprise; a is the profit share of the power supply company in the "village-enterprise cooperation" model; C E1 The operating costs of power supply enterprises under the independent service model; C E2 The investment made by the power supply enterprise under the village-enterprise cooperation model; C ci The power supply company needs to pay the cost of searching for other relevant information; v The salary income obtained by the tennis association members through long-term cooperation; vi The cost of living materials for the members of the tennis association.

[0049] One or more embodiments of this specification provide a rural power supply service quality and efficiency improvement system based on evolutionary game theory, including:

[0050] Model building module: used to determine the game subject, and build an evolutionary game model containing limited rationality and asymmetric information based on the game subject; the game subject includes local governments, power supply companies and network association members;

[0051] Function determination module: used to define two strategies for each game subject and determine the profit function corresponding to each strategy;

[0052] Game simulation module: used to simulate the natural evolution process of each game subject's strategy through natural selection and imitation mechanism, and analyze the dynamic equilibrium point of each subject's strategy selection during the game process;

[0053] Strategy adjustment module: used to make suggestions on strategy adjustment of each game subject through the dynamic equilibrium point of each subject strategy selection.

[0054] Furthermore, the game model includes economic benefits, social benefits, work standards, resource allocation, project progress and results evaluation.

[0055] Furthermore, the two strategies defined for each gaming subject specifically include:

[0056] The strategy of the local government is defined as active support and normative guidance;

[0057] The strategy of the power supply company is defined as independent service and village-enterprise cooperation;

[0058] The strategies of the tennis associates are defined as long-term cooperation and passive coordination;

[0059] The profit function corresponding to each strategy includes basic profit, cost and investment return.

[0060] One or more embodiments of the present specification provide an electronic device, including:

[0061] processor; and,

[0062] A memory arranged to store computer executable instructions, which, when executed, enable the processor to implement the steps of the above-mentioned method for improving the quality and efficiency of rural power supply services based on evolutionary game theory.

[0063] One or more embodiments of the present specification provide a storage medium for storing computer-executable instructions, which, when executed, implement the steps of the method for improving the quality and efficiency of rural power supply services based on evolutionary game theory.

[0064] By adopting the embodiment of the present invention, by constructing a model based on evolutionary game theory, the interests of local governments, power supply companies and network association members in rural power supply service projects are effectively coordinated, resource allocation is optimized, the efficiency of project implementation and the quality of power supply services are improved, the harmonious and sustainable development of the economy, society and environment is promoted, the adaptability of the project and the spirit of cooperation of all parties are enhanced, the overall economic benefits are improved, and strong support is provided for policy formulation. It is expected to bring significant positive impacts on power supply and social development in rural areas.

[0065] The above description is only an overview of the technical solution of the present invention. In order to more clearly understand the technical means of the present invention, it can be implemented according to the contents of the specification. In order to make the above and other purposes, features and advantages of the present invention more obvious and easy to understand, the specific implementation methods of the present invention are listed below. BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS

[0066] In order to more clearly illustrate one or more embodiments of this specification or the technical solutions in the prior art, the drawings required for use in the embodiments or the description of the prior art will be briefly introduced below. Obviously, the drawings described below are only some embodiments recorded in this specification. For ordinary technicians in this field, other drawings can be obtained based on these drawings without paying creative labor.

[0067] Figure 1 A flowchart of a method for improving the quality and efficiency of rural power supply services based on evolutionary game theory provided in one or more embodiments of this specification;

[0068] Figure 2 A schematic diagram of strategy selection for three parties involved in a "village network co-construction" project for a method for improving the quality and efficiency of rural power supply services based on evolutionary game theory, provided in one or more embodiments of this specification;

[0069] Figure 3 A schematic diagram of the composition of a rural power supply service quality and efficiency improvement system based on evolutionary game theory provided in one or more embodiments of this specification;

[0070] Figure 4 A schematic diagram of the structure of an electronic device provided for one or more embodiments of this specification. DETAILED DESCRIPTION

[0071] In order to enable those skilled in the art to better understand the technical solutions in one or more embodiments of this specification, the following will be combined with the drawings in one or more embodiments of this specification to clearly and completely describe the technical solutions in one or more embodiments of this specification. Obviously, the described embodiments are only part of the embodiments of this specification, not all of the embodiments. Based on one or more embodiments of this specification, all other embodiments obtained by ordinary technicians in this field without creative work should fall within the scope of protection of this document.

[0072] Method Embodiment

[0073] According to an embodiment of the present invention, a method for improving the quality and efficiency of rural power supply services based on evolutionary game theory is provided. Figure 1 A flowchart of a method for improving the quality and efficiency of rural power supply services based on evolutionary game theory is provided for one or more embodiments of this specification, such as Figure 1 As shown, the method for improving the quality and efficiency of rural power supply services based on evolutionary game theory according to an embodiment of the present invention specifically includes:

[0074] S1. Determine the game subjects, and construct an evolutionary game model containing limited rationality and asymmetric information based on the game subjects; the game subjects include local governments, power supply companies and network association members.

[0075] The game model includes economic benefits, social benefits, work standards, resource allocation, project progress and results evaluation. It further includes:

[0076] (1) Game between local governments and power supply companies:

[0077] a. Balance between cooperation and competition: Local governments pursue economic growth and social benefits, while power supply companies focus on project cost-effectiveness and service quality. Both parties need to find a balance in strategic choices.

[0078] b. Game of public resource allocation: Local governments tend to allocate resources to other social projects to meet broader social needs. At the same time, power supply companies need to ensure that they obtain sufficient public resources to support grid construction and improve service quality, and ensure the stability and reliability of power supply.

[0079] c. Game of project progress and priority: Local governments may adjust project progress and priority according to local development needs, and power supply companies will make suggestions based on implementation difficulty and technical requirements.

[0080] d. Game of outcome evaluation: Local governments and power supply companies need to reach a consensus on project outcome evaluation to ensure effective implementation and evaluation of the project.

[0081] (2) Game between power supply companies and network association members:

[0082] a. The game between workload and work standards: The power supply company expects network assistants to take on more service tasks in an efficient and accurate way to solve the shortage of human resources in the power supply company and improve the professional level of service to ensure that problems can be discovered and solved in a timely manner. At the same time, network assistants focus on their work performance in government projects, as well as their personal work performance, ability, carrying capacity and remuneration. These factors need to be reasonably adjusted to meet the needs and expectations of both parties.

[0083] b. Game between remuneration and working conditions: The power supply company has higher requirements on the workload and timeliness of network associates. Network associates hope to obtain reasonable remuneration and more recognition from all parties, and both parties need to reach an agreement.

[0084] c. The game between work quality and efficiency: The power supply company is committed to improving the quality and efficiency of its services while paying attention to customer satisfaction, while network assistants are concerned about work pressure and burden. In order to balance the interests of both parties, it is necessary to reasonably adjust work pressure while ensuring work quality and efficiency, to ensure that network assistants can perform at their best in a sustainable working environment.

[0085] (3) Game between local governments and tennis association members:

[0086] a. Game between work standards and quality: Local governments expect tennis association members to complete the tasks and objectives of representing government functions. Tennis association members focus on working conditions, remuneration, work difficulty, and personal work performance and capacity. In order to achieve the expectations of both parties, it is necessary to make reasonable adjustments to working conditions on the basis of ensuring work standards and quality, so as to meet the reasonable concerns of tennis association members and ensure the smooth completion of tasks.

[0087] b. The game between work pressure and burden: Local governments seek to improve work standards to ensure project quality and efficiency. Tennis association members focus on work intensity, hoping that their skill level can be within the scope of their personal ability, and seek to reduce work pressure to maintain work enthusiasm and efficiency. In order to achieve this goal, both parties need to improve work enthusiasm on the basis of reasonable adjustment of work pressure and burden, ensure the smooth completion of tasks and the protection of personal well-being.

[0088] S2. Define two strategies for each game player and determine the payoff function corresponding to each strategy.

[0089] Specifically, two strategies are defined for each game subject, including defining the strategy of the local government as active support and normative guidance; defining the strategy of the power supply company as independent service and village-enterprise cooperation; and defining the strategy of the network association member as long-term cooperation and passive cooperation. Figure 2 A schematic diagram of strategy selection for three parties involved in a "village network co-construction" project for a method for improving the quality and efficiency of rural power supply services based on evolutionary game theory provided in one or more embodiments of this specification.

[0090] The profit function corresponding to each strategy includes basic profit, cost and investment return, etc. The profit functions of each game subject are interdependent.

[0091] The profit function is divided into 8 models according to the different strategic choices of local governments, power supply companies and network association members. Table 1 is the profit matrix of the three parties involved in the "village network co-construction" project based on the rural power supply service quality and efficiency improvement method based on evolutionary game theory:

[0092] Table 1

[0093]

[0094] The eight modes are represented as follows:

[0095] (1) Under the strategy of active support from local governments, independent service from power supply companies, and long-term cooperation among network association members, the profit function of all parties is:

[0096] Local government: R G -C G0 -C G +R1;

[0097] Power supply company: L×rC E1 -R G -C ci -R V +C G0 ;

[0098] Tennis Associate: R V -C vi ;

[0099] (2) Under the strategy of local government active support, power supply company independent service, and network association members passive cooperation, the profit function of all parties is:

[0100] Local government: R G ;

[0101] Power supply company: -C ci ;

[0102] Tennis Associate: -C vi ;

[0103] (3) Under the strategy of active support from local governments, cooperation between power supply companies and villages and long-term cooperation between network association members, the profit function of all parties is:

[0104] Local government: R G ;

[0105] Power supply company: -C ci ;

[0106] Tennis Associate: -C vi ;

[0107] (4) Under the strategy of active support from local government, cooperation between power supply company and village-enterprise, and passive cooperation from network association members, the profit function of all parties is:

[0108] Local government: R G -C G0 -C G +R2;

[0109] Power supply company: aL×rC E2 -C ci -R G +C G0 ;

[0110] Tennis Association: (1-a) L×rC vi ;

[0111] (5) Under the policy of local government regulation and guidance, independent service of power supply companies, and long-term cooperation of network association members, the profit function of all parties is:

[0112] Local government: R G -R G0 -C G +R3;

[0113] Power supply company: L×rC E1 -R G -C ci -R V +R G0 ;

[0114] Tennis Associate: R V -C ci ;

[0115] (6) Under the strategy of local government regulation and guidance, independent service of power supply companies, and passive cooperation of network association members, the profit function of all parties is:

[0116] Local government: R G ;

[0117] Power supply company: -C ci ;

[0118] Tennis Associate: -C vi ;

[0119] (7) Under the guidance of local government regulations, cooperation between power supply companies and villages, and long-term cooperation strategies of network association members, the profit function of all parties is:

[0120] Local government: R G ;

[0121] Power supply company: -C ci ;

[0122] Tennis Associate: -C vi ;

[0123] (8) Under the strategy of local government regulation and guidance, power supply company village-enterprise cooperation, and network association members passive cooperation, the profit function of all parties is:

[0124] Local government: R G +R G0 -C G +R4;

[0125] Power supply company: aL×rC E2 -C ci -R G -R G0 ;

[0126] Tennis Association: (1-a) L×rC vi ;

[0127] These profit functions reflect the expected returns of each party under a given strategy, where R G The basic income of grassroots governments; G0 Costs of funds and policy support for grassroots governments to actively support strategies; C GThe opportunity cost of developing cooperation; R i (i=1,2,3,4) is the social and ecological environmental benefits of grassroots governments; R G0 is the economic benefits obtained by the grassroots government through regulation and guidance; L is the scale of the power supply enterprise's operating area; r is the additional income or reduced service cost of the power supply enterprise; a is the profit share of the power supply company in the "village-enterprise cooperation" model; C E1 The operating costs of power supply enterprises under the independent service model; C E2 The investment made by the power supply enterprise under the village-enterprise cooperation model; C ci The power supply company needs to pay the cost of searching for other relevant information; v The salary income obtained by the tennis association members through long-term cooperation; vi The cost of living materials for the members of the tennis association.

[0128] S3. Simulate the natural evolution of the strategies of each game subject through natural selection and imitation mechanisms, and analyze the dynamic equilibrium point of the strategy selection of each subject during the game.

[0129] Based on the above game subject strategies, the natural evolution process is simulated, including:

[0130] (1) Strategic evolution between local governments and power supply companies:

[0131] During the project implementation process, local governments and power supply companies will dynamically adjust their cooperation strategies based on actual results and benefits. When the cooperation between the two parties can significantly enhance the public interest and achieve economic benefits for the enterprise, they are more likely to consolidate and strengthen the existing cooperative relationship. In this case, the local government may formulate and implement a series of preferential policies to support the power supply company's work in project promotion and grid services, thereby promoting the smooth progress of the project and the improvement of service quality. However, if the benefits of the cooperation do not meet expectations or the costs exceed the budget, the two parties may re-evaluate the existing cooperation model. They may explore new ways of cooperation or take independent actions when necessary to seek more effective solutions and a more optimized cost-effectiveness ratio. This flexible strategic adjustment helps ensure the sustainability of the project and the long-term interests of both parties.

[0132] (2) Strategic evolution between power supply companies and network association members:

[0133] The power company adjusts training and incentives based on the network assistant's performance. If the network assistant is efficient, provides good service, and has high customer satisfaction, the power company may provide more support and rewards. If the network assistant performs poorly, the power company may reduce support or take measures to improve efficiency.

[0134] (3) Strategic evolution between local governments and tennis association members:

[0135] The local government adjusts the supervision and management mode according to the work results of the tennis assistants. If the tennis assistants complete their tasks effectively, the local government may increase their trust and autonomy; if the work performance is not ideal, the local government may strengthen supervision and intervention.

[0136] Analyze the dynamic equilibrium point of each subject's strategy selection during the game, specifically:

[0137] Observe the evolution of each agent's strategy over multiple iterations or simulations to study which strategies tend to be stable in the long run and whether any combination of strategies forms a recurring pattern;

[0138] During the simulation, we look for a point where the strategy choices of each subject no longer change significantly, or the change pattern shows periodicity or convergence. This point can be regarded as a dynamic equilibrium point.

[0139] Evaluate the stability of the identified equilibrium points and check whether when one agent in the system changes its strategy, it will cause other agents to change their strategies as well, thus destroying the equilibrium.

[0140] S4. Propose suggestions for the strategy adjustment of each game subject through the dynamic equilibrium point of the strategy selection of each subject.

[0141] First, the data collected during the simulation process are reviewed in detail, including the strategy choices, payoff changes, and interaction patterns of each game player; identify strategies that bring higher or more stable payoffs in most cases, which may be strategies that each player should consider adopting or maintaining; analyze the stability of strategies in different situations, including the adaptability and flexibility of current strategies when external conditions change or other players change their strategies; identify deviations between actual strategy choices and dynamic equilibrium points, and understand why some players may not choose the optimal strategy; consider the specific goals and constraints of each game player to ensure that the proposed strategy recommendations are consistent with their goals; and make specific recommendations. For local governments, it may be recommended to adjust management policies, provide more incentives, or improve infrastructure to attract investment from power supply companies. For power supply companies, it may be recommended to optimize power production arrangements and management models, strengthen cooperation with local governments, or improve service models to improve service quality. For network association members, it may be recommended to improve work efficiency, participate in training programs, or improve communication with community residents and power supply companies to improve work performance and benefits.

[0142] The beneficial effects of the present invention are as follows:

[0143] By constructing a model based on evolutionary game theory, the present invention effectively coordinates the interests of local governments, power supply companies and network association members in rural power supply service projects, optimizes resource allocation, improves the efficiency of project implementation and the quality of power supply services, promotes the harmonious and sustainable development of the economy, society and environment, enhances the adaptability of the project and the spirit of cooperation among all parties, improves the overall economic benefits, and provides strong support for policy formulation. It is expected to have a significant positive impact on power supply and social development in rural areas.

[0144] System Example

[0145] According to an embodiment of the present invention, a rural power supply service quality and efficiency improvement system based on evolutionary game theory is provided. Figure 3 A schematic diagram of a rural power supply service quality and efficiency improvement system based on evolutionary game theory is provided for one or more embodiments of this specification, such as Figure 4 As shown, the rural power supply service quality and efficiency improvement system based on evolutionary game theory according to an embodiment of the present invention specifically includes:

[0146] Model building module 30: used to determine the game subjects, and build an evolutionary game model containing limited rationality and asymmetric information based on the game subjects; the game subjects include local governments, power supply companies and network association members.

[0147] The game model includes economic benefits, social benefits, work standards, resource allocation, project progress and results evaluation.

[0148] Function determination module 32: used to define two strategies for each game subject and determine the profit function corresponding to each strategy.

[0149] The two strategies defined for each gaming subject specifically include:

[0150] The strategy of the local government is defined as active support and normative guidance;

[0151] The strategy of the power supply company is defined as independent service and village-enterprise cooperation;

[0152] The strategies of the tennis associates are defined as long-term cooperation and passive coordination;

[0153] The profit function corresponding to each strategy includes basic profit, cost and investment return.

[0154] Game simulation module 34: used to simulate the natural evolution process of the strategies of each game subject through natural selection and imitation mechanism, and analyze the dynamic equilibrium point of the strategy selection of each subject during the game process.

[0155] Strategy adjustment module 36: used to make suggestions on strategy adjustment of each gaming subject through the dynamic equilibrium point of the strategy selection of each subject.

[0156] The embodiment of the present invention is a system embodiment corresponding to the above-mentioned method embodiment. The specific operations of each module can be understood by referring to the description of the method embodiment, which will not be repeated here.

[0157] Device Example 1

[0158] An embodiment of the present invention provides an electronic device, such as Figure 4 As shown, it includes: a memory 40, a processor 42, and a computer program stored in the memory 40 and executable on the processor 42. When the computer program is executed by the processor 42, the following method steps are implemented:

[0159] S1. Determine the game subject, and construct an evolutionary game model containing limited rationality and asymmetric information based on the game subject; the game subject includes local governments, power supply companies and network association members;

[0160] S2. Define two strategies for each game player and determine the payoff function corresponding to each strategy;

[0161] S3. Simulate the natural evolution of the strategies of each game subject through natural selection and imitation mechanisms, and analyze the dynamic equilibrium point of the strategy selection of each subject in the game process;

[0162] S4. Propose suggestions for the strategy adjustment of each game subject through the dynamic equilibrium point of the strategy selection of each subject.

[0163] Device Example 2

[0164] An embodiment of the present invention provides a computer-readable storage medium, on which a program for implementing information transmission is stored. When the program is executed by the processor 42, the following method steps are implemented:

[0165] S1. Determine the game subject, and construct an evolutionary game model containing limited rationality and asymmetric information based on the game subject; the game subject includes local governments, power supply companies and network association members;

[0166] S2. Define two strategies for each game player and determine the payoff function corresponding to each strategy;

[0167] S3. Simulate the natural evolution of the strategies of each game subject through natural selection and imitation mechanisms, and analyze the dynamic equilibrium point of the strategy selection of each subject in the game process;

[0168] S4. Propose suggestions for the strategy adjustment of each game subject through the dynamic equilibrium point of the strategy selection of each subject.

[0169] The computer-readable storage medium in this embodiment includes, but is not limited to, ROM, RAM, magnetic disk or optical disk, etc.

[0170] Finally, it should be noted that the above embodiments are only used to illustrate the technical solutions of the present invention, rather than to limit it. Although the present invention has been described in detail with reference to the aforementioned embodiments, those skilled in the art should understand that they can still modify the technical solutions described in the aforementioned embodiments, or replace some or all of the technical features therein with equivalents. However, these modifications or replacements do not cause the essence of the corresponding technical solutions to deviate from the scope of the technical solutions of the embodiments of the present invention.

Claims

1. A method for improving the quality and efficiency of rural power supply services based on evolutionary game theory, characterized in that: include: Determine the game subject, and construct an evolutionary game model containing limited rationality and asymmetric information based on the game subject; the game subject includes local governments, power supply companies and network association members; Define two strategies for each game player and determine the payoff function corresponding to each strategy; Through natural selection and imitation mechanisms, the natural evolution process of the strategies of each game subject is simulated, and the dynamic equilibrium point of the strategy selection of each subject in the game process is analyzed; Through the dynamic equilibrium point of the strategy selection of each subject, suggestions are made for the strategy adjustment of each game subject.

2. The method according to claim 1, characterized in that The game model includes economic benefits, social benefits, work standards, resource allocation, project progress and results evaluation.

3. The method according to claim 1, characterized in that The two strategies defined for each gaming subject specifically include: The strategy of the local government is defined as active support and normative guidance; The strategy of the power supply company is defined as independent service and village-enterprise cooperation; The strategies of the tennis assistants are defined as long-term cooperation and passive coordination.

4. The method according to claim 1, characterized in that: The benefit function includes basic benefit, cost and investment return.

5. The method according to claim 1, characterized in that The specific profit function corresponding to each strategy is determined as follows: The revenue function is divided into 8 modes according to the different strategic choices of local governments, power supply companies and network association members. The 8 modes are represented as follows: (1) Under the strategy of active support from local governments, independent service from power supply companies, and long-term cooperation among network association members, the profit function of all parties is: Local government: R G -C G0 -C G +R1; Power supply company: L×rC E1 -R G -C ci -R V +C G0 ; Tennis Associate: R V -C vi ; (2) Under the strategy of local government active support, power supply company independent service, and network association members passive cooperation, the profit function of all parties is: Local government: R G ; Power supply company: -C ci ; Tennis Associate: -C vi ; (3) Under the strategy of active support from local governments, cooperation between power supply companies and villages and long-term cooperation between network association members, the profit function of all parties is: Local government: R G ; Power supply company: -C ci ; Tennis Associate: -C vi ; (4) Under the strategy of active support from local government, cooperation between power supply company and village-enterprise, and passive cooperation from network association members, the profit function of all parties is: Local government: R G -C G0 -C G +R2; Power supply company: aL×rC E2 -C ci -R G +C G0 ; Tennis Association: (1-a) L×rC vi ; (5) Under the policy of local government regulation and guidance, independent service of power supply companies, and long-term cooperation of network association members, the profit function of all parties is: Local government: R G -R G0 -C G +R3; Power supply company: L×rC E1 -R G -C ci -R V +R G0 ; Tennis Associate: R V -C ci ; (6) Under the strategy of local government regulation and guidance, independent service of power supply companies, and passive cooperation of network association members, the profit function of all parties is: Local government: R G ; Power supply company: -C ci ; Tennis Associate: -C vi ; (7) Under the guidance of local government regulations, cooperation between power supply companies and villages, and long-term cooperation strategies of network association members, the profit function of all parties is: Local government: R G ; Power supply company: -C ci ; Tennis Associate: -C vi ; (8) Under the strategy of local government regulation and guidance, power supply company village-enterprise cooperation, and network association members passive cooperation, the profit function of all parties is: Local government: R G +R G0 -C G +R4; Power supply company: aL×rC E2 -C ci -R G -R G0 ; Tennis Association: (1-a) L×rC vi ; Among them, R G The basic income of grassroots governments; G0 Costs of funds and policy support for grassroots governments to actively support strategies; C G The opportunity cost of developing cooperation; R i (i=1,2,3,4) is the social and ecological environmental benefits of grassroots governments; R G0 is the economic benefits obtained by the grassroots government through regulation and guidance; L is the scale of the power supply enterprise's operating area; r is the additional income or reduced service cost of the power supply enterprise; a is the profit share of the power supply company in the "village-enterprise cooperation" model; C E1 The operating costs of power supply enterprises under the independent service model; C E2 The investment made by the power supply enterprise under the village-enterprise cooperation model; C ci The power supply company needs to pay the cost of searching for other relevant information; v The salary income obtained by the tennis association members through long-term cooperation; vi The cost of living materials for the members of the tennis association.

6. A rural power supply service quality and efficiency improvement system based on evolutionary game theory, characterized in that: include: Model building module: used to determine the game subject, and build an evolutionary game model containing limited rationality and asymmetric information based on the game subject; the game subject includes local governments, power supply companies and network association members; Function determination module: used to define two strategies for each game subject and determine the profit function corresponding to each strategy; Game simulation module: used to simulate the natural evolution process of each game subject's strategy through natural selection and imitation mechanism, and analyze the dynamic equilibrium point of each subject's strategy selection during the game process; Strategy adjustment module: used to make suggestions on strategy adjustment of each game subject through the dynamic equilibrium point of each subject strategy selection.

7. The system according to claim 6, characterized in that The game model includes economic benefits, social benefits, work standards, resource allocation, project progress and results evaluation.

8. The system according to claim 6, characterized in that The two strategies defined for each gaming subject specifically include: The strategy of the local government is defined as active support and normative guidance; The strategy of the power supply company is defined as independent service and village-enterprise cooperation; The strategies of the tennis associates are defined as long-term cooperation and passive coordination; The profit function corresponding to each strategy includes basic profit, cost and investment return.

9. An electronic device, characterized in that: include: processor; as well as, A memory arranged to store computer executable instructions, which, when executed, enable the processor to implement the steps of the method for improving the quality and efficiency of rural power supply services based on evolutionary game theory as described in any one of claims 1 to 5.

10. A storage medium, characterized in that: Used to store computer executable instructions, which, when executed, implement the steps of the method for improving the quality and efficiency of rural power supply services based on evolutionary game theory as described in any one of claims 1 to 5.

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