Non-interactive instant authentication and secure data transmission method

Abstract

The invention discloses a non-interactive instant identity authentication and secure data transmission method, which comprises the following steps of: generating global parameters through a trust mechanism, distributing the global parameters to an edge terminal, an authentication center and an edge computing server, and performing edge terminal authentication by adopting a non-interactive identity authentication technology. And the edge terminal generates and sends an instant authentication certificate in the authentication process to realize secure connection with the edge computing server. The security of communication is ensured by adopting a hash function and a public key cryptography technology, and an illegal terminal is prevented from accessing the system through a non-member certification and revocation list mechanism. The edge terminal and the server are encrypted through a temporary symmetric key, so that the confidentiality and integrity of data transmission are ensured. The method has the advantages of efficient identity authentication, reliable data transmission security and optimized calculation and bandwidth utilization, is suitable for edge calculation scenes with limited resources, and has good security, efficiency and expandability.

Description

Technical Field

[0001] The invention belongs to the technical field of data transmission, and in particular relates to a non-interactive instant identity authentication and secure data transmission method. Background Art

[0002] With the continuous development of information technology, especially in the application fields of edge computing and the Internet of Things, the security issues of identity authentication and data transmission have become increasingly prominent. Traditional identity authentication methods, such as authentication based on username and password, two-factor authentication, etc., often have many shortcomings when facing large-scale device access and complex network environments. These traditional methods usually rely on user interaction and require users to provide identity information and verification credentials at each authentication, resulting in inefficiency and security issues in the authentication process. Especially in scenarios with complex network environments and a large number of terminal devices, it is easy to encounter security threats such as identity theft and data leakage.

[0003] In an edge computing environment, edge terminal devices are usually located at the edge of the network and frequently exchange data with remote servers. In this process, how to achieve efficient and secure identity authentication and data encryption transmission without relying on user interaction has become a technical problem that needs to be solved urgently. Traditional authentication methods often require frequent user input and complex communication processes, which not only increases the time and cost of authentication, but also increases the possibility of security risks such as man-in-the-middle attacks and replay attacks.

[0004] In order to solve these problems, non-interactive authentication and secure data transmission methods have emerged. Based on cryptographic principles, this method uses global parameters, key derivation, hash functions and other technologies. Through the collaboration between edge terminals, authentication centers and edge computing servers, it can complete identity authentication without user interaction and ensure the security of data transmission through encryption technology. This method can effectively reduce the complexity of the authentication process and improve the security and communication efficiency of devices in edge computing environments.

[0005] At present, many security protocols based on traditional authentication mechanisms have certain limitations when facing emerging application scenarios such as edge computing and the Internet of Things. In order to cope with the needs of large-scale device access and high-frequency data transmission, it is necessary to design a solution that can not only ensure security, but also complete identity authentication and data encryption transmission with low latency and high efficiency. Therefore, a non-interactive instant identity authentication and secure data transmission method is proposed, which can effectively solve the problems in the existing technology, improve the degree of automation of identity authentication, and enhance the reliability of data encryption transmission, which has important practical application value. Summary of the invention

[0006] The purpose of the present invention is to overcome the defects of the prior art and provide a method and device for installing a low voltage commutation device.

[0007] The purpose of the present invention can be achieved by the following technical solutions:

[0008] The present invention provides a non-interactive instant identity authentication and secure data transmission method, comprising the following steps:

[0009] Step S1: The trust institution generates global parameters and sends the global parameters to the corresponding edge terminals, authentication center and edge computing server;

[0010] Step S2: The edge terminal sends the edge terminal identity identifier to the first authentication center and the second authentication center. The first authentication center and the second authentication center cooperate to generate a pseudonym, MAIBC key, and non-member certificate for the edge terminal, and send the pseudonym, MAIBC key, and non-member certificate to the edge terminal.

[0011] Step S3: The edge terminal generates an edge terminal public key and private key, and makes the edge terminal public key and pseudonym public;

[0012] Step S4: The edge terminal generates an instant authentication credential and sends the instant authentication credential to the edge computing server. The edge computing server authenticates the edge terminal according to the instant authentication credential. If the authentication succeeds, step S5 is executed. If the authentication fails, verification is stopped.

[0013] Step S5: the edge terminal generates public key information, generates a temporary symmetric key through a key derivation function according to the public key information, and encrypts the message using the temporary symmetric key to generate an encrypted message;

[0014] Step S6: The edge terminal sends the encrypted message and the instant authentication credential to the edge computing server, and the edge computing server decrypts the encrypted message to obtain the message transmitted by the edge terminal.

[0015] Furthermore, the global parameters include a generator G of cyclic addition group G with order q, edge terminal, authentication center and edge computing server identity identifier ID ∈ 0,1 ＊ , the public key pk1∈G and private key of the first authentication center The public key pk2∈G and private key of the second authentication center Four hash functions H0:G×G→0,1 ★ ,

[0016] Furthermore, the step S2 includes the following steps:

[0017] Step S2.1: The edge terminal sends the edge terminal identity identifier to the first authentication center and the second authentication center;

[0018] Step S2.2: The first authentication center cooperates with the second authentication center to generate a pseudonym for the edge terminal;

[0019] Step S2.3: The first authentication center and the second authentication center generate the MAIBC key of the edge terminal according to the pseudonym, the public key and the private key of the first authentication center and the second authentication center and verify it. If the verification is successful, step S2.4 is executed. If the verification fails, the second authentication center exits the key distribution program and the edge terminal registration fails.

[0020] Step S2.4: The first authentication center and the second authentication center generate a non-member certificate for the edge terminal, and send the pseudonym, MAIBC key, and non-member certificate to the edge terminal.

[0021] Furthermore, the step S2.2 includes the following steps:

[0022] The first authentication center randomly selects a random number in, is the first random number, is the multiplicative group modulo q, computing the first intermediate parameter Where pk2 is the public key of the second authentication center, and the first authentication center sends the first intermediate parameter X to the second authentication center;

[0023] After receiving the first intermediate parameter X, the second authentication center generates the pseudonym pid of the edge terminal through the following formula i :

[0024]

[0025] Among them, pid i is the pseudonym of edge terminal i, ID i is the identity identifier of edge terminal i, H0 is the first hash function in the global parameters, and sk2 is the private key of the second authentication center;

[0026] The second authentication center will be the pseudonym pid of the edge terminal i Sent to the first authentication center.

[0027] Furthermore, the step S2.3 includes:

[0028] The first authentication center uses the first random number The public key pk2 of the second authentication center and the pseudonym pid of the edge terminal i The first hash value is generated by the following formula

[0029]

[0030] Wherein, H1 is the second hash function in the global parameters;

[0031] The first authentication center The second intermediate parameter is generated by the following formula

[0032]

[0033] Among them, sk1 is the private key of the first authentication center;

[0034] The first authentication center sends the second intermediate parameter Send to the second authentication center;

[0035] The second authentication center randomly selects a random number as the second random number Generate the second hash value according to the following formula

[0036]

[0037] in, is the second hash value, H2 is the third hash function in the global parameters;

[0038] The second authentication center verifies the intermediate parameters sent by the first authentication center according to the following equation based on the second authentication center private key:

[0039]

[0040] Among them, X, The first intermediate parameter and the second intermediate parameter are respectively generated by the first authentication center;

[0041] If the equation is true, the verification is successful and step S2.4 is executed. If the equation is not true, the verification fails, the second authentication center exits the key distribution program, and the edge terminal registration fails.

[0042] Furthermore, the step S2.4 includes the following steps:

[0043] The second authentication center updates the second intermediate parameter according to the following formula The third intermediate parameter

[0044]

[0045] According to the updated third intermediate parameter Generate partial private key z of edge terminal i :

[0046]

[0047] in, is the updated second intermediate parameter, z i Part of the private key of the edge terminal;

[0048] The first authentication center generates a first non-member certificate for the edge terminal Will Send to edge terminal;

[0049] The second authentication center generates a second non-member certificate for the edge terminal Will Sent to the edge terminal.

[0050] Furthermore, the step S3 includes the following steps:

[0051] The edge terminal receives the first intermediate parameter X and the third intermediate parameter X. Generate the first hash value of the edge terminal The second hash value with edge terminal

[0052]

[0053] According to the first hash value of the edge terminal The second hash value with edge terminal Partial private key z for edge terminals i To verify, the equation is:

[0054]

[0055] If the equation does not hold, then the edge terminal ET i If the generation of the edge terminal public key and private key fails, exit the registration program. If the equation is true, perform the following steps:

[0056] Edge Terminal ET i Generate the edge terminal public key pk according to the following formula i Private key sk i Proof with non-membersω i :

[0057]

[0058]

[0059] where ω i Used to indicate edge terminal ET i Public key pk i Not on the revocation list;

[0060] Edge Terminal ET iThe edge terminal public key pk i with pseudonym pid i public.

[0061] Further, the step S4 includes the following steps:

[0062] The edge terminal generates instant authentication credentials, including the following steps:

[0063] The edge terminal randomly selects a random number as the third random number Generate a first instant authentication value R according to the third random number i , the second instant authentication value R′ i With instant authentication intermediate value The formula is:

[0064] R i =r i ·pk j

[0065]

[0066] Among them, pk j MEC for edge computing servers j Public key of edge computing server MEC j The public key pk j Get process and edge terminal ET i The process of obtaining the public key is the same. z j MEC for edge computing servers j Part of the private key, is the fourth random number, d i By R i , the public key information of both parties and the current timestamp are used as input to calculate the hash function value;

[0067] The edge terminal takes the current system timestamp TS i , timestamp TS i By d i Embedded in the instant authentication credential IAC, timestamp TS i For plain text transmission, if the timestamp TS i Modification will result in IAC verification failure;

[0068] According to the current system timestamp TS i 、Non-member certificateω i , the first instant authentication value R i , the second instant authentication value R′ i With instant authentication intermediate value Generate instant authentication credentials for IAC, where

[0069] The edge terminal sends the instant authentication credentials as IAC to the edge computing server MEC j ;

[0070] Edge computing server MEC j Get the current system timestamp TS j , according to the timestamp TS j Verify TS by the following formula i Is it valid?

[0071] TS j -TS i >Δ

[0072] Among them, Δ is a system parameter set in advance, and its value depends on the specific network environment;

[0073] If it is greater than Δ, the authentication fails. If it is less than Δ, the edge computing server MEC j verify Whether it has been verified within the Δ time period, if it has been verified, the authentication fails, if it has not been verified, the authentication succeeds, Perform storage records, the edge computing server only stores the instant authentication credentials within the Δ time period;

[0074] Edge computing server MEC j According to ω i Check the edge terminal ETi public key pk i Is it in the revocation list? If it is in the revocation list, the authentication fails. If it is not in the revocation list, perform the following steps:

[0075] Edge computing server MEC j Through edge computing server MEC j Public key pk j The first instant authentication value R is calculated according to the following equation i , the second instant authentication value R′ i With instant authentication intermediate value To verify:

[0076]

[0077] Among them, z j MEC for edge computing servers j Part of the private key, is the fourth random number, z j and By edge computing server MEC j Public key pk j get;

[0078] If the equation holds, the authentication is successful and step S5 is executed. If the equation does not hold, the authentication fails.

[0079] Furthermore, the step S5 includes the following steps:

[0080] Edge Terminal ET i According to the public key pk i Generate public key information PS ij ,

[0081]

[0082] And use the key generation function KDF (PS ij ,R′ i ,pid j ) derive the temporary symmetric key K ij ;

[0083] Edge Terminal ET i Using the temporary symmetric key K ij For message M ij Encryption is performed, and the encryption formula is:

[0084]

[0085] Among them, C ij is the encrypted ciphertext;

[0086] Edge Terminal ET i Generate encrypted message

[0087] Further, the step S6 includes the following steps:

[0088] Edge Terminal ET i Encrypt the message Sent to the edge computing server MEC j , Edge Computing Server MEC j Obtain the key material PS′ based on the encrypted message ij , the formula is:

[0089]

[0090] According to the key material PS′ ij Get the symmetric key K′ ij , the formula is:

[0091] K′ ij =KDF(P′ Sj ,R′ i ,pid i )

[0092] Edge computing server MEC j Through the symmetric key K' ij For ciphertext C ij Decrypt and obtain message M ij .

[0093] Compared with the prior art, the present invention has the following advantages:

[0094] (1) The present invention adopts a key management system that combines multi-authorization center IBC and non-membership certification, taking into account the security of the identity cryptographic system and the flexibility of the certificateless cryptographic system. The secure encryption method based on pre-authentication technology integrates the flexibility of authenticated key negotiation and the security of authenticated encryption to achieve non-interactive instant secure data delivery.

[0095] (2) The present invention adopts a non-interactive identity authentication method, and performs identity authentication between the edge terminal and the edge computing server based on pre-shared global parameters and public key encryption, avoiding multiple rounds of message exchange in the traditional interactive authentication process, greatly improving the authentication efficiency, and reducing communication delays and system burdens.

[0096] (3) The present invention adopts a variety of hash functions and public key cryptography technologies to ensure the authenticity of the edge terminal identity and the security of data transmission by generating temporary keys, instant authentication credentials and non-member certificates, effectively preventing security attacks such as forgery and replay, and improving the security and anti-attack capabilities of the system.

[0097] (4) The present invention combines the mechanism of non-member certification with the revocation list to ensure that only legitimate and unrevoked edge terminal identities are allowed to communicate, thereby preventing terminals with revoked identities from accessing the system and enhancing the security and credibility of the system.

[0098] (5) The present invention ensures the uniqueness and timeliness of each communication by generating an instant authentication credential (IAC) combined with timestamp and hash verification, avoiding the risk of authentication failure or data leakage caused by key leakage or abuse. At the same time, the reliability of the authentication mechanism is further enhanced by time validity verification and historical record verification.

[0099] (6) The present invention uses public key information to generate a temporary symmetric key through a key derivation function (KDF), and uses the symmetric key to encrypt the message. This technology can effectively improve the efficiency of data transmission, reduce the computational burden brought by public key encryption, and ensure that the encrypted message is not tampered with or stolen during the transmission process.

[0100] (7) The present invention significantly reduces the network bandwidth and computing resource consumption in the authentication process while ensuring security through non-interactive authentication, generation and verification of instant authentication credentials, and application of symmetric encryption technology, thereby optimizing the overall system performance and being particularly suitable for resource-constrained edge computing environments. BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS

[0101] Figure 1 is a flow chart of the method of the present invention;

[0102] Figure 2 It is a flowchart of the present invention. DETAILED DESCRIPTION

[0103] The following will be combined with the drawings in the embodiments of the present invention to clearly and completely describe the technical solutions in the embodiments of the present invention. Obviously, the described embodiments are part of the embodiments of the present invention, not all of the embodiments. Based on the embodiments of the present invention, all other embodiments obtained by ordinary technicians in this field without creative work should fall within the scope of protection of the present invention.

[0104] Embodiment 1:

[0105] This embodiment provides a non-interactive instant identity authentication and secure data transmission method, including the following steps:

[0106] Step S1: The trust agency generates global parameters and sends the global parameters to the corresponding edge terminals, authentication center and edge computing server;

[0107] Step S2: The edge terminal sends the edge terminal identity identifier to the first authentication center and the second authentication center. The first authentication center and the second authentication center cooperate to generate a pseudonym, MAIBC key, and non-member certificate for the edge terminal, and send the pseudonym, MAIBC key, and non-member certificate to the edge terminal.

[0108] Step S3: The edge terminal generates an edge terminal public key and private key, and makes the edge terminal public key and pseudonym public;

[0109] Step S4: The edge terminal generates an instant authentication credential and sends the instant authentication credential to the edge computing server. The edge computing server authenticates the edge terminal according to the instant authentication credential. If the authentication succeeds, step S5 is executed. If the authentication fails, verification is stopped.

[0110] Step S5: the edge terminal generates public key information, generates a temporary symmetric key through a key derivation function according to the public key information, and encrypts the message using the temporary symmetric key to generate an encrypted message;

[0111] Step S6: The edge terminal sends the encrypted message and the instant authentication credential to the edge computing server, and the edge computing server decrypts the encrypted message to obtain the message transmitted by the edge terminal.

[0112] The global parameters include a cyclic addition group G with a generator of g order and q, the identity identifiers ID∈0,1 of the edge terminal, the authentication center and the edge computing server. * , the public key pk1∈G and private key of the first authentication center The public key pk2∈G and private key of the second authentication center Four hash functions H0:G×G→0,1 * ,

[0113] Wherein, step S2 comprises the following steps:

[0114] Step S2.1: The edge terminal sends the edge terminal identity identifier to the first authentication center and the second authentication center;

[0115] Step S2.2: The first authentication center cooperates with the second authentication center to generate a pseudonym for the edge terminal;

[0116] Step S2.3: The first authentication center and the second authentication center generate the MAIBC key of the edge terminal according to the pseudonym, the public key and the private key of the first authentication center and the second authentication center and verify it. If the verification is successful, step S2.4 is executed. If the verification fails, the second authentication center exits the key distribution program and the edge terminal registration fails.

[0117] Step S2.4: The first authentication center and the second authentication center generate a non-member certificate for the edge terminal, and send the pseudonym, MAIBC key, and non-member certificate to the edge terminal.

[0118] Wherein, step S2.2 comprises the following steps:

[0119] The first authentication center randomly selects a random number in, is the first random number, is the multiplicative group modulo q, computing the first intermediate parameter Where pk2 is the public key of the second authentication center, and the first authentication center sends the first intermediate parameter X to the second authentication center;

[0120] After receiving the first intermediate parameter X, the second authentication center generates the pseudonym pid of the edge terminal through the following formula i :

[0121]

[0122] Among them, pid iis the pseudonym of edge terminal i, ID i is the identity identifier of edge terminal i, H0 is the first hash function in the global parameters, and sk2 is the private key of the second authentication center;

[0123] The second authentication center will be the pseudonym pid of the edge terminal i Sent to the first authentication center.

[0124] Wherein, step S2.3 comprises:

[0125] The first authentication center uses the first random number The public key pk2 of the second authentication center and the pseudonym pid of the edge terminal i The first hash value is generated by the following formula

[0126]

[0127] Wherein, H1 is the second hash function in the global parameters;

[0128] The first authentication center The second intermediate parameter is generated by the following formula

[0129]

[0130] Among them, sk1 is the private key of the first authentication center;

[0131] The first authentication center sends the second intermediate parameter Send to the second authentication center;

[0132] The second authentication center randomly selects a random number as the second random number Generate the second hash value according to the following formula

[0133]

[0134] in, is the second hash value, H2 is the third hash function in the global parameters;

[0135] The second authentication center verifies the intermediate parameters sent by the first authentication center according to the following equation based on the second authentication center private key:

[0136]

[0137] Among them, X, The first intermediate parameter and the second intermediate parameter are respectively generated by the first authentication center;

[0138] If the equation is true, the verification is successful and step S2.4 is executed. If the equation is not true, the verification fails, the second authentication center exits the key distribution program, and the edge terminal registration fails.

[0139] Wherein, step S2.4 comprises the following steps:

[0140] The second authentication center updates the second intermediate parameter according to the following formula The third intermediate parameter

[0141]

[0142] According to the updated third intermediate parameter Generate partial private key z of edge terminal i :

[0143]

[0144] in, is the updated second intermediate parameter, z i Part of the private key of the edge terminal;

[0145] The first authentication center generates a first non-member certificate for the edge terminal Will Send to edge terminal;

[0146] The second authentication center generates a second non-member certificate for the edge terminal Will Sent to the edge terminal.

[0147] Wherein, step S3 comprises the following steps:

[0148] The edge terminal receives the first intermediate parameter X and the third intermediate parameter X. Generate the first hash value of the edge terminal The second hash value with edge terminal

[0149]

[0150] According to the first hash value of the edge terminal The second hash value with edge terminal Partial private key z for edge terminals i To verify, the equation is:

[0151]

[0152] If the equation does not hold, then the edge terminal ET i If the generation of the edge terminal public key and private key fails, exit the registration program. If the equation is true, perform the following steps:

[0153] Edge Terminal ET i Generate the edge terminal public key pk according to the following formula i Private key sk i Proof with non-membersω i :

[0154]

[0155]

[0156] where ω i Used to indicate edge terminal ET i Public key pk i Not on the revocation list;

[0157] Edge Terminal ET i The edge terminal public key pk i with pseudonym pid i public.

[0158] Wherein, step S4 comprises the following steps:

[0159] The edge terminal generates instant authentication credentials, including the following steps:

[0160] The edge terminal randomly selects a random number as the third random number Generate a first instant authentication value R according to the third random number i , the second instant authentication value R′ i With instant authentication intermediate value The formula is:

[0161] R i =r i ·pk j

[0162]

[0163] Among them, pk j MEC for edge computing servers j Public key of edge computing server MEC j The public key pk j Get process and edge terminal ET i The process of obtaining the public key is the same. z j MEC for edge computing servers j Part of the private key, is the fourth random number, d i By R i , the public key information of both parties and the current timestamp are used as input to calculate the hash function value;

[0164] The edge terminal takes the current system timestamp TS i , timestamp TS i By d i Embedded in the instant authentication credential IAC, timestamp TS i For plain text transmission, if the timestamp TS i Modification will result in IAC verification failure;

[0165] According to the current system timestamp TS i 、Non-member certificateω i , the first instant authentication value R i , the second instant authentication value R′ i With instant authentication intermediate value Generate instant authentication credentials for IAC, where

[0166] The edge terminal sends the instant authentication credentials as IAC to the edge computing server MEC j ;

[0167] Edge computing server MEC j Get the current system timestamp TS j , according to the timestamp TS j Verify TS by the following formula i Is it valid?

[0168] TS j -TS i >Δ

[0169] Among them, Δ is a system parameter set in advance, and its value depends on the specific network environment;

[0170] If it is greater than Δ, the authentication fails. If it is less than Δ, the edge computing server MEC j verify Whether it has been verified within the Δ time period, if it has been verified, the authentication fails, if it has not been verified, the authentication succeeds, For storage records, the edge computing server only stores the instant authentication credentials within the Δ time period;

[0171] Edge computing server MEC j According to ω i Check edge terminal ET i Public key pk i Is it in the revocation list? If it is in the revocation list, the authentication fails. If it is not in the revocation list, perform the following steps:

[0172] Edge computing server MEC j Through edge computing server MECj Public key pk j The first instant authentication value R is calculated according to the following equation i , the second instant authentication value R′ i With instant authentication intermediate value To verify:

[0173]

[0174] Among them, z j MEC for edge computing servers j Part of the private key, is the fourth random number, z j and By edge computing server MEC j Public key pk j get;

[0175] If the equation holds, the authentication is successful and step S5 is executed. If the equation does not hold, the authentication fails.

[0176] Wherein, step S5 comprises the following steps:

[0177] Edge Terminal ET i According to the public key pk i Generate public key information PS ij ,

[0178]

[0179] And use the key generation function KDF (PS ij ,R′ i ,pid j ) derive the temporary symmetric key K ij ;

[0180] Edge Terminal ET i Using the temporary symmetric key K ij For message M ij Encryption is performed, and the encryption formula is:

[0181]

[0182] Among them, C ij is the encrypted ciphertext;

[0183] Edge Terminal ET i Generate encrypted message

[0184] Wherein, step S6 comprises the following steps:

[0185] Edge Terminal ET i Encrypt the message Sent to the edge computing server MEC j , Edge Computing Server MEC j Obtain the key material PS′ based on the encrypted message ij , the formula is:

[0186]

[0187] According to the key material PS′ ij Get the symmetric key K′ ij , the formula is:

[0188] K′ ij =KDF(PS′ ij ,R′ i ,pid i )

[0189] Edge computing server MEC j Through the symmetric key K' ij For ciphertext C ij Decrypt and obtain message M ij .

[0190] Embodiment 2:

[0191] The parts not mentioned in this embodiment are the same as those in Embodiment 1.

[0192] The present embodiment provides a non-interactive instant authentication and secure data transfer (NiIA-SDD) protocol that aims to overcome the limitations of traditional public key infrastructure (PKI) and interactive key exchange protocols, enabling mobile terminal devices to transmit data to the MEC network immediately after the connection is established. NiIA-SDD allows authentication before data decryption, thereby simplifying the data transmission process. This authentication is critical in MEC environments because reducing network latency is a top priority and reducing the time required for secure authentication before data transmission. Once a network connection is established, authenticated edge devices can upload data immediately. The nearest MEC server temporarily stores this data and forwards it on behalf of the authenticated entity, eliminating the need for the edge device to create a separate connection with each data recipient. This approach not only reduces the number of connections, but also ensures secure data transmission, making it ideal for multi-access edge networks with unstable network topologies. Figure 2 As shown, this embodiment has the following steps:

[0193] (1) Setup phase: Generate the global parameters required by the protocol.

[0194] (2) Registration phase, including pseudonym generation, MAIBC key distribution, and generation of non-membership certificates.

[0195] (3) Identity verification stage, ET i Generate instant authentication credentials, MEC j Verify the credentials.

[0196] (4) In the secure data delivery phase, necessary data is encrypted and sent.

[0197] The protocol includes three main phases: registration, authentication, and secure data distribution. In the registration phase, at least two ACs participate in the protocol to distribute keys and pseudonyms to edge terminals ET in the MEC environment. Assume that there are N ETs and M MEC servers (abbreviated as MEC) in the protocol. i Represents an edge terminal that initiates authentication and data delivery, MEC j represents an edge server that verifies identity and receives data, 0≤i <M,0≤j<M.ID i ,ID j is their identity identifier, pid i ,pid j are their pseudonyms. In addition, for the convenience of description, all modulo symbols will be omitted in the following protocol description.

[0198] In the registration phase, the trust authority generates the global parameters required by the protocol through the Setup(λ) function with the security parameter λ as input, including a cyclic additive group G with a generator G and an order of q, and the identity identifiers ID∈0,1 of all participants. ＊ , the master public-private key pair of the two ACs and pk1,pk2∈G,4 hash functions H0:G×G→0,1 ★ , and The registration phase includes pseudonym generation, MAIBC key distribution, and non-membership proof generation. At the beginning of the registration phase, the edge terminal ET i First, submit the identity ID to the first authentication center AC1 and the second authentication center AC2 i , AC1 and AC2 will cooperate as ET according to the following steps i Generate pseudonymous pid i .

[0199] AC1 first randomly selects calculate And send X to AC2.

[0200] After AC2 receives X, it calculates And the pseudonym pid i Sent to AC1.

[0201] Then, AC1 and AC2 follow the steps below to provide ET iDistribute MAIBC keys:

[0202] AC1 calculation and and will Sent to AC2; Received After that, AC2 randomly selects calculate Then verify Is it true? If the equation is not true, AC2 exits the key distribution procedure, ET i Registration failed. If the equation is true, go to the next step.

[0203] AC2 is calculated separately and

[0204] Subsequently, AC1 and AC2 were ET i Generate non-membership certificate and To illustrate ET i The public key of and Send to ET i .

[0205] Finally, E.T. i The following steps will be followed to assemble the key and generate the complete public and private key sk i ,pk i :

[0206] ET i Calculate separately and And verify the equation If the equation is not true, then ET i If key assembly fails, exit the registration process, otherwise proceed to the next step.

[0207] ET i Assembling the key and non-member certificate ET i After registration is completed, pk i and pid i public.

[0208] Authentication phase: The authentication phase occurs at the edge terminal ET i Prepare to move to edge computing server MEC i At the time of data submission, ET i The public and private keys MECi The public and private keys The instant authentication credentials will be generated as follows:

[0209] ET i Random Selection And calculate R i =r i ·pk j ;

[0210] T i Get the current system timestamp TS i ←Time(·), calculate and Output instant authentication credentials as

[0211] Then, the edge computing server MEC j Follow the steps below to verify the credentials:

[0212] MEC j First get the current system timestamp TS j , and verify TS i Whether it is within the validity period, through TS j -TS i >Δ. Δ is a system parameter set in advance, and its value depends on the specific network environment.

[0213] MEC j Then verify Whether it was ET within the Δ time period i It is worth noting that MEC j A portion of the storage space will be used to record the credentials that have been used and verified within the Δ period of time, which can strengthen the system's ability to resist replay attacks.

[0214] MEC j Check ET i Non-member certificate, verify ET i Whether the public key is in the revoked public key list.

[0215] MEC j Finally, by checking the equation Is it established to verify the authentication credentials. i Once all verifications are passed, the secure data delivery phase begins.

[0216] Secure data delivery phase, ET i After generating the authentication credentials, encrypt the data to be sent as follows to complete secure data delivery:

[0217] ET i calculate And use the key generation function KDF (PS ij ,R′ i ,pid i ) derive the temporary symmetric key K ij .

[0218] ETi then encrypts the message using Kij (C ij ) Get the ciphertext C ij . And will Send to MEC together j .

[0219] The process of generating instant authentication credentials is actually a variant of Diffi-Hallman key exchange, so MEC j Able to generate the key material PS′ required for Diffi-Hallman key exchange based on the received authentication credentials ij And derive the symmetric key, no additional parameters are required. Specifically, MEC j Follow the steps below to decrypt the data:

[0220] Edge computing server MEC j Obtain the key material PS′ based on the encrypted message ij , the formula is:

[0221]

[0222] According to the key material PS′ ij Get the symmetric key K′ ij , the formula is:

[0223] K′ ij =KDF(PS′ ij ,R′ i ,pid i )

[0224] Edge computing server MEC j Through the symmetric key K' ij For ciphertext C ij Decrypt and obtain message M ij .

[0225] If the above functions are implemented in the form of software functional units and sold or used as independent products, they can be stored in a computer-readable storage medium. Based on this understanding, the technical solution of the present invention, or the part that contributes to the prior art, or the part of the technical solution, can be embodied in the form of a software product. The computer software product is stored in a storage medium, including several instructions for a computer device (which can be a personal computer, a server, or a network device, etc.) to perform all or part of the steps of the method described in each embodiment of the present invention. The aforementioned storage medium includes: U disk, mobile hard disk, read-only memory (ROM, Read-Only Memory), random access memory (RAM, Random Access Memory), disk or optical disk, etc., which can store program code.

[0226] The above is only a specific embodiment of the present invention, but the protection scope of the present invention is not limited thereto. Any technician familiar with the technical field can easily think of various equivalent modifications or replacements within the technical scope disclosed by the present invention, and these modifications or replacements should be included in the protection scope of the present invention. Therefore, the protection scope of the present invention shall be based on the protection scope of the claims.

Claims

1. A non-interactive instant identity authentication and secure data transmission method, characterized in that: The following steps are involved: Step S1: The trust institution generates global parameters and sends the global parameters to the corresponding edge terminals, authentication center and edge computing server; Step S2: The edge terminal sends the edge terminal identity identifier to the first authentication center and the second authentication center. The first authentication center and the second authentication center cooperate to generate a pseudonym, MAIBC key, and non-member certificate for the edge terminal, and send the pseudonym, MAIBC key, and non-member certificate to the edge terminal. Step S3: The edge terminal generates an edge terminal public key and private key, and makes the edge terminal public key and pseudonym public; Step S4: The edge terminal generates an instant authentication credential and sends the instant authentication credential to the edge computing server. The edge computing server authenticates the edge terminal according to the instant authentication credential. If the authentication succeeds, step S5 is executed. If the authentication fails, verification is stopped. Step S5: the edge terminal generates public key information, generates a temporary symmetric key through a key derivation function according to the public key information, and encrypts the message using the temporary symmetric key to generate an encrypted message; Step S6: The edge terminal sends the encrypted message and the instant authentication credential to the edge computing server, and the edge computing server decrypts the encrypted message to obtain the message transmitted by the edge terminal.

2. A non-interactive instant identity authentication and secure data transmission method according to claim 1, characterized in that: The global parameters include a cyclic addition group G with a generator of g order and q, the edge terminal, the identity identifier ID∈0,1 of the authentication center and the edge computing server ＊ , the public key pk1∈G and private key of the first authentication center The public key pk2∈G and private key of the second authentication center Four hash functions H0:G×G→0,1 ＊ , 3. A non-interactive instant identity authentication and secure data transmission method according to claim 1, characterized in that: The step S2 comprises the following steps: Step S2.1: The edge terminal sends the edge terminal identity identifier to the first authentication center and the second authentication center; Step S2.2: The first authentication center cooperates with the second authentication center to generate a pseudonym for the edge terminal; Step S2.3: The first authentication center and the second authentication center generate the MAIBC key of the edge terminal according to the pseudonym, the public key and the private key of the first authentication center and the second authentication center and verify it. If the verification is successful, step S2.4 is executed. If the verification fails, the second authentication center exits the key distribution program and the edge terminal registration fails. Step S2.4: The first authentication center and the second authentication center generate a non-member certificate for the edge terminal, and send the pseudonym, MAIBC key, and non-member certificate to the edge terminal.

4. A non-interactive instant identity authentication and secure data transmission method according to claim 3, characterized in that: The step S2.2 comprises the following steps: The first authentication center randomly selects a random number in, is the first random number, is the multiplicative group modulo q, computing the first intermediate parameter Where pk2 is the public key of the second authentication center, and the first authentication center sends the first intermediate parameter X to the second authentication center; After receiving the first intermediate parameter X, the second authentication center generates the pseudonym pid of the edge terminal through the following formula i : Among them, pid i is the pseudonym of edge terminal i, ID i is the identity identifier of edge terminal i, H0 is the first hash function in the global parameters, and sk2 is the private key of the second authentication center; The second authentication center will be the pseudonym pid of the edge terminal i Sent to the first authentication center.

5. A non-interactive instant identity authentication and secure data transmission method according to claim 3, characterized in that: The step S2.3 comprises: The first authentication center uses the first random number The public key pk2 of the second authentication center and the pseudonym pid of the edge terminal i The first hash value is generated by the following formula Wherein, H1 is the second hash function in the global parameters; The first authentication center The second intermediate parameter is generated by the following formula Among them, sk1 is the private key of the first authentication center; The first authentication center sends the second intermediate parameter Send to the second authentication center; The second authentication center randomly selects a random number as the second random number Generate the second hash value according to the following formula in, is the second hash value, H2 is the third hash function in the global parameters; The second authentication center verifies the intermediate parameters sent by the first authentication center according to the following equation based on the second authentication center private key: Among them, X, The first intermediate parameter and the second intermediate parameter are respectively generated by the first authentication center; If the equation is true, the verification is successful and step S2.4 is executed. If the equation is not true, the verification fails, the second authentication center exits the key distribution program, and the edge terminal registration fails.

6. A non-interactive instant identity authentication and secure data transmission method according to claim 3, characterized in that: The step S2.4 comprises the following steps: The second authentication center updates the second intermediate parameter according to the following formula The third intermediate parameter According to the updated third intermediate parameter Generate partial private key z of edge terminal i : in, is the updated second intermediate parameter, z i Part of the private key of the edge terminal; The first authentication center generates a first non-member certificate for the edge terminal Will Send to edge terminal; The second authentication center generates a second non-member certificate for the edge terminal Will Sent to the edge terminal.

7. A non-interactive instant identity authentication and secure data transmission method according to claim 1, characterized in that: The step S3 comprises the following steps: The edge terminal receives the first intermediate parameter X and the third intermediate parameter X. Generate the first hash value of the edge terminal The second hash value with edge terminal According to the first hash value of the edge terminal The second hash value with edge terminal Partial private key z for edge terminals i To verify, the equation is: If the equation does not hold, then the edge terminal ET i If the generation of the edge terminal public key and private key fails, exit the registration program. If the equation is true, perform the following steps: Edge Terminal ET i Generate the edge terminal public key pk according to the following formula i Private key sk i Proof with non-membersω i : where ω i Used to indicate edge terminal ET i Public key pk i Not on the revocation list; Edge Terminal ET i The edge terminal public key pk i with pseudonym pid i public.

8. A non-interactive instant identity authentication and secure data transmission method according to claim 1, characterized in that: The step S4 comprises the following steps: The edge terminal generates instant authentication credentials, including the following steps: The edge terminal randomly selects a random number as the third random number Generate a first instant authentication value R according to the third random number i , the second instant authentication value R′ i With instant authentication intermediate value The formula is: Among them, pk j MEC for edge computing servers j Public key of edge computing server MEC j The public key pk j Get process and edge terminal ET i The process of obtaining the public key is the same. z j MEC for edge computing servers j Part of the private key, is the fourth random number, d i By R i , the public key information of both parties and the current timestamp are used as input to calculate the hash function value; The edge terminal takes the current system timestamp TS i , timestamp TS i By d i Embedded in the instant authentication credential IAC, timestamp TS i For plain text transmission, if the timestamp TS i Modification will result in failure of IAC verification; According to the current system timestamp TS i 、Non-member certificateω i , the first instant authentication value R i , the second instant authentication value R′ i With instant authentication intermediate value Generate instant authentication credentials for IAC, where The edge terminal sends the instant authentication credentials as IAC to the edge computing server MEC j ; Edge computing server MEC j Get the current system timestamp TS j , according to the timestamp TS j Verify TS by the following formula i Is it valid? TS j -TS i >Δ Among them, Δ is a system parameter set in advance, and its value depends on the specific network environment; If it is greater than Δ, the authentication fails. If it is less than Δ, the edge computing server MEC j verify Whether it has been verified within the Δ time period, if it has been verified, the authentication fails, if it has not been verified, the authentication succeeds, Perform storage records, the edge computing server only stores the instant authentication credentials within the Δ time period; Edge computing server MEC j According to ω i Check edge terminal ET i Public key pk i Is it in the revocation list? If it is in the revocation list, the authentication fails. If it is not in the revocation list, perform the following steps: Edge computing server MEC j Through edge computing server MEC j Public key pk j The first instant authentication value R is calculated according to the following equation i , the second instant authentication value R′ i With instant authentication intermediate value To verify: Among them, z j MEC for edge computing servers j Part of the private key, is the fourth random number, z j and By edge computing server MEC j Public key pk j get; If the equation holds, the authentication is successful and step S5 is executed. If the equation does not hold, the authentication fails.

9. A non-interactive instant identity authentication and secure data transmission method according to claim 1, characterized in that: The step S5 comprises the following steps: Edge Terminal ET i According to the public key pk i Generate public key information PS ij , And use the key generation function Derive the temporary symmetric key K ij ; Edge Terminal ET i Using the temporary symmetric key K ij For message M ij Encryption is performed, and the encryption formula is: Among them, C ij is the encrypted ciphertext; Edge Terminal ET i Generate encrypted message 10. A non-interactive instant identity authentication and secure data transmission method according to claim 1, characterized in that: The step S6 comprises the following steps: Edge Terminal ET i Encrypt the message Sent to the edge computing server MEC j , Edge Computing Server MEC j Obtain the key material PS′ based on the encrypted message ij , the formula is: According to the key material PS′ ij Get the symmetric key K′ ij , the formula is: K′ ij =KDF(PS′ ij ,R′ i ,pid i ) Edge computing server MEC j Through the symmetric key K' ij For ciphertext C ij Decrypt and obtain message M ij .

Images