Anonymous identity authentication method, system and device in 5G-V2V and medium

Abstract

The invention relates to the field of wireless network security communication, and discloses an anonymous identity authentication method, system and device in 5G-V2V and a medium, and the method comprises the steps: an AMF selects and generates a system common parameter; the on-board unit entering the 5G network coverage area registers in the AMF based on the system public parameters to generate a public key, a private key and a pseudonym corresponding to the on-board unit; the two vehicle-mounted units carry out mutual authentication based on the corresponding public keys, private keys and pseudonyms, and start a session key establishment process after mutual authentication succeeds, if the session key is successfully established, the two vehicle-mounted units carry out data transmission, and otherwise, the two vehicle-mounted units stop establishing the session key. By means of the method, identity verification can be conducted on the vehicle locally, and participation of a trusted mechanism or other infrastructures is not needed.

Description

Technical Field

[0001] The present invention relates to the field of wireless network security communications, and in particular to an anonymous identity authentication method, system, device and medium in 5G-V2V. Background Art

[0002] Existing V2V mutual authentication schemes in the 5G-V2X environment can be roughly divided into two categories: (1) Infrastructure-dependent methods. Most of these technologies use public key infrastructure (PKI) or other centralized authentication mechanisms to distribute and verify authentication information through trusted third parties or roadside units (RSUs). (2) Infrastructure-independent methods. This type of technology includes but is not limited to authentication schemes based on identity cryptography; authentication using network slicing and lidar; and direct authentication using broadcast.

[0003] Although the first method can work effectively in some scenarios, they rely on the full deployment and maintenance of infrastructure, which is obviously not a feasible solution in an environment with no infrastructure or weak infrastructure. For example: some inventions have proposed methods of distributing digital certificates and keys through RSUs, which can provide authentication services when vehicles enter a certain area. Through decentralized authentication of vehicle-to-roadside unit communication, the information of the vehicle sensor network (VSN) is continuously updated. However, this scheme only has trusted vehicles communicating through the V2V secret communication channel established with the assistance of RSU. Or the OBU (on-board unit) generates anonymous identities and temporary encryption keys by itself to open an authentication session. Secondly, the legitimacy of the real and anonymous identity of the vehicle can be verified by a trust authority (TA). After that, when vehicles want to establish a secure session with other vehicles, they first send requests to the surrounding RSUs for mutual authentication. After preliminary processing, the RSU forwards the request to the top layer through a wired channel to complete the identity and reputation verification. Finally, their session keys can be negotiated with the help of RSU. Others use physical unclonable functions (PUFs) and biometric keys to avoid RSU capture attacks and OBU intrusion attacks, and design feature embedding strategies with dynamic pseudo-identities to recover the identity of malicious vehicles by a trusted authority (TA). Vehicles in the same RSU domain can authenticate each other and establish session keys, and then they can communicate in any RSU domain or traffic-free infrastructure without repeated authentication.

[0004] Most of the existing second methods are still not applicable in environments where roadside units (RSUs) are missing. In addition, due to their innovative nature, these solutions often do not conform to the traditional vehicle networking framework, resulting in some drawbacks and limitations in practical applications. For example, a V2V authentication and key negotiation scheme based on identity cryptography (IBC) uses its vehicle identification (VID) as its public key, and the key management center (KMC) generates the private key of the C-V2X device based on the VID of the C-V2X device. The C-V2X device transmits secret data encrypted with the public key of the other device to other devices. They verify each other through the challenge response protocol based on identity cryptography and negotiate the working key for encrypting communication data. Others use network slicing (NS) to ensure the different characteristics of V2X services, and also analyze security requirements according to the V2X service type. When a vehicle requests access to a subscribed service, the NSSF determines whether the request is allowed. They can connect through a 5G millimeter wave direct V2V link or on a running PC5 interface. The shared key between the two vehicles can be negotiated and then communicate securely. Others have proposed an authentication based on lidar information for vehicle networks without infrastructure. The lidar uses available hardware to authenticate the vehicle based on the shared surrounding information, and establishes a secure V2V symmetric key after verifying common object types, distances, and angles.

[0005] The above methods all take the resources of the vehicle network environment into consideration. Considering that the vehicle network environment is a resource-constrained environment, it is particularly important to design a lightweight, efficient and secure direct vehicle-to-vehicle mutual authentication scheme.

[0006] Therefore, how to design an ideal solution that can effectively handle authentication and data security issues without relying on external infrastructure while ensuring efficient communication is not affected is an urgent problem that needs to be solved. Summary of the invention

[0007] The present invention provides an anonymous identity authentication method, system, device and medium in 5G-V2V, aiming to overcome the defects of the aforementioned prior art in that the identity authentication between vehicles is not efficient and safe enough and cannot be performed in an environment without infrastructure.

[0008] The present invention is achieved through the following technical solutions:

[0009] An anonymous identity authentication method in 5G-V2V, comprising:

[0010] AMF selects and generates system common parameters;

[0011] The on-board unit entering the 5G network coverage area registers with the AMF based on the system public parameters to generate a public key, a private key and a pseudonym corresponding to the on-board unit;

[0012] The two vehicle-mounted units authenticate each other based on the corresponding public key, private key and pseudonym, and start the process of establishing a session key after the mutual authentication is successful. If the session key is successfully established, the two vehicle-mounted units transmit data, otherwise, the two vehicle-mounted units stop establishing the session key.

[0013] As an optimization, it also includes regularly updating the pseudonym of the on-board unit and sending the updated pseudonym to the AMF.

[0014] As an optimization, AMF specifically uses elliptic cryptography to select and generate system public parameters. The specific process is as follows:

[0015] A1. Based on the elliptic curve E over the finite field Fp, a suitable additive subgroup G is selected, where the additive subgroup G is generated by a generator P, and the order of the additive subgroup G is q, where q is a large prime number;

[0016] A2. Select the AMF master key s and calculate the corresponding AMF public key P pub , P pub =s*P;

[0017] A3. Define the first one-way hash function The second one-way hash function h2:G→{0,1} * 、The third one-way hash function h3:{0,1} * →{0,1} l 、The fourth one-way hash function h4:{0,1} l →{0,1} λ , λ represents the safety parameter of the system; represents the multiplication group modulo q, l represents the length of the session key;

[0018] A3, finally get the system common parameters {G,P,P pub ,h1,h2,h3,h4} and propagate throughout the system.

[0019] As an optimization, the specific process of registering the on-board unit with AMF to generate the public key, private key and pseudonym corresponding to the on-board unit is as follows:

[0020] B1, the vehicle unit i sends the registration request information {RID i ,X i}, where i is the serial number of the on-board unit in the 5G network coverage area, RIDi represents the vehicle identification number of the onboard unit i, X i is the random number of the onboard unit i, X i =x i *P,x i The vehicle-mounted unit i is in the group Random numbers generated internally;

[0021] B2. The AMF receives the registration request information {RID i ,X i} and verify the legitimacy and uniqueness of the vehicle-mounted unit i, select parameter r i ,

[0022] B3. Calculate the second parameter R i 、The third parameter H i 、The fourth parameter y i 、The fifth parameter Y i , where R i =r i *P,H i =h1(ID i ||X i ||R i ), y i =(r i +sH i ), Y i =R i +P pub *H i , ID i is the pseudonym of the onboard unit i,

[0023] B4, through the network security channel, the second parameter R i , Pseudonym ID i 、The fourth parameter y i 、The fifth parameter Y i Registration feedback information composed of i ,R i ,Y i ,ID i ) is sent to the onboard unit i;

[0024] B5, the vehicle-mounted unit i receives the registration feedback information (y i ,R i ,Y i ,ID i ) and then check whether y is satisfied i P=R i +P pub *H iIf so, then (x i +y i ) as the private key and store (X i +Y i ) is published as the public key to complete the registration of the on-board unit i in the AMF, otherwise, the operation is terminated.

[0025] As an optimization, when the two on-board units perform mutual authentication based on the corresponding public key, private key and pseudonym, the two on-board units are respectively on-board unit i and on-board unit j, and the specific process of identity authentication between the on-board unit j and the on-board unit i is as follows:

[0026] C1, the vehicle-mounted unit j sends the corresponding pseudonym ID j 、Public key(X j +Y j ) and the authentication request information are sent together to the vehicle-mounted unit i;

[0027] C2. After receiving the authentication request information, the vehicle-mounted unit i generates a random value a i and b i , And calculate the sixth parameter A i 、Seventh parameter B i 、The eighth parameter M i and the ninth parameter N i , where A i =a i *P, B i =b i *P,M i =b i *(X j +Y j ),

[0028] C3. Calculate the signature σ of the onboard unit i i , σ i *B i =h1(ID i′ ||A′|T a )*P+Y i , where T a Indicates the current timestamp;

[0029] C4, the vehicle-mounted unit i sets the seventh parameter B i 、The ninth parameter N i , signature σ i , current timestamp T a As authentication feedback information (B i ,N i ,σ i ,T a) is sent to the onboard unit j;

[0030] C5. The vehicle-mounted unit j receives the authentication feedback information (B i ,N i ,σ i ,T a ) and then determine the current timestamp T a Is it the latest one? If so, jump to C6; otherwise, terminate this session.

[0031] C6. Calculate the tenth parameter M', M'=(x j +y j )*B i , and deduce Then derive the ID i ‖A i =ID i′ ‖A′, finally ensuring that the information sent by the onboard unit i to the onboard unit j can be received by the onboard unit j, thereby completing the identity authentication of the onboard unit j, and then jumping to C7;

[0032] C7, the vehicle-mounted unit j verifies the signature σ i Whether it satisfies σ i *B i =h1(ID i′ ||A′||T a )*P+Y i If so, the identity authentication of the onboard unit i is successfully completed; otherwise, the identity authentication of the onboard unit i fails.

[0033] As an optimization, after the two on-board units successfully authenticate each other, the specific process of establishing the session key is as follows:

[0034] D1, the vehicle-mounted unit j selects the fourteenth parameter D j , D j =d j *P,d j The vehicle-mounted unit j is in the group The random number generated within and the fifteenth parameter k are calculated j 、16th parameter SK j-i 、The seventeenth parameter η j , where k j =h1(ID i′ ‖ID j ||A′‖D j ||T b ), SK j-i =h3(ID i′ ||ID j ||dj (k j *A′+X j )), η j =h4(ID′ i ‖ID j ||SK j-i ||T b ), T b The end time of identity authentication, ID j is the pseudonym of the onboard unit j, RID j represents the vehicle identification number of the onboard unit j, R j =r j *P,r j is a random parameter,

[0035] D2, through the network security channel, the fourteenth parameter D j 、The seventeenth parameter η j , Identity authentication end time T b The response information composed of j ,η j ,T b ) is sent to the onboard unit i;

[0036] D3, the on-board unit i receives the response information (D j ,η j ,T b ) and determine the end time of identity authentication T b Is it the latest one? If so, the on-board unit i calculates the eighteenth parameter k i 、19th parameter SK i-j , where k i =h1(ID i ‖ID j ||A i ‖D j ||T b ), SK i-j =h3(ID i ||ID j ||D j (k i *a+x i )), then jump to D4, otherwise, terminate this session;

[0037] D4. Verify η j =h4(ID i ‖ID j ||SK i-j ||T b) is true, if so, the session key negotiation is successful, otherwise, the session key negotiation fails.

[0038] As an optimization, the pseudonym of the onboard unit is updated regularly, and the updated pseudonym is sent to the AMF, and the onboard unit is set as onboard unit i. The specific process is as follows:

[0039] E1. Let the validity period of each pseudonym of the onboard unit i be Δt, when |TT b |≥Δt, the onboard unit i will sign σ i 、Old pseudonym ID i 、The sixth parameter A i , the second parameter R i The pseudonym update request message (σ i ,ID i ,A i ,R i ) is sent to the AMF;

[0040] E2. The AMF receives the pseudonym update request information (σ i ,ID i ,A i ,R i ) and then calculate σ i *B i =h1(ID i ‖A i ‖T)*P+Y i Whether it is established to verify the legitimacy of the vehicle-mounted unit i, if it is verified, jump to E3, otherwise, terminate the session;

[0041] E3. AMF calculation And at the same time select a new random variable r′ i ,

[0042] E4. According to the new random variable r′ i Generate a new pseudonymous ID′ i , R′ i = r′ i *P;

[0043] E5. Calculate the twentieth parameter Q, And the twentieth parameter Q and the current timestamp T c The updated feedback information (Q, T c ) is sent to the onboard unit i;

[0044] E6. The onboard unit i receives the update feedback information (Q, T c ) and then determine the current timestamp Tc Is it the latest one? If so, generate a new pseudonym ID' i , Otherwise, terminate the session.

[0045] The present invention also discloses an efficient and anonymous identity authentication system in 5G-V2V, including AMF and access to a plurality of on-board units, wherein two of the plurality of on-board units perform mutual identity authentication and establish a session key through the aforementioned anonymous identity authentication method in 5G-V2V.

[0046] The present invention also discloses an electronic device, comprising at least one processor and a memory communicatively connected to the at least one processor; wherein the memory stores instructions executable by the at least one processor, and the instructions are executed by the at least one processor so that the at least one processor can execute an anonymous identity authentication method in 5G-V2V as described above.

[0047] The present invention also discloses a storage medium storing a computer program, which, when executed by a processor, implements the aforementioned anonymous identity authentication method in 5G-V2V.

[0048] Compared with the prior art, the present invention has the following advantages and beneficial effects:

[0049] 1. In the present invention, an authentication scheme for an ECC-based lightweight anonymous V2V identity mutual authentication protocol EAIA is proposed, which can authenticate vehicles locally without the participation of a trusted authority or other infrastructure.

[0050] 2. The proposed protocol achieves authentication and session key negotiation without the participation of TA and RSU in the mutual authentication process between vehicles, allowing vehicles to communicate in scenarios lacking transportation infrastructure.

[0051] 3. Using temporary anonymous identities, nodes cannot resolve each other's true identities, and privacy is protected accordingly. At the same time, once the authentication session is opened, the established temporary session key is used. The burden of key management can be avoided, and it is difficult for attackers to obtain keys or even tamper with messages.

[0052] 4. Taking into account the limited computing power of vehicle resources, an authentication protocol is designed that is lightweight and efficient while resisting a variety of complex typical attacks. BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS

[0053] The drawings described herein are used to provide a further understanding of the embodiments of the present invention, constitute a part of this application, and do not constitute a limitation of the embodiments of the present invention. In the drawings:

[0054] Figure 1 A model diagram of the authentication system of the present invention;

[0055] Figure 2 It is the algorithm diagram of the authentication phase protocol;

[0056] Figure 3 It is the algorithm diagram of the registration phase protocol;

[0057] Figure 4 Results diagram for safety analysis;

[0058] Figure 5 The performance analysis result graph for one of the calculation overheads;

[0059] Figure 6 This is a graph showing the results of one type of communication overhead performance analysis;

[0060] Figure 7 This is a result diagram of one of the unknown attacks;

[0061] Figure 8 A performance analysis result diagram of one of the energy costs. DETAILED DESCRIPTION

[0062] In order to make the objectives, technical solutions and advantages of the present invention more clearly understood, the present invention is further described in detail below in conjunction with embodiments and drawings. The exemplary embodiments of the present invention and their description are only used to explain the present invention and are not intended to limit the present invention.

[0063] This embodiment 1 provides an anonymous identity authentication method in 5G-V2V, which mainly involves four steps, namely system initialization stage (S1)---registration stage (S2)----mutual authentication stage (S3)----pseudonym update stage (S4). Next, these four steps are specifically introduced.

[0064] S1. AMF selects and generates system common parameters;

[0065] The system here refers to the entire operating system. For this protocol, it is the authentication system required by the Internet of Vehicles. The public parameters will be sent to the on-board unit (OBU). The public parameters are the public parameters of the entire system. As long as you participate, you will receive and have these public parameters.

[0066] In the 5G network, AMF is the core unit, the full name of which is Access and Mobility Management Function; it is responsible for registration, connection, reachability, mobility, security, access management and service authorization.

[0067] In some embodiments, during the system initialization phase, the AMF specifically uses elliptic cryptography to select and generate system public parameters. The specific process is:

[0068] A1. Based on the elliptic curve E over the finite field Fp, a suitable additive subgroup G is selected, where the additive subgroup G is generated by a generator P, and the order of the additive subgroup G is q, where q is a large prime number;

[0069] The appropriateness here depends on the order q of the additive subgroup G. The order q of the subgroup should not be too large to avoid excessive computational complexity, but it should not be too small to avoid reduced security. 256 bits is appropriate, depending on the computing resources of the specific device.

[0070] Generator P is an element in G, and P is able to generate the entire subgroup G (i.e., the order of P is q). This means that all elements in G can be obtained by calculating k*P (where k is an integer). The order q of the group G should usually be a large prime number, and the factor relationship between q and p-1 is usually p=2q+1 (also called a safe prime number), which ensures that the computational complexity of the discrete logarithm problem (DLP) in this subgroup is high enough, thereby ensuring the security of the system.

[0071] p represents a large prime number, which is used to define a finite field Fp. The elements in the finite field can be regarded as the set of integers modulo p, that is, {0,1,2,…,p-1}.

[0072] P represents a base point (also called a generator) on the elliptic curve E. The base point P is a point defined on the elliptic curve, through which a subgroup G can be generated.

[0073] The finite field Fp provides the basis for defining elliptic curves, and the coordinates of points on the elliptic curve are all elements in this finite field.

[0074] The generating group G is a specific subset on the elliptic curve E(Fp). The elements in this subset are generated by a point P on the elliptic curve, and multiple additions of P generate all the elements in the group.

[0075] In elliptic curve cryptography, in order to achieve the equivalent security of 128-bit symmetric encryption, the prime number p used is usually 256 bits or more.

[0076] A2. Select the AMF master key s and calculate the corresponding AMF public key P pub , P pub =s*P, P is the generator;

[0077] The master key must be randomly generated to ensure that it cannot be predicted or guessed.

[0078] A3. Define the first one-way hash function The second one-way hash function h2:G→{0,1} * 、The third one-way hash function h3:{0,1} * →{0,1} l 、The fourth one-way hash function h4:{0,1} l →{0,1} λ , λ represents the safety parameter of the system, The multiplication group modulo q (also called the unit group) is represented by the multiplication modulo q, where the operations are multiplication modulo q. The modulo q here is the large prime number q mentioned above.

[0079] {0,1} * , {0,1} l , {0,1} λ They represent a binary string of arbitrary length; a binary string of fixed length l; and a binary string of length λ respectively.

[0080] A3, finally get the system common parameters {G,P,P pub ,h1,h2,h3,h4} and propagates throughout the system, where l represents the length of the session key.

[0081] That is, the final result of the above process is to select the system common parameters {G,P,P pub ,h1,h2,h3,h4} propagates throughout the system.

[0082] S2. The on-board unit OBU entering the 5G network coverage area registers with the AMF based on the system public parameters to generate the public key, private key and pseudonym corresponding to the on-board unit OBU;

[0083] The present invention adopts the elliptic curve discrete logarithm problem, and the on-board unit OBU is registered in the AMF to generate its own public and private key pair and pseudonym.

[0084] In some embodiments, Figure 3 As shown, the specific process of the on-board unit OBU registering with AMF to generate the public key, private key and pseudonym corresponding to the on-board unit OBU is:

[0085] B1, the on-board unit i sends the registration request information {RID i ,X i}, where i is the serial number of the on-board unit OBU in the 5G network coverage area, RID i The vehicle identification number of the vehicle-mounted unit i is the unique vehicle identification, that is, the chassis number of the vehicle, that is, the frame number, which is the only proof of each vehicle. i For the on-board unit i (with OBUi represents a random number, X i =x i *P,x i The vehicle-mounted unit i is in the group Random numbers generated internally;

[0086] B2. The AMF receives the registration request information {RID i ,X i} and verify the legitimacy and uniqueness of the vehicle-mounted unit i, select parameter r i ,

[0087] The legitimacy and uniqueness of the identity are verified by querying whether the RID is unique and not illegal. The first parameter r i For randomly selected groups The parameter generation in is, r represents the parameter, i represents the i-th vehicle, that is, the parameter r i is the parameter of the i-th on-board unit OBU.

[0088] B3. Calculate the second parameter R i 、The third parameter H i 、The fourth parameter y i 、The fifth parameter Y i , where R i =r i *P,H i =h1(ID i ||X i ||R i ), y i =(r i +s*H i ), Y i =R i +P pub *H i , ID i is the pseudonym of the onboard unit i,

[0089] B4, through the network security channel, the second parameter R i , Pseudonym ID i 、The fourth parameter y i 、The fifth parameter Y i Registration feedback information composed of i ,R i ,Y i ,ID i ) is sent to the onboard unit i;

[0090] B5, the vehicle-mounted unit i receives the registration feedback information (y i ,Ri ,Y i ,ID i ) and then check whether y is satisfied i *P=R i +P pub *H i If so, then (x i +y i ) as the private key and store (X i +Y i ) is published as the public key to complete the registration of the on-board unit i in the AMF, otherwise, the operation is terminated.

[0091] The registration steps of other on-board units, such as on-board unit j, refer to B1-B5, that is, the same as on-board unit i. On-board unit j will (x j +y j ) as the private key and store (X j +Y j ) is published as a public key to complete the registration of the on-board unit j in the AMF

[0092] S3, the two on-board units OBU authenticate each other based on the corresponding public key, private key and pseudonym, and start the process of establishing a session key after the mutual authentication is successful. If the session key is successfully established, the two on-board units OBU perform data transmission, otherwise, the two on-board units OBU stop establishing the session key. Figure 2 As shown, Figure 2 In the expression, ? indicates whether the words before and after the equal sign are equal.

[0093] The present invention mainly adopts certificateless public key encryption technology and elliptic curve Diffie-Hellman difficulty problem to achieve mutual authentication between OBUs and start the process of establishing session keys with the nearest neighboring OBU.

[0094] The session key is established after mutual authentication and contains parameters owned by each party that are unknown to others. Failure means that it is not part of the mutual authentication, which means that the connection will not be established to conduct the session.

[0095] This process includes two small processes, one is the process of mutual authentication, and the other is the process of establishing a session key after the mutual authentication is successful. Next, these two small processes are introduced in detail.

[0096] The process by which two on-board units authenticate each other.

[0097] In some embodiments, when two on-board units OBU perform mutual authentication based on corresponding public keys, private keys and pseudonyms, the two on-board units are respectively on-board unit i (with OBU iIndicated by) and on-board unit j (indicated by OBU j The specific process of identity authentication between the vehicle-mounted unit j and the vehicle-mounted unit i is as follows:

[0098] C1, the vehicle-mounted unit j sends the corresponding pseudonym ID j 、Public key(X j +Y j ) and the authentication request information are sent together to the vehicle-mounted unit i;

[0099] C2. After receiving the authentication request information, the vehicle-mounted unit i generates a random value a i and b i , And calculate the sixth parameter A i 、Seventh parameter B i 、The eighth parameter M i and the ninth parameter N i , where A i =a i *P, B i =b i *P,M i =b i *(X j +Y j ), This means that OBU i Using OBU j The public key of the OBU encrypts its identity, so only the OBU j OBU can be extracted i identity.

[0100] C3. Calculate the signature σ of the onboard unit i i , Among them, T a Indicates the current timestamp;

[0101] C4, the vehicle-mounted unit i sets the seventh parameter B i 、The ninth parameter N i , signature σ i , current timestamp T a As authentication feedback information (B i ,N i ,σ i ,T a ) is sent to the onboard unit j;

[0102] C5. The vehicle-mounted unit j receives the authentication feedback information (B i ,N i ,σ i ,T a ) and then determine the current timestamp T aIs it the latest one? If so, jump to C6; otherwise, terminate this session.

[0103] The on-board unit will have the current timestamp time, and by comparing it with Ta, it can be determined whether it is the latest.

[0104] C6. Calculate the tenth parameter M', M'=(x j +y j )*B i , and deduce Then derive the ID i ‖A i =ID i′ ‖A′, finally ensuring that the information sent by the onboard unit i to the onboard unit j can be received by the onboard unit j, thereby completing the identity authentication of the onboard unit j, and then jumping to C7;

[0105] ID i′ , A′ are given in B3 and C2 respectively, is an XOR operation, where ID i′ , A′ are respectively the pseudonym and sixth parameter of onboard unit i derived from onboard unit j.

[0106] Since M can be obtained from the following formula i =M′.

[0107] M′=(x j +y j )*B i =b i *(x j +y j )*P=b i *(X j +Y j )=M i .

[0108] according to and You can get the ID i ||A=ID′ i ||A′. In this way, OBU i Send to OBU j The information can be obtained by OBU j Receive, thus completing the OBU j identity authentication.

[0109] ID and A are the pseudonym and random number generated by vehicle i itself. i′ , A′ is derived by vehicle j to verify the calculation. It is derived by XORing the formula of C2.

[0110] By ID i‖A i =ID i′ ‖A′ can ensure that the information of vehicle-mounted unit i can be received by vehicle-mounted unit j, because this formula ensures that the sender sends to the designated one, and the receiver is also sure that it is sent by the sender.

[0111] C7, the vehicle-mounted unit j verifies the signature σ i Whether it satisfies σ i *B i =h1(ID i′ ||A′||T a )*P+Y i =h1(ID i ||A||T a )*P+Y i If so, the identity authentication of the onboard unit i is successfully completed; otherwise, the identity authentication of the onboard unit i fails.

[0112] The correctness of identity authentication can be proved by the following formula.

[0113] σ i *B i =(b -1 (h1(ID i ||A||T a )+y i ))B=b(b -1 (h1(ID i ||A||T a )+y i ))P=(h1(ID i ||A||T a ))P+y i P=(h1(ID i ||A||T a ))P+Y i .

[0114] In this way, it is ensured that the sender is an OBU i . Completed the OBU i identity authentication.

[0115] If OBU i The verification is successful, which means that the identity authentication of both parties has been successful. Then the session key negotiation begins.

[0116] Small process of establishing a session key.

[0117] In some embodiments, after the two on-board units OBU successfully authenticate each other, the specific process of establishing the session key is as follows:

[0118] D1, the vehicle-mounted unit j selects the fourteenth parameter D j , D j =d j *P,d j The vehicle-mounted unit j is in the group The random number generated within and the fifteenth parameter k are calculated j 、16th parameter SK j-i 、The seventeenth parameter η j , where k j =h1(ID i′ ||ID j ||A′||D j ||T b ), SK j-i =h3(ID i′ ||ID j ||d j (k j *A′+X i )), η j =h4(ID′ i ||ID j ||SK j-i ||T b ), T b The end time of identity authentication, ID j is the pseudonym of the onboard unit j, RID j represents the vehicle identification number of the onboard unit j, R j =r j *P,r j is a random parameter,

[0119] D2, the vehicle-mounted unit j transmits the fourteenth parameter D through the network security channel j 、The seventeenth parameter η j , Identity authentication end time T b The response information composed of j ,η j ,T b ) is sent to the onboard unit i;

[0120] D3, the on-board unit i receives the response information (D j ,η j ,T b ) and determine the end time of identity authentication T b Is it the latest one? If so, the on-board unit i calculates the eighteenth parameter k i 、19th parameter SK i-j , where k i =h1(ID i||ID j ||A i ||D j ||T b ), SK i-j =h3(ID i ||ID j ||D j (k i *a i +x i )), then jump to D4, otherwise, the onboard unit i terminates the session;

[0121] D4. Verify η j =h4(ID i ||ID j ||SK i-j ||T b ) is true, if so, the session key negotiation is successful, otherwise, the session key negotiation fails.

[0122] Therefore, there are SK i-j =SK j-i , because the following equation holds:

[0123] D j (k i a i +x i ) = d j (k i a i +x i )P=d j (kA i +X i ).

[0124] S4. Regularly update the pseudonym of the on-board unit OBU, and send the updated pseudonym to the AMF.

[0125] It should be noted that the parameter subscripts i and j represent onboard unit i and onboard unit j respectively, and the corresponding parameters are the parameters of onboard unit i or onboard unit j. The formulas for the same parameters with different subscripts are the same, but the dependent variables in the formulas correspond to different onboard units according to the different subscripts.

[0126] Regularly changing the vehicle's pseudonym can effectively prevent the vehicle from being tracked and personal information from being leaked. Pseudonym updates protect the vehicle's privacy while allowing the vehicle to continue to participate in necessary communications and data exchanges without revealing its true identity.

[0127] In some embodiments, the pseudonym of the onboard unit is updated regularly, and the updated pseudonym is sent to the AMF, and the onboard unit is set as onboard unit i. The specific process is:

[0128] E1. Let the validity period of each pseudonym of the onboard unit i be Δt, when |TT b |≥Δt, pseudonym update is required, where T represents the current time, Δt is the period of system parameters, and T b is roughly equal to the end time of authentication, then the onboard unit i will sign σ i 、Old pseudonym ID i 、The sixth parameter A i , the second parameter R i The pseudonym update request message (σ i ,ID i ,A i ,R i ) is sent to the AMF;

[0129] E2. After receiving the request, the AMF receives the pseudonym update request information (σ i ,ID i ,A i ,R i ) and then calculate σ i *B i =h1(ID i ‖A i ‖T)*P+Y i Whether it is established to verify the legitimacy of the vehicle-mounted unit i, if it is verified, jump to E3, otherwise, terminate the session;

[0130] E3. AMF calculation And at the same time select a new random variable r′ i ,

[0131] E4. According to the new random variable r′ i Generate a new pseudonymous ID′ i , R′ i = r′ i *P;

[0132] E5. Calculate the twentieth parameter Q, And the twentieth parameter Q and the current timestamp T c The updated feedback information (Q, T c ) is sent to the vehicle-mounted unit i; T c Indicates the current timestamp.

[0133] By connecting the ID to the i Hashing avoids the ID being transmitted in plain text and prevents illegal users from obtaining the ID.

[0134] E6. The onboard unit i receives the update feedback information (Q, T c ) and then determine the current timestamp T c Is it the latest one? If so, generate a new pseudonym ID' i , Otherwise, terminate the session.

[0135] Next, the present invention is verified and explained through specific cases.

[0136] Pairing-based cryptography (PBC) is used to implement the pairing-based scheme, and the implementation of the ECC-based scheme is performed by the Multiple Precision Integer and Rational Arithmetic C / C++ Library (MIRACL). The experimental platform is an Intel i7-7500U CPU with a main frequency of 2.70GHZ and 4G RAM. The operating system is Linux Ubuntu18.10-desktop-amd64, which is used as an OBU of a vehicle; the hash operation, scalar multiplication, ECC-based point addition, modular exponentiation, encryption and decryption, signature, signature authentication, and bilinear pairing times are 2 microseconds, 576 microseconds, 20 microseconds, 249 microseconds, 530 / 7425 microseconds, 12560 microseconds, 450 microseconds, and 6574 microseconds, respectively.

[0137] Technical effect: The computational overhead of the solution in this embodiment is effectively reduced.

[0138] In some embodiments, the final computational overhead is shown in Table 1:

[0139] Table 1:

[0140]

[0141] In some embodiments, in order to accurately evaluate the performance, the present invention sets the length and time cost of each parameter during the simulation. Specifically, the present invention defines |ID| as the length of each participant identity, |T| as the length of the timestamp, |G| as the length of an element in the cyclic group G, |H| as the length of the hash function output, and |q| as The length of an element in. The length is set as follows: |G| = 320 bits, |ID|=256bits, |H|=512bits, |T|=32bits.

[0142] Technical effect: The communication overhead of the solution in this embodiment is effectively reduced.

[0143] In some embodiments, the communication overhead finally obtained is shown in Table 2:

[0144] Table 2:

[0145]

[0146]

[0147] In some embodiments, finally, the present invention evaluates robustness by introducing the concept of unknown attacks, to which every system is subject.

[0148] When facing unknown attacks, the authentication process may be forced to stop and restart. In order to carefully analyze the impact of these attacks, it is assumed that the probability of unknown attacks occurring in each step of authentication is uniform. The average time for successful switching is calculated as follows:

[0149]

[0150] Among them, T, T success 、T failed They are the average time for successful switching authentication, the total time for successful authentication and the total time for failed authentication. success is the number of successful authentications; p is the percentage of unknown attacks; n is the number of steps in the protocol; t fail represents the amount of time before an attack can occur to switch authentication failures; t success Indicates that the authentication was successfully switched before the attack occurred.

[0151] Technical effect: The solution in this embodiment has effectively improved its ability to resist unknown attacks.

[0152] The communication overhead finally obtained in this embodiment is as follows: Figure 7 shown.

[0153] In some embodiments, in V2V communication, energy consumption is a key factor in determining system endurance, cost-effectiveness, environmental impact, and overall sustainability. The energy consumption generated by V2V authentication includes computational energy cost and transmission energy cost. Computational energy cost mainly relies on heavy calculations such as pairing calculations and scalar multiplication. As for transmission energy cost, the number of messages sent and received needs to be considered.

[0154] In this embodiment, the computational energy analysis and transmission energy analysis are performed with reference to the 133MHz SA-1110 StrongARM microprocessor and the LA-4121 WLAN card, respectively. The microprocessor consumes 8.8mJ for a scalar multiplication and 47.0mJ for a bilinear pairing operation. As for the transmission energy cost, the WLAN card consumes 0.66μJ for transmitting 1 bit and 0.31μJ for receiving 1 bit.

[0155] Technical effect: The solution in this embodiment can effectively reduce overhead.

[0156] The energy consumption finally obtained in this embodiment is shown in Table 3.

[0157] Table 3:

[0158]

[0159]

[0160] 1. Figure 1 The system model diagram is described in . The 3GPP 5G system mainly consists of the 5G core network (5GC) and the 5G radio access network ((R)AN). In the 5G radio access network (RAN), each vehicle and RSU is connected to the network through the gNB wireless channel. The gNB is connected to the 5G core network (5GC) through a wired channel. There are four participants in the V2V authentication protocol that supports 5G. These participants are the on-board unit (OBU), the roadside unit (RSU), the 5G base station (gNB), and the 5G core network. Among them, except for the OBU participant, the remaining participants only participate in the registration part. In the authentication part, only two OBUs participate.

[0161] 2. Meaning of letters, parameters and formulas in the formula: λ is the security parameter of the system; p, q are large prime numbers. ; is the length of the session key; G is the additive group in elliptic curve cryptography; P is the generator of G. s is the system master key. P pub is the system public key; h i is a hash function (i=1,...,4); a, b, d are random numbers; T a ,T b The timestamp selected in the communication; RID i ,RID j For Vehicle i / j Real identity; ID i ,ID j for The pseudo identity of Vehicle i / j Pseudonym of; (x i / j ,y i / j ) is The static private key pair of Vehicle i / j static; (X i / j ,Y i / j ) is The static publickey of Vehicle i / j The public key pair (SK i-j ,SK j-i ) is the session key generated in the scheme.

[0162] 3. Figure 7Indicates the security analysis results using the formal security analysis tool scyther. Scyther is a powerful formal verification tool used to forge, verify, and detect potential attacks, and plays a key role in security protocol analysis. The main features of Scyther include: Automatic verification: Scyther can automatically generate and verify all possible execution paths of security protocols to identify potential security vulnerabilities.

[0163] 4. Different abbreviations in the embodiments represent different schemes; EAIA is this scheme; the other schemes are HDMA: Hybrid D2D Message Authentication Scheme for 5G-Enabled VANETs; PPMA: An Efficient Privacy-Preserving Mutual Authentication Scheme for Secure V2V Communication in Vehicular Ad Hoc Network; PPDAS: Efficient Privacy-Preserving Dual Authentication and Key Agreement Scheme for Secure V2V Communications in an IoV Paradigm; SPPC: Secure Privacy-Preserving V2V Communication in 5G-V2X Supporting Network Slicing.

[0164] The specific implementation methods described above further illustrate the objectives, technical solutions and beneficial effects of the present invention in detail. It should be understood that the above description is only a specific implementation method of the present invention and is not intended to limit the scope of protection of the present invention. Any modifications, equivalent substitutions, improvements, etc. made within the spirit and principles of the present invention should be included in the scope of protection of the present invention.

Claims

1. An anonymous identity authentication method in 5G-V2V, characterized in that: include: AMF selects and generates system common parameters; The on-board unit entering the 5G network coverage area registers with the AMF based on the system public parameters to generate a public key, a private key and a pseudonym corresponding to the on-board unit; The two vehicle-mounted units authenticate each other based on the corresponding public key, private key and pseudonym, and start the process of establishing a session key after the mutual authentication is successful. If the session key is successfully established, the two vehicle-mounted units transmit data, otherwise, the two vehicle-mounted units stop establishing the session key.

2. The anonymous identity authentication method in 5G-V2V according to claim 1, characterized in that: It also includes regularly updating the pseudonym of the on-board unit and sending the updated pseudonym to the AMF.

3. The anonymous identity authentication method in 5G-V2V according to claim 1, characterized in that: AMF specifically uses elliptic cryptography to select and generate system public parameters. The specific process is as follows: A1. Based on the elliptic curve E over the finite field Fp, a suitable additive subgroup G is selected, where the additive subgroup G is generated by a generator P, and the order of the additive subgroup G is q, where q is a large prime number; A2. Select the AMF master key s and calculate the corresponding AMF public key P pub , P pub =s*P; A3. Define the first one-way hash function The second one-way hash function h2:G→{0,1} * 、The third one-way hash function h3:{0,1} * →{0,1} l , the fourth one-way hash function h4:{0,1} l →{0,1} λ , λ represents the safety parameter of the system; represents the multiplication group modulo q, l represents the length of the session key; A3, finally get the system common parameters {G,P,P pub ,h1,h2,h3,h4} and propagate throughout the system.

4. The anonymous identity authentication method in 5G-V2V according to claim 3, characterized in that: The specific process of registering the on-board unit with AMF to generate the public key, private key and pseudonym corresponding to the on-board unit is as follows: B1, the vehicle unit i sends the registration request information {RID i ,X i }, where i is the serial number of the on-board unit in the 5G network coverage area, RID i represents the vehicle identification number of the onboard unit i, X i is the random number of the onboard unit i, X i =x i *P,x i The vehicle-mounted unit i is in the group Random numbers generated internally; B2. The AMF receives the registration request information {RID i ,X i } and verify the legitimacy and uniqueness of the vehicle-mounted unit i, select parameter r i , B3. Calculate the second parameter R i 、The third parameter H i 、The fourth parameter y i 、The fifth parameter Y i , where R i =r i *P,H i =h1(ID i ||X i ||R i ), y i =(r i +sH i ), Y i =R i +P pub *H i , ID i is the pseudonym of the onboard unit i, B4, through the network security channel, the second parameter R i , Pseudonym ID i 、The fourth parameter y i 、The fifth parameter Y i Registration feedback information composed of i ,R i ,Y i ,ID i ) is sent to the onboard unit i; B5, the vehicle-mounted unit i receives the registration feedback information (y i ,R i ,Y i ,ID i ) and then check whether y is satisfied i P=R i +P pub *H i If so, then (x i +y i ) as the private key and (X i +Y i ) is published as the public key to complete the registration of the on-board unit i in the AMF, otherwise, the operation is terminated.

5. The anonymous identity authentication method in 5G-V2V according to claim 4, characterized in that: When the two on-board units perform mutual authentication based on the corresponding public key, private key and pseudonym, the two on-board units are respectively on-board unit i and on-board unit j, and the specific process of identity authentication between the on-board unit j and the on-board unit i is as follows: C1, the vehicle-mounted unit j sends the corresponding pseudonym ID j 、Public key(X j +Y j ) and the authentication request information are sent together to the vehicle-mounted unit i; C2. After receiving the authentication request information, the vehicle-mounted unit i generates a random value a i and b i , And calculate the sixth parameter A i 、Seventh parameter B i 、The eighth parameter M i and the ninth parameter N i , where A i =a i *P, B i =b i *P,M i =b i *(Xj+Yj), C3. Calculate the signature σ of the onboard unit i i , Among them, T a Indicates the current timestamp; C4, the vehicle-mounted unit i sets the seventh parameter B i 、The ninth parameter N i , signature σ i , current timestamp T a As authentication feedback information (B i ,N i ,σ i ,T a ) is sent to the onboard unit j; C5. The vehicle-mounted unit j receives the authentication feedback information (B i ,N i ,σ i ,T a ) and then determine the current timestamp T a Is it the latest one? If so, jump to C6; otherwise, terminate this session. C6. Calculate the tenth parameter M', M'=(x j +y j )*B i , and deduce Among them, ID i′ A′ is the pseudonym and sixth parameter of vehicle-mounted unit i derived from vehicle-mounted unit j, and then ID i ‖A i =ID i′ ||A′, finally ensuring that the information sent by the onboard unit i to the onboard unit j can be received by the onboard unit j, thereby completing the identity authentication of the onboard unit j, and then jumping to C7; C7, the vehicle-mounted unit j verifies the signature σ i Whether it satisfies σ i *B i =h1(ID i′ ||A′||T a )*P+Y i If so, the identity authentication of the onboard unit i is successfully completed; otherwise, the identity authentication of the onboard unit i fails.

6. The anonymous identity authentication method in 5G-V2V according to claim 5, characterized in that: After the two on-board units successfully authenticate each other, the specific process of establishing the session key is as follows: D1, the vehicle-mounted unit j selects the fourteenth parameter D j , D j =d j *P,d j The vehicle-mounted unit j is in the group The random number generated within and the fifteenth parameter k are calculated j 、Sixteenth parameter SK j-i 、The seventeenth parameter η j , where k j =h1(ID i′ ||ID j ||A′||D j || T b), SK j-i =h3(ID i′ ||ID j ||d j (k j *A′+X j )), η j =h4(ID i ′||ID j ||SK j-i ||T b ), T b The end time of identity authentication, ID j is the pseudonym of the onboard unit j, RID j represents the vehicle identification number of the onboard unit j, R j =r j *P,r j is a random parameter, D2, through the network security channel, the fourteenth parameter D j 、The seventeenth parameter η j , Identity authentication end time T b The response information composed of j ,η j ,T b ) is sent to the onboard unit i; D3, the on-board unit i receives the response information (D j ,η j ,T b ) and determine the end time of identity authentication T b Is it the latest one? If so, the on-board unit i calculates the eighteenth parameter k i 、19th parameter SK i-j , where k i =h1(ID i ‖ID j ||A i ‖D j ||T b ), SK i-j =h3(ID i ||ID j ||D i (k i *a+x i )), then jump to D4, otherwise, terminate this session; D4. Verify η j =h4(ID i ‖ID j ||SK i-j ||T b ) is true, if so, the session key negotiation is successful, otherwise, the session key negotiation fails.

7. The anonymous identity authentication method in 5G-V2V according to claim 6, characterized in that: The pseudonym of the onboard unit is updated regularly, and the updated pseudonym is sent to the AMF, and the onboard unit is set as onboard unit i. The specific process is as follows: E1. Let the validity period of each pseudonym of the vehicle-mounted unit i be Δt, when |TT b |≥Δt, the onboard unit i will sign σ i 、Old pseudonym ID i 、The sixth parameter A i , the second parameter R i The pseudonym update request message (σ i ,ID i ,A i ,R i ) is sent to the AMF; E2. The AMF receives the pseudonym update request information (σ i ,ID i ,A i ,R i ) and then calculate σ i *B i =h1(ID i ‖A i ‖T)*P+Y i Whether it is established to verify the legitimacy of the vehicle-mounted unit i, if it is verified, jump to E3, otherwise, terminate the session; E3. AMF calculation And at the same time choose a new random variable E4. According to the new random variable r i 'Generate a new pseudonym ID i ′, R′ i = r′ i *P; E5. Calculate the twentieth parameter Q, And the twentieth parameter Q and the current timestamp T c The updated feedback information (Q, T c ) is sent to the onboard unit i; E6. The onboard unit i receives the update feedback information (Q, T c ) and then determine the current timestamp T c Is it the latest one? If so, generate a new pseudonym ID' i , Otherwise, terminate the session.

8. An efficient and anonymous identity authentication system in 5G-V2V, characterized in that: It includes AMF and entering into a plurality of on-board units, wherein two of the plurality of on-board units perform mutual authentication and establish a session key through an anonymous authentication method in 5G-V2V as described in any one of claims 1 to 7.

9. An electronic device, characterized in that: It includes at least one processor and a memory communicatively connected to the at least one processor; wherein the memory stores instructions executable by the at least one processor, and the instructions are executed by the at least one processor so that the at least one processor can execute an anonymous identity authentication method in 5G-V2V as described in any one of claims 1 to 8.

10. A storage medium storing a computer program, characterized in that: When the computer program is executed by a processor, an anonymous identity authentication method in 5G-V2V is implemented as described in any one of claims 1 to 8.

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