Quality decision-making method under'main manufacturer-supplier 'civil aircraft full-manufacturing industry chain mode based on game theory

Abstract

The invention discloses a quality decision-making method in a'main manufacturer-supplier 'civil aircraft full-manufacturing industry chain mode based on a game theory, which comprises the following steps of: considering game variables specified by sampling quality detection, high-quality reward, disqualification punishment and remedial cost contracts, establishing a quality optimal contract decision-making model, inputting contract decision-making instance data, and establishing a quality optimal contract decision-making model; outputting optimal contract decision information of the main manufacturer; on the premise that information of main manufacturers and suppliers is asymmetric, the suppliers are analyzed in a targeted mode according to the characteristics that an upper limit is not set for yield requirements in a double-fixed-point mode of airplane part supply; if the suppliers in the market are equal, establishing a supplier yield decision-making model under the equal market of the civil aircraft full-manufacturing industrial chain; if the suppliers in the market are uneven in status, establishing a supplier yield decision model under the uneven market of the civil aircraft full-manufacturing industry chain; supplier market instance data are input, supplier yield decision information is output, and guidance is provided for a main manufacturer.

Description

Technical Field

[0001] The present invention relates to the field of high-quality production and game decision-making of civil aircraft, and in particular to a quality decision-making method in a "main manufacturer-supplier" civil aircraft full manufacturing industry chain model based on game theory. Background Art

[0004] In recent years, with the growing demand for supply chain management and quality management, especially in the field of aviation manufacturing, quality control methods for the "main manufacturer-supplier" model have been continuously innovated. In the field of civil aircraft production, production efficiency and final quality are subject to many constraints, and the quality of parts and materials provided by suppliers is one of the key factors. Therefore, how the main manufacturer can effectively manage and monitor the quality of suppliers throughout the entire industrial chain has become an important issue. Especially in the context of a global supply chain, the number and geographical distribution of suppliers increase the complexity of quality control, and quality problems may lead to serious production delays and rising costs. In recent years, there has been an increasing number of studies on the application of game theory to quality decision-making in the main manufacturer-supplier cooperation model. By analyzing the quality, output and cost game between the main manufacturer and the supplier, this paper explores how to achieve quality optimization in the industry. Chen J et al. (Chen J, Liang L, Yao DQ, et al. Price and quality decisions in dual-channel supply chains[J]. European Journal of Operational Research, 2016, 259(1-2): 29-32. DOI: 10.1016 / j.ejor.2016.11.016.) studied the price and quality decisions in dual-channel supply chains and characterized the impact of channel structure on supply chain performance by adding Pareto zones in the channel. J Pang et al. (Jiangang Pang, Kim Hua Tan. Supply chain quality and pricing decisions under multi-manufacturer competition [J]. Industrial Management & Data Systems, 2017, 118 (12): 00-00. DOI: 10.1108 / IMDS-03-2017-0092.) investigated the optimal quality strategies of suppliers under different cooperation mechanisms in the e-commerce environment and their impact on the profits of channel members. The improved Nerlove-Arrow model was used to examine the relationship between goodwill and product sales quality levels.Zhao Y et al. (Zhao Y, Cui Z, Chen J, et al. Priclng and quality decisions in a supply chain with consumers'privacy concern [J]. Journal of Industrial and Management Optimization, 2023, 19 (2): 1211-1235. DOI: 10.3934 / jimo.2021226.) Considering a supply chain in a retail product environment where a manufacturer produces products with quality levels and sells them through a retailer, a stylized model was established to study the impact of consumers' privacy concerns on pricing, quality decisions, and profitability through the relationship between product quality and personal information. Malmir B et al. (Malmir B, Dehghani S, Jahantigh FF, et al. A New Model for Supply Chain Quality Management of Hospital MedicaiEquipment through Game Theory [J]. 2016.) analyzed the supply chain environment of hospital equipment and explored the importance of the reward and punishment system for hospitals to implement quality management of medical equipment supply chains, thereby promoting medical companies to adopt high-quality strategies. Wang L et al. (Wang L, He Z, Zhang H Y. Manufacturer encroachment and quality investment decisions in a two-period supply chain [J]. International transactions in operational research: A journal of The International Federation of 0perational Research Societies, 2024, 31 (4): 2613-2643. DOI: 10.1111 / itor.13254.) explored the impact of manufacturers' encroachment on endogenous quality investment decisions in a two-period supply chain under the Internet manufacturer retail scenario where consumers' valuation of products depreciates over time. Four channel strategies for manufacturers were proposed and equilibrium decisions and profits were discussed.NAGURNEY (NAGURNEY, ANNA, LI, DONG. A supply chain network game theory model with product differentiation. outsourcing of production and distribution, and quality and price competition [J]. Annals of operations research, 2015, 226 (Mar.): 479-503. DOI: 10.1007 / s10479-014-1692-5.) established a supply chain network game model that takes into account product differentiation, possible outsourcing of production and distribution, and quality and price competition. The model is applicable to a variety of products ranging from pharmaceuticals to fast fashion to high-tech products. Summary of the invention

[0005] A quality decision-making method based on game theory in the "main manufacturer-supplier" civil aircraft full manufacturing industry chain model. First, considering the characteristics of the "main manufacturer-supplier" model of civil aircraft, such as long contract signing cycle, complex influencing factors, and contract formulation based on experience, the game variables stipulated in the contract, such as sampling quality inspection, high-quality rewards, non-conformity penalties, and remediation costs, are considered to establish a quality optimal contract decision model, input contract decision instance data, and output the optimal contract decision information of the main manufacturer. On the basis of the quality optimal contract decision model, the production status and specific information of the supplier are still largely unknown to the main manufacturer. This information asymmetry makes it difficult for the main manufacturer to accurately estimate the supplier's response, thereby affecting the overall production efficiency and supply chain quality. Therefore, under the premise of information asymmetry between the main manufacturer and the supplier, targeted analysis is carried out on the suppliers in view of the characteristics of the "double fixed-point" model of aircraft parts supply and the unlimited production demand. Determine whether the status of suppliers in the market is equal. If the status of suppliers in the market is equal, then establish a supplier production decision model under an equal market for the entire civil aircraft manufacturing industry chain. If the status of suppliers in the market is unequal, then establish a supplier production decision model under an unequal market for the entire civil aircraft manufacturing industry chain, input supplier market instance data, output supplier production decision information, and provide guidance for main manufacturers.

[0006] 1. Optimal Contract Decision Model for the Quality of the Whole Civil Aircraft Manufacturing Industry Chain

[0007] For the game under the "main manufacturer-supplier" model, considering the contract provisions such as sampling quality inspection, high quality reward, non-conformity penalty, and remediation cost, some variables are set as shown in Table 1:

[0008] Table 1 Game variables in the “main manufacturer-supplier” model

[0009]

[0010]

[0011] Some assumptions and explanations:

[0012] 1) Mass can be defined by a single random variable and is assumed to follow a normal distribution;

[0013] 2) In the actual production process, suppliers may be able to reduce the production quality variance by upgrading equipment, training workers, etc., but for the convenience of analysis, the production quality variance is assumed to be known and fixed;

[0014] 3) When the supplier determines the target quality as m, the actual production quality average is m;

[0015] 4) The data related to the normal distribution of the supplier's production quality can be evaluated;

[0016] 5) At the time of delivery, the main manufacturer will sample the batch of products and conduct a quality review of the sampled products to decide whether to accept the batch. The sampling ratio can be determined in the range of [0%, 100%] according to the interests of the main manufacturer. For example, for a batch of L products, n pieces are randomly sampled. If the number of non-compliant products is greater than the pre-set acceptance number, the batch will be rejected. Therefore, the delivery success rate Γ(m) of the batch can be calculated as:

[0017]

[0018] Where Φ=Φ x (m0; m, σ), d is the number of unqualified items in the sample, and c is the qualified number. Since the complex products related to aircraft production are of high value, the quality requirements are usually close to zero unqualified products, so the qualified number c is set to 0, so

[0019] Γ(m)=(1-Φ x (m0; m, σ) n

[0020] 6) Suppliers need to bear the start-up costs, warehousing costs, manufacturing costs, costs to prevent low quality, internal failure costs, and external failure costs; while the main manufacturer needs to bear the cost of quality review;

[0021] 7) When Q>L, the supplier retains some inventory. It is easy to calculate that the average inventory is

[0022] 8) When a single delivery product fails the quality inspection, since there is a batch of products in stock, some of the stock can be used to deal with the product remediation. The corresponding remediation cost decreases as Q increases;

[0023] 9) When a single batch of products passes the quality inspection, the main manufacturer will give high quality rewards according to the target quality actually set by the supplier;

[0024] 10) In order to receive as little penalty as possible, the target quality set by the supplier should obviously be greater than m0;

[0025] 11) In the actual operation process, there is often some asymmetric information. Due to their own production experience and professional advantages, suppliers are generally able to accurately identify the actual quality level of their products, which can be considered as the supplier's private information. However, the main manufacturer does not have such an advantage and can only try to identify the actual quality of purchased parts through an imperfect quality inspection process, and decide whether to accept a batch of products by sampling and testing a set proportion of a batch of products. Under strict quality requirements, the main manufacturer still needs to conduct a full quality inspection of the products provided by the supplier, that is, the sampling inspection rate is usually taken as 100%;

[0026] 12) The set variables are at least second-order differentiable with respect to the variable variables.

[0027] For suppliers: the annual costs include manufacturing costs, warehousing costs, start-up costs, possible penalties and remediation costs; the benefits include high-quality rewards and total sales price.

[0028] For the main manufacturer: the annual costs include the purchase costs paid to suppliers, high-quality rewards given to suppliers, and the testing fees required for sampling and testing batches of products. The profits that can be obtained are the penalty fees charged to suppliers and the profits from using products of a certain quality for subsequent production.

[0029] Based on the above assumptions and explanations, the expected annual costs for suppliers and main manufacturers are calculated separately:

[0030]

[0031]

[0032] In the case of decentralized decision-making, each party appropriately adjusts the values ​​of their own changeable variables to maximize their respective interests. The supplier can decide m and Q, while the main manufacturer can decide m0, rP, j each time a contract is drafted.

[0033]

[0034]

[0035] in,

[0036] Furthermore, in the actual quality analysis and decision-making process, main manufacturers such as Shanghai Aircraft Corporation have a better understanding of their own production and manufacturing information. However, in the "main manufacturer-supplier" civil aircraft full manufacturing industry chain model, the supplier's decision and specific information are unknown to the main manufacturer. This information asymmetry makes it difficult for the main manufacturer to accurately estimate the supplier's response, thus affecting the overall production efficiency and supply chain coordination. To this end, the main manufacturer needs to deeply analyze the possible behavior of the supplier in order to better formulate strategies and optimize decisions. Considering the characteristics of the "double fixed-point" model of aircraft parts supply and the unlimited production demand, since the unit production cost of some suppliers tends to increase with the increase of scale, a quadratic cost enterprise is set, and the supplier's production decision in equal and unequal markets is modeled based on the Cournot model and the Stackelberg model, and the supplier's optimal production decision is analyzed, providing theoretical guidance for the main manufacturer to formulate an effective incentive mechanism and promote the quality improvement of the entire manufacturing industry chain.

[0037] 2. Supplier production decision model in an equal market of the entire civil aircraft manufacturing industry chain based on the Coumot model

[0038] Under the "dual fixed-point" model of aircraft parts supply, sometimes the two suppliers have equal status in the market, there is no single monopoly enterprise, and the unit production cost of some supplier enterprises tends to increase with the increase of scale, which is a quadratic cost enterprise. Therefore, based on the continuous output Coumot model, it is assumed that there are only two suppliers of a certain component product in the market, and they are modeled as duopoly in the market, namely Enterprise 1 and Enterprise 2. The output of Enterprise 1 is q1, and the output of Enterprise 2 is q2. The total market supply of the component is Q=q1+q2. According to game theory, the price at which the main manufacturer purchases the component is constructed as a market demand function P(Q)=a-bQ. In order to simulate the cost situation of real suppliers, the cost function of Enterprise 1 is linear, and the total cost is

[0039] C1=c1q1

[0040] Where c1 is the unit cost coefficient of enterprise 1. The cost function of enterprise 2 is a quadratic cost function. Due to the demand for production efficiency, high-cost instruments and other resources due to the increase in scale, it presents the production characteristics of scale diseconomy. The total cost is

[0041]

[0042] Where c2 is the primary cost coefficient of enterprise 2, and c3>0 indicates the accelerated growth rate of costs. Therefore, the total profits of enterprises 1 and 2 are

[0043] π1=(ab×(q1+q2))×q1-c1×q1

[0044]

[0045] Since both companies make decisions at the same time every year, that is, they do not know the output of the other party before making a decision, this Coumot model is a complete information static game. For each company, the purpose of its own production and decision-making is to obtain as much profit as possible, that is, to maximize benefits. And the decision variables of the two companies are only their own output.

[0046]

[0047] So as to obtain the optimal production decision for each

[0048]

[0049] 3. Supplier production decision model in an unequal market for the entire civil aircraft manufacturing industry chain based on the Stackelberg model

[0050] In the "dual-point" model of aircraft parts supply, sometimes the two suppliers have unequal positions in the market, and some large suppliers dominate the market. The unit production cost of the supplier-following enterprises usually increases with the scale, and they are quadratic cost enterprises. Therefore, the Stackelberg model is used to model this asymmetric market competition.

[0051] Set enterprise 1 as the dominant supplier and enterprise 2 as the follower supplier. The cost and total profit of each party follow the Coumot model. Competition between enterprises is asymmetric and status is unequal. Decisions of suppliers are not made at the same time. Small enterprises observe the behavior of large enterprises before making their own decisions. Since game decisions are not made simultaneously and there are two stages, this Stackelberg model is a dynamic game with complete information. First, analyze the total profit of the follower supplier.

[0052]

[0053] Solve to obtain the optimal output of enterprise 2

[0054]

[0055] Substitute the optimal output of firm 2 into the total profit of firm 1

[0056]

[0057] Analyze the total profit of leading suppliers

[0058]

[0059] Solve to obtain the optimal output of enterprise 1

[0060]

[0061] Based on the output of enterprise 1, enterprise 2 decides its optimal output

[0062]

[0063] Based on the above analysis, a modeling study was conducted on the supplier's production decision under the "main manufacturer-supplier" civil aircraft full manufacturing industry chain model, which takes into account the "double-point" model of aircraft parts supply, the characteristics of no upper limit on production demand, and the secondary cost enterprise. Based on the calculation and analysis of the supplier's production behavior, the main manufacturer can formulate bidding strategies or contract rules more scientifically, thereby promoting the quality improvement of the entire manufacturing industry chain.

[0064] By adopting the above scheme, the beneficial effects of the present invention are:

[0065] 1. Aiming at the characteristics of the "main manufacturer-supplier" model of civil aircraft, such as long contract signing cycle, complex influencing factors, and contract formulation based on experience, the present invention considers contract provisions such as sampling quality inspection, high-quality rewards, non-conformity penalties, and remedial costs, and establishes a quality optimal contract decision model based on dynamic repeated games. It uses iterative calculation to quantitatively analyze the contract decisions of both parties in the future stage, providing a basis for the optimal quality decisions of the main manufacturer and supplier.

[0066] 2. Based on the quality optimal contract decision model and game information asymmetry, the present invention targets the characteristics of the "double fixed-point" mode of aircraft parts supply and no upper limit on production demand, and considers a secondary cost enterprise. Based on the Coumot model and the Stackelberg model, a supplier production decision model under equal and unequal markets in the entire manufacturing industry chain is established, and the supplier's optimal production decision is quantitatively analyzed, providing theoretical guidance for the main manufacturers to formulate effective incentive mechanisms, thereby promoting quality improvement of the entire manufacturing industry chain. BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS

[0067] Figure 1 It is the main process of the quality decision-making method in the "main manufacturer-supplier" civil aircraft full manufacturing industry chain model based on game theory.

[0068] Figure 2 It is a dynamic iterative process for the optimal quality contract decision model for the entire civil aircraft manufacturing industry chain.

[0069] Figure 3It is the process of the supplier production decision model in an equal market of the entire civil aircraft manufacturing industry chain based on the Cournot model.

[0070] Figure 4 It is the process of the supplier production decision model in the unequal market of the entire civil aircraft manufacturing industry chain based on the Stackelberg model. DETAILED DESCRIPTION

[0071] The technical solution provided by the present application will be further described below in conjunction with specific embodiments and accompanying drawings. The advantages and features of the present application will become more apparent with the following description.

[0072] Figure 1 As shown in the figure, a quality decision-making method based on game theory in the "main manufacturer-supplier" civil aircraft full manufacturing industry chain model:

[0073] Step 1: Based on the data obtained from the entire civil aircraft manufacturing industry chain, establish a quality optimal contract decision model; input contract decision instance data, and output the optimal contract decision information of the main manufacturer through the quality optimal contract decision model. Determine whether the status of suppliers in the market is equal. If so, execute step 2, otherwise execute step 3. ( Figure 2 )

[0074] Explanation: Based on the optimal quality contract decision model, the production status and specific information of suppliers are still largely unknown to the main manufacturer. This information asymmetry makes it difficult for the main manufacturer to accurately estimate the supplier's response, thus affecting the overall production efficiency and supply chain quality. Therefore, targeted analysis is carried out on suppliers to determine whether the status of suppliers in the market is equal.

[0075] Step 2: If the suppliers in the market have equal status, then establish a supplier output decision model under an equal market for the entire civil aircraft manufacturing industry chain ( Figure 3 ), input supplier market instance data, and output supplier production decision information through the supplier production decision model.

[0076] Step 3: If the suppliers in the market have unequal status, then establish a supplier output decision model under the unequal market of the entire civil aircraft manufacturing industry chain ( Figure 4 ). Input supplier market instance data, and output supplier production decision information through the supplier production decision model.

[0077] The following is a detailed description of the key points of each step in the technical solution:

[0078] 1. Establishing a static model of optimal quality contract decision-making for the entire civil aircraft manufacturing industry chain and its dynamic game iteration process

[0079] For the game under the "main manufacturer-supplier" model, the variable values ​​are set as shown in Table 2:

[0080] Table 2 Game variable values ​​under the “main manufacturer-supplier” model

[0081]

[0082]

[0083] Based on the assumptions and explanations, calculate the expected annual costs for the supplier and the primary manufacturer respectively:

[0084]

[0085] In the case of decentralized decision-making, each party appropriately adjusts the values ​​of their own changeable variables to maximize their respective interests. The supplier can decide m and Q, while the main manufacturer can decide m0, r, P, j each time a contract is drafted.

[0086]

[0087]

[0088]

[0089]

[0090]

[0091] When the main manufacturer makes a decision, although the increase and decrease relationship between the main manufacturer's cost and the high-quality reward r, penalty P and supply unit price is determined under the premise that other variables remain unchanged. However, in order to encourage the supplier's high-quality production, higher r and j will be appropriately provided; and in order to prevent low-quality production, the main manufacturer will set a higher penalty. The value of m0 can be evaluated by numerical calculation and appropriately adjusted according to the supplier's behavior. Through case investigation, the decision variables that cannot be determined by numerical calculation are set to fixed values, r = 0.5, P = 250, j = 5. And set the initial m = 200, Q = 4000. The main manufacturer observes the initial m and Q and makes the optimal m0 in the next round of game decision.

[0092] Therefore, when the other party’s last decision is determined, the main manufacturer in the next game can determine the optimal m0, and the supplier can determine the optimal m and Q to maximize their own interests.

[0093] Table 3 Optimal decision variables under repeated games

[0094]

[0095]

[0096] The final numerical calculation results are shown in Table 3. The approximate optimal decision is m≈145, Q≈3370, and m0≈127.

[0097] Based on the above calculation and analysis, the production behaviors and choices of the main manufacturers and suppliers are predictable. Through repeated games in multiple collaborations over several years, the values ​​of each decision variable will eventually stabilize and maximize the interests of both parties.

[0098] like Figure 2 As shown in the flowchart, the process is as follows: obtain data from the contract decision-making instance of the entire civil aircraft manufacturing industry chain.

[0099] Step 1.1: Based on case studies, set game variables and assign values ​​to them according to the case.

[0100] Step 1.2: Construct the main manufacturer's expected annual cost function C b (m0, r, P, j) and the supplier's expected annual cost function C s (m, Q).

[0101] Step 1.3: In each round of contract decision-making, the main manufacturer and the supplier adjust the values ​​of their respective decision variables with the goal of maximizing their own interests, that is,

[0102] min C s (m, Q)

[0103] min C b (m0, r, P, j).

[0104] Step 1.4: Repeat steps 1.1 to 1.3 to simulate multiple contract decision-making processes and perform dynamic game iterative calculations until the specified number of game iterations is reached.

[0105] Step 1.5: Output the values ​​of the decision variables at each stage of the game, analyze the final converged numerical results, and obtain the approximate optimal decision.

[0106] 2. Supplier production decision model in an equal market of the entire civil aircraft manufacturing industry chain based on the Coumot model

[0107] Aiming at the characteristics of the "dual fixed-point" mode of aircraft parts supply and no upper limit on production demand, and considering a secondary cost enterprise, a supplier production decision-making model in an equal market of the entire civil aircraft manufacturing industry chain based on the Cournot model is established, and the optimal decision and optimal profit of the equal duopoly suppliers are analyzed to promote the enthusiasm of suppliers and improve the supply quality.

[0108] Figure 3The flowchart shown contains the following steps:

[0109] Step 2.1: Determine the parameter values ​​based on case studies. The market demand base level a = 100, the price sensitivity to demand b = 1, the unit cost coefficient of supplier 1 c1 = 15, the primary cost coefficient of supplier 2 c2 = 10, and the accelerated growth rate of cost of supplier 2 c3 = 0.5.

[0110] Step 2.2: Construct the market demand function P(Q)=a-bQ=ab(q1+q2)=100-(q1+q2) and the enterprise production cost function

[0111] Step 2.3: Construct the profit function of Enterprise 1 and Enterprise 2 π1=(100-(q1+q2))×q1-15q1,

[0112] Step 2.4: The two companies adjust their own output q1 and q2 respectively to optimize their respective profits and solve the equation

[0113]

[0114] Get the best yield

[0115] Step 2.5: Output the optimal output Under the guidance of the optimal production decision, the quality of supply is improved. 3. Supplier production decision model in the unequal market of the entire civil aircraft manufacturing industry chain based on the Stackelberg model

[0116] Aiming at the characteristics of the "dual fixed-point" mode of aircraft parts supply and no upper limit on production demand, and considering a secondary cost enterprise, a supplier production decision model in the unequal market of the entire civil aircraft manufacturing industry chain based on the Stackelberg model is established. The optimal decision and optimal profit of the unequal duopoly suppliers are analyzed, and the enthusiasm of suppliers and the quality of supply are improved, thereby improving the quality of the entire civil aircraft manufacturing industry chain.

[0117] Figure 4 The flowchart shown contains the following steps:

[0118] Step 3.1: Determine the parameter values ​​based on case studies. The market demand base level a = 100, the price sensitivity to demand b = 1, the unit cost coefficient of supplier 1 c1 = 15, the primary cost coefficient of supplier 2 c2 = 10, and the accelerated growth rate of cost of supplier 2 c3 = 0.5.

[0119] Step 3.2: Construct the market demand function P(Q)=a-bQ=ab(q1+q2)=100-(q1+q2) and the enterprise production cost function C1=c1q1=15q1,

[0120] Step 3.3: Construct the profit function of Enterprise 1 and Enterprise 2 π1=(100-(q1+q2))×q1-15q1,

[0121] Step 3.4: Set the production decision of enterprise 1 to q1. Enterprise 2 observes the production of enterprise 1 and analyzes to obtain the optimal production.

[0122] Step 3.5: Given the output of firm 2, find the optimal output decision for firm 1.

[0123] Step 3.6: Firm 2 observes the output of Firm 1 Then set its own optimal output

[0124] Step 3.7: Output the optimal output Under the guidance of optimal production decision, we can promote the improvement of supply quality.

Claims

1. A quality decision-making method based on game theory in the "main manufacturer-supplier" civil aircraft full manufacturing industry chain model, characterized by: include: Firstly, in view of the long contract signing cycle, complex influencing factors and empirical contract formulation of the "main manufacturer-supplier" model of civil aircraft, the optimal quality contract decision model is established by considering the game variables stipulated in the contract, such as sampling quality inspection, high quality reward, non-conformity penalty and remediation cost, inputting the contract decision instance data and outputting the optimal contract decision information of the main manufacturer; Based on the quality optimal contract decision model, the production status and specific information of suppliers are still largely unknown to the main manufacturer. This information asymmetry makes it difficult for the main manufacturer to accurately estimate the supplier's response, thus affecting the overall production efficiency and supply chain quality. Under the premise of information asymmetry between the main manufacturer and the supplier, targeted analysis is carried out on the suppliers in view of the "double-point" model of aircraft parts supply and the characteristics of no upper limit on production demand; whether the status of suppliers in the market is equal: If the suppliers in the market have equal status, then a supplier output decision model under an equal market of the entire civil aircraft manufacturing industry chain is established; If the status of suppliers in the market is unequal, then a supplier output decision model under an unequal market in the entire civil aircraft manufacturing industry chain is established; Input supplier market instance data and output supplier production decision information to provide guidance to the main manufacturer.

2. The method according to claim 1, characterized in that: The optimal quality contract decision model: considering contract provisions such as sampling quality inspection, high quality rewards, non-conformity penalties, and remediation costs, a optimal quality contract decision model is established based on dynamic repeated games.

3. The method according to claim 2, characterized in that: The quality optimal contract decision model: Calculate the expected annual costs for the supplier and the main manufacturer separately: The above-mentioned optimal quality contract decision model takes into account the contract provisions of sampling quality inspection, high-quality rewards, non-conformity penalties, and remediation costs in the game decision variables. From the perspective of dynamic repeated games, the model is modeled to quantitatively analyze the impact of the main manufacturer and supplier's contracts and production behaviors on their own interests and overall interests, so as to adjust the purchasing policy or contract quality reward and punishment provisions to promote the quality improvement of the entire civil aircraft manufacturing industry chain; Furthermore, the problem objective is to minimize the expected annual costs of suppliers and main manufacturers respectively: min C s (m,Q) min C b (m0,r,P,j) Among them C s (m, Q) and C b (m0, r, P, j) are the expected annual costs of the supplier and the main manufacturer, respectively, and the variables m, Q, m0, r, P, j are contract or production-related decision variables; The expected annual cost to suppliers and primary manufacturers is minimized as follows: in, The above minimization of the expected annual costs of suppliers and main manufacturers is that under the situation of decentralized decision-making, each party appropriately adjusts the values ​​of their respective changeable variables to maximize their respective interests. The supplier can decide m and Q, and the main manufacturer can decide m0, r, P, j each time a contract is drafted.

4. The method according to claim 1, characterized in that: The supplier output decision model in the equal market of the entire civil aircraft manufacturing industry chain is as follows: Aiming at the characteristics of "double fixed-point" mode of aircraft parts supply and no upper limit on production demand, and modeling one of the suppliers as a secondary cost enterprise, a supplier production decision model under equal market in the whole manufacturing industry chain was established based on Cournot model.

5. The method according to claim 4, characterized in that: The supplier output decision model in the equal market of the entire civil aircraft manufacturing industry chain is as follows: In view of the characteristics of the "dual fixed-point" model of aircraft parts supply and no upper limit on production demand, a linear cost enterprise and a quadratic cost enterprise are considered to model and analyze the supplier production decisions in an equal market in the entire manufacturing industry chain, analyze the optimal decision and optimal profit of the equal duopoly suppliers, promote the enthusiasm of suppliers and improve the quality of supply, thereby improving the quality of the entire civil aircraft manufacturing industry chain; The following steps are included: Step 2.1: Obtain data from equal market instances in the entire civil aircraft manufacturing industry chain to determine parameter values; Step 2.2: Construct the market demand function P(Q) and the enterprise production cost functions C1 and C2, assuming that enterprise 1 has linear cost and enterprise 2 has quadratic cost; Step 2.3: Construct the profit functions π1, π2 of Enterprise 1 and Enterprise 2; Step 2.4: The two companies adjust their own output q1 and q2 respectively to optimize their respective profits. Solve the equation to get the optimal output Step 2.5: Output the optimal output The supplier output decision model under the equal market includes the following five functions: The market demand function is P(Q) = a-bQ, where a is the maximum possible market price and b represents the price elasticity of demand; The cost function of enterprise 1 is C1=c1q1, where c1 is the unit cost coefficient of enterprise 1; Cost function of firm 2 Where c2 is the primary cost coefficient of enterprise 2, and c3>0 indicates the accelerated growth rate of costs; Profit function of enterprise 1π1=(ab×(q1+q2))×q1-c1×q1 Profit function of firm 2 Solve the equation to get the optimal yield So as to obtain the optimal production decision for each 6. The method according to claim 1, characterized in that: The supplier output decision model under the unequal market of the entire civil aircraft manufacturing industry chain is as follows: Aiming at the characteristics of the "double fixed-point" mode of aircraft parts supply and no upper limit on production demand, and modeling the follower supplier enterprises as secondary cost enterprises, a supplier production decision model under unequal market in the whole manufacturing industry chain was established based on the Stackelberg model.

7. The method according to claim 6, characterized in that: The supplier output decision model under the unequal market of the entire civil aircraft manufacturing industry chain is as follows: In view of the characteristics of the "dual fixed-point" model of aircraft parts supply and no upper limit on production demand, considering the dominant linear cost-type enterprises and the following quadratic cost-type enterprises, modeling and analysis of supplier production decisions under unequal markets in the entire manufacturing industry chain are carried out, and the optimal decision-making and optimal profit of the unequal duopoly suppliers are analyzed to promote the enthusiasm of suppliers and improve the supply quality, thereby improving the quality of the entire civil aircraft manufacturing industry chain. The following steps are involved: Step 3.1: Obtain data from equal market instances in the entire civil aircraft manufacturing industry chain to determine parameter values; Step 3.2: Construct the market demand function P(Q) and the enterprise production cost functions C1 and C2, assuming that enterprise 1 is the dominant supplier and the cost function is linear; enterprise 2 is the follower supplier and the cost function is quadratic; Step 3.3: Construct the profit functions π1, π2 of Enterprise 1 and Enterprise 2; Step 3.4: Set the production decision of enterprise 1 to q1. Enterprise 2 observes the production of enterprise 1 and analyzes to obtain the optimal production. Step 3.5: Given the output of firm 2, find the optimal output decision for firm 1. Step 3.6: Firm 2 observes the output of Firm 1 Then set its own optimal output Step 3.7: Output the optimal output The supplier output decision model under the equal market includes the following five functions: The market demand function is P(Q) = a-bQ, where a is the maximum possible market price and b represents the price elasticity of demand; The cost function of enterprise 1 is C1=c1q1, where c1 is the unit cost coefficient of enterprise 1; Cost function of firm 2 Where c2 is the primary cost coefficient of enterprise 2, and c3>0 indicates the accelerated growth rate of costs; Profit function of enterprise 1π1=(ab×(q1+q2))×q1-c1×q1 Profit function of firm 2 Fix q1 and solve the equation to get the optimal So we can solve Will Substitute into π1 and solve for the optimal Solve to obtain the optimal output of enterprise 1 Based on the output of enterprise 1, enterprise 2 solves for its own optimal output

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