Method for preventing misoperation of electrical equipment of power plant distributed control system

Abstract

The present application relates to the technical field of electrical equipment control, and discloses a method for preventing misoperation of electrical equipment of a power plant distributed control system, comprising: setting a control node number based on acquired electrical equipment information; establishing a number database of electrical equipment in combination with label content of all control nodes; generating a first control instruction based on operation state information of the distributed control system; generating a second control instruction based on verification of the first control instruction by a first misoperation prevention model; and verifying the second control instruction based on a second misoperation prevention model. The present application enhances the reliability of the system based on the generation of the control instruction and the verification process of the two-stage misoperation prevention model, wherein the first misoperation prevention model relates to human-machine interface operation of operating personnel and emergency conditions of the power plant, and the second misoperation prevention model relates to generation and judgment of reference values from different angles to verify the control instruction.

Description

TECHNICAL FIELD

[0001] The present application relates to the technical field of electrical equipment control, in particular to a method for preventing misoperation of electrical equipment of a distributed control system of a thermal power plant. BACKGROUND

[0002] At present, most of the electrical equipment of a thermal power plant is remotely operated through a man-machine interface of a distributed control system, and the misoperation prevention means for starting and stopping important electrical equipment and opening and closing electrical switches is only double-checking by an electrical operator and a guardian through manual operation.

[0003] The effect of misoperation prevention is greatly affected by personnel factors, and the electrical equipment operates quickly after the operation instruction is sent, so there is usually no reaction time, and once misoperation occurs, it will endanger personal and equipment safety. SUMMARY

[0004] The purpose of the present application is to design a method for preventing misoperation of electrical equipment of a distributed control system of a thermal power plant, to number important electrical equipment, to distinguish between emergency and non-emergency operation states, to check the operation object under the non-emergency state by using the equipment number, and to prevent misoperation of electrical equipment and eliminate major hidden dangers endangering personal and equipment safety by using the control system design and considering various possible situations in practice.

[0005] To achieve the above purpose, the present application provides a method for preventing misoperation of electrical equipment of a distributed control system of a thermal power plant, comprising:

[0006] A method for preventing misoperation of electrical equipment of a distributed control system of a thermal power plant, comprising:

[0007] Setting a control node number based on the obtained electrical equipment information;

[0008] Establishing a number database of electrical equipment in combination with the label content of all control nodes;

[0009] Generating a first control instruction based on the operation state information of the distributed control system;

[0010] Generating a second control instruction based on the first misoperation prevention model verifying the first control instruction;

[0011] Verifying the second control instruction based on a second misoperation prevention model.

[0012] In some embodiments of the present application, the first misoperation prevention model comprises:

[0013] Setting an operator category and an emergency situation of the thermal power plant;

[0014] The operator category includes an operator level and an engineer level, and the emergency situation of the thermal power plant includes a first running state and a second running state.

[0015] Obtaining the current operator category and the emergency situation of the thermal power plant based on the operation state information of the distributed control system;

[0016] Running the corresponding human-computer interaction interface based on the operator category and the emergency situation of the thermal power plant;

[0017] Generating the secondary control instruction based on the information sent by the human-computer interaction interface.

[0018] In some embodiments of the present application, the generation of the secondary control instruction comprises:

[0019] Generating a set of emergency situation reference values A of the current thermal power plant based on the obtained historical operation state data of the current thermal power plant, A={a1, a2…ai…an};

[0020] Wherein, ai is the i-th emergency situation reference value, and n is the number of emergency situation reference values in the set of emergency situation reference values;

[0021] Judging the emergency situation of the current thermal power plant by comparing ai with a preset value ah of the emergency situation;

[0022] If ai≥ah, the current thermal power plant is in a primary operation state;

[0023] If ai<ah, the current thermal power plant is in a secondary operation state;

[0024] If the current user category is the operator level, running the operator level human-computer interaction interface;

[0025] If the current user category is the engineer level, running the engineer level human-computer interaction interface;

[0026] Combining the emergency situation of the current thermal power plant and the current human-computer interaction interface;

[0027] If the current thermal power plant is in the primary operation state and the running human-computer interaction interface is the operator level human-computer interaction interface, directly setting the primary control instruction as the secondary control instruction;

[0028] If the current thermal power plant is in the secondary operation state and the running human-computer interaction interface is the operator level human-computer interaction interface, sending the primary control instruction for verification;

[0029] If the running human-computer interaction interface is the engineer level human-computer interaction interface, directly setting the primary control instruction as the secondary control instruction.

[0030] In some embodiments of the present application, the sending of the primary control instruction for verification comprises:

[0031] Text checking on the number text input by the operator level personnel type;

[0032] The text verification includes: numbered text form verification and control point number verification;

[0033] If the text verification passes, the numbered text is deleted;

[0034] If the text verification does not pass, an alarm prompt message is generated until the verification passes.

[0035] In some embodiments of the application, the text verification includes:

[0036] The distributed control system includes a plurality of partitions, each partition including a plurality of electrical devices;

[0037] The electrical device operation interface is set based on the partition;

[0038] When the current operation interface performs numbered text input, the remaining electrical device operation interfaces automatically clear the input characters;

[0039] According to the actual execution time of electrical operation, the effective time of numbered text character input is set, and the numbered text input beyond the effective time is automatically cleared.

[0040] In some embodiments of the application, the second anti-misoperation model includes:

[0041] The first reference value of the distributed control system and the current node is generated based on the secondary control instruction;

[0042] The second reference value of the current control node is generated in combination with the obtained running state information of the current control node device and the secondary control instruction;

[0043] The control type set is generated by classifying the secondary control instruction based on historical data, and the third reference value is generated based on the historical data and the control type of the current secondary control instruction;

[0044] The first preset value, the second preset value and the third preset value corresponding to the first reference value, the second reference value and the third reference value are set in combination with the historical data;

[0045] When the first reference value, the second reference value and the third reference value all reach the corresponding first preset value, the second preset value and the third preset value, the secondary control instruction passes the verification;

[0046] In some embodiments of the application, when the first reference value of the distributed control system and the current node is generated, it includes:

[0047] The number of the control node is obtained based on the secondary control instruction;

[0048] The verification data is sent to the control node through the distributed control system, and the verification data feedback situation is obtained;

[0049] Set a communication state judgment index based on historical data;

[0050] Generate a first reference value in combination with the communication state judgment index and the check data feedback situation.

[0051] In some embodiments of the application, when the second reference value of the current control node is generated, the following steps are included:

[0052] Obtain the running state information of the current control node;

[0053] Classify the running state information based on historical data to generate a function execution reference value set B of the current control node, B={b1, b2…bj…bm};

[0054] Wherein, bj represents the jth function execution reference value of the current control node, and m represents the number of functions of the current control node.

[0055] Determine a function subset B1 that needs to be executed by the current control node based on the secondary control instruction;

[0056] Obtain the function execution reference values of all function items in the function subset B1 from the function execution reference value set B;

[0057] Generate a second reference value by comparing the function execution reference values of all function items in the function subset B1 with the function execution preset value;

[0058] In some embodiments of the application, when the third reference value of the current control node is generated, the following steps are included:

[0059] Divide the control types of the secondary control instruction based on historical data to generate a control type set C, C={c1, c2…ck…cq};

[0060] Wherein, ck represents the kth control type of the secondary control instruction, and q represents the total number of control types of the secondary control instruction.

[0061] Generate a direct feasibility reference value e1 and an indirect feasibility reference value e2 in combination with the control type of the current secondary instruction and the current thermal power plant running state;

[0062] Generate the third reference value of the current control node based on the direct feasibility reference value e1 and the indirect feasibility reference value e2 of the current thermal power plant running state.

[0063] In some embodiments of the application, when the direct feasibility reference value e1 and the indirect feasibility reference value e2 are generated, the following steps are included:

[0064] Divide the thermal power plant running state based on historical data to generate a thermal power plant running state data set;

[0065] The execution situation evaluation value of the control type corresponding to each secondary control instruction is generated in combination with the control type set C and the power plant operation state data set;

[0066] The execution situation evaluation value of the control type of the current secondary instruction is obtained to generate a direct feasibility reference value e1;

[0067] The association reference value between the control node and the abnormal control node of the current secondary instruction is obtained; and the indirect feasibility reference value e2 is generated based on the association reference value.

[0068] Compared with the prior art, the method for preventing misoperation of electrical equipment of a power plant distributed control system provided by the embodiment of the application has the following beneficial effects:

[0069] The possibility of misoperation is significantly reduced through the multi-level verification mechanism. Each level of verification checks the control instruction from a different angle.

[0070] The man-machine interaction interface corresponding to various factors is operated to generate the secondary control instruction. This means that the operation is customized based on the current operation environment and the personnel authority, avoiding misoperation caused by mismatching of the operation personnel authority or improper handling of the emergency situation.

[0071] The comparison with the preset value is used to determine whether the emergency situation is a primary operation state or a secondary operation state, which is more objective and accurate, and provides a reliable basis for subsequent different operations according to different emergency situations, thereby improving the accuracy of instruction generation.

[0072] When the primary control instruction is sent for verification, the number text input by the operator-level personnel is subjected to text checking, ensuring the accuracy of the input instruction in terms of format and content, and reducing misoperation caused by input errors.

[0073] The distributed control system includes multiple partitions, and each partition has a corresponding electrical equipment operation interface. This partition setting is conducive to clearer management and operation of electrical equipment in different regions by the operator.

[0074] The effective time of the number text character input is set according to the actual execution time of the electrical operation, and the number text that has been input beyond the effective time is automatically cleared, ensuring the timeliness of the operation, preventing the occupation of input resources for a long time from affecting other operations, and promoting the operator to efficiently and accurately input the instruction, thereby improving the overall operation efficiency.

[0075] The communication state judgment index set in combination with the historical data is used to comprehensively judge by sending the checking data to the control node; the comprehensive reference value generation mode ensures that the control instruction is evaluated from multiple aspects, thereby enhancing the reliability of the system. BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF DRAWINGS

[0076] Figure 1 is a flow chart of a method for preventing misoperation of electrical equipment of a distributed control system of a thermal power plant provided by an embodiment of the present application. DETAILED DESCRIPTION

[0077] The specific embodiments of the present application will be further described in conjunction with the accompanying drawings and embodiments. The following embodiments are used to illustrate the present application, but not to limit the scope of the present application.

[0078] In the description of the present application, it should be understood that the terms "center", "upper", "lower", "front", "back", "left", "right", "vertical", "horizontal", "top", "bottom", "inner", "outer" and the like indicate the orientation or positional relationship based on the orientation or positional relationship shown in the drawings, and are only for the convenience of describing the present application and simplifying the description, and do not indicate or imply that the device or element referred to must have a particular orientation, be constructed and operated in a particular orientation, and therefore cannot be understood as a limitation of the present application.

[0079] The terms "first", "second" are only for descriptive purposes, and cannot be understood as indicating or implying relative importance or implicitly indicating the number of technical features indicated. Therefore, the features defined with "first", "second" can explicitly or implicitly include one or more of the features. In the description of the present application, unless otherwise specified, the meaning of "a plurality of" is two or more.

[0080] In the description of the present application, it should be noted that unless otherwise specified and limited, the terms "mounting", "connection", "connection" should be understood broadly, for example, it can be fixedly connected, or it can be detachably connected, or integrally connected; it can be mechanically connected, or it can be electrically connected; it can be directly connected, or it can be indirectly connected through an intermediate medium; it can be the communication inside two elements. For those skilled in the art, the specific meaning of the above terms in the present application can be understood according to the specific circumstances.

[0081] Embodiment 1: A method for preventing misoperation of electrical equipment of a distributed control system of a thermal power plant, as shown in Figure 1 , comprising:

[0082] Setting the control node number based on the acquired electrical equipment information;

[0083] Establishing a numbering database of electrical equipment based on the label content of all control nodes;

[0084] Generating a first control instruction based on the operation state information of the distributed control system;

[0085] Generating a second control instruction based on the first misoperation prevention model verifying the first control instruction;

[0086] Verify the secondary control instruction based on the second anti-misoperation model.

[0087] Embodiment 2: The primary anti-misoperation model comprises:

[0088] Set the operator category and the emergency state of the thermal power plant;

[0089] Wherein, the operator category comprises: operator level and engineer level; the emergency state of the thermal power plant comprises: primary operation state and secondary operation state;

[0090] Obtain the current operator category and the emergency state of the thermal power plant based on the operation state information of the distributed control system;

[0091] Run the corresponding human-computer interaction interface based on the operator category and the emergency state of the thermal power plant;

[0092] Generate the secondary control instruction based on the information sent by the human-computer interaction interface.

[0093] Operator level:

[0094] This category is mainly responsible for daily operation tasks, such as routine switching operations on electrical equipment, parameter adjustments (such as adjusting voltage, current, etc. within a certain range of small changes), etc. Their operation authority is relatively limited, mainly based on the operation process set in advance, and cannot modify the key settings or complex functions of the system.

[0095] The personnel of operator level have undergone special operation training and are familiar with the basic operation methods of electrical equipment, but may have limited understanding of the in-depth technical principles and complex troubleshooting of the system.

[0096] Engineer level:

[0097] The personnel of engineer level have higher technical ability and more extensive operation authority. They can not only perform routine operations, but also can deeply configure and adjust the system. For example, in system upgrade, fault diagnosis and repair, engineers can modify the control algorithm of electrical equipment, adjust the safety threshold of the system, reprogram the control logic of the equipment, etc.

[0098] Engineers need to have deep professional knowledge, including electrical engineering, automation control, computer technology and other aspects of knowledge, to cope with complex system maintenance and optimization tasks.

[0099] Primary operation state:

[0100] When the power plant is in a level one operating state, it indicates that a more serious situation has occurred. For example, there may be a risk of failure of critical components of the generator set (such as abnormal vibration of the main shaft of the steam turbine, excessive temperature of the stator winding of the generator approaching the critical value, etc.), or there may be a large fluctuation in power (such as a sudden drop in power output exceeding a certain proportion, which may affect the stability of the power grid).

[0101] In this state, immediate emergency measures need to be taken to ensure the safety of equipment, stable power supply, and possible emergency shutdown or adjustment of some non-critical equipment to ensure the normal operation of core equipment.

[0102] Level two operating state:

[0103] The level two operating state indicates that the power plant has some conditions that need attention but have not reached an emergency level. For example, the operating parameters of a certain auxiliary equipment (such as the flow of a cooling water pump slightly lower than the normal level, but not affecting the cooling effect of the main equipment), or the control system detects some potential small faults (such as slight fluctuations in the signals of some sensors, but not affecting the accuracy of the overall operating data).

[0104] At this time, although it is not necessary to take large-scale emergency measures immediately, it is necessary to closely monitor the operating conditions of related equipment and systems and carry out some preventive operations or adjustments.

[0105] Operator category acquisition:

[0106] In the distributed control system, each operator needs to perform identity verification when logging into the system. The system will determine whether the operator is an operator or an engineer based on the permission level of the login account.

[0107] At the same time, the system will monitor the operation behavior in real time, and if an operator tries to perform an operation beyond his / her authority (such as modifying the control logic of a critical device), the system will issue a warning and prevent the operation to ensure the safety and compliance of the operation.

[0108] Power plant emergency condition acquisition:

[0109] The distributed control system acquires the operating state information of each device and system in the power plant through a large number of sensors. These sensors are distributed in the generator set, boiler, auxiliary equipment, etc., and can monitor key parameters such as temperature, pressure, flow, and speed in real time.

[0110] The system analyzes the data collected by the sensors, for example, for temperature data, the system sets different thresholds. When the temperature of a device exceeds the threshold of the secondary operating state but has not reached the threshold of the primary operating state, the system determines the secondary operating state; when the temperature exceeds the threshold of the primary operating state, it is determined to be the primary operating state. At the same time, the correlation between multiple parameters (such as the relationship between steam pressure and flow) is also analyzed to more accurately determine the overall emergency situation.

[0111] In the embodiment 3, the generating the secondary control instruction comprises:

[0112] generating an emergency situation reference value set A of the current thermal power plant based on the obtained historical operating state data of the current thermal power plant, A={a1, a2…ai…an};

[0113] wherein ai is the i-th emergency situation reference value, and n is the number of emergency situation reference values in the emergency situation reference value set;

[0114] judging the emergency situation of the current thermal power plant by comparing ai and ah;

[0115] if ai≥ah, the current thermal power plant is in the primary operating state;

[0116] if ai<ah, the current thermal power plant is in the secondary operating state;

[0117] if the current user category is the operator level, running the operator level human-computer interaction interface;

[0118] if the current user category is the engineer level, running the engineer level human-computer interaction interface;

[0119] combining the emergency situation of the current thermal power plant and the current human-computer interaction interface;

[0120] if the current thermal power plant is in the primary operating state and the running human-computer interaction interface is the operator level human-computer interaction interface, directly setting the primary control instruction as the secondary control instruction;

[0121] if the current thermal power plant is in the secondary operating state and the running human-computer interaction interface is the operator level human-computer interaction interface, sending the primary control instruction for verification;

[0122] if the running human-computer interaction interface is the engineer level human-computer interaction interface, directly setting the primary control instruction as the secondary control instruction.

[0123] In this example, historical operating state data is collected from various monitoring systems of a thermal power plant. The data sources are diverse, including but not limited to operating parameters of the generator unit (such as power output, rotational speed, oil temperature, water temperature, etc.), operating data of the boiler (such as steam pressure, steam temperature, water level, etc.), and data of auxiliary equipment (such as flow rate and pressure of the cooling system, air volume of the ventilation system, etc.).

[0124] The collected data is classified and sorted, and outliers and erroneous data are removed. For example, data points that are obviously outside the normal range are identified and corrected through data cleaning algorithms. Then the data is sorted in chronological order for subsequent analysis.

[0125] Different calculation methods are used to determine the emergency condition reference value ai for different types of operating data.

[0126] For key parameters such as power output, statistical indicators such as mean and standard deviation are calculated. For example, ai can be the sum of the mean and standard deviation of power output in the past period (such as the past hour), reflecting the overall level of power output and its fluctuation.

[0127] For temperature-related data such as boiler water temperature, ai can be the difference between the fitted temperature change curve based on historical data and the current actual temperature. If the difference is too large, it may indicate that the water temperature control is abnormal, and this difference as an emergency condition reference value helps to determine whether it is close to an emergency condition.

[0128] For the frequency of equipment failures, such as the number of failures of a certain electrical equipment in the past period, it can also be used as an emergency condition reference value. Calculate the mean time between failures of the equipment, and take its reciprocal as part of ai to reflect the reliability of the equipment and the potential risk of emergency conditions.

[0129] The basis for determining the emergency condition preset value ah is:

[0130] The setting of the emergency condition preset value ah needs to consider the design parameters of the thermal power plant, safety standards and past operating experience.

[0131] For power output-related parameters, ah can be set according to the grid connection requirements and the rated power of the generator unit. For example, if the rated power of the generator unit is 100 MW, ah can be set to consider approaching an emergency condition when the power output is less than 80 MW or more than 110 MW. This value is determined based on the stability requirements of the power grid and the safe operating range of the generator unit itself.

[0132] For the temperature parameter, ah is set according to the material properties of the equipment, the safe working temperature range, and the temperature threshold value when a failure occurred in the past. For example, for some key components of the boiler, the safe working temperature range is 80 - 120°C, ah can be set to consider approaching an emergency situation when the temperature exceeds 110°C or is lower than 85°C.

[0133] For the failure frequency related parameter, ah is set according to the reliability index of the equipment and the maintenance strategy. If the average failure-free time of a certain equipment is designed to be 1000 hours, when the calculated average failure-free time is lower than 500 hours (i.e. the failure frequency is too high), it is considered to approach an emergency situation.

[0134] Compare ai and ah one by one. When comparing the power output related ai and ah, if ai (such as the fluctuation value of power output) is greater than ah (the set power fluctuation threshold), it may indicate that the power supply is unstable, and further judgment is needed to determine whether it is in a primary operating state.

[0135] For temperature related comparison, if ai (such as the difference between water temperature and the fitting curve) is greater than ah (temperature deviation threshold), it may mean that the water temperature control of the boiler has a problem, which also needs to be determined in combination with other parameters to determine the level of emergency situation.

[0136] When comparing the failure frequency related ai and ah, if ai (such as the failure frequency calculation value) is greater than ah (the set failure frequency threshold), it indicates that the reliability of the equipment has decreased, which may have a serious impact on the operation of the entire thermal power plant, and the emergency situation level needs to be considered.

[0137] The operating characteristics of the operator level human-machine interaction interface (under different emergency situations):

[0138] In the normal secondary operating state, the operator level human-machine interaction interface mainly displays simple and clear operation information. For example, the basic operating parameters of each equipment are displayed in the form of intuitive charts, such as the on-off state of the equipment is indicated by green (on) and red (off) indicator lights, and voltage, current and other parameters are displayed in numerical form in real time next to the corresponding equipment icons.

[0139] The operation options are mainly daily operation tasks, such as starting, stopping, and simple parameter adjustment (such as adjusting the voltage within a small range allowed) of the equipment. These operation options are presented in the form of large icons or prominent buttons, making it convenient for operators to quickly operate.

[0140] When in level one operational state, the layout of the operator-level human-machine interaction interface changes. The interface highlights devices or parameters in danger with prominent colors (e.g., red) and gives clear prompts for emergency operations. For example, for devices that need to be shut down urgently, an "emergency shutdown" button is displayed next to the device icon, accompanied by a flashing warning sign. At the same time, some operations that may cause greater harm to the system (such as starting some non-critical but potentially increasing system load devices in emergency situations) are hidden or disabled to prevent operators from making mistakes.

[0141] Features of the engineer-level human-machine interaction interface (under different emergency situations):

[0142] In level two operational state, the engineer-level human-machine interaction interface provides more technical analysis tools. In addition to basic device operating parameter display, it also displays detailed device operating curves (such as power output curve trends in the past period of time), device health status assessment (based on data analysis to obtain device potential failure risk level), etc.

[0143] Engineers can perform some in-depth operations, such as fine-tuning the control algorithm of the device. The operation interface provides a code editing area (for operations involving algorithm adjustment) and provides syntax checking and simple logic verification functions. At the same time, the interface displays links to technical documents related to the device, making it easy for engineers to consult detailed technical materials.

[0144] In level one operational state, the engineer-level human-machine interaction interface provides more comprehensive system control. The interface displays more detailed system architecture diagrams, including device connection relationships, interlocking logic, etc. Engineers can modify the interlocking relationship between devices, and the operation interface provides simulation tools to simulate the impact of such modifications before the engineer makes the modification, so that the engineer can make accurate decisions. At the same time, the interface displays real-time fault alarm information for all devices, including fault codes, specific locations of faults, and possible cause analysis, helping engineers quickly locate and solve problems.

[0145] Operator-level human-machine interaction interface and level two control instructions in level one operational state:

[0146] In this case, the level one control instruction is directly set to the level two control instruction. This is because in level one operational state, for the operator level operation, it is usually some emergency and simplified operation, such as emergency shutdown of a device to avoid greater loss.

[0147] However, before converting the primary control instruction into a secondary control instruction, the human-machine interface will perform a simple format and reasonableness check on the primary control instruction. For example, it will ensure that the instruction to shut down a device is in the correct format and that the device is indeed in a state where it can be shut down (e.g., it is not locked by another system or in a special state where it cannot be shut down). If the check fails, the operator will be prompted to re-enter or adjust the instruction.

[0148] The operator-level human-machine interface in the secondary operating state and the secondary control instruction;

[0149] When in the secondary operating state and the operator-level human-machine interface, the primary control instruction is sent for verification.

[0150] First, the primary control instruction is subjected to a format verification to check if the instruction is in the correct format. For example, for an instruction to adjust a device parameter, the instruction format should include the device number, parameter name, and the value to be adjusted. The format verification ensures that these elements are complete and in the correct format.

[0151] Then, an authority verification is performed to ensure that the operator has the authority to execute the instruction. For example, adjusting certain advanced parameters may be beyond the operator's authority. The authority verification will detect this situation and refuse to send the instruction.

[0152] Next, a parameter range verification is performed to check if the parameter value to be adjusted in the instruction is within the allowed range. For example, if the voltage of a device is to be adjusted, the verification will check if the input voltage value is within the upper and lower limits of the device's rated voltage. Only when all verifications pass will the primary control instruction be converted into a secondary control instruction and sent to the next level of control system.

[0153] The engineer-level human-machine interface and the secondary control instruction (regardless of operating state);

[0154] When the engineer-level human-machine interface is running, the primary control instruction is directly set as a secondary control instruction.

[0155] Before converting the primary control instruction into a secondary control instruction, the human-machine interface will perform a series of complex checks. For instructions involving modification of device control algorithms, syntax checking, logic verification, and evaluation of the overall impact on the system will be performed.

[0156] Syntax checking ensures that the algorithm code entered by the engineer conforms to the syntax rules of the programming language. Logic verification checks if the logic of the algorithm is correct, for example, when modifying the interlocking logic of a device, it ensures that the new logic does not cause conflicts or deadlocks between devices.

[0157] The evaluation of the overall impact on the system is achieved by simulation tools. For example, when modifying the power control algorithm of a certain device, the simulation tools predict the possible impact on the power output, stability, etc. of the entire power plant based on the current system operating state and other device parameters. Only when all checks pass, the primary control instruction is converted into a secondary control instruction.

[0158] In the sending verification of the primary control instruction, the embodiment 4 includes:

[0159] Text checking is performed on the number text input by the operator-level personnel type.

[0160] The text checking includes number text form checking and control point number checking.

[0161] If the text checking passes, the number text is deleted.

[0162] If the text checking does not pass, an alarm prompt message is generated until the checking passes.

[0163] In this embodiment, the number text should follow a specific format rule. For example, it can take the form of a combination of letters and numbers, where the letter part represents the partition or type to which the device belongs, and the number part represents the serial number of the device in the partition or type. For example, “A - 001” represents the first electrical device in partition A.

[0164] For the letter part, it is specified that only certain uppercase letters can be used, which have a clear correspondence with the partitions or device types of the power plant. For example, “A” may represent the power generation area, “B” represents the power transmission area, etc. The number part is required to be three digits, starting from “001” and increasing.

[0165] When the operator inputs the number text, the system first checks whether the format of the text meets the specified requirements. If the input is pure numbers or the combination of letters and numbers does not meet the requirements, such as “123” or “a - 1” (lowercase letters do not meet the requirements), the system determines that the number text form checking does not pass.

[0166] The system also checks whether the length of the number text is correct. If the specified length of the number text is a certain value (such as the above-mentioned five characters of letters and three digits), the length of the input text is not equal to the value, for example, input “A - 1” (length of 3 characters), it is also determined that the checking does not pass.

[0167] For electrical devices within each partition, there is a pre-defined control point number range. For example, in the power generation area (partition A), the control point number range of the device can be from 1 to 100. In the power transmission area (partition B), the number range is 101 to 200, etc.

[0168] These ranges are determined according to the equipment layout and control system design of the power plant, and each control point number corresponds to a specific control function or equipment parameter.

[0169] When the operator inputs the number text, the system extracts the numerical part (representing the control point number) and then checks whether the number is within the range of numbers corresponding to the partition to which it belongs. If the input number is "A - 150" and the number range of the power generation area (A partition) is 1 to 100, the system determines that the control point number check fails.

[0170] At the same time, the system also checks whether the control point number has been assigned to an active electrical equipment. If the equipment corresponding to the input number has been removed or does not exist, it is also determined that the check fails.

[0171] In the embodiment 5, the text check includes:

[0172] The distributed control system includes multiple partitions, each of which includes multiple electrical equipment;

[0173] The electrical equipment operation interface is set based on the partition;

[0174] When the current operation interface performs number text input, the input characters of the remaining electrical equipment operation interfaces are automatically cleared;

[0175] The effective time of number text character input is set according to the actual execution time of electrical operation, and the number text input beyond the effective time is automatically cleared.

[0176] In this embodiment, when the form check of the number text and the control point number check are both passed, the system immediately deletes the number text input by the operator.

[0177] This deletion operation is to prevent the number text from being misused or causing confusion in subsequent operations. The system records the operation request corresponding to the number text and converts it into an internal control instruction format at the same time of deleting the number text, so as to facilitate subsequent processing and execution.

[0178] If the number text form check fails, the system generates an alarm prompt message that explicitly indicates the specific content of the text format error. For example, "Number text format error, please input according to the format of 'letter - three digits', where the letter should be in uppercase".

[0179] When the control point number check fails, the alarm prompt message will inform the operator that the control point number is not within the valid range or the corresponding equipment does not exist. For example, "The input control point number 150 is not within the valid range (1 - 100) of the power generation area (A partition), please re-input".

[0180] The system will continue to display the alarm prompt until the operator re-enters the number text that passes the verification. Each time the operator re-enters the number text, the system will re-perform the complete text verification process, including the number text form verification and the control point number verification.

[0181] Each partition in the distributed control system has an independent electrical equipment operation interface. These operation interfaces are similar in design but customized for the equipment characteristics of each partition.

[0182] When entering the number text in the current operation interface, the characters entered in the remaining electrical equipment operation interfaces are automatically cleared. For example, when the operator enters the number text in the power generation area (partition A) operation interface, any characters previously entered in the power transmission area (partition B) operation interface are cleared. This is to avoid confusion for the operator when operating between different partitions, ensuring that the operation of each partition is independent and clear.

[0183] According to the actual execution time of electrical operation, the effective time for number text character input is set. This effective time is determined considering the timeliness and safety of electrical equipment operation.

[0184] For example, for some equipment operations that require quick response, such as emergency shutdown operation, the effective time may be set to 10 seconds. If the operator does not complete the number text input within 10 seconds, the system will automatically clear the entered number text.

[0185] The system displays a countdown timer on the operation interface to remind the operator of the remaining effective input time. When the countdown ends, the entered number text is automatically cleared, and if the operator wants to operate again, the operator needs to start entering the number text again and re-perform the text verification.

[0186] In some embodiments, the second anti-misoperation model comprises:

[0187] generating a first reference value of the distributed control system and the current node based on the secondary control instruction;

[0188] generating a second reference value of the current control node based on the obtained running state information of the current control node equipment and the secondary control instruction;

[0189] generating a control type set based on the classification of the secondary control instruction based on historical data, and generating a third reference value based on the historical data and the control type of the current secondary control instruction;

[0190] setting first, second, and third preset values corresponding to the first, second, and third reference values based on historical data;

[0191] When the first reference value, the second reference value, and the third reference value all reach the corresponding first preset value, the second control instruction passes the verification.

[0192] In an embodiment 7, the generating the first reference value includes:

[0193] Obtaining the number of the control node based on the second control instruction;

[0194] Sending the verification data to the control node through the decentralized control system and obtaining the feedback of the verification data;

[0195] Setting a communication state judgment index based on the historical data;

[0196] Generating the first reference value based on the communication state judgment index and the feedback of the verification data.

[0197] In this embodiment, after receiving the verification data, the control node processes the verification data according to its own functions and internal logic, and returns feedback information.

[0198] The feedback information may include data reception confirmation, execution results (if the verification data contains test instructions), current state information of the control node, etc.

[0199] The decentralized control system waits for the feedback of the control node and sets a reasonable waiting time (this time is determined according to the communication delay characteristics and the processing speed of the control node). If no feedback is received within the waiting time, it is considered that the communication has failed, and corresponding fault handling is performed, such as resending the verification data or marking the control node as a communication failure state.

[0200] The system collects and analyzes past communication data, which includes the success rate of communication with each control node, communication delay, data error rate, etc.

[0201] For the communication success rate, the proportion of the number of successful communications with each control node in the total number of communication attempts in the past period of time (such as the past day, week or month) is calculated.

[0202] The communication delay data records the time interval from sending data to receiving feedback each time. By analyzing these historical delay data, the normal communication delay range and the threshold value of possible abnormal delay can be determined.

[0203] The data error rate is calculated by counting the number of data verification errors in historical communication and calculating the proportion of the error number in the total communication data volume.

[0204] According to the analysis results of the historical data, the communication state judgment index is set.

[0205] For example, the threshold of communication success rate is set as 80%. If the communication success rate with a certain control node is lower than 80% in a certain period of time, it is considered that the communication status of the control node may have problems.

[0206] For communication delay, the normal delay range is set as [lower limit, upper limit], such as [10ms, 50ms]. If the delay of a certain communication exceeds this range, it may indicate that the communication is abnormal.

[0207] The threshold of data error rate can be set as 1%. When it exceeds this threshold, it indicates that the accuracy of data in the communication process is affected, and there may be communication failure or interference.

[0208] The first reference value is a quantitative indicator for comprehensively evaluating the communication status of the control node. Its calculation needs to consider the communication status judgment indicators and the verification data feedback situation.

[0209] If the communication success rate in the verification data feedback situation is higher than the success rate threshold in the communication status judgment indicators, it has a positive contribution to the first reference value. For example, if the success rate threshold is 80% and the actual success rate is 90%, according to certain calculation rules (such as proportional calculation), the value of the first reference value will be increased.

[0210] For communication delay, if the delay of the verification data feedback is within the normal delay range, it also has a positive contribution to the first reference value; if the delay exceeds the range, it will reduce the first reference value according to the extent of the excess.

[0211] In terms of data error rate, if the error rate of the verification data feedback is lower than the data error rate threshold, it has a positive impact on the first reference value; otherwise, it reduces the first reference value.

[0212] Embodiment 8: when generating the second reference value of the current control node, comprising:

[0213] obtaining the running state information of the current control node;

[0214] generating a function execution reference value set B of the current control node based on the classification of the running state information, B={b1, b2…bj…bm};

[0215] wherein, bj represents the jth function execution reference value of the current control node, and m represents the number of functions of the current control node;

[0216] determining a function subset B1 that needs to be executed by the current control node based on the secondary control instruction;

[0217] obtaining the function execution reference values of all function items in the function subset B1 from the function execution reference value set B;

[0218] generate a second reference value by comparing the functional execution reference value of all functional items in the functional subset B1 with the functional execution preset value;

[0219] In this embodiment, the running state information of the current control node is obtained from various sensors and monitoring devices. These sensors can be internal sensors directly connected to the control node, used to monitor the hardware status of the control node itself, such as temperature sensors monitoring the temperature of the control node chip, voltage sensors monitoring the supply voltage, etc.

[0220] They can also be sensors related to the devices controlled by the control node, for example, if the control node controls a motor, the speed sensor, current sensor, etc. of the motor feedback data are also part of the running state information of the control node, because these data reflect the control effect of the control node on the device.

[0221] The running state information includes but is not limited to the running parameters of the device (such as power, current, voltage, speed, etc.), the health status of the device (such as whether there is a fault alarm, fault code, etc.), the resource utilization of the control node (such as CPU usage, memory occupancy, etc. if the control node is an intelligent controller), etc.

[0222] These information are collected and transmitted in a specific data format, for example, using standard industrial data protocol (such as Modbus protocol), arranging the data into data frame form, which contains data identifier, value, timestamp, etc. information, for subsequent analysis and processing.

[0223] The historical running data of the control node is analyzed, which covers the running state information of different time periods (such as the past hours, days, weeks, months, etc.).

[0224] Through data mining techniques such as clustering analysis, association rule mining, etc., the relationship pattern between running state information and control node function execution is found out. For example, through analysis, it is found that when the temperature of the control node is within a certain range, the execution efficiency of a certain function has a specific influence; when the current of the controlled device is within a certain interval, the stability of another function is related.

[0225] Taking the start function of the control node controlling the motor as an example, if the historical data shows that when the voltage of the motor starts is within the range of [220V - 230V], the success rate of starting is the highest, then this voltage range can be used as a functional execution reference value b1 of the start function. If it is found that when the ambient temperature of the motor is within [10°C - 30°C], the stability of the start is the best, this temperature range can also be used as another functional execution reference value b2 of the start function.

[0226] A plurality of function execution reference values are determined in this way for different function items j, thereby forming a function execution reference value set B = {b1, b2…bj…bm}, where m represents the number of function items of the control node.

[0227] After determining the function subset B1, the integrity of the function subset is checked. It is ensured that all relevant functions are correctly identified and there is no conflict or omission.

[0228] For example, if the control node needs to perform a complex operation, it needs to start the motor and open the related cooling system at the same time, then the function subset B1 should contain the motor starting function and the cooling system starting function. If only the motor starting function is identified, the system will prompt or further analyze to ensure the integrity of the function subset.

[0229] For each function item in the function subset B1, the corresponding function execution reference value in the function execution reference value set B is found.

[0230] For example, if the function subset B1 contains the motor starting function, the function execution reference value related to the motor starting function determined previously, such as the voltage range, temperature range, etc., is found in the function execution reference value set B.

[0231] In this way, the function execution reference values of all function items in the function subset B1 are extracted, which will be used for subsequent comparison operations.

[0232] The function execution preset value is set according to the design specifications, safety standards and best practice experience of the control node.

[0233] For the motor starting function, the function execution preset value may include the standard starting voltage (such as 220V), the allowed starting temperature range (such as 5°C - 40°C), etc. These preset values are the basis for judging whether the control node function execution is normal.

[0234] For each function item in the function subset B1, its function execution reference value is compared with the corresponding function execution preset value.

[0235] Taking the motor starting function as an example, if the actual starting voltage function execution reference value is [210V - 230V] and the preset value is 220V, according to certain calculation rules (such as the deviation proportion of the calculation reference value and the preset value), a comparison result value corresponding to the function item is obtained.

[0236] The comparison calculation is performed for all function items in the function subset B1, and then according to a certain comprehensive calculation method (such as weighted average method, different weights are given according to the importance of different function items), the comparison result values are combined to generate a second reference value. The second reference value reflects the deviation of the current control node from the ideal state when executing the specified function subset B1.

[0237] In the embodiment 9, when the third reference value of the current control node is generated, the following steps are included:

[0238] The control types of the secondary control instructions are divided based on the historical data to generate a control type set C, C={c1, c2…ck…cq};

[0239] Wherein, ck represents the kth control type of the secondary control instruction, and q represents the total number of control types of the secondary control instruction;

[0240] The direct feasibility reference value e1 and the indirect feasibility reference value e2 are generated in combination with the control type of the current secondary instruction and the current thermal power plant operation state;

[0241] The third reference value of the current control node is generated based on the direct feasibility reference value e1 and the indirect feasibility reference value e2 of the current thermal power plant operation state.

[0242] In this embodiment, the historical records of the secondary control instructions of the thermal power plant are collected, which contain detailed information of the secondary control instructions issued at different times in the past, such as the target of the instruction, the operation content, the execution time, etc.

[0243] The historical instructions are classified and arranged, and the main control target and operation mode of each instruction are analyzed. For example, some secondary control instructions may be for power adjustment of the generator unit, some may be for start-stop control of the equipment, and some may be for adjustment of the running parameters (such as temperature, pressure, etc.) of the equipment.

[0244] The control type is determined according to the control target and operation mode of the instruction. For example, all instructions related to the start-stop of the equipment are divided into a control type c1, and instructions related to power adjustment are divided into a control type c2, etc.

[0245] Each control type has its unique characteristics. For example, for the start-stop control type, the characteristic is that the instruction mainly focuses on the conversion of the on and off states of the equipment, and the operation parameters involved may be the switch signal of the equipment, the start sequence, etc.; while the power adjustment control type focuses on the setting and adjustment of the output power of the generator unit, and the parameters involved may be the power set value, the adjustment rate, etc.

[0246] According to the division manner, a control type set C = {c1, c2…ck…cq} is constructed, where q represents the total number of control types of the secondary control instructions.

[0247] In the embodiment 10, the direct feasibility reference value e1 and the indirect feasibility reference value e2 are generated by including:

[0248] The operation state of the thermal power plant is divided based on historical data to generate a thermal power plant operation state data set;

[0249] The execution situation evaluation value of each control type of the secondary control instruction in the corresponding operation state of the thermal power plant is generated in combination with the control type set C and the thermal power plant operation state data set;

[0250] The execution situation evaluation value of the control type of the current secondary instruction is obtained to generate the direct feasibility reference value e1;

[0251] The association reference value between the control node of the current secondary instruction and the abnormal control node is obtained, and the indirect feasibility reference value e2 is generated based on the association reference value.

[0252] In the embodiment, for each control type ck in the control type set C, the execution situation of the control type in different operation states of the thermal power plant operation state data set is analyzed.

[0253] For example, for the equipment start-stop control type (assuming c1), in the normal operation state, if a standby device is started, the execution situation may be good because other devices are normally operated and there is enough resource to support the start of the new device. An evaluation value can be set according to various parameters in the start process (such as start time, impact on the power grid, etc.), and the evaluation value is assumed to be 0.8.

[0254] In the partial equipment failure state, the start of the new device may be affected by the failure device, such as the failure device may occupy part of the resource or cause the overall operation to be unstable. At this time, the execution situation evaluation value may be reduced, and the evaluation value is assumed to be 0.4.

[0255] For the power adjustment control type (assuming c2), in the high load operation state, power adjustment may face more challenges, such as the device is close to the limit operation state, and power adjustment may affect the stability of the device. The evaluation value is set according to the adjustment effect, the influence on the device, and other factors, for example, the evaluation value is 0.6. In the low load operation state, power adjustment is relatively easy, and the evaluation value may be 0.9.

[0256] According to the above analysis, an execution situation evaluation value matrix is constructed, where the row represents the control type ck, and the column represents the operation state of the thermal power plant. Each element in the matrix is the execution situation evaluation value of each control type in the corresponding operation state of the thermal power plant.

[0257] First, determine the control type of the current secondary instruction, for example, determine whether the current secondary instruction is a device start-stop control type (c1).

[0258] In the previously constructed execution situation evaluation value matrix, find the execution situation evaluation value of the current control type (c1) under the current operation state of the thermal power plant. Assuming that the current thermal power plant is in a partial device failure state, the found execution situation evaluation value is 0.4, which is the direct feasibility reference value e1.

[0259] Analyze the relationship between the control node of the current secondary instruction and the abnormal control node (control node with faults or potential problems) in the thermal power plant. For example, if the current control node is the controller of a certain generator, and the abnormal control node is the controller of the cooling system connected to the generator, there is a close association between them, because the cooling system failure will affect the normal operation of the generator.

[0260] By analyzing the connection relationship between devices, control logic relationship, and historical fault association between them, etc., the strength of the association is determined. A quantitative value can be used to represent the association, for example, if the association is strong, the association reference value can be set to 0.8; if the association is weak, set to 0.2.

[0261] According to the association reference value, generate the indirect feasibility reference value e2. If the association reference value is high, it means that the operation of the current control node will be greatly affected by the abnormal control node, and the indirect feasibility is low. For example, when the association reference value is 0.8, the indirect feasibility reference value e2 may be set to 0.3; if the association reference value is 0.2, the indirect feasibility reference value e2 may be set to 0.8, indicating that the indirect influence is small and the indirect feasibility is high.

[0262] Finally, it should be noted that those skilled in the art can make various modifications and changes to the present application without departing from the spirit and scope of the present application. Thus, if these modifications and changes of the present application fall within the scope of the claims and their equivalent technologies, the present application also intends to include these modifications and changes.

[0263] The above is only a preferred embodiment of the present application, and is not intended to limit the protection scope of the present application.

Claims

1. A method for preventing misoperation of electrical equipment in a distributed control system of a thermal power plant, characterized in that, Including: Setting the control node number based on the obtained electrical equipment information; Establishing a number database of electrical equipment by combining the label contents of all control nodes; Generating a primary control instruction based on the operation status information of the distributed control system; Generating a secondary control instruction by verifying the primary control instruction based on the first anti-error model; The first anti-error model includes: setting the operator category and the emergency situation of the thermal power plant; among them, the operator category includes: operator level and engineer level; the emergency situation of the thermal power plant includes: primary operation status and secondary operation status; obtaining the current operator category and the emergency situation of the thermal power plant based on the operation status information of the distributed control system; operating the corresponding human-machine interface based on the operator category and the emergency situation of the thermal power plant; generating a secondary control instruction based on the information sent by the human-machine interface; Verifying the secondary control instruction based on the second anti-error model; the second anti-error model includes: generating a first reference value of the distributed control system and the current node based on the secondary control instruction; generating a second reference value of the current control node by combining the obtained operation status information of the current control node device and the secondary control instruction; classifying the secondary control instruction based on historical data to generate a control type set, and generating a third reference value based on the historical data and the control type of the current secondary control instruction; setting the first preset value, the second preset value, and the third preset value corresponding to the first reference value, the second reference value, and the third reference value by combining historical data; when the first reference value, the second reference value, and the third reference value all reach the corresponding first preset value, second preset value, and third preset value, the secondary control instruction passes the verification.

2. The method for preventing misoperation of electrical equipment in a distributed control system of a thermal power plant as described in claim 1, characterized in that, When generating the secondary control instruction, it includes: Generating a set A of emergency situation reference values for the current thermal power plant based on the obtained historical operation status data of the current thermal power plant, A = {a1, a2…ai…an}; Where, ai is the i-th emergency situation reference value, and n is the number of emergency situation reference values in the set of emergency situation reference values; Judging the emergency situation of the current thermal power plant by comparing ai with the emergency situation preset value ah; If ai≥ah, the current thermal power plant is in the primary operation status; If ai<ah, the current thermal power plant is in the secondary operation status; If the current user category is the operator level, operate the operator-level human-machine interface; If the current user category is the engineer level, operate the engineer-level human-machine interface; Combining the current emergency situation of the thermal power plant and the current human-machine interface; If the current thermal power plant is in the primary operation status and the operating human-machine interface is the operator-level human-machine interface, directly set the primary control instruction as the secondary control instruction; If the current thermal power plant is in the secondary operation status and the operating human-machine interface is the operator-level human-machine interface, send the primary control instruction for verification; If the operating human-machine interface is the engineer-level human-machine interface, directly set the primary control instruction as the secondary control instruction.

3. The method for preventing misoperation of electrical equipment in a distributed control system of a thermal power plant as described in claim 2, characterized in that, When sending the primary control instruction for verification, it includes: Performing text verification on the numbered text input by the operator-level personnel type; The text verification includes: numbered text form verification and control point number verification; If the text validation passes, delete the numbered text. If the text validation fails, an alarm message will be generated until the validation passes.

4. The method for preventing misoperation of electrical equipment in a distributed control system of a thermal power plant as described in claim 3, characterized in that, The text validation process includes: A distributed control system comprises multiple zones, each containing multiple electrical devices; The electrical equipment operation interface is set based on partition settings; When the current operation interface is executing the number text input, the characters already entered on the operation interfaces of other electrical equipment will be automatically cleared; The validity period for the input of the numbered text character is set according to the actual execution time of the electrical operation. The numbered text that has been entered after the validity period will be automatically cleared.

5. The method for preventing misoperation of electrical equipment in a distributed control system of a thermal power plant as described in claim 4, characterized in that, When generating the first reference value between the distributed control system and the current node, the following steps are included: The control node number is obtained based on the secondary control command; The distributed control system sends verification data to the control nodes and obtains feedback on the verification data. Set communication status judgment indicators based on historical data; A first reference value is generated by combining communication status indicators and verification data feedback.

6. The method for preventing misoperation of electrical equipment in a distributed control system of a thermal power plant as described in claim 5, characterized in that, When generating the second reference value for the current control node, the following steps are included: Obtain the current operating status information of the control node; Based on historical data, the operational status information is classified to generate a set of functional execution reference values ​​B for the current control node, B={b1,b2…bj…bm}; Where bj represents the reference value for the execution of the j-th function of the current control node, and m represents the number of function items of the current control node; Based on the secondary control instructions, determine the functional subset B1 that the current control node needs to execute; Obtain the function execution reference values ​​for all function items in the function subset B1 from the function execution reference value set B; A second reference value is generated by comparing the function execution reference values ​​of all function items in function subset B1 with the function execution preset values.

7. The method for preventing misoperation of electrical equipment in a distributed control system of a thermal power plant as described in claim 6, characterized in that, When generating the third reference value for the current control node, the following steps are included: Based on historical data, the control types of secondary control commands are divided to generate a control type set C, C={c1,c2…ck…cq}; Where ck represents the kth control type of the secondary control instruction, and q represents the total number of control types of the secondary control instruction; Based on the current control type of the secondary command and the current operating status of the thermal power plant, generate a direct feasibility reference value e1 and an indirect feasibility reference value e2. The third reference value for the current control node is generated based on the direct feasibility reference value e1 and the indirect feasibility reference value e2 of the current thermal power plant's operating status.

8. The method for preventing misoperation of electrical equipment in a distributed control system of a thermal power plant as described in claim 7, characterized in that, The generation of the direct feasibility reference value e1 and the indirect feasibility reference value e2 includes: The operating status of thermal power plants is divided based on historical data to generate a thermal power plant operating status dataset. By combining the control type set C and the thermal power plant operation status dataset, an evaluation value for the execution status of each secondary control instruction under the corresponding thermal power plant operation status is generated. Obtain the execution status evaluation value of the current secondary instruction's control type to generate a direct feasibility reference value e1; Obtain the correlation reference value between the control node of the current secondary instruction and the abnormal control node; generate an indirect feasibility reference value e2 based on the correlation reference value.

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