A data security transmission method and system with quantum security resistance

Abstract

The application discloses a data security transmission method and system with quantum security resistance, and relates to the technical field of data transmission. The method comprises the following steps: obtaining information, wherein the information comprises an identity identifier of a user, a temporary public key, a temporary secret value and a validity period requirement; generating a public key and a private key of the user based on an ML-DSA signature algorithm; sending an authentication request to a CA authentication center according to the information and the public key of the user, and receiving a certificate authenticated and issued by the CA authentication center; exchanging and verifying the certificate with other users; responding to the data transmission instruction after the certificate verification is passed, calling and executing a temporary shared key generation module, and outputting a temporary shared key; and then sending data to other users or receiving data from other users according to the temporary shared key based on an SM4 algorithm and an ML-DSA signature algorithm. The application reduces the cost and risk during system upgrading.

Description

Technical Field

[0001] This invention relates to the field of data transmission technology, and in particular to a data security transmission method and system with quantum-resistant security. Background Technology

[0002] In recent years, the development of quantum computing has progressed rapidly, gradually shifting from theoretical research to practical applications. Exploration based on medium-scale noisy quantum processors and dedicated quantum computers has been widely carried out both domestically and internationally, covering multiple industries such as chemistry, finance, artificial intelligence, transportation and aviation, and meteorology. Although some application cases have demonstrated the acceleration advantages of quantum computing, there is still a gap between now and achieving the exponential computing speedup and leap in computing power that the industry expects.

[0003] In 2020, in the paper "A Novel Secure Data Transmission Scheme in Industrial Internet of Things," authors Hongwen Hui et al. proposed a novel chaotic secure communication scheme to address data transmission security issues. The authors were the first to propose using fractional-order chaotic systems with different structures and orders to enhance data transmission security. They combined the characteristics of fog computing with timestamp-based encryption, improving both the real-time performance and security of data transmission. Although the scheme targets the Industrial Internet environment, it primarily focuses on data transmission from a single source node to a single target node, neglecting scenarios involving multiple source and target nodes. Furthermore, quantum computing attacks pose a potential threat to this method.

[0004] In 2024, the paper "QPASE: Quantum-Resistant Password-Authenticated Searchable Encryption for Cloud Storage" proposed a quantum-resistant cryptographic authentication and search encryption scheme based on lattice cryptography, capable of resisting the security threats posed by quantum computing. This scheme allows users to encrypt and search data stored in the cloud using easy-to-remember passwords, avoiding complex key management and ensuring secure data transmission. The authors analyzed the security of QPASE using a formal security model, employing the Bellare-Pointcheval-Rogaway model to analyze QPASE's authentication security, and using an indistinguishability-resistant chosen-keyword attack model to prove the privacy and security of keywords. QPASE has been proven to be robust and secure under both classical and quantum computers. However, its high complexity poses a significant challenge for resource-constrained devices or scenarios.

[0005] In 2022, patent CN202211114432.6, "A Quantum-Resistant Computing Method and Device Based on Chinese National Cryptographic Technology," proposed a key protection method applied to the initiating terminal. This method involves randomly selecting a key and generating a corresponding key ID, conducting standard key exchange negotiation, adding a quantum-resistant payload PPKi (containing the encrypted key ID) to the message, and sending the modified message to the responder. Upon receiving the message, the system checks if it contains the quantum-resistant payload PPKr. If it exists and its key ID matches that of PPKi, an SKEYID is generated, and key exchange negotiation continues. This method enhances quantum-resistant capabilities based on Chinese national cryptographic technology, improving data encryption security. However, this method only provides quantum-resistant protection for the key ID; other parts, such as key exchange, are not quantum-secured.

[0006] In 2023, patent CN202311832721.4, "An Encryption Method, Decryption Method, Device, and Medium Resistant to Quantum Attacks," proposed a method to enhance security during encryption by combining a national cryptographic algorithm with a whitening key and performing multiple XOR operations to extend the key length. During encryption, the information to be encrypted is first XORed with the whitening key, then encrypted using the national cryptographic algorithm, and finally XORed again with the whitening key to obtain the ciphertext. Decryption involves the reverse operation. This increases the complexity of resistance to quantum attacks, thereby improving the anti-cracking capability of the national cryptographic algorithm. However, this method can only guarantee the security of the symmetric encryption stage and cannot guarantee the security of the more critical asymmetric encryption stage.

[0007] Therefore, a data security transmission method and system with quantum-resistant security was developed to solve the above problems. Summary of the Invention

[0008] This invention proposes a data security transmission method and system with quantum-resistant security to solve the problem of serious security vulnerabilities in existing encryption algorithms under quantum computing environments.

[0009] The present invention achieves the above objectives through the following technical solutions:

[0010] This invention provides a quantum-resistant data security transmission method, comprising:

[0011] Obtain information, including the user's identity identifier, temporary public key, temporary secret value, and expiration period requirement;

[0012] Generate the user's public and private keys based on the ML-DSA signature algorithm;

[0013] Based on the information and the user's public key, the user sends an authentication request to the CA certification center and receives the certificate issued by the CA certification center.

[0014] The certificate is an X.509 certificate generated and issued by the CA certification center based on the authentication request, public key and certificate of the corresponding user. The authentication request includes the corresponding user's identity identifier, temporary public key and validity period requirement. The certificate generation private key is generated by the CA certification center based on the ML-DSA signature algorithm.

[0015] After certificate verification, in response to the data transmission command, the temporary shared key generation module is invoked and executed to output a temporary shared key. Then, based on the temporary shared key, data is sent to or received from other users using the SM4 algorithm and ML-DSA signature algorithm. The temporary shared key generation module is used to acquire matrix signals and exchange matrix signals with other users. It is also used to calculate and output a temporary shared key shared with other users based on the exchanged matrix signals using the DKE algorithm. The matrix signals are generated based on a shared value, which is calculated based on the temporary public key in the exchanged certificate, the temporary secret value of the corresponding user, and a shared value calculation function. The shared value calculation function is selected from the corresponding user's preset formula library according to the type of data transmission command. The types of data transmission commands include data sending and data receiving.

[0016] Furthermore, the user's public and private keys are generated based on the ML-DSA signature algorithm, including:

[0017] The SHAKE-256 algorithm and a seed are used to generate a k×l dimensional matrix G, where each element of G is in the quotient ring. polynomials on, where n=256 The ring of integers modulo q, X n +1 is a fixed polynomial. It is a polynomial ring structure;

[0018] Using the SHAKE-256 algorithm and a seed, generate l-dimensional vectors s1 and k-dimensional vectors s2, where each element of s1 and s2 is... arrive Random numbers in the data, arrive Indicates the range of private key coefficients;

[0019] Calculate vectors ;

[0020] Based on the vector t, the public and private keys of this user are calculated using the Power2Round algorithm.

[0021] Furthermore, the X.509 certificate includes the corresponding user's version number, serial number, identity information, validity period, object identifier of the ML-DSA signature algorithm public key, and temporary public key.

[0022] Furthermore, the step of obtaining the temporary public key includes:

[0023] Three common parameters are set: prime number, random matrix, and noise parameter.

[0024] Calculate the temporary secret value based on the DKE algorithm using the three common parameters;

[0025] The temporary public key is calculated based on the temporary secret value, using the following formula:

[0026] ;

[0027] Where, p i is a temporary public key, M is a random matrix, and s i e is a temporary secret value. i Let q be noise, q be a prime number, and mod represent the modulo operation.

[0028] Furthermore, the shared value calculation function is selected from the corresponding user-preset formula library according to the type of data transmission instruction:

[0029] When the data transmission instruction is of type data transmission, the shared value calculation function is:

[0030] ;

[0031] When the data transmission instruction is of type data reception, the shared value calculation function is:

[0032] ;

[0033] Among them, K B K A Both represent shared values, p j p j T s i T The sequence is as follows: the temporary public key in the exchanged certificate, the transpose of the temporary public key in the exchanged certificate, and the transpose of the temporary secret value of this user.

[0034] Furthermore, the formula for calculating the temporary shared key SK is as follows:

[0035] ;

[0036] K represents the shared value, σ represents the matrix signal, and each element in the matrix signal is used to indicate whether the element at the corresponding position in the shared value is present. , where K is K B or K A .

[0037] Further, based on the temporary shared key, sending data to or receiving data from the other users using the SM4 algorithm and ML-DSA signature algorithm includes:

[0038] In response to a data transmission command, the system encrypts the data to be transmitted using the SM4 algorithm based on the temporary shared key to obtain encrypted data. Then, it signs the digest of the encrypted data using the ML-DSA signature algorithm based on its private key to obtain encrypted signed data. After sending the encrypted signed data to other users, the system receives verification feedback from those users; or:

[0039] In response to the data reception instruction, the received data is decrypted based on the SM4 algorithm according to the temporary shared key to obtain decrypted data, and then the decrypted data is verified based on the ML-DSA signature algorithm.

[0040] Furthermore, the SM4 algorithm is a multi-level encryption structure, and its algorithm steps are as follows:

[0041] Input seed key: Use the 256-bit temporary shared key K as the input key seed;

[0042] Key Derivation: Using the key derivation function KDF, the key seed is expanded into two independent 128-bit first subkey and second subkey, while assigning a unique salt to each subkey;

[0043] The three-layer encryption process is as follows: The first layer of encryption uses the first subkey to encrypt the information to obtain the first ciphertext; the second layer of decryption uses the second subkey to decrypt the first ciphertext obtained in the first layer to obtain the second ciphertext; and the third layer of encryption uses the first subkey again to encrypt the second ciphertext obtained in the second layer to obtain the final ciphertext.

[0044] Decryption process: The decryption process is the reverse execution of the encryption process.

[0045] Furthermore, among which:

[0046] After responding to the data transmission command, and receiving verification feedback from other users, if the other user's verification is successful, the signature is valid; if the other user's signature verification fails, the data is retransmitted to the other user according to their retransmission request; if signature verification fails, the current connection is abandoned, and a new connection is established. Alternatively:

[0047] If decryption fails after responding to the data reception instruction, the data will be rejected. If the verification of the decrypted data fails, the data will be discarded and a request will be made to the sender to resend the data.

[0048] Another aspect of the present invention provides a data security transmission system with quantum-resistant security, comprising:

[0049] The acquisition module is used to acquire information, including the user's identity identifier, temporary public key, temporary secret value, and validity period requirement.

[0050] The generation module is used to generate the user's public and private keys based on the ML-DSA signature algorithm;

[0051] The receiving module is used to send an authentication request to the CA certification center based on the information and the user's public key, and to receive the certificate certified and issued by the CA certification center.

[0052] The exchange module is used to exchange and verify the certificates of other users. The certificate is an X.509 certificate generated and issued by the CA certification center based on the authentication request, public key and certificate of the corresponding user. The authentication request includes the identity identifier of the corresponding user, temporary public key and validity period requirement. The certificate generation private key is generated by the CA certification center based on the ML-DSA signature algorithm.

[0053] The response module is used to respond to data transmission instructions after certificate verification, call and execute the temporary shared key generation module, output a temporary shared key, and then send data to or receive data from other users based on the temporary shared key using the SM4 algorithm and ML-DSA signature algorithm. The temporary shared key generation module is used to acquire matrix signals and exchange them with other users. It is also used to calculate and output a temporary shared key shared with other users based on the exchanged matrix signals using the DKE algorithm. The matrix signals are generated based on a shared value, which is calculated based on the temporary public key in the exchanged certificate, the temporary secret value of the corresponding user, and a shared value calculation function. The shared value calculation function is selected from a preset formula library of the corresponding user according to the type of data transmission instruction, which includes data sending and data receiving.

[0054] The beneficial effects of this invention are as follows:

[0055] This invention proposes a quantum-resistant data security transmission method and system that utilizes the quantum-resistant cryptographic algorithms ML-DSA and DKE. This effectively prevents quantum computing attacks during data transmission in the quantum computing era. By employing a dual-key encryption method, it ensures both high-efficiency data transmission and enhanced system security. The method employs a hybrid architecture, enabling the system to support traditional cryptographic systems while gradually upgrading to post-quantum-secure solutions. This reduces the cost and risk of system upgrades and replacements, making it particularly suitable for critical infrastructure scenarios such as power, finance, and healthcare. It ensures data confidentiality, integrity, and non-repudiation while offering flexible deployment capabilities and high-performance operating efficiency, meeting the data security requirements of the post-quantum era. Attached Figure Description

[0056] Figure 1 This is a flowchart illustrating the original process of a quantum-resistant data security transmission method according to this application.

[0057] Figure 2 This is a schematic diagram of the structure of this application. Detailed Implementation

[0058] To make the objectives, technical solutions, and advantages of the embodiments of the present invention clearer, the technical solutions of the embodiments of the present invention will be clearly and completely described below with reference to the accompanying drawings. Obviously, the described embodiments are only some, not all, of the embodiments of the present invention. The components of the embodiments of the present invention described and shown in the accompanying drawings can generally be arranged and designed in various different configurations.

[0059] Therefore, the following detailed description of the embodiments of the invention provided in the accompanying drawings is not intended to limit the scope of the claimed invention, but merely to illustrate selected embodiments of the invention. All other embodiments obtained by those skilled in the art based on the embodiments of the invention without inventive effort are within the scope of protection of the invention.

[0060] It should be noted that similar labels and letters in the following figures indicate similar items. Therefore, once an item is defined in one figure, it does not need to be further defined and explained in subsequent figures.

[0061] Furthermore, the terms "first," "second," etc., are used only for distinguishing descriptions and should not be interpreted as indicating or implying relative importance. The term "unique salt" refers to a different and non-repeating random value used when generating each subkey. This ensures that even if the same key seed is used multiple times, different subkeys can be generated using different salt values, thereby enhancing security and preventing attackers from deriving other keys through pre-computation or correlation attacks. The independence of the two independent 128-bit subkeys is guaranteed after salting. Using the same salt and key derivation function ensures that both parties have identical keys, and encryption and decryption will not encounter any problems. The terms ML-DSA stand for "Digital Signature Standard Based on Modular Lattice," and DKE stands for "Ding Key Exchange (DKE), a post-quantum key exchange algorithm based on the lattice problem."

[0062] The specific embodiments of the present invention will now be described in detail with reference to the accompanying drawings.

[0063] like Figure 1 As shown, one aspect of the present invention provides a data security transmission method with quantum-resistant security, comprising:

[0064] S1: Obtain information, including the user's identity identifier, temporary public key, temporary secret value, and validity period requirement;

[0065] Identity identifier: This includes a username or device ID identifier, which is used to reflect the identity information of the subject in the certificate and to verify its authenticity and validity during communication.

[0066] Temporary public key and temporary secret value: The DKE algorithm requires setting a prime number q and a random matrix during initialization. And three common parameters, including the noise parameter α. This means that all elements belong to An n x n matrix is ​​used to generate a temporary secret value s for negotiating a symmetric encryption key. i Through the temporary secret value s i Calculate the temporary public key P i is a temporary public key, M is a random matrix, and s i e is a temporary secret value. i Let q be noise, q be a prime number, and mod represent the modulo operation.

[0067] S2: Generate the user's public and private keys based on the ML-DSA signature algorithm;

[0068] It mainly consists of four steps:

[0069] (1) Generate a k×l dimension matrix G using the SHAKE-256 algorithm and a seed. Each element in G is in the quotient ring. polynomials on, where n=256 The ring of integers modulo q, X n +1 is a fixed polynomial. It is a polynomial ring structure;

[0070] (2) Using the SHAKE-256 algorithm and a seed, generate l-dimensional vector s1 and k-dimensional vector s2 respectively, where each element in s1 and s2 is a... arrive Random numbers in the data, arrive Indicates the range of private key coefficients;

[0071] (3) Calculate the vector .

[0072] (4) Use the Power2Round algorithm to decompose the high and low bits to reduce the key size, pack the key and output it, outputting the user's public and private keys. and .

[0073] ML-DSA signature algorithm key pair and Generated and stored locally by each participating party. Temporary secret value for the DKE key exchange algorithm. It is dynamically generated during each session, encrypted, temporarily stored in local secure memory, and destroyed immediately after the session ends.

[0074] S3: Based on the information and the user's public key, send an authentication request to the CA certification center and receive the certificate issued by the CA certification center;

[0075] S4: Exchange and verify the certificates of other users. The certificates are X.509 certificates generated and issued by the CA certification center based on the authentication request, public key and certificate of the corresponding user. The authentication request includes the identity identifier of the corresponding user, temporary public key and validity period requirement. The certificate generation private key is generated by the CA certification center based on ML-DSA signature algorithm.

[0076] Exchanging and verifying certificates ensures the authentication of both communicating parties, guaranteeing the trustworthiness of data transmission and preventing man-in-the-middle attacks and identity forgery. During authentication, the two parties exchange certificates and verify the certificate signature using the ML-DSA algorithm. Upon successful verification, both parties confirm their trustworthiness and establish a secure communication channel.

[0077] The Certificate Authority (CA) generates a public-private key pair (PK) for certificate generation based on the ML-DSA signature algorithm. CA and SK CA The CA (Certificate Authority) verifies and confirms the user's identity to ensure its legitimacy, and then generates a private key SK using the ML-DSA signature algorithm. CA This is used to sign the body of the certificate. The body of the certificate includes the user's version number, serial number, identity information, validity period, object identifier of the ML-DSA signature algorithm public key, and the user's temporary public key P. i Finally, the signature value is encapsulated into an X.509 certificate structure. The user requests a temporary public key P from a Certificate Authority (CA). i It uses a public key (UPK) based on the ML-DSA signature algorithm for authentication and certificate issuance.

[0078] S5: After certificate verification, respond to the data transmission command, call and execute the temporary shared key generation module, output the temporary shared key, and then send data to or receive data from other users based on the temporary shared key, using the SM4 algorithm and ML-DSA signature algorithm. The temporary shared key generation module is used to obtain matrix signals and exchange matrix signals with other users. Based on the exchanged matrix signals, it calculates and outputs the temporary shared key shared with other users using the DKE algorithm. The matrix signals are generated based on the shared value, which is calculated based on the temporary public key in the exchanged certificate, the temporary secret value of the corresponding user, and the shared value calculation function. The shared value calculation function is selected from the formula library preset by the corresponding user according to the type of data transmission command. The data transmission command types include data sending and data receiving.

[0079] The beneficial effects of this invention are as follows:

[0080] 1. This invention can provide quantum security guarantees. Through a "three-in-one" design of ML-DSA + DKE + enhanced SM4, a quantum-resistant security system covering the entire process of authentication, negotiation, and transmission is constructed. The ML-DSA algorithm is based on the Lattice problem, and DKE is based on the Ring-LWE problem; both are NIST-approved post-quantum cryptography algorithms. The enhanced SM4 can also effectively resist Grover's quantum algorithm attack, achieving the dual goals of "quantum-resistant security" and "domestic compliance."

[0081] 2. This invention provides flexible certificate management. The strictly hierarchical model adopted provides efficient certificate management and good scalability, suitable for rapid implementation of update and revocation operations, reducing potential risks, and meeting the requirements of high security, high real-time performance, and long-term stable operation.

[0082] 3. This invention enables efficient key management. Dynamic temporary keys completely eliminate the risk of long-term key residency, ensure the security of the key lifecycle, effectively reduce the complexity of key management, and ensure system security.

[0083] 4. This invention achieves efficient data transmission while ensuring security. The use of key encapsulation technology during data transmission effectively reduces security risks during key transmission and ensures high efficiency. The symmetric encryption SM4 algorithm can be hardware-accelerated, ensuring a fast encryption process, making it particularly suitable for scenarios requiring the processing of large amounts of data.

[0084] 5. This invention has wide applicability. It is not only suitable for power applications but also for critical infrastructure sectors such as finance and healthcare. These industries typically have high security requirements, and the system design meets their needs for data security, reliability, and performance. Furthermore, its quantum resistance and flexible certificate management ensure effective responses to new threats in the face of future technological changes.

[0085] The corresponding user mentioned above refers to the user who sends the authentication request or the user who performs the shared value calculation. For example, if the user sends an authentication request, the corresponding user is the user who sends the authentication request; if other users send authentication requests, the corresponding user is the other user. This invention can be applied to any user who needs to transmit data; the user can act as both a data sender and a data receiver.

[0086] like Figure 2 As shown, the following example illustrates the application of this invention in two data transmission parties. Hereinafter, A refers to the receiver and B refers to the sender.

[0087] According to this invention, both receiver A and sender B obtain their respective certificates from a CA (Certificate Authority). After successfully obtaining the certificate, the CA distributes it to the user through a secure channel distribution system. If the user's private key is leaked or the device is lost, the CA must be notified immediately for certificate revocation. Furthermore, to maintain long-term security, a new certificate can be applied for before the current certificate expires, updating the temporary public key P. i and expiration date.

[0088] This architecture employs a strict hierarchical model to build the CA (Certificate Authority) system. In this architecture, all CAs are organized according to a strict hierarchy. The root CA is at the top, and all other CAs directly or indirectly depend on it. This model offers high security, is suitable for medium to large-scale systems and enterprises, and ensures good management and scalability. The model ensures that the root CA and lower-level issuing certificates mutually verify each other through a strong authentication mechanism, thereby enhancing the overall security of the system.

[0089] At the start of communication, both parties exchange identity information and certificates. Receiver A verifies the sender's ML-DSA signature certificate, and the sender also verifies the receiver's certificate. Both parties use the DKE algorithm to generate a shared 256-bit temporary secret key. Receiver A uses its own temporary secret value s. A and the temporary public key p in the sender B's certificate B Calculate the shared value Sender B also uses its own temporary secret value s B and the temporary public key in the recipient A's certificate Calculate the shared value Sender B first determines K based on the symbol function. B The generated matrix signal σ1 represents the matrix signal, where each element indicates whether the element at the corresponding position in the shared value is present. After receiving the matrix signal σ1, receiver A calculates the key. : .

[0090] After receiving the matrix signal σ2 in the same manner, sender B calculates the key. : Since the error term satisfies ,and Therefore, for all All satisfied Therefore, the final shared key is obtained by concatenating SK in sequence. .

[0091] Data Encryption and Signature. In the data encryption and signature stage, the main objective is to encrypt the data using the previously generated shared key K and utilize signature technology to ensure data integrity and authentication. This process ensures that the data is not tampered with during transmission and also guarantees data confidentiality. To achieve quantum resistance, this stage uses the SM4 encryption algorithm and the ML-DSA signature algorithm together to ensure the security of the encryption and signature parts. The SM4 algorithm of this invention consists of 32 iterations and 1 reverse transformation.

[0092] (1) 32 rounds of iteration: First, the 4-word plaintext needs to be iterated 32 times. Each round of iteration requires a 1-word round key, and a total of 32 round keys are needed, denoted as... (wherein the round key) In the The round function (starting from 0) is used iteratively, with a length of 1 character. The iterative process involves continuously using the round function F to calculate the next character. The round function F is... It can accept four plaintext characters of the letter '1' and a round key of the letter '1' as parameters, and finally produce a result of the letter '1'.

[0093] (2) A simple reverse transformation: The second step in the encryption process is a simple reverse transformation. The four characters obtained at the end of the iteration... Reverse the order to obtain the final ciphertext. .

[0094] The decryption process of SM4 is exactly the same as the encryption process, also including 32 rounds of iteration and one reverse transformation. The difference is that the round key needs to be used in reverse order during the round iterations in the decryption process. For example, for... First round of use The second round of use And so on.

[0095] However, the native SM4 algorithm supports a key length of 128 bits, which is equivalent to 64 bits of security in future quantum computing environments. Using the native SM4 algorithm may not be sufficient to resist quantum attacks. Therefore, this method uses a key expansion and multi-level encryption structure similar to 3DES, generating two independent 128-bit keys through the key derivation function KDF. and The method employs an "encryption-decryption-encryption" approach to enhance security. The specific algorithm design is as follows:

[0096] (1) Input seed key: Use the 256-bit shared key SK as the input key seed.

[0097] (2) Key derivation: Using the key derivation function KDF, the seed key is expanded into two independent 128-bit subkeys. and At the same time, a unique salt is assigned to each subkey to ensure the independence of the two keys.

[0098] (3) Three-layer encryption process: The first layer of encryption uses a key. Encrypting the information M yields the ciphertext C1, i.e. The second layer of decryption uses a key. Decrypting C1 from the first layer yields ciphertext C2, i.e. The third layer of encryption uses the key again. Encrypting the C2 obtained from the second layer yields ciphertext C, i.e. .

[0099] (4) Decryption process: The decryption process is the reverse of the encryption process, using the key. M is obtained from the ciphertext C, where:

[0100]

[0101] Multi-level encryption structures increase the difficulty of cracking, requiring attackers to crack all keys simultaneously to recover the plaintext. If the keys could be independent of each other, the difficulty of cracking would be greatly increased, effectively extending the key length of the SM4 algorithm.

[0102] To ensure data integrity and prevent tampering during transmission, a digest of the encrypted data is used as input, and the ML-DSA algorithm is employed to sign it, generating a digital signature. The signing process uses the sender B's private key, usk. B A signature is performed to ensure the data's immutability and non-repudiation. Finally, the signed and encrypted data are transmitted together, ensuring the data recipient can simultaneously verify the data's integrity and perform decryption.

[0103] Decryption and Verification. Data decryption in this invention uses the SM4 algorithm, and the key is processed in reverse order. Verification uses the ML-DSA algorithm, and signature verification mainly consists of the following steps:

[0104] Generate a polynomial masking vector y with coefficients less than the security parameter γ1. The parameter γ1 needs to be set within a certain range so that the final signature will not reveal the key and that the signature is not easy to forge.

[0105] calculate and use High-low bit decomposition algorithm obtains high bit and low-order bits .

[0106] Generate a challenge value for the signature information m. c is The polynomial in the expression has coefficients of 0 and H0 represent a hash function.

[0107] Calculate potential signatures Since direct output might lead to key leakage, rejection sampling is used, and the parameter β is the maximum possible coefficient of cs1. If any coefficient of z is greater than If so, then the signing process will be rejected and restarted. Similarly, if The coefficient of any low-order bit is greater than If not, the signature needs to be recalculated.

[0108] If signature verification fails, the receiver must discard the data packet and request a retransmission from the sender. If multiple signature verification failures are detected, the current communication should be abandoned, and a new connection established. If decryption fails due to key mismatch, corrupted ciphertext, or other reasons, the receiver should reject the data packet, trigger error handling, and request the data again. Upon successful verification, both parties are considered trusted entities, and a secure communication channel is established.

[0109] SM4 symmetric keys are dynamically generated during key negotiation, used only in a single session, and destroyed immediately after the session ends; they are not stored by default. Each participant must record metadata information such as the key's purpose, validity period, and owner, and employ security measures such as encrypted storage and digital signatures to ensure the integrity and authenticity of this metadata. Keys are updated regularly according to system security level requirements and security policies to avoid the risk of long-term attacks. When a key is destroyed, the key data must be completely deleted to ensure it is unrecoverable, and relevant certificates must be updated simultaneously, with destruction logs recorded to meet security compliance requirements.

[0110] This invention also provides a quantum-resistant data security transmission system, comprising:

[0111] The acquisition module is used to acquire information, including the user's identity identifier, temporary public key, temporary secret value, and validity period requirement.

[0112] The generation module is used to generate the user's public and private keys based on the ML-DSA signature algorithm;

[0113] The receiving module is used to send an authentication request to the CA certification center based on the information and the user's public key, and to receive the certificate certified and issued by the CA certification center.

[0114] The exchange module is used to exchange and verify the certificates of other users. The certificate is an X.509 certificate generated and issued by the CA certification center based on the authentication request, public key and certificate of the corresponding user. The authentication request includes the identity identifier of the corresponding user, temporary public key and validity period requirement. The certificate generation private key is generated by the CA certification center based on the ML-DSA signature algorithm.

[0115] The response module is used to respond to the data transmission command after the certificate verification is successful. It calls and executes the temporary shared key generation module, outputs a temporary shared key, and then sends or receives data from other users based on the SM4 algorithm and ML-DSA signature algorithm according to the temporary shared key. The temporary shared key generation module is used to acquire matrix signals and exchange them with other users. Based on the exchanged matrix signals, it calculates and outputs a temporary shared key shared with other users using the DKE algorithm. The matrix signals are generated based on a shared value, which is calculated based on the temporary public key in the exchanged certificate, the corresponding user's temporary secret value, and a shared value calculation function. The shared value calculation function is selected from a preset formula library of the corresponding user according to the type of data transmission command, which includes data sending and data receiving.

[0116] The innovation of this invention compared to the prior art lies in:

[0117] 1. Innovation in Certificate Systems Based on Post-Quantum Cryptography. This invention creatively employs the core scheme of the ML-DSA international standard to construct a digital signature system, achieving quantum-resistant security through the LWE problem on rings. This algorithm can resist Shor's algorithm attack, ensuring that data is protected from quantum computing threats during transmission, providing reliable protection for public-key cryptography systems in the future quantum computing era; it also uses X.509 certificate bridging technology to embed the ML-DSA public key simultaneously in the CA hierarchical model, supporting the gradual upgrade of existing PKI systems to quantum-resistant systems and achieving a smooth transition from traditional schemes to quantum-resistant schemes.

[0118] 2. Dynamic Key Lifecycle Management. This invention designs a hierarchical dynamic key management system to achieve collaborative control of quantum-resistant keys and traditional keys. The DKE temporary key adopts a "one-time pad" mechanism, which is encrypted and temporarily stored in secure memory during the session. After the session ends, it is destroyed by the trusted execution environment, eliminating the risk of key residue. A three-level key derivation tree based on SM4 is constructed, and device fingerprints and environmental noise are bound by salt values ​​to ensure key independence.

[0119] 3. Quantum-Resistant Enhanced SM4 Three-Layer Encryption. Addressing the insufficient quantum resistance of the SM4 algorithm, this invention pioneers a "encryption-decryption-encryption" composite encryption mode. It utilizes the key derivation function (KDF) to split the 256-bit DKE shared key into two factors, SK1 and SK2. Through salt injection and round key cross-contamination, the equivalent key space is expanded from... Upgraded to .

[0120] 4. It has the ability to securely transmit and receive data simultaneously.

[0121] The data security transmission method and system with quantum-resistant security proposed in this invention solves the problem.

[0122] The above description is only a preferred embodiment of the present invention. It should be noted that for those skilled in the art, several improvements and modifications can be made without departing from the technical principles of the present invention, and these improvements and modifications should also be considered within the scope of protection of the present invention.

Claims

1. A data security transmission method with quantum-resistant security, characterized in that, include: Obtain information, including the user's identity identifier, temporary public key, temporary secret value, and expiration period requirement; Generate the user's public and private keys based on the ML-DSA signature algorithm; Based on the information and the user's public key, the user sends an authentication request to the CA certification center and receives the certificate issued by the CA certification center. The certificate is an X.509 certificate generated and issued by the CA certification center based on the authentication request, public key and certificate of the corresponding user. The authentication request includes the corresponding user's identity identifier, temporary public key and validity period requirement. The certificate generation private key is generated by the CA certification center based on the ML-DSA signature algorithm. After certificate verification, the system responds to data transmission commands, calls and executes a temporary shared key generation module, outputs a temporary shared key, and then sends or receives data from other users based on the SM4 algorithm and ML-DSA signature algorithm according to the temporary shared key. The temporary shared key generation module is used to acquire matrix signals and exchange matrix signals with other users. It is also used to calculate and output a temporary shared key shared with other users based on the exchanged matrix signals using the DKE algorithm. The matrix signals are generated based on shared values, which are calculated based on the temporary public key in the exchanged certificate, the temporary secret value of the corresponding user, and a shared value calculation function. The shared value calculation function is selected from the formula library preset by the corresponding user according to the type of data transmission command. The types of data transmission commands include data sending and data receiving. Three common parameters are set: prime number, random matrix, and noise parameter. Calculate the temporary secret value based on the DKE algorithm using the three common parameters; The temporary public key is calculated based on the temporary secret value, using the following formula: ； Where, p i is a temporary public key, M is a random matrix, and s i e is a temporary secret value. i For noise, q is a prime number, and mod represents the modulo operation; The user's public and private keys are generated based on the ML-DSA signature algorithm, including: The SHAKE-256 algorithm and a seed are used to generate a k×l dimensional matrix G, where each element of G is in the quotient ring. polynomials on, where n=256 Let X be an integer ring modulo q. n +1 is a fixed polynomial. It is a polynomial ring structure; Using the SHAKE-256 algorithm and a seed, generate l-dimensional vectors s1 and k-dimensional vectors s2, where each element of s1 and s2 is... arrive Random numbers in the data, arrive Indicates the range of private key coefficients; Calculate vectors ; Based on the vector t, calculate the user's public key upk and private key usk using the Power2Round algorithm; Select the shared value calculation function from the corresponding user-preset formula library according to the type of data transmission instruction: When the data transmission instruction is of type data transmission, the shared value calculation function is: ； When the data transmission instruction is of type data reception, the shared value calculation function is: ； Among them, K B K A Both represent shared values, p j p j T s i T The sequence is as follows: the temporary public key in the exchanged certificate, the transpose of the temporary public key in the exchanged certificate, and the transpose of the temporary secret value of this user. The formula for calculating the temporary shared key SK is as follows: ； K represents the shared value, σ represents the matrix signal, and each element in the matrix signal is used to indicate whether the element at the corresponding position in the shared value is present. , where K is K B or K A ; Based on the temporary shared key, sending data to or receiving data from other users using the SM4 algorithm and ML-DSA signature algorithm includes: In response to a data transmission command, the system encrypts the data to be transmitted using the SM4 algorithm based on the temporary shared key to obtain encrypted data. Then, it signs the digest of the encrypted data using the ML-DSA signature algorithm based on its private key to obtain encrypted signed data. After sending the encrypted signed data to other users, the system receives verification feedback from those users; or: In response to the data receiving instruction, the received data is decrypted based on the SM4 algorithm according to the temporary shared key to obtain decrypted data, and then the decrypted data is verified based on the ML-DSA signature algorithm; The SM4 algorithm is a multi-level encryption structure, and its algorithm steps are as follows: Input seed key: Use the 256-bit temporary shared key K as the input key seed; Key Derivation: Using the key derivation function KDF, the key seed is expanded into two independent 128-bit first subkey and second subkey, while assigning a unique salt to each subkey; The three-layer encryption process is as follows: The first layer of encryption uses the first subkey to encrypt the information to obtain the first ciphertext; the second layer of decryption uses the second subkey to decrypt the first ciphertext obtained in the first layer to obtain the second ciphertext; and the third layer of encryption uses the first subkey again to encrypt the second ciphertext obtained in the second layer to obtain the final ciphertext. Decryption process: The decryption process is the reverse execution of the encryption process.

2. The data security transmission method with quantum-resistant security according to claim 1, characterized in that, The X.509 certificate includes the corresponding user's version number, serial number, identity information, validity period, object identifier of the ML-DSA signature algorithm public key, and temporary public key.

3. The data secure transmission method with quantum-resistant security according to claim 1, characterized in that, in: After responding to the data transmission command, and receiving verification feedback from other users, if the other user's verification is successful, the signature is valid; if the other user's signature verification fails, the data is retransmitted to the other user according to their retransmission request; if signature verification fails, the current connection is abandoned, and a new connection is established. Alternatively: If decryption fails after responding to the data reception instruction, the data will be rejected. If the verification of the decrypted data fails, the data will be discarded and a request will be made to the sender to resend the data.

4. A data security transmission system with quantum-resistant security, characterized in that, include: The acquisition module is used to acquire information, including the user's identity identifier, temporary public key, temporary secret value, and validity period requirement. The generation module is used to generate the user's public and private keys based on the ML-DSA signature algorithm; The receiving module is used to send an authentication request to the CA certification center based on the information and the user's public key, and to receive the certificate certified and issued by the CA certification center. The exchange module is used to exchange and verify the certificates of other users. The certificate is an X.509 certificate generated and issued by the CA certification center based on the authentication request, public key and certificate of the corresponding user. The authentication request includes the identity identifier of the corresponding user, temporary public key and validity period requirement. The certificate generation private key is generated by the CA certification center based on the ML-DSA signature algorithm. The response module is used to respond to data transmission instructions after certificate verification, call and execute the temporary shared key generation module, output a temporary shared key, and then send data to or receive data from other users based on the temporary shared key, using the SM4 algorithm and ML-DSA signature algorithm. The temporary shared key generation module is used to acquire matrix signals and exchange them with other users. It is also used to calculate and output a temporary shared key shared with other users based on the exchanged matrix signals using the DKE algorithm. The matrix signals are generated based on a shared value, which is calculated based on the temporary public key in the exchanged certificate, the corresponding user's temporary secret value, and a shared value calculation function. The shared value calculation function is selected from a preset formula library of the corresponding user according to the type of data transmission instruction, which includes data sending and data receiving. Three common parameters are set: prime number, random matrix, and noise parameter. Calculate the temporary secret value based on the DKE algorithm using the three common parameters; The temporary public key is calculated based on the temporary secret value, using the following formula: ； Where, p i is a temporary public key, M is a random matrix, and s i e is a temporary secret value. i For noise, q is a prime number, and mod represents the modulo operation; The user's public and private keys are generated based on the ML-DSA signature algorithm, including: The SHAKE-256 algorithm and a seed are used to generate a k×l dimensional matrix G, where each element of G is in the quotient ring. polynomials on, where n=256 Let X be an integer ring modulo q. n +1 is a fixed polynomial. It is a polynomial ring structure; Using the SHAKE-256 algorithm and a seed, generate l-dimensional vectors s1 and k-dimensional vectors s2, where each element of s1 and s2 is... arrive Random numbers in the data, arrive Indicates the range of private key coefficients; Calculate vectors ; Based on the vector t, calculate the user's public key upk and private key usk using the Power2Round algorithm; Select the shared value calculation function from the corresponding user-preset formula library according to the type of data transmission instruction: When the data transmission instruction is of type data transmission, the shared value calculation function is: ； When the data transmission instruction is of type data reception, the shared value calculation function is: ； Among them, K B K A Both represent shared values, p j p j T s i T The sequence is as follows: the temporary public key in the exchanged certificate, the transpose of the temporary public key in the exchanged certificate, and the transpose of the temporary secret value of this user. The formula for calculating the temporary shared key SK is as follows: ； K represents the shared value, σ represents the matrix signal, and each element in the matrix signal is used to indicate whether the element at the corresponding position in the shared value is present. , where K is K B or K A ; Based on the temporary shared key, sending data to or receiving data from other users using the SM4 algorithm and ML-DSA signature algorithm includes: In response to a data transmission command, the system encrypts the data to be transmitted using the SM4 algorithm based on the temporary shared key to obtain encrypted data. Then, it signs the digest of the encrypted data using the ML-DSA signature algorithm based on its private key to obtain encrypted signed data. After sending the encrypted signed data to other users, the system receives verification feedback from those users; or: In response to the data receiving instruction, the received data is decrypted based on the SM4 algorithm according to the temporary shared key to obtain decrypted data, and then the decrypted data is verified based on the ML-DSA signature algorithm; The SM4 algorithm is a multi-level encryption structure, and its algorithm steps are as follows: Input seed key: Use the 256-bit temporary shared key K as the input key seed; Key Derivation: Using the key derivation function KDF, the key seed is expanded into two independent 128-bit first subkey and second subkey, while assigning a unique salt to each subkey; The three-layer encryption process is as follows: The first layer of encryption uses the first subkey to encrypt the information to obtain the first ciphertext; the second layer of decryption uses the second subkey to decrypt the first ciphertext obtained in the first layer to obtain the second ciphertext; and the third layer of encryption uses the first subkey again to encrypt the second ciphertext obtained in the second layer to obtain the final ciphertext. Decryption process: The decryption process is the reverse execution of the encryption process.

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