HIRF specific risk analysis method and device for eVTOL aircraft and test system

Abstract

The invention relates to an HIRF specific risk analysis method and device for an eVTOL aircraft and a test system, and the method comprises the steps: carrying out the system-level analysis of the eVTOL aircraft, and determining a plurality of sensitive systems which are sensitive to high-intensity radiation field HIRF in the eVTOL aircraft; performing device-level analysis on each sensitive system, and determining a plurality of sensitive devices in each sensitive system; wherein the step of carrying out system-level analysis on the eVTOL aircraft and the step of carrying out equipment-level analysis on each sensitive system respectively comprises the step of removing systems and / or equipment which do not need to be analyzed by utilizing a preset screening condition. According to the embodiment of the invention, the resource occupation cost during analysis can be reduced, the test cost can be reduced, on the other hand, a plurality of sensitive systems sensitive to the high-intensity radiation field HIRF and the sensitive equipment in each sensitive system can be accurately determined, the cost and the accuracy are both considered, and the HIRF test of the eVTOL aircraft can be realized with relatively low cost.

Description

HIRF-specific risk analysis methods, apparatus and testing systems for eVTOL aircraft Technical Field

[0001] This disclosure relates to the field of aircraft testing technology, and in particular to a HIRF-specific risk analysis method, apparatus and testing system for eVTOL aircraft. Background Technology

[0002] The development of eVTOL (Electric Vertical Takeoff and Landing) aircraft has attracted widespread attention from aerospace companies, the automotive industry, the transportation industry, governments, the military, and academia. Potential future applications of eVTOL include urban passenger transport, regional passenger transport, cargo transport, personal aircraft, and emergency medical services. Its most prominent advantages are energy efficiency and environmental friendliness, achieving near-zero emissions, low noise and vibration levels, and high passenger comfort, making it a truly environmentally friendly aircraft. Furthermore, it features safety and reliability, simple structure, ease of operation, good maintainability / low cost, and good economic efficiency. It also offers many design advantages: flexible overall layout, allowing for the use of optimal and unconventional / innovative layouts; and the ability to design aircraft with exceptional performance to meet special application requirements.

[0003] However, high-intensity radio fields (HIRF) refer to electromagnetic radiation with relatively high radiated energy per unit area. It is determined by both electric and magnetic field strength. Besides affecting human health, this electromagnetic radiation environment poses a significant threat to the normal operation of the electronic and electrical systems of various aircraft. For aircraft, the HIRF environment is caused by energy emitted from radar, radio, television stations, and other ground, water, or airborne radio frequency transmitters. It is characterized by a wide frequency band (10kHz-40GHz) and a long duration (far exceeding the duration of lightning). High-intensity radio fields have become a crucial factor affecting aircraft safety. During aircraft development, measures should be taken to protect the aircraft's electronic / electrical systems to avoid adverse effects on flight safety.

[0004] eVTOL (Electric Vertical Takeoff and Landing) aircraft typically operate in low-altitude environments, where the electromagnetic radiation intensity is much stronger than at high altitudes (tens of thousands of meters) and airports. Furthermore, the systems and equipment onboard eVTOL aircraft are mostly HIRF-sensitive electronic devices. Finally, in pursuit of lightweight design, eVTOL aircraft use composite material fuselage designs, which cannot provide electromagnetic protection for onboard electronic devices like aircraft with metal skins. Therefore, for eVTOL aircraft, it is necessary to focus on HIRF protection design and airworthiness compliance verification.

[0005] The relevant technologies usually involve directly conducting HIRF tests on aircraft, which is costly, inefficient, and inaccurate. Summary of the Invention

[0006] In view of this, this disclosure proposes a HIRF-specific risk analysis method for eVTOL aircraft, the method comprising:

[0007] A system-level analysis of the eVTOL aircraft was conducted to identify several sensitive systems within the eVTOL aircraft that are sensitive to high-intensity radiation fields (HIRF).

[0008] Perform device-level analysis on each sensitive system to identify multiple sensitive devices in each system;

[0009] The system-level analysis of eVTOL aircraft and the equipment-level analysis of each sensitive system both include: using preset screening criteria to remove systems and / or equipment that do not need to be analyzed.

[0010] In one possible implementation, the preset filtering conditions include at least one of the following:

[0011] If any system or device has a backup module whose function is implemented by a purely mechanical structure, or if the system or device is not sensitive to high-intensity radiation fields, then remove the system or device and do not perform system-level or device-level analysis.

[0012] If any system or device is isolated, then remove that system or device;

[0013] If there are two or more systems or devices that perform any function, only one system or device that performs that function will be retained for analysis, and the remaining systems or devices that perform that function will be removed.

[0014] In one possible implementation, the system-level analysis of the eVTOL aircraft includes:

[0015] An aircraft-level functional hazard assessment is conducted to obtain aircraft-level failure status information. The sensitive systems in the aircraft-level failure status information include aircraft-level Class I systems, aircraft-level Class II systems, and aircraft-level Class III systems. Among them, aircraft-level Class I systems include systems assessed to be prone to catastrophic failure in high-intensity radiation fields, aircraft-level Class II systems include systems assessed to be prone to severe failure in high-intensity radiation fields, and aircraft-level Class III systems include systems assessed to be prone to minor failure in high-intensity radiation fields.

[0016] A preliminary aircraft-level safety assessment is performed on the sensitive systems identified in the aircraft-level failure status information to obtain HIRF sensitive system information. This information includes Class A, Class B, and Class C HIRF sensitive systems.

[0017] The method further includes:

[0018] The device-level analysis of the HIRF sensitive system includes: device-level analysis of Class A, Class B, and Class C HIRF sensitive systems;

[0019] The first indication information is generated to instruct the Class A HIRF sensitive system to conduct system-level HIRF testing and equipment-level HIRF testing.

[0020] The second indication information is generated, indicating that Class B and Class C HIRF sensitive systems need to undergo system-level HIRF testing and equipment-level HIRF testing.

[0021] In one possible implementation, each sensitive system in the aircraft-level failure state information has a different aircraft-level failure state. A preliminary aircraft-level safety assessment is performed on the sensitive systems in the aircraft-level failure state information to obtain HIRF sensitive system information, including:

[0022] For any sensitive system, the HIRF sensitivity rating of the sensitive system in the HIRF sensitive system information is determined according to the highest level of aircraft-level failure status of the sensitive system. Among them, aircraft-level Class I systems, aircraft-level Class II systems, and aircraft-level Class III systems in the aircraft-level failure status correspond to the HIRF sensitivity ratings of Class A, Class B, and Class C HIRF sensitive systems, respectively.

[0023] In one possible implementation, device-level analysis is performed on each sensitive system to identify multiple sensitive devices within each system, including:

[0024] Based on fault tree analysis, the minimum device cut set where system failure occurs in each sensitive system is determined, thereby identifying multiple sensitive devices in that sensitive system.

[0025] In one possible implementation, the device-level analysis of the various sensitive systems further includes:

[0026] Determine the failure status level of each sensitive device. The failure status levels include Class I system-level failure status, Class II system-level failure status, and Class III system-level failure status.

[0027] For any given sensitive device, the HIRF sensitivity level of that sensitive device in the sensitive system is determined based on the highest failure level of that sensitive device. The HIRF sensitivity levels include Class A, Class B, and Class C HIRF sensitive devices. Class A, Class B, and Class C HIRF sensitive devices correspond to Class I, Class II, and Class III system-level failure states, respectively.

[0028] Determine the test type for HIRF-sensitive devices with different HIRF sensitivity levels.

[0029] In one possible implementation, the test types for HIRF-sensitive devices with different HIRF sensitivity levels are determined, including:

[0030] All HIRF sensitive devices classified as Class A, Class B, and Class C must undergo equipment-level DO-160G conductive and radiative susceptibility testing.

[0031] In one possible implementation, the method further includes:

[0032] Obtain electromagnetic zoning information for each HIRF-sensitive device on an eVTOL aircraft to determine the HIRF protection level;

[0033] Set the test environment parameters for each HIRF-sensitive device according to the HIRF protection level;

[0034] Based on the determined test environment parameters, device-level HIRF tests were conducted on each HIRF-sensitive device.

[0035] According to another aspect of this disclosure, a HIRF-specific risk analysis apparatus for eVTOL aircraft is provided, the apparatus comprising:

[0036] The first analysis module is used to perform system-level analysis on eVTOL aircraft to identify multiple sensitive systems in eVTOL aircraft that are sensitive to high-intensity radiation fields.

[0037] The second analysis module is used to perform device-level analysis on each sensitive system to identify multiple sensitive devices in each sensitive system;

[0038] The system-level analysis of eVTOL aircraft and the equipment-level analysis of each sensitive system both include: using preset screening criteria to remove systems and / or equipment that do not need to be analyzed.

[0039] According to another aspect of this disclosure, a HIRF-specific risk analysis test system for eVTOL aircraft is provided, the system including the aforementioned apparatus.

[0040] This disclosure removes systems and / or devices that do not require analysis by using preset screening conditions. When performing system-level analysis of eVTOL aircraft and device-level analysis of each sensitive system, on the one hand, it can reduce the resource consumption cost during analysis, and these devices do not require HIRF protection design and verification, which can reduce testing costs. On the other hand, by analyzing the systems and devices screened according to the preset screening conditions, it can also accurately identify multiple sensitive systems and sensitive devices in each sensitive system that are sensitive to high-intensity radiation fields (HIRF), thus balancing cost and accuracy and enabling HIRF testing of eVTOL aircraft at a relatively low cost.

[0041] Other features and aspects of this disclosure will become clear from the following detailed description of exemplary embodiments with reference to the accompanying drawings. Attached Figure Description

[0042] The accompanying drawings, which are included in and form part of this specification, illustrate exemplary embodiments, features, and aspects of this disclosure together with the specification and serve to explain the principles of this disclosure.

[0043] Figure 1 shows a flowchart of a HIRF-specific risk analysis method for eVTOL aircraft according to an embodiment of the present disclosure.

[0044] Figure 2 shows a flowchart of a HIRF-specific risk analysis method for eVTOL aircraft according to an embodiment of this disclosure.

[0045] Figure 3 illustrates a flowchart of equipment-level testing in a HIRF-specific risk analysis method for eVTOL aircraft according to an embodiment of this disclosure.

[0046] Figure 4 shows a block diagram of a HIRF-specific risk analysis apparatus for an eVTOL aircraft according to an embodiment of the present disclosure.

[0047] Figure 5 shows a block diagram of an apparatus for HIRF-specific risk analysis of an exemplary eVTOL aircraft according to the present disclosure. Detailed Implementation

[0048] Various exemplary embodiments, features, and aspects of this disclosure will now be described in detail with reference to the accompanying drawings. The same reference numerals in the drawings denote elements that have the same or similar functions. Although various aspects of the embodiments are shown in the drawings, they are not necessarily drawn to scale unless specifically indicated otherwise.

[0049] As used herein, the terms “comprising,” “including,” “having,” or variations thereof are open-ended and include one or more of the stated features, integrals, elements, steps, components, or functions, but do not exclude the presence or addition of one or more other features, integrals, elements, steps, components, functions, or groups thereof.

[0050] When an element is referred to as “connected,” “coupled,” “responding,” or a variation thereof relative to another element, it may be directly connected, coupled, or responding to another element, or there may be an intermediate element present.

[0051] Although the terms first, second, third, etc., may be used herein to describe various elements / operations, these elements / operations should not be limited by these terms. These terms are only used to distinguish one element / operation from another. Therefore, without departing from the teachings of the inventive concept, a first element / operation in some embodiments may be referred to as a second element / operation in other embodiments.

[0052] The term “exemplary” as used herein means “serving as an example, embodiment, or illustration.” Any embodiment illustrated herein as “exemplary” is not necessarily to be construed as superior to or better than other embodiments.

[0053] Furthermore, to better illustrate this disclosure, numerous specific details are set forth in the following detailed description. Those skilled in the art will understand that this disclosure can be practiced without certain specific details. In some instances, methods, means, components, and circuits well known to those skilled in the art have not been described in detail in order to highlight the main points of this disclosure.

[0054] It should be noted that the information (including but not limited to user device information, user personal information, etc.), data (including but not limited to data used for analysis, data stored, data displayed, etc.) and signals involved in this application are all authorized by the user or fully authorized by all parties, and the collection, use and processing of related data must comply with the relevant laws, regulations and standards of the relevant regions.

[0055] Those skilled in the art will know that eVTOL aircraft must meet the airworthiness requirements related to high-intensity radiation fields in the airworthiness regulations issued by the Civil Aviation Administration of China.

[0056] Among the requirements is protection against high-intensity radiation fields (HIRF):

[0057] (a) For every electronic and electrical system whose malfunction would prevent the aircraft from continuing to fly and land safely, its design and installation shall comply with the following provisions:

[0058] Aircraft-level functions will not be adversely affected during and after an aircraft is exposed to a (HIRF) environment;

[0059] Unless the restoration of this function conflicts with other operational or functional requirements of the system, the system should promptly restore normal operation of this function after the aircraft has exited the high-intensity radiation field (HIRF) environment.

[0060] (b) For every electronic and electrical system whose functional failure would severely reduce the aircraft's or flight crew's ability to cope with adverse operating conditions, its design and installation shall ensure that the system promptly restores its normal functioning once the aircraft has left the high-intensity radiation field (HIRF) environment.

[0061] For eVTOL aircraft, the electromagnetic environment of the operating space is the most severe Category III HIRF environment. It is necessary to identify which functional failures in this environment would prevent the aircraft from continuing to fly and land safely, and which functional failures would severely reduce the aircraft's or flight crew's ability to cope with adverse operating conditions; and then analyze which equipment is related to these functional failures.

[0062] This disclosure provides a solution for HIRF protection design and compliance verification of eVTOL aircraft by using HIRF-specific risk analysis to screen and identify HIRF-sensitive and safety-related key equipment, and planning aircraft-level HIRF on-ground tests, system-level HIRF laboratory tests, and equipment-level HIRF equipment tests for different equipment.

[0063] Please refer to Figure 1, which shows a flowchart of a HIRF-specific risk analysis method for eVTOL aircraft according to an embodiment of this disclosure.

[0064] As shown in Figure 1, the method includes:

[0065] Step S11: Perform a system-level analysis on the eVTOL aircraft to identify multiple sensitive systems in the eVTOL aircraft that are sensitive to the high-intensity radiation field (HIRF).

[0066] Step S12: Perform device-level analysis on each sensitive system to identify multiple sensitive devices in each sensitive system;

[0067] The system-level analysis of eVTOL aircraft and the equipment-level analysis of each sensitive system both include: using preset screening criteria to remove systems and / or equipment that do not need to be analyzed.

[0068] This disclosure removes systems and / or devices that do not require analysis by using preset screening conditions. When performing system-level analysis of eVTOL aircraft and device-level analysis of each sensitive system, on the one hand, it can reduce the resource consumption cost during analysis, and these devices do not require HIRF protection design and verification, which can reduce testing costs. On the other hand, by analyzing the systems and devices screened according to the preset screening conditions, it can also accurately identify multiple sensitive systems and sensitive devices in each sensitive system that are sensitive to high-intensity radiation fields (HIRF), thus balancing cost and accuracy and enabling HIRF testing of eVTOL aircraft at a relatively low cost.

[0069] This disclosure does not limit the specific type of eVTOL aircraft. The embodiments of this disclosure can be applied to the verification of HIRF sensitive systems and sensitive devices in various eVTOL aircraft. For example, eVTOLs mainly have three configurations: multirotor, compound wing, and tiltrotor. Multirotors utilize multiple lifters to achieve eVTOL takeoff, landing, and level flight; compound wing uses multiple lifters to complete the takeoff and landing phases, and then uses pushrods to complete level flight; tiltrotor uses multiple lifters to complete the takeoff and landing phases, and then one or more of the lifters tilt 90 degrees to complete level flight.

[0070] The embodiments disclosed herein do not limit the specific implementation of the system-level analysis method or the device analysis method. Those skilled in the art can adopt appropriate analysis methods according to the actual situation and needs.

[0071] The embodiments disclosed herein do not limit the setting of preset screening conditions, and those skilled in the art can set them according to actual conditions and needs.

[0072] For example, in one possible implementation, the preset filtering conditions may include at least one of the following:

[0073] If any system or device has a backup module whose function is implemented by a purely mechanical structure, or if the system or device is not sensitive to high-intensity radiation fields, then remove the system or device and do not perform system-level or device-level analysis.

[0074] If any system or device is isolated, then remove that system or device;

[0075] If there are two or more systems or devices that perform any function, only one system or device that performs that function will be retained for analysis, and the remaining systems or devices that perform that function will be removed.

[0076] Among them, the backup module of the pure mechanical structure may include the pure mechanical structure flight control module of the aircraft, mechanical attitude indicator, mechanical airspeed indicator, mechanical altimeter, independent mechanical timer, etc. The pure mechanical structure flight control does not rely on electronic sensors, chips and other electronic components, and only realizes the flight attitude and trajectory control through mechanical devices (such as linkages, levers, springs, hydraulic / pneumatic mechanisms, etc.).

[0077] In this context, "isolated state" refers to a state where there is no information interaction with other devices or systems. When other devices or systems are operating normally or malfunctioning, they will not affect the isolated system or device. For example, isolated systems or devices typically operate based on natural physical principles (such as magnetism or air pressure) or require only manual operation. They do not receive or send information from other systems throughout the process, and therefore are unaffected by the normal operation or malfunction of other devices. The specific types of isolated systems or devices are not limited in this disclosure. Those skilled in the art can set them according to actual conditions and needs. For example, isolated systems and devices may include compasses, independent fire extinguishers, etc.

[0078] By setting the above preset screening conditions, the embodiments of this disclosure can reduce the HIRF analysis cost of the system and equipment, improve efficiency, and ensure accuracy.

[0079] Of course, the embodiments disclosed herein are not limited to the above screening conditions. In other embodiments, those skilled in the art can expand and adjust the screening conditions according to actual conditions and needs.

[0080] Please refer to Figure 2, which shows a flowchart of a HIRF-specific risk analysis method for eVTOL aircraft according to an embodiment of this disclosure.

[0081] In one possible implementation, as shown in Figure 2, step S11, which performs a system-level analysis of the eVTOL aircraft, may include:

[0082] Step S111: Perform an Aircraft-Level Functional Hazard Assessment (AFHA) to obtain aircraft-level failure status information. The sensitive systems in the aircraft-level failure status information include aircraft-level Category I systems, aircraft-level Category II systems, and aircraft-level Category III systems. Among them, aircraft-level Category I systems include systems assessed as being capable of catastrophic failure in a high-intensity radiation field, aircraft-level Category II systems include systems assessed as being capable of severe failure in a high-intensity radiation field, and aircraft-level Category III systems include systems assessed as being capable of minor failure in a high-intensity radiation field.

[0083] Step S112: Perform a Preliminary Aircraft-Level Safety Assessment (PASA) on the sensitive systems in the aircraft-level failure status information to obtain HIRF sensitive system information, which includes Class A HIRF sensitive systems, Class B HIRF sensitive systems, and Class C HIRF sensitive systems.

[0084] The embodiments disclosed herein do not limit the specific methods for Aircraft-Level Functional Hazard Assessment (AFHA) and Preliminary Aircraft Safety Assessment (PASA). Those skilled in the art can implement these methods by referring to relevant technologies according to actual circumstances and needs.

[0085] Aircraft-level Functional Hazard Assessment (AFHA) refers to an assessment method that analyzes the potential safety risks arising from functional failures, starting from the overall functionality of the aircraft. It focuses on functional failures and their potential impacts at the entire aircraft level. The output of AFHA can be aircraft-level failure state information, which is then classified into HIRF sensitive systems through a Preliminary Aircraft Safety Assessment (PASA).

[0086] For example, step S111 performs an aircraft-level functional hazard assessment (AFHA) to obtain aircraft-level failure state information, which may include, for example:

[0087] Define the scope of the assessment: cover all core functions of the eVTOL aircraft (such as flight control, propulsion, navigation and communication, avionics display, power distribution, attitude awareness, etc.); limit the HIRF environment scenarios (such as typical HIRF field strength levels in civil aviation, electromagnetic radiation derived from indirect lightning effects, ground / airborne electromagnetic interference sources, etc.); exclude non-HIRF related failures (such as mechanical fatigue, hydraulic failures, etc., focusing only on "HIRF-induced functional failures").

[0088] Obtain assessment information including: eVTOL overall functional architecture diagram, system interface documentation, list of key electronic components (such as flight control computer, motor controller, radar, satellite navigation receiver, etc.); HIRF environmental level standards (such as HIRF field strength requirements of RTCAO-160GS Section 20); AFHA reports and HIRF failure cases of similar eVTOL / general aviation aircraft (such as avionics anomalies caused by electromagnetic interference); airworthiness requirements (such as EASA CS-23 and FAA Part 23 safety objectives for eVTOL).

[0089] Functions are categorized according to their "safety criticality," with priority given to core safety functions, including: Level 1 functions (safety critical): flight attitude control, power output regulation, navigation and positioning, emergency avoidance (such as one-key return to base), and stable power supply; Level 2 functions (important functions): avionics information display, communication links (air-to-ground / air-to-air), landing gear control, and air conditioning / environmental control; Level 3 functions (general functions): cabin entertainment, lighting, and auxiliary monitoring (such as battery temperature display).

[0090] Establish a mapping table between functions and systems to clarify the supporting system for each core function. For example: flight attitude control function → flight control system (including sensors, controllers, and actuators); power output regulation function → electric propulsion system (including motors, motor controllers, and battery management system (BMS); navigation and positioning function → navigation system (including GPS / BeiDou receivers and inertial navigation unit (IMU)).

[0091] For each core function, Failure Mode and Effects Analysis (FMEA) is used to identify HIRF-related failure modes, i.e., the relationship between the direct impact of HIRF on the system and the final result (i.e., HIRF-induced system failure). For example, Example 1 (Flight Attitude Control Function): HIRF interferes with flight control sensor signals → sensor data distortion; HIRF damages the flight control controller chip → controller crash; Example 2 (Power Propulsion Function): HIRF couples to the motor controller communication bus → abnormal output power fluctuations; HIRF interferes with BMS sampling signals → battery overcharge / over-discharge protection failure; Example 3 (Navigation Function): HIRF suppresses GPS receiver signals → positioning accuracy exceeds limits; HIRF causes inertial navigation unit drift → attitude calculation errors.

[0092] Determine the severity criteria (based on user definition and with reference to airworthiness safety levels), for example including: Aircraft-class Category I systems include systems assessed as capable of catastrophic failure in high-intensity radiation fields; Aircraft-class Category II systems include systems assessed as capable of severe failure in high-intensity radiation fields; Aircraft-class Category III systems include systems assessed as capable of minor failure in high-intensity radiation fields.

[0093] Each system is assessed for severity based on its "Functional System - Failure Mode - Failure Level - System Classification". For example: Example 1: Flight Control System (carrying flight attitude control function) → HIRF causes controller crash → catastrophic failure → Aircraft-class Category I system; Example 2: Electric Propulsion System (carrying power output regulation function) → HIRF causes power fluctuation → severe failure (unable to maintain stable flight) → Aircraft-class Category II system; Example 3: Avionics Display System (carrying information display function) → HIRF causes abnormal display of some non-critical parameters → minor failure → Aircraft-class Category III system; Example 4: Navigation System (carrying navigation and positioning function) → HIRF causes positioning deviation to exceed tolerance → severe failure (affecting flight path accuracy, requiring urgent correction) → Aircraft-class Category II system;

[0094] Based on the above information, aircraft-level failure status information is generated.

[0095] The above description is exemplary and should not be regarded as a limitation on the embodiments of this disclosure.

[0096] For example, step S112, the Preliminary Aircraft-Level Safety Assessment (PASA), can be implemented based on the Fault Tree Analysis (FTA) method. Fault Tree Analysis (FTA) is a top-down, logically deductive risk analysis method whose core advantage lies in its ability to clearly decompose the causal chain of "top event (aircraft-level failure state) → intermediate event (functional failure) → bottom event (HIRF-induced system failure)". Applying it to PASA can accurately locate systems directly associated with Category I / II / III aircraft-level failures, and combined with HIRF sensitivity assessment, ultimately form a list of A / B / C level HIRF-sensitive systems.

[0097] Of course, the specific implementation of the fault tree analysis method is not limited in the embodiments disclosed herein, and those skilled in the art can refer to relevant technologies to implement it according to actual conditions and needs.

[0098] For example, step S112, which performs an aircraft-level preliminary safety assessment (PASA) on the aircraft-level failure state information to obtain HIRF-sensitive system information, may include:

[0099] Using the aircraft-level Class I, Class II, and Class III systems in the aircraft-level failure state information determined by AFHA as top events and the system failures induced by HIRF as bottom events, a fault tree under the HIRF scenario is constructed.

[0100] The different failure levels of each system are determined based on the established fault tree. For example, for system A, the occurrence of bottom event 1 causes system A to become an aircraft-class Class I system, and the occurrence of bottom event B causes system A to become an aircraft-class Class II system. In other words, the same system may become a different type of aircraft-class failure system due to different bottom events.

[0101] The highest failure level of each system is determined as the target failure level of that system.

[0102] The HIRF sensitivity level of each system in the aircraft-level failure state information is determined by fault tree analysis. For example, the failure level of system A includes aircraft-level Class I system and aircraft-level Class II system. The level of aircraft-level Class I system is higher than that of aircraft-level Class II system. Therefore, the target failure level of system A is set to the level of aircraft-level Class I system, that is, system A is an aircraft-level Class I system.

[0103] The HIRF sensitive system information (system-level HIRF certification level (SHCL System HIRF Certification Level)) is determined based on the target failure level of each system. The HIRF sensitive system information includes Class A HIRF sensitive systems, Class B HIRF sensitive systems, and Class C HIRF sensitive systems.

[0104] Among them, Class A, Class B, and Class C HIRF sensitive systems represent different system-level HIRF certification levels. According to the degree of HIRF sensitivity, the level of Class A, Class B, and Class C HIRF sensitive systems gradually decreases. The higher the level, the more sensitive the system is to HIRF.

[0105] In one possible implementation, each sensitive system in the aircraft-level failure state information has a different aircraft-level failure state. Step S112 performs a preliminary aircraft-level security assessment on the sensitive systems in the aircraft-level failure state information to obtain HIRF sensitive system information, which may include:

[0106] For any sensitive system, the HIRF sensitivity rating of the sensitive system in the HIRF sensitive system information is determined according to the highest level of aircraft-level failure status of the sensitive system. Among them, aircraft-level Class I systems, aircraft-level Class II systems, and aircraft-level Class III systems in the aircraft-level failure status correspond to the HIRF sensitivity ratings of Class A, Class B, and Class C HIRF sensitive systems, respectively.

[0107] For example, for system A, the target failure level of system A is the level of an aircraft-class Class I system, that is, system A is an aircraft-class Class I system, so system A is determined to be a Class A HIRF sensitive system; if the target failure level of system F is the level of an aircraft-class Class III system, that is, system F is an aircraft-class Class III system, so system F is determined to be a Class C HIRF sensitive system.

[0108] In one possible implementation, step S12, which involves performing device-level analysis on each sensitive system, may include:

[0109] Equipment-level analysis was conducted on Class A, Class B, and Class C HIRF sensitive systems to identify the HIRF sensitive devices in each of the three systems.

[0110] That is, the embodiments of this disclosure obtain Class A, Class B, and Class C HIRF sensitive systems through system-level analysis, so that in subsequent device-level analysis, the sensitive systems that have been identified as Class A, Class B, and Class C HIRF sensitive systems can be analyzed at the device level, excluding other systems (such as Class D, Class E, etc.) and reducing analysis costs.

[0111] In one possible implementation, as shown in Figure 2, the method may further include the following in system-level analysis:

[0112] Step S113: Generate first indication information to instruct the Class A HIRF sensitive system to conduct system-level HIRF testing and equipment-level HIRF testing;

[0113] Step S114: Generate second indication information indicating that Class B HIRF sensitive systems and Class C HIRF sensitive systems need to conduct system-level HIRF tests and equipment-level HIRF tests.

[0114] This disclosure does not limit the types of the first and second indication information, or the specific test types of system-level HIRF tests and equipment-level HIRF tests. Those skilled in the art can implement it using relevant technologies according to actual conditions and needs.

[0115] Using the above methods, the embodiments of this disclosure can determine that different levels of HIRF sensitive systems require different HIRF tests, thereby enabling accurate classification and avoiding the need to conduct various tests on all systems, thus reducing testing costs.

[0116] In one possible implementation, as shown in Figure 2, step S12 performs device-level analysis on each sensitive system to identify multiple sensitive devices in each sensitive system, which may include:

[0117] Step S121: Based on the fault tree analysis, determine the minimum device cut set in each sensitive system where system failure occurs, so as to identify multiple sensitive devices in the sensitive system.

[0118] A cut set, also called a cut or cutoff set, is the set of basic events that cause the top event to occur. In other words, a set of basic events in the fault tree that can cause the top event is called a cut set. The minimum set of basic events that causes the top event is called the minimal cut set, which refers to the smallest combination of component failures that leads to overall system failure.

[0119] Fault tree analysis is based on a fault tree and analyzes the types of bottom events that influence the occurrence of top events and their relative impact. By performing fault tree analysis on the system containing each sensitive device, the minimum device cut set that causes system failure can be determined, thus identifying the HIRF sensitive devices in the system.

[0120] For example, when identifying sensitive devices in each sensitive system, devices that do not need to be analyzed can be removed based on preset constraints. This includes removing redundant devices (either device A or device B can perform this function; in the HIRF environment, A and B are considered to be of the same type, so only one of them is selected for HIRF sensitivity analysis). Furthermore, as mentioned earlier, mechanical devices and isolated devices are not considered, thereby further reducing analysis costs.

[0121] To facilitate understanding, the concept of redundant devices is further explained. In a fault tree, "AND" indicates that the failure of both device A and device B leads to a higher-level failure (to achieve a function, either device A or device B needs to be operational), while "OR" indicates that the failure of either device A or device B leads to a higher-level failure (to achieve a function, both devices A and B need to be operational simultaneously). Therefore, similar devices under an "AND" gate are not independent, and their redundancy is not considered. When performing device analysis, only one of them is analyzed using HIRF, and the other similar devices are analyzed in the same way. In this way, the embodiments of this disclosure can further reduce the analysis cost.

[0122] By performing fault tree analysis on each sensitive system, the minimum device cut set in each sensitive system where system failure occurs can be determined, thereby identifying multiple sensitive devices in that sensitive system and obtaining a failure state list associated with each HIRF sensitive device. The failure state list includes the relevant failure state level (including Class I system-level failure state, Class II system-level failure state, and Class III system-level failure state) for each HIRF sensitive device. In this embodiment of the disclosure, the highest failure state level can be selected as the HIRF sensitivity level of the device.

[0123] This disclosure does not limit the specific method for determining the failure state level of sensitive equipment. Those skilled in the art can implement this method using relevant technologies according to actual circumstances and needs. For example, the failure state level of sensitive equipment can be determined based on the aircraft-level failure state level caused by the equipment failure. For instance, Class I, Class II, and Class III system-level failure states can correspond to the aircraft-level Class I, Class II, and Class III systems, respectively. In other words, if the failure of a sensitive equipment would cause the system containing that equipment to become an aircraft-level Class I system, then the sensitive equipment corresponds to a Class I system-level failure state, and so on.

[0124] Among them, the equipment-level HIRF certification levels (IHCL Item HIRF Certification Level) corresponding to Class I, Class II, and Class III system-level failure states are Class A, Class B, and Class C HIRF sensitive equipment, respectively. The HIRF sensitivity level of Class A, Class B, and Class C HIRF sensitive equipment gradually decreases. The higher the sensitivity level, the more sensitive the equipment is to HIRF.

[0125] In one possible implementation, as shown in Figure 2, step S12, which involves performing device-level analysis on each sensitive system, may further include:

[0126] Step S124: Determine the failure status level of each sensitive device. The failure status levels include Class I system-level failure status, Class II system-level failure status, and Class III system-level failure status.

[0127] Step S125: For any sensitive device, determine the HIRF sensitivity level of the sensitive device in the sensitive system based on the highest failure level of the sensitive device. The HIRF sensitivity levels include Class A HIRF sensitive devices, Class B HIRF sensitive devices, and Class C HIRF sensitive devices. Class A HIRF sensitive devices, Class B HIRF sensitive devices, and Class C HIRF sensitive devices correspond to Class I system-level failure states, Class II system-level failure states, and Class III system-level failure states, respectively.

[0128] Step S126: Determine the test type for HIRF-sensitive devices with different HIRF sensitivity levels.

[0129] This disclosure does not limit the specific implementation of step S124, which determines the failure state level of each sensitive device. Those skilled in the art can refer to relevant technologies to implement it according to actual conditions and needs. For example, the method described above can determine multiple system-level failure states of each sensitive device.

[0130] For example, after determining the failure state level of each sensitive device, the highest system-level failure state among its various system-level failure states can be determined as the highest failure level. For instance, if the highest failure level of device A is a Class I system-level failure state, its HIRF sensitivity level can be determined as a Class A HIRF sensitive device; if the highest failure level of device C is a Class I system-level failure state, its HIRF sensitivity level can be determined as a Class A HIRF sensitive device; and if the highest failure level of device D is a Class II system-level failure state, its HIRF sensitivity level can be determined as a Class B HIRF sensitive device.

[0131] In one possible implementation, step S126, determining the test type for HIRF-sensitive devices at different HIRF sensitivity levels, may include:

[0132] All HIRF sensitive devices classified as Class A, Class B, and Class C must undergo equipment-level DO-160G conductive and radiative susceptibility testing.

[0133] This disclosure does not limit the specific test methods for conducting and radiating susceptibility tests of the equipment-grade DO-160G. Those skilled in the art can implement these methods by referring to relevant technologies according to actual conditions and needs.

[0134] The conducted susceptibility (CS) and radiated susceptibility (RS) tests in DO-160G at the equipment level are crucial for verifying whether avionics equipment can maintain normal function or meet permissible performance degradation requirements under conducted interference (through cables) and radiated interference (through space). These are key electromagnetic compatibility (EMC) verification steps that must be passed before equipment installation, directly related to the equipment-level HIRF protection requirements corresponding to the SHCL levels (A / B / C) mentioned earlier. The conducted susceptibility test corresponds to Chapter 22 of DO-160G, verifying the equipment's resistance to interference intruded through conducted paths such as power lines, signal lines, and control lines. The radiated susceptibility test corresponds to Chapter 20 of DO-160G, verifying the equipment's resistance to space electromagnetic radiation intruded through radiated paths (such as radar signals, radio radiation, and HIRF environments), and is the core test for equipment-level HIRF protection.

[0135] Please refer to Figure 3, which shows a flowchart of equipment-level testing in a HIRF-specific risk analysis method for eVTOL aircraft according to an embodiment of this disclosure.

[0136] In one possible implementation, as shown in Figure 3, the method may further include:

[0137] Step S31: Obtain electromagnetic partition information of each HIRF-sensitive device on the eVTOL aircraft and determine the HIRF protection level;

[0138] Step S32: Set the test environment parameters for each HIRF-sensitive device according to the HIRF protection level;

[0139] Step S33: Perform device-level HIRF tests on each HIRF-sensitive device based on the determined test environment parameters.

[0140] This disclosure does not limit the specific method for obtaining electromagnetic partition information of each HIRF-sensitive device on an eVTOL aircraft and determining the HIRF protection level. For example, the electromagnetic partition information of each HIRF-sensitive device can be obtained from the current design information of the eVTOL aircraft, and the preset HIRF protection level can be determined based on the electromagnetic environment strength at the device installation location. The HIRF protection level can be predetermined based on the electromagnetic radiation intensity at different frequency bands.

[0141] For example, the physical installation area (such as the power compartment, flight control compartment, passenger compartment, and antenna compartment) of each HIRF-sensitive device (such as flight control sensors, motor controllers, and navigation receivers) can be determined from the design information of the eVTOL aircraft. Different physical installation areas have corresponding preset HIRF protection levels.

[0142] As an example, based on existing electromagnetic zoning rules (divided by field strength level), equipment installation areas can be mapped to three types of electromagnetic zones (strong field strength zone, medium field strength zone, and weak field strength zone). The strong field strength zone can include areas near the power system (motor, battery) and radio frequency antennas, with a HIRF field strength ≥ 100 V / m. The medium field strength zone can include areas with basic electromagnetic shielding but near interference sources, with a HIRF field strength of 50~100 V / m (such as flight control cabins and avionics equipment cabins). The weak field strength zone can include areas far from interference sources, with a HIRF field strength ≤ 50 V / m (such as passenger cabins and auxiliary equipment cabins).

[0143] After determining the HIRF protection level of each HIRF-sensitive device, the embodiments of this disclosure can refer to its protection level to set the experimental environment parameters for testing the HIRF-sensitive device, so as to simulate the electromagnetic field environment and protection level under real conditions, thereby improving the accuracy and pertinence of the test.

[0144] Of course, this disclosure does not limit the specific type and steps of the equipment-level HIRF test. Those skilled in the art can refer to relevant technologies to implement it according to actual conditions and needs. For example, the HIRF-sensitive device can be fixed on the test bench according to the actual installation layout, and the matching modules (such as connecting the flight control sensor to the flight control computer to simulate the load, and the motor controller to simulate the motor load) can be connected. In an environment without HIRF interference, the normal operating parameters of the device (such as the output accuracy of the flight control sensor and the power stability of the motor controller) can be collected as a performance benchmark. The input / output signals, operating temperature, fault codes and other status of the device can be monitored synchronously through a data acquisition instrument and an oscilloscope. Then, in an anechoic chamber, the set HIRF interference can be applied to the device through a signal generator + power amplifier + antenna. The entire frequency band is traversed in the frequency sweep order, and the device is recorded synchronously for any functional abnormalities (such as signal distortion, crashes, power fluctuations). After the HIRF interference is turned off, it is verified whether the device can recover to the baseline state, whether the hardware is damaged, and an equipment-level HIRF test report is generated, which may include test parameters, baseline data, abnormal records (including abnormal frequency bands / field strengths), recovery time, etc.

[0145] The HIRF-specific risk analysis method for eVTOL aircraft disclosed in this embodiment can be applied to various types of eVTOL aircraft. Of course, for small and medium-sized eVTOL aircraft, if the aircraft (including all airborne systems and equipment) is placed directly in the whole-aircraft high-intensity radiation field effect test system, it is not necessary to identify aircraft-level, system-level, and equipment-level HIRF test objects and test indicators through HIRF-specific risk analysis. Instead, it is possible to directly determine whether the high-intensity radiation field verification has been passed by observing the phenomena of the whole-aircraft test and the corresponding failure relationship.

[0146] It is important to emphasize that existing aircraft HIRF protection verification technologies focus on innovation and practice in testing tools, testing methods, and test data processing during the testing phase, lacking a top-level perspective. For eVTOL aircraft airworthiness compliance verification, the research should focus on how to identify the objects that need to undergo HIRF protection airworthiness compliance verification, and how to determine the HIRF test level and test indicators.

[0147] This disclosure provides a complete solution that, through HIRF-specific risk analysis, reasonably selects the targets for HIRF protection work, formulates HIRF environmental testing indicators, and determines whether to conduct airworthiness compliance verification at the aircraft, system, and equipment levels.

[0148] Therefore, the technical solution of this disclosure has the following beneficial effects:

[0149] 1. Through HIRF-specific risk analysis, accurately identify equipment that may cause disasters, dangers, and major failures to aircraft due to HIRF effects;

[0150] 2. By excluding non-HIRF sensitive equipment and non-critical equipment through HIRF-specific risk analysis, HIFR protection design and verification can be omitted, achieving the overall goal of high aircraft-level safety at the lowest cost. This approach both mitigates risks and avoids over-design, improving the product's economy and competitiveness while ensuring the overall safety level of the aircraft.

[0151] 3. To establish the criteria for HIRF-sensitive critical equipment; and to lay the foundation for subsequent equipment-level and system-level compliance verification tests.

[0152] 4. Provide the criteria for system HIRF testing for a Class A system-level HIRF certification grade SHCL, namely, the absence of a Type I failure identified by this HIRF-specific risk analysis method.

[0153] Please refer to Figure 4, which shows a block diagram of a HIRF-specific risk analysis apparatus for an eVTOL aircraft according to an embodiment of the present disclosure.

[0154] As shown in Figure 4, the device includes:

[0155] The first analysis module 10 is used to perform system-level analysis on the eVTOL aircraft to identify multiple sensitive systems in the eVTOL aircraft that are sensitive to high-intensity radiation fields.

[0156] The second analysis module 20 is used to perform device-level analysis on each sensitive system to identify multiple sensitive devices in each sensitive system;

[0157] The system-level analysis of eVTOL aircraft and the equipment-level analysis of each sensitive system both include: using preset screening criteria to remove systems and / or equipment that do not need to be analyzed.

[0158] This disclosure removes systems and / or devices that do not require analysis by using preset screening conditions. When performing system-level analysis of eVTOL aircraft and device-level analysis of each sensitive system, on the one hand, it can reduce the resource consumption cost during analysis, and these devices do not require HIRF protection design and verification, which can reduce testing costs. On the other hand, by analyzing the systems and devices screened according to the preset screening conditions, it can also accurately identify multiple sensitive systems and sensitive devices in each sensitive system that are sensitive to high-intensity radiation fields (HIRF), thus balancing cost and accuracy and enabling HIRF testing of eVTOL aircraft at a relatively low cost.

[0159] It should be understood that the HIRF-specific risk analysis device for eVTOL aircraft is the same as the aforementioned HIRF-specific risk analysis method for eVTOL aircraft. For a detailed description of the method, please refer to the previous description of the method, which will not be repeated here.

[0160] In one possible implementation, the preset filtering conditions include at least one of the following:

[0161] If any system or device has a backup module whose function is implemented by a purely mechanical structure, or if the system or device is not sensitive to high-intensity radiation fields, then remove the system or device and do not perform system-level or device-level analysis.

[0162] If any system or device is isolated, then remove that system or device;

[0163] If there are two or more systems or devices that perform any function, only one system or device that performs that function will be retained for analysis, and the remaining systems or devices that perform that function will be removed.

[0164] In one possible implementation, the system-level analysis of the eVTOL aircraft includes:

[0165] An aircraft-level functional hazard assessment is conducted to obtain aircraft-level failure status information. The sensitive systems in the aircraft-level failure status information include aircraft-level Class I systems, aircraft-level Class II systems, and aircraft-level Class III systems. Among them, aircraft-level Class I systems include systems assessed to be prone to catastrophic failure in high-intensity radiation fields, aircraft-level Class II systems include systems assessed to be prone to severe failure in high-intensity radiation fields, and aircraft-level Class III systems include systems assessed to be prone to minor failure in high-intensity radiation fields.

[0166] A preliminary aircraft-level safety assessment is performed on the sensitive systems identified in the aircraft-level failure status information to obtain HIRF sensitive system information. This HIRF sensitive system information includes Class A, Class B, and Class C HIRF sensitive systems.

[0167] The device-level analysis of the HIRF sensitive system includes: device-level analysis of Class A, Class B, and Class C HIRF sensitive systems;

[0168] The first indication information is generated to instruct the Class A HIRF sensitive system to conduct system-level HIRF testing and equipment-level HIRF testing.

[0169] The second indication information is generated, indicating that Class B and Class C HIRF sensitive systems need to undergo system-level HIRF testing and equipment-level HIRF testing.

[0170] In one possible implementation, each sensitive system in the aircraft-level failure state information has a different aircraft-level failure state. A preliminary aircraft-level safety assessment is performed on the sensitive systems in the aircraft-level failure state information to obtain HIRF sensitive system information, including:

[0171] For any sensitive system, the HIRF sensitivity rating of the sensitive system in the HIRF sensitive system information is determined according to the highest level of aircraft-level failure status of the sensitive system. Among them, aircraft-level Class I systems, aircraft-level Class II systems, and aircraft-level Class III systems in the aircraft-level failure status correspond to the HIRF sensitivity ratings of Class A, Class B, and Class C HIRF sensitive systems, respectively.

[0172] In one possible implementation, device-level analysis is performed on each sensitive system to identify multiple sensitive devices within each system, including:

[0173] Based on fault tree analysis, the minimum device cut set where system failure occurs in each sensitive system is determined, thereby identifying multiple sensitive devices in that sensitive system.

[0174] In one possible implementation, the device is further used to:

[0175] Determine the failure status level of each sensitive device. The failure status levels include Class I system-level failure status, Class II system-level failure status, and Class III system-level failure status.

[0176] For any given sensitive device, the HIRF sensitivity level of that sensitive device in the sensitive system is determined based on the highest failure level of that sensitive device. The HIRF sensitivity levels include Class A, Class B, and Class C HIRF sensitive devices. Class A, Class B, and Class C HIRF sensitive devices correspond to Class I, Class II, and Class III system-level failure states, respectively.

[0177] Determine the test type for HIRF-sensitive devices with different HIRF sensitivity levels.

[0178] In one possible implementation, the test types for HIRF-sensitive devices with different HIRF sensitivity levels are determined, including:

[0179] All HIRF sensitive devices classified as Class A, Class B, and Class C must undergo equipment-level DO-160G conductive and radiative susceptibility testing.

[0180] In one possible implementation, the device is further used to:

[0181] Obtain electromagnetic zoning information for each HIRF-sensitive device on an eVTOL aircraft to determine the HIRF protection level;

[0182] Set the test environment parameters for each HIRF-sensitive device according to the HIRF protection level;

[0183] Based on the determined test environment parameters, device-level HIRF tests were conducted on each HIRF-sensitive device.

[0184] According to another aspect of this disclosure, a HIRF-specific risk analysis test system for eVTOL aircraft is provided, the system including the aforementioned apparatus.

[0185] Figure 5 shows a block diagram of an apparatus for HIRF-specific risk analysis of an exemplary eVTOL aircraft according to the present disclosure.

[0186] For example, device 1900 may be provided as a server or terminal device. Referring to FIG5, device 1900 includes a processing component 1922, which further includes one or more processors, and memory resources represented by memory 1932 for storing instructions, such as application programs, that can be executed by the processing component 1922. The application programs stored in memory 1932 may include one or more modules, each corresponding to a set of instructions. Furthermore, processing component 1922 is configured to execute instructions to perform the methods described above.

[0187] Device 1900 may also include a power supply component 1926 configured to perform power management of device 1900, a wired or wireless network interface 1950 configured to connect device 1900 to a network, and an input / output interface 1958 (I / O interface). Device 1900 can operate on an operating system, such as Windows Server, stored in memory 1932. TM macOS X TM Unix TM Linux TM FreeBSD TM Or similar.

[0188] In an exemplary embodiment, a non-volatile computer-readable storage medium is also provided, such as a memory 1932 including computer program instructions that can be executed by a processing component 1922 of the device 1900 to perform the above-described method.

[0189] Computer-readable storage media can be tangible devices capable of holding and storing programs / instructions used by instruction execution devices. Computer-readable storage media can be, for example—but not limited to—electrical storage devices, magnetic storage devices, optical storage devices, electromagnetic storage devices, semiconductor storage devices, or any suitable combination of the foregoing. More specific examples (a non-exhaustive list) of computer-readable storage media include: portable computer disks, hard disks, random access memory (RAM), read-only memory (ROM), erasable programmable read-only memory (EPROM or flash memory), static random access memory (SRAM), portable compact disc read-only memory (CD-ROM), digital multifunction disc (DVD), memory sticks, floppy disks, mechanical encoding devices, such as punch cards or recessed protrusions storing instructions thereon, and any suitable combination of the foregoing. The computer-readable storage media used herein are not to be construed as transient signals themselves, such as radio waves or other freely propagating electromagnetic waves, electromagnetic waves propagating through waveguides or other transmission media (e.g., light pulses through fiber optic cables), or electrical signals transmitted through wires.

[0190] The computer program (or computer-readable program instructions) described herein can be downloaded from a computer-readable storage medium to various computing / processing devices, or downloaded via a network, such as the Internet, local area network, wide area network, and / or wireless network, to an external computer or external storage device. The network may include copper transmission cables, fiber optic transmission, wireless transmission, routers, firewalls, switches, gateway computers, and / or edge servers. A network adapter card or network interface in each computing / processing device receives the computer-readable program instructions from the network and forwards them to the computer-readable storage medium in the respective computing / processing device.

[0191] The computer program (or computer program instructions) used to perform the operations of this disclosure may be assembly instructions, instruction set architecture (ISA) instructions, machine instructions, machine-dependent instructions, microcode, firmware instructions, state setting data, or source code or object code written in any combination of one or more programming languages, including object-oriented programming languages ​​such as Smalltalk, C++, etc., and conventional procedural programming languages ​​such as the "C" language or similar programming languages. The computer-readable program instructions may execute entirely on the user's computer, partially on the user's computer, as a standalone software package, partially on the user's computer and partially on a remote computer, or entirely on a remote computer or server. In cases involving a remote computer, the remote computer may be connected to the user's computer via any type of network—including a local area network (LAN) or a wide area network (WAN)—or may be connected to an external computer (e.g., via the Internet using an Internet service provider). In some embodiments, electronic circuitry, such as programmable logic circuitry, field-programmable gate arrays (FPGAs), or programmable logic arrays (PLAs), is personalized by utilizing state information from the computer-readable program instructions to implement various aspects of this disclosure.

[0192] Various aspects of this disclosure are described herein with reference to flowchart illustrations and / or block diagrams of methods, apparatus (systems), and computer program products according to embodiments of this disclosure. It should be understood that each block of the flowchart illustrations and / or block diagrams, and combinations of blocks in the flowchart illustrations and / or block diagrams, can be implemented by computer-readable program instructions.

[0193] These computer-readable program instructions can be provided to a processor of a general-purpose computer, a special-purpose computer, or other programmable data processing apparatus to produce a machine such that, when executed by the processor of the computer or other programmable data processing apparatus, they create means for implementing the functions / actions specified in one or more blocks of the flowchart and / or block diagram. These computer-readable program instructions can also be stored in a computer-readable storage medium that causes a computer, programmable data processing apparatus, and / or other device to operate in a particular manner; thus, the computer-readable medium storing the instructions comprises an article of manufacture that includes instructions for implementing aspects of the functions / actions specified in one or more blocks of the flowchart and / or block diagram.

[0194] Computer-readable program instructions may also be loaded onto a computer, other programmable data processing apparatus, or other device to cause a series of operational steps to be performed on the computer, other programmable data processing apparatus, or other device to produce a computer-implemented process, thereby causing the instructions executed on the computer, other programmable data processing apparatus, or other device to perform the functions / actions specified in one or more boxes of a flowchart and / or block diagram.

[0195] The flowcharts and block diagrams in the accompanying drawings illustrate the architecture, functionality, and operation of possible implementations of systems, methods, and computer program products according to various embodiments of the present disclosure. In this regard, each block in a flowchart or block diagram may represent a module, segment, or portion of an instruction containing one or more executable instructions for implementing a specified logical function. In some alternative implementations, the functions marked in the blocks may occur in a different order than those shown in the drawings. For example, two consecutive blocks may actually be executed substantially in parallel, and they may sometimes be executed in reverse order, depending on the functions involved. It should also be noted that each block in the block diagrams and / or flowcharts, and combinations of blocks in the block diagrams and / or flowcharts, may be implemented using a dedicated hardware-based system that performs the specified function or action, or using a combination of dedicated hardware and computer instructions.

[0196] The various embodiments of this disclosure have been described above. These descriptions are exemplary and not exhaustive, nor are they limited to the disclosed embodiments. Many modifications and variations will be apparent to those skilled in the art without departing from the scope and spirit of the described embodiments. The terminology used herein is chosen to best explain the principles, practical application, or technical improvements to the embodiments in the market, or to enable others skilled in the art to understand the embodiments disclosed herein.

Claims

1. A HIRF-specific risk analysis method for eVTOL aircraft, characterized in that, The method includes: performing system-level analysis on the eVTOL aircraft to identify multiple sensitive systems in the eVTOL aircraft that are sensitive to the high-intensity radiation field (HIRF); performing equipment-level analysis on each sensitive system to identify multiple sensitive devices in each sensitive system; wherein both the system-level analysis on the eVTOL aircraft and the equipment-level analysis on each sensitive system include: using preset screening conditions to remove systems and / or devices that do not need to be analyzed.

2. The method according to claim 1, characterized in that, The preset screening conditions include at least one of the following: if any system or device has a backup module implemented by a purely mechanical structure or is not sensitive to high-intensity radiation fields, then the system or device is removed and no system-level or device-level analysis is performed; if any system or device is isolated, then the system or device is removed; if there are two or more systems or devices that implement any function, then only one system or device that implements the function is retained for analysis, and the remaining systems or devices that implement the function are removed.

3. The method according to claim 1, characterized in that, The system-level analysis of the eVTOL aircraft includes: conducting an aircraft-level functional hazard assessment to obtain aircraft-level failure state information. Sensitive systems in this information include aircraft-level Category I, Category II, and Category III systems. Category I systems include those assessed as prone to catastrophic failure in high-intensity radiation fields; Category II systems include those assessed as prone to severe failure in high-intensity radiation fields; and Category III systems include those assessed as prone to minor failure in high-intensity radiation fields. A preliminary aircraft-level safety assessment is then performed on the sensitive systems identified in the failure state information. The method obtains HIRF sensitive system information, which includes Class A, Class B, and Class C HIRF sensitive systems. The device-level analysis of each sensitive system includes performing device-level analysis on Class A, Class B, and Class C HIRF sensitive systems. The method further includes generating a first indication message to instruct Class A HIRF sensitive systems to undergo system-level and device-level HIRF testing; and generating a second indication message to instruct Class B and Class C HIRF sensitive systems to undergo both system-level and device-level HIRF testing.

4. The method according to claim 3, characterized in that, Each sensitive system in the aircraft-level failure status information has a different aircraft-level failure status. A preliminary aircraft-level safety assessment is performed on the sensitive systems in the aircraft-level failure status information to obtain HIRF sensitive system information, including: for any sensitive system, determining the HIRF sensitive system rating level of the sensitive system in the HIRF sensitive system information based on the highest level of aircraft-level failure status of the sensitive system. Among them, aircraft-level Class I systems, aircraft-level Class II systems, and aircraft-level Class III systems in the aircraft-level failure status correspond to HIRF sensitive system rating levels of Class A, Class B, and Class C, respectively.

5. The method according to claim 1, characterized in that, Perform device-level analysis on each sensitive system to identify multiple sensitive devices in each system, including: determining the minimum device cut set in each sensitive system where system failure occurs based on fault tree analysis, in order to identify multiple sensitive devices in that sensitive system.

6. The method according to claim 5, characterized in that, The device-level analysis of each sensitive system also includes: determining the failure state level of each sensitive device, which includes Class I, Class II, and Class III system-level failure states; for any sensitive device, determining the HIRF sensitivity level of that sensitive device in the sensitive system based on its highest failure level, wherein the HIRF sensitivity levels include Class A, Class B, and Class C HIRF sensitive devices, which correspond to Class I, Class II, and Class III system-level failure states, respectively; and determining the test type for HIRF sensitive devices of different HIRF sensitivity levels.

7. The method according to claim 6, characterized in that, Determine the test types for HIRF sensitive devices of different HIRF sensitivity levels, including: determining that Class A, Class B, and Class C HIRF sensitive devices must all undergo equipment-level DO-160G conducted conduction and radiation sensitivity tests.

8. The method according to any one of claims 1-7, characterized in that, The method further includes: acquiring electromagnetic partition information of each HIRF-sensitive device on the eVTOL aircraft and determining the HIRF protection level; setting test environment parameters for each HIRF-sensitive device according to the HIRF protection level; and conducting equipment-level HIRF tests on each HIRF-sensitive device based on the determined test environment parameters.

9. A HIRF-specific risk analysis device for eVTOL aircraft, characterized in that, The device includes: a first analysis module for performing system-level analysis on the eVTOL aircraft to identify multiple sensitive systems in the eVTOL aircraft that are sensitive to high-intensity radiation fields; and a second analysis module for performing device-level analysis on each sensitive system to identify multiple sensitive devices in each sensitive system; wherein both the system-level analysis on the eVTOL aircraft and the device-level analysis on each sensitive system include: removing systems and / or devices that do not need to be analyzed using preset screening conditions.

10. A HIRF-specific risk analysis test system for eVTOL aircraft, characterized in that, The system includes the apparatus as described in claim 9.

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