Power password definition protocol stack implementation method and system based on information flow interference-free

Abstract

The invention provides a power password definition protocol stack implementation method and system based on information flow interference-free, and the method comprises the steps: adding an information flow label for marking a data security level for to-be-sent data through employing an information flow interference-free rule layer based on a subject level of a sending end and an object level of the to-be-sent data; a power password definition layer is utilized to select a power password matched with the object level, and the power password is adopted to encrypt data to be sent to generate a ciphertext; orienting the ciphertext to a specific transmission channel by using a protocol stack hierarchical adaptation layer, and packaging the ciphertext according to a set transmission protocol to form a security message; and sending the security message through the specific transmission channel. A three-in-one security protocol stack architecture of an information flow non-interference rule layer, a power password definition layer and a protocol stack hierarchical adaptation layer is constructed for a power system, security level division is performed, information flow labels and adaptive power passwords are added, and safe and stable operation of the power system can be ensured.

Description

Technical Field

[0001] This invention relates to the field of power system security and defense technology, specifically to a method and system for implementing a power cryptography definition protocol stack based on interference-free information flow. Background Technology

[0002] As a critical infrastructure, the power system's communication network carries core data such as dispatch instructions, equipment status monitoring, and electricity consumption information collection. A security attack on this network would directly threaten the stable operation of the power grid and even public safety. With the advancement of "dual-carbon" goals, the power system is transforming towards digitalization and intelligence. The increasing number of scenarios such as renewable energy grid integration and distributed power distribution is leading to a surge in the number of communication nodes and increased data interaction complexity, highlighting the limitations of existing security protocol stacks.

[0003] Power data has a clear security level classification, such as dispatch instructions being "high security level" and electricity consumption statistics being "medium security level". However, the existing protocol stack can only achieve end-to-end encryption and does not control the information exchange and interaction of data with different security levels, which affects the safe and stable operation of the power system. Summary of the Invention

[0004] To overcome the shortcomings of current protocol stacks, which can only achieve end-to-end encryption and do not control the information exchange and interaction of data with different security levels, thus affecting the safe and stable operation of the power system, this invention provides a method for implementing a power cryptographic definition protocol stack based on interference-free information flow, including: Based on the subject level of the sending end and the object level of the data to be sent, an information flow tag for marking the data security level is added to the data to be sent using the information flow non-interference rule layer; Using the power cipher definition layer, a power cipher that is compatible with the object level is selected, and the power cipher is used to encrypt the data to be sent to generate ciphertext; By utilizing the protocol stack layered adaptation layer, the ciphertext is directed to a specific transmission channel, and the ciphertext is encapsulated according to the set transmission protocol to form a secure message; The security message is sent through the specific transmission channel.

[0005] Optionally, the subject level and the object level are obtained by classifying the core data and interactive subjects in the power system according to the power information security level protection standard. The main body is classified into H-level main body, M-level main body and L-level main body; the H-level main body includes core control node, the M-level main body includes regional control equipment, and the L-level main body includes terminal equipment; The objects are classified into H-level objects, M-level objects, and L-level objects; the H-level objects include dispatch instructions and / or relay protection settings; the M-level objects include distribution terminal status data and / or new energy grid-connected power data; and the L-level objects include electricity consumption information collection data and / or equipment operation and maintenance logs.

[0006] Optionally, based on the subject level of the sender and the object level of the data to be sent, the information flow non-interference rule layer is used to add information flow tags to the data to be sent to mark the data security level, including: Based on the subject level of the sending end and the object level of the data to be sent, the data-subject-business scenario mapping table in the information flow non-interference rule layer is matched to determine that the transmission of data of the object level by the device of the subject level belongs to the legitimate data flow direction and conforms to the non-interference rule; In the information flow non-interference rule layer, information flow tags are added to the data to be sent to mark the data security level; The information flow tag occupies 2 bytes.

[0007] Optionally, the interference-free rule includes at least one of the following: Physical layer rules: H-class objects use dedicated channels for data transmission, while M-class and L-class objects share channels but their corresponding sub-bands are independent; Data link layer rule: If, based on the data security level in the information flow label, it is determined that the subject level of the sending end is higher than that of the receiving end and there is illegal transmission, then the receiving end refuses to receive the data. Network layer rules: Allow forwarding of legitimate data flows, prohibit forwarding of illegitimate data flows; Transport layer and application layer rules: There are access control matrices for subjects and data, used to restrict cross-level access.

[0008] Optionally, the step of utilizing the power cipher definition layer to select a power cipher adapted to the object level, and using the power cipher to encrypt the data to be sent to generate ciphertext, includes: The scenario-based cryptographic algorithm pool in the power cryptographic definition layer is invoked to select the encryption algorithm and integrity verification algorithm for the current transmission scenario where the object data is located; The scenario key for the current transmission scenario is retrieved from the three-level key system of the power cryptography definition layer, and a session key for transmission is generated using the scenario key. In the power cryptography definition layer, the encryption algorithm and the session key are used to encrypt the data to be sent to obtain ciphertext; and based on the ciphertext, the integrity verification algorithm is used to generate a verification value.

[0009] Optionally, the cryptographic algorithm pool includes algorithms adapted to different transmission scenarios; wherein, the algorithms adapted to H-level scenarios include the SM4 symmetric encryption algorithm and the SM3 integrity verification algorithm; the algorithms adapted to M-level scenarios include the SM2 asymmetric encryption algorithm and the SM3 integrity verification algorithm; and the algorithms adapted to L-level scenarios include the lightweight SM4 encryption algorithm. The three-level key system includes a root key for H-level scenarios, a regional key for M-level scenarios, and a terminal key for L-level scenarios. The root key is stored in a hardware security module, the regional key is generated based on the root key, and the terminal key is generated based on the regional key.

[0010] Optionally, the step of utilizing a protocol stack layered adaptation layer to direct the ciphertext to a specific transmission channel and encapsulate the ciphertext according to a set transmission protocol to form a secure message includes: In the physical layer of the protocol stack layered adaptation layer, the ciphertext is directed to a specific transmission channel, and the ciphertext is preprocessed with physical layer frame check sequence encryption. In the data link layer of the protocol stack layered adaptation layer, the information flow tag is embedded in the Ethernet frame header, and the check value is added to the Ethernet frame tail to form the encrypted data link layer frame; In the network layer of the protocol stack layered adaptation layer, the power security option header is extended, and the information flow level, the identifier of the encryption algorithm, and the index of the session key are added to the power security option header to form a network layer message; In the transport layer of the protocol stack layered adaptation layer, a mark indicating that the network layer message has passed the interference-free verification is added to the network layer message to form a transport layer message; In the application layer of the protocol stack layered adaptation layer, a security extension field is added to the transport layer message to form a secure message; the security extension field is used to indicate the result of passing the interference-free verification and that encryption has been completed.

[0011] On the other hand, the present invention also provides a method for implementing a power cryptography definition protocol stack based on interference-free information flow, comprising: Based on the receiving end, the ciphertext is extracted from the received secure message by utilizing the protocol stack layered adaptation layer. Using the power cryptography definition layer, the ciphertext is decrypted and restored based on the session key adapted to the ciphertext to obtain the plaintext; By utilizing the information flow non-interference rule layer, information flow tags are removed from the plaintext to obtain the final plaintext data.

[0012] Optionally, the step of extracting ciphertext from the received secure message using a protocol stack layered adaptation layer at the receiving end includes: The receiving end utilizes the physical layer of the protocol stack layered adaptation layer to decrypt the received security message using the frame verification sequence, thus obtaining the physical layer decrypted message. In the data link layer of the protocol stack layered adaptation layer, the information flow tag in the physical layer decryption message is extracted, and the interference-free verification is verified based on the information flow tag, and the integrity verification is performed on the verification value in the physical layer decryption message; after the verification is passed, the Ethernet frame header and Ethernet frame trailer in the physical layer decryption message are stripped to obtain the data link layer decryption message. In the network layer of the protocol stack layered adaptation layer, the power security option header in the data link layer decryption message is parsed to obtain option header information including the information flow level, the identifier of the encryption algorithm, and the index of the session key; based on the option header information, verification is performed, and after the verification passes, the network layer message is obtained; In the transport layer of the protocol stack layered adaptation layer, after reading the tag that has passed the interference-free verification, the session key is called to obtain the transport layer message; In the application layer of the protocol stack layered adaptation layer, the security extension field is parsed to determine that the transport layer message is a compliant and secure message; the security extension field of the transport layer message is stripped to obtain the ciphertext.

[0013] Optionally, the step of using the power cryptography definition layer to decrypt and restore the ciphertext based on the session key adapted to the ciphertext to obtain the plaintext includes: In the power cryptography definition layer, the session key is invoked to decrypt and restore the ciphertext to obtain the plaintext. The ciphertext is subjected to integrity verification to obtain the integrity verification result.

[0014] Optionally, the step of using an information flow non-interference rule layer to remove information flow tags from the plaintext to obtain the final plaintext data includes: Using the data-subject-business scenario mapping table in the information flow non-interference rule layer, it is verified that the ciphertext belongs to a legitimate data flow direction and conforms to the interference rules; Remove the information flow tags from the plaintext to obtain the final plaintext data.

[0015] On the other hand, the present invention also provides a power cryptography definition protocol stack implementation system based on interference-free information flow, comprising: The layer processing module is used to add information flow tags to the data to be sent to mark the data security level based on the subject level of the sending end and the object level of the data to be sent, using the information flow non-interference rule layer; using the power cipher definition layer, selects a power cipher that is compatible with the object level, and uses the power cipher to encrypt the data to be sent to generate ciphertext; using the protocol stack layered adaptation layer, directs the ciphertext to a specific transmission channel, and encapsulates the ciphertext according to the set transmission protocol to form a secure message; The sending module is used to send the security message through the specific transmission channel.

[0016] Optionally, the subject level and the object level are obtained by classifying the core data and interactive subjects in the power system according to the power information security level protection standard. The main body is classified into H-level main body, M-level main body and L-level main body; the H-level main body includes core control node, the M-level main body includes regional control equipment, and the L-level main body includes terminal equipment; The objects are classified into H-level objects, M-level objects, and L-level objects; the H-level objects include dispatch instructions and / or relay protection settings; the M-level objects include distribution terminal status data and / or new energy grid-connected power data; and the L-level objects include electricity consumption information collection data and / or equipment operation and maintenance logs.

[0017] Optionally, the layer processing module is specifically used for: Based on the subject level of the sending end and the object level of the data to be sent, the data-subject-business scenario mapping table in the information flow non-interference rule layer is matched to determine that the transmission of data of the object level by the device of the subject level belongs to the legitimate data flow direction and conforms to the non-interference rule; In the information flow non-interference rule layer, information flow tags are added to the data to be sent to mark the data security level; The information flow tag occupies 2 bytes.

[0018] Optionally, the interference-free rule includes at least one of the following: Physical layer rules: H-class objects use dedicated channels for data transmission, while M-class and L-class objects share channels but their corresponding sub-bands are independent; Data link layer rule: If, based on the data security level in the information flow label, it is determined that the subject level of the sending end is higher than that of the receiving end and there is illegal transmission, then the receiving end refuses to receive the data. Network layer rules: Allow forwarding of legitimate data flows, prohibit forwarding of illegitimate data flows; Transport layer and application layer rules: There are access control matrices for subjects and data, used to restrict cross-level access.

[0019] Optionally, the layer processing module is specifically used for: The scenario-based cryptographic algorithm pool in the power cryptographic definition layer is invoked to select the encryption algorithm and integrity verification algorithm for the current transmission scenario where the object data is located; The scenario key for the current transmission scenario is retrieved from the three-level key system of the power cryptography definition layer, and a session key for transmission is generated using the scenario key. In the power cryptography definition layer, the encryption algorithm and the session key are used to encrypt the data to be sent to obtain ciphertext; and based on the ciphertext, the integrity verification algorithm is used to generate a verification value.

[0020] Optionally, the cryptographic algorithm pool includes algorithms adapted to different transmission scenarios; wherein, the algorithms adapted to H-level scenarios include the SM4 symmetric encryption algorithm and the SM3 integrity verification algorithm; the algorithms adapted to M-level scenarios include the SM2 asymmetric encryption algorithm and the SM3 integrity verification algorithm; and the algorithms adapted to L-level scenarios include the lightweight SM4 encryption algorithm. The three-level key system includes a root key for H-level scenarios, a regional key for M-level scenarios, and a terminal key for L-level scenarios. The root key is stored in a hardware security module, the regional key is generated based on the root key, and the terminal key is generated based on the regional key.

[0021] Optionally, the layer processing module is specifically used for: In the physical layer of the protocol stack layered adaptation layer, the ciphertext is directed to a specific transmission channel, and the ciphertext is preprocessed with physical layer frame check sequence encryption. In the data link layer of the protocol stack layered adaptation layer, the information flow tag is embedded in the Ethernet frame header, and the check value is added to the Ethernet frame tail to form the encrypted data link layer frame; In the network layer of the protocol stack layered adaptation layer, the power security option header is extended, and the information flow level, the identifier of the encryption algorithm, and the index of the session key are added to the power security option header to form a network layer message; In the transport layer of the protocol stack layered adaptation layer, a mark indicating that the network layer message has passed the interference-free verification is added to the network layer message to form a transport layer message; In the application layer of the protocol stack layered adaptation layer, a security extension field is added to the transport layer message to form a secure message; the security extension field is used to indicate the result of passing the interference-free verification and that encryption has been completed.

[0022] On the other hand, the present invention also provides a power cryptography definition protocol stack implementation system based on interference-free information flow, comprising: The receiving module is used to receive security messages; The layer processing module is used to extract ciphertext from the secure message based on the receiving end using the protocol stack layer adaptation layer; decrypt and restore the ciphertext based on the session key adapted to the ciphertext using the power cryptography definition layer to obtain plaintext; and remove information flow tags from the plaintext using the information flow non-interference rule layer to obtain the final plaintext data.

[0023] Optionally, the layer processing module is specifically used for: The receiving end utilizes the physical layer of the protocol stack layered adaptation layer to decrypt the received security message using the frame verification sequence, thus obtaining the physical layer decrypted message. In the data link layer of the protocol stack layered adaptation layer, the information flow tag in the physical layer decryption message is extracted, and the interference-free verification is verified based on the information flow tag, and the integrity verification is performed on the verification value in the physical layer decryption message; after the verification is passed, the Ethernet frame header and Ethernet frame trailer in the physical layer decryption message are stripped to obtain the data link layer decryption message. In the network layer of the protocol stack layered adaptation layer, the power security option header in the data link layer decryption message is parsed to obtain option header information including the information flow level, the identifier of the encryption algorithm, and the index of the session key; based on the option header information, verification is performed, and after the verification passes, the network layer message is obtained; In the transport layer of the protocol stack layered adaptation layer, after reading the tag that has passed the interference-free verification, the session key is called to obtain the transport layer message; In the application layer of the protocol stack layered adaptation layer, the security extension field is parsed to determine that the transport layer message is a compliant and secure message; the security extension field of the transport layer message is stripped to obtain the ciphertext.

[0024] Optionally, the layer processing module is specifically used for: In the power cryptography definition layer, the session key is invoked to decrypt and restore the ciphertext to obtain the plaintext. The ciphertext is subjected to integrity verification to obtain the integrity verification result.

[0025] Optionally, the layer processing module is specifically used for: Using the data-subject-business scenario mapping table in the information flow non-interference rule layer, it is verified that the ciphertext belongs to a legitimate data flow direction and conforms to the interference rules; Remove the information flow tags from the plaintext to obtain the final plaintext data.

[0026] On the other hand, the present invention also provides a computer device, characterized in that it includes: one or more processors; The processor is used to store one or more programs; When the one or more programs are executed by the one or more processors, the above-described method for implementing a power cryptographic definition protocol stack based on information flow non-interference is implemented.

[0027] On the other hand, the present invention also provides a computer-readable storage medium, characterized in that it stores a computer program thereon, wherein when the computer program is executed, it implements the above-described method for implementing a power cryptographic definition protocol stack based on information flow non-interference.

[0028] Compared with the prior art, the beneficial effects of the present invention are as follows: This invention provides a method and system for implementing a power cryptography definition protocol stack based on interference-free information flow. The method utilizes an interference-free information flow rule layer to add information flow tags to the data to be transmitted, marking its security level, based on the subject level of the sending end and the object level of the data to be transmitted. Using an power cryptography definition layer, a power cryptography compatible with the object level is selected and used to encrypt the data to be transmitted, generating ciphertext. A protocol stack layered adaptation layer directs the ciphertext to a specific transmission channel and encapsulates the ciphertext according to a set transmission protocol, forming a secure message. The secure message is then transmitted through the specific transmission channel. This invention constructs a three-in-one secure protocol stack architecture for power systems: an interference-free information flow rule layer, a power cryptography definition layer, and a protocol stack layered adaptation layer. During data transmission, security levels are classified based on the sending end and the data to be transmitted, corresponding information flow tags are added, and a compatible power cryptography is selected for encryption, thereby generating secure messages. This ensures the safe and stable operation of the power system. Attached Figure Description

[0029] Figure 1 This is a flowchart illustrating the implementation method of the power cryptography definition protocol stack based on interference-free information flow according to the present invention. Figure 2 This is a schematic diagram of the overall architecture of the power cryptography definition security protocol stack of the present invention; Figure 3 This is a flowchart illustrating the implementation method of the power cryptography definition protocol stack based on interference-free information flow according to the present invention. Figure 4 This is a schematic diagram of the system architecture for the power cryptography definition protocol stack implementation based on non-interference information flow of the present invention. Figure 5 This is a schematic diagram of the system architecture for the power cryptography definition protocol stack implementation based on non-interference information flow of the present invention. Figure 6 This is a schematic diagram of the electronic device of the present invention. Detailed Implementation

[0030] The specific embodiments of the present invention will be further described in detail below with reference to the accompanying drawings.

[0031] Example 1: This invention provides a method flow for implementing a power cryptography definition protocol stack based on interference-free information flow, as follows: Figure 1 As shown, it includes: Step 101: Based on the subject level of the sender and the object level of the data to be sent, use the non-interference rule layer of the information flow to add information flow tags to the data to be sent to mark the data security level; Step 102: Using the power cipher definition layer, select a power cipher that is compatible with the object level, and use the power cipher to encrypt the data to be sent to generate ciphertext; Step 103: Utilize the protocol stack layered adaptation layer to direct the ciphertext to a specific transmission channel and encapsulate the ciphertext according to the set transmission protocol to form a secure message; Step 104: Send a security message through a specific transmission channel.

[0032] This invention constructs a three-in-one security protocol stack architecture for power systems, consisting of an "information flow non-interference rule layer + power cryptography definition layer + protocol stack layered adaptation layer". During data transmission, security levels are classified based on the sending end and the data to be sent, and corresponding information flow tags are added and appropriate power cryptography is selected for encryption processing, thereby generating secure messages and ensuring the safe and stable operation of the power system.

[0033] Figure 2 This diagram illustrates the overall architecture of a power cryptography definition security protocol stack, comprising an information flow non-interference rule layer, a power cryptography definition layer, and a layered protocol stack adaptation layer. Through the collaboration of these three layers, it achieves high-security protection, business adaptation, and compliance assurance for power communications. It is suitable for security protection, communication protocol optimization, and defense strategy implementation in high-security communication scenarios within power systems. It can support power systems in resisting network attacks such as data tampering and eavesdropping, meet industry cryptography compliance requirements, and ensure the stable operation of core power grid services. The working principles of each layer will be explained in subsequent steps.

[0034] The information flow interference-free rule layer enables the mapping of power data security levels to business scenarios. This layer includes a security level classification function. The subject and object levels in step 101 above are obtained by classifying the security levels of core data and interacting subjects in the power system (i.e., the target power scenario) based on power information security level protection standards (such as relevant standards for power industry information security level protection or relevant implementation guidelines). A three-level security system—High (H), Medium (M), and Low (L)—is clearly defined. The main body is divided into three levels: H-level main body, M-level main body and L-level main body; H-level main body includes core control nodes (such as dispatch center, specifically power dispatch center server, master station and other core nodes), M-level main body includes regional control equipment (such as distribution automation terminal, new energy power station gateway and other regional control unit / regional equipment), and L-level main body includes terminal equipment (such as user smart meter, maintenance handheld terminal and other end equipment).

[0035] The objects are classified into three levels: H-level objects, M-level objects, and L-level objects. H-level objects include key data such as dispatch instructions and / or relay protection settings; M-level objects include distribution terminal status data and / or renewable energy grid-connected power data; L-level objects include electricity consumption information collection data and / or equipment operation and maintenance logs.

[0036] The information flow interference-free rule layer also establishes a "data-subject-business scenario" mapping table to clarify the data flow direction under different business scenarios. For example, when a dispatch center (H-level subject) transmits H-level dispatch instructions to a power distribution terminal (M-level subject), this mapping table provides a clear basis for the design and verification of information flow interference-free rules. For example, in step 101 above, based on the subject level of the sending end and the object level of the data to be sent, the data-subject-business scenario mapping table in the information flow interference-free rule layer can be matched to determine that the transmission of object-level data by the subject-level device belongs to a legitimate data flow direction and conforms to the interference-free rule. In the information flow interference-free rule layer, an information flow tag for marking the data security level is added to the data to be sent. The example information flow tag occupies 2 bytes.

[0037] The information flow interference-free rule layer can also realize the design and formal verification of information flow interference-free rules. This layer includes hierarchical interference-free rules and information flow tag verification functions. For example, based on the mapping result of "data-subject-business scenario," hierarchical interference-free rules for the protocol stack can be designed specifically. These interference-free rules include at least one of the following: Physical layer rules: H-class object data is transmitted through a dedicated channel, while M-class and L-class object data share the channel but their corresponding sub-bands are independent. That is, H-class data is limited to transmission through the H-class dedicated channel and must not share the transmission medium with M-class or L-class channels.

[0038] Data link layer rule: If, based on the data security level in the information flow label, it is determined that the subject level of the sender is higher than that of the receiver and there is a violation of transmission rules, the receiver will refuse to receive the data. That is, the receiver verifies the information flow label in the frame header. For example, if the security level of the sender is higher than that of the receiver, such as H-level transmitting data to L-level, the receiver will directly refuse to receive the frame.

[0039] Network layer rules: Forwarding legitimate data flows is permitted, while forwarding illegitimate data flows is prohibited. For example, routers maintain security level routing tables, allowing only data flows of the same security level or authorized higher-level flows to lower-level flows. For instance, transmission from level H to level M requires authorization from the dispatch center, and forwarding from lower-level to higher-level flows is strictly prohibited.

[0040] Transport layer and application layer rules: Access control matrices exist for subjects and data to restrict cross-level access. For example, establishing an access control matrix for subjects and data allows only subjects at the same level to read data at that level, preventing unauthorized cross-level access.

[0041] As can be seen, the aforementioned interference-free rules are rigid rules based on the core idea of ​​the interference-free information flow model, which prohibit reading downwards and writing upwards. Under these rules, H-level entities can only send data to H-level and M-level objects, and are strictly prohibited from transmitting to L-level objects; L-level entities have no right to read data from H-level and M-level objects; and M-level entities can only interact compliantly with M-level and L-level objects, thus isolating cross-security-level illegal information flows at the source. One possible approach is to use formal verification tools to verify the designed interference-free rules, ensuring that the rules are free from logical contradictions, such as deadlocks and rule conflicts, while also ensuring that the rules can meet the normal data flow transmission requirements of power services.

[0042] Furthermore, the interference-free rules are deeply embedded into each layer of the protocol stack in the information flow interference-free rule layer. By adding "information flow tags" to record the security level throughout the data transmission process, real-time rule verification is achieved during data interaction to ensure that illegal information flows are intercepted in a timely manner in the transmission link.

[0043] Power data has clearly defined security levels (e.g., dispatch instructions are "high security level," and electricity consumption statistics are "medium security level"). However, traditional protocol stacks can only achieve end-to-end encryption and cannot restrict the information flow interaction of data with different security levels. For example, a low-security-level terminal may steal high-security-level data through a bypass channel, posing a risk of information flow leakage. The application of an interference-free information flow model (which can strictly isolate information flows of different security levels) in power protocol stacks is still lacking. In this embodiment of the invention, the interference-free information flow rule layer achieves rigid isolation of power data with different security levels by embedding interference-free information flow rules and a real-time tag verification mechanism in a layered manner, completely blocking the path of low-level entities to illegally access and steal high-level data. Covering the entire business process of power dispatching, distribution automation, and new energy grid connection, it can accurately intercept cross-level information flow transmission, achieving a 100% leakage protection rate for H-level core data. It fully meets the requirements of the power industry's information security protection 2.0 in-depth defense, effectively resisting new security threats such as bypass attacks and unauthorized data access. In other words, the power information flow security protection capability is significantly improved, and the risk of cross-level leakage can be eliminated.

[0044] The information flow interference-free rule layer in this invention is based on the power data security level classification. It deeply integrates the core idea of ​​the information flow interference-free model with the layered architecture of the power protocol stack, designing a rigid rule system that "prohibits reading from below and writing to above." Real-time verification across levels and scenarios is achieved through "information flow tags," solving the core problem of insufficient information flow isolation in traditional protocol stacks. This provides rigid isolation for information flow security protection, building a solid barrier for core data. During implementation, multiple cross-level unauthorized access attempts were successfully intercepted, including access requests from county-level L-level terminals to provincial-level H-level core data and unauthorized data transmission from M-level devices to the H-level master station. The interception response was timely and accurate, with no misjudgments or omissions. H-level core data remained under strict level isolation protection throughout the entire transmission process, without any leakage, unauthorized access, or unauthorized transfer events. This fully meets the "defense-in-depth" and data classification protection requirements of the power industry's Classified Protection 2.0, fundamentally solving the security risks of uncontrolled cross-security level data interaction in the original network, and building a solid technical barrier for the transmission security of critical data such as dispatch instructions and relay protection settings.

[0045] The power cryptography definition layer, designed to meet the differentiated needs of power business scenarios, constructs an integrated cryptographic support system comprising a cryptographic algorithm pool, a key management module, and a compliance verification module. For example, the cryptographic algorithm pool integrates national cryptographic standard algorithms such as SM2, SM3, and SM4. SM2 is used for identity authentication, SM3 for data integrity verification, and SM4, as the core symmetric encryption algorithm, can dynamically call appropriate algorithms based on the security requirements, real-time requirements, and terminal computing power conditions of different power businesses. Furthermore, the key management module employs a hierarchical control mechanism, establishing a power-specific key system: H-level data encryption uses a root key, generated and managed by the provincial power dispatch center's key management system; M-level data encryption uses a regional key, generated and distributed by the municipal power company's key management system; and L-level data encryption uses a terminal key, generated by the district / county power branch's key management system and synchronized to terminal devices, achieving hierarchical key generation, transmission, and updating. For example, the compliance verification module monitors algorithm calls and key usage status in real time, conducts compliance verification against relevant standards for cryptographic applications in the power industry, ensures that specified algorithms and modes are used in scenarios such as dispatch data encryption and terminal identity authentication, and generates detailed verification logs simultaneously, providing a complete basis for cryptographic application security assessment.

[0046] In one implementation, step 102 above may include the following steps: Call the scenario-based cryptographic algorithm pool in the power cryptography definition layer to select the encryption algorithm and integrity verification algorithm for the current transmission scenario where the object data is located; The scenario key for the current transmission scenario is retrieved from the three-level key system of the power cryptography definition layer, and a session key for transmission is generated using the scenario key; In the power cryptography definition layer, encryption algorithms and session keys are used to encrypt the data to be sent to obtain ciphertext; and based on the ciphertext, an integrity verification algorithm is used to generate a verification value.

[0047] The cryptographic algorithm pool includes algorithms adapted to different transmission scenarios, meaning it's a scenario-based pool with algorithms configured to meet the needs of different security levels. For example, algorithms adapted for H-level scenarios include SM4 symmetric encryption and SM3 integrity verification. For H-level scenarios such as scheduling command transmission, SM4 symmetric encryption combined with SM3 integrity verification is used. The SM4 key length can be 128 bits, and ECB (Electronic Codebook) mode is used to ensure low-latency transmission. Algorithms adapted for M-level scenarios include SM2 asymmetric encryption and SM3 integrity verification. For M-level scenarios such as power distribution terminal authentication, SM2 asymmetric encryption combined with SM3 signature verification is used. The SM2 key length is 256 bits, suitable for terminal identity signature authentication. Algorithms adapted for L-level scenarios include a lightweight SM4 encryption algorithm. For L-level scenarios such as electricity consumption information collection, a lightweight SM4 encryption algorithm is used, simplifying the number of encryption rounds to adapt to low-computing-power terminal devices such as smart meters.

[0048] The three-tier key system is constructed based on a hierarchical key management strategy. For example, the three-tier key system includes a root key for H-level scenarios, a regional key for M-level scenarios, and a terminal key for L-level scenarios. The root key is stored in the hardware security module, and the regional keys and terminal keys are generated based on the root key. For instance, the root key, corresponding to H-level data encryption requirements, is generated by the provincial power dispatch center's key management system and stored in the hardware security module, used to generate M-level regional keys. The regional key, corresponding to M-level data encryption requirements, is generated by the municipal power company's key management system and transmitted to M-level terminals using SM2 encryption, used to generate L-level terminal keys. The terminal key, corresponding to L-level data encryption requirements, is generated by the district / county power branch's key management system and transmitted to L-level terminals using SM4 encryption, with a periodic automatic update mechanism.

[0049] The power cryptography definition layer also includes a cryptography compliance verification module, which can monitor algorithm calls in real time, conduct compliance checks against relevant guidelines for cryptography applications in the power industry, and immediately trigger an alarm and automatically switch to a compliant algorithm if violations such as calling non-SM4 algorithms occur in the dispatching scenario, while recording a complete verification log.

[0050] Traditional security protocol stacks are mostly derived from general network domains (such as TCP / IP (Transmission Control Protocol / Internet Protocol) security enhancements), and do not fully consider the characteristics of power business. For example, power dispatch instructions need to be transmitted in real time at the millisecond level, while the handshake delay of general encryption protocols (such as SSL / TLS (Secure Socket Layer / Transport Layer Security)) is often insufficient to meet the requirements. Another example is that the computing power of distribution terminals is limited, and the deployment of complex cryptographic algorithms can easily lead to terminal overload. However, the power cryptography definition layer of this invention relies on a scenario-based cryptographic algorithm pool and a hierarchical key management system to achieve a deep match between national cryptographic algorithms and the characteristics of power business. The transmission delay of dispatch instructions is controlled within 10ms, meeting the millisecond-level real-time requirements. After deploying lightweight algorithms on low-computing-power devices such as distribution terminals and smart meters, terminal overload can be avoided. All cryptographic modules strictly adhere to the cryptographic standards of the power industry. The compliance verification logs can directly support the security assessment of cryptographic applications (such as by using CAE (Computer Aided Engineering) technology) without additional adaptation or modification, reducing the cost of compliance implementation. This ensures that cryptography is accurately adapted to power business operations, balancing compliance and practicality.

[0051] This invention's power cryptography definition layer, centered on the real-time requirements of power services and the differentiated computing power needs of terminals, constructs a three-in-one cryptographic support system: a scenario-based algorithm pool, hierarchical key management, and compliance verification. This system enables dynamic adaptation of national cryptographic algorithms and hierarchical key control, overcoming the limitations of traditional cryptographic deployments that are rigid and lack compliance. It ensures compliant adaptation of cryptographic applications, balancing business efficiency with compliance requirements. Through the dynamic invocation mechanism of the scenario-based cryptographic algorithm pool, different power business scenarios obtain optimally adapted cryptographic services: the dispatch instruction transmission scenario uses a low-latency encryption scheme, fully meeting the millisecond-level real-time transmission requirements without affecting the timeliness of dispatch services; after deploying lightweight encryption algorithms on low-computing-power devices such as distribution terminals and smart meters, the operation is stable, without terminal overload or slow response issues, ensuring normal operation and maintenance of terminal devices and business continuity. All cryptographic algorithm calls in all business scenarios strictly comply with the cryptographic application standards of the power industry. The logs generated by the compliance verification module are complete and traceable, clearly recording the entire process information such as algorithm calls, key usage, and compliance verification. No additional adaptation or rectification is required, which greatly reduces the time and manpower costs of compliance implementation.

[0052] The protocol stack layered adaptation layer deeply integrates the rules for interference-free information flow and the power cryptography definition system into the five-layer architecture of the power protocol stack: physical layer, data link layer, network layer, transport layer, and application layer, achieving synergistic enhancement of security mechanisms at each layer. In one implementation, the working principle of each layer in the protocol stack layered adaptation layer is as follows: Physical layer: Based on the interference-free rule, the transmission medium is divided into secure channels. H-level data is transmitted using a dedicated optical fiber channel, while M-level and L-level data are transmitted using a shared channel. At the same time, the physical layer frame check sequence is encrypted using the SM3 algorithm to prevent frame data from being tampered with. Data Link Layer: An information flow tag field is added to the Ethernet frame header, which occupies 2 bytes to store data security level information. The receiving end first verifies the legitimacy of the tag through the interference-free rule. After the verification is passed, the frame data is encrypted using the SM4 algorithm. The encryption key is generated by the terminals at both ends of the link through negotiation. Network Layer: Based on the IPv6 (Internet Protocol Version 6) protocol, the power security option header is extended, which contains core information such as information flow level identifier and cryptographic algorithm identifier. After the router parses the option header, it controls the forwarding of data flow according to the non-interference rule, rejects the forwarding of illegal data flow across security levels, and verifies the integrity of IP (Internet Protocol) data packets through the SM3 algorithm. Transport Layer: Optimized for the characteristics of TCP (Transmission Control Protocol) and UDP (User Datagram Protocol) transport protocols in power systems. The TCP protocol is adapted to high-reliability scenarios such as dispatch command transmission, using a "pre-handshake + SM4 session encryption" mode to shorten encryption latency; the UDP protocol is adapted to real-time scenarios such as distribution terminal status reporting, using ZUC (Zu Chongzhi algorithm) stream encryption and combining it with the SM2 algorithm to achieve fast authentication of the transmission end. Application Layer: For power-specific application protocols such as IEC60870-5-104 dispatching protocol and DL / T645 meter communication protocol, a dedicated security encapsulation format is designed. Information such as interference-free rule verification results and cryptographic algorithm execution status are embedded in the application layer message header to ensure that application data is only delivered to the application layer for processing after compliance encryption and interference-free verification are completed.

[0053] In one implementation, step 103 above may include the following process: In the physical layer of the protocol stack layered adaptation layer, the ciphertext is directed to a specific transmission channel, and the ciphertext is preprocessed by physical layer frame check sequence encryption. In the data link layer of the protocol stack layered adaptation layer, an information flow tag is embedded in the Ethernet frame header and a check value is added to the Ethernet frame tail to form a ciphertext data link layer frame. In the network layer of the protocol stack layered adaptation layer, the power security option header is extended. The information flow level, the identifier of the encryption algorithm and the index of the session key are added to the power security option header to form a network layer message. In the transport layer of the protocol stack layered adaptation layer, a mark indicating that the network layer message has passed the interference-free check is added to the network layer message to form the transport layer message; In the application layer of the protocol stack layered adaptation layer, a security extension field is added to the transport layer message to form a secure message; the security extension field is used to indicate the result of passing the interference-free verification and that encryption has been completed.

[0054] In conjunction with the above implementation methods, during physical layer adaptation, channel division can be performed on power communication media such as optical fiber and 230MHz wireless private networks. H-level channels utilize a combination of optical fiber and a physical layer encryption device for dedicated transmission, while M-level and L-level channels use shared media transmission. Different sub-frequency bands are divided through frequency isolation to ensure secure channel isolation. During data link layer adaptation, a 2-byte information flow tag field is reserved in the frame header based on the IEEE 802.3 Ethernet protocol, embedding the security level information defined in step 1. Simultaneously, a 4-byte SM3 checksum is added to the frame tail. The receiving end first verifies the information flow tag and then verifies the SM3 checksum, providing double protection for data transmission security. During network layer adaptation, a power security option header can be extended based on the IPv6 protocol. This option header contains three subfields: information flow level, cryptographic algorithm identifier, and key index. The information flow level field occupies 2 bits, the cryptographic algorithm identifier field occupies 4 bits, and the key index field occupies 12 bits. After parsing this option header, the router forwards the data flow according to the rules set in step 2. During transport layer adaptation: This can include: 1) TCP protocol optimization: Negotiating the SM4 session key in advance during the three-way handshake phase reduces encryption latency during subsequent data transmission. A security flag is added to the TCP header, using one bit to indicate whether the data has passed interference-free verification; 2) UDP protocol optimization: Employing ZUC stream encryption enables real-time encryption of each data frame without waiting for the complete data packet. A 2-byte SM2 signature digest is added to the UDP header for rapid authentication of the transmitting end. During application layer adaptation: Dedicated secure encapsulation formats can be designed for power-specific application protocols such as the IEC60870-5-104 dispatch protocol and the DL / T645 meter communication protocol. Taking the IEC60870-5-104 protocol as an example, a security extension field is added after the application protocol control information field. This field contains two subfields: the result of the interference-free rule verification and the execution status of the cryptographic algorithm. The result of the interference-free rule verification is represented by 1 byte, where "00" represents compliance and "01" represents violation. The execution status of the cryptographic algorithm is represented by 1 byte, where "00" represents encryption completed and "01" represents encryption failure. The application layer only processes messages that are verified to be compliant and have been encrypted.

[0055] In some cases, protocol stack function and performance testing and verification can also be carried out: (1) Functional testing: Build a power communication simulation environment to simulate various nodes such as dispatch center, distribution terminal, and smart meter, and carry out three core verifications: First, the validity verification of the interference-free rule, send H-level dispatch instructions to L-level smart meters and check whether the data link layer can refuse to receive; Second, the cryptographic compliance verification, forcibly call non-national cryptographic algorithms and check whether the compliance verification module triggers an alarm and automatically switches to the compliant algorithm; Third, the layered collaboration verification, simulate physical layer channel failure and check whether the system can automatically switch H-level data to the backup H-level channel and keep the data encryption state unchanged. (2) Performance testing: For different power business scenarios, test the key performance indicators of the protocol stack, including the delay of scenarios such as dispatch instruction transmission, the throughput of scenarios such as distribution terminal data upload, and the computing power occupation of terminal devices such as smart meters, to ensure that various performance indicators meet the requirements of power business operation.

[0056] Currently, the "Implementation Guidelines for Cryptographic Application and Security Assessment in the Power Industry" requires that cryptographic algorithms in the power system comply with the SM series of national cryptographic standards. However, existing protocol stack cryptographic modules are mostly "fixed and integrated," unable to flexibly switch algorithms according to different power scenarios (such as using SM4 symmetric encryption for dispatch networks and SM2 asymmetric encryption for new energy grid connection authentication). Furthermore, the lack of cryptographic algorithm validity verification mechanisms makes it difficult to meet the requirements of the power industry's Cybersecurity Classified Protection 2.0 and Cryptographic Application Security Assessment (CAE). Traditional power security protocols are mostly optimized for a single protocol layer (such as physical layer anti-eavesdropping and application layer data encryption), with each layer's security mechanism operating independently—for example, data already encrypted at the data link layer is repeatedly encrypted at the transport layer, leading to resource waste. Also, the network layer does not mark data security levels, preventing the application layer from taking targeted protective measures, resulting in "protection redundancy" or "protection blind spots." In contrast, the protocol stack layered adaptation layer of this invention adopts a loosely coupled "rule-cryptography-protocol" design. Uninterrupted rules can be flexibly added or removed according to the power business security level, and the cryptographic algorithm pool supports smooth access to newly added national cryptographic algorithms without modifying the core architecture of the protocol stack. For emerging business scenarios such as power generation, grid, load, and storage; virtual power plants; and distributed power distribution, protocol stack adaptation can be quickly completed simply by updating the scenario mapping table and adapting algorithm parameters, without the need for large-scale reconstruction. Simultaneously, the architecture is compatible with existing power communication protocols (such as IEC60870-5-104 and DL / T645) and terminal equipment, and can be directly embedded into existing power communication networks without replacing hardware or modifying the underlying network. This significantly reduces the difficulty of system upgrades and long-term operation and maintenance. In other words, the protocol stack security architecture is flexible and compatible, adaptable to the expansion of new business in the power system.

[0057] The "information flow non-interference rule layer + power cryptography definition layer + protocol stack layered adaptation layer" three-in-one architecture of this invention deeply embeds security rules and cryptographic technology from the physical layer to the application layer, realizing the coordinated linkage of security mechanisms at each layer, eliminating protection redundancy and blind spots, improving the overall security protection efficiency and business adaptability of the protocol stack, and enabling layered collaborative protection to optimize resource utilization and improve system operation stability and adaptability. Through coordinated linkage, the security mechanisms at each layer of the protocol stack effectively eliminate the redundancy problems existing in traditional security protection: after data is encrypted at a certain layer, other layers only need to verify or mark it as needed, without repeating the encryption operation, significantly improving network bandwidth utilization and data transmission efficiency, and making the message processing flow simpler and more efficient. At the same time, the layered collaborative mechanism gives the system strong fault self-healing capabilities. When abnormalities occur in the physical layer dedicated channel, cryptographic algorithm calls, etc., the system can automatically trigger backup plans and quickly switch to security redundancy resources to ensure uninterrupted data transmission and no loss of encryption state, greatly improving the operational stability and anti-interference capability of the entire communication system. Furthermore, the protocol stack adopts a loosely coupled architecture design, fully compatible with mainstream application protocols such as IEC60870-5-104 and DL / T645 in existing power communication networks, as well as various terminal devices. Deployment can be completed solely through software upgrades and parameter configurations, without requiring hardware replacement or modifications to the basic network architecture. For emerging power business scenarios such as source-grid-load-storage interaction and virtual power plants, only updating the data security level mapping table and cryptographic algorithm adaptation parameters is needed to quickly adapt the protocol stack to these scenarios, eliminating the need for large-scale architecture reconstruction. This significantly reduces the difficulty of system upgrades, iterations, and long-term operation and maintenance, demonstrating excellent technical scalability and engineering promotion value.

[0058] It is evident that traditional research attempts to integrate national cryptographic algorithms into power protocols, but fails to combine this with an interference-free information flow model to achieve a collaborative design of "information flow-cryptography-business". Furthermore, while the interference-free information flow model has applications in operating systems and database security, it lacks adaptation rules for the layered architecture of the power protocol stack (physical layer, data link layer, network layer, transport layer, and application layer), thus failing to address core issues such as "balancing real-time performance and security" and "matching business characteristics with cryptographic compliance" in power scenarios. Therefore, the security protocol stack proposed in this invention, specifically designed for power systems and integrating an interference-free information flow model with flexible cryptographic definitions, possesses a full-link security protection system of "information flow control-cryptographic adaptation-layered collaboration". This addresses the problems of insufficient information flow isolation, rigid cryptographic adaptation, and lack of layered collaboration in traditional power security protocol stacks, achieving a technological breakthrough from general security enhancement to power-specific security customization. Specifically, in this embodiment of the invention, firstly, an interference-free rule system for power scenario-based information flow is constructed. This system fully leverages the strict isolation advantage of the interference-free model for data streams of different security levels, breaking through the limitations of traditional protocol stacks that can only achieve end-to-end encryption. It enables precise information flow control of power data across levels and scenarios, eliminating the security risks of "low-level entities stealing high-level data." Secondly, a dynamic cryptographic definition system adapted to the characteristics of power business is established. This system integrates professional elements such as national cryptographic standards requirements, power terminal computing power constraints, and real-time business requirements into the entire cryptographic deployment process, ensuring cryptographic security through scenario-based algorithm pools and hierarchical key management. The application's compliance and flexibility avoid terminal overload or insufficient real-time performance issues caused by incompatibility between cryptographic algorithms and power business; thirdly, it achieves deep integration of interference-free information flow control and power cryptographic definition, which can adapt to the high-complexity communication characteristics of the new power system after digital and intelligent transformation. While improving the overall security protection capability of the protocol stack, it provides "security-compliance-real-time" three-in-one communication support for core scenarios such as power dispatching, distribution automation, and new energy grid connection, promoting the upgrade of power system communication security from "general adaptation" to "customization", and effectively filling the technical gap in the precise construction of high-security protocol stacks in the power field.

[0059] Example 2: Based on the same inventive concept, this invention also provides a method flow for implementing a power cryptography definition protocol stack based on interference-free information flow, such as... Figure 3 As shown, it includes: Step 301: Based on the receiving end, extract the ciphertext from the received secure message using the protocol stack layered adaptation layer; Step 302: Using the power cryptography definition layer, based on the ciphertext-adapted session key, decrypt and restore the ciphertext to obtain the plaintext; Step 303: Using the information flow non-interference rule layer, remove the information flow tags from the plaintext to obtain the final plaintext data.

[0060] In one implementation, step 301 above may include the following steps: Based on the receiving end, the physical layer of the protocol stack layered adaptation layer is used to decrypt the received security message using the frame verification sequence to obtain the physical layer decrypted message; In the data link layer of the protocol stack layered adaptation layer, the information flow tag is extracted from the physical layer decryption message. Based on the information flow tag, the interference-free verification has been passed, and the integrity verification of the check value in the physical layer decryption message is performed. After the verification is passed, the Ethernet frame header and Ethernet frame trailer in the physical layer decryption message are stripped to obtain the data link layer decryption message. In the network layer of the protocol stack layered adaptation layer, the power security option header in the data link layer decryption message is parsed to obtain option header information including the information flow level, the identifier of the encryption algorithm, and the index of the session key; the option header information is verified, and after the verification is successful, the network layer message is obtained. In the transport layer of the protocol stack layered adaptation layer, after reading the tag that has passed the interference-free verification, the session key is called to obtain the transport layer message; In the application layer of the protocol stack layered adaptation layer, the security extension field is parsed to determine that the transport layer message is a compliant and secure message; the security extension field of the transport layer message is stripped to obtain the ciphertext.

[0061] In one implementation, step 302 above may include the following steps: In the power cryptography definition layer, the session key is invoked to decrypt and restore the ciphertext, thus obtaining the plaintext; Perform an integrity check on the encrypted text to obtain the integrity check result.

[0062] In one implementation, step 303 above may include the following steps: By utilizing the data-subject-business scenario mapping table in the information flow non-interference rule layer, it is verified that the ciphertext belongs to the legitimate data flow direction and conforms to the interference rules; Remove the information flow tags from the plaintext to obtain the final plaintext data.

[0063] For a description of the security protocol stack for defining power cryptography, please refer to the above embodiments; similar points will not be repeated here.

[0064] The following sections describe the specific construction process of the power cryptography definition security protocol stack and the implementation process of the power cryptography definition protocol stack based on non-interference information flow to illustrate the embodiments of the present invention.

[0065] First, a specific process for constructing a secure protocol stack for power cryptography is proposed: To verify the effectiveness and practicality of the power cryptography security protocol stack construction process conforming to the information flow non-interference model in the core scenarios of the power system, "deployment of a secure protocol stack for a provincial power dispatching data network" is selected as the best embodiment, and the specific deployment process is described in detail. Combining the actual network architecture, business requirements, and security standards of a provincial power dispatching center, the application process, configuration parameters, and implementation effects of the method are explained in detail, highlighting the technical advantages of this invention in information flow isolation, cryptographic compliance adaptation, and layered collaborative protection.

[0066] 1.1 Overview of Implementation Scenarios The provincial-municipal-county three-tiered dispatch data network under the jurisdiction of a provincial power dispatch center was selected as the application object. This network covers one provincial master station, 14 municipal branch centers, and 92 county-level distribution terminals, carrying core businesses such as dispatch command issuance, relay protection setting transmission, distribution terminal status reporting, and electricity consumption information collection. Among them, dispatch commands and relay protection settings are H-level core data, which need to be transmitted in real time at the millisecond level and absolutely confidential; distribution terminal status data and renewable energy grid-connected power data are M-level data, which require reliable transmission and meet regional security control requirements; electricity consumption information collection data and equipment operation and maintenance logs are L-level data, which need to ensure basic transmission security.

[0067] The current dispatch data network suffers from three major pain points: First, cross-level data transmission lacks effective isolation, posing a risk of county-level L-level terminals accessing provincial-level H-level data; second, cryptographic algorithms are rigidly deployed, with dispatch command transmission and terminal authentication using the same encryption algorithm, failing to meet the real-time and security requirements of the business; and third, security mechanisms at each layer operate independently, with redundant encryption at the data link and transport layers leading to bandwidth waste, and the lack of data security level marking at the network layer resulting in blind application-layer protection. This embodiment addresses these pain points by constructing the security protocol stack described in this invention, meeting the Level 3 requirements of the power industry's Information Security Protection Scheme 2.0 and the Cryptographic Application Security Assessment (CAE) compliance standard.

[0068] 1.1.1 Implementation Preparation and Parameter Configuration (1) Power data security level mapping and rule preset Based on the "Implementation Guidelines for Power Information Security Level Protection", the security level classification and scenario mapping of data and subjects were completed: Data objects: H-level (dispatch instructions, relay protection settings), M-level (distribution terminal status data, new energy grid-connected power data), L-level (electricity consumption information collection data, equipment operation and maintenance logs); Main components: H-level (provincial dispatch center main station server, core switch), M-level (municipal branch center server, regional router), L-level (county-level power distribution terminal, smart meter, maintenance handheld terminal); Scenario Mapping Table: Clearly defines 6 types of legitimate data flow directions, including "Provincial H-level main station → Municipal M-level branch center (transmitting H-level scheduling instructions)" and "Municipal M-level branch center → County L-level terminal (transmitting M-level status query instructions)," and prohibits 4 types of illegal flow directions, including "County L-level terminal → Provincial H-level main station (requesting H-level data)" and "Provincial H-level main station → County L-level terminal (directly transmitting H-level data)."

[0069] Based on the mapping results, a hierarchical, interference-free rule is preset: physical layer H-level data is transmitted through a dedicated fiber optic channel, while M / L-level data shares a fiber optic channel but is divided into independent sub-frequency bands; the data link layer receiver verifies the information flow label and rejects illegal transmissions from higher to lower levels; the network layer router only forwards legitimate data flows and prohibits forwarding of data from lower to higher levels; the transport layer and application layer restrict cross-level access based on the access control matrix.

[0070] (2) Configuration of power cryptography definition system Establish a scenario-based cryptographic algorithm pool and define the appropriate algorithms for each level of scenario: H-level scenarios: Scheduling command transmission uses SM4 symmetric encryption (ECB mode, key length 128 bits) + SM3 integrity verification to ensure low latency and high security; M-level scenario: The power distribution terminal identity authentication adopts SM2 asymmetric encryption (key length 256 bits) + SM3 signature verification, which takes into account both identity uniqueness and transmission reliability. Level L scenario: Electricity information collection adopts lightweight SM4 encryption (simplifying the number of encryption rounds to 8 rounds), which is suitable for terminals with low computing power.

[0071] Design a hierarchical key management system: Root key (H level): Generated by the provincial power dispatch center KMS (Key Management Service), stored in HSM (Hardware Security Module), and updated quarterly; Regional Key (Level M): Generated by KMS of 14 municipal power companies, transmitted to municipal branch center equipment via SM2 encryption, and updated monthly; Terminal key (Level L): Generated by KMS of 92 county-level power sub-bureaus, transmitted to county-level distribution terminals and smart meters through SM4 encryption, and automatically updated every half month.

[0072] Deploy a password compliance verification module with preset verification rules: scheduling command transmission must use the SM4 algorithm, terminal authentication must use the SM2 algorithm, and an alarm will be triggered immediately and the system will automatically switch to the compliant algorithm when a violation occurs. At the same time, logs will be recorded for CAE assessment and query.

[0073] (3) Protocol stack layering adaptation parameter settings Physical layer: The H-level dedicated data channel uses single-mode fiber (transmission rate 10Gbps) and deploys a physical layer encryption machine; the M / L-level data sharing channel uses multimode fiber and divides the M-level (1310nm band) and L-level (1550nm band) sub-bands through wavelength division multiplexing technology. Data link layer: Reserve a 2-byte information flow tag field in the Ethernet frame header, with H-level identifier "11", M-level identifier "10" and L-level identifier "01", and add a 4-byte SM3 checksum value to the frame tail; Network layer: Based on the IPv6 protocol, the power security option header (OptionType=0xEE) is extended, which includes a 2-bit information flow level, a 4-bit cryptographic algorithm identifier ("0001" represents SM4, "0010" represents SM2, and "0011" represents lightweight SM4), and a 12-bit key index; Transport Layer: The TCP protocol is used for H-level scheduling instruction transmission. During the pre-handshake phase, the SM4 session key is negotiated, and a 1-bit security flag ("1" indicates that the interference-free verification has been passed) is added to the TCP header. The UDP protocol is used for M / L-level data transmission. The M-level uses SM4 encryption, and the L-level uses ZUC stream encryption. A 2-byte SM2 signature digest is added to the UDP header. Application layer: For the IEC60870-5-104 scheduling protocol, add a 2-byte security extension field after the APCI field. The first byte is the interference-free verification result ("00" compliant, "01" non-compliant), and the second byte is the password execution status ("00" completed, "01" failed).

[0074] 1.1.2 Specific Implementation Process (1) Protocol stack layered adaptation and integrated deployment Physical layer adaptation: Channel division is performed on the provincial-municipal-county level transmission optical fibers. The H-level data dedicated optical fiber deployment from the provincial main station to the municipal branch center is completed. The band division and isolation configuration of the M / L level shared optical fiber are in place. The physical layer encryption machine is connected to the dedicated channel and the SM3 frame verification encryption function is enabled. Data link layer adaptation: Configure information flow label addition and verification functions in switches at all levels, embed preset security level identification rules, and complete the deployment of SM4 encryption algorithm and configuration of key negotiation mechanism at both ends of the link; Network layer adaptation: Extend the IPv6 power security option header resolution function in core routers and area routers, import the security level routing table, configure forwarding control logic based on non-interference rules, and enable SM3 packet integrity verification; Transport layer adaptation: Optimize the TCP / UDP protocol of the scheduling data network, complete the deployment of the pre-handshake key negotiation module and ZUC stream encryption module, and add security flag bits and SM2 signature digest processing functions to the transport layer protocol stack; Application layer adaptation: Security encapsulation and modification of application protocols such as IEC60870-5-104 and DL / T645 are performed, and a security extension field processing module is embedded to ensure that only verified and encrypted messages are received.

[0075] (2) Integration of rules and cryptographic system Interference-free rule verification: Sending H-level scheduling instructions from the provincial master station to the county-level L-level terminal, the data link layer directly rejects the transmission after detecting label mismatch, verifying the effectiveness of intercepting illegal information flow; Simulating the city-level M-level branch center requesting L-level operation and maintenance logs from the provincial H-level master station, the network layer allows the transmission based on the routing table, verifying the logic of allowing legal cross-level flow. Cryptographic system integration testing: When a scheduling instruction transmission scenario is triggered, the algorithm pool automatically calls SM4 encryption + SM3 verification to test the transmission delay; when a power distribution terminal authentication scenario is triggered, the SM2 algorithm is automatically called to complete the signature and verification, and the terminal computing power usage is checked; when the AES algorithm is forcibly called to replace SM4, the compliance verification module immediately triggers an audible and visual alarm and switches to SM4 to check the integrity of the log records. Layered coordination test: Monitor the data transmission process to confirm that after the data link layer is encrypted, the transport layer does not encrypt again, and only verifies the security flag bit; simulate physical layer H-level channel failure, the system automatically switches to the backup H-level channel, and the encryption state is maintained without data loss.

[0076] (3) System trial operation and optimization The pilot network, consisting of a provincial main station, one municipal branch center, and three county-level terminals, underwent a 30-day trial run, with real-time monitoring of key indicators: dispatch command transmission delay, terminal computing power utilization, bandwidth utilization, number of intercepted illegal information flows, and password compliance rate. To address the issue of "brief connection interruptions during county-level terminal key updates" discovered during the trial run, the key update mechanism was optimized to "silent background update + breakpoint resumption." To address the "network layer routing resolution delay" issue, the power security option header parsing algorithm was optimized to improve forwarding efficiency.

[0077] First, a specific data transmission process of the power cryptographic definition security protocol stack is proposed: taking the typical scenario of transmitting H-level dispatch instructions from the provincial dispatch center H-level master station (sender) to the municipal M-level branch center (receiver) as an example, the dynamic interaction logic of the security protocol is explained in conjunction with the overall architecture diagram of the power cryptographic definition security protocol stack.

[0078] I. Processing Actions of the Sending End (Provincial Dispatch Center H-level Master Station) The sending end itself is an H-level subject, and the scheduling instruction to be transmitted is an H-level data object. It needs to complete the processing actions corresponding to the three-layer architecture in sequence, and finally generate a compliant and secure message and send it: (1) Information flow non-interference rule layer processing ① The sending end first matches the "data-subject-business scenario" mapping table to confirm that the transmission of H-level scheduling instructions from its own H-level subject to the municipal M-level sub-center (M-level subject) is a legitimate data flow direction (transmission from a high-level subject to a medium-level subject authorized by the scheduling center), which complies with the core rule of "prohibiting downward reading and prohibiting upward writing" to avoid interference. ② Add a 2-byte information flow tag to the scheduling instruction data. The tag field is written with the "H level" identifier (binary "11") according to the preset rules to complete the explicit marking of the data security level.

[0079] (2) Power cryptography definition layer processing ① Call the appropriate algorithm from the scenario-based cryptographic algorithm pool, and automatically select the SM4 symmetric encryption algorithm (ECB mode, 128-bit key) and the SM3 integrity verification algorithm for the H-level scheduling instruction transmission scenario; ② Retrieve the H-level root key from the hardware security module of the provincial key management system, and generate the SM4 session key for this transmission using the root key; ③ First, the SM4 algorithm is used to encrypt the plaintext of the scheduling instruction, and then the SM3 algorithm is executed on the encrypted ciphertext to generate a 4-byte check value; ④ The compliance verification module verifies the algorithm call status in real time, confirms that the SM4 / SM3 called this time is a national cryptographic compliant algorithm, generates an algorithm call log and saves it locally, and completes the cryptographic layer processing.

[0080] (3) Protocol stack layer adaptation layer processing ①Physical layer: The transmitting end directs the data to the H-level dedicated optical fiber channel, activates the physical layer encryption machine, and performs physical layer frame check sequence encryption preprocessing on the data; ② Data Link Layer: Based on the IEEE 802.3 protocol, a generated 2-byte information flow tag is embedded in the Ethernet frame header, and a 4-byte SM3 check value is appended to the frame tail to form a complete data link layer frame structure; ③ Network Layer: Based on the IPv6 protocol, extend the power security option header, fill in the option header with 2 bits of information flow level (H level), 4 bits of cryptographic algorithm identifier (SM4 corresponds to "0001"), and 12 bits of root key index to complete the network layer message encapsulation; ④ Transport Layer: Because the scheduling instructions need to be transmitted with high reliability, the optimized TCP protocol is adopted. The SM4 session key has been negotiated with the receiving end during the pre-handshake phase. One security flag bit is set to "1" in the TCP header (indicating that the interference-free check has been passed) to complete the transport layer encapsulation. ⑤ Application Layer: For the IEC60870-5-104 scheduling protocol, add a 2-byte security extension field after the APCI field. The first byte, the interference-free verification result, is set to "00" (compliant), and the second byte, the password execution status, is set to "00" (encryption complete), forming the final application layer security message; ⑥ After the sending end completes message encapsulation according to the protocol stack layer, it sends the security message to the municipal M-level branch center through the H-level dedicated optical fiber channel.

[0081] II. Processing Actions at the Receiving End (City-Level M-Level Sub-Center) After receiving the message, the receiving end performs verification and parsing in reverse order according to the protocol stack layers, and finally obtains the valid scheduling instruction data. The specific actions are as follows: (1) Protocol stack layering and adaptation layer processing ①Physical layer: The receiving end receives the message through the H-level dedicated channel, first uses the physical layer decryption mechanism to complete the frame check sequence decryption, confirms that there is no abnormality in the physical layer transmission medium and that the data has not been tampered with, and then pushes the message to the data link layer. ② Data Link Layer: First, extract the 2-byte information stream tag from the frame header, verify that the tag is identified as "H level", and confirm that the M-level subject has the authority to receive H-level data (authorized cross-level reception); then verify the SM3 checksum of the frame tail to confirm that there has been no tampering during the data link layer transmission. After the verification is passed, remove the redundant fields from the frame header and frame tail, and push the message to the network layer. ③ Network Layer: Parse the IPv6 power security option header, extract the information flow level, algorithm identifier, and key index information, confirm that the information flow level is H and the algorithm is a compliant SM4 algorithm, and then match the local key index to confirm the validity of the root key. After the verification is passed, it enters the transport layer for processing. ④ Transport layer: Reads the TCP header security flag bit as "1" to confirm that the data has passed the interference-free verification, then calls the pre-negotiated SM4 session key to prepare for subsequent application layer decryption, and pushes the packet to the application layer after completing the transport layer verification. ⑤ Application Layer: Parse the security extension field of the IEC60870-5-104 protocol, confirm that the interference-free verification result is "00" and the password execution status is "00", determine that the message is a compliant and secure message, and extract the application layer ciphertext data after stripping the security extension field.

[0082] (3) Power cryptography definition layer processing ① The receiving end calls the locally stored SM4 session key to decrypt the application layer ciphertext and restore the plaintext of the scheduling command; ② Perform SM3 integrity check again, compare the check value generated by the sending end with the check value calculated locally, and confirm that the data has not been tampered with throughout the transmission process; ③ The compliance verification module synchronously verifies the compliance of the decryption algorithm, retains decryption logs, and completes reverse processing of the cryptographic layer.

[0083] (3) Information flow non-interference rule layer processing ① The receiving end re-verifies its own M-level subject and H-level data object interaction permissions, matches the "data-subject-business scenario" mapping table, and confirms that this receiving behavior complies with the no-interference rule; ② After verification, remove security tags such as information flow labels from the data, and push the final scheduling instruction in plaintext to the municipal branch center's business system to complete the entire receiving process.

[0084] Based on the two specific processes described above, this embodiment of the invention, in accordance with the power industry security level protection standards, classifies power data and interaction subjects into three security levels and establishes a "data-subject-business scenario" mapping table; designs layered, interference-free rules covering the physical layer, data link layer, network layer, transport layer, and application layer, ensuring the logical consistency of the rules through formal verification tools, and allowing the rules to be flexibly expanded according to business changes; it also builds a scenario-based cryptographic algorithm pool including national cryptographic algorithms such as SM2, SM3, and SM4, dynamically calling and adapting algorithms for different security level scenarios; designs a three-level key management strategy of "root key-regional key-terminal key" to achieve hierarchical generation, transmission, and periodic updates of keys; and develops a cryptographic compliance verification module to monitor the compliance of algorithm calls in real time and generate traceable logs, meeting the security assessment requirements for cryptographic applications in the power industry. Furthermore, based on a layered, interference-free rule and dynamic cryptographic definition system, the five-layer architecture of the power protocol stack is adapted and modified—the physical layer divides secure channels, the data link layer adds information flow tags and encryption, the network layer expands power security option headers, the transport layer optimizes the TCP / UDP protocol encryption mechanism, and the application layer designs a dedicated secure encapsulation format, achieving deep integration of "rules-cryptography-protocols." This includes an interference-free information flow rule layer, a power cryptographic definition layer, and a layered protocol stack adaptation layer. The interference-free information flow rule layer is responsible for cross-level information flow isolation and real-time verification; the power cryptographic definition layer provides compliant and flexible cryptographic services; and the layered protocol stack adaptation layer achieves collaborative integration between the first two layers and the power protocol stack, adapting to the secure communication needs of core scenarios such as power dispatching, distribution automation, and new energy grid connection.

[0085] Example 3: Based on the same inventive concept, this invention also provides a power cryptography definition protocol stack implementation system based on interference-free information flow, as shown in the schematic diagram below. Figure 4 As shown, it includes: The layer processing module is used to add information flow tags to the data to be sent to mark the data security level based on the subject level of the sender and the object level of the data to be sent, using the information flow non-interference rule layer; using the power cipher definition layer, it selects the power cipher that matches the object level and uses the power cipher to encrypt the data to be sent to generate ciphertext; using the protocol stack layered adaptation layer, it directs the ciphertext to a specific transmission channel and encapsulates the ciphertext according to the set transmission protocol to form a secure message. The sending module is used to send secure messages through a specific transmission channel.

[0086] In one specific implementation, the subject level and object level are obtained by classifying the core data and interactive subjects in the power system according to the power information security level protection standard. The main body is classified into three levels: H-level main body, M-level main body and L-level main body; H-level main body includes core control nodes, M-level main body includes regional control equipment, and L-level main body includes terminal equipment. Objects are classified into H-level objects, M-level objects, and L-level objects; H-level objects include dispatch instructions and / or relay protection settings; M-level objects include distribution terminal status data and / or renewable energy grid-connected power data; L-level objects include electricity consumption information collection data and / or equipment operation and maintenance logs.

[0087] In one specific implementation, the layer processing module is specifically used for: Based on the subject level of the sending end and the object level of the data to be sent, the data-subject-business scenario mapping table in the information flow non-interference rule layer is matched to determine that the data transmitted by the device at the subject level belongs to the legitimate data flow direction and conforms to the non-interference rule. In the non-interference rule layer of the information flow, add information flow tags to the data to be sent to mark the data security level; The information flow tag occupies 2 bytes.

[0088] In one specific implementation, the interference-free rule includes at least one of the following: Physical layer rules: H-class objects use dedicated channels for data transmission, while M-class and L-class objects share channels but their corresponding sub-bands are independent; Data link layer rule: If, based on the data security level in the information flow label, it is determined that the subject level of the sending end is higher than that of the receiving end and there is illegal transmission, then the receiving end refuses to receive the data. Network layer rules: Allow forwarding of legitimate data flows, prohibit forwarding of illegitimate data flows; Transport layer and application layer rules: There are access control matrices for subjects and data, used to restrict cross-level access.

[0089] In one specific implementation, the layer processing module is specifically used for: Call the scenario-based cryptographic algorithm pool in the power cryptography definition layer to select the encryption algorithm and integrity verification algorithm for the current transmission scenario where the object data is located; The scenario key for the current transmission scenario is retrieved from the three-level key system of the power cryptography definition layer, and a session key for transmission is generated using the scenario key; In the power cryptography definition layer, encryption algorithms and session keys are used to encrypt the data to be sent to obtain ciphertext; and based on the ciphertext, an integrity verification algorithm is used to generate a verification value.

[0090] In one specific implementation, the cryptographic algorithm pool includes algorithms adapted to different transmission scenarios; among them, the algorithms adapted to H-level scenarios include the SM4 symmetric encryption algorithm and the SM3 integrity verification algorithm; the algorithms adapted to M-level scenarios include the SM2 asymmetric encryption algorithm and the SM3 integrity verification algorithm; and the algorithms adapted to L-level scenarios include the lightweight SM4 encryption algorithm. The three-level key system includes a root key for H-level scenarios, a regional key for M-level scenarios, and a terminal key for L-level scenarios. The root key is stored in the hardware security module, the regional key is generated based on the root key, and the terminal key is generated based on the regional key.

[0091] In one specific implementation, the layer processing module is specifically used for: In the physical layer of the protocol stack layered adaptation layer, the ciphertext is directed to a specific transmission channel, and the ciphertext is preprocessed by physical layer frame check sequence encryption. In the data link layer of the protocol stack layered adaptation layer, an information flow tag is embedded in the Ethernet frame header and a check value is added to the Ethernet frame tail to form a ciphertext data link layer frame. In the network layer of the protocol stack layered adaptation layer, the power security option header is extended. The information flow level, the identifier of the encryption algorithm and the index of the session key are added to the power security option header to form a network layer message. In the transport layer of the protocol stack layered adaptation layer, a mark indicating that the network layer message has passed the interference-free check is added to the network layer message to form the transport layer message; In the application layer of the protocol stack layered adaptation layer, a security extension field is added to the transport layer message to form a secure message; the security extension field is used to indicate the result of passing the interference-free verification and that encryption has been completed.

[0092] Example 4: Based on the same inventive concept, this invention also provides a power cryptography definition protocol stack implementation system based on interference-free information flow, as shown in the schematic diagram below. Figure 5 As shown, it includes: The receiving module is used to receive security messages; The layer processing module is used to extract ciphertext from secure messages based on the receiving end using the protocol stack layer adaptation layer; decrypt and restore the ciphertext to obtain plaintext using the power cryptography definition layer based on the session key adapted to the ciphertext; and remove information flow tags from the plaintext using the information flow non-interference rule layer to obtain the final plaintext data.

[0093] In one specific implementation, the layer processing module is specifically used for: Based on the receiving end, the physical layer of the protocol stack layered adaptation layer is used to decrypt the received security message using the frame verification sequence to obtain the physical layer decrypted message; In the data link layer of the protocol stack layered adaptation layer, the information flow tag is extracted from the physical layer decryption message. Based on the information flow tag, the interference-free verification has been passed, and the integrity verification of the check value in the physical layer decryption message is performed. After the verification is passed, the Ethernet frame header and Ethernet frame trailer in the physical layer decryption message are stripped to obtain the data link layer decryption message. In the network layer of the protocol stack layered adaptation layer, the power security option header in the data link layer decryption message is parsed to obtain option header information including the information flow level, the identifier of the encryption algorithm, and the index of the session key; the option header information is verified, and after the verification is successful, the network layer message is obtained. In the transport layer of the protocol stack layered adaptation layer, after reading the tag that has passed the interference-free verification, the session key is called to obtain the transport layer message; In the application layer of the protocol stack layered adaptation layer, the security extension field is parsed to determine that the transport layer message is a compliant and secure message; the security extension field of the transport layer message is stripped to obtain the ciphertext.

[0094] In one specific implementation, the layer processing module is specifically used for: In the power cryptography definition layer, the session key is invoked to decrypt and restore the ciphertext, thus obtaining the plaintext; Perform an integrity check on the encrypted text to obtain the integrity check result.

[0095] In one specific implementation, the layer processing module is specifically used for: By utilizing the data-subject-business scenario mapping table in the information flow non-interference rule layer, it is verified that the ciphertext belongs to the legitimate data flow direction and conforms to the interference rules; Remove the information flow tags from the plaintext to obtain the final plaintext data.

[0096] Example 5: like Figure 6As shown, the present invention also provides an electronic device, which may be a computer device, a microcontroller device, a smart mobile device, etc. The electronic device in this embodiment may include a processor, a memory, a transceiver component, etc. The memory, processor, and transceiver component are connected via a bus; the memory can be used to store executable programs, and an exemplary executable program may include instructions; the processor is used to execute the instructions stored in the memory. The memory can also be used to store data, which can be accessed and / or modified when instructions are executed.

[0097] The processor may be a Central Processing Unit (CPU), or it may be other general-purpose processors, digital signal processors (DSPs), application-specific integrated circuits (ASICs), field-programmable gate arrays (FPGAs), or other programmable logic devices, discrete gate or transistor logic devices, discrete hardware components, etc. It is the computing and control core of the terminal, and it is suitable for implementing one or more instructions. Specifically, it is suitable for loading and executing one or more instructions in the storage medium to implement the corresponding method flow or corresponding function, so as to realize the steps of the power cryptography definition protocol stack implementation method based on information flow non-interference in the above embodiments.

[0098] Example 6: Based on the same inventive concept, this invention also provides a readable storage medium, specifically an electronic device readable storage medium (Memory). This readable storage medium is a memory device within an electronic device used to store programs and data. It is understood that the storage medium here can include both built-in storage media within the electronic device and extended storage media supported by the electronic device. The storage medium provides storage space, which stores the terminal's operating system. Furthermore, this storage space also stores one or more instructions suitable for loading and execution by a processor. These instructions can be one or more executable programs (including program code). It should be noted that the storage medium here can be high-speed RAM or non-volatile memory, such as at least one disk storage device. Loading and executing one or more instructions stored in the storage medium by the processor can implement the steps of the above-described method for implementing a power cryptography definition protocol stack based on interference-free information flow.

[0099] Those skilled in the art will understand that embodiments of the present invention can be provided as methods, systems, or computer program products. Therefore, the present invention can take the form of a completely hardware embodiment, a completely software embodiment, or an embodiment combining software and hardware aspects. Furthermore, the present invention can take the form of a computer program product embodied on one or more computer-usable storage media (including, but not limited to, disk storage, CD-ROM, optical storage, etc.) containing computer-usable program code.

[0100] This invention is described with reference to flowchart illustrations and / or block diagrams of methods, apparatus (systems), and computer program products according to embodiments of the invention. It will be understood that each block of the flowchart illustrations and / or block diagrams, and combinations of blocks in the flowchart illustrations and / or block diagrams, can be implemented by computer program instructions. These computer program instructions can be provided to a processor of a general-purpose computer, special-purpose computer, embedded processor, or other programmable data processing apparatus to produce a machine, such that the instructions, which execute via the processor of the computer or other programmable data processing apparatus, generate instructions for implementing the flowchart illustrations and / or block diagrams. Figure 1 One or more processes and / or boxes Figure 1 A device that provides the functions specified in one or more boxes.

[0101] These computer program instructions may also be stored in a computer-readable storage medium that can direct a computer or other programmable data processing device to function in a particular manner, such that the instructions stored in the computer-readable storage medium produce an article of manufacture including instruction means, which are implemented in a process Figure 1 One or more processes and / or boxes Figure 1 The function specified in one or more boxes.

[0102] These computer program instructions may also be loaded onto a computer or other programmable data processing equipment to cause a series of operational steps to be performed on the computer or other programmable equipment to produce a computer-implemented process, thereby providing instructions that execute on the computer or other programmable equipment for implementing the process. Figure 1 One or more processes and / or boxes Figure 1 The steps of the function specified in one or more boxes.

[0103] Finally, it should be noted that the above embodiments are only used to illustrate the technical solutions of the present invention and not to limit its scope of protection. Although the present invention has been described in detail with reference to the above embodiments, those skilled in the art should understand that after reading the present invention, they can still make various changes, modifications or equivalent substitutions to the specific implementation methods of the application, but these changes, modifications or equivalent substitutions are all within the scope of protection of the claims pending approval.

Claims

1. A method for implementing a power cryptography definition protocol stack based on interference-free information flow, characterized in that, include: Based on the subject level of the sending end and the object level of the data to be sent, an information flow tag for marking the data security level is added to the data to be sent using the information flow non-interference rule layer; Using the power cipher definition layer, a power cipher that is compatible with the object level is selected, and the power cipher is used to encrypt the data to be sent to generate ciphertext; By utilizing the protocol stack layered adaptation layer, the ciphertext is directed to a specific transmission channel, and the ciphertext is encapsulated according to the set transmission protocol to form a secure message; The security message is sent through the specific transmission channel.

2. The method as described in claim 1, characterized in that, The subject level and the object level are obtained by classifying the core data and interactive subjects in the power system according to the power information security level protection standard. The main body is classified into H-level main body, M-level main body and L-level main body; the H-level main body includes core control node, the M-level main body includes regional control equipment, and the L-level main body includes terminal equipment; The objects are classified into H-level objects, M-level objects, and L-level objects; the H-level objects include dispatch instructions and / or relay protection settings; the M-level objects include distribution terminal status data and / or new energy grid-connected power data; and the L-level objects include electricity consumption information collection data and / or equipment operation and maintenance logs.

3. The method as described in claim 2, characterized in that, Based on the subject level of the sending end and the object level of the data to be sent, the information flow non-interference rule layer is used to add information flow tags to the data to be sent to mark the data security level, including: Based on the subject level of the sending end and the object level of the data to be sent, the data-subject-business scenario mapping table in the information flow non-interference rule layer is matched to determine that the transmission of data of the object level by the device of the subject level belongs to the legitimate data flow direction and conforms to the non-interference rule; In the information flow non-interference rule layer, information flow tags are added to the data to be sent to mark the data security level; The information flow tag occupies 2 bytes.

4. The method as described in claim 3, characterized in that, The non-interference rule includes at least one of the following: Physical layer rules: H-class objects use dedicated channels for data transmission, while M-class and L-class objects share channels but their corresponding sub-bands are independent; Data link layer rule: If, based on the data security level in the information flow label, it is determined that the subject level of the sending end is higher than that of the receiving end and there is illegal transmission, then the receiving end refuses to receive the data. Network layer rules: Allow forwarding of legitimate data flows, prohibit forwarding of illegitimate data flows; Transport layer and application layer rules: There are access control matrices for subjects and data, used to restrict cross-level access.

5. The method as described in claim 3 or 4, characterized in that, The process of utilizing the power cipher definition layer to select a power cipher compatible with the object level and encrypting the data to be sent using the power cipher to generate ciphertext includes: The scenario-based cryptographic algorithm pool in the power cryptographic definition layer is invoked to select the encryption algorithm and integrity verification algorithm for the current transmission scenario where the object data is located; The scenario key for the current transmission scenario is retrieved from the three-level key system of the power cryptography definition layer, and a session key for transmission is generated using the scenario key. In the power cryptography definition layer, the encryption algorithm and the session key are used to encrypt the data to be sent to obtain ciphertext; and based on the ciphertext, the integrity verification algorithm is used to generate a verification value.

6. The method as described in claim 5, characterized in that, The cryptographic algorithm pool includes algorithms adapted to different transmission scenarios; among them, the algorithms adapted to H-level scenarios include the SM4 symmetric encryption algorithm and the SM3 integrity verification algorithm; the algorithms adapted to M-level scenarios include the SM2 asymmetric encryption algorithm and the SM3 integrity verification algorithm; and the algorithms adapted to L-level scenarios include the lightweight SM4 encryption algorithm. The three-level key system includes a root key for H-level scenarios, a regional key for M-level scenarios, and a terminal key for L-level scenarios. The root key is stored in a hardware security module, the regional key is generated based on the root key, and the terminal key is generated based on the regional key.

7. The method as described in claim 6, characterized in that, The method of utilizing a protocol stack layered adaptation layer to direct the ciphertext to a specific transmission channel and encapsulate the ciphertext according to a set transmission protocol to form a secure message includes: In the physical layer of the protocol stack layered adaptation layer, the ciphertext is directed to a specific transmission channel, and the ciphertext is preprocessed with physical layer frame check sequence encryption. In the data link layer of the protocol stack layered adaptation layer, the information flow tag is embedded in the Ethernet frame header, and the check value is added to the Ethernet frame tail to form the encrypted data link layer frame; In the network layer of the protocol stack layered adaptation layer, the power security option header is extended, and the information flow level, the identifier of the encryption algorithm, and the index of the session key are added to the power security option header to form a network layer message; In the transport layer of the protocol stack layered adaptation layer, a mark indicating that the network layer message has passed the interference-free verification is added to the network layer message to form a transport layer message; In the application layer of the protocol stack layered adaptation layer, a security extension field is added to the transport layer message to form a secure message; the security extension field is used to indicate the result of passing the interference-free verification and that encryption has been completed.

8. A power cryptography definition protocol stack implementation system based on interference-free information flow, characterized in that, include: The layer processing module is used to add information flow tags to the data to be sent, based on the subject level of the sending end and the object level of the data to be sent, using the information flow non-interference rule layer, to mark the data security level. Using the power cipher definition layer, a power cipher that is compatible with the object level is selected, and the power cipher is used to encrypt the data to be sent to generate ciphertext; By utilizing the protocol stack layered adaptation layer, the ciphertext is directed to a specific transmission channel, and the ciphertext is encapsulated according to the set transmission protocol to form a secure message; The sending module is used to send the security message through the specific transmission channel.

9. A method for implementing a power cryptography definition protocol stack based on interference-free information flow, characterized in that, include: Based on the receiving end, the ciphertext is extracted from the received secure message by utilizing the protocol stack layered adaptation layer. Using the power cryptography definition layer, the ciphertext is decrypted and restored based on the session key adapted to the ciphertext to obtain the plaintext; By utilizing the information flow non-interference rule layer, information flow tags are removed from the plaintext to obtain the final plaintext data.

10. The method as described in claim 9, characterized in that, The step of extracting ciphertext from received secure messages using a protocol stack layered adaptation layer at the receiving end includes: The receiving end utilizes the physical layer of the protocol stack layered adaptation layer to decrypt the received security message using the frame verification sequence, thus obtaining the physical layer decrypted message. In the data link layer of the protocol stack layered adaptation layer, the information flow tag in the physical layer decryption message is extracted, and the interference-free verification is verified based on the information flow tag, and the integrity verification is performed on the verification value in the physical layer decryption message; after the verification is passed, the Ethernet frame header and Ethernet frame trailer in the physical layer decryption message are stripped to obtain the data link layer decryption message. In the network layer of the protocol stack layered adaptation layer, the power security option header in the data link layer decryption message is parsed to obtain option header information including the information flow level, the identifier of the encryption algorithm, and the index of the session key; based on the option header information, verification is performed, and after the verification passes, the network layer message is obtained; In the transport layer of the protocol stack layered adaptation layer, after reading the tag that has passed the interference-free verification, the session key is called to obtain the transport layer message; In the application layer of the protocol stack layered adaptation layer, the security extension field is parsed to determine that the transport layer message is a compliant and secure message; the security extension field of the transport layer message is stripped to obtain the ciphertext.

11. The method as described in claim 10, characterized in that, The method of using the power cryptography definition layer to decrypt and restore the ciphertext based on the session key adapted to the ciphertext to obtain the plaintext includes: In the power cryptography definition layer, the session key is invoked to decrypt and restore the ciphertext to obtain the plaintext. The ciphertext is subjected to integrity verification to obtain the integrity verification result.

12. The method as described in claim 11, characterized in that, The step of using an interference-free information flow rule layer to remove information flow tags from the plaintext to obtain the final plaintext data includes: Using the data-subject-business scenario mapping table in the information flow non-interference rule layer, it is verified that the ciphertext belongs to a legitimate data flow direction and conforms to the interference rules; Remove the information flow tags from the plaintext to obtain the final plaintext data.

13. A power cryptography definition protocol stack implementation system based on interference-free information flow, characterized in that, include: The receiving module is used to receive security messages; The layer processing module is used to extract ciphertext from the secure message based on the receiving end and by utilizing the protocol stack layer adaptation layer. Using the power cryptography definition layer, the ciphertext is decrypted and restored based on the session key adapted to the ciphertext to obtain the plaintext; By utilizing the information flow non-interference rule layer, information flow tags are removed from the plaintext to obtain the final plaintext data.

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