Control methods for fingerprint-encrypted PSSD
By integrating a fingerprint acquisition module onto the PSSD and enabling contactless fingerprint acquisition on the power button, and dynamically controlling the visibility of the security partition, the problem of requiring the user to be present to unlock the device during data transfer in existing technologies is solved. This achieves the convenience and security of contactless security control and data encryption isolation.
Patent Information
- Application Number
- CN202611551098.9
- Authority / Receiving Office
- CN · China
- Patent Type
- Applications(China)
- Current Assignee / Owner
- Filing Date
- 2026-10-08
- Publication Date
- 2026-11-17
AI Technical Summary
Existing fingerprint-encrypted PSSDs require the authorized user to be present and manually unlock them during data transfer, which is inconvenient. At the same time, removing encryption or opening the secure partition could lead to data leakage risks.
During PSSD power-on initialization, the security partition encryption key is locked and made invisible. The fingerprint is collected non-intrusively by the fingerprint acquisition module integrated into the power button, and the security partition is unlocked when a match is found. When a mismatch occurs, a temporary docking area is defined to keep the security partition encrypted and invisible. The host device is enumerated as an unencrypted storage device.
It achieves seamless security control, allowing authorized users to complete data handover without being present, ensuring secure partitioned data encryption and isolation, simplifying operation processes, and improving convenience and security.
Smart Images

Figure CN123116247A_ABST
Abstract
Description
Technical Field
[0001] This invention relates to the field of PSSD technology, specifically a control method for fingerprint-encrypted PSSD. Background Technology
[0002] Portable solid-state drives (PSSDs) are external storage devices that use flash memory as the storage medium and connect to host devices such as computers via interfaces such as USB. They are characterized by high read and write speeds, small size, and portability. Fingerprint-encrypted PSSDs integrate a fingerprint acquisition module and a hardware encryption engine into the PSSD, dividing the storage medium into a public partition and a secure partition. Data in the secure partition is stored encrypted and typically requires authorized users to authenticate via fingerprint before it can be decrypted and accessed.
[0003] When using existing fingerprint-encrypted PSSDs, unlocking the secure partition typically requires the authorized user to be present and actively perform fingerprint authentication. In daily work, when handing over the PSSD to others for data exchange, if the recipient does not have an authorized fingerprint, the user must be present to manually unlock it each time, which is inconvenient. However, if encryption is removed or the secure partition is opened for easier handover, the data within the secure partition risks being leaked.
[0004] Therefore, how to eliminate the inconvenience of manually unlocking fingerprint-encrypted PSSDs every time data is transferred, and how to achieve seamless encryption to reduce inconvenience in work, are urgent technical problems to be solved in this field. Summary of the Invention To overcome the shortcomings mentioned above, this invention aims to provide a technical solution that can solve the aforementioned problems.
[0005] To achieve the above objectives, the present invention provides the following technical solution: A control method for a fingerprint-encrypted PSSD, wherein the PSSD includes a main control chip, a fingerprint acquisition module, a hardware encryption / decryption engine, and a non-volatile storage medium, wherein the non-volatile storage medium is divided into a public partition and a secure partition, and the control method includes the following steps: S1: During power-on initialization, the main control chip sets the public partition to be visible to the host device, sets the secure partition to be invisible to the host device, and keeps the encryption key of the secure partition in a locked state; S2: During the period when the power button is triggered, the fingerprint acquisition module acquires the operator's fingerprint and compares it with the pre-stored authorized fingerprint template to obtain the comparison result; S3: When the comparison result is a match, the main control chip unlocks the encryption key of the secure partition, making the secure partition visible to the host device, while keeping the public partition readable and writable; S4: When the comparison result is a mismatch, the main control chip keeps the encryption key of the secure partition locked and invisible without sending any encryption status prompt signal to the host device, and divides a temporary docking area in the public partition for the host device to read and write, so that the host device recognizes the portable solid-state drive as an unencrypted storage device. S5: When the portable solid-state drive is disconnected from the host device or the power button is triggered again, the main control chip re-executes S1.
[0006] As a further aspect of the present invention, step S1 includes the following steps: In response to the power button being triggered, the main control chip is powered on and reset, loads firmware and initializes the interface controller, partition management module and hardware encryption / decryption engine; The main control chip reads the partition configuration table, which records the logical block address range of the public partition and the secure partition, the key identifier corresponding to the secure partition, and the storage address of the authorized fingerprint template. The main control chip reads the encrypted key ciphertext of the secure partition according to the key identifier and stores it in the hardware encryption and decryption engine, thereby keeping the encrypted key of the secure partition locked.
[0007] As a further aspect of the present invention, step S1 includes the following steps: The main control chip generates a list of logical units visible to the host device, adds the public partition to the list of visible logical units, excludes the secure partition from the list of visible logical units, and reports storage device description information containing only the public partition to the host device, so that the host device enumerates the portable solid-state drive as an unencrypted storage device with only the public partition.
[0008] As a further aspect of the present invention, step S2 includes the following steps: The main control chip waits for the fingerprint acquisition module to output the comparison result. If a matching result is received within a preset time, step S3 is executed. If a non-matching result is received or no comparison result is received within a preset time, step S4 is executed.
[0009] As a further aspect of the present invention, step S2 includes the following steps: When the operator presses the PSSD power button, the press of the power button simultaneously triggers two actions: Action 1: Trigger the main control chip to power on and reset, enabling the PSSD to start working; Action 2: Wake up the fingerprint acquisition module integrated on the surface of the power button, so that the fingerprint acquisition module enters the fingerprint acquisition preparation state, with the acquisition surface of the fingerprint acquisition module facing the pressing surface of the power button.
[0010] As a further aspect of the present invention, step S3 includes the following steps: The main control chip receives the matching result output by the fingerprint acquisition module, confirms that the current operator is a legitimate user, and stops the timer; The main control chip reads the encrypted key ciphertext of the secure partition from the key storage area of the hardware encryption and decryption engine according to the key identifier in the partition configuration table, and decrypts the encrypted key ciphertext using the root key stored inside the main control chip to obtain the plaintext encryption key of the secure partition. The main control chip loads the plaintext encryption key into its key register and enables the hardware encryption / decryption engine to establish the encryption / decryption mapping relationship between the logical block address and the physical storage block of the secure partition.
[0011] As a further aspect of the present invention, step S4 includes the following steps: The main control chip receives the mismatch result, confirms that the current operator is an unauthorized user, stops the timer, and enters the stranger processing procedure. The main control chip keeps the encryption key of the secure partition locked and the secure partition invisible, and prohibits sending any encryption status prompt signals to the host device.
[0012] As a further aspect of the present invention, step S4 includes the following steps: The main control chip allocates a temporary docking area within the logical block address range corresponding to the public partition, and the capacity of the temporary docking area does not exceed 50% of the total capacity of the public partition; The main control chip establishes and activates an address remapping table, maps the temporary docking area to a physical storage block, sets the temporary docking area to be visible and readable / writable by the host device, and sets the remaining areas of the public partition to be visible only. The main control chip maintains the reported storage device description information unchanged, enabling the host device to enumerate the portable solid-state drive as a complete unencrypted storage device.
[0013] Compared with the prior art, the beneficial effects of the present invention are as follows: By integrating the fingerprint acquisition module into the power button, fingerprint acquisition is seamlessly completed during the power-on process. When the fingerprint matches, the secure partition is unlocked while the public partition remains readable and writable. When the fingerprint does not match, the encryption key of the secure partition is locked and invisible, and no encryption status prompts are sent to the host device. At the same time, a temporary access area is designated within the public partition, ensuring that the host device always enumerates the PSSD as a complete unencrypted storage device. Thus, even without the presence of an authorized user, strangers can complete data transfer independently through the public partition and the temporary access area, while ensuring that the data in the secure partition is always stored in encrypted form and cannot be accessed by unauthorized personnel. This achieves a balance between convenient data transfer, pre-defined data integrity, secure partition confidentiality, and host device compatibility. Temporary data can be automatically cleared and the security baseline restored after use, forming a seamless encryption control loop that features default security, on-demand access, and automatic recovery. Attached Figure Description
[0014] Figure 1 This is a three-dimensional view of a structure in one embodiment of the present invention; Figure 2 This is a side view of one embodiment of the present invention; Figure 3 This is a perspective view of the power button structure in one embodiment of the present invention; Figure 4 This is another perspective view of the power button in one embodiment of the present invention; Figure 5 This is a schematic diagram of each partition in this invention; The reference numerals and names in the figure are as follows: Power button - a, Physical button assembly - b, Fingerprint acquisition module - c, Non-volatile storage medium - A, Public partition - B, Security partition - C, Temporary docking area - D. Detailed Implementation
[0015] The technical solutions of the embodiments of the present invention will be clearly and completely described below with reference to the accompanying drawings. Obviously, the described embodiments are only some embodiments of the present invention, and not all embodiments. Based on the embodiments of the present invention, all other embodiments obtained by those skilled in the art without creative effort are within the scope of protection of the present invention.
[0016] Please see Figure 1-5 A control method for a fingerprint-encrypted PSSD, wherein the PSSD includes a main control chip, a fingerprint acquisition module, a hardware encryption / decryption engine, and a non-volatile storage medium, wherein the non-volatile storage medium is divided into a public partition and a secure partition, and the control method includes the following steps: S1: When the PSSD is powered on and initialized, the main control chip sets the public partition to be visible to the host device, sets the secure partition to be invisible to the host device, and keeps the encryption key of the secure partition in a locked state; S2: The fingerprint acquisition module is integrated into the power button of the PSSD. During the period when the power button of the PSSD is triggered, the fingerprint image of the operator is acquired, and the acquired fingerprint image is compared with the authorized fingerprint template pre-stored in the non-volatile storage medium to obtain the comparison result. S3: When the comparison result is a match, the main control chip unlocks the encryption key of the secure partition, sets the secure partition to be visible to the host device, and maintains the read and write state of the previously written docking data in the public partition, so that the host device displays the public partition and the secure partition at the same time. S4: When the comparison result is a mismatch, the main control chip automatically performs the following operations without issuing any encryption status prompt signal to the host device: a) keeping the encryption key of the secure partition locked and keeping the secure partition invisible; b) dividing a temporary docking area in a specified region of the logical address space of the non-volatile storage medium, mapping the temporary docking area to a preset independent sub-region in the public partition, setting the temporary docking area to be visible to the host device and readable and writable, and setting the remaining areas in the public partition other than the temporary docking area to be visible to the host device, so that the host device presents a complete unencrypted storage device; S5: When the portable solid-state drive disconnects from the host device or the power button is triggered again, S1 is executed again; This invention revolves around the core logic of "fingerprint collection upon power-on, identity verification driving partition state switching, and silent isolation for strangers." Its hardware foundation consists of a portable solid-state drive (PSSD) containing a main control chip, a fingerprint acquisition module, a hardware encryption / decryption engine, and a non-volatile storage medium. The non-volatile storage medium is divided into a public partition and a secure partition. The public partition stores publicly accessible data, while the secure partition stores confidential data. Data in the secure partition is always stored in encrypted form, and its accessibility depends on whether the encryption key is unlocked. When the visibility of the secure partition changes, the main control chip sends a simulated USB re-enumeration (plug-and-play) to the host via the interface controller, causing the host to reread the storage device description information and logical unit list, thereby dynamically refreshing the visibility or hiding of the secure partition without exposing the encryption state. S1 is power-on initialization, establishing a security baseline. During PSSD power-on initialization, the main control chip first sets the public partition to be visible to the host device and the secure partition to be invisible to the host device, and keeps the encryption key of the secure partition locked. At this time, the PSSD enumerated by the host device only appears as an ordinary unencrypted storage device with a public partition. Although the secure partition physically exists in the non-volatile storage medium, its logical unit does not participate in the host enumeration, and the host device cannot perceive its existence through the standard storage device enumeration process. Since the encryption key of the secure partition is locked, even if someone bypasses the main control chip and directly reads the storage medium, what they get is only encrypted data. S2 collects and compares fingerprints during the power button press, such as... Figure 1 and 2 As shown, a power button a is installed on the PSSD casing, as... Figure 3 and 4 The power button a integrates a physical button component b and a fingerprint acquisition module c. When the operator presses the power button a, the physical button component b performs the power-on action while the fingerprint acquisition module c performs fingerprint acquisition, so that the power-on action and the fingerprint acquisition action are triggered synchronously. The fingerprint acquisition module acquires the operator's fingerprint image and compares it with the authorized fingerprint template pre-stored in the non-volatile storage medium, and outputs the comparison result of matching or not matching. This process does not require the operator to perform additional fingerprint authentication. Both legitimate users and strangers complete fingerprint acquisition during the natural pressing of the power button. The comparison result determines whether to enter the legitimate user processing branch or the stranger processing branch. S3 is the legitimate user processing branch during fingerprint matching. When the comparison result is a match, the main control chip confirms that the current operator is a legitimate user, and then unlocks the encryption key of the secure partition, sets the secure partition to be visible to the host device, and maintains the read and write state of the previously written docking data in the public partition. At this time, the host device displays both the public partition and the secure partition. Legitimate users can access the docking data in the public partition, and can also transparently read and write the encrypted data in the secure partition through the hardware encryption and decryption engine. The docking data in the public partition does not change due to the unlocking of the secure partition, and legitimate users can still carry out data exchange or daily use normally. S4 is the silent handling branch for fingerprint mismatches. When the comparison result is a mismatch, the main control chip enters the stranger access handling process. Its key features are "silence" and "isolation": First, the main control chip does not send any encryption status indication signals to the host device. That is, it does not change the USB descriptor, send SCSI Unit Attention or media change notifications, change the capacity or number of logical units in the device enumeration information, or drive any indicator lights, buzzers, or vibrators indicating encryption status, fingerprint recognition status, or the existence of a secure partition. The host device cannot perceive the existence of the secure partition or the occurrence of encryption behavior from either the enumeration information or external indications. Second, the main control chip keeps the encryption key of the secure partition locked and maintains the secure partition in an invisible state. Therefore, the data within the secure partition continues to be stored in encrypted form, and strangers cannot access it. Third, if... Figure 5 As shown, the main control chip divides a temporary docking region D in the logical address space of the non-volatile storage medium A. This temporary docking region D is mapped to a preset independent sub-region in the public partition B and is set to be visible to and readable and writable by the host device. At the same time, the other regions in the public partition B, except for the temporary docking region, are also set to be visible to the host device. In this way, the host device still sees a complete, unencrypted storage device. Strangers can read the data exchanged in the public partition and read and write in the temporary docking region, but cannot access the secure partition C. The public partition can be pre-placed with the data to be connected. The main control chip designates a temporary connection area to limit the data written by strangers to a controllable range. After disconnection or re-triggering the power button, the data in the temporary connection area is saved to an independent sub-area of the public partition. Before handing over, legitimate users will pre-place the data to be connected in the public partition. This data is what legitimate users want strangers to see, but do not want to be deleted, tampered with, or overwritten by strangers. If strangers are allowed to read and write freely in the entire public partition, they may accidentally delete or maliciously modify this preset data. The purpose of the temporary connection area is to restrict the write operations of strangers to an independent area, protecting the preset data in the public partition from being affected. Strangers or colleagues can copy the preset data to the temporary connection area, modify it, and then save it back to the temporary connection area (i.e., an independent sub-area of the public partition), but they cannot arbitrarily modify the original data in the public partition. S5 is the recovery after use ends; when the PSSD is disconnected from the host device, or the power button is triggered again, the main control chip will re-execute S1, thereby keeping the security partition encryption key locked, and restoring the visibility status of the public and security partitions to the initial baseline; the next time it is used, the PSSD starts from S1 again, and decides whether to enter the legitimate user branch or the stranger branch based on the new fingerprint comparison result. This invention does not re-encrypt all data when a stranger uses it. Instead, it leverages the characteristic of secure partition data being "always stored in encrypted form and the key always lockable." It controls whether the key is unlocked and whether the secure partition is visible through fingerprint comparison results, and provides a temporary access area for data transfer when others use it. This achieves seamless security control where "legitimate users have full access, strangers can only access public / temporary areas, and the secure partition automatically maintains encrypted isolation." This "seamless" feature can avoid resistance or curiosity from colleagues. First, this solution eliminates the hassle of the authorized user manually unlocking the device during data transfer. Existing fingerprint-encrypted PSSDs typically require the authorized user's presence for fingerprint authentication before data transfer can be used by others. In this solution, the authorized user only needs to place the data to be transferred into the public partition beforehand. When a stranger uses the device, the authorized user's presence and manual unlocking are unnecessary. If the fingerprint does not match when a stranger presses the power button, the PSSD automatically enters the stranger's processing branch, and the public partition and temporary transfer area can still be read normally, thus successfully completing the data transfer. During the stranger's use, the encryption key of the secure partition remains locked, and the secure partition remains invisible to the host device. The stranger cannot access the secure partition through the host device, nor can they detect its existence through the standard storage device enumeration process. Even if a stranger attempts to read the non-volatile storage medium through other means, they will only obtain encrypted data. Therefore, the convenience of data transfer does not come at the expense of the security of the secure partition's data. Secondly, it achieves "seamless encryption." When the fingerprint does not match, this solution does not send any encryption status prompt signal to the host device, does not change the device enumeration information, and does not drive any indicator lights, buzzers, or vibrators that indicate encryption or fingerprint recognition status. Strangers see a complete, unencrypted ordinary storage device and cannot perceive the existence of the secure partition, nor can they perceive that they are being fingerprinted and identified. This "seamless" characteristic avoids the resistance or curiosity of strangers and reduces their motivation to try to crack or attack the secure partition. Secondly, it is easy to operate and conforms to daily usage habits. The fingerprint collection module is integrated into the power button. Pressing the power button will simultaneously complete the power-on and fingerprint collection, without requiring users to perform additional fingerprint authentication. Both legitimate users and strangers can operate it in the same way as ordinary external hard drives, without needing to learn a new authentication process. Legitimate users are granted full access rights, while strangers are granted public / temporary area access rights, resulting in a natural and smooth user experience. In summary, this invention, through its control logic of "unlocking the secure partition when the fingerprint matches and silently locking the secure partition and opening a temporary area when the fingerprint does not match," ensures both the convenience of data transfer and the encrypted isolation of secure partition data without requiring the presence of the legitimate user. This transforms the traditional fingerprint-encrypted PSSD usage mode, which requires the user to be present to manually unlock, into a seamless security mode where the user can be absent, the device automatically identifies the user, secure data is automatically encrypted and isolated, and data transfer can be read and written normally.
[0017] In this embodiment of the invention, step S1 includes the following steps: In response to the power button of the portable solid-state drive being triggered, the main control chip is powered on and reset, loads firmware from the firmware storage area of the non-volatile storage medium, and initializes the interface controller, partition management module and hardware encryption / decryption engine. The main control chip reads the partition configuration table from the metadata area of the non-volatile storage medium. The partition configuration table records at least the logical block address range of the public partition, the logical block address range of the secure partition, the key identifier corresponding to the secure partition, and the storage address of the authorized fingerprint template. The main control chip reads the encrypted key ciphertext of the secure partition from the key storage area of the non-volatile storage medium according to the key identifier, and stores the encrypted key ciphertext in the key storage area of the hardware encryption and decryption engine, so that the encryption key of the secure partition remains in a locked state. The interface controller is used to communicate with the host device using protocols such as USB. It is responsible for descriptor reporting, logical unit management, and data transmission. The partition management module is used to maintain the mapping relationship between logical block addresses and physical storage blocks, and to manage the boundary between public and secure partitions. The hardware encryption and decryption engine is used to transparently encrypt and decrypt data in the secure partition. This step provides the operational foundation for subsequent partition configuration and key management. The partition configuration table is equivalent to the partition map and key index inside the PSSD. By reading this table, the main control chip can determine which logical block addresses belong to the public partition, which belong to the secure partition, as well as the storage location of the secure partition encryption key and the reading location of the authorized fingerprint template. This step ensures that subsequent operations are based on evidence and do not depend on instructions issued by the host device. The main control chip reads the encrypted key ciphertext of the secure partition from the key storage area of the non-volatile storage medium according to the key identifier in the partition configuration table. This encrypted key ciphertext is usually encrypted and protected by the root key inside the main control chip. The main control chip keeps the encrypted key ciphertext in the key storage area of the hardware encryption and decryption engine, but performs the following two key controls: First, it does not load the decrypted encryption key into the key register of the main control chip; second, it does not enable the decryption channel of the hardware encryption and decryption engine for the secure partition. The main control chip does not write an enable signal to the hardware encryption and decryption engine to activate the decryption channel. At this time, even if the encrypted key ciphertext of the secure partition already exists in the key storage area of the engine, the engine will not decrypt the data of the secure partition because the decryption function of the engine is not "enabled" to work. Therefore, the encryption key of the secure partition remains locked. Although the hardware encryption and decryption engine holds the encrypted key ciphertext, it cannot perform decryption operations on the secure partition. Even if the host device attempts to read the logical block address corresponding to the secure partition, the hardware encryption and decryption engine cannot return plaintext data. This step achieves key locking by "key not loading, channel not enabling" rather than simply relying on software flags, thus providing high security.
[0018] In this embodiment of the invention, step S1 includes the following steps: The main control chip generates a list of logical units visible to the host device based on the partition configuration table, adds the logical unit number corresponding to the public partition to the list of visible logical units, and excludes the logical unit number corresponding to the secure partition from the list of visible logical units. The main control chip reports storage device description information containing only the public partition to the host device through the interface controller. The storage device description information includes configuration descriptor, interface descriptor, endpoint descriptor and capacity information. The capacity information corresponds only to the public partition, so that the host device enumerates the portable solid-state drive as an unencrypted storage device with only the public partition, and the host device cannot detect the existence of the secure partition through the standard storage device enumeration process. The main control chip generates a list of logical units visible to the host device based on the partition configuration table. The list of logical units is the basis for the host device to identify accessible storage units when enumerating the PSSD. The main control chip adds the logical unit number corresponding to the public partition to the list of visible logical units, and at the same time excludes the logical unit number corresponding to the secure partition from the list of visible logical units. As a result, when the host device enumerates the PSSD, it can only see the logical units corresponding to the public partition and cannot see the logical units corresponding to the secure partition. Although the secure partition physically exists in the non-volatile storage medium, it is completely hidden at the logical unit level. This step achieves partition visibility control by adding and deleting logical units, without modifying the host-side driver or operating system settings. In one embodiment, the temporary area is limited to a pre-set independent partition / LUN or a pre-set directory mount point to avoid dynamically modifying the block mapping of the mounted file system. The main control chip reports storage device description information to the host device through the interface controller. This storage device description information includes configuration descriptors, interface descriptors, endpoint descriptors, and capacity information. Among them, the capacity information only corresponds to the public partition and does not include the capacity of the secure partition. Based on the above description information, the host device enumerates the PSSD as an unencrypted storage device with only a public partition. The host device cannot perceive the existence of the secure partition through the standard storage device enumeration process, nor can it infer from the descriptor or capacity information that there is an encrypted secure partition inside the PSSD. This step ensures that the secure partition is completely invisible to the host device in the initial stage of power-on, thereby preventing strangers from discovering the existence of the secure partition through the host device. Strangers see a complete, unencrypted ordinary storage device and cannot perceive the existence of the secure partition, nor can they perceive that they are being fingerprinted and identified. This "unobtrusive" characteristic avoids the resistance or curiosity of strangers and reduces their motivation to try to crack or attack the secure partition.
[0019] In this embodiment of the invention, step S2 includes the following steps: After completing the above initialization, the main control chip enters the state of waiting for the fingerprint acquisition module to output the comparison result and starts the timer; if a matching result is received within the preset time, step S3 is executed; if a non-matching result is received or no comparison result is received within the preset time, step S4 is executed. After completing the above initialization, the main control chip enters the state of waiting for the fingerprint acquisition module to output the comparison result and starts the timer. At this time, the PSSD is already in the secure baseline state: the public partition is visible and readable, and the secure partition is invisible and the encryption key is locked. If a matching result is received within the preset time, the main control chip executes step S3, enters the legitimate user processing branch, unlocks the security partition and makes it visible. If a non-matching result is received within the preset time, or no comparison result is received (e.g., fingerprint acquisition failure, finger not pressed in place, fingerprint module failure, etc.), the main control chip executes step S4, enters the stranger processing branch, keeps the security partition locked and invisible, and opens the temporary docking area. The key to this step is that the default state is secure, and the secure partition is only opened when a matching result is clearly received; any uncertain situation will be directed to the stranger processing branch, thereby avoiding the secure partition being opened unexpectedly due to abnormal fingerprint collection or timeout.
[0020] In this embodiment of the invention, step S2 includes the following steps: When the operator presses the PSSD power button, the press of the power button simultaneously triggers two actions: Action 1: Trigger the main control chip to power on and reset, enabling the PSSD to start working; The second action involves activating the fingerprint sensor module integrated into the power button surface, putting it into fingerprint acquisition preparation mode. The fingerprint sensor module is preferably a capacitive fingerprint sensor array, with its acquisition surface facing the pressing surface of the power button. Using the fingerprint acquisition module integrated into the PSSD power button, the fingerprint image acquisition, preprocessing, quality assessment, liveness detection, feature extraction and similarity comparison are completed simultaneously when the operator presses the power button to power on the device, and finally the matching or non-matching comparison results are output. This process does not require the operator to perform additional fingerprint authentication actions, nor does it require the host device to participate, and is completely completed by the PSSD itself. When the operator presses the power button of the PSSD, the pressing stroke of the power button triggers two actions simultaneously: first, the physical button component b triggers the switch button to power on and reset the main control chip, enabling the PSSD to start working; second, it wakes up the fingerprint collection module integrated on the surface of the power button, putting it into the fingerprint collection preparation state. The fingerprint collection module is preferably a capacitive fingerprint sensor array, with its collection surface facing the pressing surface of the power button. Therefore, when the operator's finger presses the power button, it naturally covers the collection surface. This step combines "powering on" and "fingerprint collection" into one, making fingerprint collection a natural part of the power-on action. The operator does not need to place their finger on a separate fingerprint sensor, thus achieving contactless collection. During the period when the finger is continuously pressed on the power button, the fingerprint acquisition module continuously acquires multiple frames of fingerprint images at a preset acquisition rate until the finger leaves the power button or the preset number of frames are acquired. Since the finger pressing time is usually hundreds of milliseconds to several seconds, acquiring multiple frames of images can provide more data for subsequent processing and improve the fingerprint image quality. If the number of frames acquired is less than the preset number of frames, it indicates that the finger pressing time is too short or the acquisition is abnormal. In this case, the result of no valid fingerprint was acquired is output, and step S4 is executed. To eliminate the timing conflict caused by the need to complete fingerprint comparison immediately upon pressing the power button, a prompt message can be added to the terminal device: "Press the power button for x seconds to power on the PSSD." This clearly indicates that the operator needs to continuously press and hold the PSSD power button for a preset duration (e.g., x=2) to trigger the boot process. During this continuous press, the PSSD main control chip has sufficient time to complete power-on reset, firmware loading, interface controller / partition management module / hardware encryption / decryption engine initialization, non-volatile storage media access, partition configuration table and authorized fingerprint template reading, and simultaneously... The fingerprint acquisition module can continuously acquire multiple frames of fingerprint images and complete preprocessing, feature extraction, and comparison, thereby enabling power-on initialization, storage access, and fingerprint authentication to be seamlessly integrated in time. The main control chip executes S3 to unlock the security partition only when the pressure is continuously pressed for a preset duration and the comparison result is a match. If the preset duration is not reached, the pressure is released midway, or the comparison result is a mismatch / no valid fingerprint is obtained, S4 is executed to enter the stranger silent processing flow, thus providing a reliable time window for system initialization and fingerprint comparison without adding extra authentication operations.
[0021] In this embodiment of the invention, step S3 includes the following steps: The main control chip receives the matching result output by the fingerprint acquisition module, confirms that the current operator is a legitimate user, and stops the timer; The main control chip reads the encrypted key ciphertext of the secure partition from the key storage area of the hardware encryption and decryption engine according to the key identifier in the partition configuration table, and decrypts the encrypted key ciphertext using the root key stored inside the main control chip to obtain the plaintext encryption key of the secure partition. The main control chip loads the plaintext encryption key into the key register of the main control chip, and enables the hardware encryption and decryption engine to establish the encryption and decryption mapping relationship between the logical block address and the physical storage block of the secure partition. The main control chip receives the matching result output by the fingerprint acquisition module. This matching result means that the current operator has been confirmed as a legitimate user. The main control chip then stops the timer started in S1 to prevent the timer from erroneously entering the stranger processing branch after it expires. This step is the entry point of the entire legitimate user processing branch, ensuring that subsequent operations are only performed when there is a clear match. Based on the key identifier recorded in the partition configuration table read from S1, the main control chip reads the encrypted key ciphertext of the secure partition from the key storage area of the hardware encryption / decryption engine. This encrypted key ciphertext has been stored in the key storage area of the hardware encryption / decryption engine in S1, but it has not been decrypted or loaded. At this time, the main control chip uses its internally stored root key to decrypt the encrypted key ciphertext, obtaining the plaintext encryption key of the secure partition. The "ciphertext storage, root key decryption" method used here means that the encryption key of the security partition is not stored in plaintext form in a non-volatile storage medium for a long time. Even if an attacker disassembles the storage medium, they can only obtain the ciphertext of the encryption key. The root key is stored inside the main control chip and is not output to the outside. This step is only performed after the legitimate user's fingerprint is matched, which avoids the key being decrypted in an unauthorized state. The main control chip loads the decrypted plaintext encryption key into its key register and enables the hardware encryption / decryption engine to access the decryption and encryption channels of the secure partition. Simultaneously, it establishes an encryption / decryption mapping between the logical block address of the secure partition and the physical storage block. Therefore, when the host device subsequently initiates read / write operations on the secure partition, the hardware encryption / decryption engine automatically encrypts the data written to the secure partition and decrypts the data read from it. Authorized users can transparently access the plaintext data in the secure partition without manually entering a password or performing additional encryption / decryption operations. The key is only loaded into the key register and not written to non-volatile storage media. Furthermore, the encryption and decryption are performed by the hardware engine, transparent to the host device, ensuring security without significantly impacting read / write performance.
[0022] In this embodiment of the invention, step S4 includes the following steps: The main control chip receives the mismatch result, confirms that the current operator is an unauthorized user, stops the timer, and enters the stranger processing procedure. The main control chip keeps the encryption key of the secure partition locked and the secure partition invisible, and prohibits sending any encryption status prompt signals to the host device; The main control chip allocates a temporary docking area within the logical block address range corresponding to the public partition, and the capacity of the temporary docking area does not exceed 50% of the total capacity of the public partition; The main control chip establishes and activates an address remapping table, maps the temporary docking area to a physical storage block, sets the temporary docking area to be visible and readable / writable by the host device, and sets the remaining areas of the public partition to be visible only. The main control chip maintains the reported storage device description information unchanged, so that the host device enumerates the portable solid-state drive as a complete unencrypted storage device; The public partition pre-stores the data that legitimate users wish to transfer. Setting the remaining areas of the public partition to visible only means that strangers can read this data but cannot write, modify, or delete it. Therefore, even if a stranger accidentally or maliciously manipulates the data, the pre-set data transfer will not be damaged, and the original content of the data transfer is protected. The temporary docking area is set to be visible and readable and writable. Strangers can write back data, supplementary files or temporary data in this area. Therefore, the data exchange is not a one-way read-only exchange, but a two-way exchange mode of "preset data is readable and back data is writable", which takes into account the data exchange needs in actual work scenarios.
[0023] By setting the remaining areas of the public partition to visible only and the temporary access area to read and write, the main control chip achieves the separation of read and write permissions within the same public partition. Unauthorized personnel can only read the preset data and write data to the temporary area. They cannot modify the preset data or write data to the area where the preset data is located. This separation of permissions is not visible from the perspective of the host device, but it is precisely controlled inside the main control chip through the address remapping table, which improves security and controllability. During the stranger handling process, the encryption key for the secure partition remains locked and the secure partition is not visible. No encryption status prompts are allowed. Even if a stranger can read and write the temporary access area, the data in the secure partition is still stored in encrypted form, and the security of confidential data is not reduced due to the transfer of data. The main control chip maintains the reported storage device description information unchanged, enabling the host device to enumerate the portable solid-state drive as a complete unencrypted storage device. Strangers see an ordinary portable hard drive, which can read preset data and write data to temporary areas without being aware of the existence of the secure partition.
[0024] In one embodiment, the public partition is mounted as a whole in read-only mode in stranger mode, and the temporary connection area is made into an independent read-write logical unit (LUN) or independent partition. The host sees a normal dual-partition unencrypted storage device. The partition where the data is located is read-only, and the temporary swap partition is writable, thereby avoiding conflicts between metadata and read / write permissions within the same file system, and no special driver is required. In one embodiment, ordinary unencrypted storage devices are typically read-write by default. After power-on, the public partition is first mounted in read-only or with delayed write access. Write permissions are then determined after identity verification is completed. This avoids the situation where the host may have already enumerated and mounted the public partition during the time window of S2 fingerprint collection and comparison and S1 waiting for comparison results. Strangers may write, delete, or format the public partition before S4 restricts write access.
[0025] The capacity of the temporary access area shall not exceed 50% of the total capacity of the public partition. Even if a stranger writes a large amount of data, it will not fill the entire public partition. The area where the data is located will still have enough space to remain visible and readable, thus preventing the temporary data from growing indefinitely.
[0026] When the PSSD is disconnected from the host or the power button is triggered again, the main control chip first suspends and completes the in-transit I / O of the secure partition, refreshes the secure partition write cache and mapping table to the non-volatile storage medium, and waits for the hardware encryption / decryption engine queue to be cleared. Then, it clears the plaintext encryption key in the main control chip's key register, disables the hardware encryption / decryption engine's decryption and encryption channels for the secure partition, and deletes or invalidates the encryption / decryption mapping relationship between the secure partition's logical block address and the physical storage block. Finally, it removes the secure partition from the list of logical units visible to the host and reports the media change / re-enumeration, so that the host no longer displays the secure partition. At this point, the encrypted key of the security partition is only stored in the non-volatile key storage area or the engine key storage area, but it is not decrypted or loaded into the key register, and the key copy and temporary state in memory are cleared. After the above security lock is completed, the initial baseline setting of S1 is executed to ensure that the security partition truly returns to the state of "key locked, invisible, encrypted storage" regardless of whether the device is powered off. If the power button is triggered again but the power is not turned off, the firmware should capture the event and execute the above soft lock process. If the power is turned off directly, the cache is flushed by power failure detection and energy storage capacitor, and the contents of the key register are naturally cleared when the power is turned off.
[0027] It will be apparent to those skilled in the art that the present invention is not limited to the details of the exemplary embodiments described above, and that the invention can be implemented in other specific forms without departing from its spirit or essential characteristics. Therefore, the embodiments should be considered in all respects as exemplary and non-limiting, and the scope of the invention is defined by the appended claims rather than the foregoing description. Thus, all variations falling within the meaning and scope of equivalents of the claims are intended to be included within the present invention. No reference numerals in the claims should be construed as limiting the scope of the claims.
Claims
1. A control method for fingerprint-encrypted PSSD, characterized in that, A control method for a fingerprint-encrypted PSSD, wherein the PSSD includes a main control chip, a fingerprint acquisition module, a hardware encryption / decryption engine, and a non-volatile storage medium, wherein the non-volatile storage medium is divided into a public partition and a secure partition, and the control method includes the following steps: S1: During power-on initialization, the main control chip sets the public partition to be visible to the host device, sets the secure partition to be invisible to the host device, and keeps the encryption key of the secure partition in a locked state; S2: During the period when the power button is triggered, the fingerprint acquisition module acquires the operator's fingerprint and compares it with the pre-stored authorized fingerprint template to obtain the comparison result; S3: When the comparison result is a match, the main control chip unlocks the encryption key of the secure partition, making the secure partition visible to the host device, while keeping the public partition readable and writable; S4: When the comparison result is a mismatch, the main control chip keeps the encryption key of the secure partition locked and invisible without sending any encryption status prompt signal to the host device, and divides a temporary docking area in the public partition for the host device to read and write, so that the host device recognizes the portable solid-state drive as an unencrypted storage device. S5: When the portable solid-state drive is disconnected from the host device or the power button is triggered again, the main control chip re-executes S1.
2. The control method for fingerprint-encrypted PSSD according to claim 1, characterized in that, Step S1 includes the following steps: In response to the power button being triggered, the main control chip is powered on and reset, loads firmware and initializes the interface controller, partition management module and hardware encryption / decryption engine; The main control chip reads the partition configuration table, which records the logical block address range of the public partition and the secure partition, the key identifier corresponding to the secure partition, and the storage address of the authorized fingerprint template. The main control chip reads the encrypted key ciphertext of the secure partition according to the key identifier and stores it in the hardware encryption and decryption engine, thereby keeping the encrypted key of the secure partition locked.
3. The control method for fingerprint-encrypted PSSD according to claim 2, characterized in that, Step S1 includes the following steps: The main control chip generates a list of logical units visible to the host device, adds the public partition to the list of visible logical units, excludes the secure partition from the list of visible logical units, and reports storage device description information containing only the public partition to the host device, so that the host device enumerates the portable solid-state drive as an unencrypted storage device with only the public partition.
4. The control method for fingerprint-encrypted PSSD according to claim 3, characterized in that, Step S2 includes the following steps: The main control chip waits for the fingerprint acquisition module to output the comparison result. If a matching result is received within a preset time, step S3 is executed. If a non-matching result is received or no comparison result is received within a preset time, step S4 is executed.
5. The control method for fingerprint-encrypted PSSD according to claim 4, characterized in that, Step S2 includes the following steps: When the operator presses the PSSD power button, the press of the power button simultaneously triggers two actions: Action 1: Trigger the main control chip to power on and reset, enabling the PSSD to start working; Action 2: Wake up the fingerprint acquisition module integrated on the surface of the power button, so that the fingerprint acquisition module enters the fingerprint acquisition preparation state, with the acquisition surface of the fingerprint acquisition module facing the pressing surface of the power button.
6. The control method for fingerprint-encrypted PSSD according to claim 5, characterized in that, Step S3 includes the following steps: The main control chip receives the matching result output by the fingerprint acquisition module, confirms that the current operator is a legitimate user, and stops the timer; The main control chip reads the encrypted key ciphertext of the secure partition from the key storage area of the hardware encryption and decryption engine according to the key identifier in the partition configuration table, and decrypts the encrypted key ciphertext using the root key stored inside the main control chip to obtain the plaintext encryption key of the secure partition. The main control chip loads the plaintext encryption key into its key register and enables the hardware encryption / decryption engine to establish the encryption / decryption mapping relationship between the logical block address and the physical storage block of the secure partition.
7. The control method for fingerprint-encrypted PSSD according to claim 6, characterized in that, Step S4 includes the following steps: The main control chip receives the mismatch result, confirms that the current operator is an unauthorized user, stops the timer, and enters the stranger processing procedure. The main control chip keeps the encryption key of the secure partition locked and the secure partition invisible, and prohibits sending any encryption status prompt signals to the host device.
8. The control method for fingerprint-encrypted PSSD according to claim 7, characterized in that, Step S4 includes the following steps: The main control chip allocates a temporary docking area within the logical block address range corresponding to the public partition, and the capacity of the temporary docking area does not exceed 50% of the total capacity of the public partition; The main control chip establishes and activates an address remapping table, maps the temporary docking area to a physical storage block, sets the temporary docking area to be visible and readable / writable by the host device, and sets the remaining areas of the public partition to be visible only. The main control chip maintains the reported storage device description information unchanged, enabling the host device to enumerate the portable solid-state drive as a complete unencrypted storage device.
